

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Working File, November 1996

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1398

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Sinn Fein and IMG Trade "Questions" Relating to Terms for Possible IRA Ceasefire (3 pages)	02/20/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
002. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Northern Ireland: Critical Days Approach (1 page)	11/27/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
003. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: New U.S. Initiative on Northern Ireland (2 pages)	11/23/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
004. cable	John Holmes to Anthony Lake (3 pages)	11/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
005. fax cover sheet	re: Martha Pope/Gerry Kelly [partial] (2 pages)	12/01/1996	P3/b(3)
006. report	re: Multi Party Talks Daily Report (3 pages)	11/18/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
007. memo	Val Martinez to Anthony Lake re: Northern Ireland Developments: Proposed British Statement (3 pages)	11/06/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
008. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Update on Northern Ireland (1 page)	11/28/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
009. cable	Anthony Lake to John Holmes (3 pages)	11/27/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
010. cable	Anthony Lake to John Holmes (3 pages) Partial release - KBH 8/29/2023	11/27/1996	P1/b(1)
011. talking points	re: Suggested Talking Points, John Holmes (1 page)	11/27/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
012. notes	re: [Soderberg Notes on Mitchell Meeting] (2 pages)	11/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, November 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- 1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- 2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- 3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- 4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- 5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- 6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



Edward M. Kennedy

U.S. Senator for Massachusetts

315 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
202/224-4543
202/224-2417 FAX

W4

FAX TRANSMISSION

DATE/TIME:

3/18/97

TO:

Nancy

RECEIVING FAX#:

391-~~2000~~ 2403

FROM:

Trina Vargo, Foreign Policy, 224-2638

NUMBER OF PAGES
INCLUDING COVER:

8

COMMENTS:



Northern Ireland Office
Stormont Castle
Belfast BT4 3ST

Mr John Hume MP
House of Commons
London
SW1A 0AA

14 March 1997

Dear John

You approached me a short while ago to explain to me your belief that a further IRA ceasefire, which would help clear the way for Sinn Fein's participation in talks, was a possibility. I explained to you that the Government's position on a new ceasefire and on Sinn Fein's involvement in talks was set out in the Talks Ground Rules and the Prime Minister's statement of 28 November 1996, and that that position was not open to negotiation. I also explained, however, that if there were areas of Government policy where Sinn Fein were still uncertain of our position, we would be prepared to consider any genuine questions they might put to us. You subsequently sent me, on 31 January, a preliminary list of such questions ~~which were not considered in the~~
~~document.~~

There is an obvious - and unacceptable - inconsistency between Sinn Fein's repeated assurances of their commitment to the search for peace, and the continuing deplorable attacks by the IRA, notably the murder, last month, of Lance Bombardier Stephen Restorick. This inconsistency engenders serious mistrust, and in the light of that I put to you certain questions of our own about Sinn Fein's position. In due course you gave me replies to these, the responses being reflected in Gerry Adams' article of 22 February in the Irish Times.



I have reflected carefully on the questions you have put to me and I now offer you the following answers and commentary in reply. These reflect the legal position, and our existing policy as set out in the Prime Minister's statement of 28 November 1996.

I set out the questions you sent me: each is followed by my answer and commentary.

Does the British Government remain operationally committed to inclusive and comprehensive negotiations, in accordance with the principles and understandings set out in the public documents which they have agreed with the Irish Government on this issue?

- Yes. The British Government's operational commitment has been demonstrated in the efforts which have resulted in the current talks process which began on 10 June 1996.

As paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Ground Rules agreed between the British and Irish Governments set out, these negotiations are intended to be inclusive: they are open to all the parties which successfully contested the May 1996 elections and which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process. Sinn Fein's participation requires the unequivocal restoration of the IRA's ceasefire of 1994. A new ceasefire must be genuinely unequivocal. Beyond this, the negotiations are without pre-conditions.

These negotiations are comprehensive. The agreed rules of procedure, accepted by all the current participants, provide for:



- all the key relationships to be covered;
- all participants to negotiate in good faith, address seriously all aspects of the agreed agenda, and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement;
- a comprehensive agenda for the negotiations as a whole to be adopted by agreement and each participant to be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns without their ability to do so being subject to the veto of any other party in the negotiations;
- no negotiated outcome to be either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Sinn Fein say that they can, "with credibility", seek an IRA ceasefire "when a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiations is genuinely being offered". Such a process already exists and Sinn Fein will be invited to join it once there is a restoration of the IRA ceasefire, on a basis that is genuinely unequivocal. We can see no cause for further uncertainty, prevarication or delay. Sinn Fein should now seek an immediate and genuinely unequivocal ceasefire.

What are the practical implications of these commitments for the inclusion of Sinn Fein in a meaningful negotiating process?



- The practical implication is that for Sinn Fein to participate in these negotiations there needs to be a restoration of the IRA ceasefire, on a basis that is genuinely unequivocal.

A comprehensive negotiating process exists which is statutorily open to Sinn Fein if the requirements in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Ground Rules are met. The Secretary of State must, in accordance with the statute, invite Sinn Fein to nominate its team to participate in the negotiations as soon as he considers those requirements are met.

The Government statement of 28 November 1996 set out the process which would follow the declaration by the IRA of a restoration of the ceasefire, in order to ensure that assurances were in place that any new ceasefire was intended to be genuinely unequivocal, ie lasting and not simply a tactical device. The Secretary of State is also committed to consulting the Irish Government.

Our policy has always been for inclusive talks. There is nothing in the 28 November statement to preclude Sinn Fein's early participation in the talks after a ceasefire. We do not seek an unnecessary lapse of time. Entry depends on the words and deeds of the IRA and Sinn Fein. Indeed, the statute requires the issuing of an invitation as soon as practicable once the requirements are met.

What assurance is there that engagement on the key political issues underlying the conflict, which must be the purpose of any meaningful negotiation, will not be thwarted by recourse to unreasonable or undeliverable preconditions?



What assurance is there that Unionist politicians, as the incumbents and beneficiaries of the status quo, will not simply exploit that advantage to stall indefinitely, in effect using an open-ended negotiating process as a tactical instrument to ward off, rather than to seek agreement on political change?

- Taking these together, all participants in the current negotiations are committed, under the agreed rules of procedure, to negotiate in good faith, seriously address all aspects of the agreed agenda, and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement.

We agree that there needs to be a determined and sustained engagement on the key political issues underlying the conflict. It is only through such a process of engagement, leading to a political agreement and democratic ratification embracing all the key issues and relationships, that progress can be made in resolving the underlying conflict. That engagement needs to involve both main traditions, as well as the British and Irish Governments, as appropriate.

The consent of both main traditions - unionist and nationalist - to any agreement is essential. But such consent must be freely given on both sides: it cannot be forced or coerced.

The British Government's role is to encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of such agreement over a period, through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. It cannot, however, force or guarantee agreement: in particular, it cannot secure unionist agreement or even participation where the consent of unionist representatives and people is absent.



The Government is, however, fully committed to using its influence to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed and to doing so, for its part, with a view to overcoming any obstacles in the negotiating process. The Government has already set out in 'Frameworks for the Future' its assessment of the parameters of a possible outcome to the talks process as an aid to discussion and negotiation.

Timetables cannot guarantee agreement; this can only come about through a good faith engagement by all sides. If it would be helpful, the Government will bring forward, in conjunction with the Irish Government, proposals to the participants for the adoption of an agreed indicative timeframe for the conduct of negotiations.

It is generally accepted that the lack of trust and confidence has been a major obstacle in the peace process so far. What contribution would the British Government make to confidence-building in the event of an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire?

- The Government's statement of 28 November set out its commitment to raising confidence, including continuing to apply the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment, parity of esteem and equal respect for the varied cultural traditions of both communities across the spectrum of issues. It set out how it would continue to pursue a process of mutual confidence building and how the opportunity for further confidence building would be enhanced by a restoration of the IRA ceasefire.



The statement envisaged that the first step in the process following the declaration of a restoration of the ceasefire which was genuinely unequivocal would be meetings with Sinn Fein at various levels to explore with them what assurances could be given and what confidence building measures established. As the statement also explained, confidence building is a two-way street. We therefore welcome Sinn Fein's endorsement of the suggestions in Chapter VII of the International Body's Report, including:

- the early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting;

- the provision of information on the status of missing persons;

- the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

The Government has already endorsed the Report as a whole, including Chapter VII.

In order to ensure that there are no misunderstandings about these important issues I intend to make clear our position either in due course, by issuing this letter for publication or in some other suitable way.

Yours sincerely,
Patrick

75/11/12
buhler

3/6/97

1150pm

McMichael -

bomb outside SF in Republic. No indication
as to who, ~~ass~~ rumors UDF. not sure.
Could be rogue element, Billy Wright
last day of negotiations

Hope things will stay quiet
bomb attack from IRA, no one injured
going to be over 50

Bill Flynn helping financially
- put in request for POTUS;
turned down; only ones who haven't
needs personal recognition;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. The two governments have agreed to launch the preparatory phase for all party talks in the peace process with a target date of not later than December 15, substantive political negotiations in round table format, to reach an agreed political settlement based on consent. The two governments will work jointly to lay the groundwork for constructive round table talks by seeking agreement among the concerned parties on the basis, participation and agenda for the negotiations. The governments will be ready to meet with the parties jointly or to convene a meeting with two or more parties at their request.
2. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an international body under the eminent chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell, to ascertain and advise the two governments on whether and in what context and manner the question of illegal arms, now thankfully silenced, can be finally and satisfactorily settled. Senator Mitchell will be assisted by two other figures of international standing likely to inspire widespread confidence.
3. The body will have the remit of reporting, by the end of November, whether it has established that a clear commitment exists on the part of the relevant organizations to a satisfactory process for the full and verifiable decommissioning of illegally held arms. To reach its conclusions, the panel will consider, among other factors, the commitment of the political parties (relevant) to exclusively peaceful and democratic means of influencing the body politic. In addition, the panel can review other political issues that may be relevant to the decommissioning issue.
4. The British government reaffirms that movement on the question of illegally held arms would open the way to further responsive measures, including (on the advice of the chief constable) further troop reductions. The British Government reaffirms that, if progress were maintained, these measures would lead ultimately to its objective of totally civilian policing.
5. The body will report to the two governments who will undertake to consider seriously any recommendations it makes and give them due weight on their merits.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 1/11/14
2011-0355-P

Baldwin, Kenneth

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Draft Communique [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, October 11, 1995 9:46AM
Priority: High

Here is a suggested version. The key issue, it seems to me, is to give the commission a vague and therefore broad mandate. < < File Attachment: IRLCOMMQ.DOC > >

NE 5

! Status of prisoner transfer
cases. Ones in boxes (p 2+3)
are those just approved.
None pending, far as I know.

Tha P wq

with his home country and the United States, respectively. In keeping with our understanding of national policy, this Office has historically been very reluctant to grant transfers to those who have come to the United States and committed offenses in furtherance of terrorist activities.

In the cases now pending decision, the Embassy of Ireland, as well as the prisoners and their representatives, have urged us to ignore the terrorist element of their offenses and to transfer these prisoners because transfer would, they say, aid in the on-going peace process in Northern Ireland. We are in no position to assess this claim.

As you can see from the synopsis which follows on each of these cases, several of these prisoners are near their release dates. This is an important factor. Weighing against transfer, though, is the nature of these offenses and the adamant opposition of the prosecutors and law enforcement officers who were involved in these prosecutions and who therefore know the facts well. Your assistance in evaluating the political considerations would be appreciated.

The prisoners are:

Seamus Anthony Moley (Ireland): Moley was convicted for his part in a weapons purchasing conspiracy which was prosecuted both in Florida (the stinger missile phase) and in Arizona (the detonators phase). The evidence demonstrated that 2,000 explosive detonators purchased by the Moley and his co-conspirators were shipped in unmarked cardboard boxes on Greyhound passenger buses from Tucson, Arizona, to New York, New York. Moley was also instrumental in providing \$50,000 for the conspirators to purchase a Stinger missile, apparently to be used against British helicopters. He was sentenced to serve a total of seventy months, and his projected release date is July 15, 1996.

Kevin Joseph McKinley (Ireland): A co-conspirator of Moley's. He also was sentenced to serve a total of seventy months, and his projected release date is August 27, 1996.

Martin Peter Quigley (Ireland): Quigley was convicted of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Act, violating the Arms Export Act, conspiracy to injure or destroy property, and possession of property in aid of foreign insurgents.

According to the prosecutor, the evidence in this case established that the prisoner and his co-conspirators were terrorists engaged in the research and development of explosives and surface-to-air missiles for export to the Republic of Ireland and for use by the PIRA in its attacks against British civilian and military targets. The prisoner was personally involved in

ALREADY
RELEASED

ALREADY
RELEASED

WITHDRAWN
HIS
REQUEST

3

soliciting the aid of an American co-conspirator³ to aid in the development of a surface-to-air missile system to "counteract" British military helicopters in Northern Ireland. The prisoner was prosecuted in the District of Massachusetts. Sentenced to serve ninety-six months, he has a projected release date of December 27, 1996.

Peter Eamon Maguire (Ireland): A co-conspirator of Quigley's. We have been told that Maguire was the Southern Commander for the PIRA for many years, and has been in the PIRA's explosives research program since the late 1970s. Maguire is fifty-nine years of age and has been treated for basal cell carcinoma, a form of skin cancer. He is serving a seventy-month sentence and his projected release date is January 26, 1998.

Samuel Ignatius Millar (Northern Ireland): Millar was convicted of conspiracy to receive stolen money. This conviction arose out of a January 5, 1993 robbery of a Brinks facility in Rochester, New York, in which approximately \$7.4 million was stolen. The prisoner came under suspicion soon thereafter, and ultimately was found to be in possession of a portion of the stolen money. The prisoner and his American codefendants had substantial connections with the PIRA and, without going into every detail of this complex circumstantial case, it is clear that the proceeds of this robbery were to go for PIRA projects. The prisoner is serving a sixty-month sentence and is scheduled to be released on March 22, 1998.

Please do not hesitate to call me on (202) 514-1107 if you have any questions. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Sylvia Royce
Chief, International Prisoner
Transfer Unit
Office of Enforcement Operations

³This is significant because the district court judges typically mete out sentences which reflect the comparative culpability of all the defendants. Transfer of those prisoners who happen to be foreign nationals to countries which may treat them very sympathetically raises real fairness issues for the American convicts.

Michael Oliver McNaught (Northern Ireland): Fifty-one year old Michael McNaught was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, obstruction of commerce, firearms offenses and other related charges arising out of an attempted robbery of the Bank of New England in Boston, Massachusetts. He was sentenced to serve 68 months in prison, and his projected release date is May 18, 2000.

Chronology of Recent IRA Terrorism

1996

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| 9 February | The IRA breaks its 17-month cease-fire by detonating a truck bomb in the Docklands area of east London. |
| 15 February | Security authorities disarm an IRA bomb in a phone booth in central London. |
| 18 February | A bomb explodes on a bus in central London, killing the IRA perpetrator. |
| 9 March | A small IRA bomb explodes inside a trash bin at a western London cemetery close to a Defense Ministry building. |
| 17 April | A small IRA bomb explodes in the garden of an empty house in the Boltons area of southwestern London. |
| 25 April | Security authorities find two undetonated IRA bombs under Hammersmith Bridge, London. |
| 15 June | The IRA explodes a large vehicle bomb near the Arndale shopping center in Manchester, England. |
| 28 June | IRA terrorists attack a British Army barracks in Osnabruck, Germany, with three mortar rounds. |
| 7 October | The IRA detonates two vehicle bombs on the grounds of the British Army headquarters in Lisburn, Northern Ireland. |
| 21 December | IRA gunmen shoot and injure a policeman guarding a senior member of the Democratic Unionist Party in a Belfast children's hospital. |

1997

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| 1 January | Security authorities defuse an IRA vehicle bomb on the grounds of Belfast Castle. |
| 6 January | IRA rocket attack on Northern Ireland's Court of Justice in central Belfast injures a police officer. |

INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO:

*To: NES
From: MAP**Wd
(Astatist)*

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FBIS S 072JAN10

UNCLAS 7E

UNITED KINGDOM: Daily Carries IRA New Year Statement MS1001120697 Dublin
An Phoblacht in English 9 Jan 97 p

Unattributed Report: "IRA 'Unified, Confident and Steadfast'"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The IRA has said it is ready to

assist in the development of the conditions necessary" for re-
establishing a meaningful peace process.

The message came in a New Year statement issued on 8 January.

The full text of the statement reads: "The leadership of Oglagh
na hEireann [Irish Volunteers] extends New Year greetings to our friends
and our supporters at home and abroad. We send solidarity greetings
to our comrades imprisoned in Ireland, England and the USA.Our thoughts, at this particular time of year, are also with
the families of Volunteers Ed O'Brien and Diarmuid O'Neill who tragically
lost their lives in the past year.As we move into the New Year we feel it appropriate to again
reaffirm our steadfast commitment to our republican objectives. Our
primary objective remains the reunification of our country. We reiterate
also our commitment to the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in Ireland.Time and again in the past we have demonstrated clearly that
we will face up to our responsibilities, either in the direct pursuit
of our objectives or in assisting in the development of the conditions
necessary for the establishment of a meaningful process with the potential
for securing a lasting settlement to the conflict in Ireland.On 9 February last we announced, with reluctance, an end to our
complete cessation of military operations. Whilst we take full responsibility
for that decision we remind John Major and his government that the opportunity

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for lasting peace, created by our initiative of 31 August 1994, 18 months earlier, had been gradually strangled to the point of extinction by himself and his cabinet long before our decision to resume military operations.

We commend those who, despite British bad faith, continue to rise to the challenge of attempting to put together a meaningful process aimed at initiating inclusive negotiations with the goal of attaining a lasting peace settlement.

In the 18 months prior to 9 February the British refused to do this. Events since then have demonstrated a continuing lack of political will, on their part, to do so. They remain both firmly opposed to the development of the required process and also committed to underpinning the Unionist agenda in whatever process takes root in its place, nowhere better exemplified than at Drumcree, on the Ormeau Road and in Derry in the summer months of last year.

Lasting peace requires an inclusive negotiated settlement. There can be no preconditions on participation in such negotiations.

We approach the year ahead unified, confident and steadfast in our commitment to succeed. No amount of British obduracy will deflect us from the task we have set ourselves. Beirigi bua." [gain victory]

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FBIS 01/10/97 06:43:00

FROM:
SITREPT

INTERNATIONAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ulster Democratic Party

Briefing Paper

December 1996

The Talks process

The stalemate which has been reached on the current agenda item of decommissioning cannot be overcome in any other way than a compromise being reached between the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP.

Unless these two parties can come to agreement, therefore making sufficient consensus realizable, the talks shall inevitably collapse.

The Chairman is currently working on a compromise package, but if that is not going to be accepted before the Christmas break, then the talks shall rise for around one month. This period may be beneficial if it facilitates a cooling off period which may produce a more reasoned approach when the talks sit again. Alternatively it could result in some of the participants deciding not to return to the process in January.

Naturally what materializes from the ongoing dialogue which is taking place between Adams Hume and Major will have a significant impact upon how the process develops in either a positive or negative sense.

This alternative process of dialogue, in pursuit of a cease-fire restoration, is already at this point having serious impact on the approach both the SDLP and UUP are taking in relation to the current decommissioning stalemate.

The Adams/Hume/Major Talks

While it is at least encouraging that some evidence exists of a willingness to pursue a cease-fire, there is concern about this alternative Talks process. It is considered among the wider community that a secret process of negotiation is taking place between the British government and Sinn Fein through the medium of John Hume.

The first point which must be made is that there is a world of difference between trying to encourage the IRA that they should engage a new cease-fire and what this is believed to be, a case of negotiating a cease-fire. It is not the view of loyalists or the wider community that a cease-fire should be bartered for.

The need for a cease-fire is absolute and must be unilaterally engaged by the IRA. It is absolutely unacceptable for political concessions to be offered in return for a cease-fire.

**DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING**

Initials: M' Date: 1/12/16

721-0355-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Talks process which has been taking place since June between the other nine NI political parties elected to them is being undermined because of what is perceived to be an alternative process taking place in secret. It is natural that such secrecy creates suspicion and that the Talks process at Castle Buildings is devalued by it.

Unionists have a particular difficulty being comfortable with the communications between Adams/Hume and Major. This is because it has been presented that Hume/Adams delivered into John Major's hands the terms for another IRA cease-fire. These have been described as peace proposals.

It is believed by unionists that these proposals are in fact a raft of preconditions which must be met to facilitate such a cease-fire. That belief is well founded. The fact that while John Hume has said that the proposals do not 'threaten or offend any section of our community' does not alleviate suspicion, for while this statement is made on the one hand, on the other Hume and Adams refuse to make public what the proposals contain.

There is also an element of suspicion about John Hume's position. He is not seen in a role of honest broker in the relationship. His public pronouncements have placed him solely in the court of Adams, constantly outlining the responsibility which John Major must accept in the search for peace, ignoring the other side of the coin which is that the IRA have responsibilities to face also.

An IRA cease-fire

There is reason to doubt whether the IRA is in a position to engage another cease-fire now or in the near future. Their organization is subject to such internal difficulty that it is unlikely it would remain intact if the ruling body called a cease-fire. Our analysis is that the IRA shall not risk a fragmentation under any circumstances. One must remember that Canary Wharf happened not purely because of dissatisfaction with the peace process, but as reaction to a threatened split within its ranks.

If this internal problem were however to be overcome, the question of what forms a credible cease-fire has still to be answered. There is a view throughout nationalism in Northern Ireland and abroad that the IRA should be admitted immediately into Talks upon a declaration of another cease-fire. A cease-fire is a cease-fire after all. But in our view this is a simplistic and naive view. It ignores the deep feeling of distrust in which the unionist people hold the IRA.

The IRA demand that a condition for a cease-fire is a guarantee of immediate inclusion in Talks, regardless of the views of the other participants. Loyalists wish the negotiation process to be inclusive, but that does not solely apply to the inclusion of Sinn Féin. The process is not advanced if the inclusion of Sinn Féin takes is enforced against the background of a questionable cease-fire resulting in some or all of the unionist or loyalist parties walking away from the table.

It is argued by prominent persons such as Congressman Bruce Morrison that it is reasonable for the IRA to seek assurances from the British government that things shall be different this time round. Surely it is equally reasonable for unionists and loyalists to seek assurances from the IRA that it shall be different this time round in the event of a cease-fire.

One cannot pretend that Canary Wharf, Manchester, Osnabreuk, and Lisburn simply did not happen, that attitudes towards the IRA have not been affected by this experience. The activities of the IRA cannot be simply written off. Naturally republicans must take confidence building steps to convince others of that they are sincere and that a cease-fire is credible.

A credible cease-fire

When is a cease-fire not a cease-fire. The answer is, when preparation for an offensive is simultaneously employed. The 1994 cease-fire was declared as a total and complete cessation, yet within days of its announcement the IRA was buying property in London and putting assets into place which would be used in an offensive campaign following the eventual collapse of its cease-fire.

For the duration of the IRA cease-fire that organization was gathering intelligence, building networks in Britain and Europe, developing new weaponry technology, training personnel and targeting individuals for assassination, including those of us it sought to negotiate with.

An unequivocal restoration of the 1994 cease-fire bears all those activities we have identified. What is therefore required is the declaration of an unequivocal cease-fire, which is an entirely different thing.

If the IRA wishes to be taken seriously then it must recognize the lack of trust of its position, and take confidence building steps directed towards the apprehensions held within the unionist and loyalist community.

We believe that the manner in which a new cease-fire is expressed is a crucial factor. The first confidence step taken by the Combined Loyalist Military Command was in its cease-fire declaration on 13th October 1994, when it conveyed its 'abject and true remorse' to the innocent victims of the conflict. While some would argue that such words are merely that - words, the fact is that the expression of those sentiments did have a positive effect on how the loyalist cease-fire was viewed.

Negotiations cannot succeed in an atmosphere of violence or under the threat of violence. We would hope that republicans shall apply themselves to the apprehensions felt by others and that in the expression of a new cease-fire the IRA shall publicly commit itself against the initiation of further conflict and that its military activity as previously described would cease completely.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is our belief that such commitments would significantly affect how republicans would be treated by others in the event of a cease-fire.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR KERRICK SIT ~~SODERBERG~~ STEINBERG
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NODIS

NSC FOR BERGER AND STEINBERG FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/07

TAGS: PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: SINN FEIN AND HMG TRADE "QUESTIONS" RELATING TO
TERMS FOR POSSIBLE IRA CEASEFIRE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (5.00)

KBH 7/11/2023

THIS IS A RETRANSMISSION OF DUBLIN 774 WITH A NEW MESSAGE
REFERENCE NUMBER AND MCN'S.

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON 1.5 (D).
2. ☒ DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO SECRETARY'S PARTY AND
OTHER ADDRESSEES AS APPROPRIATE.
3. ☒ JOHN HUME CALLED ME LAST NIGHT TO SAY THAT,
FOLLOWING CONVERSATIONS WITH SANDY BERGER AND JIM
STEINBERG, HE WOULD BE FORWARDING THE DOCUMENTS BELOW.
THESE DOCUMENTS WERE RELAYED TO ME TODAY VIA SEAN
O'HUIGINN AT THE IRISH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE
DOCUMENTS CONSIST OF TWO LISTS OF QUESTIONS, ONE PREPARED
BY SINN FEIN, THE OTHER BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,
CONCERNING THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THE IRA MIGHT DECLARE A
CEASEFIRE AND SINN FEIN MIGHT BE ADMITTED TO THE STORMONT
TALKS. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

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4. ☒ BEGIN TEXT OF SINN FEIN DOCUMENT "POSSIBLE
QUESTIONS TO BRITISH" (NOTE INTERNAL NUMBERING):

1. DOES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REMAIN OPERATIONALLY
COMMITTED TO INCLUSIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND UNDERSTANDINGS SET OUT
IN THE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WHICH THEY HAVE AGREED WITH THE
IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

2. WHAT ARE THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE COMMITMENTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF SINN FEIN IN A MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATING PROCESS?

3. WHAT ASSURANCE IS THERE THAT ENGAGEMENT ON THE KEY POLITICAL ISSUES UNDERLYING THE CONFLICT, WHICH MUST BE THE PURPOSE OF ANY MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATION, WILL NOT BE THWARTED BY RECOURSE TO UNREASONABLE OR UNDELIVERABLE PRECONDITIONS?

Prum

4. WHAT ASSURANCE IS THERE THAT UNIONIST POLITICIANS, AS THE INCUMBENTS AND BENEFICIARIES OF THE STATUS QUO, WILL NOT SIMPLY EXPLOIT THAT ADVANTAGE TO STALL INDEFINITELY, IN EFFECT USING AN OPEN-ENDED NEGOTIATING PROCESS AS A TACTICAL INSTRUMENT TO WARD OFF, RATHER THAN TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL CHANGE?

5. IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE LACK OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE HAS BEEN A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS SO FAR. WHAT CONTRIBUTION WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MAKE TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE EVENT OF AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE CEASEFIRE?

END TEXT OF SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

BRITISH GOVERNMENT QUESTIONS

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5. (C) BEGIN TEXT OF "QUESTIONS FROM HMG" (NOTE INTERNAL NUMBERING):

1. WHAT ASSURANCE WILL THERE BE THAT, IF THE IRA DECLARE AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, IT WILL INDEED BE GENUINELY UNEQUIVOCAL, THAT IS TO SAY LASTING AND NOT SIMPLY A TACTICAL DEVICE, AND HOW WOULD THAT ASSURANCE BE REFLECTED IN WORDS AND DEEDS?

2. WHEN SINN FEIN JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEY WILL NEED TO MAKE A TOTAL AND ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES. IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE IRA, WHAT ASSURANCES WILL THERE BE THAT THE IRA WILL NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS OR ALTER ANY ASPECT OF THE AGREED OUTCOME WITH WHICH THEY DISAGREE?

3. IS IT THE CASE THAT IF SINN FEIN WERE TO JOIN THE INCLUSIVE TALKS PROCESS, THEY WOULD BE READY TO ABIDE BY ALL THE AGREED PROVISIONS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE?

4. DO SINN FEIN UNDERSTAND THAT IF THEY WERE TO JOIN THE INCLUSIVE TALKS THEY WOULD FIRST OF ALL HAVE TO COMMIT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THEMSELVES TO THE PRINCIPLES IN PARAGRAPH 20 OF THE MITCHELL REPORT AND THAT IF DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY DEMONSTRABLY DISHONoured THEIR COMMITMENT TO THOSE PRINCIPLES, THEY WOULD NO LONGER BE ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

5. MARTIN MCGUINNESS SAID, IN A STATEMENT OF 14 NOVEMBER 1996, THAT THE ISSUE OF ARMS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH TO THE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000790

NODIS

NSC FOR BERGER AND STEINBERG FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/07

TAGS: PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: SINN FEIN AND HMG TRADE "QUESTIONS" RELATING TO TERMS FOR POSSIBLE IRA CEASEFIRE

SATISFACTION OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT, FOR THAT TO HAPPEN, THE ONLY LIKELY AREA OF AGREEMENT IS AROUND THE COMPROMISE APPROACH SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 34 AND 35 OF THE MITCHELL REPORT AND WHICH THE REPORT ASKS ALL PARTIES TO CONSIDER. IS SINN FEIN PREPARED TO ENDORSE THAT COMPROMISE APPROACH TO DECOMMISSIONING, UNDER WHICH SOME DECOMMISSIONING WOULD TAKE PLACE DURING THE PROCESS OF ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS?

6. WHAT CONTRIBUTION WOULD SINN FEIN AND THE IRA EXPECT TO MAKE TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN THE EVENT OF A RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE, BEARING IN MIND THE OBSERVATIONS IN CHAPTER VII OF THE MITCHELL REPORT?

END TEXT OF HMG QUESTIONS. SMITH

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02

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<^TOR>970220114206 M2625563

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

<^SSN>0790

<MSGID> M2625563

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/27/96

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (S.OI)

KBH 4/11/2023

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *ML*

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Critical Days Approach

Following up on our initiative to crack the current stalemate in Northern Ireland, I sent a synopsis of our thinking to Prime Minister Major's private secretary John Holmes, and then spoke with Holmes on November 27. In a very frank but still friendly conversation, I explained to Holmes why we thought our scenario would work -- and why the British alternative of simply publishing their view on how Sinn Fein could enter negotiations would not. Holmes understood what we are trying to do, yet was resistant. He feared our involvement would become public and generally was concerned about how the approach would play out. This is not surprising; it is a very sensitive area for the British.

Nonetheless, Holmes did not reject our initiative but asked for more time to consider it. Meanwhile, I asked that he give us advance warning if the British, under much pressure to clarify where they stand on matters, decide to go ahead and publish their position. In that event, I might ask that you call the Prime Minister.

We are keeping this extremely close-hold, but those who know -- Peter Tarnoff at State, Ambassador Crowe, George Mitchell and Prime Minister Bruton -- all agree that we are on the right track.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 11/27/16

PROPOSED SCENARIO

An IRA cease-fire and Sinn Fein entry into the Stormont talks are possible if all sides keep demands upon one another to the essential minimum.

A precise choreography of statements and events should be agreed in advance, by all parties.

A scenario that could win the private and advance agreement of all parties would look like the following:

1. Agreed Actions, Prior to British Statement/IRA Cease-fire:

The U.S. government encourages principal actors -- Trimble, Adams, loyalists -- to exercise restraint and caution.

No further attacks by the IRA.

The UK resumes contact with Sinn Fein at the official level.

Senator Mitchell calls for a holiday break in plenary sessions and begins bilateral and trilateral consultations. Announces that plenary talks will resume by late January.

The British and Irish governments, if possible, pass decommissioning legislation.

2. The following would occur within a 24 hour period:

A. IRA unequivocal cease-fire: The IRA announces an unequivocal cease-fire, and commits to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues. Text of cease-fire announcement is known to both governments in advance.

[On a private and confidential basis or as part of IRA statement announcing cease-fire:] The IRA agrees to end immediately IRA-authorized targeting, weapons preparation and surveillance. The IRA and British reach an understanding on immediate communication and consultation in the event of splinter group or unauthorized activities.

B. The British government, perhaps at a summit with the Irish, states publicly that:

The British and Irish governments state that when plenary talks resume by late January, Sinn Fein will be invited to attend, assuming the IRA carries through on its commitments stated above.

No outcome is ruled out in the talks.

Substantial progress would be expected within a reasonable time frame.

The talks will be reviewed by the British and Irish governments at a summit in six months.

The talks are inclusive, have a comprehensive agenda, and no party can veto a subject being raised.

The British and Irish governments accept the Mitchell approach on parallel decommissioning.

The British government repeats "no victory over the IRA."

3. Agreed Actions, After British Statement/IRA Cease-fire:

Resumption of Meetings:

- As early as possible after the cease-fire announcement, Sinn Fein has a bilateral meeting (or meetings) with Mitchell, and the two governments. This provides "equality of treatment" for Sinn Fein at once, but does not see the party in plenaries, since the plenaries are on a break.
- At this first meeting, Sinn Fein accepts publicly a) the six Mitchell Principles on democracy and nonviolence and b) the Mitchell approach on parallel decommissioning. [Trimble may push for as part of IRA cease-fire statement.]
- HMG reinstates ministerial contact with Sinn Fein.
- Adams is invited to White House.
- Trimble, already due at the White House on December 2-4, has been received at appropriate level.
- Loyalist parties visit White House in December at appropriate level.

Entry into Talks: When plenary talks resume by late January, Sinn Fein is present, on an equal basis with other parties.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 23, 1996

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**2011-0355-F (5.02)
KBM 7/11/2023ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: New U.S. Initiative on Northern Ireland

Purpose

To obtain your concurrence for a new initiative on Northern Ireland.

Background

The Northern Ireland peace process is at a critical juncture. Either the IRA will reinstate its ceasefire and Sinn Fein will enter inclusive talks or IRA hardliners will soon lead the organization back to war and effectively kill the peace process until after the British elections this spring. For months now, the British and Sinn Fein have been talking past one another. In addition, the unionists in Northern Ireland are making more strident demands on the issue of decommissioning paramilitary weapons as Major's parliamentary majority declines.

On the other hand, we sense that because they see the dangers ahead, both the British and Sinn Fein want a deal and are prepared to seize one -- if it is properly packaged. What must happen is fairly straightforward but difficult to accomplish given the level of distrust. First, each side must reduce its demands on the other to a minimum in order to make progress possible -- the process has become bogged down in detail. Second, a precise and agreed sequence of events is needed to get around the political need of each side to have the other move first.

The broad elements of such a scenario: The talks are likely to be suspended soon until January -- a fact that will create a natural period between an IRA ceasefire and Sinn Fein's entry into talks. Once the talks are suspended, the British offer inclusive, comprehensive talks by the end of January and agree to stay with the Mitchell formula of parallel decommissioning of arms. They also commit to review progress of the talks after six months. The IRA calls an unequivocal ceasefire and publicly accepts the Mitchell Principles on non-violence and democratic methods as well as parallel decommissioning. Privately, the

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 11/23/16

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

British and IRA agree that the IRA will stop targeting and training.

The pre-cooked sequence of events would involve first a summit between Major and Bruton at which the British position outlined above is announced. The IRA ceasefire would follow very quickly after the Summit. We would also offer Adams a visit to the White House after a ceasefire, perhaps a Major visit here early in the year. Sinn Fein would meet with the British, Irish and Mitchell during the Christmas break in the all-party talks.

Throughout the last two years, we have avoided putting forward formal American proposals or overtly pressing the parties. I believe, however, that the only hope of moving the process forward is to table a proposal and push it on all sides.

Irish ambassador Gallagher agreed that this approach could work when we discussed it very informally the morning of November 23. The State Department agrees with the idea and we are checking with Justice regarding the Adams invitation to the white House. In addition, Senators Kennedy and Dodd called this week to encourage you to take an active role in trying to overcome the current stalemate. I suggest we proceed along the following lines:

- A) See if the Irish agree with this approach; we think they will.
- B) Given British sensitivities, you would then write John Major (attached message). The letter states that I will approach his private secretary John Holmes with a proposal to break the logjam. Our role would remain private.
- C) If Major agrees, and I can work out a scenario with Holmes, we and the Irish would then put the package to Sinn Fein, stressing that this is the last best chance for peace. We and the British would work on Trimble.

This strategy is not without risks. We could well fail. Nevertheless, the risks of doing nothing are still greater.

wd

FACSIMILE COVER PAGE

*Copy sent to
mfp*

Date: 9/12/96
Time: 15:35:04
Pages: 5

To: Nancy Sodaburg
Company: NSC
Fax #: 0012024569460

From: Gary McMichael
Company: Ulster Democratic Party

Message:

FAO NANCY SODABURG

NANCY,

I HAVE PUT TOGETHER THIS BRIEFING PAPER AS WE AGREED. I HOPE IT
GIVES YOU AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PERSPECTIVE AT THIS POINT.

I'LL GIVE YOU A RING AGAIN AT THE END OF THE WEEK.

,GARY

TO R

reborn
last section
with ready

reborn

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ulster Democratic Party

Briefing Paper

December 1996

The Talks process

The stalemate which has been reached on the current agenda item of decommissioning cannot be overcome in any other way than a compromise being reached between the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP.

Unless these two parties can come to agreement, therefore making sufficient consensus realizable, the Talks shall inevitably collapse.

The Chairman is currently working on a compromise package, but if that is not going to be accepted before the Christmas break, then the Talks shall rise for a number of weeks. This period may be beneficial if it facilitates a cooling off period which may produce a more reasoned approach when the Talks sit again. Alternatively it could result in some of the participants deciding not to return to the process in January.

Naturally what materializes from the ongoing dialogue which is taking place between Adams Hume and Major will have a significant impact upon how the process develops in either a positive or negative sense.

This alternative process of dialogue, in pursuit of a cease-fire restoration, is already at this point having serious impact on the approach both the SDLP and UUP are taking in relation to the current agenda item of decommissioning.

The Adams/Hume/Major Talks

While it is at least encouraging that some evidence exists of a willingness to pursue a cease-fire, there is concern about this alternative Talks process. It is considered among the wider community that a secret process of negotiation is taking place between the British government and Sinn Fein through the medium of John Hume.

The first point which must be made is that there is a world of difference between trying to encourage the IRA that they should engage a new cease-fire and what this is believed to be, a case of negotiating a cease-fire. It is not the view of loyalists or the wider community that a cease-fire should be bartered for.

**DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING**

Initials: M Date: 4/2/16

201-0355-15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The need for a cease-fire is absolute and must be unilaterally engaged by the IRA. It is absolutely unacceptable for political concessions to be offered in return for a cease-fire.

The Talks process which has been taking place since June involving nine of the ten NI political parties elected to them is being undermined because of what is perceived to be an alternative process taking place in secret. It is natural that such secrecy creates suspicion and that the Talks process at Castle Buildings is devalued by it.

Unionists have a particular difficulty being comfortable with the communications between Adams/Hume and Major. This is because it has been presented that Hume/Adams delivered into John Major's hands the terms which if met would result in another IRA cease-fire. These have been described as peace proposals.

It is believed by unionists that these proposals are in fact a raft of preconditions which must be met to facilitate such a cease-fire. That belief is well founded. The fact that while John Hume has said that the proposals do not 'threaten or offend any section of our community' does not alleviate suspicion, for while this statement is made on the one hand, on the other Hume and Adams refuse to make public what the proposals contain.

There is also an element of suspicion about John Hume's position. He is not seen in a role of honest broker in the relationship. His public pronouncements have placed him solely in the court of Adams, constantly outlining the responsibility which John Major must accept in the search for peace, ignoring the other side of the coin which is that the IRA has responsibilities to face also.

An IRA cease-fire

There is sufficient reason to doubt whether the IRA is in a position to engage another cease-fire now or in the near future. Their organization is subject to such internal difficulty that it is unlikely it would remain intact if the ruling body called a cease-fire. Our analysis is that the IRA shall not risk a fragmentation under any circumstances. One must remember that Canary Wharf happened not purely because of dissatisfaction with the peace process, but as reaction to a threatened split within its ranks.

If this internal problem were however to be overcome, the question of what forms a credible cease-fire has still to be answered. There is a view throughout nationalism in Northern Ireland and abroad that Sinn Fein should be admitted immediately into Talks upon a declaration of another cease-fire. A cease-fire is a cease-fire after all. But in our view this is a simplistic and naive view. It ignores the deep feeling of distrust in which the unionist people hold the IRA.

The IRA demand that a condition for a cease-fire is a guarantee of immediate inclusion of Sinn Fein in Talks, regardless of the views of the other participants. Loyalists wish the negotiation process to be inclusive, but that does not solely apply to the inclusion of Sinn Fein. The process is not advanced if the inclusion of Sinn Fein is enforced against the

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background of a questionable cease-fire resulting in some or all of the unionist or loyalist parties walking away from the table.

It is argued by prominent persons such as Congressman Bruce Morrison that it is reasonable for the IRA to seek assurances from the British government that things shall be different this time round. Surely it is equally reasonable for unionists and loyalists to seek assurances from the IRA that it shall be different this time round in the event of a cease-fire.

One cannot pretend that Canary Wharf, Manchester, Osnabruck, and Lisburn simply did not happen, that attitudes towards the IRA have not been affected by this experience. The activities of the IRA cannot be simply written off. Naturally republicans must take confidence building steps to convince others that they are sincere and that a cease-fire is credible.

A credible cease-fire

When is a cease-fire not a cease-fire? The answer is, when preparation for an offensive is simultaneously employed. The 1994 cease-fire was declared as a total and complete cessation, yet within days of its announcement the IRA was buying property in London and putting assets into place which would be used in an offensive campaign following the eventual collapse of its cease-fire.

For the duration of the IRA cease-fire that organization was gathering intelligence, building networks in Britain and Europe, developing new weaponry technology, training personnel and targeting individuals for assassination, including those of us it sought to negotiate with.

An unequivocal restoration of the 1994 cease-fire brings with it all those activities we have identified. What is therefore required is the declaration of an unequivocal cease-fire, which is an entirely different thing.

If the IRA wishes to be taken seriously then it must recognize the lack of trust of its position, and direct confidence building steps towards apprehensions within the unionist and loyalist community.

We believe that the manner in which a new cease-fire is expressed is a crucial factor. The first confidence step taken by the Combined Loyalist Military Command was in its cease-fire declaration on 13th October 1994, when it conveyed its 'abject and true remorse' to the innocent victims of the conflict. While some would argue that such words are merely that - words, the fact is that the expression of those sentiments did have a positive effect on how the loyalist cease-fire was viewed by others.

apology

Negotiations cannot succeed in an atmosphere of violence or under the threat of violence. We would hope that republicans shall apply themselves to addressing the apprehensions felt by others and that in the expression of a new cease-fire the IRA shall publicly commit

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itself against an initiation of further conflict and that its military activity as previously described would cease completely.

It is our belief that such commitments would significantly affect how republicans would be treated by others in the event of a cease-fire.

To: Many Soderberg/Mary Jane Peters

From: Francis Costello

Date: December 19, 1996

I have just returned from Belfast last night and am sending along this piece which ran in Wednesdays Boston Globe which in part covers a chat I had with Mary Jane earlier in the week. If I can be of any help let me know.

I am preparing a short memo on the situation Belfast given the week I have just spent there. I will be going back next moth to launch an historical book I have written.

Thank you for all the good work you are doing.

Francis Costello

Tel: 617- 323-7254

*To Mary Jane! :)
Can you ack!*

*The best times have given way
to what may become the worst of times.*

Ireland's tattered peace

FRANCIS COSTELLO

If ever there was a time for fresh thinking aimed at restoring the tattered peace process in Northern Ireland, it is now.

Today the dogs of war are in the ascendancy as a tentative and noninclusive discussion process that commenced last June sputters to a close at year's end. A return to sectarian violence could prove worse than the troubles already endured.

Both the IRA and the British government share blame for the dire state in which matters now stand. The best times have given way to what could become the worst of times. It did not have to be this way.

The British government probably did not respond quickly enough to include Sinn Fein in all-party talks soon after the IRA proclaimed its August 1994 cease-fire.

But the IRA's return to violence last February, combined with the fact that during the cease-fire it continued to stockpile weapons throughout the Irish Republic and transport bomb material to Britain, compromised its ability to be trusted. Indeed, John Major's recent description of the IRA's original cease-fire as "bogus" seems reasonable. And although some look to a possible change in the British government as holding out the prospect of a change in policy, it is unlikely that a Labor Government would react any differently to the IRA, notwithstanding the Tories' dependence on Northern Ireland unionists for the survival of their government.

Nonetheless a leap of faith by Britain and all parties to the conflict is needed if the steady descent toward all-out violence is to be avoided. During the 1994-1996 IRA cease-fire, important gains were made. Britain commenced a demilitarization of its forces in Northern Ireland, returning thousands of troops to barracks and withdrawing entire regiments to Britain. The removal of the British Army from the streets and by-ways of Northern Ireland and the reopening of long-closed

border roads between the North and the Irish Republic offered hard evidence that peace could become real and boost both the quality of life and prospects for new investment and tourism. Perhaps most important, the 1994 IRA cease-fire and the cease-fire declared - and kept - by the loyalist paramilitaries set the stage for what has become the internationalization of the Northern Ireland peace process.

The appointment of former Sen. George Mitchell as chairman of an international panel overseeing talks that began last June with all political parties except for Sinn Fein marked an important turnaround for the British government. Prior to this, Britain had argued for decades that Northern Ireland was solely a British domestic concern.

Within the existing talks process lies a kernel of hope for lasting peace. Given its international dimension and the fact that it has the weight of both the Irish and British governments behind it, the talks can move forward if Sinn Fein is included as an equal player. This should be done soon after the IRA declares a cease-fire and commits to the Mitchell Principles as evidence that it has permanently renounced violence.

To assure a favorable British response to the restoration of the IRA cease-fire, the Irish and US governments should act as guarantors. The IRA should be informed that if it ends its cease-fire, the Irish government will bring harsh action against those who provide a safe haven for the storage of weapons and explosives tied to the IRA. The United States should commit itself to supporting any such action by the Irish government. The murder last summer of an Irish detective by the IRA in County Limerick brought home to many Irish citizens the threat that the IRA continues to pose to its own democracy as well as to peace and stability throughout the island.

Fresh thinking is also required in confronting the vexing question of decommissioning paramilitary weapons - an issue that surfaced in barring Sinn Fein's entry to the talks after the IRA's October attack in Lisburn. Borrowing from the

FAX COVER SHEET

Friday, December 20, 1996 01:32:24 PM

Fax #: 1202-456-9460

From:

Fax: 1 page and a cover page.

To: Nancy Soderberg/Mary Anne Peters
From: Francis Costello
Date: December 20, 1996

I returned from a week on business in Northern Ireland on the night of December 18th.

The situation is highly charged in my view, with optimism having been drained from most people and obviously stands in stark contrast to the year before.

Talk and promises of an IRA cease-fire is now regarded with to a great extent with cynicism even among many Nationalists.

What must be understood is that any belief that the IRA were serious about peace has been shattered this year rendering talk of a cease-fire and even the actual implementation of a new one as another step in a tactical agenda where a little peace is mixed with a little violence. Something positive must be done to correct that.

Where there is hope is in the sense among many unionist politicians and their supporters that decommissioning as a requirement to all party talks is a red herring issue. Something of substance that they feel is a tangible demonstration that a new cease-fire is genuine is needed. Otherwise, in the language of one, the "IRA will continue to be free lancers with no accountability to anyone" able to call off their cease-fire any time that suits them without recrimination.

I have offered the idea of perhaps the Irish Government acting as a guarantor as imep4fect as it is to move this process forward. Single guarantees from anyone individual no matter how highly regarded are simply not enough to win the unionist and I suspect the British Government over at this stage. One Irish Government official I have talked with offers the view that the his government is in effect already acting as a guarantor now by serving as a communicator to and from Sinn Fein. This I am sure he genuinely believes but it falls short of a demonstration of a commitment that should the IRA break another cease-fire they will meet more serious opposition to its involvement in the Irish Republic than it did after the collapse of the last one.

I use the phrase that a reality check is needed. The fact is it is. Some dynamic involving our government and the European union in validating what the Irish Government might do in offering itself as a guarantor would be quite useful I am convinced in the context leading to an IRA cease-fire followed by Sinn Fein's immediate entry to all party talks.

I was at Queens University last Friday when Tony Blair spoke. The lack of trust in the IRA I found also runs deep among British Labor. If I can be of any help, please let me know. I will be heading back to Northern Ireland in the new year.

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939

FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

FAX COVER SHEET

FAX NO: _____

DATE: 29/11/96 TIME: 9.45TO: NSC Press OfficeFOR: Jim FitzFROM: Adrian O'NeillTOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: 4BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL: Trust the Brits to Ruin Thanksgiving! Regrets

ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: _____

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x PR
Done 11/29
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Nancy -
Thought you might
not have seen this.

Interview with Tánaiste on Six One News - 28th November, 1996

Sean Duignan: Now returning to our lead story, John Major's latest pronouncement on the peace process, we're joined from Tralee by Tánaiste, Dick Spring. Tánaiste, you may have seen a great deal, there has been a great deal of reaction, but could I put it to you that the key reaction really has to be from Sinn Féin. They say it's insufficient to bring about a ceasefire and aren't you going to have to accept it? They say it's insufficient, that we're not going to have a ceasefire?

Tánaiste: Well, two things Sean. Firstly, as you know John Hume has been working for many months, seeking a statement that will reassure Sinn Féin that meaningful talks are on offer and we've heard Sinn Féin's reaction and we would have preferred if work would have continued to get agreement between both Governments and indeed with Sinn Féin and the other parties. That has not happened. But there are some positive indications in that statement. As I said over the last number of days there are gaps that need to be bridged and we are going to continue our work to see if we can bridge those gaps over the coming days.

Sean Duignan: What do you see as positive in the statement?

Tánaiste: Well, the fact that the British have made it very clear they want inclusive all party talks. Of course, we have to have a restoration of a cessation of violence. That is the number one objective. But I also think it has to be made very clear, that on a firm unequivocal restoration of a ceasefire that there will be an entry into talks within a relatively short period of time.

Sean Duignan: Bertie Ahern has been saying, you know, that it's a studied rebuff to John Hume's peace initiative, it's a unilateral British statement against all precedent. You're obviously aware that the Government itself has issued a statement? You probably helped to frame it. But it says "we've repeatedly made clear our view that conditions so carefully set out by both Governments in the February communique on the ground rule papers for Sinn Féin's admission to talks should be maintained. The Irish Government will not accept any exclusion of Sinn Féin once these conditions are fulfilled". Is that an Irish Government shot across John Major's bow?

Tánaiste: Well, this is the Irish Government reaffirming its position. We have made it very clear that we would want to see an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire and in the event of that happening that Sinn Fein be brought to the talks as quickly as possible. That is not only practical, but it's in everybody's interest, that we would have all party talks with all parties there, free from violence or a threat of violence in the background. And one obvious way of establishing that would be the subscription by Sinn Fein to the Mitchell principles immediately on the declaration of the ceasefire.

Sean Duignan: Now, are you satisfied then that the Prime Minister in his statement started talking about other conditions like "no IRA targeting, no IRA surveillance, no weapons preparation"? Is that not making it harder for Sinn Fein?

Tánaiste: Well, these are all understandable. But in fact there is a degree of uncertainty in the statement made in the House of Commons today by the Prime Minister in relation to Sinn Fein joining the talks after the unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire. Now we will use the next few days to have discussions with the British government to make sure we are all still in agreement on the ground rules paper and on the communique of February which were effectively setting out the conditions for the entry of Sinn Fein into talks.

Sean Duignan: Could I put it to you, relations between yourself and David Trimble haven't been good, at least as he sees it, and once again there you may have seen him challenging, you to say why he says you refused to agree to a British government paper last Wednesday. To what extent do you think that this unharmonious relationship is affecting the overall situation?

Tánaiste: Well Sean, I think Mr Trimble has difficulties understanding what we're trying to achieve. We're trying in the first instance to bring about a cessation of violence, bring a restoration of a ceasefire, to bring Sinn Fein into talks, and to have negotiations which are meaningful and which will in fact bring about results and help us to bring about an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland. That is what our interest is, that is what we're trying to do and the sooner Mr Trimble understands that the better for everybody. I have no difficulties answering Mr

Trimble in relation to any assertions he makes. The reason why I didn't sign up for this last week is because one obvious reason - it wasn't going to bring about the cessation of violence which we're all trying to achieve.

Sean Duignan: Now finally, are you, could you tell us are you more optimistic or less optimistic having listened to what Mr Major had to say in the Commons?

Tánaiste: I would say to you that in an ideal world, we should have, the statement should not have issued until there was agreement that it would achieve the desired results. That is not going to happen at the moment, but I still believe that there are openings, the door is open and it's up to us now to continue at work that John Hume has undertaken for a number of months and to bring about the cessation of violence and the entry of Sinn Féin into talks on that basis.

Sean Duignan: Tánaiste, thank you very much.

Tánaiste: Thank you.

ENDS

White House cool on statement

From Joe Carroll,

Washington Correspondent

THE White House has given a less-than-enthusiastic reaction to the statement by the British Prime Minister, Mr John Major, on the conditions for the admission of Sinn Féin to the multi-party talks.

A White House spokesman said simply that "the British government statement speaks for itself" but would not comment on the substance of the statement or the absence of a date for the entry of Sinn Féin into the talks following an IRA ceasefire.

In what is now a standard wording, the spokesman added: "We hope that all parties will redouble their efforts in the search for peace. We continue to urge the immediate restoration of the ceasefire."

"We continue to believe that a way forward can and must be found to achieve inclusive and

substantive talks on the future of Northern Ireland. We remind everyone that our role is to encourage all sides to redouble their efforts in the search for a just and lasting peace."

While he would not comment on the content of the British position, there is probably disappointment on the US side that British conditions have been laid down for testing the credibility of a future ceasefire.

As White House officials are constantly in touch with Sinn Féin, as well as both governments, they would be well aware that such conditions remain a major obstacle to Sinn Féin and IRA acceptance.

At the same time, the calling of an Anglo-Irish Summit and the suspension of the present talks for the Christmas and New Year period would be seen as leaving the door open for some further manoeuvring by both sides.

Dublin restates position on North talks

The following is the text of the Government statement issued last night:

The Irish Government remains fully committed to an inclusive negotiating process, on exclusively democratic terms and in conditions of peace, so as to reach an honourable and generally acceptable accommodation of the Northern Ireland conflict.

In pursuit of that objective we are continuing to work for the earliest possible restoration of the IRA ceasefire, and for the establishment of a truly inclusive process of negotiations. In this regard we have repeatedly made clear our view that the conditions so carefully set out by both governments in the February Communiqué and the Ground Rules paper for Sinn Féin's admission to talks should be maintained.

The Irish Government will not accept any exclusion of Sinn Féin once these conditions are fulfilled, and hopes that, when the talks resume in January, Sinn Féin will be in a position to participate in the talks, as a result, in the meantime, of an IRA ceasefire and of Sinn Féin having complied fully with the ground rules and the Mitchell principles. There is an onus on the republican movement to allow this to happen.

Trimble welcomes response by Major

THE DUP leader, Mr David Trimble, last night welcomed the response of the British Prime Minister, Mr John Major, to the Hume/Adams initiative.

"What I found helpful in his attitude was the very clear indication that a mere tactical ceasefire would not trigger off any process for Sinn Féin/IRA."

"We would have to have a genuine ceasefire, with the stated purpose of it being a permanent end to the conflict, and of course time would be needed to assess that."

The DUP leader said there would also have to be a "process" in which assurances by Sinn Féin and the IRA would have to be tested against their actions.

The leader of the Democratic Unionist Party the Rev Ian Paisley, said: "They have moved in

the direction that Mr Hume wanted them to move. Now, they haven't moved fully in that direction. Whether they will stop the peace there or not, I do not know."

The Progressive Democrat spokesman on Northern Ireland, Mr Do O'Malley, said that Mr Major's statement was "reasonable".

"The British government, in the circumstances, has gone as far as its perilous parliamentary situation allowed it to go in trying to encourage a positive response. That response should now be forthcoming by the declaration of a genuine ceasefire."

"It is abundantly clear that Sinn Féin are free to join talks in a short time if they take the obvious step. Why are they not prepared to give up violence?"

THE IRISH TIMES, Friday, November 29, 1996

To: Nancy Soderberg
Mary Anne Peters

From: Frank Costello

Date: January 6, 1997

For your information

To: Wd

FORUM

Boston Herald

Jan 5, 1997

FRANCIS COSTELLO

Closing the chasm

Northern Ireland holds key
to opening door to peaceful future

As Northern Ireland stares once again into the abyss of a full-scale return to sectarian violence, a school of thought — a quite mistaken school of thought — has emerged that has taken on all the characteristics of a mantra.


It holds the view that the situation is unlikely to change until after the next British general election, likely in April. A corollary to this view is the belief that a change in the Irish government will also be needed, an event likely sooner rather than later given the many problems that have beset the Fine Gael Party of Irish Taoiseach

In December 1992, long before the phrase "Northern Ireland peace process" was on every tongue, Adams had publicly asked Kennedy to lead a peace initiative. Four years later, exactly such an effort by Kennedy was met by an IRA atrocity as he visited Belfast.


Perhaps the best message from a U.S. official delivered lately in

Northern Ireland was Kennedy's message afterward to Sinn Féin's Martin McGuinness that "this stuff has simply got to stop."

Questions about whether



It holds the view that the situation is unlikely to change until after the next British general election, likely in April. A corollary to this view is the belief that a change in the Irish government will also be needed, an event likely sooner rather than later given the many problems that have beset the Fine Gael Party of Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) John Bruton.



**Irish Prime Minister
John Bruton**
*Will a change in Irish
government be needed
to ensure peace?*

But upon such views the hopes of breaking the political stalemate in Northern Ireland should not be allowed to rest. For one thing, a British government headed by Labor leader Tony Blair is extremely unlikely to shift from the current British government's hard-and-fast position that unless the IRA declares a permanent cease-fire and openly rejects violence for good, Sinn Fein will not be permitted to enter all-party talks.

Second, the out-of-power Fianna Fail Party now headed by Bertie Ahern and likely to be in a coalition government by necessity with the anti-IRA Progressive Democrats is itself no less likely to retreat from John Bruton's outright opposition to the IRA's return to violence in Britain and Northern Ireland itself.

But most of all, the inescapable fact remains that a lasting solution can only come from those who live in Northern Ireland. To believe that, even if a British government wished it, Sinn Fein could be admitted to all-party talks in the absence of a permanent IRA cease-fire and the IRA's renunciation of violence for good without the Unionist representatives walking out the door in an instant is to indulge in a fantasy that does no one any good.

Clearly absent in Northern Ireland is a generous wish and a sense that a commonweal must be built in which all are valued. This was made horribly clear in 1996 by the IRA's needless return to a campaign of violence and likewise by the Orange Order's determination to provoke public disorder by attempting to force its triumphalist marches through isolated Catholic communi-



**Sinn Fein leader
Gerry Adams**
*Will he be able to deliver
a cease-fire in '97?*


ties. This necessary spirit cannot be imposed by Britain, the Irish Republic or any amount of American intervention.

What should the role of the United States be? George Mitchell, in effect a U.S. special envoy, should be allowed to carry on as an honest broker. The U.S. government should move cautiously to ensure that the economic initiatives supported by President Clinton and the late Ron Brown continue to benefit both communities.

But finding new ways to invest the full faith and credit of the United States when the IRA is demonstrating a callous disregard for human life would represent an unwarranted squandering of America's prestige.

It cannot be forgotten that less than two months after President Clinton's triumphant reception by both communities in Northern Ireland and his clear admonition to the men of violence on all sides that, "Your day is over," the IRA decided to end its cease-fire by bombing London's Canary Wharf.

Similarly, within a day of Rep. Joe Kennedy's meeting last month with Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams in Belfast, the IRA unleashed a brutal attack in a children's hospital ward on two police officers guarding a unionist politician visiting his terminally ill child. The incident was perhaps as much an insult to Adams' own efforts as to Kennedy's good will. But it was also a clear demonstration of the limits to American influence.



**British Prime Minister
John Major**
*Will the British govern-
ment election have any
bearing on the cease-fire?*

more than anyone else was responsible for directing a campaign of guerrilla war against British rule in Ireland.

At the cost, in the end, of his own life, Collins faced the uncompromising "wild men" of the IRA of that era and delivered the greatest possible degree of Irish independence, an action validated by the vast majority of the Irish people.

There can be no mining of words in 1997. The IRA's campaign must end if Ireland, North and South, is to be allowed to bind up its wounds and draw one day on the talents of all its quite remarkable people. Each day that senseless campaign continues, each life that is wasted, ensures that Ireland's people, not just its soil, remain divided.

From the beginning of a permanent cease-fire, all-party talks should be allowed to take place. If necessary, the U.S. government might join the Irish Republic and the European Union in certifying a new cease-fire as lasting and genuine. If it proves not to be, then no section of the Irish people should be asked to put up with the atrocities that the IRA has taken upon itself to commit in no one's name but its own. □

Francis Costello is an economic consultant on Ireland who holds a doctorate in modern Irish history. His book on Michael Collins will be published soon.

an IRA atrocity as he visited Belfast. Perhaps the best message from a U.S. official delivered lately in Northern Ireland was Kennedy's message afterward to Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness that "this stuff has simply got to stop."

Questions about whether Gerry Adams is or ever was a member of the IRA are far less relevant than whether he is in fact able to deliver a permanent IRA cease-fire in 1997.

In October 1921, a British government found it within its interest to sit down with the same

Michael Collins who

~~SECRET~~

01 00

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SSSS

AA ZYUW MSG726

WHITE HOUSE
CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ANTHONY LAKE TO JOHN HOLMES AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

BELOW IS THE PROPOSED SCENARIO WE DISCUSSED. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING IT WITH YOU.

PROPOSED SCENARIO

AN IRA CEASE-FIRE AND SINN FEIN ENTRY INTO THE STORMONT TALKS ARE POSSIBLE IF ALL SIDES KEEP DEMANDS UPON ONE ANOTHER TO THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM.

A PRECISE CHOREOGRAPHY OF STATEMENTS AND EVENTS SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE, BY ALL PARTIES.

A SCENARIO THAT COULD WIN THE PRIVATE AND ADVANCE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES WOULD LOOK LIKE THE FOLLOWING:

1. AGREED ACTIONS, PRIOR TO BRITISH STATEMENT/IRA CEASE-FIRE:

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES PRINCIPAL ACTORS -- TRIMBLE, ADAMS, LOYALISTS -- TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND CAUTION.

NO FURTHER ATTACKS BY THE IRA.

THE UK RESUMES CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

SENATOR MITCHELL CALLS FOR A HOLIDAY BREAK IN PLENARY SESSIONS AND BEGINS BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. ANNOUNCES THAT PLENARY TALKS WILL RESUME BY LATE JANUARY.

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS, IF POSSIBLE, PASS DECOMMISSIONING LEGISLATION.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS AT A SUMMIT WITH THE IRISH, STATES PUBLICLY THAT:

~~SECRET~~

~~S E C R E T~~

02 00

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT WHEN PLENARY TALKS RESUME BY LATE JANUARY, SINN FEIN WILL BE INVITED TO ATTEND, ASSUMING THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE, UNEQUIVOCAL CEASE-FIRE.

NO OUTCOME IS RULED OUT IN THE TALKS.

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WOULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIMEFRAME.

THE TALKS WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS AT A SUMMIT IN SIX MONTHS.

THE TALKS ARE INCLUSIVE, HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA, AND NO PARTY CAN VETO A SUBJECT BEING RAISED.

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ACCEPT THE MITCHELL APPROACH ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPEATS "NO VICTORY OVER THE IRA."

3. THE IRA RESPONDS (WITHIN 24-48 HOURS): THE IRA ANNOUNCES AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASE-FIRE, AND COMMITS TO DEMOCRATIC AND EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS OF RESOLVING POLITICAL ISSUES. TEXT OF CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT IS KNOWN TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS IN ADVANCE.

ON A PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS: THE IRA AGREES TO END IRA-AUTHORIZED TARGETING, WEAPONS PREPARATION AND SURVEILLANCE. THE IRA AND BRITISH REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION IN THE EVENT OF SPLINTER GROUP OR UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.

4. AGREED ACTIONS, AFTER BRITISH STATEMENT/IRA CEASE-FIRE:

RESUMPTION OF MEETINGS:

AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT, SINN FEIN HAS A BILATERAL MEETING (OR MEETINGS) WITH MITCHELL, AND THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THIS PROVIDES "EQUALITY OF TREATMENT" FOR SINN FEIN AT ONCE, BUT DOES NOT SEE THE PARTY IN PLENARIES, SINCE THE PLENARIES ARE ON A BREAK.

AT THIS FIRST MEETING, SINN FEIN ACCEPTS PUBLICLY A) THE SIX MITCHELL PRINCIPLES ON DEMOCRACY AND NONVIOLENCE AND B) THE MITCHELL APPROACH ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING.

HMG REINSTATES MINISTERIAL CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN.

ADAMS IS INVITED TO WHITE HOUSE.

~~S E C R E T~~

~~SECRET~~

03 00

· TRIMBLE, ALREADY DUE AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON DECEMBER 2-4, HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL.

ENTRY INTO TALKS: WHEN PLENARY TALKS RESUME BY LATE JANUARY, SINN FEIN IS PRESENT, ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH OTHER PARTIES.

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END TEXT
DECL: OADR

#0000

~~SECRET~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

01 00

OO CCCC

AA ZYUW MSG723

WHITE HOUSE
CABINET OFFICE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN MAJOR, M.P.
PRIME MINISTER
LONDON

DEAR JOHN:

HILLARY AND I HAVE JUST COMPLETED A WONDERFUL FEW DAYS OF
REST -- AND SOME WORK -- IN AUSTRALIA. THIS IS A BEAUTIFUL AND
EXOTIC PART OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

WHILE I AM HERE IN THAILAND, I WANTED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU
ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. I GREATLY
ADMIRE YOUR COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP ON THIS ISSUE, ESPECIALLY
IN THE WAKE OF THE TERRIBLE BOMB AT LISBURN. YOUR STRONG
COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVING PROGRESS, TOGETHER WITH THAT OF
JOHN BRUTON, HAS ENABLED REAL PROGRESS TO BE MADE.

WE HAVE BEEN THINKING HARD ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT BE OF SOME
ASSISTANCE IN FINDING A WAY FORWARD. I HAVE ASKED TONY TO
EXPLAIN OUR IDEAS IN DETAIL TO JOHN HOLMES. I BELIEVE THEY
COULD OFFER A REAL CHANCE OF GETTING THE PROCESS OUT OF ITS
CURRENT IMPASSE. WE WILL, OF COURSE, DO ALL WE CAN TO
MAINTAIN PRIVACY.

AGAIN, HILLARY AND I SEND WARM REGARDS FROM AFAR TO YOU AND
NORMA.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT
DECL: OADR

#0000

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By W NARA, Date 7/11/16
2011-0355-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. fax cover sheet	re: Martha Pope/Gerry Kelly [partial] (2 pages)	12/01/1996	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, November 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLASSIFICATION

SITE A.
CIA

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL) MSG NBR

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM	(b)(3)	OFFICE/DISK	(b)(3)	PHONE NBR	(b)(3)
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SUBJECT: Information on Martha Pope/Gerry Kelly Link

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES 5
(INCLUDES COVER)

☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE

☐ IMMEDIATELY/URGENT

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDRESS REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

[illegible]

REMARKS: Enclosed is my message to the Field, their response, and the requested article. Cheers!

WAGFAX COVER SACTY

WAXTAP OPERATOR 1700 458-7800

Mail on Sunday 1 Dec pp1, 2

Major warned by MI5 of link between
top IRA man and US peace negotiator

DANGEROUS LIAISON...

EXCLUSIVE By Chester Stern

THE Prime Minister and President Clinton have been told by MI5 of a close romantic friendship between a top IRA terrorist and a key US peace negotiator.

Gerard Kelly, a member of the IRA Army Council until last month and an important member of the Sinn Fein peace negotiating team, has been secretly meeting Martha Pope — Number Two in President Clinton's peace mediating team in Northern Ireland.

As Chairman of the Talks Support Team, Miss Pope works with long-time friend former Senator George Mitchell who has been pivotal in attempts to bring the IRA to the negotiating table and whose team advises the White House on the prospects for peace in Ulster.

MI5 is understood to have feared that the suave and sophisticated Kelly, who led Sinn Fein's delegation to last year's peace talks at Stormont, might attempt to win over one of the American team.

Three weeks ago MI5's secret report went to John



Continued on Page 2

SECRET MEETINGS: U.S. mediator Martha Pope and Sinn Fein negotiator Gerard Kelly

The Mail on Sunday, December 1, 1996

THE CHARMING TERRORIST AND THE KEY US DIPLOMAT

Sack her, says Paisley

From Page One

Major and Northern Ireland Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew. It has been sent on to President Clinton and the FBI.

The report detailed secret weekend trysts in Ulster and the Irish Republic between the attractive American diplomat, who looks much younger than her 51 years, and 42-year-old Kelly, who, the reports add, has been writing romantic poetry for her.

Yesterday Democratic Unionist leader Ian Paisley revealed some of the secret to 400 delegates at his party conference.

He said: 'People who work in Senator Mitchell's office are not to be trusted, for they're friends of leading members of the IRA.'

And last night, when the names became known to The Mail on



REPORT: Sir Patrick

Sunday, he called for Miss Pope's dismissal.

Mr Paisley's deputy, Peter Robinson MP, said: 'We have raised the matter at a meeting with the Prime Minister and Sir Patrick.'

'We believe it would be thoroughly inappropriate for such a relationship between such a senior IRA member and somebody supposed to be representing an impartial chairman of the talks process.'

Downing Street refused to comment.

But Mr Paisley accused Sir Patrick Mayhew of a cover up after the Ulster Secretary told The Mail on Sunday: 'I have seen nothing and know nothing to lead me to doubt the statement by Senator Mitchell that neither he nor any member of his office has had any contact with Sinn Fein.'

Until last month Gerard Kelly was a member of the IRA's Army Council although he denies reports he held the rank of Adjutant General.

Remission

In 1973 he was jailed for life for his part in the Old Bailey bomb.

In the Maze prison he went on hunger strike and in 1983 escaped with 37 IRA men. He spent four years on the run before finally being extradited from Holland. He was freed in

1989 under a remission scheme.

The other side of the terrorist is a charming self-educated, well-read man, a spellbinding orator who is also a talented artist and has published a book of poetry.

He is understood to be divorced from his childhood sweetheart and to be living in West Belfast with a woman and their child.

Kelly has said he wants to turn more to politics and between 1990-93 he took part in secret Sinn Fein talks with the British Government alongside the party's chief negotiator Martin McGuinness. He is one of the two Sinn Fein delegates to any future peace talks.

Miss Pope is described by a longtime member of the Senate staff as 'very attractive and looking much younger than her age... she can be charming but she has a reputation as

a ruthless career woman.'

And he said he would be amazed if she had done anything to embarrass her close friend Senator Mitchell whose staff she joined in 1980.

In the Eighties she had been expected to marry a Congressman and was devastated when he wed another woman.

She has remained single, concentrating on her career.

Tipped

In 1994 she became the first woman Secretary of the Senate making her the most important political staff member on Capitol Hill.

Last year she was the main organiser of President Clinton's conference on Trade and Investment in Ireland at the White House and is widely tipped to succeed Senator Mitchell as President Clinton's special representative in Ireland.

able to do that... through the second half... it was certainly a different story to the 1996 World Cup semi-final - we kept Jonathan Lomax quiet at least. We tried a different type of defence, an their players... I suspect... Johnson were magnificent... second row and Tim Rodger had his... best game for England... Surely we have the best line-out jumpers in the world but we must have to take it one season at a time.

ROGER, Jack

UNCLASSIFIED

..CLASSIFICATION:
UNCLASSIFIED
..DISSEMINATION:
..HEADER:
UNCLAS /MSS/WB 304

SERIAL: LD0112185896
PASS: ATTN FOC
ATTN BBC RDSUP
ONLY FOC, ENEAG

COUNTRY: UNITED KINGDOM
SUBJ: Service -- Reports on Contacts Between IRA, US Official

REF: 1. wa0112180296 answering foc/wilson
2. wa-ld telecon
3. ld0112183596 london press association english 011733 --
denial on martha pope links with sinn fein fein's kelly
4. ld3011232696 london press association english 302203 --
mi5 probe alleged contact between mitchell assistant, ira

TEXT:

..TAGS:
..SUBJECT:
Service -- Reports on Contacts Between IRA, US Official
..AUTHOR:
..AFFILIATION:
..TARGET OF BROADCAST:
..REFERENCE:
1. wa0112180296 answering foc/wilson
2. wa-ld telecon
3. ld0112183596 london press association english 011733 --
denial on martha pope links with sinn fein fein's kelly
4. ld3011232696 london press association english 302203 --
mi5 probe alleged contact between mitchell assistant, ira

..SOURCE LINE:

..SUBSLUG:

..SUMMARY:

..TEXT:

After an intensive search through Caversham/Reading, Associate Editor (b)(3) was able to locate a copy of today's THE MAIL ON SUNDAY. Page one article, entitled "Dangerous Liaison...", on alleged "romantic friendship" between a "top IRA terrorist and a key US peace negotiator" has been faxed to FOC as requested.

..TEXT:

British newspapers received at LD today (TIMES, TELEGRAPH, OBSERVER, INDEPENDENT) do not carry any reports of the alleged "romantic friendship." Furthermore, the evening television newscasts (London BBC 1 Television Network in English at 1745 GMT and London ITV Television Network in English at 1845 GMT) do not carry any related reports.

..TEXT:

LD is alert to highest-level consumer interest in reaction to the report in THE MAIL ON SUNDAY, and will file any responsive items flagged ATTN WIRE SELECT.

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SERIAL: WAO112180296

PASS: ATTN LD DUTY EDITOR

ATTN BBC RDSUP

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SUBJ: Service -- Consumer Request on Mitchell Assistant, IRA

REF: 1. wa-ld telecon

2. ld3011232696 london press association english 302203 --
m15 probe alleged contact between mitchell assistant, ira

TEXT:

..TAGS:

..SUBJECT:

Service -- Consumer Request on Mitchell Assistant, IRA

..AUTHOR:

..AFFILIATION:

..TARGET OF BROADCAST:

..REFERENCE:

1. wa-ld telecon

2. ld3011232696 london press association english 302203 --
m15 probe alleged contact between mitchell assistant, ira

..SOURCE LINE:

..SUBSLUG:

..SUMMARY:

..TEXT:

Highest-level consumer has requested more information on ref item -- namely, a faxed copy of the original article, if possible, which is listed in ref as being from the 1 Dec 'Mail on Sunday.' Also, if possible, an idea of how much credence this article is being given by established sources such as BBC. Please send any associated reportage at priority precedence flagged ATTN WIRE SELECT.

..TEXT:

Realizing that this is an extraordinary request, heartfelt thanks are sent in advance. Regards.

(endall) foc/wilson 01/1802 dec

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MESSAGE:

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PRIME MINISTER/MR BRUTON - DOORSTEP - LONDON - 9 DECEMBER 1996

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FROM FOX FOR RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF DOORSTEP

GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR JOHN MAJOR,
AND THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER, MR JOHN BRUTON,
ON MONDAY, 9 DECEMBER 1996

PS
PW
JB
MR MG
NIB

PRIME MINISTER:

Can I firstly apologise for the fact that we are running so late, but I think you know there were some fog problems this morning and the Taoiseach arrived at Downing Street a little later than previously advertised, we had a very lengthy agenda and I am afraid that accounts for our late arrival out here in Downing Street. My apologies for that.

I welcome the Taoiseach here really in two capacities: first as the current President of the European Union; and secondly of course as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland. We divided our discussions today into both those quite separate compartments.

We began with a very comprehensive examination of the European Union issues that lie in front of us, most obviously of course the Intergovernmental Conference and the summit that we have in Dublin on Friday and on Saturday.

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I would like at the outset to congratulate the Irish Presidency not only on the work they have done during their Presidency thus far, but on the excellent Presidency text that they have produced about the Intergovernmental Conference, which is not prejudicial to the subsequent decisions to be taken, but which sets out with great clarity and fairness the differing positions of all the countries on the various European issues. It cannot have been easy to get such an excellent text but it is one I think that will be very useful in the months that lie immediately ahead.

The text of course sets out the basis for negotiation during the period between the Dublin Summit and the Amsterdam summit, and it does not prejudice what the outcome of any of those discussions may be. But I think there is little doubt that at the Dublin Summit this weekend, as we discuss many of the issues in the Intergovernmental Conference, that the different positions of member states on a range of issues will be set out, and certainly we anticipate discussing Economic and Monetary Union, common foreign and security policy, employment, justice and home affairs, and also some anti-drugs initiatives that the United Kingdom have been working on with France and with other countries as well, and I look forward to discussing all those issues, and others as well. I strongly suspect, at Dublin on Friday and Saturday.

09:42 PM 12/10/96

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We also spent some time discussing the current position in Northern Ireland, about which the two governments have worked together for so long and so well with the same objective in mind. We are united in wishing to see a credible ceasefire, and we are united also, provided we can get a credible and verifiable ceasefire, in seeing Sinn Féin join the talks and making them inclusive in due course. And of course they would have to join the talks in accordance with the ground rules that were established some many months ago.

We both wish those talks to succeed, but we recognise that if they are to succeed they must be carried out on a basis that will require all the participants to remain at the table so that we can credibly examine the issues that still lie before us in Northern Ireland.

I don't wish this afternoon to speculate about whether a particular date is possible for Sinn Féin to join the talks. That, as I have indicated on a number of occasions recently, depends on what is said and done and whether an unequivocal ceasefire is declared and is then held after having been declared. Clearly the developments on the ground need to be consistent with the Mitchell principles of peace and democracy. And I certainly share with the Taoiseach a wish that we will be able to get in due course to inclusive talks involving all the parties as soon as all the parties have established their commitment to a democratic process and to peaceful means.

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I share his judgment too that there should be no undue and unnecessary delay in coming to a judgment upon matter. But the onus, to enable us to reach that judgment, depends upon the actions of Sinn Fein/IRA firstly to restore their ceasefire credibly, to do so as soon as possible and then to have a judgment made upon whether it is a genuine and lasting ceasefire and upon the actions on the ground that we need to see in order to establish the ground rules procedure.

Those are the matters that we need to look at, but whether they join the talks or not, we expect the talks to continue in any event. They would be better if inclusive, but whether inclusive or not depends upon the actions of Sinn Fein/IRA and a proper judgment being made upon whether those actions are sincere and lasting or not.

So these are the issues we have been discussing, we have discussed also some, if I may use the jargon, east-west issues, London/Dublin issues, where there is a range of initiatives that I don't think I need detain you with at the moment, but add up to an ever improving relationship between London and Dublin. I very much welcome that. I think the developments between the two countries are much better when we work together, and we have done so very successfully in recent years and I look forward to that continuing.

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I would like now to invite the Taoiseach to say whatever he wishes on European matters, and Northern Ireland matters as well no doubt, as well as East-West, and then we will endeavour to take any questions you may have.

MR BRUTON:

First of all, this is the 13th of a series of 14 meetings that I am having with other Heads of EU Governments. I am travelling to Paris tomorrow to complete the series of bilaterals in each of the capitals of the European Union in preparation for the Dublin Summit next week. And I have outlined to the Prime Minister basically what we would like to achieve at the Dublin Summit. First of all we want to move forward on the issues that remain to be resolved in regard to the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union in Europe based on a single currency. The issues that have been worked upon and are ready for decision at Dublin include the actual date, the confirmation of the date for the commencement of the single currency, which is 1 January 1999; the legal arrangements, which are exceptionally complex when one is moving from one currency regime to another, which have also been finalised; the arrangements for the relationship between those Union countries that will be in the single currency from day one, and those who will not be in it from day one, that again required a lot of complex work, which has been completed; and finally the budgetary discipline that will apply to the countries that are already in the European currency from day one.

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There are some difficulties that remain to be resolved as far as that is concerned, but tremendous progress is being made and I hope that the remaining arguments will be settled at the Economic and Finance Ministers meeting, which is taking place later this week.

We will also be reaching conclusions in accordance with the Essen Process, and which the Prime Minister was involved in initiating, in regard to employment. We will be re-dedicating ourselves to work as members of the European Union to reduce unemployment as it exists in the Union at the present time. It is worth noting that the total level of unemployment in the European Union at the present time is equivalent to the population of the three smallest member states combined. So clearly we have a requirement to work hard on that question.

We will also be taking note of the treaty, to which the Prime Minister has referred, which we have prepared a draft of, which we hope will be completed at Amsterdam, a new treaty for the European Union.

And finally, we will be making decisions we hope on crime and drug issues. In particular we hope to adopt a major statement on organised crime, which is an increasing problem across national boundaries within the European Union, and also on the supply of and the demand for drugs within the European Union, which is a

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trans-national problem, it is not a problem confined to one member state.

We hope that across all of those issues that I have mentioned, plus a number of foreign policy questions, including the Middle East Peace Process, our relations with central and eastern Europe, we will be able to reach very substantial conclusions which will mark a major advance in our work.

As the Prime Minister has said, we availed of this opportunity which arose primarily from an EU-related visit, to review our joint work in regard to Northern Ireland. We have two objectives in common: firstly, both governments are seeking a truly inclusive process of negotiation involving all of the parties, of the electorate represented; secondly, we are both working for an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire at the earliest possible moment. Both of these conditions are necessary for any durable and freely negotiated agreement to be reached which will be fair and acceptable to all. Violence is inimical to the reaching of a freely agreed solution.

Obviously the problems that we are dealing with are complex and long-standing. But the two governments are working together to solve those problems on the basis of the firm foundation of the communique that the Prime Minister and I agreed here on 28 February of this year, and also the ground rules that we agreed between our two governments for the all-party talks which relate

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in particular as far as an IRA ceasefire is concerned, to paragraphs 8 and 9, which determine eligibility as far as Sinn Fein is concerned for participation in the talks.

Since the original IRA ceasefire, it is worth noting that major steps forward have been made. We have agreed a joint framework document between the two governments which set out a long term outline of how we see the solution to the problem being arrived at, an agreed position between the two governments, something never achieved before historically. Since the ceasefire also there has been amelioration in the conditions of prisoners, and also the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in Dublin reached a joint report involving the largest range of parties ever to sit around the same table in Ireland since 1917.

Since the ceasefire broke down, we have continued our work. We have fixed a date for all-party talks, that date - the 10th of June - and the talks have started. We agreed detailed ground rules for those talks and procedures for those talks, and we are now working together to achieve an IRA ceasefire so that all the parties, including Sinn Fein, can participate in the talks.

My government's position is that if the IRA calls an unequivocal ceasefire, in words that are believable and provided there is nothing done that is inconsistent with this ceasefire, or with the Mitchell Principles, then Sinn Fein should be admitted to participation in the talks in accordance with the ground rules

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that we have agreed. The first step, however, is a credible ceasefire. The onus is on the Republican Movement to restore the ceasefire credibly at the earliest moment. I want to see Sinn Fein's participation in the talks at the earliest moment too on that basis.

In practical terms, given the imminence of the Christmas recess, I would hope that this would be possible early in the New Year. But there could also be room for reciprocal confidence-building measures in the meantime. The sooner we have a ceasefire, the sooner we can work in that direction.

A way forward is now in place. All who are willing to negotiate with patience and determination are welcome to take part. For the sake of the people of Ireland, and of all in these islands, I call on the Republican Movement to give us an IRA ceasefire so that all can negotiate their future together free of threat.

QUESTION:

Could I ask you if you agree with what Mr Bruton has just said, that this business of bringing Sinn Fein in and starting the substantive phase of the all-party talks could happen by the New Year?

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PRIME MINISTER:

I have never been prepared to put a date on to it because I don't think the question is the passage of a particular timespan. The question at issue is the actions of Sinn Fein/IRA. It is not just a question of saying we are going to have a ceasefire, we need to know on this occasion that it is a genuine ceasefire, so we need to examine that, we need to see not only what they say about the ceasefire, but what they subsequently do. And that is why I have spelt out on a number of occasions the particular things that we will be looking at. So we are not looking at a particular time frame, either short or long, I am not seeking undue delay, this is not a delaying process, but I need to be certain that if they have a ceasefire it is a genuine ceasefire and for that reason we have set out the sort of things that we will look at to make a judgment about whether it is a genuine ceasefire. And once that is the case of course we are better off with an inclusive process. But I can't put a date to it. Sinn Fein/IRA may be able to put a date to it, but that is for them, not for me.

QUESTION:

But you are not ruling out the prospect of this being settled by the New Year or by January?

PRIME MINISTER:

I am not ruling anything out or ruling anything in. I am not going to be drawn on dates because I have said until I am blue in the face that I don't think dates are the point, the point is

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actions, the point is people need to be convinced, in order to sit down and talk with Sinn Féin, that this time it is not a fake. Another fake is of no use, except in the very short-term. What we want is a genuine ceasefire, so we need to see whether the actions that follow the words are satisfactory, and I can't and won't put a timescale to that because it is the actions that are relevant, and I have spelt that out on a number of occasions over recent days.

QUESTION:

Isn't it a fact that based on what you have said, and what the Taoiseach has said, that there still appears to be a gulf between your two positions? The Taoiseach seems to be saying, ceasefire, adherence to the Mitchell Principles, straight into talks against the backdrop of a credible ceasefire. You don't seem to be saying that, am I interpreting you correctly?

MR REYNOLDS:

Could I just say that what I have said consistently on this matter is that for a political party to take part in the all-party talks, there must be compliance with the ground rules for the talks. They are set out in paragraph 6 and 9 in particular, and paragraphs 8 and 9 require a ceasefire, but also paragraph 8 in particular requires demonstration that the ceasefire is credible.

PRIME MINISTER:

And I couldn't have put it better myself, thank you.

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QUESTION:

... on how you established paragraph 8?

PRIME MINISTER:

We set out the ground rules, as the Taoiseach said, some time ago and I put some flesh upon how we will interpret the ground rules. And so that is why I say to you, the point isn't just setting an arbitrary date, that is not really the point. I understand the fears that some people have that because there is not an arbitrary date that that necessarily implies a very long delay. Well that would be a wrong reading of the situation. We set out the ground rules some time ago, we need to make sure the ground rules are kept. I have set out some of the things that we are going to look at to make sure the ground rules are kept. Once we have examined those, if there is a ceasefire, we will look at the words that are issued with the ceasefire, but beyond that we will look at the sort of things necessary to see if the ground rules themselves are met, and that is what we propose to do, that is why you can't put a particular timescale to it.

QUESTION:

Taoiseach, on Europe, on the basis of your talks do you think it is going to be possible to make any meaningful progress on the sensitive areas or whether it is going to be again a question of Britain against the rest?

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MR BRUTON:

It certainly won't be a question of Britain against the rest. The issues which I have outlined are ones on which I believe we will make substantial progress in Dublin, I believe we will make substantial progress on crime and drugs, because here there is a complete identity of views around Europe that this must be a very high priority for all political leaders and governments. I believe also we will make progress on employment based on each government taking its own responsibilities, but also our working together to free up the internal market, and indeed to free up labour markets so that maximum job opportunities are created within Europe and between European countries.

As far as Economic and Monetary Union is concerned, it is obviously the case that Britain has an opt-out of their own which was negotiated and agreed to by all other member states, but as far as the other states are concerned we are on track to move forward on time to introduce the single currency on the date specified, and I believe you will see at the Dublin Summit evidence of a huge amount of detailed painstaking and effective work that has been done to lay the technical basis for the early introduction of the single currency.

QUESTION:

In the current circumstances the conditions that now exist for Sinn Fein to get into talks, the Republic Spokesmen and the IRA have repeatedly made clear on the current circumstances they

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simply are not interested. Is there anything that either you or the Taoiseach can say to Sinn Fein to persuade them to talk to the IRA to persuade the IRA to have another ceasefire, because on the current circumstances they don't want to know.

PRIME MINISTER:

That is a matter for Sinn Fein/IRA, they must make their own judgments. If they wish to remain pariahs then I suppose they will remain pariahs, but I don't believe that they can expect suddenly to return to the talks after having been in a process, after having effectively broken their word during that process. We were told repeatedly during the last ceasefire, that the ceasefire was for good, the bomb and the gun has gone forever we were told time after time. We now know self-evidently that that was not true. Not only have we discovered it wasn't true, we know that it wasn't true at the time they said it, because they were planning to return to violence at the same time that they said it. So if they are frustrated about the need to get back into talks, the frustration arises out of their own actions, not out of anything anyone else has done.

MR BRUTON:

That question was addressed to both of us and I would like to answer it too. I would like to say to the Republican movement, first of all you have a talks process now in existence, which you can join. You know the terms upon which you can join it, they are set out in the ground rules for the talks.

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When you had the previous ceasefire there was no talks process in existence; there is one now which you can join. Furthermore, we have independent chairmen ready and willing to include you in the talks and take the necessary steps to ensure that your position is adequately safeguarded, as will be the position of all other parties. There are detailed procedures agreed insofar as the talks are concerned to ensure that no minority is in any sense badly treated. None of these conditions existed when the first ceasefire was called. These conditions exist now, so why not have a ceasefire now.

I would say in particular to the Republican Movement, those who are in Sinn Fein are people of ability. They should have nothing to fear from sitting down at the table to discuss their future - and it is a joint future - with all their neighbours in Northern Ireland. They don't need recourse to violence to argue their case, they have the ability of their minds and the strength of their convictions to argue their case. They have nothing to fear from a ceasefire, nothing to fear from taking part in the talks. The only barrier that is preventing them from taking part in the talks is the absence of a ceasefire and the absence so far of compliance with the ground rules for the talks.

QUESTION:

Those talks have been going now for 6 months, they appear to be heading nowhere, surely those talks are pointless without Sinn Fein?

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MR BRUTON:

First of all I think it is fair to say that the problems which these talks are addressing have existed on the island of Ireland for 400 years, they have caused 25 years of violence. I don't understand these expressions of impatience at the fact that after just 6 months of talks we haven't found a solution yet. Anybody who looks at this problem against the sweep of history will have to see that what we have now is something we have not had for 75 years, which is all the people with a table that they can sit around, with governments that are willing to work with them to find a solution, with governments that respect both minority and majority in that situation. Let us not ask whether the glass is three-quarters full or not, let us look at the fact that we have got a process now which enables the participants together to fill the glass to the brim if that is what they want to do.

PRIME MINISTER:

And let me add just a word to that. We heard similar expressions of pessimism about what would happen repeatedly before the first cease-fire and before the progress we made on a whole range of things - the Downing Street declaration could never be reached, the frameworks could never be reached, the agreements I have reached with John Bruton could never be done - we have heard all this time, and time, and time again. It is certainly true that this is a frustrating process, often two steps forward and one step back. It was always likely that it was going to be that way, and it certainly has been that way. But I think what the Taoiseach and

OF THE PRIME MINISTER/MR BRUTON - DOORSTEP - LONDON - 9 DECEMBER 1996
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I share is a conviction in the power of reason, reason suggests that the only way this is ever going to be resolved is by people coming together and reaching a conclusion in democratic talks. Anyone who believes this is going to be resolved in anyone's favour out of the barrel of a gun I think mis-judges the situation, deceives themselves and deceives other people. Reason must prevail. It must be very frustrating, I know, for many people who wish to see faster progress that reason often seems to take so long to be reached, but I think that is the only way of making progress, that is what the two governments are seeking to do.

QUESTION:

You set out in your interview yesterday a number of areas of pressure for greater integration in Europe which you were prepared to resist, for example border controls, asylum and immigration, qualified majority voting. Do you expect to find yourself isolated in Dublin on those issues and are you prepared to face such isolation, and do you agree with the Taoiseach that unemployment is a problem for the European Union to solve?

PRIME MINISTER:

Let me take the first point. I don't expect to be isolated on all those issues, certainly on some of them we will have allies, how vocal they will be only time alone will tell, but we are certainly not isolated on all those issues. But on some of the issues where we are isolated I have to say I am undeterred by that.

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I think the needs and requirements of what is right for the United Kingdom must govern what I do in the Intergovernmental Conference, in the discussions at Dublin and beyond, and it most assuredly will do so. When the Taoiseach spoke a moment ago about employment, he spoke also of the Essen Process. The Essen Process of course is explicit to the extent that this is a matter for the member states and sets out quite particularly a range of supply side measures, a number of which we have adopted in the United Kingdom. So certainly across Europe there is a communal interest in employment. What is not the case is that getting unemployment down further could best be done at the centre by Community policies, I don't believe that and I don't think most dispassionate observers could believe that. That we should discuss how unemployment generally could come down, of course that is fine, but the decisions and the judgments as to how to get it down must be decisions and judgments made individually within each member state, as foreshadowed in the Essen Agreements.

QUESTION:

Taoiseach, you have called on the Republican Movement to ensure a ceasefire, but given that there is a difference between yourself and the British Government over a possible time or date for the verification process to be completed, could you say with conviction to the Republican Movement that if they called a ceasefire that Sinn Féin would speedily get into substantive negotiations?

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MR BRUTON:

First of all, let me say that there are no time limits on the table. The conditions, and the only conditions, that have to be fulfilled for Sinn Fein to take part in the talks are set out in the ground rules paper. Obviously that calls upon the IRA to take certain very clear decisions. They know, and have known since April, what are the conditions they must fulfil because they are set out in a published document, namely the ground rules paper. I believe that if a credible ceasefire is called, a ceasefire which sets out in the terms in which it is called, to convince everybody in Northern Ireland, including those who have been at the receiving end of IRA violence over 25 years, to convince them that this time there is no going back to violence. And if the IRA makes the necessary effort, in the way in which they frame their ceasefire declaration, to convince all concerned that this time there is no turning back to violence, yes I believe Sinn Fein will be quickly admitted to talks.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)

12/10/96 TUE 18:45 FAX

021

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Multi-Party TalksDaily Report - 16 December1. In summary:

- The atmosphere today was one of pronounced pessimism about the prospects for an agreement this week on the handling of decommissioning which would open the way to three-stranded talks;
- A dispiriting Plenary confirmed indications received over the weekend of a hardening of the UUP position on the paper currently under discussion with Alliance and the UUP;
- There is now a clear sense on the part of the British Government, the Chairmen, the SDLP and others that the UUP are not interested in reaching agreement before Christmas on this paper and are unwilling, furthermore, to move away from their demands for prior decommissioning and prior decommissioning schedules;
- A UUP proposal for the resumption of the talks on 13 January pointed to a desire to frustrate timetabling proposals which might facilitate Sinn Féin entry to the talks following a restored ceasefire.

2. The Government delegation today was led by the Minister for Justice.
3. An hour-long Plenary session which began at 12 noon under Senator Mitchell's chairmanship consisted essentially of intra-Unionist squabbling. It was agreed to adjourn until Wednesday morning to facilitate further bilaterals and trilaterals.
4. The UKUP and the DUP attacked the UUP over the latter's involvement in the recent trilateral contacts. McCartney renewed his threat to withdraw from the talks if his party continued to be excluded from such contacts. He and Robinson pressed for circulation of the document lodged by the SDLP with the Chairmen last Wednesday. They also criticised media leaks over the weekend regarding these discussions. A further complaint was that the trilaterals were dealing with agenda item 2(c), though formally the negotiations were still at item 2(a).
5. At the invitation of the Chairman, the three parties who had been involved in the trilateral contacts reported briefly on progress achieved to date. Trimble made clear that an agreement on modalities and mechanisms for decommissioning would not be sufficient to meet the UUP's concerns. Such an agreement would represent only "part of the picture": there were other aspects which were just as important, if not more important. Trimble also defended himself from the UKUP by questioning the seriousness of the latter's commitment to talks (given their failure to request bilaterals

with the UUP - a point, however, which the UKUP contested, claiming that one such request had been made this morning and not answered).

6. The SDLP and Alliance condemned the media leaks, which had also misrepresented their positions. The SDLP declined to circulate the document under discussion as this was confidential to the Chairman and in any event had not yet been agreed.
7. The Secretary of State suggested an adjournment of the Plenary until Wednesday morning (with the possibility of an earlier meeting subject to the Chairman's call). The Minister for Justice supported this. The Chairman indicated his intention to conduct his own meetings with the parties in order to explore whether he might put forward a proposal of his own. This was agreed.
8. The Government delegation met the SDLP three times today. We were told that no progress had been made at a bilateral meeting which the latter had this morning with the UUP (attended by Trimble) or at a further meeting this afternoon.
9. We met the British Government and the Chairmen this morning before the Plenary. Senator Mitchell confirmed that, judging from the account he had received of the SDLP/UUP contacts, no progress had been made beyond the text submitted to him last Wednesday. In addition, Reg Empey had informed General De Chastelain on Saturday, following the UUP's party meeting, that three UUP concerns would have to be met before they would regard the decommissioning item as having been dealt with. There would have to be agreement on (i) the respective roles of the Commission and the sub-committee; (ii) the handling of confidence-building measures; and (iii) the entry conditions for Sinn Féin. On the latter point, Empey expressed anxiety about a possible ceasefire occurring during the recess and went on to propose a resumption of the talks on 13 January. The UUP also requested the Chairman not to put forward a proposal of his own unless it was likely to command general acceptance.
10. The British Government endorsed the Senator's gloomy assessment of the prospects for progress this week. The Secretary of State commented that, although he had been more hopeful last week, matters took a turn for the worse when "the eagle landed" over the weekend (Trimble's return from the US and Westminster). The malign influence of Taylor had also increased over recent days. Ancram saw a need to confront the UUP on their demands for prior decommissioning (a "substantial tranche") and prior schedules for decommissioning. These demands, he said, were not British Government policy and amounted to a "deal-breaker".
11. The Government delegation met the Chairmen this afternoon. The Minister for Justice indicated our preference for a resumption of the talks towards the end of January (possibly Monday 27 January). Castle Buildings might, however, be available to delegations from 13 January onwards for bilaterals. Senator Mitchell recognised the tactical advantages of a substantial recess, particularly given the probability of unproductive exchanges with the Unionists between now and the election. With sufficient political will, the differences on the current text could be overcome but it was clear to him that the UUP were not willing to reach an agreement at this point.

12. The British told us that, at a bilateral which they had this afternoon with the UUP (Maginnis and Donaldson), they pursued Maginnis on the UUP's bottom line on decommissioning. After some effort, they eventually wrung from him an admission that the UUP were maintaining their demand for prior decommissioning as a condition for Sinn Féin entry to the three-stranded talks. On this basis, the British have now joined us in the conclusion that the UUP have decided that they cannot afford to make progress in the negotiations until after the British election and the Northern Ireland local elections (due on 21 May).
13. The British subsequently had a meeting with the Chairman at which they suggested that the Plenary break until 20 January. However, it appears that, when it was put to them, they were content with our suggestion as in para 11 above. They suggested to the Chairman that the least negative note on which to adjourn for Christmas would be for him to announce that he had as yet been unable to establish sufficient consensus to justify bringing forward a proposal of his own under Article 20a, and that he would continue his efforts after the break.

David Donoghue

David Donoghue
16 December 1996

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939

FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008



To R
Val -
Does not include
Irish response to
British 'latest proposal'

FAX COVER

Date:

20 November 1996

To:

The White House

For:

Ms Nancy Soderberg

From:

Ambassador Gallagher

Telephone number: (202) 462-0017

Fax number: (202) 319-9757

Number of pages (including cover) 7

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
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EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

Personal and Confidential

20 November 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Nancy

I am enclosing, on the usual basis, the following: (a) copy of the Unionist Party's paper on Decommissioning; and (b) our internal and confidential daily report, dated the 18th November, on the multi-Party Talks.

I will give you a call in the morning to let you know where things stand, arising from tonight's Conference meeting between Paddy Mayhew and Dick Spring in Belfast, and from our ongoing contacts with the British.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely


Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY

DECOMMISSIONING

12 NOVEMBER 1996

Ulster Unionists have, with all other participant parties, declared their desire to see the removal of illegally held arms and explosives from our society. This process requires the oversight of a Disarmament and Verification Commission to be established by legislation in both Westminster and the Dail.

It is clear that the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, and support for, paramilitary violence.

To qualify to participate fully in the current talks process parties must establish a tangible commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and show that they abide by the democratic process.

DECOMMISSIONING PROPOSALS

1. There must be an express declaration by all parties associated with, or deemed to be affiliated to, a paramilitary organisation of a complete, universal and permanent end to the use of violence.

2. Sinn Féin/IRA must subscribe to the Six Principles outlined in the Report of the International Body. Any action incompatible with a genuine and tangible ending of a terror campaign will result in exclusion from the process. This should apply to both actions and omissions on the part of any party, its associate organisation or any proxy thereof.

3. To confirm a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods Sinn Féin/IRA must begin actual decommissioning with a substantial tranche of guns, commercial explosives (e.g. Semtex) and bomb initiating materials before it can be admitted to substantive negotiations. *prior decom.*

4. There must be an acceptance that the decommissioning process is independent of the negotiations. Decommissioning (on the basis of commitment to the Six Principles), must progress to completion irrespective of the progress of the separate political negotiations. ?

5. Structures should be put in place and methodology outlined prior to the launch of substantive negotiations which would provide for actual decommissioning. The United Kingdom and Irish Governments should publish and enact the necessary enabling legislation as soon as possible.

6. All agreements on decommissioning entered into prior to the launch of the substantive negotiations shall be binding on all current and future participants in such negotiations.

DECOMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY

A core Disarmament and Verification Commission designate should be established consisting of the Chairman designate, ideally some other Commissioners designate, and some support/advisory staff. The first task of the Commission Designate would be to draft and publish provisional decommissioning and verification scheme/s.

Establishment of the Disarmament and Verification Commission proper should take place within a specified period after the enactment of the necessary legislation. Its first task will be to finalise Decommissioning Schemes.

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Multi-Party Talks

Daily Report - 18 November 1996

1. In summary:

- The Plenary met for half an hour this morning and adjourned until Wednesday morning, (not before midday, and subject to the Chairman's call) in order to facilitate further bilaterals.
- We met the British Government, the SDLP and the UDP. There was general consensus that the talks may shortly break down over decommissioning unless a way can be found through the present impasse.
- We made clear that the Government would wish to be convinced that the approach proposed by the British Government last week is a viable exit strategy - rather than a potential trap which effectively involves ratcheting us close to the Washington Three precondition and is also at variance with the Mitchell Report.

2. The Government delegation today was led by Minister Coveney.
3. The Plenary, chaired by PM Holkeri, met at noon for half an hour. It was agreed that it would be helpful to let bilaterals continue and that the Plenary would not meet again before noon on Wednesday. (It seems unlikely it will meet before next week).
4. In this session, McCartney (in the unchallenged role of spokesman for the Unionist side) summed up three points from the papers submitted by the three Unionist parties. First, any ceasefire declared must be complete in nature in permanent in extent. Second, the declaration must be accompanied by the handing-over of a substantial amount of weapons. Third, decommissioning must not be linked to progress in the negotiations.
5. At a bilateral meeting, the Secretary of State explained last week's British Government paper in terms of the UUP's need for political cover in the context of possible Sinn Féin entry into the talks. The paper had not been shown to David Trimble but its ideas had been aired with him (and had drawn a less than enthusiastic response). The Secretary of State underlined how close the talks were to collapse.
6. Minister Coveney recognised this but made clear that we could not go along with an approach which involved a retreat towards Washington Three. Efforts were being made to satisfy Trimble's voracious appetite for political cover at the expense of most other interests in the talks process. The Minister recalled the successive steps agreed to by the two Governments in order to meet Unionists concerns. These had been

entirely unreciprocated.

7. The Secretary of State and Michael Ancram denied any intention to revert to Washington Three. We commented that the British proposal was either an exit strategy or a trap. If they could persuade us that it offered the former, and did not simply involve further ratcheting back to Washington Three, our Government would be willing to look at this. If, however, we were being asked simply to "try this out", without any guarantee that it would secure the transition to meaningful three-stranded negotiations and a realistic approach to decommissioning, this would effectively mean that the talks were going to break down over the decommissioning issue. If so there was little point in going to elaborate lengths merely to come up with the same outcome at a slightly later stage.
8. In response, the British emphasised the non-mandatory nature of the judgement which they were proposing for the Commission and also the value of the envisaged liaison committee as a means of ensuring political input to this judgement. They indicated that Trimble had been unenthusiastic about vesting in the Commission anything approximating to a decision on the timing of decommissioning.
9. The meeting ended inconclusively. The discussion will be resumed at the Conference meeting scheduled for Wednesday evening.
10. The SDLP indicated some annoyance to us over the UUP's preparation and subsequent circulation of a paper (which effectively aligns them with the DUP and UKUP positions on decommissioning) at the very time when the SDLP and the UUP were supposedly engaged in bilateral efforts to find a joint solution to the impasse. They were, in consequence, reserved on the Alliance proposal for a trilateral meeting between the SDLP, the UUP and Alliance.
11. The UDP expressed considerable gloom about the prospects for the process and the consequences of a collapse for their own situation on the ground. They showed disappointment with the position reflected in the UUP paper, and asked the two Governments to intercede with the SDLP and the UUP to find an agreed way forward.
12. They expressed extreme unease at the prospect of setting up the verification commission "upfront" and indicated they may now become more overtly critical of the Unionist Parties' position (Ervine seems to be thinking along the same lines).
13. We were told today that General De Chastelain planned to discuss with the two Governments some ideas arising from contacts which he had with "the parties" last week, but is persuaded of the wisdom of clearing this with Senator Mitchell first.
14. The SDLP briefed us on bilaterals they had with the UUP and Alliance this afternoon.
15. The UUP delegation had included Trimble and Maginnis, who seemed to have no knowledge of earlier UUP/SDLP discussion, and denied there had been any bad faith in publishing a paper on decommissioning which bore no relationship whatever to that

discussion. It was unclear to the SDLP whether they were signalling there was any latitude in terms of their stated position, so a further meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow. (They mentioned the forthcoming DUP Conference as an inhibiting factor for discussions next week).

16. Alliance seemed in despair and conceded that the current UUP seemed to vindicate the pessimistic analysis on Unionist intentions which the SDLP had proffered to the Alliance Party proposal last week. They will have a trilateral with Alliance and the UUP tomorrow, but without any great expectations.

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PAGE 01 OF 02

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^BC-IRISH

^Irish premier Bruton urges credible IRA truce

By Andrew Hill

DUBLIN, Ireland (Reuter) - Irish Prime Minister John Bruton said Wednesday that IRA guerrillas could be represented at Northern Ireland peace talks in January if the outlawed group called a new cease-fire "in words that are believable."

Bruton acknowledged that his understanding of how the Irish Republican Army's political wing, Sinn Fein, could enter talks differed from Britain's, but said he hoped to iron out differences in talks with British Prime Minister John Major in London Monday.

The Irish leader said that if the IRA called a credible cease-fire and Sinn Fein adhered to democratic rules governing the talks, the guerrillas could be represented at the Belfast peace talks after the Christmas recess.

Major said last week that Britain would first have to be satisfied that any new IRA truce was credible. In February the guerrillas ended a 17-month cease-fire in their war against British rule of Northern Ireland.

But Bruton said his government opposed any rewriting of the rules the two countries had worked out to convene the most serious attempt in 27 years to negotiate a settlement between pro-British Unionists and Irish nationalists.

"This means that if the IRA clearly called an unequivocal cease-fire, in words that are believable, and provided there is an adherence to the Mitchell principles, then Sinn Fein should be admitted to the talks," he told Ireland's parliament.

The five-month-old talks, chaired by former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell, group all the province's major political parties except Sinn Fein in an attempt to end a conflict which has killed 3,200 in the past quarter century.

Mitchell wrote a series of democratic principles which commit parties to accepting the outcome of the talks and shunning violence.

Sinn Fein is barred from the talks since the IRA ended its cease-fire and Major has said the guerrillas will have to prove any new truce is not a tactical ploy by calling a halt to targetting and surveillance.

Bruton said one of the reasons mediation efforts by peace-broker John Hume appeared to be deadlocked was a lack of trust between the IRA and the British government.

"It is for this reason that both governments are engaged in

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**INTERNATIONAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 02

intensive contact with a view to developing our respective positions. That work will be continued in the days before Monday's Anglo-Irish summit," he said.

"Unless both governments are traveling together on the same road toward the same destination, progress is simply not possible," he said.

Hume leads the moderate Irish nationalist Social, Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) and is engaged in behind-the-scenes moves to secure a new IRA truce by Christmas.

Bruton's statement was seen as a further push at the Irish Republican Army to call an end to its current bombing campaign, which has seen attacks in Britain, Germany and Northern Ireland.

^REUTER

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INTERNATIONAL

Holmes -

(11/2)

Dec 5

Congressional
NI talking to the Irish re summit
on Monday.

| Can't go out with a date; trying to
orchestrate a scenario, not a joint communique
A PM say make clear not looking at long
time. Hope it can happen by; make clear to
Irish that we are quite genuine. Perfectly possible
that time - |

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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November 6, 1996

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: VAL MARTINEZ *VM*
SUBJECT: Northern Ireland Developments: Proposed British Statement

The British draft public statement sent to you on November 5 by John Holmes is not at all bad. It does much to address Sinn Fein concerns. The document, for example:

- Does not list a specific date for post-ceasefire Sinn Fein participation in all-party talks. This purposeful vagueness is a necessity.
- Makes clear that substantive all-party talks will address all issues -- including the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK. The draft also stresses that all parties will be treated equally in the talks. Further, the British commit themselves to see that all issues are addressed, even if some parties balk at a truly comprehensive agenda (Paisley could walk out if Northern Ireland's constitutional status arises, for example).
- States specifically that there are no "pre-conditions" for Sinn Fein entry other than an unequivocal IRA ceasefire.
- Calls for the substantive negotiations to be as "speedy" as possible -- a nod to nationalists and republicans who favor a definite timeframe.

Nonetheless, as John Hume mentioned to you the morning of November 6, there is a troublesome paragraph in the British draft concerning how HMG will make a "dependable judgment" that a ceasefire is "genuinely unequivocal." That paragraph lists a number of things the British view as logical elements of judging a ceasefire -- an end to IRA targeting, weapons training, and the like. What looks reasonable to the British here (and maybe reasonable to us as well) will of course look like a pre-

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condition to the IRA. There is also the issue, which Hume did not raise, of the British plan to have Sinn Fein address decommissioning immediately upon entry to plenary talks. This too could be a dealbreaker.

Our goal is to narrow the small gap in words so the large chasm of distrust between the British and Sinn Fein can begin to close. What are the options?

Option One: Try and sell the British statement as is to Sinn Fein. I agree with Hume that this will be difficult, but it is worth raising with Adams just to see how bad he thinks it is (but also to remind him that the document is a serious effort by HMG to bridge gaps).

Option Two: Hume read you alternative language to the paragraph at issue. It was basically a reformulation of a recent Irish idea: a ceasefire is called and Sinn Fein enters plenary talks immediately, but only to adhere to the Mitchell Principles on non-violence. This would be followed by a break in plenary sessions and a series of bilateral meetings. After a suitable period of bilateral meetings (during which HMG would judge the nature of the ceasefire) plenary sessions would resume with Sinn Fein as a participant.

Option Three: The Mitchell/Lake option. An IRA ceasefire would be followed, not by a plenary session, but by a series of bilateral meetings between Sinn Fein and Mitchell, and between Sinn Fein and the British and Irish governments. The latter meetings could be at the ministerial level, an immediate and tangible symbol that the two governments recognize that a serious step has been taken by the IRA. Presumably, these bilateral contacts would take place during a Christmas hiatus in the talks, thereby allowing time for the nature of the ceasefire to be judged. The Christmas break in effect becomes the "airlock" leading to Sinn Fein participation in talks.

I think some variation of the third option holds the most promise. The first two, in one way or the other, force one of the parties to lose face by accepting what they have made clear is unacceptable -- for Sinn Fein, lack of immediate entry into talks; for HMG, a climbdown on its position that a suitable period must pass before Sinn Fein enters those talks. The third option, on the other hand, does not force Sinn Fein into a plenary before its time but nor does it force the IRA to face explicit exclusion. After all, if there are no talks taking place how can anyone feel excluded from them? The key to this scenario is for the IRA to cease all action between now and early December and call a ceasefire in early December as the talks enter a holiday abeyance. This solution neatly avoids whether

Sinn Fein enters talks immediately or not and both sides save face. In addition, if Mitchell and the two governments use the Christmas break to meet with Sinn Fein, then Sinn Fein will be having all the substantive meetings it could be having, given that the all-party talks are on a break.

There are many complicating factors to all this, not least of which are the state of mind of the unionists and the precarious political position of John Major. Nonetheless, if we go into all of this knowing that one side or the other cannot accept the basic premise of the other, we will not get far. Simplicity and clarity seem to be keys. The more words on the table, and the more actions demanded by one party against the other, the better the chance that this opportunity will slip away.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed British Statement

IN CONFIDENCE



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1996

Dee Tany,

NORTHERN IRELAND

You will be interested to see the attached letter I sent to Paddy Teahan this morning, covering a further text we propose to send to John Hume. We are anxious to bring this exercise to a conclusion as soon as possible, not least following the leaks over the weekend.

Hume told me yesterday that, on the question of the permanence of any new ceasefire, the IRA/Sinn Fein would probably be prepared to say that the ceasefire was unequivocal, and that they believed that the statement by the Prime Minister provided the basis for an ending to the conflict and a lasting peace. This would be helpful as far as it goes, but that is not far, frankly.

I will keep you in close touch with developments, and am meanwhile happy to discuss with you further.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature, likely of John Holmes, consisting of a stylized 'J' and 'H'.

JOHN HOLMES

The Honorable Anthony Lake

IN CONFIDENCE



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1996

Dear Paddy,

Following our discussion last night, I attach the revised text we plan to send to John Hume and subsequently to publish. As I said, we now wish to move fast and would like to give Hume the text as soon as possible. Publication could follow shortly afterwards.

You will see that we have adjusted the text we last received from Hume in various ways to ensure it continues to reflect our policies, but have tried to keep changes to a minimum. There is a new paragraph on what would happen after a ceasefire, to replace the one discussed between us earlier. Your concerns have been taken into account. I trust you will be able to support the result.

In sending the text to John Hume, we would accompany it with a letter explaining further our position, making clear again that the timing of Sinn Fein's entry into negotiations in the event of a ceasefire is dependent on the words used and the actions which follow. We are bound to take time to evaluate any new ceasefire - paragraph 8 of the Groundrules makes that clear in any case.

You should be aware that this text is the product of much consideration here and represents just about the limits of what we are prepared to say, given our overall approach, and the present circumstances. As we discussed, the kind of words Hume has suggested might be used by the IRA/Sinn Fein in the event of a ceasefire, on the question of "permanence", do not seem to us to change the position. And there is no indication of any move forward on other issues such as parallel decommissioning or the consent principle.

Yours sincerely

JOHN HOLMES

Paddy Teahan, Esq.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Text in response to Hume text of 10 October

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the no-warning attack on Thiepval barracks, Lisburn and various arms finds, including the huge find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The purpose of the negotiations is to achieve a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands. The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent.

They will therefore address all the issues relevant to a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both the British and Irish Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations, in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate and the need for sufficient consensus. But no one party can prevent the negotiations continuing by withdrawing from them. No party has an undemocratic advantage. Both Governments intend that the outcome of these negotiations will be submitted for democratic ratification through referendums, North and South.

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2011-0355-F

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. The loyalist ceasefire has made an important contribution. It made it possible for the loyalist parties to join the negotiations. They are now playing their part in shaping Northern Ireland's future, as I acknowledged when I met their leaders in July.

Under the legislation setting up the talks, if there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to join the negotiations.

In the light of recent events, unless there were some incontrovertible developments supporting it, a dependable judgement that any restoration was indeed genuinely unequivocal could not be formed at once. Each atrocity deepens the credibility gap which Sinn Fein must address. Much would turn on whether words, actions and all the circumstances were consistent with the declared ceasefire. For example, whether or not any paramilitary activity, including surveillance, targeting and weapons preparation, continued would be relevant. Sufficient time would be taken to ensure that a well founded judgement could be made.

Beyond the unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. In their report, the International Body said the parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations. We and the Irish Government support this compromise approach. Agreement needs to be reached on how to take it forward, so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a block to progress in the negotiations, but can be used to build confidence one step at a time during them. So both Governments have already said they will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding our responsibility to encourage, facilitate and enable agreement over a period through the negotiations.

This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have difficulties. We will encourage the adoption by the participants of an agreed indicative timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held in December to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. The two Governments will also review progress at regular intervals. Progress in the negotiations will be reviewed again in May 1997, before we decide whether or not to extend the forum's one-year life which expires then.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. We support, with equal respect, the varied cultural traditions of both communities. We are also committed to developing policing arrangements so that the police service should enjoy the support of the entire community.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force

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- 5 -

redeployment, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The process of peace and reconciliation has received valuable economic support from the United States, the European Union and through the International Fund. The negotiations are widely supported internationally and benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of the people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all violence. That is our aim too.

Text sm

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November 28, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(5.06)
KSH 7/11/2023

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Update on Northern Ireland

Contrary to Prime Minister Bruton's and our strong urgings, the British government went ahead and published their response to the Hume-Adams initiative. The proposal was initiated with the purpose of providing assurances to the IRA regarding the terms and timing of Sinn Fein's entrance into the talks. The process leaked to the press, and Major has been under intense political pressure to make public their private discussions with Hume. Because of strong opposition from the Unionists, the document originally intended to provide those assurances to the IRA became far too complicated, and in our view, a net negative. That is also the view of the Irish government, John Hume, and Gerry Adams.

The British statement today is being portrayed by the press as a rejection of the Hume-Adams effort. But, John Holmes told me this morning that they will continue to consider and possibly pursue the approach we laid out for them yesterday. I also have urged the Irish government not close any doors and to press Hume and Adams to be moderate in their reactions. We have told the British we will not be able to say anything positive -- the first time we have done so -- because that would burn our bridges to the nationalists and at least singe our bridge to the Irish. Attached is what we are saying on an if-asked basis only.

attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 28, 1996

Press Guidance on 11/28 British Government Statement on U.K. - Northern Ireland Peace Process

If Asked Basis:

- The British government statement today speaks for itself.
- We hope all parties will redouble their efforts in the search for peace.
- We continue to urge an immediate restoration of the ceasefire.
- We continue to believe that a way forward can and must be found to achieve inclusive and substantive talks on the future of Northern Ireland.

If Pressed:

- Not going to comment on specifics.
- Our role is to encourage all sides to redouble their efforts in the search for a just and lasting peace.

'96 NOV 28 AM 10 23



**Embassy of Ireland
2244 S Street NW
Washington DC 20008**

FAX COVER

Date: 28 Nov

To: Tony Lake

From: Don & Tallie

for information.

Telephone number: (202) 232-9305

Fax number: (202) 232-8974

Number of pages (including cover) 3

28/11/96 14:36

NO. 642 002

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

28th November, 1996.

The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P.,
Prime Minister

Dear John

I was particularly disturbed to learn just before our 'phone call that you had unilaterally decided to publish the text of your communication to John Hume, M.P., M.E.P.

Progress in relation to the difficult situation which both Irish and British Governments have faced over the last twenty five years has been made only when both Governments have found it possible to synchronise their policies and approaches.

Since I became Taoiseach, I have sought at all times to proceed in this matter on the basis of agreement with you. It is in this spirit that my Government has in recent months been working with you in support of the Hume Initiative

The objective - our joint objective - was to achieve a ceasefire, one that was credible and unequivocal.

The only purpose of your publishing a statement, whenever that might be done, was to achieve that ceasefire.

As I hope I made clear in our call, to proceed this afternoon in the certain knowledge that it will not achieve its purpose will simply convince the Republican Movement that the whole exercise was tactical and manifestly aimed at some objective other than a ceasefire. Premature publication in the

28/11/96

14:57

NO. 642

D03

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 2 -

way proposed will make our attempts to restore a ceasefire immeasurably more difficult.

What will happen I fear is that Hume/Adams will publish their proposal and a most confrontational debate about British attitudes to the peace process will take place. I will, in these circumstances, have to make my own position abundantly clear.

The outcome will then be a rift in Anglo-Irish relations with appalling potential consequences for both Governments and for all our people.

It is my judgement imperative, if your decision to publish is irrevocable, that the text of your article be accompanied by an agreed public indication of the two Government's support for the following course of action:

- there would be an early Christmas break next week in the talks of approximately two months to last until 30th January
- that in the event of an IRA declaration now of the unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire, and of Sinn Féin signing up to the Mitchell principles with both Governments early after that declaration, and further, provided that there is adherence both to the cessation and to the Mitchell principles, Sinn Féin would be invited to join the talks from their resumption on 30th January.

I urgently await the response which you promised me on this.

Yours sincerely

John
Taoiseach.

Oifig an Taoisigh, Tithe an Riada, Baile Átha Cliath 2.
Office of the Taoiseach, Government Buildings, Dublin 2.

FLASH

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER LAKE SODERBERG

SIT: COQ LAKEA SUM2

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<DTG> 271540Z NOV 96

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

INFO ////

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (5.08)
K8H 7/11/2023

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ANTHONY LAKE TO JOHN HOLMES AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

BELOW IS THE PROPOSED SCENARIO WE DISCUSSED. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING IT WITH YOU.

PROPOSED SCENARIO

AN IRA CEASE-FIRE AND SINN FEIN ENTRY INTO THE STORMONT TALKS ARE POSSIBLE IF ALL SIDES KEEP DEMANDS UPON ONE ANOTHER TO THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM.

A PRECISE CHOREOGRAPHY OF STATEMENTS AND EVENTS SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE, BY ALL PARTIES.

A SCENARIO THAT COULD WIN THE PRIVATE AND ADVANCE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES WOULD LOOK LIKE THE FOLLOWING:

1. AGREED ACTIONS, PRIOR TO BRITISH STATEMENT/IRA CEASE-FIRE:

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES PRINCIPAL ACTORS -- TRIMBLE, ADAMS, LOYALISTS -- TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND CAUTION.

NO FURTHER ATTACKS BY THE IRA.

THE UK RESUMES CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

SENATOR MITCHELL CALLS FOR A HOLIDAY BREAK IN PLENARY SESSIONS AND BEGINS BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. ANNOUNCES THAT PLENARY TALKS WILL RESUME BY LATE JANUARY.

~~SECRET~~

FLASH

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

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DECOMMISSIONING LEGISLATION.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS AT A SUMMIT WITH THE IRISH,
STATES PUBLICLY THAT:

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT WHEN PLENARY
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NO OUTCOME IS RULED OUT IN THE TALKS.

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WOULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN A REASONABLE
TIMEFRAME.

THE TALKS WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRITISH AND IRISH
GOVERNMENTS AT A SUMMIT IN SIX MONTHS.

THE TALKS ARE INCLUSIVE, HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA, AND NO
PARTY CAN VETO A SUBJECT BEING RAISED.

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ACCEPT THE MITCHELL
APPROACH ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPEATS "NO VICTORY OVER THE IRA."

3. THE IRA RESPONDS (WITHIN 24-48 HOURS): THE IRA ANNOUNCES AN
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~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>2663

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	Anthony Lake to John Holmes [partial] (1 page)	11/27/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, November 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

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FM WHITE HOUSE

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~~SECRET~~

VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

2011-0355-F [5.08]

KBH 4/11/2023

Set to wrong Addressee

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

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~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
JOHN HOLMES
November 27, 1996

If Holmes Says No

- I urge you in the strongest terms to reconsider.
- It has been well over two years since we've had any serious disagreement on Northern Ireland, and we have always given you our sincere and vocal support.
- Nonetheless, as I told you yesterday, I strongly believe that the current strategy simply won't work.
- If you look closely at what we have proposed, you'll see that it is very close to where you are now; what is needed is a catalyst to bring things together before they fall apart for good.
- We think our scenario is that catalyst.
- I fear that if you publish your latest draft public statement as is, we would find it difficult to give it public support.
- At this point, I'm inclined to suggest a phone call between the Prime Minister and the President.

If Holmes Says Yes

- Good. We plan to put this to Sinn Fein via the Irish, since we don't want our fingerprints on this any more than you do.
- We'll do this as quickly as possible, and get back to you.

Mitchell

6 months - feels great suspicion. But why agree to a date certain - as good a guess yet not of British

logalist is despair; This process over & a real war is imminent. All just spinning our wheels. Resent all of ideas & viewed from unionist perspective & all attempts to get SF in. Really irritated constabular unionists

Internal unionist political rivalry. Constant pressure by Paisley & MacLachlan put in Trimble Alliance - full scale UUP panic. Separately SF in, Paisley & Mac. out. Need to decide whether to stay in. Extremely nervous. as nervous a spotlight as I've seen them. Rules agreed. Tense situation. Putting pressure on major. Major briefed Trimble really - Trimble thinks he'll like it. Seem almost to dread prospect of ceasefire all believe tactical no matter what

Peter Robinson is convinced ~~SF~~ Trimble will walk
if SF is in

talks going ahead.

Decomng can't be resolved until large
issue of plenary at ICA article.

Dec 18 - could go until

British to put out paper on Thurs.

- B Mitchell - Back on Monday - Thurs, Dec 2-5
returns after 11th

Expect talks to go to Dec 18

RUSH

WASHINGTON DATELINE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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VERSHBOW
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FM Reuter

a0903

^BC-IRELAND-US-TALKS

^Lake pessimistic on Northern Ireland talks

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - Peace talks in Northern Ireland seem unlikely to produce a cease-fire with the Irish Republican Army, U.S. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said Sunday.

"The talks frankly are not going well," Lake said on NBC television's "Meet the Press."

He said even if the IRA agreed to a truce, "there's always a danger that a cease-fire could again be broken."

IRA guerrilla forces broke a 17-month cease-fire last February. The British and Irish governments insist on a new truce before all-party talks on British rule in Northern Ireland can begin.

"The president and all of us are working very hard to try to bring about both a cease-fire and then comprehensive and inclusive talks," Lake said of the two-year effort led by former Sen. George Mitchell to bring the parties together.

"I hope all of the parties and governments involved, if they look at the alternatives for Northern Ireland, realize that it's time to compromise, time not to get too involved in the details and move forward," he said.

^REUTER

<MSGID> R0183199

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

11-25-96

wrong

To R -

We might want
to ~~correct~~ ^{softer} this line if it
gets attention

To Tim F. Val -
what was reaction
in UK to this?
m

WASHINGTON DATELINE

011 44. 1232
~~603-~~ 6014442.
~~441232~~

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Fetig, James L.
To: Kessinger, Jodi
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Lake's Remarks [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, November 25, 1996 12:40PM

Transcript not yet available from library. We're trying to get it from NBC. These quotes are both complete and accurate by my recollection.

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``The talks frankly are not going well," Lake said on NBC television's ``Meet the Press."

He said [even if the IRA agreed to a truce] ``there's always a danger that a ceasefire could again be broken."

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^REUTER

its goods into this country with low tariffs, must be reviewed every year. Clinton initially insisted on linking human rights with trade and other issues but reversed himself in 1994 under pressure from Beijing.

"I think MFN is going to be a factor with regard to China for a long time to come," Daschle said. "I favor making it permanent. I think we've got to get on with it."

"I don't know that MFN, the concept of MFN, is really what it used to be. We ought to say 'normalize relations,'" he added.

It's not that human rights is unimportant, the Senate minority leader said, but "in the mix we've got to recognize that trade, that dealing with the issues of nuclear proliferation, that dealing with all of the factors involving the Chinese government are very important."

"And we've got to be engaged."

On NBC's "Meet The Press," national security adviser Anthony Lake defended Clinton's decision to stop linking trade and human rights.

"Well, we think the linkage in the first year helped in getting human rights on the agenda with the Chinese in a way that it had never been before," Lake said. "Now we think the best way to pursue it is to have this dialogue with the Chinese, and that's a priority."

Lake said China's human rights record was "not very good, and we will continue to press them on it, we will continue to pursue our interest in human rights, like our interests in opening the Chinese market and getting good Chinese performance on (arms) nonproliferation issues."

"The purpose of our relationship with China is not that it be more and more cool," the White House official said.

APE- 11/25/96 00:37:00

DIST:

UNCLASSIFIEDPREC: DAILY/DEFERRED CATEGORY: WASHINGTON DATELINE
NWSID: R0181867SOURCE: Reuter a0936

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^REUTER

RB-- 11/24/96 12:29:00

DIST:

UNCLASSIFIEDPREC: RUSH CATEGORY: WASHINGTON DATELINE NWSID:
R0181794SOURCE: Reuter a0919

^BC-CHINA-USA

^U.S. to continue to press China on human rights

WASHINGTON, Nov 24 (Reuter) - The Clinton administration will continue to press China on human rights issues while pursuing dialogue on a range of other interests, U.S. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said on Sunday.

Following a meeting between President Bill Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Manila and an announcement that they would exchange state visits within the next two years, Lake said the administration still wanted China to improve its human rights record, which he called "not very good."

Human rights activists had objected to the meeting in Manila because of alleged rights abuses by Beijing.

"We will continue to press them on it. We will continue to pursue our interests in human rights like our interests in opening the Chinese market and getting good Chinese performance on non-proliferation issues," Lake said on NBC television's "Meet the Press."

He said the Clinton administration had successfully put human rights on the agenda with Beijing in its first year by linking them to free trade issues.

"Now we think the best way to pursue it is to have this dialogue with the Chinese," he said.

Retiring Sen. Sam Nunn, speaking on the same show, said the planned summits were a good idea.

"Isolation of China and basically having unilateral sanctions against China are not only not working but they are counterproductive to human rights in China," said the Georgian, who is the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota reinforced the Democrats' shift away from linking trade and human rights, saying said he would favour giving China permanent trade preferences as a "most favoured nation" to build a better relationship with Beijing.

"I favour making it permanent," Daschle said on Fox television's "Fox News Sunday."

Addressing concerns that North Korea might have suspended its commitment to stop developing nuclear weapons, Lake said he was confident that its nuclear programme remained frozen.

"They have not said that as a matter of policy they have suspended it. We hope that they will not," he said.

"The North Korean nuclear programme is frozen under international supervision, and we think that it can be totally stood down," he added.

^REUTER

RB-- 11/24/96 12:23:00

DIST:

UNCLASSIFIEDPREC: RUSH CATEGORY: WASHINGTON DATELINE NWSID: R0181562SOURCE: Reuter a0800

^BC-SAUDI-USA-FBI

^FBI chief pleased with Saudi efforts on bombing

WASHINGTON, Nov 24 (Reuter) - The FBI said on Sunday it was pleased with Saudi efforts to investigate the truck bombing that killed 19 U.S. servicemen on June 25.

In a statement issued following a visit to Saudi Arabia by FBI Director Louis Freeh, the bureau said close cooperation between the FBI and Saudi authorities would continue.

Freeh was "pleased with the efforts and thoroughness of the Saudi law enforcement authorities to solve this heinous act of terrorism," the FBI statement said.

The visit was arranged at the invitation of the Saudi government and was the third trip by Freeh to Saudi Arabia since the bombing.

FBI officials previously complained about a lack of Saudi cooperation in the investigation of the bombing at the U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran. They said FBI agents were not allowed to question Saudi citizens and were not told about any arrests.

Defence Secretary William Perry told reporters on Nov. 1 the United States had not concluded who was responsible for the bombing. He was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia next weekend.

National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said Freeh's talks with the Saudis were very successful.

"It's part of a continuing effort with the Saudis to find who was responsible for this terrible act," Lake said on NBC Television's "Meet the Press" programme.

^REUTER

RB-- 11/24/96 11:18:00

DIST: