

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1993


Mr. Daniel Yankelovich
21 Holiday Point Road
Sherman, CT 06784

Dear Mr. Yankelovich:

Thank you for your materials on health care. I have shared a copy with the First Lady and Ira Magaziner.

I will be in touch soon.

Sincerely,



Maggie Williams
Chief of Staff to the First Lady

THE PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION



Forwarded
to
Ira Magaziner

May 24, 1993

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Ms. Margaret A. Williams
Assistant to the President and
Chief of Staff to the First Lady
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Williams:

I enjoyed the chance to chat with you after our meeting on Friday. There are several ways I would like to follow up. One is to send the materials I mentioned that elaborate the concept of a national dialogue on health care. I have enclosed multiple copies so that you can share them with the First Lady, Ira Magaziner, and others as you see fit. Here's what you'll find enclosed:

- The February 1 memorandum to President Clinton from David Mathews and myself outlines a proposal for launching nonpartisan citizen discussions on issues of preeminent importance to the Administration — health care, the deficit, and welfare reform. The discussions would be designed to enhance public understanding and promote a constructive, fair-minded debate.
- The Fortune Magazine article explains a little more about the stages of public opinion using health care as the main example.
- The American Assembly chapter (from an upcoming book on foreign policy) applies my ideas about how public opinion develops to foreign policy issues and posits "rules of public engagement" for each stage of public opinion.
- The February 11 memorandum to Mack McLarty suggests several ways that President Clinton might strengthen his use of town hall meetings to promote greater public understanding of issues like health care and the economy.

I was struck by the First Lady's comment in our Friday meeting that she does not want the announcement of the health care reform package to be the "high point" of the national debate. One way to lessen this possibility would be to announce — right at the beginning when the plan is unveiled — a specific period of public discussion and deliberation. In a sense, I am suggesting that the Administration plan for two phases of national debate: an initial announcement phase and a second, more extended public discussion phase.

In the first phase, I know that the Administration plans to launch a series of activities to promote its health care plan. Americans will want to hear — and deserve to hear — the reasoning behind the plan, and this is entirely appropriate. But our experience in public debate has taught us that "selling" the public doesn't engage people nearly as effectively as other forms of communication where people have the chance to think through a problem for themselves.

It may therefore be useful to plan for another kind of discussion — a nonpartisan citizen discussion that gives Americans the opportunity to look at a range of choices for addressing this issue. As I point out in the enclosed American Assembly chapter, research on public thinking about scores of public policy issues shows that presenting choices — and letting people wrestle with the pros and cons themselves — is a far better method for advancing understanding and promoting consensus than merely laying out the arguments for a single solution. President Reagan's experience with catastrophic care suggests just how prickly and unpredictable health care legislation can be without a strong, stable consensus to back it, a consensus based on broad public understanding and real deliberation.

My colleagues at Public Agenda and the Kettering Foundation have already been at work promoting nonpartisan citizen "choicework" on health care on a small scale. But they are, as the enclosed memorandum from David Mathews and myself suggests, eager to play a constructive role in the upcoming national debate on the health care issue.

I have asked my Public Agenda/Kettering associates to elaborate the "national dialogue" concept in the form of a draft announcement the First Lady could make if she is persuaded that this approach is necessary to forming a national consensus. If she likes the idea, this will give her something concrete to use in discussion with her associates.

There are two other ways I plan to follow up our Friday meeting. One is to send a fax to the First Lady answering a specific public opinion question she raised on Friday, and the second is to set up a meeting between some of my associates and your own opinion research people. If, in the meantime, you would like additional copies of the enclosed materials — or if you have questions and I cannot be reached immediately — please call Deborah Wadsworth or Jean Johnson at Public Agenda (212-686-6610). They would be happy to help you.

With best regards,



Daniel Yankelovich
President
Public Agenda Foundation

P.S. My recent book, *Coming to Public Judgment*, also explores these issues in greater detail, and Deborah or Jean can get copies to you quickly if that would be useful.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ina from
Fy! Dan
Yankelovich

DANIEL YANKELOVICH

February 11, 1992

To: "Mack" McLarty
From: Dan Yankelovich
Re: Future Town Meetings

There is a serious flaw in the "town meeting" format the President used last night in Detroit. I am taking the liberty of identifying it because so much is at stake in developing a sound method for engaging the public.

The flaw is this: the kinds of questions people asked were exactly the same questions interests groups ask: what are you planning to do about my joblessness, my illness, my taxes, my relatives in Haiti and Croatia? In effect, people are saying, "How are you going to address *my* needs?"

This format worked splendidly in the campaign. It exhibited the President's gift of empathy and his mastery of the issues. It served his purposes as a candidate. It does not serve his purposes as President, for two reasons.

The first is that it reinforces the public mindset that dominated the 1970s and 1980s: "What have you done for me lately?" In a subtle way, it sends the message that the proper role of the public is to assert its rights and entitlements, and the proper role of government is to cater to them. The mood thus created is the very opposite of what the President wants to encourage, namely, a new focus on the need for reciprocity, responsibility and even sacrifice for the common good. It undercuts the President in ways that are bound to create disillusionment.

The second — and more serious — flaw is that the format fails to engage the public in a genuine dialogue on how to solve problems rather than create new ones. The President says he wants people's ideas, but the format invites their demands, not their ideas. To solve this problem you need to set a specific agenda for the town meetings. For example, the President might say, "Here are three choices for reducing the deficit, with their pros and cons. What do you think?" Or, "Here are several choices for treating older patients with terminal cancer — which best combines compassion with common sense?" In our work at the Public Agenda and Kettering Foundation, we find that this format works wonderfully well. It elicits the public's thoughtfulness rather than its wish list; it makes people feel like citizens rather than subjects of a benevolent, but ineffective government.

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To: President Clinton
From: David Mathews and Daniel Yankelovich
Date: February 1, 1993
Subject: National Dialogues

You have often stated that an objective of your Administration will be to reach out to people and seek to close the gap that separates the American public from its leadership.

We represent two foundations whose main work in recent years has been dedicated to this task. Based on our experience, we have prepared for your consideration a plan for "National Dialogues" on urgent issues — in particular on rising health care costs. This issue requires a considerable measure of public consensus in order for a legislative plan to be implemented. You will recall that the Reagan Administration's Catastrophic Health Care Bill was recalled and defeated because of lack of public understanding and support.

Ideally, the dialogue on health care can be the basis for a series of National Dialogues on those issues where the need exists to give voters the *incentive* and the *understanding* to judge hard choices and sacrifices. We believe that sustained public deliberation of such issues has to accompany political debate in Congress.

We unhesitatingly recommend rising health care costs as the first issue for a National Dialogue for the following reasons:

- i. As you yourself have noted, unless health care costs are brought under control, your other priorities are in jeopardy.
- ii. Without active public support and understanding, you could end up with one half of your program (insurance coverage for those who now lack it), without the other half — reducing costs to defray the extra expense. Such a result would undermine your Administration's efforts to bring the federal budget deficit under control.

- iii. At the present time, the public's sense of urgency about controlling rising health care costs is not matched by a readiness to accept change. To put it bluntly, the country is not ready for fundamental health care reform. Opinion polls that show high levels of public support for change are misleading: they reflect the public's feeling of urgency rather than any realistic understanding and acceptance of change. In our experience, no gap between leaders and public has ever been as massive as the one that exists on this issue. Only a dialogue of the most serious and searching kind can narrow it.
- iv. Without a National Dialogue, or its equivalent, this issue can continue to fester unresolved as it has for the past twenty years, undermining other social and economic priorities. On the other hand, with the right kind of dialogue, we believe the country can be ready for significant change within a year.
- v. A National Dialogue will give people a "say" on an issue that will inevitably require sacrifice. Several centuries ago, the slogan of the people was "No taxation without representation." Today's slogan might be: "No sacrifice without a say." Our research suggests a surprisingly straightforward answer to the question of whether or not the public is willing to make sacrifices for the common good: when people feel excluded from decision making that affects their lives, they are *not* willing to make sacrifices. When they have a place at the table and feel that their viewpoint is being heeded, they take a far more responsible position.

The material that follows gives you some background information about the experience of the two organizations, and then outlines the National Dialogue concept.

Background

As you know, David Mathews, president of the Kettering Foundation, is a former Secretary of H.E.W. Kettering, as a research foundation, has designed the National Issues Forums (NIF), whose purpose is to stimulate serious public deliberation on the difficult choices that every policy issue — like health care — entails. These forums, sponsored by thousands of civic and educational institutions around the country, range from high school students, to middle class Americans from all regions of the nation, to prisoners behind bars.

At the forums, citizens of diverse backgrounds work their way from first opinions to more thoughtful and shared judgments. The forums are locally controlled and financed, demonstrating the hunger Americans have for democracy at the grass roots.

As you know, too, Daniel Yankelovich has spent much of his career exploring and understanding public opinion on major issues. Dan is president of the Public Agenda Foundation. For the past 17 years, the Public Agenda has been devoted to enhancing public understanding of complex policy issues and providing the country's leaders with comprehensive, objective information about the public's views. Public Agenda works through "public choice campaigns" in partnership with local TV, newspapers, and community groups to stimulate balanced news coverage and local activities that involve citizens in making hard choices on issues such as education, welfare and taxes. Public Agenda also prepares the discussion guides on policy choices for The National Issues Forums. A recent book, *The Health Care Crisis: Containing Costs, Expanding Coverage*, is included here.

For many years now, the two organizations have closely coordinated their work. Through their joint endeavors they have learned a great deal about what to do (and what *not* to do) to close the gap between leaders and public.

Perhaps the main lesson learned is that the dominant model of public education is so deeply flawed that it accounts for a large part of the gap separating leadership from public. Nowhere is the gap wider and more dangerous than on health care, as reported in the enclosed publication, *Faulty Diagnosis: Public Misconceptions About Health Care Reform*.

Ironically the gap often widens when leaders try to "educate" the public. By "education," leaders usually mean a one-way communications effort to cause the public to arrive at conclusions the leaders hold. The irony here is that the leaders reach their own conclusions through a far different process than the one they prescribe for the public.

One of America's most successful social inventions is its great variety of think tanks, conferences, workshops, assemblies, institutes, and councils where leaders and experts get together to deliberate and discuss vital issues. As veteran attendees of such groups, we are impressed with their ability to put partisanship aside, and to engage in serious dialogue in the interest of finding common ground. Certainly, your highly successful economic conference in December personified this approach; all of the attendees we personally know left the conference feeling good about it, and more importantly, left it with a new perspective.

All successful conferences have certain features in common: issues are carefully defined, a framework established, a wide variety of points of view expressed, there is a notable absence of manipulation, the opportunity exists to probe the full meaning of what the various speakers are seeking to convey, and above all, there is time to digest and to deliberate core ideas.

On complex issues such as health care, it is not unusual for leaders to attend many such conferences over a period of months or years before they reach firm and thoughtful judgments. Yet, these same leaders will turn around and recommend a "public education" program featuring a few superficial ads, some articles and op-ed pieces in leading newspapers and magazines, and appearances on TV talk shows. These simple-minded PR conceptions are based on the erroneous assumption that people reach judgment mainly through passively absorbing information.

In other words, for those who need it least — knowledgeable leaders and experts — the process of educating themselves on issues is active, lengthy, and conducted mainly through dialogue with those who hold diverse points of view. For those who need it most — the general public — the process is passive, brief, and conducted mainly through exposure to information or manipulation. Everyone knows the consequences: gridlock on issues that depend on public sacrifice and depth of understanding.

We have developed a model of public education that eliminates this double standard. It sets forth the seven stages through which people move from superficial first opinions to firm and responsible judgments (Dan Yankelovich has applied this model to health care in a recent *Fortune* article which accompanies this memo). Stage Four — where people can get stuck for decades — relates to the failure of leadership to address people's emotional resistance. For example, one current proposal is to tax the public's health care benefits from employers above a certain minimum. This proposal is oblivious to the depth of the public's emotional resistance and is doomed to failure until and unless the resistance is confronted. (How to do this is too complex a subject to cover in this sketchy memo).

Our model is still evolving: there is no easy way to engage several hundred million people in the kind of intimate dialogue possible among small numbers of participants. But it is far superior to existing models, and sounder in conception than Ross Perot's "electronic town meetings."

Proposal

The essence of the National Dialogue idea is a Presidential invitation to the citizenry to engage in a national discussion of one or two major issues each year, implemented through citizen forums in cities and towns throughout the nation. These discussions need to reach into every neighborhood and sector of our society. They need to highlight the *values* at the heart of every policy question, and the way issues affect people in every day life rather than the way experts frame issues. They need to enlarge the common ground citizens share with officials in government. They need to give the public the time and opportunity to confront the need for sacrifices and to work their way gradually from unrealistic thinking to responsible judgment. They need to make people realize just how difficult the choices are, giving the Administration the time and latitude it needs to act.

The Principles

Listed below are principles that, in our experience, are indispensable to success.

- **Extreme selectivity.** The public cannot focus on a large number of issues simultaneously. The now classic expression of this principle was the sign over James Carville's desk ("The economy, stupid") noted by virtually every reporter in America.

Being restricted to only one or two issues a year, the choice of subjects is critically important. We have already given the reasons why we recommend health care for priority attention.

- **Countering resistance.** The information-driven model of public education badly underestimates the need to address peoples' emotional resistance to changes that require sacrifices. ("No say, no sacrifice"). Conventional "public education" places too much emphasis on rational reasons for sacrifice without recognizing the depth of people's wishful thinking and the length of time people need to wrestle with disagreeable tradeoffs.

- **Courage, not wonkish ingenuity.** Health care has received lavish attention from the nation's most cogent policy analysts. The concept of "managed health care" is a bureaucratic masterpiece. But the public will not accept it until leaders first confront the public's conviction that "waste and greed" are the primary forces driving health care costs skyward.

Sooner or later this waste-and-greed factor will lead you to confront one or another powerful interest group — for example, the legal pressure that feeds defensive medicine, or insurance companies whose functions are not justified on economic grounds, or the drug companies or the hospitals. One key to the public's willingness to change is a President's moral courage in standing up to one or another of these groups — just as Ronald Reagan stood up to the air controllers' union. This was perhaps the defining moment of his presidency. The timing is your call — as it was with Jesse Jackson and Sister Souljah in the 1992 campaign. The principle is critical. People may exaggerate the extent of waste and greed and underestimate other factors such as an aging population. But until the very real greed factor is confronted morally, people will resist clever reform proposals.

- **"Working through" the policy choices.** In our model of public debate, coming to grips with choices in a rational way (Stage Five) can only take place once people's emotional resistance has been worked through. Then and only then does the "choicework" phase begin. Public Agenda and Kettering have developed a systematic approach to defining choices from the point of view of the public rather than within the expert's framework, and have learned how to conduct citizen forums in a cost-effective way with a minimum of wasted motion.

Kettering has produced a series of video tapes ("A Public Voice") that samples the results of the forums. We are sending copies along with this memo.

- **Incentives to pay attention.** People will only pay attention to complex issues if they have an incentive to do so. It need not be a big one. In Public Agenda's "public choice" campaigns, people have an opportunity to express their views on a community "ballot" after considering the various choices, and that is ample incentive (Condition Critical is enclosed).

A National Dialogue should give the public two incentives — a Presidential invitation to spend three or six months in debate, and a mechanism, electronic or otherwise, for people to register their choices at the *conclusion* of the Dialogue (and *only* at its conclusion).

- **Public involvement.** Even in an age of mass media, there is no substitute for face-to-face discussion. For people to feel included they must have the opportunity to meet and discuss issues in their own world — over dinner tables, in coffee factory breaks, in churches, at schools. The National Dialogues should embrace the thousands of town meeting groups that exist and also create new ones.

Americans today hunger for community — a sense of being part of a larger whole rather than an isolated individual. The National Dialogue is an opportunity for people to participate not just in national policy making, but in community building.

- **The media.** The work of the Public Agenda has demonstrated unmistakably that partnerships can be shaped between commercial media and leaders who wish to engage the public in dialogue. Such partnerships have been forged in many cities with commercial TV stations and leading newspapers (many of them working together for the first time). The integration of these existing “networks” — expanded with Presidential support and Forum-type meetings — provides a vehicle for direct public participation on a massive scale.

In conclusion, we believe that as you address the health care issue as President, you need the American people to join you in facing it. People have to understand what you already know all too well — how truly difficult the issue is. With your leadership, they have to confront the critical value question: To what extent should health care be a citizen right? We do not think that instant polling or Ross Perot’s type of electronic town meeting will help you do this. Neither provides the weeks and months of time voters need to weigh policy alternatives and their pros and cons carefully. Neither produces the deliberation and the overcoming of wishful thinking that is essential to sound public judgment. And on this issue, a collective national “knee jerk” would be fatal to our political health. So, we have outlined an alternative strategy for reaching and engaging the public. We recognize that we have only given you principles and not a concrete plan of action, but we are prepared to provide whatever assistance your staff needs in turning these principles into a workable program.



Wrestling with complex issues requires getting in touch with one's deepest feelings.

to accept the consequences—including the costs—of changing the existing system. The health care issue hasn't yet reached Stage 4 among the broad public.

■ STAGE 5: WEIGHING THE CHOICES. Here the public does what we call choice work: weighing the pros and cons of alternatives for dealing with an issue. In practice Stages 4 and 5 overlap, with people thinking through how they feel at the same time that they continue to resist coming to grips with the hard choices.

Wrestling with complex issues—abortion, the death penalty, immigration, censorship, environmental protection, homelessness, as well as health care—requires getting in touch with one's deepest values and often realizing that these may conflict with one another on a particular question. People naturally resist having to compromise or abandon cherished values.

Stage 5 is hard work, and work that the public must do for itself; there are no shortcuts. In earlier stages the media and experts do most of the work. The media specialize in consciousness raising, and they do it well. Leaders and experts formulate the policy choices. But the public must invest the effort to grasp the choices, understand their consequences, and wrestle with the conflicts of values these choices entail.

Virtually none of the choices on health care have made it to Stage 5. Stretching a bit, one choice may be edging into this stage for one group in the population. Older Americans are just beginning to weigh the pros and cons of the so-called heroic measures physicians often take to keep elderly people alive for a few more days, weeks, or months. My firm's surveys show that over the past five years the percentage of older Americans having doubts about whether anything and everything should be done on this front for as long as possible has grown from 40% to 64%.

Stages 3, 4, and 5 can be grouped under the general heading "working through," a term borrowed from psychology. I find it apt because it has several connotations that "thinking

through" doesn't have. It encompasses thought but also feelings and ethical concerns. And it signifies the hard work of struggling with change.

■ STAGE 6: TAKING A STAND INTELLECTUALLY and STAGE 7: MAKING A RESPONSIBLE JUDGMENT MORALLY AND EMOTIONALLY. As the two stages of resolution, these can be considered together. These stages are linked, but different. People are quicker to accept change in their minds than in their hearts. Most Americans, for example, accept in their minds the idea of equal opportunity for minorities in the workplace, but they haven't quite taken the final critical step toward accepting it wholeheartedly.

The same is true for First Amendment guarantees of freedom of expression. In their minds, Americans support freedom of expression unreservedly, recognizing how essential it is to preserving America's priceless heritage of political freedom. But the reason that laws and courts are indispensable to First Amendment protection is that offensive speech, flag burning, and pornography create such intense emotional and moral revulsion that, in the heat of the moment, the public can easily disregard its intellectual commitment. Intellectual resolution requires people to clarify fuzzy thinking, reconcile inconsistencies, consider relevant facts and new realities, and grasp the full consequences of choices. Emotional resolution requires people to confront their own ambivalent feelings, accommodate themselves to unwelcome realities, and overcome an urge to procrastinate.

In arriving at moral resolution, people's first impulse is to put their own needs and desires ahead of ethical commitments. But once they have time to reflect on their choices, especially if the larger society provides moral support, the ethical dimension asserts itself, and people struggle to do the right thing, often successfully.

NO FACET of the health care issue has arrived at either stage of resolution. But polls suggest that, under the impetus of a national debate, health care will move forward in virtually

every stage. The public will learn that more than waste and greed are involved in driving costs higher (Stage 1). People's sense of urgency will grow less panicky and more tightly concentrated on controlling and reducing costs (Stage 2). Voters will focus particularly on choices entailing a larger role for government (Stage 3).

Resistance will grow as people learn more about the options and the extent to which each involves higher costs and less choice for the individual. Resistance will focus particularly on options requiring employees to pay more, limiting technology, rationing health care, and otherwise restricting choice and access (Stage 4).

If the debate genuinely engages the voters, then the public, in Stage 5, should be ready to consider on their merits proposals for some degree of federal regulation of costs, for extending coverage to those who lack it, for curbing heroic measures in the last months of life. Even proposals for modest tax increases may receive a fair hearing.

A few choices may even make their way to Stage 6. If the national debate is productive, Americans will support—at least intellectually—proposals for drastically reducing the incentives for malpractice lawyers to drive up settlement costs. They will also support proposals that emphasize prevention and that give incentives to individuals to take greater responsibility for their own health.

It is too much, I suspect, to think that Americans can reach Stage 7—the public judgment stage—on such a vexing issue in so short a time. But there may be some preliminary movement toward it. If so, it will take the form of an agonizing rethinking of complete health care as an inalienable right.

People still support this right unqualifiedly, without thinking through its implications. Odds are that many years and many crises will have to pass before the American public fully accepts the need to ration, regulate, reform, and even revolutionize health care in America so that it preserves some semblance of a right rather than a consumer good, without bankrupting the nation. **□**

OCTOBER 19, 1992

FORTUNE

POLITICS & POLICY

HOW PUBLIC OPINION REALLY WORKS


The public's thinking on issues progresses through seven predictable stages, the dean of American pollsters finds. Politicians make a big mistake just looking at raw numbers. **■ by Daniel Yankelovich**

SOMETIMES a truth is so simple and obvious that it eludes detection for years. So it is with public opinion. We have grown so accustomed to seeing public opinion quantified in polls (77% say they support "national health insurance," for example) that we make an unwitting—and, as it happens, false—assumption. We assume that public opinion is some kind of phenomenon like wind velocity, whose variations can be measured, and that the measurement is valid.

Public opinion is in fact less like a physical process than a biological one, evolving in seven stages. Unless one knows opinion's stage of development on an issue, poll numbers will usually mislead. Any political leader who really thinks 77% of voters support national health insurance is deluding himself. As I demonstrate in my book *Coming to Public Judgment*, once one sees public opinion in this light, one can never go back to the old way of looking at it.

Public opinion on any issue develops slowly over a long period—at least ten years for a complex issue. It evolves from incoherent globs of opinion toward fully integrated, thoughtful, and considered public judgment. On issues in early stages of development, the quality of public opinion is raw and unformed. Many people express strong feelings, but vehemence does not mean settled views. Opinions at this stage are unstable, flip-flopping at the slightest provocation. People have not thought through the consequences of their views. Today, for example, most of the public remains mired in wishful thinking on protectionism and health care.

REPORTER ASSOCIATE: Samuel Ratan



Dan Yankelovich has been charting American attitudes for three decades.

Views evolve from the unstable and flip-flopping to the mature and solid.

resisting any attempt to confront with realistic information the costs and trade-offs each entails. Political candidates who act on the results of opinion polls on these issues will soon feel the ground give way under their feet.

At the opposite end of the developmental spectrum are issues on which public opinion has had a chance to mature. When public opinion has progressed through all seven stages, its quality is impressive. People's views are solid and stable, not mushy. They hold them consistently

and coherently, accepting responsibility for the trade-offs involved.

Many issues have reached this stage, but I want to cite one that may seem surprising. Many policymakers fear that the American public, under pressure from the recent recession, is reverting to a pre-World War II form of isolationism. But the American people have actually thought through the isolationism vs. internationalism issue. Having gone through all seven stages, they agree with those who urge that with the end of the Cold War, the

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ILLUSTRATIONS BY RENEE KLEIN

nation should give greater priority to our domestic concerns—without, however, abdicating our responsibility as leader of the free world.

Unfortunately, opinion polls as presently reported don't indicate which stage a particular issue has reached. Leaders attempting to communicate with the public without this information risk gridlock and frustration. Why? Because to communicate with the populace, a leader has to know where people are coming from, where they stand in their thinking now, and where they are headed.

Let me illustrate the seven stages with a critical issue of the 1992 presidential campaign: the rising cost of health care.

■ STAGE 1: DAWNING AWARENESS. Here people become aware of an issue or some aspect of it. Budding awareness launches the long and tortuous journey toward public judgment.

On health care a number of messages have reached Stage 1. A majority of the public is aware that health care costs are skyrocketing, that millions of Americans have no health insurance coverage, and that their own coverage is at risk of being lost or whittled away. The public's current view is that greed and waste are at fault—too many people with their hands in the health care till. Everyone has an anecdote to tell: The hospital that charges \$40 for a \$3.95 bottle of aspirin, the \$1,000 surgeon's fee for a ten-minute procedure, the millions of dollars that stick to the hands of malpractice lawyers, and so on.

At this stage in the debate most people remain largely *unaware* of the

more specific drivers of rising health care costs: advances in technology, the high cost of caring for increasing numbers of elderly people and AIDS patients, and rising administrative expenses, among others. Nor is there much awareness of specific proposals being floated to address the problem. People glibly refer to the Canadian system but don't know what it is.

■ STAGE 2: GREATER URGENCY. The second stage is a move beyond awareness to a sense of urgency about an issue. Health care has moved squarely into this second stage. The recession has many people terrified about job security, and much of this anxiety gets channeled into worry about health care. Typically someone will say, "If I lost my job we could manage for a while, but what happens if I get sick and no longer have health insurance?" This concern is why almost four out of five Americans (79%) believe the health care system is in crisis. For now this sense of urgency is global and diffuse. The dominant sentiment is a panicky appeal to "Do something!"

These first two stages are parts of a necessary "consciousness raising." The term, borrowed from the women's movement, is apt for describing how the public learns about an issue. One can be aware of a problem without feeling it is important or that anything needs to be done about it. Although the health care issue has been kicking around for years, the public's consciousness of its importance and active readiness to do something about it has risen only in the past year or so.


■ STAGE 3: DISCOVERING THE CHOICES. In the third stage the public begins to focus on alternatives for dealing with issues. The timing of Stage 3 varies by issue. On some, choices become clear almost immediately. But on most they do not. Some issues can fester for years before concrete, feasible choices appear.

The public comes to focus on choices that leaders offer without insisting upon alternatives to consider. Often the proffered options are not the best choices and certainly not the only ones. Stage 3 represents progress, however, because it begins the process of converting the public's free-floating concern about the need to do something into proposals for action.

Health care is a particularly vivid example of the disorderly manner by which the public comes to focus on choices. Among leaders and experts hardly a day passes without a new idea for coping with the crisis. But the public remains oblivious to most choices.

Four choices have begun to swim into focus for the public, indicating the issue's progress to the third stage of public opinion. The first relates to malpractice: People are learning about the debate to limit damages in malpractice suits. They are coming to see the links between multimillion-dollar damage settlements, rising insurance rates for physicians, and the pressure on doctors to practice defensive (and unnecessarily expensive) medicine. This understanding neatly fits their preconceptions about greed as the driver of costs: The idea that lawyers are enriching themselves at

The first two stages are part of a necessary "consciousness raising."



Public opinion on health care is still in the early stages of development, with people unwilling to face the hard choices.

the expense of the system is inherently credible.

A second choice coming into focus is incentives for prevention. People are aware of the benefits of not smoking, adopting more nutritious diets, exercising, and reducing stress. This doesn't mean that their behavior has changed drastically. It does mean that they are focusing on prevention as a choice.

For some groups of employees the use of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) has become a third choice. Typically this choice is forced by employers. The growth of managed health care plans is making prepaid alternatives to fee-for-service health care increasingly familiar to some segments of the population.

A fourth choice, less sharply focused, is the idea that individuals should become more cost conscious and begin to bring their well-honed consumer skills to the purchase of health care. It rarely occurs to people to shop actively for quality and price in the health care arena; the idea of evaluating hospitals for elective surgery, for example, is unfamiliar and confusing. Still, the idea that one should approach health care as a knowledgeable, cost-conscious consumer is gradually coming into focus.

■ STAGE 4: WISHFUL THINKING. This is where the public's resistance to facing trade-offs kicks in. Most of the

time on most issues, the public raises a barricade of wishful thinking that must be overcome before people come to grips with issues realistically. In opinion polls it is easy to get people to express approval for a cornucopia of improved services and even to claim that they would accept modest increases in taxes for them. But saying this in a survey and accepting it in reality are wholly different matters.

It is difficult to know whether the public's tendency toward wishful thinking is stronger now than in earlier periods of American life. I suspect it is. The public's ritualistic incantation of "waste, fraud, and abuse" may be a rationalization to avoid the need to confront societal problems, even though it has grounding in reality.

Mainly, though, the public erects its wishful-thinking barricade to public-policy proposals because people feel excluded from decision-making on matters that affect their lives. It is a truism that people act most responsibly when they are personally engaged. To make sacrifices ungrudgingly, people must understand why these are needed, and they must have some say in the types, forms, and conditions of sacrifice they are asked to make. A significant part of the public's resistance to facing reality reflects the perception that a serious disconnect separates today's leaders from the voters.


No issue illustrates this resistance better than health care. People start with the assumption that complete health care is a right, such that "everyone should have the right to get the best possible care—as good as the treatment a millionaire gets"; 91% agreed to this proposition in a Harris poll. They think "health insurance should pay for any treatment that will save lives even if it costs \$1 million to save a life" (71%). Reinforcing this outlook is a gross misunderstanding of who bears the costs. People assume that they pay directly for 70% to 80% of their health care insurance, as they do for auto insurance, while in reality they pay for only about 20% to 30%.

The present outlook, in sum: People feel a sense of urgency about changing the health care system but haven't even begun to confront realistically the hard choices that need to be made. Unfortunately, policymakers are largely unaware of the depth and intensity of the public's resistance, for the simple reason that the bulk of it has not yet made itself felt—voters have not yet focused on the hard choices.


The situation is analogous to what happened in 1988 to legislation on catastrophic health care insurance for the elderly. In July of that year, Congress passed a bill putting a \$2,000 cap on out-of-pocket costs for catastrophic health care in hospitals. Legislators had badly misinterpreted public opinion. They had learned from polling data that two-thirds of older Americans (69%) were deeply concerned about catastrophic care and supported a program to address it. But they went on to infer that older Americans were prepared to accept the higher Medicare premiums needed to defray the costs of the cap—a disastrously false inference. Humiliating itself, Congress was obliged a year and a half later to repeal the bill.

We are in danger of repeating the same mistake on a larger scale. Policymakers know Americans are deeply concerned about the adequacy, safety, and affordability of health care coverage. But they incorrectly infer that this means voters are ready

FROM PUBLIC OPINION TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT



Exploring the choices depends in part on the alternatives that leaders offer up.



BEYOND THE BELTWAY

*Engaging the Public
in U.S. Foreign Policy*

DANIEL YANKELOVICH
and I. M. DESTLER, Editors

Chapter 1
THE RULES OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT¹

by

Daniel Yankelovich
and John Immerwahr

Even under ideal conditions, the relationship of the public to foreign policy is replete with difficulties. Compared to domestic issues, opinion polls show that average Americans know less about foreign policy, care less, are more volatile in their views, and base their attitudes more on slogan-like generalizations (e.g. no-more-Vietnams) than on the specific merits of the issue. So, except when war threatens, the challenge of engaging the public in foreign policy is formidable.

Today's conditions are far from ideal, and engaging the public is particularly daunting in the present post-cold war climate of opinion. As former Senator Mathias observed in a previous American Assembly volume, "The greatest problem that confronts American leadership with respect to future foreign policy is to achieve a new national .. consensus in the absence of a powerful threat." ²

For the past two generations our nation's adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union has been the framework within which all foreign policy initiatives were evaluated. Absent that framework, it is difficult for the public to know what criteria to bring to bear in making foreign policy judgments. For forty years, leaders and public alike were prepared to go to great lengths to contain a menacing Soviet power; today there is no consensus that

the country should spend even a fraction of the "peace dividend" to ensure a peaceful, democratic Russia.

Ever since the troubles of the economy have come to preoccupy the public mind, voters have pushed foreign policy issues to the rear of the national agenda. Although for much of the post-war period foreign policy ranked near the top of the public's concerns, the combination of mounting concern for domestic issues and the collapse of the Soviet Union has greatly reduced public interest in international problems. On the Gallup/USA Today index of fifteen issues for discussion and debate in the 1992 Presidential campaign, national defense ranked fourteenth out of fifteenth, with only 43 percent feeling that it was a "very important issue" (Gallup/USA Today, January 1992). When the goals of foreign policy are discussed, by two to one margins (62 percent to 31 percent), voters give greater priority to the pursuit of our economic interests than to more traditional political-military objectives. In brief, the gap between foreign policy leadership and the public--large under any circumstances--is particularly difficult to bridge under present conditions.

Traditionally, leadership has managed this gap by limiting the influence of the public in the foreign policy arena. Most foreign policy initiatives are taken without much public consultation. Even on issues that involve putting U.S. troops in harm's way, such as in Somalia, leadership sometimes does not bother to consult or inform the public until after the fact.

Increasingly, however, despite its low level of interest in foreign affairs, the public insists upon being in the loop, especially when sacrifice and hard choices are involved. The public has come to feel that foreign policy competes with domestic problems for attention and resources. As a result, the public is no longer prepared to delegate critical foreign policy decisions to the judgment of experts; there is a concern that foreign policy leaders will distract the country from more pressing domestic issues. As the nation struggles to find solutions to both its domestic and foreign problems, leaders can expect a new aggressiveness and insistence on the part of the public that it be directly engaged in shaping the new post-cold war foreign policy.

Here we bump up against an unexpected obstacle. In the past, foreign policy leaders may have been reluctant to go to the trouble of engaging the public in complex foreign policy issues. But they never doubted their ability to do so. Yet the sad truth is that the foreign policy community has little or no idea how to go about engaging the public under these new post-cold war conditions.

Selling the Public

What foreign policy leaders do understand is the conventional top-down method for winning public support. In this approach, leaders first get together and hammer out policy positions among themselves. This process, which might take months or even years on complex policies, is often characterized by extensive, open, and

thoughtful debate. But once a position is reached, the process of winning public support for it is usually far less thoughtful and open. It then becomes largely a matter of selling the public on decisions that leaders already have made.

The techniques for selling the public are familiar. Leaders make speeches, brief reporters, write op-ed pieces, and appear on talk shows to convey their thinking and to share a tiny fraction of their knowledge with the public. In effect, leaders present a simplified version of a lawyer's brief to the public, justifying their policy recommendations in a one-way process of communication.

Let us hasten to add that the top-down method is quite appropriate for many issues. It works well when public interest and concern are low, either because the issue is highly technical or because it does not touch people's lives directly. The decision of the National Air and Space Administration (NASA) to implement the shuttle program, for example, was intensely debated within the expert community but, appropriately, most of the public discussion was focused on selling the program to the public. The traditional method also works well on issues where no special sacrifices or actions are demanded of the public. Many foreign policy decisions have no immediate impact on the public. There is no special reason to engage the public in a lengthy debate about our policy toward Namibia, for example. Finally, this process works well when the goals of the policy are widely shared by the public and the leadership community as in the cold war era.

But the conventional top-down approach is surprisingly ineffective for other issues. It does not work well when the public has a real stake in the issue, such as military intervention in Bosnia or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It does not work well when the public does not share the leadership's assumptions and priorities. It is especially ineffective on issues where demands will be made on the public, and where the public is expected to accept sacrifices. As a growing number of observers have noted, the top-down approach has not even worked well for domestic policies; it is hardly likely to do much better for foreign policy.

The Need for a New Approach

So we are confronted with a prickly dilemma: foreign policy issues have grown more elusive and less clear-cut. The public is eager to focus on urgent domestic concerns but is unwilling to delegate the shaping of foreign policy to experts who might give foreign policy too large a share of the resources needed to fix our domestic problems. Foreign policy leaders are (more or less) willing to engage the public to win its support, but don't know how to do so, and, worst yet, don't know that they don't know.

What is needed, then, is a new method for winning public support for vital foreign policy initiatives, to substitute, where appropriate, for the more familiar and traditional approach. Let

us call this new method "engaging the public," to distinguish it from the top-down approach.

Engaging the public differs from top-down communication in a number of ways. Instead of seeking to persuade the public to buy into policy positions that leaders and experts have pre-packaged, the public is drawn more directly into the process of deliberation. Instead of one-way communication, there is dialogue between public and leaders. Instead of a public relations campaign, a more complex process of debate, discussion, and interaction between public and leaders is instituted.

Engaging the public is more difficult than persuasion or information sharing. It demands more time and energy from leaders, and greater sensitivity to the nuances of the public's thinking. The difficulty should not be minimized. The price of winning public support for issues that require this approach is the adoption of a new set of rules for public engagement in foreign policy issues. These rules of engagement are the principal subject of this chapter.

The Stages of Public Opinion


The key differences between top-down communication and engaging the public reflect radically different theories of how public opinion actually works, theories that are almost never made explicit. It is only when we clarify the difference between two

implicit theories of public opinion that a workable strategy for engaging the public becomes clear.

The top-down approach is based on the theory that public opinion is driven by information and persuasion. In this view, what prevents people from supporting a position is that they do not understand the issues. The appropriate role of leadership would appear obvious: leaders inform the public about the issues and present a cogent case for a policy solution. The theory leads to this three-step model schematized on Chart 1.

Chart 1

TOP-DOWN COMMUNICATION MODEL



On the face of it, this approach makes sense. Since leaders have much more information than the public, it is up to them to impart some of their information persuasively. Once the leader's arguments are absorbed, the public is expected to reach the same conclusion as the leadership.

The engagement approach is based on a more complex model of how public opinion works. Over the last several decades, together with colleagues at the Public Agenda Foundation (in collaboration with the Charles F. Kettering Foundation), we have been studying how public opinion develops on a series of policy issues, domestic and foreign. What we have learned is that public opinion moves through a multi-stage journey, starting from ignorant, volatile, impulsive, initial responses to issues (which we call "raw opinion") to firm, thoughtful, and responsible judgments (which we call "public judgment").³ At certain stages the public does assimilate information, but the information component is often of secondary importance, as compared to cultural values and moral convictions. The main stages of the journey from raw opinion to public judgment primarily involve reconciling conflicting values and overcoming emotional resistances--a process in which information plays a relatively minor role.

Sending foreign aid to the Russians, intervening militarily in Bosnia, lifting the ban on gays in the military, endorsing the export of jobs to Mexico, putting American troops under United Nations command, encouraging Japanese investment in American businesses--these are matters of deep concern that engage our prejudices, emotions, and values, as well as our minds. In the end, these kinds of policies cannot be effectively sold to the public in the traditional top-down manner.

Chapter 1


Instead of seeking to inform and persuade, leaders need to stimulate people to be more thoughtful, to confront their own prejudices and resistances, to embrace long-term goals as opposed to the impulses of the moment, to weigh the pros and cons of policy choices seriously and responsibly. Average Americans are as capable of carrying out this difficult chore of citizenship as their leaders--if we cast the issues in their framework (not that of the experts) and if they are given the time, necessary incentives, and communicative leadership.

Those leaders who are willing to go to the trouble of winning public commitment to ensure that people will stick with a policy even when the going gets tough need to ground themselves in a better understanding of how public opinion works when peoples' feelings, prejudices, and moral values are engaged. In the balance of this chapter, we will set forth the various stages through which public opinion evolves and suggest what rules of engagement are appropriate at each stage.

Analysis of the public's response to hundreds of issues shows that the public moves through seven distinct stages in the journey from raw opinion to public judgment. These stages may sometimes overlap, but they warrant being distinguished here for a very practical reason: the rules for engaging the public are different at every stage. Leaders trip over themselves and defeat their own purposes when they take actions inappropriate for the stage the public has reached. The seven stages are schematized in Chart 2.

In what follows, then, we describe the seven stages of public opinion, and the rules of engagement appropriate to each.

CHART 2



THE SEVEN-STAGE JOURNEY FROM RAW OPINION TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT

STAGE ONE: DAWNING AWARENESS

The first stage of what we call the long journey to public judgment is the public's growing awareness that a problem is developing. What drives public awareness is a combination of events reported by the media, plus people's own responsiveness to the world around them. While this stage of the journey is somewhat more obvious than later stages, it is an essential point of departure for the journey. Unless people are aware of issues, they certainly are not going to make any hard choices associated with resolving them.

The methods for creating public awareness at this initial stage of the journey are identical for both the top-down and engagement approaches. In both, it is the job of experts and the media to sound the "wake-up" call. Leaders traditionally have understood this as an important part of their role. Since this stage of the journey is well understood, it is not surprising that our culture has developed highly effective means for calling people's attention to an issue. Indeed, this stage calls for precisely the kind of one-way communication (with an active leadership and a passive public) that leaders are most comfortable with. It is only when we get into the later stages that new and less familiar communication approaches are called for.

Examples: Competitiveness and Developments in the Former Soviet Union

An excellent example of an issue that has grown gradually in public awareness is the competitiveness problem. One indicator is awareness of the trade deficit. In 1977, only a bare majority (53 percent) was aware of the trade deficit (Roper, September-October, 1977). But as the trade deficit grew, as more and more attention was directed toward it by the media, and as people experienced the impact of stagnant economic growth on their own lives, consciousness of America's competitiveness problem grew accordingly. By the mid-1980s, awareness of the trade deficit had reached the 75 percent level, and by the end of the decade

awareness exceeded 80 percent (Los Angeles Times, 1985; Gallup/Times Mirror, January-February 1989). By now, awareness and concern about the competitiveness crisis is nearly universal. One survey found that 84 percent of the population reports that they "really get upset" about America's falling behind other countries economically (Analysis Group, February 1990).

Turning to another theme of this book--the future of the former Soviet Union--we can see that leaders have led a large majority of the public to at least this first stage of awareness. Sixty percent of the public says that it has been following political developments in the former Soviet Union (CBS News/New York Times, March 1993).

It is important to note that the growth of public awareness on issues is not always automatic; there have been spectacular examples where important issues failed to capture public attention. The key factor here is almost always the role of the press. (As political scientist Bernard Cohen observed a number of years ago, "The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."⁴) When the media falls down on its job of bringing an issue to the attention of the public, public awareness is inevitably stalled. The savings and loan (S&L) crisis, for example, developed gradually and was well known to many in the banking community, but the media paid relatively little

attention to it until the problem reached an advanced state. Had the media been more alert, taxpayers might have been saved hundreds of billions of dollars.

STAGE TWO: A GROWING SENSE OF URGENCY

To gain public support for a solution, it is not enough for people just to be aware of a problem. Before beginning the hard work of deliberating about it, people must be convinced that an issue has some urgency. They must believe that unless something is done about the problem soon, the consequences will be dire.

The shift from awareness to urgency is rarely automatic. The public can be aware of a serious problem for years without assigning a great deal of urgency to it. For example, people have been aware of many environmental threats for decades without developing a sense of urgency. People were aware of rising health care costs and the growth of the federal budget deficit for many years before concluding that action was urgently needed.

Example: Aiding Russia

A good example of awareness without urgency in foreign policy is the issue of giving aid to Russia. For several years, the nation's leadership has been concerned about the dangers of potential instability in the former Soviet Union. As we have seen, leadership has succeeded in making people aware of the issue. But

attempts to give the issue of aid to Russia some real urgency for the public have so far been less successful.

Survey results show that people are well aware of potential problems in Russia:

- 79 percent express some degree of concern that if the former Soviet Union does not receive enough help from us, their nuclear weapons and technology will spread to other countries, and an equal number is concerned that if the former Soviet Union does not receive enough help there will be serious food shortages there (Gallup, April 1992).
- 67 percent express some concern that if the former Soviet Union does not receive enough aid from us, an unfriendly government may seize power there (Gallup, April 1992).

These concerns would suggest a certain amount of urgency regarding the need to help Russia. But despite that, there is little support for actually doing much more to help. The vast majority of the public (75 percent) thinks that we are already helping Russia to move toward capitalism and democracy (Gallup, March 1993). Fifty-four percent oppose giving more aid to encourage Russia to adopt a democratic government and a market economy; only 38 percent favor doing this (Yankelovich Partners/Time/CNN March 1993).

This example shows that the public is able to play back concerns expressed by foreign policy experts but obviously does not give them the same weight. Although these worries may be urgent

for leaders, for the public they remain low-level concerns. They lack urgency because the possible dire consequences that are required to give an issue real urgency remain remote and theoretical, rather than real and pressing. Soviet nuclear technology does not seem to be spreading, and places like Iraq seem to get what they need from other sources. While people may be waiting in longer lines than ever in Russia, the public is not deluged with daily pictures of starving stick-figure babies (as they see in the coverage from Africa).

In fact, for the vast majority of people, the real danger is that we will give so much aid to Russia that we will not have enough left for our own domestic needs. Three-quarters of the public says that what concerns them is that the United States will give too much financial aid to the former Soviet republics when we badly need it here at home; only 15 percent say that they are concerned that we may not provide enough aid (Los Angeles Times, January 1992). The dire consequence that people worry most about, in other words, is that the United States might sacrifice its own wellbeing for the Russians.

Focus group respondents express, for example, fear that if we help the Russian economy, the result will be a loss of U.S. jobs. People are worried that goods produced by low-wage workers in the former Soviet republics will undercut U.S. products. For many people, the idea of helping the Soviet Union evokes memories of

helping other former enemies such as Japan and Germany, countries that are now seen as taking away American jobs.

Rules of Engagement

At this stage, the top-down and the engagement approaches begin to diverge from one another. Leaders often assume that if the public does not see the urgency of a problem, it is because people do not have enough information about it. But, as we see from the example above, people are aware of at least some of the consequences of failing to come to Russia's aid, and they still are not convinced of its urgency or even its desirability.

How should leaders go about the task of imparting a sense of urgency to the public on issues such as this one? We propose that leaders keep in mind two rules of engagement. There is no guarantee that these will work every time; even under the best of circumstances, the public may simply not share leadership's priorities. But following these two rules will give leaders a much better chance than will the top-down approach.

1. Identify the reasons for the urgency gap. There are many possible reasons why, on any particular issue, the public may not share leadership's sense of urgency. One reason is different priorities. With respect to aid to Russia, for example, the foreign policy community is still mainly focused on the military and political aspects of foreign policy while the public is much more concerned with its economic aspects. This difference in

emphasis is not surprising. It is difficult for the foreign policy community to shed habits of thought ingrained over several generations. The reality is that the public has probably made the transition from the cold war era faster than the experts have. In any event, the two groups--the experts and the public--are in different stages of the transition, and consequently do not see things in the same light.

Another reason the public may not share the experts' sense of urgency is that the threat may be too abstract and, therefore, not real enough to rouse people to action. For decades people felt no urgency about rising health care costs, because the costs were paid by others through the third-party payment system. It was only when the problem grew so serious that employers were demanding higher co-payments for fewer services that people demanded action.

A third reason for the urgency gap is more subtle. Most people feel excluded from foreign policy decisions. Looking in from the outside, they adopt the stance of critics rather than participants. The attitude is, "It is their problem, not our problem." When people feel excluded, it is not easy to stir up feelings of urgency.

These are only a few of the causes of an urgency gap, but perhaps they are enough to indicate why it is imprudent for foreign policy leaders to guess at the public's frame of mind. The likelihood is that the guess will be wrong, since the public and the foreign policy community rarely think alike. There is a

variety of research techniques available for revealing the public's mindset, but policy makers should be wary about relying on "quickie" media-sponsored polls. They are rarely subtle enough to dig beneath the surface, nor are they usually concerned with the reasons that urgency may be lacking.

2. Stimulate grass-roots demand for action. Ideally the demand for action should well up from below rather than be imposed from above. When the demand for action does come from the public, people feel ownership in the issue and engage it as participants rather than as critics.

What would make aid to Russia assume greater urgency for the public? The best solution would be for leaders to credibly attack the public's zero-sum assumption: "aid helps them, hurts us." This assumption may be unfounded but it has to be understood and responded to sympathetically, even to the point of acknowledging that, at first glance, it seems plausible. The argument that we might, putatively, save defense dollars in the future will not be persuasive. The case can be made persuasive if the policy itself can be broadened so that it results in direct economic benefit to the United States. Could Russian oil make us less dependent on the Middle East? Could American jobs be created in helping Russia to build a new infrastructure? Could access to vast new markets help to simulate our own economy, as happened in Western Europe after the war? A positive answer to these questions could transform what

appears in the mind of the public to be a zero-sum strategy into a win-win strategy.

In brief, if the policy context of aid to Russia were shifted from a military-political one to an economic one, and if this shift were both real and credible (and not merely spin control), then thoughtful segments of the public would begin to demand action rather than brush it aside as a deflection from the nation's real priorities.

STAGE THREE: FIRST RESPONSE TO SOLUTIONS

As an issue becomes more urgent, there is a growing desire for action. At this stage, people start to look for solutions. In some cases ideas for solutions rise up from the grass roots, such as the nuclear freeze movement of the 1970s. But typically solutions are shaped and presented by leadership.

What is characteristic of this stage is that people are often groping for an answer to a problem they have only just begun to take seriously, and which at the same time causes them acute anxiety. Not surprisingly, they may overreact to proposals even though they may not have thought through the complexities of the issue and the consequences of their views. As a result, at this stage of public opinion development, people's responses are usually unstable and given to rapid fluctuation.

What makes both this stage and the following one difficult to grasp is that the public's decision-making process diverges from

the more systematic process that leaders adhere to in their formal analysis of issues. When leaders in the military, government, business, or think tanks deal with a problem formally, they follow a systematic approach that starts with the analysis of a problem and concludes with the development of an array of options for dealing with it.

In the hurly-burly of political life, however, decision making is far different. It is much less systematic, and much more based on trial and error. Culturally, Americans react to a problem by moving quickly to action, giving short shrift to lengthy and laborious analysis. The tendency is to leap to solutions without pausing to formulate alternatives and without deliberating on which solution would be optimal. Instead, people consider one solution at a time, and move on to alternatives only when serious doubts about it develop. This may not be the ideal way to approach a problem, but research shows that it is the way the American political process actually works. It also helps us understand how Americans react to possible solutions when they first encounter them.

Example: NAFTA

One example of this trial-and-error style of thinking is the public's reaction to NAFTA. People have a sense of urgency about both the problem of immigration and the potential threat to American jobs. As leaders tossed out ideas about how to deal with

this issue, the public initially reacted dogmatically, eagerly seeking a solution to the problem.

The early reactions to a North American free trade agreement thus tended to more emphatic than what developed later.

- A March 1991 question found that an overwhelming majority (72 percent) thought that a North American free trade agreement would be good for this country (Gallup, March 1991).
- In more recent surveys, however, people are saying that they have not heard enough about the agreement--49 percent felt this way in early 1993 (ABC News/Washington Post, March 1991).

In other words, people seemed surer of their position in 1991 before they had really had a chance to think about the subject. Two years later, in 1993, after the issue had been ventilated in the 1992 Presidential election, we found people saying that they have not heard enough about it. Rather than starting with a need for more information and gradually moving toward a solution, people sometimes start with the solution, and only later come to realize that they need more thinking and information about the problem.

Rules of Engagement

An understanding of how public opinion works at this stage suggests a number of implications for communication with the public.

1. Assume that poll results about solutions are soft. It is at this stage that public opinion polls are most liable to misinterpretation. Policy makers need to learn, therefore, to interpret the findings for what they are: initial reactions rather than either final support or ultimate rejection.

When people are first reacting to a solution, their opinions are highly unstable, and poll results can shift dramatically based on small changes in the wording or order of questions. In some of the early opinion polls on NAFTA, for example, support for the agreement could change by large margins based on small changes in question wording. The reason for this is clear: sometimes people are saying yes to a solution when all they really mean is that they want someone to deal with the problem; they are not yet focusing on the details of that particular solution. At other times, the public reacts violently against a proposal, because it has not yet realized the unattractive implications of that proposal may be necessary. In both cases, what it is registering is an initial reaction, rather than a firm public judgment one way or the other.

The danger is that policy makers will over-react in two different ways. If the public opinion survey results show that the public opposes a promising solution, policy makers may throw up their hands in disgust, and assume that the public is completely hopeless (rather than working to facilitate the public's movement through this stage). In other cases, leaders make the opposite mistake: they seize upon the favorable early opinion polls as a

mandate and rush ahead, only to find that public support evaporates when the implications of the choices become clearer.

2. Use policy proposals as "trial balloons." Leaders can also accelerate the public's journey to sound judgment through the use of trial balloons. If leaders know that a policy will encounter serious public resistance, for example, military intervention in Bosnia, the sooner the resistance can be brought into the open, the sooner it can be confronted and dealt with. This is the subject of stage four, which follows below.

STAGE FOUR: RESISTANCE

When people start to consider new policies seriously (rather than merely as "trial balloons" as in the previous stage), the journey to public judgment hits its first real bump in the road. Any serious foreign policy initiative is bound to meet resistance. The question is, how serious is it, and how can it be countered.

Sometimes the resistance is mild; other times it is fierce and unyielding. The key point to keep in mind is that resistance always indicates strong feelings. People don't resist a new proposal because they don't have the facts. They resist either because the proposal is seen to conflict with cherished values and beliefs, or because it seems to collide with their interests (raising their taxes, threatening their jobs, causing them inconvenience). These perceptions may be erroneous or exaggerated. If so, factual information can help to dispel the misconceptions.

But when strong feelings are involved, simply giving people the facts can be an ineffective and alienating tactic for those whose feelings are being ignored.

During the presidential campaign of 1992, for example, there was some discussion about lifting the ban on gays in the military. But it wasn't until after the election, when the proposal to lift the ban began to loom as a real possibility, that serious resistance started to emerge; only then did the conflict come to the surface. On the one hand, there is in the culture a general movement toward acceptance of alternative life styles. Majorities of the public are comfortable, for example, with the idea of a gay person serving in the president's cabinet (Gallup, June 1992). (Indeed, only a minority of the public says that being gay would disqualify someone as a presidential candidate.) But, on the other hand, many people still harbor a deep-seated emotional antipathy toward homosexuality and a lingering conviction that it violates moral values. Their emotional resistance is triggered when they imagine themselves sharing close quarters with a gay or lesbian person. When the proposal to lift the ban on gays in the military is taken seriously, it causes these conflicts to come to the surface.

In politics, we are most familiar with conflicts between groups of people, such as the bitter and irreconcilable conflict between pro-choice and pro-life groups on the abortion issue. But most conflicts regarding public policy issues take place within the

individual psyche. Most of the time, these conflicts lie dormant until events force them to surface. (For example, in good economic times an individual might support both affirmative action and a seniority system; economic cutbacks cause a conflict between these values as society makes hard choices about who will be laid off first.)

People find it difficult enough to deal with emotional conflict in their personal lives. When it comes to public policy, they are usually under less pressure to resolve the conflict. If they can avoid doing so, they will.

Example: United States as the World's Policeman

One good example of inner conflict is the public's view of the proper role of the United States in world affairs. On the one hand, people say that they want the United States to assume a lower profile in world affairs, but on the other hand, they are not quite ready to relinquish or share American power with our allies or with international organizations such as the UN. What is at stake here are two conflicting value systems that people wish to embrace simultaneously. On the one hand, voters want to focus on the domestic economy and limit our commitments abroad. At the same time, the appeal of a special leadership role in world affairs--moral, political, military--is deeply embedded in our national identity. There is a deep suspicion of our allies and a sense

that, when the chips are down, the United States must ultimately act on its own.

Survey findings document this conflict. Some of the most interesting findings surround the concept of the United States as the world's policeman. Only a small minority of Americans (21 percent) endorses this concept in principle, while 75 percent oppose it (Yankelovich, Clancy Shulman/Time/CNN, March 1991).

On specific issues, however, there is strong support for the United States playing the role of world policeman. Some examples:

- Eighty percent support U.S. air strikes inside Iraq, because of Saddam Hussein's violations of UN resolutions (Harris, January 1993). Nearly six out of ten (59 percent) think that we should continue military actions until Saddam Hussein is removed from power (Gallup, January 1993).
- Fifty-seven percent say they favor using U.S. ground forces to restore peace and humanitarian aid in Bosnia (Gallup/Newsweek, January 1993), and 54 percent say they think the United States has an obligation to use military force in Bosnia if there is no other way to get humanitarian aid to civilians and prevent atrocities (Los Angeles Times, August 1992).
- As many as 70 percent support the general principle that "the U.S. and the United Nations should take clear actions" to stop all sorts of human rights violations against dictators such as General Rodriguez in Paraguay (Market Strategies/Americans Talk Security, November 1991).

The conflict crystallizes when people are asked about relations between the United States, the UN, and our traditional allies. One side of the public's thinking resonates with the idea that the United States should not attempt to "go it alone" in foreign policy:

- Eighty-seven percent believe that the United States should commit its troops only as part of a UN operation (Gallup, December 1992).
- Seventy-three percent believe that the United States should commit troops only in concert with allies (Gallup, December 1992).

But when people are asked questions that evoke the other side of the conflict (namely that the United States must stand up for its own interests), large majorities support the notion of unilateral U.S. action. For example, almost two-thirds of the public (63 percent) believe that the United States should be willing to commit troops on its own in some cases (Gallup, December, 1992).

When both values are directly pitted against each other, the result is a kind of stalemate, as we can see in the following question:

Now that the Soviet Union no longer exists, do you think the United States should share world power with other nations, or should we use our power to ensure that no other nation can challenge our dominance in world affairs? (Yankelovich, Clancy Shulman, March 1992.)

Responses:

Share world power	46%
Ensure no one can challenge us	43
Not sure	11

This example helps to illuminate the nature of what we mean by resistance: the presence within the same individual of two conflicting values. In this instance the two values are a belief in the "special mission" of the United States to act unilaterally to protect its own interests and to impose its own moral standards, coexisting with a belief in the need to act in concert with allies and to delegate the world-policeman role to international bodies such as the UN so that we can pay more attention to urgent domestic concerns.

People are reluctant to give up either value. This reluctance gives rise to a variety of forms of resistance: wishful thinking ("Surely we can do both if we put our mind to it."), avoidance ("Why can't we just ignore the conflict?"), contradictory thinking (support of mutually exclusive policy options), and procrastination ("Maybe if we are lucky it will just go away.").

Rules of Engagement

This stage and the next highlight the most important differences between the two models. The greatest limitation of the top-down model is that it is often ineffective in dealing with resistance caused by conflicts in values because it either ignores

them or rides roughshod over them. The reason it does so is because the top-down theory of public opinion assumes that the public's thinking process is driven by information and persuasion. Most resistance, however, cannot be overcome by giving people more information or even by providing a more persuasive argument. Rarely do the arguments of policy makers address the fundamental value conflicts that are at the root of resistance.

By contrast, the engagement model takes seriously the emotional resistance caused by conflicts in values. Three rules of engagement are important here:

1. Allocate time and attention to resistance. The first principle is simply that foreign policy leaders recognize that such conflicts exist and cannot be ignored. Acknowledgement of this reality should take several forms. Leaders should give people plenty of time to "work through" these conflicts; they cannot be resolved overnight. Leaders should also make sure they understand the public's inner conflicts and how these might differ from their own. The foreign policy community has its own subculture and value system. It is sufficiently removed from the general culture that leaders should never assume that their own value conflicts (or lack thereof) are shared by the general public. It is always worth making the extra effort to learn the precise nature of the public's inner conflicts when resistance makes itself felt.

2. Bring the conflict into the open. Leaders must be prepared to bring the conflict into the open where it can be confronted and

discussed. One reason the race problem continues to fester in the United States is that the real nature of racial conflicts is rarely made explicit. As long as white Americans are reluctant to discuss the sources of tension with black Americans as openly as they do among themselves in private, then the processes of reconciliation, compromise, and resolution cannot proceed. Making conflicts explicit, and giving both sides of the conflict their proper weight and dignity are important leadership functions, without which procrastination and resistance will persist indefinitely.

3. Create the conditions for public resolution to occur. Finally, leaders must recognize that the public has to do the heavy lifting here. Leaders alone cannot overcome these resistances. Leadership needs to provide a format for people to work through the conflicts themselves. But if an issue has real urgency, and leadership has successfully identified the resistance that stands in the way of facing the issue squarely, then the public itself can do the hard work of resolving its own value conflicts. And, with some leadership support, it will do so. If people can get together (literally or figuratively) and deliberate, they will almost always gravitate toward balance and compromise.

It is this deliberative process that in recent years has been almost totally absent from American life, due partly to the dominance of the top-down model.

STAGE FIVE: CHOICEWORK

Once people have worked through their resistance to dealing with an issue, they are ready for the hard work of sorting out various choices, weighing the pros and cons, and beginning to make the hard trade-offs. We call this stage "choicework," emphasizing both the process of wrestling with choices and the fact that this is a very arduous task for the public.

In one way this is the easiest of all the steps for policy makers to understand. This is how leaders themselves come to grip with an issue when they are being systematic: an array of options is developed, their costs and consequences thought through and discussed. What is new and different about the engagement model is not the process itself, but the idea that--at least on certain issues--the public must take part in a similar process.

One of the advantages of involving the public in the process of deliberation is that this is an excellent way to transfer a sense of ownership. If foreign policy leaders want people to make a real commitment to policies so that they stand behind them even when they involve hard choices or sacrifices, leaders need to find a way to help people become invested in those decisions. Obviously, many foreign policy issues do not require this level of public ownership. But for the few that do, there is no better way to bring the public toward a stable and responsible position.

In practice, this stage and the preceding one often overlap. Weighing alternative choices is a good way to bring people's

resistances to the surface to work them through. But while these stages may overlap in time sequence, the business of seriously weighing alternatives usually does not begin until people's emotional resistances have been confronted.

In other words, there are two analytically distinct tasks the public must accomplish once an issue has been fully engaged. One involves resolving value conflicts--a task for the heart as well as the mind. The other is more purely cognitive (weighing pros and cons). The relationship between the two tasks is often complex. Deciding among competing alternatives is hard work intellectually, especially when choices involve difficult-to-assess tradeoffs. Decisions become even harder when there are deep-seated conflicts of interests and moral values to be worked out.

Rules of Engagement

The engagement model and the top-down approach differ strikingly at this stage. The essential contrast is between including the public in the deliberative process versus simply giving people information or selling them on a previously decided option.

For the public to share fully in the deliberative process, a number of conditions must obtain. All of them revolve around the concept of "choicework"--the empirically grounded discovery that the single best mechanism for advancing public deliberation is to give people real choices to mull over.

Research on public thinking about scores of public policy issues shows that presenting choices is a far better method for advancing deliberation than merely laying out the arguments for a single solution: presenting choices gives people a systematic way to consider the consequences of alternative solutions so that they can be weighed against each other thoughtfully and judiciously. Examination of choices is the essence of the deliberative process; it is the one that leaders themselves follow when they are serious about solving a difficult problem.

The message to foreign policy leaders is this: a solid public consensus for new policies is most likely to flow from including the public in the consideration of choices. This means that leaders must give up their double standard, which has traditionally meant presenting options to each other but single solutions to the public.

The rules of engagement for this stage dictate that special effort is required in preparing the conditions for public choicework:

1. Enough choices. The choices have to be the right ones, and there must be enough of them. It is not enough to present choices if they are all inadequate.

In some cases the choices can be confined to two alternatives. In the national debate about the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the country eventually focused on two fairly clear choices: direct military intervention or continued sanctions. In

most cases, however, such as improving trade relations with Japan, the issues are tremendously complex. Unless the choices presented to the public include at least one credible solution to a problem that people feel is urgent, the deliberative process will be aborted.

2. The public's framework, not the experts'. The choices must be defined in the public's terms rather than in the terms experts favor. Frequently experts use terms that mean something very different to the public. During the cold war, for example, there were countless discussions of arms control. By arms control, most experts meant achieving a balance of arms, usually at a high level. To the public, however, the idea of arms control meant arms reduction. In effect, the two groups were talking past each other, thinking that they were speaking to each other but not really communicating. In fact, the public's conception of arms reduction was not employed until the very last years before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

3. Allocate sufficient time. Deliberation takes time. It is not enough to present choices, do an instant poll, and expect that the process has been completed. It takes an irreducible minimum amount of time to accomplish any difficult form of working through choices, especially if strong feelings are also involved. Even when an issue does not stir emotional conflicts, it takes time to grasp and absorb all of its implications. It often takes leaders themselves months or even years to come to a consensus or

compromise; it is hardly reasonable to expect the public to do it overnight.

4. Give the public an incentive. Because deliberation is hard work, people must have be motivated to do it. One of the most effective incentives is to convince people that leaders will actually listen to them and take their thoughts seriously after they have gone to the trouble to debate and work their way through an issue.

A national election forces leaders to listen. In a presidential election, a debate on foreign policy will draw seventy to eighty million viewers. This same debate, in a non-election context, might have only one or two million viewers. The main reason people follow debates in presidential elections more closely than debates at other times is that an election offers them an incentive; at some future date they will vote, and their vote may make a difference.

Elections on specific issues, however, are neither practical nor even desirable. People must have an incentive, but it need not be as tangible as an election. Any sign that leaders are heeding the public's concerns will serve as an incentive. Informally, through their speeches and interviews with media, leaders may invite the public to debate various choices. More formally, other mechanisms can be invented to give the public a sense that leaders are really listening. The Public Agenda Foundation, for example, has experimented with what it calls "public choice campaigns,"

where leaders and the media work together at the city or state level to present a range of choices on a controversial issue. The final step of the process is a mail-in "ballot" where citizens register their final opinion, with some assurance that leaders will take what they say seriously. The public is hungry for any sign that leaders are responsive to their views. A great deal has been said about public apathy, but our experience has been that as soon as the public comes to feel that leadership is genuinely interested in what it has to say, the apathy melts away as if by magic.

5. Make leadership debates meaningful to the public. Our research suggests that indirect and vicarious methods of expediting the public's choicework can also be used to great effect, if done well. For example, congressional debates carried by the media sometimes work well. When they do, people feel that they are participating in the debate themselves.

Unfortunately, most congressional debates seem remote from the public's concerns and fail to expedite the public's choicework. Debates fail to engage the public when they are pursued in either a lawyer-like or a partisan manner--the usual style of congressional debates since most people in Congress are lawyers and partisans.

On rare occasions, however, leadership debates do engage the public. Here again, the national debate in 1991 over the proper response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provides an excellent example of how the public can become vicariously involved in the

deliberative process. The debate in Congress over military intervention or continuing non-military sanctions was strikingly different from the usual partisan, lawyer-like format. The voters appreciated the difference and were helped by it. In this case their elected representatives were seen to be honestly deliberating and searching for an answer to a very difficult problem. The legislators agonized over the issue and were honest in expressing their own doubts and reservations. Rather than advancing interest group positions or offering lawyers' briefs, they drew on their own personal experiences and values, and the public was able to identify with them.

This form of public deliberation (which was widely covered by the media) creates a climate where the public feels it is participating in an extended process of debate and deliberation. The public nature of the debate helped people to do the choice work associated with stage five. As a result, Operation Desert Storm developed strong public support.

STAGES SIX AND SEVEN: INITIAL ACCEPTANCE AND FULL COMMITMENT

In the final stages of the process, people sign on, having worked through both their emotional resistances and the weighing of pros and cons. Full resolution moves through two distinct stages, as people advance from an intellectual assent to a full commitment of both heart and mind. Empirical research shows that the cognitive aspects come first, while the moral and emotional aspects

lag behind. People form a resolution first in their heads; it takes a while for their hearts and consciences to catch up.

Example of Initial Acceptance: Women in the Military

One area where people have come to at least an intellectual resolution is on the question of women in the military. The public has thought this through and is ready to accept the idea of women in the military, at least on an intellectual level. In this connection it is interesting to contrast attitudes today with attitudes a decade ago.

- In a 1981 survey, for example, the clear majority (59 percent) opposed the idea of women serving in combat positions. Only 36 percent favored this concept (NBC/Associated Press, July 1981).
- Today the numbers have completely reversed. In one survey, 74 percent said that "qualified women" should be allowed to serve in combat positions (Gallup, April, 1992).

Once again, there is a striking contrast between attitudes toward women in the military and attitudes toward gays in the military. (The issue of gays in the military, as we have already noted, is still caught in stage four--resistance.) A January 1993 survey showed that people oppose lifting the ban on gays in the military by margins of 48 percent opposed to 43 percent in favor (Yankelovich Partners, Time/CNN, January 1993).

Although Americans have intellectually accepted women in the military, it is far from clear that they have internalized this concept. Americans have not yet dealt clearly with the reality of women in combat positions, and remain uncomfortable with the idea of women in the front line. It will take time for this new reality to be emotionally internalized.

Example of Full Commitment: Support for a Strong Defense

One area where Americans have made a full stage seven commitment is to the maintenance of a strong defense. Given the concern that people have with the economy, one might expect that deep cuts in the defense budget would be enormously popular. But there is strong support for moderate cuts. People have thought this issue through, and support intellectually, emotionally, and morally the concept that America must remain strong, even though the cold war has ended.

Rules of Engagement

Here are the rules of engagement that are useful to observe in these last stages of resolution.

1. Synthesize conflicting values. When two conflicting values are both important to the public, resolution can be enhanced by compromises that preserve at least some elements of each of the conflicting values. Political leaders are usually comfortable with

reaching compromises among themselves, but some degree of inspired tinkering has to be carried out with the public as well.

Cutting the defense budget is a good demonstration of this principle. People want to devote all available resources to the domestic economy, but they also value a strong America. If the country were to pursue either radical cuts in the defense budget or no cuts at all, one or the other value would be flatly rejected. The idea of moderate cuts preserves elements of each conflicting value.

2. Make the context explicit. To ensure final resolution, leaders must relate policies to a broader vision. Whether it be working with the UN to achieve the world policeman role, or U.S.-Japan trade, policies must be articulated in a way that stresses their place in the broad context of America's interests and ideals. The issue of a strong defense has such powerful support precisely because it has been attached to a broader vision of America's role in the world.

In foreign policy more than domestic policy, people think in terms of general principles (often encapsulated in slogans and code words). People easily forget the specific pros and cons of an argument, but they remember the general principles (e.g., "protect American jobs," "create a level playing field," "keep America strong") and relate policies to them. The key here is to find and articulate the general principle that will reinforce resolution.

3. Celebrate the result. Finally, leadership needs to find occasions to pause to recognize and celebrate a genuine accomplishment of democracy. Reaching public judgment on an important issue is not a small task, and everyone deserves--and needs--to be congratulated on achieving it. This includes leaders, experts, and the public alike.

CONCLUSION

The top-down model grows out of a concept of leadership implicit in representative democracy where leaders take responsibility for solutions, and the electorate holds leaders accountable for results. Taking their case to the public may help leaders to inform people and win their support, but the main avenue of public accountability is at election time when leaders who have not done a good job can be replaced ("Throw the rascals out."). The division of tasks is clear: the leaders do the thinking, the public judges the results.

This concept has great strengths, but time has shown that it also has certain limitations. In today's complex world, accountability only at election time is frustrating to the electorate. For one thing, our governance system has evolved ingenious ways to insulate itself from the public, and the public, excluded from the process, fights back by blocking solutions that require it to make sacrifices. As a result, the country is increasingly trapped in a far more serious gridlock than that

between the legislative and the executive branches, much discussed in the 1992 presidential election.

Not surprisingly, the top-down model of leadership is now being challenged in many quarters, not just in government. Nowhere has the top-down model been more deeply entrenched than in large corporations. Traditionally in business the boss makes the decisions; the employees are informed and expected to carry them out. But some corporations have discovered that in today's brutal economy, there are serious limits to this traditional style of leading and communicating with employees. In virtually all major business corporations today, the management styles of the mass-production era are being transformed to fit the new age of information.

The old techniques work well enough when conformity will do the job; they don't work well when what is needed is dramatic change--not just better compliance with the rules, but genuine commitment from the entire workforce. Companies are discovering that if they need to reinvent the company so that it can survive and prosper in today's world, they must shift from the old top-down form of management to one where people are wooed rather than ordered around, and where a vision of the future is shared by all rather than being the exclusive concern of senior management. The result is a form of leadership essentially political in nature. Instead of the boss dictating the direction, managers have to find ways to make people think for themselves and internalize the goals

of the institution. There is still a boss; indeed the CEO function becomes more important than ever. But his or her role is different.

In the world of theory scholars, including philosophers such as Germany's Jurgen Habermas, and American social thinkers such as Jane Mansfield, Amitai Etzioni, and James Fishkin, have also been exploring the concept of deliberative democracy based on new principles of communication and leadership. A number of research institutions and foundations such as the Public Agenda, the Kettering Foundation, the Markle Foundation, and more recently The American Assembly, are also exploring these concepts.⁵

This way of thinking has yet to penetrate the world of foreign policy. In the cold war era, it was not needed. The foreign policy community was entrusted with carrying out a goal--contain communist expansion--which virtually all Americans accepted. Today there is no comparable single threat and no widely shared goal. There is, in fact, a disparity in emphasis, with the leadership continuing to stress America's political-military-moral objectives, while the public has shifted its emphasis to the economic domain.

As a result, foreign policy leaders need to find new ways to work with the public. What is called for is not just new communication techniques, but a new concept of leadership, one that shifts from the traditional "we do the thinking" style to one that encourages a more deliberative public. This will not be required

all the time, or for every issue. On most decisions, foreign policy leadership can continue as usual, with most of the decisions made outside of the spotlight of the public. But on a few critical issues where real public commitment is required, a new deliberative form of leadership is needed. The seven-stage theory of public opinion presented here should give leaders a practical method for seizing upon it and making it work.

DANIEL YANKELOVICH is the author of numerous books and articles on social-political trends and public opinion. His book, Coming to Public Judgment, diagnoses today's policy gridlock. In a recent Fortune article, "The Seven Stages of Public Opinion," he discusses how policy makers can do a better job in building public support. He is also the author of the lead article in Foreign Affairs (Fall '92), "Foreign Policy After the Election." Mr. Yankelovich is the founder of Yankelovich, Skelly and White and The Public Agenda Foundation (with Cyrus Vance), and is currently Chairman of the business research firm DYG, Inc. He is a director of various corporations and non-profit organizations, including US West, The Meredith Corporation, the Kettering Foundation, Educational Testing Service, Inc., and Trustee Emeritus of Brown University.

JOHN IMMERWAHR is a Senior Research Fellow at the Public Agenda Foundation; he is also Chair of the Philosophy Department of Villanova University. He is the author of a number of Public Agenda Reports, including The Speaker and the Listener: Public Perspectives on Freedom of Expression, Crosstalk: The Public, the Experts and Competitiveness, Faculty Diagnosis: Public Misconceptions about Health Care Reform, and (with Daniel Yankelovich), Putting Forth the Work Ethic to Work. He has also written numerous other articles on philosophy and on public policy. He received a BA from Princeton University and a Ph.D from the University of Michigan, where he has also served as Visiting Professor of Philosophy. He lives in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania with his wife and children.

NOTES

¹ This chapter is based on research conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation, with support from the Bohen Foundation.

² Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler, eds., 1992. From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 77.

³ For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see Daniel Yankelovich, 1991. Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.

⁴ Quoted in Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "Structuring the Unseen Environment." J. of Communication 26:2 (Spring 1976), p. 13.

⁵ For more elaboration, see Daniel Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1993

Ms. Marissa Yatco
1356 S. 28th Street, #7
Arlington, Virginia 22206


Dear Ms. Yatco:

Thank you for your résumé and thoughtful letter. I have passed your résumé on to our personnel office for their consideration.

Your expression of support and faith in the President and Mrs. Clinton is very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Margaret A. Williams".

Margaret A. Williams
Chief of Staff to the
First Lady

Marissa Yatco
1356 S. 28th Street
Arlington, VA 22206

Dear Ms. Yatco:

Thank you for your resume and thoughtful letter. I have passed your resume on to our personnel office for their consideration.

Your expression of support and faith in the President and Mrs. Clinton is very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Chief of Staff to the First Lady

Ernie
Nore
Letter
~~to~~ to just refer
Personnel

Marissa Yatco
1356 So. 28th Street, #7
Arlington, Virginia 22206
(703) 549-7729 (H)
(202) 842-2200 (W)

April 8, 1993

Diana -
I sent
Resume
to Anne B.

Ms. Maggie Williams
Chief of Staff to
Hilary Rodham Clinton
The White House
16th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ms. Williams:

I have enclosed my resume for your perusal. I am interested in a position in Mrs. Clinton's office that I may be qualified for.

Let me briefly introduce myself. I have lived in the Washington D.C. area since 1971 and worked mostly as a legal secretary. My brief marriage [I am separated now] gave me the opportunity to go back to school, get an "American" degree; and at the same time, worked part-time in large, "prestigious" law firms in the area, i.e., Hogan & Hartson; Arent, Fox; Covington & Burling.

After a legal secretarial job for many years and learning all that I can, I channelled my efforts on the administrative, management field which is where I am now. It is something new; something new is always a challenge and exciting. I am happy where I am and with what I am doing; but will welcome the opportunity to work for Mrs. Clinton whom I admire and have admired since the first Couple campaigned for the presidency. It is a great honor.

I have always envisioned myself working at the White House, but have only applied now because of my faith and belief that Mr. and Mrs. Clinton will be the difference in our country. It's been a long time coming. I would like to be a part of the difference and the change.

Feel free to call me at work (8:30a.m. to 5:30p.m.) and/or at home. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Marissa Yatco
Marissa Yatco

Enclosure

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1993

Kathleen M. York
10810 Tioga Springs Circle
Plain City, Ohio 43064

Dear Ms. York:

Thank you very much for your letter of October 28, 1993. We appreciate your concern regarding the Clinton Administration's efforts to improve our nation's health care system. To better address your concerns, I have forwarded your letter to the Office of Domestic Policy.

Again, thank you for your comments.

Sincerely,



Margaret A. Williams
Chief of Staff to the
First Lady



Kathleen M. York, RN, BSN
10810 Tioga Springs Circle
Plain City, Ohio 43064
(614) 873-3630

form ltr

being forwarded
to office of
Domestic Policy

October 28, 1993

Ms. Margaret A. Williams
Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC
20500

Dear Ms. Williams:

I am writing you to express my grave concern over the exclusion of home health care in the Clinton Health Care Plan. I am a pediatric nurse and have worked for the last six years in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit at Children's Hospital in Columbus, Ohio. I have watched children over the years in immeasurable suffering, languishing for months. I have seen some of the same children again and again, return to our unit. They live with their conditions 24 hours a day, 365 days per year. They definitely need the home health care supports. Children do better at home, in a loving, caring environment. The hospital is not a place for children to grow up in and with out home supports, they will inevitable never be able to leave. A parent can not provide 24 hour care for a ventilator depended child. The children will spend months unnecessarily at our hospital. Take a child with cystic fibrosis. They may require intravenous antibiotics. This procedure can easily be done at home. This provides a less invasive, stressful environment for treatment. In addition, it is around \$2000.00 savings to administer this treatment at home. Please expand the beneficial service of home health care in your plan.

Very Truly Yours,

Kathleen M York RN BSN

Kathleen M. York, RN, BSN

request to
expand ~~home~~ health
care in Clinton
plan...
WANTS
HOME HEALTH CARE

York
10810 Tioga Springs Circle
Plain City, Ohio
43064



Ms. Margaret A. Williams
Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC
20500

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 23, 1993

Ms. Patricia Young
National Coordinator
US National Committee For
World Food Day
1001 22nd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20437

Dear Ms. Young:


Thank you for your letter of April 30, 1993, regarding our nation's commitment to end world hunger. I apologize for the delay in sending a response, but thousands of wonderful, concerned individuals like yourself have taken the initiative to write in to express their concerns. I am trying to respond to each and every person.

I have forwarded your correspondence to President Clinton. Please be assured that your concerns are very important to the President.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Margaret A. Williams". The signature is fluid and elegant, with a large initial "M" and a long, sweeping underline.

Maggie Williams
Chief of Staff to the First Lady



U.S. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR WORLD FOOD DAY

OCTOBER 16 — A FOCUS FOR YEAR-AROUND ACTION

April 30, 1993

1001 22ND STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20437
TELEPHONE: 202-653-2404
FAX: 202-653-5760

NATIONAL COORDINATOR
PATRICIA YOUNG

Ms. Margaret A. Williams, Chief of Staff
Office of the First Lady
The White House
Washington DC 20500

Dear Ms. Williams:

Knowing of Mrs. Clinton's very high regard for Mrs. Roosevelt, I am writing to ask that she follow her example and convey a proposal to the President concerning our nation's commitment to ending hunger. I am enclosing background on this request, but allow me to highlight several points.

. In 1943 Mrs. Roosevelt learned of efforts to create an international food organization and urged the President to lend his support. He did, and convened the 44 allied nations in the first United Nations meeting, held at Hot Springs, Virginia. The delegates drafted the plans which led to the creation of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the largest specialized agency of the United Nations.


. Plans are underway to commemorate this significant event on June 7th, including a Congressional Resolution, meetings at the State Department and USDA and a ceremony at the location in Washington where the FAO Interim Commission met.

. It is hoped that the President will present the Proclamation to the FAO Director-General and use the occasion to make an announcement that could carry as much potential significance as President Roosevelt's statement on "freedom from want" did in 1943. This would be in keeping with the deep concerns so often expressed by the President and Mrs. Clinton.

The original request was made to Mr. McLarty by Ted Williams of Christian Children's Fund and Senator Charles Robb. I learned on April 29th that the occasion is not on the President's calendar. This is a matter of deep regret for everyone who has invested so much time to make this event a benchmark affecting the next 50 years of work on food security, so I am writing to urge Mrs. Clinton's intercession.

I am sending a letter directly to Mrs. Clinton from my home in Scranton, Pennsylvania in the hopes of catching her attention(!), but I am also writing to you because I believe this request needs urgent attention. I would be happy to meet with you to answer any questions.

Respectfully yours,



Patricia Young
National Coordinator

Enclosures

SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS

A Day Without Starvation
ACCION International
Action for Corporate Accountability
ADRA International
African Methodist Episcopal Church
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church
Africare
Agricultural Cooperative Development International
Agricultural Missions, Inc.
Agriculture Council of America
Alliance for Food and Fiber
All-Peoples Congress
Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc.
Alternative Gift Markets, Inc.
Alternatives
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Agricultural Economics Association
American Agricultural Movement
American Agri-Women
American Anthropological Association
American Association for International Aging
American Association for World Health
American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education
American Association of Community and Junior Colleges
American Association of Retired Persons
American Association of School Administrators
American Association of State Colleges and Universities
American Association of Teacher Educators in Agriculture
American Association of University Women
American Bakers Association
American Baptist Churches
American Baptist Women
American College of Nutrition
American Council of the United Nations University
American Council on Consumer Interests
American Council on Education
American Dietetic Association
American Farm Bureau Federation
American Farm Foundation
American Farmland Trust
AFL-CIO Food and Allied Service Trades Department
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
American Federation of Teachers
American Forestry Association
American Forum
American Home Economics Association
American Institute of Biological Sciences
American Institute of Cooperation
American International Aquaculture Foundation
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
American Jewish World Service
* American Muslim Council
American Public Health Association
American Public Welfare Association
American Red Cross
American School Food Service Association
* American School Health Association

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Enclosures

Respectfully yours,


Patricia Young
National Coordinator

- American Women's Clergy Association
 American Youth Work Center
 Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America
 Association for Childhood Education International
 Association for International Agricultural and Extension Education
 Association of American Colleges
 Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities
 B'nai B'rith International
 B'nai B'rith Women
 Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs
 Baptist World Alliance
 Boy Scouts of America
 Boys and Girls Clubs of America
 Bread for the World Institute on Hunger and Development
 Brother to Brother International, Inc.
 Business and Professional Women
 Campaign to End Hunger
 Camp Fire, Inc.
 COOL—Campus Outreach Opportunity League
 CARE, Inc.
 Catholic Charities USA
 Catholic Golden Age
 Catholic Relief Services
 Center for Advanced Study of International Development
 Center for Community Change
 Center for Global Education
 Center for Rural Affairs
 Center for Science in the Public Interest
 Center of Concern
 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
 Childreach
 Children's Defense Fund
 Children's Foundation
 Christian Children's Fund, Inc.
 Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
 Department of the Church in Society
 Christian College Coalition
 Christian Methodist Episcopal Church
 Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
 Christophers
 Church of the Brethren General Board
 Church Women United
 Church World Service
 Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition
 Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs
 Clean Fuels Development Coalition
 Clergy and Laity Concerned
 Coastal Enterprises, Inc.
 CODEL, Inc.
 Community for Creative Non-Violence
 Community Nutrition Institute
 Community Transportation Association of America
 *Concern, Inc.
 Conference of Consumer Organizations
 Conference of Major Superiors of Men
 Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies—the Agriculture Project
 Congress of National Black Churches
 Consumer Federation of America
 Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
 CAREF—Cooking Advancement, Research and Education Foundation
 Cooking for Survival Consciousness
 Cornell University
 Council of Chief State School Officers
 Council of Independent Colleges
 Countdown 2001
 Crop Science Society of America
 Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc.
 Development Alternatives, Inc.
 Development International, Inc.
 Development Resources
 Dominican Fathers and Brothers
 Earthrise—First Day without Hunger
 Entertainers Against Hunger
 Episcopal Church Center
 Equity Policy Center
 Eritrean Relief Committee
 Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
 Evangelicals for Social Action
 Ezra Taft Benson Agriculture and Food Institute
 Families USA
 Family Farm Coalition
 *Family Health International
 *Family Service America
 Farm Animal Reform Movement, Inc.
 Farm Labor Organizing Committee
 Federation of Southern Cooperatives
 Feed the Children
 Find Your Feet Limited
 First Nations Financial Project
 Food Banking, Inc.
 FOOD FOR ALL
 Food for the Hungry
 Food Industry Crusade Against Hunger
 Food Marketing Institute
 Food Research and Action Center—FRAC
 Foreign Policy Association
 FINCA (Foundation for International Community Assistance)
 Franciscans/Holy Name Province
 *These organizations joined the U.S. National Committee for World Food Day in 1992.
- of Agriculture
 National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges
 National Association of Wheat Growers Foundation
 National Audubon Society
 National Catholic Rural Life Conference
 National Center for Appropriate Technology
 National Center for Economic Alternatives
 National Center on the Black Aged
 National Community Education Association
 National Conference of State Legislatures
 National Congress for Community Economic Development
 National Congress of American Indians
 National Consumer Cooperative Bank
 National Consumers League
 National Cooperative Business Association
 National Corn Growers Association
 National Council for International Health
 National Council of Catholic Women
 National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
 National Council of Jewish Women
 National Council of LaRaza
 National Council of Negro Women
 National Council of Returned Peace Corps Volunteers
 National Council of Senior Citizens
 National Council of Women of USA
 National Council on the Aging
 National Education Association
 National Extension Homemakers Council, Inc.
 National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association
 National Farm Worker Ministry
 National Farmers Organization
 National Farmers Union
 National Federation of Priests' Councils
 National Federation of Republican Women
 National Federation of State High School Associations
 National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods
 National Fisheries Institute, Inc.
 National Food and Energy Council
 National Food Processors Association
 National 4-H Council
 National Gardening Association
 National Grange
 National Hispanic Cultural Commission
 National Institute for Science, Law and Public Policy
 National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council
 National Land for People
 National League of Cities
 National Milk Producers Federation
 National Office of Jesuit Social Ministries
 National PTA
 National Rainbow Coalition, Inc.
 National Restaurant Association
 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
 National Sharecroppers Fund/
 Rural Advancement Fund
 National Student Campaign against Hunger and Homelessness
 National Women's Health Network
 *Native American Rights Fund
 Natural Organic Farmers Association
 Natural Resources Defense Council
 Network
 New England Small Farm Institute
 North American Farm Alliance
 North American Regional Organization of International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations
 Northeast Task Force for Food, Farm and Consumer Policy
 Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, Inc.
 Operation PUSH
 Orthodox Church in America
 Overseas Development Council
 Overseas Development Network
 OXFAM—America
 Pan American Development Foundation
 PANOS Institute
 Partners of the Americas
 Pax World Foundation
 Peace Corps Institute
 Peace Links
 Pennsylvania State University
 Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity, Inc.
 Planetary Citizens
 Plenty USA
 Polish National Catholic Church
 Population Crisis Committee
 Population-Environment Balance, Inc.
 Population Institute
 Population Reference Bureau
 Prairiefire Rural Action, Inc.
 Presbyterian Hunger Program
 Presbyterian Women
 Project Concern International
 Protein Grain Products International
 Public Voice for Food and Health Policy
 Reformed Church in America
 Regeneration Project
 Renew America
 Resources for the Future
 RESULTS/RESULTS Education Fund
 Rural Coalition, Inc.
- Save the Children
 Science for the People
 Second Harvest
 SEEDS
 Self Help Foundation
 Share Our Strength—SOS
 Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority, Inc.
 Sister Cities International
 Sisters of Charity of New York
 Sisters of Charity—Northern Province
 Sisters of Mercy of the Americas
 Skiers Ending Hunger
 Society for International Development
 Society for Nutrition Education
 Society of St. Andrew—Potato Project
 Soil and Water Conservation Society of America
 Soil Science Society of America
 Southern Baptist Convention/
 Christian Life Commission
 Southern Baptist Convention/
 Home Mission Board
 Southern California Interfaith Hunger Coalition
 Southern Christian Leadership Conference
 Southern Council of Hunger Coalitions
 Southern Illinois University
 Stanford University Food Research Institute
 Synagogue Council of America
 Technoserve, Inc.
 Telamon Corporation
 Texas A&M University
 The Association for the Study of Food and Society
 The Association of Child Advocates
 The End Hunger Network
 The Hunger Project
 The Land Institute
 *The Points of Light Foundation
 The Marianists
 Third World Resources
 TRANET
 TransAfrica
 Trees for Life
 *Trees for the Future
 Trickle Up Program, Inc.
 *Union of American Hebrew Congregations
 Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
 Unitarian-Universalist United Nations Office UAW
 United Church of Christ
 United Farm Workers
 *United Food & Commercial Workers International Union
 *United Methodist Church General Board of Church and Society
 United Methodist Church General Board of Global Ministries—Women's Division
 United Methodist Committee on Relief—UMCOR
 United Nations Association (UNA-USA)
 U.S. Association for the Club of Rome
 U.S. Catholic Conference
 U.S. Committee for Refugees
 U.S. Committee for UNICEF
 United States Conference of Mayors
 U.S. Overseas Cooperative Development Committee
 U.S. Student Association
 U.S. Wheat Associates
 United Synagogues of America
 *United Way of America
 University of Minnesota Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs
 University of Notre Dame Hunger Coalition
 University of Scranton
 University of Wisconsin—Stout
 Urban League
 Valentine Vision
 Volunteers in Technical Assistance
 Volunteer: National Center for Citizen Involvement
 Wallstart
 Winrock International
 WIFE—Women Involved in Farm Economics
 Women and Food Network
 Women of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America
 Women's National Democratic Club
 World Association of Soil and Water Conservation
 World Concern
 World Congress on Philanthropy
 World Education, Inc.
 World Federalists Association
 World Food Museum/Potato Museum
 World Hunger Education Service
 World Hunger Year
 World Neighbors
 World Relief
 World Resources Institute
 *World SHARE
 *World Runners International Foundation
 World Vision Relief and Development Organization
 Worldwatch Institute
 Worldwide Farmers Exchange
 YMCA Office of International Education
 YMCA—National Board
 Zero Population Growth

THE HOT SPRING CONFERENCE - A HISTORIC NOTE ¹

The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held at the Homestead in Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 to June 3, 1943, was the first step leading to the creation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. The second step was the establishment of an Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture following the conference and the final step was the formal founding of the FAO itself which took place on October 16, 1945 at the Chateau Frontenac in Quebec City, Canada. The 50th anniversary of the first of these two events will be celebrated this summer.

The idea of forming an international organization to deal with problems of food, agriculture, and nutrition was not entirely new. David Lubin, a Polish-born American who was concerned with the plight of farmers during the depressions of the 1880's and 1890's, recognized the need for such an international body and he carried out a crusade that eventually led to the establishment in Rome on June 7, 1905, with the assistance of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, of the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA).

In the summer of 1935, Frank McDougall of Australia, while in Geneva attending the League of Nations, prepared a memorandum on "agricultural and health problems". This memorandum furnished the material for a speech to the League's General Assembly by Stanley Bruce (later Viscount Bruce of Melbourne and the first Independent Chairman of the FAO Council), in which Bruce made a strong case for "the marriage of health and agriculture". That speech led quite unexpectedly, to a three-day discussion. In October 1942, McDougall, who was in Washington negotiating a wheat agreement, took the lead in preparing a draft memorandum on a United Nations programme for freedom from want of food. The term "United Nations" was used at the time to refer to the allied nations who had joined together in a mutual effort to defeat the Axis powers in the Second World War. McDougall's views came to the attention of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who believed they should be brought to the President's attention and she arranged for him to dine at the White House. When he got the President's ear, McDougall made the point that, while the allies were held together by the exigencies of war, once the war was over they would need some common problems if cooperation was to continue. Food was seen as of major concern to all. The President was attentive to McDougall's presentation, but gave no indication of any action he might take. McDougall heard nothing until he read a newspaper announcement that Roosevelt was inviting allied governments to the Hot Springs Conference.

Forty-four nations participated in the Hot Springs Conference (plus Denmark, which was present informally). They decided that an Interim Commission should be set up in Washington, D.C. not later than July 15, 1943, to carry forward the conference recommendations. This Commission was chaired by Mr. Lester B. Pearson, who was to become the Prime Minister of Canada 20 years later. Its work ended when FAO was formally established on October 16, 1945. On that date, 45 nations were eligible for membership and 35 signed the new Constitution. Three other countries formally took up membership during the First Conference, while an additional seven became members between November 30, 1945 and December 1, 1953. One eligible member, the USSR, never chose to become a member. During this time, the headquarters of the FAO was moved from Washington, where it was first located in 1948, to Rome, where it has been established since 1951. Membership continued to grow and by the close of the 26th Conference in November 1991, there were 160 member nations, one member organization (the EEC) and one associate member (Puerto Rico).

It should be noted that the IIA, the first international agricultural organization, was liquidated following the Second World War and its assets were absorbed by the FAO. A major resource was the Institute's library which was merged with FAO's and the combined collection was designated the David Lubin Memorial Library. Lubin's portrait hangs in this library, honouring the man who may justifiably be called the first international agriculturalist.

¹ FAO is grateful to Mr. Ralph Phillips, former Deputy Director-General, who kindly provided the background information for this note.

OPTIONS FOR WHITE HOUSE CEREMONY
June 7, 1993

PURPOSES To honor the UN Food and Agriculture Organization on the occasion of its founding meetings held at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 - June 3, 1943
To renew international commitment to food security in the face of coming demands on world agriculture

PROGRAM Proclamation signing ceremony and photo opportunity
Oval Office meeting with President Clinton and Director-General Edouard Saouma

LOCATION*	<u>East Room</u>	<u>Rose Garden</u>
INVITATION LIST		
Administration Officials	State, USDA, AID	Same plus other
Diplomatic Corps	Dean of Corps Original 44 nations Italian Ambassador Lebanon Ambassador	Same plus all DC-based Ambassadors
Congressional Representatives	Resolution Sponsors (Simon and De La Garza) House and Senate Agriculture committees; Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations; Virginia Delegation	Same plus all members
Historic Figures	Roosevelt Family; Truman Family; Stettinius son; Lester Pearson son; Juan Felipe Yriart; other	Same plus former agriculture secretaries; former US FAO representatives, etc.
FAO Representatives	FAO Rome (Director-General and party); FAO Washington; FAO UN; former Deputy Directors-General; former directors of Washington office	Same
UN Agency Representatives	United Nations Association; World Bank; UNDP, IFAD, WHO, UNIC, etc.	Same
Virginia Representatives	Governor; Virginia Committee	Same
Non-Governmental Organizations	Those with FAO Consultative Status; Other INGOs	Same plus WFD sponsors; industry; ICN list
Special Invitees	Friends and Family of Director-General; Mrs. Jean Mayer; Pauline Boerma	Same

* A smaller ceremony could be arranged in the Roosevelt Room (or other) with representatives selected from each category above.