

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Working File, July 1996

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1398

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
50	2	4	1	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (3 pages)	09/12/1996	P1/b(1)
002. report	re: Northern Ireland's Economy Under Siege (1 page)	09/09/1996	P1/b(1)
003. notes	re: [Soderberg Notes from Hume Telephone Conversation] (1 page)	08/05/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
004. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Nancy's Conversation with Adams (3 pages)	07/12/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
005. cable	re: Northern Ireland: PM's Letter to Hume on Cease Fire (4 pages)	07/26/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
006a. memo	From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Calls with Prime Ministers Major and Bruton (2 pages)	07/15/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
006b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major (1 page)	07/15/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
006c. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Bruton (1 page)	07/15/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
007. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Consequences of Violence in Northern Ireland (2 pages)	07/13/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
008. memo	Nancy Soderberg to Tony Lake re: Northern Ireland: Next Steps (3 pages)	07/19/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
009. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Nancy's Conversation with Adams (3 pages)	07/12/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
010. cable	re: Northern Ireland: PM's Meeting with SDLP Leaders (2 pages)	07/19/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

OLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, July 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1710

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

(1) National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(2) Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(5) Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
M. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
R. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memo	re: Ulster Bombings at a Glance (3 pages)	07/24/1996	P1/b(1)
012. teleon	re: Teleon with Gerry Adams (7 pages)	07/21/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
013. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Next Steps in Northern Ireland Peace Process (2 pages)	07/13/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
014a. memo	Nancy Soderberg to Tony Lake re: Call to Adams (2 pages)	07/19/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
014b. talking points	re: Points for Call to Adams (1 page)	07/19/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
014c. cable	John Holmes to Nancy Soderberg (4 pages)	07/09/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023

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SDLP

Wp



✓
cc + nehr

JOHN HUME MP, MEP
5 BAYVIEW TERRACE
DERRY, BT48 7EE
TEL NO:- 01504 265340
FAX NO:- 01504 363423

F A X C O V E R S H E E T

TO:- Nancy SODERBERG

FROM:-

John Hume

NO.OF PAGES INCLUDING FAX PAGE:-

3,

MESSAGE:-

9/6
To TZ ✓
MAP-

Adams paper to Hume
on what he wants Majin
to say to get clearance.
lets talk

MS

DRAFT 3 SEPTEMBER 1996

The negotiations which started on 10 June are to secure an overall political settlement and will address all the issues relevant to that.

Clear and firm guidance at government level is critical to a real prospect of resolving the problem. That is our responsibility. We are wholly committed to upholding that responsibility.

The primary interest is to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island of Ireland. Accordingly, with a view to achieving that agreement all relevant constitutional, political, social, economic and cultural matters will be addressed.

An accommodation of the diversity of views and aspirations on these matters mean achieving agreement on the basis of equality of treatment and parity of esteem.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will be greatly enhanced if they are conducted in a peaceful environment. Beyond that the two governments are agreed that these negotiations will be without preconditions.

It is equally clear that to be successful the negotiations must be peaceful, based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means and without recourse to the threat or use of violence or coercion.

The effort to achieve a successful accommodation means that the negotiations must be inclusive, involving both governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment.

The spectrum of issues on which an overall agreement is dependent means that the agenda for negotiations must be comprehensive, with all issues on the table ensuring a fair hearing for the concerns of all the participants. No outcome will be excluded or predetermined in advance.

The governments' responsibilities and commitments are clear. So too the responsibilities of all the participants. All must approach the negotiations in good faith, with all parties seriously addressing all aspects of the agreed agenda and making every effort to reach agreement, and the two governments, for their part, committed to ensure that a comprehensive agenda is addressed and that any obstacles which may arise are overcome.

The governments are determined to see these negotiations through successfully. In this we are at one with the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of Britain and Ireland. In large part this has sustained a momentum in a process which will always have its difficulties. These hopes and aspirations will bear fruit in a negotiation process that is conducted within a calendar which ensures that momentum is built up and sustained. The two governments are committed to an agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations.

The government is committed to an equality agenda and discipline in relation to all relevant political, social, economic and cultural issues. In particular we are committed to addressing issues which arise out of the divisions among the people who inhabit the island of Ireland and which result in or from the conflict.

These measures will include urgent action on the issues of conflict related prisoners and legislation; the administration of justice, a policing service and policing methods, which would enjoy widespread acceptability.

They will ensure equality of treatment for the Irish language and culture.

They will also address and resolve the issues involved in equality of opportunity in the economic matters including equality in economic development, the empowerment and inclusion of deprived communities, the imbalance in the unemployment ratio and the subsequent greater and more equally shared prosperity which all of this enables.

The opportunity to resolve the conflict in Ireland has never been greater. This is universally recognised. Accordingly we welcome the contribution of the European Union to the resolution of the problem. Likewise we welcome the interest and involvement of the United States arising from the special affinity shared between all the peoples of these islands and people in the United States. In particular we welcome the contribution of areas of successful conflict resolution such as South Africa.

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AMBASAÍD NA hÉIREANN

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939

FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

FAX**DATE:**24 Sept. 1996**FOR:****MARY ANN PETERS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL****FROM:****PAT HENNESSY
POLITICAL COUNSELLOR, IRISH EMBASSY****SUBJECT:**Excerpt on Northern Ireland from
Mr. Dick Spring's statement to the
51st session of the UN General Assembly.**PAGES:**5

(including this cover sheet)

16

reconstruction needs in the region. It welcomes the progress in rehabilitation in Rwanda, to which it contributes substantially, and pays tribute to the work of the United Nations in various sectors in Rwanda.

The return of refugees and national reconciliation in Rwanda will remain priorities for the Union. We will also continue to support the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to underscore our belief that the international community must pursue and bring to justice those who have perpetrated gross crimes against humanity.

Mr. President

We have begun this 51st session with a signal of hope. The signature at the United Nations today of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty shows this Organisation in its rightful place - seized of the deepest concerns of humanity. This is the place which its founders sought for the United Nations. This is the place which it is our responsibility to ensure that it firmly holds, for today's world and for the generations to come.

Mr President

// Speaking now solely in my capacity as Foreign Minister of Ireland, I would like to inform the Assembly of developments in the Northern Ireland situation over the past year.

The search for lasting peace and a comprehensive political settlement continues. Substantial advances have been recorded in the past twelve months, despite serious setbacks and despite the uncertainty and suspicion which still hamper the development of true reconciliation between the communities in Northern Ireland and the two main

traditions which share the island of Ireland.

Following extensive discussion and consultation between the Irish and British Governments and with the Northern Ireland political parties, negotiations involving the Governments and the parties began in June and resumed earlier this month. The stated purpose of these negotiations is to achieve a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands, and to agree new institutions and structures to take account of the totality of relationships.

The structure and organisation of the negotiations will reflect their ambitious and comprehensive objectives, and any participant will be able to raise any relevant issue, with no outcome either predetermined or excluded in advance.

The Irish Government continues to base its approach to the negotiations on the fundamental principles set out in the 1993 Joint Declaration, published with the British Government. As I indicated last year, A New Framework for Agreement, published in 1995, represents the shared assessment of the two Governments of a balanced and honourable accommodation which might be envisaged across all of the key relationships.

We shall in negotiations vigorously make the case for a fair accommodation along these lines, believing as we do in the necessity of radical and ambitious change on all sides. At the same time, agreement requires the support of political representatives in both communities, and must also command majority popular support in both parts of Ireland.

We continue to be firmly of the view that wholly inclusive negotiations, involving the representatives of both communities in their totality, offer the best prospect of achieving a durable settlement founded on a recognition of the rights and aspirations of all. The IRA, by terminating its cease-fire last February, not only perpetrated renewed death and

destruction and flouted the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people in both Britain and Ireland. It also obliged the two Governments to cease Ministerial dialogue with Sinn Féin, which, because of the collapse of the cease-fire, is currently not a participant in the negotiations.

This is a matter of regret and frustration. Sinn Féin has a potentially valuable and constructive role to play in contributing to a stable and far-reaching settlement. But political dialogue is only sustainable and productive on the basis of the principles of democracy and non-violence. That is why there must be an unequivocal restoration of the IRA cease-fire before Sinn Féin can enter the negotiations, which would be enhanced by their presence, as they are by the continuing presence of the loyalist parties.

Likewise, however, all of those truly committed to finding an accommodation must impartially reject sectarianism and oppose disorder, from whatever source, if they wish to create an atmosphere in which reconciliation can flourish and agreement take root.

The confrontation and polarisation which occurred during the summer "marching season", the consequences of which still reverberate, highlight the absolute necessity of compromise and mutual understanding.

The instrument for progress is to hand in the Talks process underway, if we can persuade all the parties to use it constructively. That requires the earliest possible transition to substantive negotiations. We are working with the British Government to persuade the representatives of the unionist community to embark on this step without delay, secure in the knowledge that the process already contains multiple safeguards, including the guarantee of popular referendum, to ensure that the interests of their community must be

respected in any agreed outcome.

The continuing support of the international community is an invaluable asset on which we can draw in the search for a settlement. Most directly, the negotiations benefit from the independent chairmanship of Senator Mitchell of the United States, former Prime Minister Holkeri of Finland, and General de Chastelain of Canada, whose skill and authority command the respect and confidence of the participants. In addition, I would like to express my Government's gratitude for the generosity and support of all of our many friends in this Assembly, in particular the governments of the United States and of our European Union partners.

The wounds of conflict are still deep and unhealed. We can be under no illusions that the process of reconciliation and the crafting of agreement will be slow and painstaking. But we have continued to make progress on the journey, and are committed to continuing our quest.

Thank you Mr President //

PAGE.001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT: 24 SEPTEMBER 199

(Agreed between officials ad referendum: 19.00)

SUGGESTED CONCLUSIONS TO THE PLENARY ADDRESS TO DECOMMISSIONING
(to be tabled by the two Governments)

The participants in the multi-party negotiations, meeting in plenary session:

- note the commitment of the two Governments to all aspects of the report of the International Body including their support for the compromise approach to decommissioning set out in paragraphs 34 and 35, which state:

"The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.

In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence".

- note the commitment of the two Governments to work with all other participants to implement all aspects of the Report.
- note that as an important step towards implementation, each Government will publish at the conclusion of the opening Plenary session draft enabling legislation which will provide the basis for giving effect to the International Body's recommendations on the modalities of decommissioning. Having considered any comments which the committee referred to below may have they intend to introduce legislation in their respective Parliaments in the forthcoming session so that as progress is made on political issues the legislative framework is enacted by Christmas 1996.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

Initials: M' Date: 1/12/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25/09/96

11:06

PAGE 022

24 SEP '88 21:01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- agree to work constructively and in good faith to secure the implementation of all aspects of the Report of the International Body, in the context of an inclusive and dynamic process in which mutual trust and confidence is built as progress is made on all the issues of concern to all participants. A reality for all present and future participants is that progress in the negotiations will only be possible on this basis.
- agree to establish a committee charged with working to secure implementation of all aspects of the International Body's Report on this basis. The Committee will comprise representatives of all the participants and be chaired by the Independent Chairman of the Plenary. With a view to ensuring continuity between the work of the Committee and the operation of the Independent Commission proposed in the report of the International Body and provided for in the draft legislation, the two Governments will make available to the Committee a range of expert personnel, including independent experts of international standing whom they would envisage playing an appropriate part in the work of the Commission when it is established. The Committee will follow the attached working agenda. It will first meet on [7/14 October].
- agree that a plenary session should be convened in December to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole, including the work of the Committee. At that meeting, all participants would review the position, and the progress which has been made across the entire spectrum of the negotiations. It would also be possible, under the provisions of paragraph 12 of the rules of procedure, for the plenary to be convened specifically to enable the Independent Chairman to brief participants on the progress made by the Committee.
- agree that the adoption of the above proposals will conclude the address to decommissioning by the opening Plenary.
- agree, on this basis, to complete the remaining business of the opening plenary session in time for the appropriate Chairmen to convene meetings of the negotiations within the three strands and the proposed Committee on Decommissioning, opening on [7/14 October] and proceeding in parallel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FDT/1234

23/09/96 11:28

24 SEP '96 21:02

PAGE.003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**COMMITTEE ON DECOMMISSIONING
WORKING AGENDA**

- Governments' legislative proposals: consideration of draft Bills and ongoing review of programs towards enactment.
- Conditions necessary for decommissioning: consideration of the circumstances in which mutual decommissioning would be expected to occur.
- Modalities: development of detailed scheme or schemes for decommissioning and determination of the precise functions of the Independent Commission in respect of each scheme, including its role in relation to verification of the decommissioning process.
- Role of other confidence-building measures: consideration of those other aspects of the International Body's report which participants may wish to raise in this format.
- Determination of detailed arrangements for decommissioning: agreement on detailed decommissioning arrangements, including commenting on the necessary subordinate legislation.
- Review of implementation: ongoing review of implementation of all aspects of the Report.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Adams' book is not the full story

TO read Gerry Adams's autobiography *Before the Dawn* is to feel you are not being told the entire story, or even part of it. It is a book which begs as many questions as it answers. Why, for instance, was Gerry Adams chosen to attend the secret talks with British government ministers in 1972 if he was not a leading member of the IRA?

What was his precise role on those August nights in 1969 when Belfast stood on the brink of urban warfare? Was he, at 23, the commanding officer of the IRA's second battalion in Belfast, as has often been asserted?

Much of the early pages are taken up with his young life in working class Belfast, where he would have us believe he never fully appreciated the injustices against Catholics until he witnessed a loyalist attack in Divis Street when he was 16. Yet his family was prominent in republican circles, especially the Hannaways on his mother's side. His father had been shot and wounded and imprisoned in the 1940s for attempted murder.

This was a youngster steeped in republican traditions; and yet not until he filled in a school grant form aged 16 did the question of nationality apparently strike him. "What should I put down?" he asked his mother. "Surely I am Irish."

"Well, some might put you down as British", she replied. "What you want and what you get are two completely different things". He writes: "I was beginning to get a sense of the political shape of my world."

To judge by this account, Gerry Adams could have been any working class boy in Belfast,



● Wild West Belfast . . . Gerry Adams at the age of five in cowboy gear, guns and holsters.

Protestant or Catholic. His earliest sexual experiments were with Protestant girls; he got a job as a barman in a city centre pub and his early political activity was with housing groups.

But his background meant that when the Troubles began he was on the front line. The names of well-known IRA terrorists pepper the book; he spent much of his time between 1969 and 1972, when he was interned, on the run. He seems

He makes much of the fact that when he was charged with IRA membership the case collapsed for lack of evidence. Yet nowhere does he deny it.

to have been intimately involved in the planning of activities in Belfast and Ballymurphy without ever saying he was an IRA member.

He makes much of the fact that when he was actually charged with membership of the IRA, the case against him collapsed for lack of evidence. Yet nowhere does he deny it. There is also a great deal of apologising for the inevitable consequences of IRA atrocities. Bloody Friday in 1972, when the IRA detonated 21 bombs in Belfast

after the breakdown of a truce, is a case in point.

"It is clear that the IRA made a mistake in putting out so many bombs and civilians were killed who certainly should not have been killed," he writes. "This was the IRA's responsibility and a matter of deep regret."

In the case of two bombs, the RUC or the Army "were either unable or deliberately failed to act on the warnings". It was, then, someone else's fault.

NOWHERE do we see Adams throwing a bomb, carrying a gun, hurling a stone. He is there amid the mayhem but it is all reported in a dispassionate way. There is also a curious passage, a fictional account of a soldier's murder, followed by an apologia for "the armed struggle" as a tactic. Why is it included?

Has Adams ever pulled the trigger or been responsible for a life lost? That is not answered here but he told the *New York Times* recently: "I think we all have been in situations where we have directly contributed."

The book effectively ends with the deaths of IRA hunger strikers in 1981 and the period leading to the IRA's 18-month ceasefire is skipped in 10 pages.

He writes of the bomb attack on London's Docklands in February which marked the end of the ceasefire: "The IRA was clearly responsible for the explosion in London and its consequences. But the responsibility for the breakdown in the peace process lay with John Major."

It is always someone else's fault. © The Daily Telegraph.

GARY ADAMS

9:03 AM	11:41 AM	3/1/96
11:10 AM	FRI	3/22/96 SECURE
8:40 AM	SAT	4/27/96 SECURE
8:50 AM	FRI	5/10/96 SECURE
9:34 AM	FRI	5/17/96
11:25 AM	TUES	6/4/96
11:19 AM	THURS	6/6/96
11:12 AM	FRI	6/7/96
12:40 PM	WED	6/12
10:32 AM	SAT	6/15
Time ?	THURS	6/20
11:45 AM	FRI	6/28
4:46 PM	THURS	8/1
9:20 AM	FRI	8/9

TRIMBLE

(From 1 Jun 96)

2:11 PM

FRI, 6/14/96

2:00 PM

TUES, 6/18/96

DAVID
ERVINE

9:55 AM

TUES, 6/18/96

STORMONT CASTLE
BELFAST

GARY McMICHAEL

9:42 AM

TUES, 6/18/96

DICK SPRING

2:41 PM

THURS, 8/1/96

ROBERT HUME

1:20 PM

6:21 PM

THURS 6/20/96

FRI 6/21/96

ST ANDREWS
SCOTLAND

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

9/6 conversion

W Hume -

add this to

Adams Paper -

Points to emphasize

Hume
reassure the
- no precondition
- decomm. a la
GM
- timetable - 6 months.
- CBH's & prisoners

John Hume

1:20 pm

THURS 6/20/96
- ST ANDREWS, SCOTLAND

6:21 pm

FRI, 6/21/96

9:59 pm

TUES, 8/6/96

Jim Molyneux

NONE

SINCE

1-1-96
~~3-1-96~~
~~6-1-96~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Jackson Hole, Wyoming)

For Immediate Release

August 30, 1995

**STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY
OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN NORTHERN IRELAND**

Tomorrow marks the first anniversary of the Irish Republican Army's cease-fire in Northern Ireland, joined six weeks later by the Combined Loyalist Military Command. These historic decisions opened a door that had been closed to the people of Northern Ireland for too long -- the gateway to peace. On this anniversary, I urge the parties to build on the important work of the past year to secure a just and lasting settlement to a conflict that has cost so many lives.

We owe much of the progress to the courage and determination of Prime Minister Major and Taoiseach Bruton and their continued willingness to take risks for peace. I also salute the people of Northern Ireland for their extraordinary perseverance and their dedication to the cause of peace. They have endured violence with so much dignity, and now the future that they have long deserved is within reach.

I am looking forward to visiting a peaceful Northern Ireland later this year and paying personal tribute to those who have worked so hard to bring about this new day. I welcome the progress made in recent months toward reducing barriers, alleviating tension and promoting reconciliation. Much, however, remains to be done. To advance the goal of peace, I urge both republicans and loyalists to do their part and seriously address the issue of decommissioning paramilitary weapons. This is an essential step toward banishing once and for all the specter of violence that has haunted Ireland. I urge the parties to sit down together soon to discuss their aspirations for the future as well as their fears and differences. As I have said before, I would be pleased if talks were underway by the time of my visit..

As we look back on a year in which the bombs and guns have been silenced, I hope all the parties will reaffirm their commitment to build a peace in Northern Ireland for generations. The U.S. stands ready to support the people of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments in that effort.

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Dan Collins

x 65691

Ancient Order of Hibernians Questionnaire

2. America has been and will continue to be the world's leading champion of human and civil rights throughout the world. Our government pays careful attention to and monitors human rights practices around the world. And, under President Clinton, we have stood up for those whose human rights are jeopardized, even when the relevant government has friendly relations with our country. With regard to Northern Ireland, the Administration follows closely the issue of human rights, and each year details its concerns in the annual human rights report issued by the State Department. In our view, the best way to ensure the human and civil rights of the people living in Northern Ireland is to ^{achieve} ~~promote a restoration of the cease-fire and, ultimately,~~ a just and lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration is strongly committed to assisting the achievement of such a peace. And it is that peace which can improve the lives of all citizens of Northern Ireland.

3. President Clinton ^{and has asked} continues to be a strong advocate for eliminating employment discrimination in the workplace, regardless of religious tradition. He is a strong supporter of the MacBride Principles. In addition, President Clinton has worked hard to create employment opportunities for all in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration is the first Administration to request funding for the International Fund for Ireland, and after the cease-fire increased the amount requested from Congress. The International Fund, to which the United States has contributed over \$250 million, has created 29,000 jobs in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic since its inception. The Administration ~~has acted through~~ Brian Atwood, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and James Lyons, the U.S. Observer for the International Fund, to ensure that the Fund supports employment projects which are consistent with the principles of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in employment, regardless of religious tradition.]

^{Regarding deportation,}
4. The application of United States immigration law depends on the facts of each case. In some cases, equitable factors, such as the presence of an American child, may provide a basis for suspension of deportation or other relief. In other cases, however, the Executive branch may have little discretion in the application of the immigration laws. Accordingly, these cases necessarily require fact-dependent inquiries on a case-by-case basis.

^{has followed closely re} The Administration is well aware that concerns ^{regarding whether} ~~have been expressed that certain~~ Irish nationals ^{may have} ~~are~~ been unfairly singled out for deportation under our immigration laws. ^{Because of those concerns, the President asked} The Attorney General directed the FBI and INS to review the handling of these deportation cases. Following that review, she concluded that the cases have been handled appropriately and in accordance with established guidelines. The Administration will remain alert to these concerns.

* insert paragraph on back.

5. As President Clinton said in Dublin last year, the tragedy of the Irish famine brought "the most bittersweet of blessings" -- the arrival in the U.S. of millions of new Americans "who built the United States and climbed to the top of its best works." Commemoration of the famine and the contribution of the Irish diaspora is indeed appropriate. ^{and we} ~~The Administration will consider whether the creation of a governmental commission is the best means of advancing this goal.~~

^{remain prepared to review appropriate requests to do so.}

- * With regards to those people facing extradition, this extradition is subject to judicial review. The final decision is with the Secretary of State who will, of course, consider all relevant information.

Questionnaire for Ancient Order of Hibernians in America

(1) Peace and Justice in Ireland

The conflict in Ireland is now on the foreign policy agenda of this nation. If elected, what measures would you propose to facilitate continued American involvement in a peace process?

OK { President Clinton became the first American President to visit Northern Ireland in the pursuit of real, just, and lasting peace. His historic visit in November 1995 galvanized support for peace. Even after the tragic breach of the cease-fire, the people's abiding commitment to peace is evident in the many demonstrations and vigils for peace throughout Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

OK { The Clinton Administration has remained in touch with all parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein, to get the cease-fire restored and advance the peace process. As the first President to become actively engaged in supporting the search for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, President Clinton will continue to use America's influence and willingness to take risks for peace to encourage and support those who are seeking a just and lasting settlement to the conflict.

(2) Human and Civil Rights Building Blocks of Democracy

The U.S. has made respect for human and civil rights key elements of our relations with other nations. Britain's violations of these rights in the North of Ireland has been the subject of six major inquiries from the U.S. to Amnesty International. If elected, what would you do to monitor and curb these violations?

Hv. report
Barney
to solve is
peace process.

(3) Fair Employment Guidelines

A contributing cause of the conflict in Ireland has been anti-Catholic discrimination in employment. The MacBride Fair Employment Principles have been accepted by major U.S. employers in the North as a helpful set of guidelines to ensure fairness of employment opportunity. Will you, if elected, advance the use of these principles as a means of addressing this grievance in the North and require their use as a condition to any U.S. financial aid.

Cite
Lyons/Howard
letter - previous
SMMS.

(4) Extradition/Deportation Cases

Today there are more than a dozen cases of Irish men and women being threatened with extradition/deportation from the U.S. for violating insignificant provisions of the rules of the Immigrant and Naturalization Service. The Justice Department's campaign to return these individuals to England is not justified, is tearing apart families and leading them to financial ruin. Would you, if elected, create a special commission to examine these cases to determine if a grant of Executive Clemency or pardon would be appropriate?

See my letters on who can by case



(5) U.S.-Ireland Commemoration of the Great Hunger

Centuries of British fear and hatred of the Irish reached its zenith in the period of 1845-1850. A staple cash crop of the poor, the potato, failed and Britain's response caused over 1.5 million to die of disease and starvation and millions more to emigrate. The tragic persecution of the Irish dramatically effected the course of American history.

2 No idea. perhaps study

If elected, would you support the creation of a U.S.-Ireland Commemoration Committee whose purpose which be, for the first time, to examine the causes and effects of this massive upheaval of the Irish people and to assess its impact on the U.S. in the decades that followed?

(6) Policy Regarding the Family and Life

Domestic

The rich tradition of Irish devotion to the Catholic Faith has enhanced their success and contributed to an improved quality of life in America. Today values of our Faith seem under seige with public policy who prize convenience over compassion and failed to consider the special burden on families practicing their religious beliefs.

We as Hibernians believe the family is the basic unit of our society. We should cherish and nourish this wellspring of strength. As President, would you support more choice for parents by allowing the issuance of education vouchers or tax credits for the schooling of our children?

President Clinton supports giving parents greater opportunity to choose which public school their children will attend. He has urged every state to pass laws that provide parental choice among public schools. The President proposed and signed into law the Charter Schools Act, which provides start-up funds for charter schools. His fiscal year (FY) 1997 budget more than doubles funding for charter schools. President Clinton also favors efforts to increase parental participation in education through programs such as parenting education, creating parental resource centers, and Secretary of Education Riley's Family Endowment campaign.

Recent school voucher proposals call for vouchers which would only partially cover the costs of private school tuition, while reducing overall funding for public education. President Clinton opposes voucher measures which would limit or weaken the quality of educational opportunity provided by American public schools.


President Clinton has been a good friend of Catholic education. He has called for the overturning of *Aguilar v. Felton*, a 1985 Supreme Court case that prevents parochial schools from getting all the Title I funds that they are due. President Clinton is the first President to call for the overturning of this case. He has also consistently supported increased funding for Title I that can go to parochial and private school. Title I funds provide extra support to teach the basics to schools with a high number of poor children. The Department of Education recently issued a letter restating the Department's position that special education services may be provided 'on sight' at Catholic and other religious schools. Finally, Catholic educators have been actively involved since the very beginning in developing the Department of Education's "Family Partnership for Learning" that is enlisting church and civic groups to help parents with their children's education.

As President, would you support the sanctity of human life, including parental notification of an abortion involving a minor, and the protection of human life from conception to natural death.

President Clinton believes that decisions about whether or not to have an abortion should be between a woman, her doctor, and her conscience.

While he is protecting a woman's right to choose, President Clinton is also working to reduce the number of abortions. Our goal must be to make abortion less necessary and more rare, not more difficult and more dangerous. President Clinton supports contraceptive research, family planning, comprehensive family life education, and policies that support healthy childbearing.

The abortion rate is dropping. Now we must continue to support efforts to reduce unintended pregnancies, and we call on all Americans to take personal responsibility to meet this important goal.



who has worked very hard also for the cause of peace in Northern Ireland.

Years ago, Americans learned about Dublin from the stories of James Joyce and Sean O'Casey. Today, America and the world still learn about Dublin and Ireland through the words of Sebastian Barry, Paula Meehin, Roddy Doyle; through the films of Jim Sheridan, Neil Jordan; through the voices of Mary Black and the Delores Keane, and yes, through the Cranberries and U-2. I hear all about how the world's global culture is becoming more American, but I believe if you want to grasp the global culture you need to come to Ireland.

All of you know that I have family ties here. My mother was a Cassidy, and how I wish she were alive to be here with me today. She would have loved the small towns and she would have loved Dublin. Most of all, she would have loved the fact that in Ireland, you have nearly 300 racing days a year. She loved the horses.

I understand that there are some Cassidys out in the audience today. And if they are, I want to say in my best Arkansas accent, cead mile failte — beatha saol agus slainte.

One hundred and fifty years ago, the crops of this gorgeous island turned black in the ground and one-fourth of your people either starved from the hunger or were lost to emigration. That famine was the greatest tragedy in Irish history. But out of that horrible curse came the most bittersweet of blessings — the arrival in my country of millions of new Americans who built the United States and climbed to the top of its best works. For every person here in Ireland today, 12 more in the United States have proud roots in Irish soil.

Perhaps the memory of the famine explains in part the extraordinary generosity of the Irish people, not just to needy neighbors in the local parish, but to strangers all around the globe. You do not forget those who still go hungry in the world today; who yearn simply to put food on the table and clothes on their backs. In places as far away as the Holy Land, Asia and Africa, the Irish are helping people to build a future of hope.

Your sons and daughters in the Garda and the defense forces take part in some of the most demanding missions of goodwill — keeping the peace, helping people in war-torn lands turn from conflict to cooperation. Whenever the troubled places of the earth call out for help, from Haiti to Lebanon, the Irish are always among the very first to answer the call.

Your commitment to peace helps conquer foes that threaten us all. And on behalf of the people of the United States, I say to the people of Ireland: We thank you for that from the bottom of our hearts.

Ireland is helping beat back around the world — the spread of terrorism, ethnic hatreds, religious intolerance. Ireland is helping to beat back the forces that threaten humanity. You are an inspiration. You have made peace heroic.

Nowhere are the people of Ireland more committed to peace today than right here at home.

Tuesday night, before I left, I heard the happy word that the Taoiseach had announced a gateway to a just and lasting peace between our neighbors in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is a peace that no one could have asked for. I am proud to know that the courage and the commitment of the people of Ireland are the key to this peace. And I thank you for what you have done.

Waging peace is risky. It takes time and effort. It is easier, as I said yesterday, to go back to old habits. But the right thing to do is to go forward — not because peace is a document, but because it changes lives, the lives of leaders, but because it changes the way we live.

Yesterday in Northern Ireland, I saw the people of the floor of the Mackie Plant in Belfast, who are working side by side to build a better future. I heard the voices of the two extraordinary women who, with their vision, one a Catholic girl, the other a Protestant, brought to the people of Belfast with their hopes for the future, a future without the barriers they face are the limits of their imagination.

As I look out on this sea of people, I am moved most in that extraordinary way that the young people, Catholics and Protestants, are not only with their words, but they want peace and decency and justice.

I know well that the immigration helped to make America what it is today. The young people of Ireland, who are growing up and live out their lives with honor and freedom and equality.

young people for their parents to put down the madness of war in favor of their childhood.

I received this letter from a teenager right here in Dublin. I thought I would read it to you, to make the point better than I could. This is just an excerpt: "With your help, the chance is given to reason and to reasonable people, so that the peace in my country becomes reality. What is lost is impossible to bring back. Children who were killed are gone forever. No one can bring them back. But for all those who survive these sufferings, there is future."

The young person from Dublin who wrote me that was Zlata Filipovic, the young teenager from Bosnia who is now living here, who wrote her wonderful diary which captured the imagination of people all over the world.

I am honored that at this moment in the history of the world the United States had the great good fortune to stand for the future of children in Ireland, in Bosnia, in the Middle East, in Haiti and on the toughest streets of our own land. And I thank you here in Ireland for taking your stand for those children's future, as well.

Let me say in closing that in this 150th anniversary year of the Great Famine, I would like everyone in the world to pay tribute to Ireland for coming out of the famine with perhaps a greater sense of compassion for the fate of people the world over than any other nation. As I said today in my speech to the Parliament — there has not been a single, solitary

day — not one day — since 1958, when someone representing the people of Ireland was not somewhere in the world trying to aid the cause of peace. I think there is no other nation on Earth that can make that claim.

And as I leave I feel so full of hope for the situation here in Ireland and so much gratitude for you, for what you have given to us. I leave you with these words, which I found as I was walking out the door from the Ambassador's Residence. The Ambassador made it possible for Hillary and me to spend a few moments this evening with Seamus Heaney and his wife, since I have been running around the country quoting him for two days — I might say, without his permission. And he gave Hillary an inscribed copy of his book "The Cure At Troy." And as I skimmed through it, I found these words, with which I leave you:

*Now it's high water mark
And flood tide in the heart
And time to go.
What's left to say?
Suspect too much sweet talk,
But never close your mind.
It was a fortunate wind that blew me here.
I leave half ready to believe
That a cripple's trust might walk
And the half-true rhyme is love*

Thank you and God bless you.



Øindam

Hume Aug 5

Both agreed to keep talking, church leaders
business community, working hard
don't want a reputation of Drummer.
Apprentice Boys seem to have a good deal
of confidence in me. They come
to me + said wanted to ~~be~~ ^{keep} in touch.

R will talk to Adams

H- we are majority in song - respect rights
of minority

R how are we on larger issues

H don't know how George Mitchell stood it.

Can't talk to Unionists during marching season
look to Sept. Hope will have a ceasefire
by then.

Have a secret scout from Bils; will come
back to me with some.

talk prisons, demand not precondition etc.

Any chance you could come visit?

The Cullinane Group, Inc.

Investors in High Technology Ventures

John J. Cullinane
President

MEMORANDUM

Post-it® Fax Note	7671	Date	# of pages ▶ 5
To	Nancy Soderberg	From	John Cullinane

TO: President William J. Clinton

FROM: John J. Cullinane *jk*

DATE: August 5, 1996

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland

To MAP

Attached please find letters from Philip Schaefer and Ronnie Foreman of Belfast, which involves their leading a group of pension funds representing \$1 trillion investment power to Ireland and Northern Ireland. Phil Schaefer has brought similar groups to South Africa and the Middle East, etc. Senator Kennedy encouraged him to call me and I, in turn, put him in touch with Ronnie Foreman, a consultant based in Belfast. Ronnie Foreman was a godsend in that he was able to get the trip organized both in Belfast and Dublin with all the key players participating on very short notice. In fact, a special committee (see attached list) has been created by Ronnie Foreman so that when these investment managers visit Belfast, they will be presented with good opportunities to invest. This is something I encouraged them to do and Ronnie has coordinated it well.

I know that they would deeply appreciate an official blessing from you regarding the Conference. With all the recent troubles, this Conference might be a very important milestone in your program to encourage peace via economic development in Northern Ireland.

Incidentally, I just came from a meeting with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. They want to make a major job creation commitment to Belfast in a very imaginative way. We will be helping them with this effort because it coincides with The Cullinane Group, Inc.'s, investments in the Irish software industry, which itself evolved from your efforts to encourage peace in Northern Ireland.

JJC/mb
Attachments

bcc Nancy Soderberg
Virginia Manuel



July 29, 1996

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear President Clinton,

It was a pleasure seeing you in San Francisco last week. Your speech outlining your continued vision for America was excellent. I was surprised and flattered that you remembered my name. I am especially proud to be a Clinton Delegate for the second time.

As I briefly mentioned to you, we are organizing an important pension fund investment conference, entitled **Ayes on Ireland and Europe** to be held in Brussels, Dublin and Belfast in early September. In this effort we have been supported by Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith, Senator Ted Kennedy, The Taoiseach's Office, Consul Kathleen Stephens, Ambassador Alan Blikin as well as other officials and a cross section of the business community in Dublin and Belfast. Mr. John Cullinane, who was introduced to me by Senator Kennedy, has also been of enormous moral and intellectual support.

Our delegation will consist of about 100 people representing a cross section of decision makers from the largest public and corporate pension funds. New York State Comptroller, Carl McCall and New York City Comptroller, Alan Hevasi will be among them. The combined investments assets of our delegation will exceed \$1 trillion, a surreal figure. However, these people represent the human face of capitalism. Even if a modest amount of investment finds its way into the economy (as was the case after our conference in South Africa), it can make a big difference in the lives of the people.

Having been to Northern Ireland twice in the last 6 months as part of the planning process, I was deeply moved by the profound memories of the visit you and the First Lady made to Belfast and your extraordinary address at City Hall. You inspired all of the people who yearn for peace, and you inspired me to take this small step.

There cannot have peace without the peace dividend. Therefore your support for this conference would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for all of your efforts in making the precious dream of peace closer to reality.

Best regards,

Philip Schaefer
President

PAS/jy

FOREMAN CONSULTANTS

The Cullinane Group, Inc.
One Cambridge Center,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02142
U.S.A.

Attn: Mr John J. Cullinane, President.

5th August 1996

Re: Pensions 2000 Conference in Ireland - September 1996

Dear John,

I write to give you my update on progress with arranging the Pensions 2000 Conference which is now within one month of taking place.

Since you introduced me to Mr Philip Schaefer, President of Pensions 2000, so much has happened that it is difficult to know where to begin. The programme planning is now complete and the list of participants and speakers we have been able to secure is most impressive.

We have 100 representatives of the top U.S. Corporate and Public Pension Funds and their money managers signed up and eager to come. We have a reserve list of 15 which we simply cannot accomodate. The support from the American administration in Ireland and Northern Ireland has been outstanding; we have Ambassador Kennedy-Smith, Consul Kathy Stephens and Ambassador Alan Blinken addressing the Conference and are awaiting a response from Senator George Mitchell's office. The Irish Government has been marvellous; we have the Taoiseach, Minister Mitchell, Minister Quinn and other Government officials taking part and in Northern Ireland we have Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew, Baroness Denton and other senior Government officials as well as the Lord Mayor of Belfast and Councillors involved.

Perhaps the most enthusiastic support is from within Northern Ireland. You will remember that when I took on this task, I was committed to bring the group to Northern Ireland. My fervent belief has been that the ultimate goals of peace and reconciliation can only be achieved when all citizens have jobs, prosperity and a stake in this land. There have been

many brave attempts to address this issue, some with great success, but I sincerely believe that the impact of this Conference visiting Northern Ireland, can translate into investment and ultimately jobs, peace and reconciliation on a scale appropriate to our needs.

There have been many obstacles in our way in the past few months but Philip Schaefer's and my own determination have seen us through with the full support of all sections of the community here.

The re-emergence of violence in early July caused us some anxious moments. However, I kept in close contact with Philip and our delegates who have given me their pledge that they will be here if humanly possible. Our resolve is such that nothing short of catastrophe will prevent this group from visiting Belfast, hearing of the investment possibilities and being given every encouragement to invest in the region.

I well remember the feeling of euphoria felt by all the citizens of Northern Ireland after President Clinton's famous visit. It felt good to be part of this land and the prospect of peace and stability raised our hopes. Events since then have been discouraging but I feel that it is possible to re-kindle that euphoria and translate it into lasting measures which can unite our people. I am convinced that we are making a difference.

John, your support and interest has been marvellous. You have helped open many doors for us and have played a major part so far. Can I ask you for one more favour which I feel would have tremendous impact? I wonder if you could draw the Conference to the attention of President Clinton and ask if he would give a public endorsement of the event prior to the start on 4th September? I feel that such an endorsement would encourage participants and local people alike into action and we would surely see ways found to make investment happen. This could be the key ingredient in the whole process.

Best wishes, John; thank you for your vision in putting Philip Schaefer and me together and for your stalwart support throughout the months of planning. We will make a difference!

Yours sincerely,

Ronnie M. Foreman
Ronnie M. Foreman.

**JIGSA GROUP
'PENSIONS 2000' - SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE**

**BRAINSTORMING SESSION
31ST JULY, 1996
FIRST TRUST CENTRE**

Attendees

Mr. Frank Cushnahan	Independent Consultant	CFS Consulting Limited
Professor Wallace Ewart	Springvale Project Director	Springvale Project Office
Mr. Harold A. Ennis	Chairman	Boxmore International Plc
Mr. John Forde	Asset Manager	Bank of Ireland Asset Management
Mr. Ronnie Foreman	Consultant	Foreman Consultants
Mr. Dan Harvey*	Managing Director	First Trust Bank
Mr. Ronnie Kells	Chief Executive	Ulster Bank Limited
Mr. Gerry Loughran	Permanent Secretary	Department of Economic Development
Mr. William McIlhatton	Manager	Technical Services NIGEN
Mr. Len J.P. O'Hagan	Operations Director	Fitzwillton Plc
Mr. George Mackey	Chief Executive	Laganside Corporation
Mr. Stephen Prenter	Senior Partner	BDO Stoy Hayward
Professor Desmond Rea	Secretary	JIGSA Group
Mr. John V. Simpson*	Consultant/Journalist	
Mr. Michael Smyth	Senior Lecturer	School of Public Policy, Economics & Law, University of Ulster
Mr. Mike Thompson	PFI Adviser	Department of the Environment
Mr. Geoff Warke	Partner	Building Design Partnership
Mr. Joe C. White	US Commercial Services Representative	Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce

* Members of JIGSA Group

10, DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AA



With the Private Secretary's

Compliments

ENCLOSURES SENT

ATTEND BY FAX

PERSONAL - IN CONFIDENCE



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1996

Dear Nancy,

HUME/ADAMS INITIATIVE

We have spoken on the telephone about the approach to the Prime Minister last week by John Hume. You may find helpful a few more details. As you know, Mr. Hume told the Prime Minister that, on the basis of his discussions with Gerry Adams, if we could make a further public statement - to the effect that the negotiations would be serious, comprehensive and inclusive, that in our view some decommissioning should take place during negotiations, rather than as a precondition, and that we would be ready to look at other confidence-building measures - the IRA would be ready to declare an unequivocal ceasefire. There have been other suggestions that Sinn Fein would also like some kind of timeframe for the negotiations.

... John Hume also gave the Prime Minister the attached letter from Gerry Adams which, as you will see, focuses more on the possibility of a direct dialogue with the British Government.

... The Prime Minister has now sent the enclosed letter to John Hume to make our position clear.

Yours ever
JH

JOHN HOLMES

Ms Nancy Soderberg

PERSONAL - IN CONFIDENCE

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Adams Memcon [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, July 12, 1996 7:55PM
Priority: High

for transmittal to TL <<File Attachment: ADAMS.DOC>>

J
WB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 12, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Nancy's Conversation with Adams

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4.86)

KBM 4/11/2023

Adams called unexpectedly today. Following is the memorandum of conversation.

Adams: I've been up all night -- I wanted to take the opportunity to give you an update before getting some sleep. I personally have been trying to keep the lid on here, no matter how it appears. The situation between Sunday and Wednesday was bad -- Catholic churches and schools were burned and Catholic families evicted from their homes. Then there was the murder of the taxi-driver and the blockading of towns. The Garvaghy Road business was bad, especially the tele-visual angle. The Ormeau Road (in Belfast) is still under curfew and has been for 40 hours now. The people are incensed; we are trying to keep them calm. Over 100 nationalists have been injured, some seriously, by the RUC. There were 40 people in the hospital in Derry and 30 in Belfast. One was hit in the head with plastic bullet and is clinically dead, on life support. Over 1400 plastic bullets were fired between 12:00 yesterday and 6:00 this morning. This is the kind of thing that needs quiet diplomatic efforts; the degree of reaction from the RUC is out of proportion.

Nancy: We got your message about trying to get through to speak to the Ormeau Road residents; I happened to talk to John Holmes and mentioned it to him. Did you get through?

Adams: Yes, after three and a half hours at the roadblock. It was surprising that a number of people in the U.S. sent faxes of support for the residents; they were delighted to get those messages.

Nancy: Many people here are watching the situation closely. I have been in touch with Tony. What is next? I know it is enormously difficult, but what are you pushing as a way forward?

Adams: First of all it will be absurd if the unionists can just walk back into the talks without penalty next week after walking

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/12/06

out this week, while we are still excluded. I was heckled by the crowd yesterday -- just a little heckle, nothing I couldn't handle -- but Tom Hartley (a Sinn Fein official) was heckled badly for appealing for calm and talking about the peace process. There was a lack of evenness. The unionists, who would not engage with the people in either the Garvaghy Road (in Drumcree) or in the Lower Ormeau Road, were rewarded for it. They will keep behaving like that until someone stops them, like a spoiled child. Cardinal Cahal Daly (Catholic primate of Ireland), an intelligent man who is not sympathetic to republicans, is extremely angry. The headline in the "Irish News" read "Betrayal."

Nancy: We are thinking through here what to do. We should act quickly.

Adams: I will try to sit down tomorrow and think about that. John's and my initiative is still on stream, still out there. The response was positive. I had told John that Major was not in a political position to move positively but that was when the original decision was made on Garvaghy Road. Now the situation has changed, they have capitulated to one element. John and I will pursue it. He couldn't even get out to fly to London because the roads were blocked. The two governments need to move as well on their commitments. Even if things quiet down the SDLP is so cheesed off they could disengage from the talks, either mentally or actually. Nothing dramatic, they would just fade away. As I have been saying, the British have the key. They cannot deliver the unionists but they can move the situation along.

Nancy: On television it looked like 25 years ago.

Adams: Yes, it felt the same. I was on Cooper Road where I was in 1974. Now you have the children behaving the same as their parents did. I have said maybe the situation could shock people into awareness, act as a catalyst.

Nancy: Are there other things we can push? What about the proposal for a parades commission?

Adams: I myself think it is nonsense. There are 3000 parades each year and 18 at most that are contentious. The Orangemen have not played ball with the residents of the Garvaghy Road or the Ormeau. Other protests (by Catholics) have erupted spontaneously since but they have been peaceful. I myself have a rather easygoing attitude to Orange parades but today, for instance one lodge accompanied by one band was supposed to come down the Lower Ormeau Road; instead there were 500-600 people and five bands. You need to get the Orangemen to talk to residents.

Months ago I went to Martin Smyth (Grand Master of the Orange Order, UUP MP) and asked him to arrange meetings to help resolve this issue. If a commission comes up with a decision that does not sit with either community, you will have the same problem.

Nancy: We will keep talking to everyone and explore how to move forward.

Adams: We need to grab the process and move it.

Nancy: Let us know if you have any further thoughts. Are the loyalists okay?

Adams: I think so, wouldn't know, though they did kill that taxi man, blockaded roads, put families out.

Nancy: We hear it was unauthorized. Keep in touch.

Adams: Slan

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2011-0355-F (4.87)

KRM 7/11/2023

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

SIT: NODIS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 261636Z JUL 96

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5055

INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 009113

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/01

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: PM'S LETTER TO HUME ON CEASE-FIRE

REF: A) LONDON 9063 B) DUBLIN 3582

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL J. HABIB, MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. REASON: 1.5(B).

2. (C) NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS WAS SOMEWHAT MORE UPBEAT REGARDING THE PM'S CONVERSATIONS WITH JOHN HUME ABOUT A POSSIBLE RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASE-FIRE THAN JOHN HOLMES HAD BEEN IN AN EARLIER JULY 25 MEETING (REF A). WHILE HOLMES EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFORT, THOMAS SAID HE THOUGHT HMG MUST "TAKE SERIOUSLY" THE MESSAGE FROM ADAMS WHICH HUME PURPORTS TO RELAY. THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HUME, IN HIS EAGERNESS TO FIND A WAY FORWARD, MAY TEND TO OVERSELL THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, THOMAS POINTED OUT, THE THRUST OF THE MESSAGE HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN REITERATED IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BY VARIOUS SINN FEIN LEADERS, SO THERE MAY WELL BE A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR HUME'S EFFORTS. WITHOUT DISCUSSING SPECIFICS OF REF B OR OTHER CONTACTS, WE SAID THE USG TOO HAD BEEN RECEIVING SIMILAR INDICATIONS FROM REPUBLICAN INTERLOCUTORS, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO WAY OF EVALUATING THEM.

3. (C) THOMAS SAID THE PART THAT PUZZLES HMG IS THE "IMPLAUSIBILITY" OF THE SINN FEIN DEMAND. THE BRITISH DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ESSENTIALLY A REPETITION OF STATEMENTS THEY ALREADY HAVE MADE -- THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE COMPREHENSIVE, THAT NO OUTCOME TO THEM IS PREDETERMINED AND THAT DECOMMISSIONING WILL BE HANDLED IN PARALLEL WITH SUBSTANTIVE TALKS -- WOULD INDUCE THE IRA TO RESTORE THE CEASE-FIRE AT THIS TIME. HE HYPOTHESIZED THAT PERHAPS, IN THE WAKE OF DRUMCREE, REPUBLICANS FEEL A PAN-NATIONALIST COALITION HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY REVIVED SO THAT SINN FEIN WOULD BE IN A POSITION OF STRENGTH IN THE TALKS. BUT, HE CONCLUDED, THIS DOES NOT SEEM LIKE A FULL ENOUGH EXPLANATION, SO HE REMAINS CAUTIOUS -- BUT DOES NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY. HE

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PAGE 02 OF 04

DESCRIBED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TOO AS SKEPTICAL THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD WORK.

4. (C) IN PART TO MAKE SURE THERE IS NO "MISCOMMUNICATION IN TRANSMISSION" AND IN PART TO PROVIDE A RECORD OF THE CONTACT SHOULD THE MATTER LEAK, THOMAS SAID THE PM HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO PUT THE BRITISH POSITION IN WRITING. HE SHARED WITH US A COPY OF MAJOR'S MOST RECENT LETTER TO HUME (TEXT BELOW).

5. (C) JULY 24 LETTER FROM PM MAJOR TO JOHN HUME:

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR JOHN,

SINCE MY LETTER TO YOU OF 8 JULY, YOU HAVE GIVEN FURTHER ACCOUNTS OF SINN FEIN'S POSITION ABOUT A RENEWED IRA CEASEFIRE AND ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS OBVIOUSLY VITAL THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THESE ISSUES.

YOU HAVE PRESENTED SINN FEIN'S POSITION AS FOLLOWS:

(I) SINN FEIN WOULD LIKE TO KNOW FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT:

- THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE SERIOUS AND COMPREHENSIVE;
- THAT DECOMMISSIONING WILL BE TACKLED IN PARALLEL WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS; AND
- THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DURING THE TALKS.

(II) IF SINN FEIN WERE TOLD IN ADVANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT PUBLICLY THEIR POSITION ON THESE POINTS THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE (BEFORE SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT WAS MADE) THAT THE IRA WOULD RESPOND TO THE STATEMENT BY DECLARING A GENUINE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE. SUCH A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE FOR GOOD THIS TIME.

(III) ONCE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A CEASEFIRE, SINN FEIN WOULD AFFIRM THEIR TOTAL AND ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES, AS THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE DONE.

THE TRUTH IS THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA SHOULD RESTORE THEIR CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER PREVARICATION. THERE IS NO POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE. AND I HAVE TO SAY THAT I REMAIN SCEPTICAL, GIVEN ALL THE OTHER EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED PREPARATION FOR FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING THE RECENT ARRESTS IN LONDON, THAT MORE WORDS FROM US CAN MAKE A CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE.

HOWEVER, IF YOUR PRESENTATION OF SINN FEIN'S POSITION IS CORRECT, WHAT SINN FEIN WANTS TO KNOW FROM THE GOVERNMENT IS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

NO MORE THAN THE GOVERNMENT HAS SAID PUBLICLY ALREADY. I ATTACH WORDS WHICH COULD BE USED IF WE WERE CONVINCED THAT THIS WOULD MAKE A MATERIAL DIFFERENCE TO THE PROSPECTS OF A NEW CEASEFIRE.

WE ALSO HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SINN FEIN WANTS A MEETING WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS. THERE IS OF COURSE NO QUESTION OF ANY MINISTERIAL MEETING WITH SINN FEIN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 009113

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/01

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: PM'S LETTER TO HUME ON CEASE-FIRE

UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE. IF SINN FEIN BELIEVE A MEETING WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONFIRMING AND EXPLAINING THE POSITION YOU HAVE SET OUT TO US IS NEEDED, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SUCH A REQUEST IN LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING, CRUCIALLY, EVENTS ON THE GROUND.

YOURS SINCERELY,
/S/ JOHN MAJOR

END TEXT LETTER

BEGIN TEXT ATTACHMENT

THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH STARTED ON 10 JUNE ARE TO SECURE AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND WILL ADDRESS ALL THE ISSUES RELEVANT TO THAT. ANY PARTICIPANT CAN RAISE ANY ISSUE. NO OUTCOME IS PREDETERMINED OR EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT ANSWER FOR ANY OTHER PARTICIPANT BUT, FOR ITS PART, ALONG WITH THAT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, IT IS COMMITTED TO ENSURE THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA IS ADDRESSED WITH A VIEW TO OVERCOMING ANY OBSTACLES WHICH MAY ARISE. THE GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH SUCCESSFULLY, AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE;

THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO ADDRESS THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S PROPOSALS ON DECOMMISSIONING. AT THAT STAGE, THE GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, WILL BE SEEKING THE COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REPORT, INCLUDING ITS PROPOSALS FOR SOME DECOMMISSIONING DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO MAKE URGENT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA, SO THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES CAN PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH DECOMMISSIONING;

WE ARE COMMITTED TO RAISING CONFIDENCE THROUGH THE TALKS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

PROCESS. THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REPORT ITSELF PROPOSES A PROCESS OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO THIS AS TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE REPORT. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS A TWO-WAY STREET. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT SERIOUS SETBACK TO CONFIDENCE WE HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES WILL PLAY THEIR PART IN MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR FUTURE MARCHES AND PARADES TO BE HANDLED WITHOUT CONFRONTATION.

END TEXT ATTACHMENT

CROWE

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SSN>9113

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<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

<^SSN>9113

<MSGID> M2333183

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THE FOUNDATION FOR A CIVIL SOCIETY

THE PROJECT ON JUSTICE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION

MANAGING CHANGE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY

Workshop Participants

*Baroness
Denton*

NORTHERN IRELAND

Alliance Party (2)

1. Elizabeth McCaffrey
2. Stephen Farry

Democratic Unionist Party (3)

[not sending anyone]

Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (2)

1. Monica McWilliams
2. Margaret Logue

Progressive Unionist Party (2)

1. William Smith
2. Billy Hutchinson

Sinn Féin (2)

1. Ms. Dodie McGuinness
2. Sean McManus

Social Democratic and Labour Party (3)

1. Alex Atwood
2. Marietta Farrell
3. Tommy Gallagher

Ulster Democratic Party (2)

1. David Adams
2. Frank McCoubrey

Ulster Unionist Party (3)

1. Drew Nelson
2. Richard Holmes
3. Blaine McClure

Special participant (1)

1. Reverend Roy Magee

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

Democratic Left (1)

1. Catherine Murphy

Fianna Fáil (1)

1. Rory O'Hanlon, TD

Fine Gael (1)

1. Ms. Frances FitzGerald, TD

Labour Party (1)

1. Brian Fitzgerald, TD

Progressive Democrats (1)

1. Mary Mannion

GREAT BRITAIN

Conservative Party (1)

1. [name to be confirmed]

Labour Party (1)

1. Nigel Warner

Liberal Democratic Party (1)

1. Claire Kavanagh

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: POTUS Points for Phone Calls [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Monday, July 15, 1996 7:57PM

In case POTUS calls Major and Bruton later in the week, attached is a draft background memo and talking points. They will have to be updated to reflect the expected Spring-Mayhew meetings and the tone taken by the unionists when the talks resume tomorrow. <<File Attachment: MAJBRPRE.DOC>> <<File Attachment: MAJBRTPS.DOC>> <<File Attachment: MAJBRPT.DOC>>

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (4.88)
KRM 4/11/2023

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
PRIME MINISTERS MAJOR AND BRUTON

DATE: TBD

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To restore momentum to the Northern Ireland peace process following the civil disturbances and violence of the week of July 7.

II. BACKGROUND

After four days of a loyalist standoff with police in the village of Drumcree and loyalist vandalism and violence all over Northern Ireland, on July 11 the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) reversed its earlier decision and decided to allow Orange marchers through a Catholic neighborhood in Drumcree. Nationalists in both the North and the South were angry and dismayed; for the first time in several years the Irish Government issued a statement critical of a British policy. Violence flared in Catholic areas over the following three days, resulting in the death of a man who was apparently run over by an RUC vehicle. The first bomb in two years exploded in a hotel in Northern Ireland on Saturday, but fortunately no one was seriously injured. The attack was probably carried out by a republican splinter group; the IRA has denied responsibility. The bombing has further strained the already fragile loyalist cease-fire.

Prime Ministers Major and Bruton had a "difficult" conversation July 11 but agreed to try to keep the peace process going. The British, however, have been annoyed by Bruton's continued public criticism. Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring and Northern Ireland Office Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew will talk this week, either in the formal setting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, as the Irish have suggested, or on the margins of the Belfast Belfast peace talks, as the British would prefer. The unionist party leaders had withdrawn from the talks until the Drumcree standoff was resolved. They are expected to

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/15/06

attend when the talks reconvene July 16. John Hume's SDLP has withdrawn from the forum of elected representatives but is expected to stay in the peace talks themselves.

Since they opened June 10, the Belfast talks have been mired in procedural issues raised by unionist parties anxious to make sure that decommissioning is dealt with upfront. Before last week's disturbances, it was hoped that the discussions on procedure and agenda could be brought to a close by the end of July, when the talks adjourn until September 3. That is all the more important after the Drumcree debacle. Whatever chance remains for a restoration of the cease-fire (and we are hearing privately that there is still a chance) will evaporate unless the talks are seen as meaningful negotiations.

In addition to the public process of giving impetus to the peace talks, we will be pressing the British privately to take seriously the proposal advanced by John Hume and Gerry Adams several weeks ago. Adams has told us that the IRA is prepared to restore the cease-fire if the British provide certain assurances, none of which would represent a new commitment or concession. Adams is also pressing for a meeting with British officials. We are working with the British and Adams to find a formula that will get the IRA to restore the cease-fire.

Finally it is vital that the two governments find a long-term way of dealing with the problem of Orange parades through Catholic neighborhoods, preferably before the next round of contested parades in mid-August.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made with Prime Minister Major

Tab B Points to be Made with Prime Minister Bruton

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

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2011-0355-F (4.89)
KBM 7/11/2023

- Deeply concerned by civil disturbances and violence in Northern Ireland last week. Shades of worst sectarian violence of past decades.
- Still seems to be a chance to pull them back from the brink of return to full-scale violence. Will help you in whatever way I can.
- Rapid progress in Stormont talks key to persuading population and political leaders that peace process can still work. Hope you and Irish can get parties to end procedural wrangling and get ready to move to substantive negotiations.
- UUP leader Trimble key to getting talks moving again. How do you assess his attitude after the Drumcree incident?
- Will continue to press for IRA cease-fire. Tony has been working with John Holmes on latest Hume-Adams initiative. Prospects not hopeless, especially if progress made in talks.
- If needed: Hope you will consider having your officials meet with Sinn Fein if that is what it takes to move process forward.
- Without cease-fire, sooner or later loyalists cease-fire will crack and paramilitaries return to full-scale violence.
- Also hope you can find a way to deal with the handful of contentious Orange parades. On that, if we can be helpful by providing any kind of expertise or mediating services, please let me know.

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Reason: 1.5b

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BRUTON

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.90)
KBH 4/11/2023

- Deeply concered by civil disturbances and violence in Northern Ireland week of July 7. Serious setback for peace process, but pleased you and John Major have not given up.
- Know you agree that rapid progress in Stormont talks is key to keeping process going. How do you see prospects for reaching closure on procedural issues, clearing decks for beginning of substantive negotiations in September?
- Pleased that George Mitchell able to play such a key role. He is asset to talks, as I knew he would be.
- How do you see attitude of unionists in wake of Drumcree decision? Is there a willingness to move forward?
- Also hope you and John can find a longer-term way to deal with parades issue, If we can be helpful by providing expertise or mediating service, let me know.
- Loyalists have been very restrained, but unless the IRA restores its cease-fire the loyalists will return to violence at some point too. Do you see any prospect of a cease-fire?
- Know you will be here in September to address joint meeting of Congress. Looking for a time on my schedule to meet with you then.

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Reason: 1.5b

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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2011-0355-F (4.91)
KRH 4/11/2023

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1996

96 JUL 13 P6:45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Consequences of Violence in Northern Ireland

Background

is analyzing intensity of hasn't thought of their events actually making more possibilities going full-blown

~~This past week has seen the worst civil disturbances in Northern Ireland in 25 years.~~ The crisis began on July 7 when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) decided not to allow Protestant marchers, celebrating the 1690 victory of King William of Orange at the Battle of the Boyne, to march along a traditional route through a Catholic neighborhood in the village of Drumcree. Orange Order loyalists gathered outside the police barricade and when egged on by party leaders Trimble and Paisley, declared they would lay siege to Drumcree "for as long as it takes." Loyalist violence erupted throughout Northern Ireland July 7-10, with gangs torching vehicles and Catholic buildings (including a church and a high school), and a number of Catholic families were forced to flee mixed neighborhoods.

In a surprise move, on July 11 the RUC reversed itself, forcibly cleared Catholic residents from the street and allowed 1,300 Protestant marchers to march through the Catholic area. Church leaders had been seeking to mediate a compromise between residents and the local Orange Order, but no agreement had been reached when the decision to allow the march was taken. The British say the reversal of the decision by the local chief constable was necessitated by the threat from Orange lodges all over Northern Ireland to cancel their own parades and converge on Drumcree. The police feared they would not be able to prevent the expected crowd of at least 50,000 from attacking the Catholic community.

The Irish Government and nationalist leaders, including John Hume, are dismayed and angry at what they see as yet another instance of the British "caving in" to loyalist violence and threats. For the first time in several years, the Irish Government has issued a public statement critical of a British decision. Gerry Adams called the decision "disgraceful" and appealed for restraint on the part of nationalists. We have already received calls and letters from outraged Irish Americans, some asking you to take Prime Minister Major to task publicly.

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/12/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Catholic violence broke out across Northern Ireland the night of July 11, including the injury by shooting of three police officers. One man died in the riots on July 12. Many fear the resumption of violence in Northern Ireland itself for the first time since the cease-fire was broken on February 9.

What It Means

The incident is being interpreted in the nationalist community as a message that the use and threat of force still gets results in Northern Ireland. It has also reinforced the nationalist perception that the police are pro-unionist and Catholics still need the IRA to protect their neighborhoods. It also hardens the nationalists against a more flexible position on decommissioning as some now argue that the weapons are needed to protect nationalist communities. Adams is already saying he should now be allowed into the talks without a restoration of the cease-fire.

Nevertheless, after a difficult conversation on July 11, Prime Ministers Major and Bruton agreed not to give up on the peace process. There is now no reason for the unionist parties not to return to the Stormont talks. (They had said they would not until the Drumcree standoff was resolved.) Hume is likely to swallow hard and stay in the process too, although there is talk of Hume boycotting the Forum. Some believe the Belfast talks may go more smoothly now because the unionists (having resorted to violence for their own ends) will have lost the credibility to demand a hard line on decommissioning. While this may be overly optimistic (the unionists are unlikely to draw the parallel), Trimble may see a need to make progress in the talks to refurbish his credibility. The British have promised to set up some kind of mechanism to decide how to handle these disputed parades, something the nationalists have been seeking.

Our Strategy

While the British are justifying the RUC's decision at Drumcree on security grounds, they too recognize that it has sent the wrong message. We will seek to use this to get the British to be flexible in responding to the latest Hume-Adams initiative to get the ~~cease-fire restored~~. I will be seeking to clarify with Adams exactly what kinds of reassurances he is seeking from the British. One possibility is to press HMG to agree to a low-level meeting with Sinn Fein, which would enhance Adams' credibility with the IRA leadership. We will also press for a long-term solution to the annual marching season problem. We may need you to weigh in early next week.

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2011-0355-F (4.92)
KBM 4/11/2023

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 19, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG *NS*

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Next Steps

*. talk to SF
. prisoners
. summit*

Goals

1. Get agreement on procedural points and agenda by end of month.
- OK* - 2. Handle August 12 parades in a peaceful manner agreed to by the communities.
3. Use these two accomplishments to convince Adams to restore cease-fire ASAP, perhaps in August.
- ✓ 4. Keep Loyalist cease-fire in place.
5. Get Hume back in the Forum.
6. Begin substantive all-party talks in September.
7. Keep October Trade-Investment Conference in Pittsburgh on track.

Steps to Achieve

To achieve these goals, there are a series of steps we can push the parties to take.

British: They need to reach out to the Nationalist community to begin restoring some level of confidence with it, while not breaking faith with the Unionists. They also need to shore up support for the Loyalists who have taken real risks. They need to join with the Irish and add new momentum to the talks. They need to continue to press for successful conclusion to the talks, especially on decommissioning. They also need to put in place a reasonable process for handling parades. Suggested steps:

- ✓ 1. HMG meeting next week with Sinn Fein at official but sub-ministerial level, probably Ancram's deputy, Quentin Thomas.
- ✓ 2. Release, or move to better conditions, some Loyalist prisoners.
- ✓ 3. Meet with Unionist and Nationalist leaders to resolve how to handle August parades as well as all future parades.
- ✓ 4. Bruton and Major (vs. Mayhew and Spring) agree to host plenary session of the talks on July 29.
5. End public bickering with Bruton. Possible summit.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 7/19/06

Anti-terr. corp. - not now.

- ✓ 6. Follow up on Adams-Hume channel by clarifying steps that British can take in response to Adams' letter.

Irish: They need to shore up their support and relationship with Adams, while continuing to crack down on IRA weapons facilities. (Dermott has rejected discussion of joint terrorism cooperation with us, saying "not now.") Irish should continue pressure on Adams for cease-fire; join with the British on adding new momentum to talks; continue to push talks to successful conclusion, especially on decommissioning. Steps to take:

1. End public bickering with Major. ~~Possible summit.~~
2. Continue public, sub-ministerial meetings with Adams.
3. Push Nationalists to be reasonable on parades.
4. Press Hume to rejoin Forum.
5. ~~Bruton agrees to host plenary session of the talks with Major.~~
5. *New List, i.e. CBM summit.*

Adams: He needs assurances that talks will be substantive and not blocked by decommissioning. He needs agreement on parades. He should get cease-fire restored, clarify discrepancy between his statement to us and letter to Major. Steps for him to take:

1. Clarify what he needs from British, via Hume.
2. Work constructively on parades.
3. Perhaps make constructive statement on decommissioning. (Tough absent #1 and agreement on talks. Possible for September.)

Hume: He needs some reduction in tensions and progress on parades to ease political pressure on him to respond to problems of last week. Steps to take:

1. Return to Forum (not yet clear to me how, probably couldn't do before September).
2. Work with Major to respond to Adams-Hume initiative.
3. Work constructively on parade issue.

Trimble: He has taken some hits for his actions and associations with extremist Unionists associated with violence. Has lost some credibility with Nationalists. Steps to take:

1. Public rejection of violence (unlikely to do), regret over recent events, or recommitment to Mitchell Principles (also tough since now a demand of Sinn Fein).
2. Engage constructively in talks, drop pressure for decommissioning at top of agenda.
3. Help resolve parade issue.

Paisley: Goal is to keep him in talks.

Loyalists: Need to keep cease-fire in place. They need some public recognition and positive results they can bring home.

1. Stay the course.

Clinton Administration: Keep pressure on all sides to stay constructively engaged, support Mitchell and talks, pressure and entice IRA to restore cease-fire, urge Irish America to support us in these efforts, help restore confidence in the process. Steps to take:

- ✓ 1. Lake calls to Mitchell, Holmes, Spring and Hume to push above steps, consult.
- ✓ 2. Lake call to Adams to clarify conditions in Adams-Hume initiative, press for cease-fire (or at least de facto moratorium on further bombings), underscore significance of talks, and consult.
3. Lake call to Trimble? (Let's discuss. Perhaps after a delay to show displeasure for actions last week.)
- ✗ 4. Possibly lay down marker that Smyth extradition will be hard to stop until cease-fire is restored (need to clear first in memo to POTUS).
- ✓ 5. Finesse on MacBride.
- ✓ 6. POTUS letters to Major and Bruton.

Other steps that have been suggested but that I do not recommend at this time:

- Press Mitchell not to adjourn talks (McMichael concerned about a void)
- Let Adams join talks without restoration of cease-fire (Adams position and one now advocated by some in Congress -- Gilman sent letter and issued statement)
- POTUS calls to Major, Bruton, Mitchell.
- VP calls to Loyalists.
- POTUS statement.
- Travel to region by MAP, NES, TL. (I'd be inclined to send someone to consult)
- Invite Loyalists to WH for meeting to show support.
- Replace Mayhew.
- Have Mitchell press Adams-Hume initiative

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July 12, 1996

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2011-0355-F (4.93)
KRM 7/11/2023

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Nancy's Conversation with Adams

Adams called unexpectedly today. Following is the memorandum of conversation.

Adams: I've been up all night -- I wanted to take the opportunity to give you an update before getting some sleep. I personally have been trying to keep the lid on here, no matter how it appears. The situation between Sunday and Wednesday was bad -- Catholic churches and schools were burned and Catholic families evicted from their homes. Then there was the murder of the taxi-driver and the blockading of towns. The Garvaghy Road business was bad, especially the tele-visual angle. The Ormeau Road (in Belfast) is still under curfew and has been for 40 hours now. The people are incensed; we are trying to keep them calm. Over 100 nationalists have been injured, some seriously, by the RUC. There were 40 people in the hospital in Derry and 30 in Belfast. One was hit in the head with plastic bullet and is clinically dead, on life support. Over 1400 plastic bullets were fired between 12:00 yesterday and 6:00 this morning. This is the kind of thing that needs quiet diplomatic efforts; the degree of reaction from the RUC is out of proportion.

Nancy: We got your message about trying to get through to speak to the Ormeau Road residents; I happened to talk to John Holmes and mentioned it to him. Did you get through?

Adams: Yes, after three and a half hours at the roadblock. It was surprising that a number of people in the U.S. sent faxes of support for the residents; they were delighted to get those messages.

Nancy: Many people here are watching the situation closely. I have been in touch with Tony. What is next? I know it is enormously difficult, but what are you pushing as a way forward?

Adams: First of all it will be absurd if the unionists can just walk back into the talks without penalty next week after walking

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/12/06

out this week, while we are still excluded. I was heckled by the crowd yesterday -- just a little heckle, nothing I couldn't handle -- but Tom Hartley (a Sinn Fein official) was heckled badly for appealing for calm and talking about the peace process. There was a lack of evenness. The unionists, who would not engage with the people in either the Garvaghy Road (in Drumcree) or in the Lower Ormeau Road, were rewarded for it. They will keep behaving like that until someone stops them, like a spoiled child. Cardinal Cahal Daly (Catholic primate of Ireland), an intelligent man who is not sympathetic to republicans, is extremely angry. The headline in the "Irish News" read "Betrayal."

Nancy: We are thinking through here what to do. We should act quickly.

Adams: I will try to sit down tomorrow and think about that. John's and my initiative is still on stream, still out there. The response was positive. I had told John that Major was not in a political position to move positively but that was when the original decision was made on Garvaghy Road. Now the situation has changed, they have capitulated to one element. John and I will pursue it. He couldn't even get out to fly to London because the roads were blocked. The two governments need to move as well on their commitments. Even if things quiet down the SDLP is so cheesed off they could disengage from the talks, either mentally or actually. Nothing dramatic, they would just fade away. As I have been saying, the British have the key. They cannot deliver the unionists but they can move the situation along.

Nancy: On television it looked like 25 years ago.

Adams: Yes, it felt the same. I was on Cooper Road where I was in 1974. Now you have the children behaving the same as their parents did. I have said maybe the situation could shock people into awareness, act as a catalyst.

Nancy: Are there other things we can push? What about the proposal for a parades commission?

Adams: I myself think it is nonsense. There are 3000 parades each year and 18 at most that are contentious. The Orangemen have not played ball with the residents of the Garvaghy Road or the Ormeau. Other protests (by Catholics) have erupted spontaneously since but they have been peaceful. I myself have a rather easygoing attitude to Orange parades but today, for instance one lodge accompanied by one band was supposed to come down the Lower Ormeau Road; instead there were 500-600 people and five bands. You need to get the Orangemen to talk to residents.

Months ago I went to Martin Smyth (Grand Master of the Orange Order, UUP MP) and asked him to arrange meetings to help resolve this issue. If a commission comes up with a decision that does not sit with either community, you will have the same problem.

Nancy: We will keep talking to everyone and explore how to move forward.

Adams: We need to grab the process and move it.

Nancy: Let us know if you have any further thoughts. Are the loyalists okay?

Adams: I think so, wouldn't know, though they did kill that taxi man, blockaded roads, put families out.

Nancy: We hear it was unauthorized. Keep in touch.

Adams: Slan

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 191136Z JUL 96

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4772
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 4829
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 9113
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 008784

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.97)
K8H 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/01
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, UK, EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: PM'S MEETING WITH SDLP LEADERS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL J HABIB, POLITICAL MIN-
COUNS, AMEMBASSY LONDON. REASON: 1.5 (B)

2. WE MET JULY 18 WITH THE PM'S AIDE, EDWARD OAKDEN, TO
DISCUSS JOHN MAJOR'S MEETING THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH SDLP
LEADERS JOHN HUME, SEAMUS MALLON AND JOE HENDRON. OAKDEN SAID
THE MEETING HAD, GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BEEN LESS NEGATIVE
THAN ANTICIPATED. THE SDLP LEADERS, PARTICULARLY MALLON, HAD
BEGUN BY EXPRESSING THE DEEP-SEATED ANGER OF THE NATIONALIST
COMMUNITY OVER THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS WEEK. LED BY HUME,
HOWEVER, THEY HAD SOON TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS.

3. HUME HAD STRESSED THE IMPERATIVE OF MOVING QUICKLY FROM
PROCEDURAL TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION AT THE MULTI-PARTY TALKS.
THOUGH HE HAD ISSUED NO ULTIMATUM, HUME HAD INDICATED THAT THE
SDLP WAS PREPARED TO WALK OUT OF THE TALKS IF INSUFFICIENT
PROGRESS WERE MADE IN THIS REGARD. HE HAD INDICATED THAT
AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES SHOULD BE IN HAND BY THE SUMMER
BREAK. HUME IMPLIED THAT THE SDLP COULD STILL SUBSCRIBE TO THE
ARRANGEMENT ON PROCEDURES THAT HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION PRIOR
TO DRUMCREE. (AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD LEAVE
ON THE TABLE THE GROUNDRULES CONTAINED IN THE MARCH PAPER
DRAFTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BUT SEN. MITCHELL WOULD
AGREE TO MAKE REFERENCE ONLY TO THOSE RULES THUS FAR WORKED
OUT IN THE PROCEDURAL TALKS.) OAKDEN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT
THIS WAS THE SOLUTION WHICH MITCHELL IS ADVOCATING AT THE
MOMENT.

4. OAKDEN'S VIEW WAS THAT THIS WOULD BE A SOLUTION LIKELY TO
FIND FAVOR WITH TRIMBLE SINCE THE UUP WAS VERY UNHAPPY WITH
THE MARCH PAPER. ACCORDING TO OAKDEN, CHANCES WERE MUCH LESS
FAVORABLE THAT PAISLEY WOULD SUPPORT THIS ARRANGEMENT.
THE QUESTION WOULD THEN BE WHETHER MITCHELL WAS PREPARED TO
PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF 'SUFFICIENT CONSENT'. HMG, OAKDEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

UNDERScoreD, IS VERY ANXIOUS TO MOVE SMARTLY TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF MARCHES, HUME HAD INDICATED TO THE PM THAT HE HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS IN WORKING OUT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY A COMPROMISE ON THE AUG. 10 APPRENTICESHIP BOYS MARCH IN LONDONDERRY. OAKDEN NOTED THAT MAYHEW WAS PRESENTING SOME IDEAS TO DICK SPRING AT THE IGC ON HOW THE COMMISSION ON MARCHES MIGHT WORK. THOUGH HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC, OAKDEN INDICATED THAT HMG THINKING WAS TO WORK OUT A GENERAL CODE OF PRACTICE FOR MARCHES BUT NOT TO ESTABLISH A MECHANISM TO TAKE DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL EVENTS. THE CHIEF CONSTABLE HELD STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH DECISIONS AND LONDON DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE THIS ROLE FROM HIM. OAKDEN SAID BRITISH THINKING WAS TO ESTABLISH THE COMMISSION OR REVIEW BOARD BY THE END OF THE YEAR; THE AUG. 10 MARCH WOULD BE ADDRESSED AS A SEPARATE EXERCISE.)?

6. OAKDEN ALSO TOLD US:

--THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONJECTURE BUT NO REAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ENNISKILLEN HOTEL BOMBING. MOST OF THE SPECULATION CONTINUED TO CENTER ON THE INLA;

--ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS SUGGEST THAT THE IRA PLANS FURTHER ACTS OF TERROR IN ENGLAND. THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF A CEASE-FIRE.

--A PRIMARY REASON FOR THE ORIGINAL RUC DECISION TO BAN THE GARVACHY ROAD MARCH WAS SEVERAL REPORTS THAT THE IRA WOULD USE WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUS VIOLENCE AS A COVER FOR ATTACKS ON THE SECURITY FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. CROWE ??

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>8784

<MSGID> M2322607

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 191337Z JUL 96

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0682
INFO RUEHXQ/ALL EUROPEAN UNION POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 4128
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4104
UNCLAS DUBLIN 003697

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR DS/OP/EUR-LEIBENGOOD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ASEC, UK, EI
SUBJECT: DUBLIN BOMB THREAT A "SHOT ACROSS THE BOW"

REF: DUBLIN 3688

1. YESTERDAY'S BOMB THREAT IN DUBLIN TURNED OUT TO BE A FALSE ALARM. THE SUSPICIOUS OBJECT FOUND IN A DUMPSTER AND DESTROYED BY POLICE IN A CONTROLLED EXPLOSION TURNED OUT NOT TO HAVE BEEN A BOMB. HOWEVER, GIVEN THAT THE TELEPHONE WARNING FROM THE ULSTER FREEDOM FORCE (UFF) USED AN AUTHENTIC CODEWORD, THE HOAX IS VIEWED AS A GENUINE SIGNAL FROM THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARY GROUP THAT IT IS CAPABLE OF INFLECTING DAMAGE SOUTH OF THE BORDER IF REPUBLICAN VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND OR BRITAIN CONTINUES.

2. THE UFF IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE A COVER NAME FOR THE ULSTER DEFENSE ASSOCIATION (UDA), WHOSE POLITICAL WING, THE ULSTER DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IS ONE OF THE PARTIES TAKING PART IN THE MULTI-PARTY PEACE TALKS IN BELFAST. MEDIA REPORTS NOTE THAT UNIONISTS MAY, IN THE WAKE OF THIS BOMB THREAT, NOW CALL INTO QUESTION THE UDP'S COMMITMENT TO THE SIX MITCHELL PRINCIPLES ON DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE, POSSIBLY CHALLENGING THE UDP'S PLACE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE "IRISH TIMES" SAYS "JUST AS SINN FEIN WILL NOT CONDEMN THE IRA FOR ITS ACTIONS, NEITHER WILL THE UDP CONDEMN THE UDA..." SMITH

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>3697

<MSGID> M2322844

*To Jodi -
Can you pull
list of political leaders
in Ireland + UK.
I want to check
who heads
UDP
attached
keep hands*

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memo	re: Ulster Bombings at a Glance (3 pages)	07/24/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, July 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1710

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SENT BY:

7-19-96 11:19AM :

NYS AFL-CIO-

212 779 1198:# 2/ 3

CC + *newman***Confidential Memorandum**

TO: The National Security Council
FROM: The Irish-American Peace Delegation
SUBJECT: For A New US Approach to the Peace Process.
DATE: July 19, 1996

*To Tz
CC MAP
SV.**From Niall O'Dowd.**Probably will be seen
by Adams' folks too***New Realities.**

We believe the seriousness of the situation in Northern Ireland has not fully hit home. The events of the last week have completely altered the circumstances. The British government has abrogated treaties with the Irish government by refusing to consult on matters of grave importance. The Ulster Unionist leadership has been revealed to be complicit in mob rule, while the RUC has become a totally unacceptable police force. As a result, for nationalists, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Framework Document, the Joint Declaration, milestones on which the entire nationalist engagement in the peace process was conditioned, are seen to be not worth the paper they were printed on. It now seems that the only reliable guarantor of the peace process for Northern nationalists is the US government.

The White House said in its Wednesday conference call briefing for community leaders that it welcomed suggestions for bold strokes. We think that routine recovery measures by the US are not good enough any more.

Key Congressional leaders such as Representatives Manton, King, Neal, Gilman and Walsh have jointly made a bipartisan appeal to the Administration on the urgency of immediate, inclusive all-party talks. With the Mitchell Principles having been violated on all sides, many sense the need for dramatic steps.

The US Administration appears to be on a path of letting tempers cool, seeing if the two governments can get back together, working existing structures, encouraging Senator Mitchell to press ahead with his existing assignment, making sure that the August dangers --- internment anniversaries and Apprentice Boy marches -- are foreseen and avoided. Good.

But, the larger truth is that good-faith efforts by the U.S. Administration, by the Irish government, by Hume and Adams, by moderate Unionism and loyalism, and by Irish America have come to naught because the British have erected preconditions and have been unwilling challenge hardline Unionists to come to the conference table.

US mainstream media fail to reflect the intensity of the political earthquake in Ireland. It is only beginning to register here.

Last week's breathtaking British about-face on security policy allows no fig leaf of pretense that the peace process is a priority of this dying Tory government. Security policy was changed because John Major caved in to the Tory Right with its links to Trimble's extreme

Unionism.

The Main Danger

We fear that the President will heed risk-averse campaign advisers and do little more to rescue the peace process when, ironically, the Orange rampages offer enormous opportunities to put the peace process back on track. It is not adequate that the US should merely express private protest to the British, which we assume has taken place. As violence recedes, media attention wanes, but the political crisis of the peace process is as acute as ever. A US holding action will not do. As Tony Lake once observed, if the peace process bicycle is not maintained at a certain speed, the bike falls.

Our conclusion, from the failure of the Irish peace process so far, is: there is no reason for long-term or even medium-term pessimism. The historical, objective factors arguing for a successful negotiated settlement are still present. More than ever, the people want peace. The main missing ingredient has been the willpower of the British government and some Northern politicians. A more assertive US role is necessary.

The Goals:

- * to restart the peace process, put more intense US pressure on all the parties to come together.
- * to re-assert the prestige, value and importance of the American card.
- * to get as much done as possible in the next six months before the next UK general election. Even this British government, having blundered badly, can be pushed to push Trimble *et al.*
- * to position the US Administration role to be reasserted even more forcefully soon after the Clinton re-election and the UK election.]?

The Proposal:

The chief contribution of the US Administration is the presence of Senator Mitchell in the talks in Northern Ireland. If, by August 1, matters are little or no better, think Bosnia. The Vance-Owen stage is over. The Holbrooke stage must begin:

Change and redefine Senator George Mitchell's role. Senator Mitchell, who was asked in by the two governments to play a limited, defined role in the talks, should be empowered, in a completely fresh way, to challenge authoritatively the two governments and all the parties and paramilitaries to rebuild the peace process on new foundations, to undertake aggressive independent American diplomacy, to get serious talks going -- now, without further delay, with no more song-and-dance about preconditions, to twist arms -- British and Unionist arms as well as republican arms. Start progressively: insist on appropriate rules for marches reflecting parity of esteem. Insist on no RUC collapse at the August flashpoints -- internment commemorations and August 13 in Derry. Demand structural reforms of policing. Demand other, bold confidence-building steps, and thereby win a new IRA ceasefire and hold the Loyalist ceasefire. Mitchell can draw a line in the sand for his involvement, and require an end to the political posturing and delays that have prevented progress thus far.

The changed circumstances in Northern Ireland demand a qualitatively different US response than before Drumcree. Fundamentals have changed.

1. Mitchell twist arms
2. appropriate rules for marches
3. CBI → ceasefire.

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Adams Memcon [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Thursday, July 25, 1996 6:58PM

X

Nancy - for your edits

<<File Attachment: 5131TEL.DOC>>

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By W NARA, Date 1/11/16
201-0355-F

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.95)
K8H 7/11/2023

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Gerry Adams (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake
Gerry Adams

Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME July 21, 1996, 11:40 a.m. - 12:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: White House/ConGen Belfast

Mr. Lake: It looks like all hell broke loose while I was in Asia. (U)

Gerry Adams: Once you leave town, things get difficult. (U)

Mr. Lake: I'll have to confine myself to my desk from here on. (U)

Mr. Adams: Let me give you a run-down on the situation. You're very aware, I am sure, of the events on the Garvaghy Road and the events on the Ormeau Road. The Orange brigades have been active and the attacks by the RUC on peaceful demonstrators and the curfewing of people for 36 hours has brought about a sea change of sorts. I don't know how deep-rooted it is or whether it is transient, but there is certainly extreme anger among the people. The Unionists have carried out a political coup d'etat. Trimble has shown the worst kind of leadership with the events at Drumcree and on Garvaghy Road. They threatened dire consequences for everyone and then blocked the roads throughout the six counties as well as blockading the airports and ports. In the Belfast area his followers marched through Catholic areas. They forced the eviction of Catholic families and committed the destruction of property. In the course of these actions, two Catholics were killed; one by the UVF and another by the British Army. (S)

Days before the Garvaghy Road event, on July 11, we were reasonably successful in keeping the lid on. I, and others, traveled -- we took a very hands-on approach. After the Garvaghy Road affair and later the Ormeau Road affair, things became very difficult. The best example of this is in Derry. Despite all the efforts by the Green Forces, including Martin McGuinness, we didn't manage to get it stopped. There were four nights of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(D)

Declassify On: 7/26/06

violence. I think that is a measure of the anger that has been created. (C)

I have seen the last years of the peace process. The perception is that the Republicans have been doing their best to get to inclusive talks. There has been an absence of IRA action here (in Northern Ireland) for the last two years. Against that background you have seen demonstrations with a very large involvement of professionals such as doctors, solicitors and shopkeepers who actually had some chance of making a case for peace. The RUC fired plastic bullets. They fired only 339 against the loyalists but 20 times as many against the nationalists. At least 500-600 nationalists were injured and over 200 were hospitalized -- 65 in Derry alone. We thought a third nationalist would die. (C)

In the course of all this, we pursued our initiative. John Hume gave a letter to Major two weeks ago. He urged him to stand up against the Orangemen. John couldn't do it. He couldn't get into Derry. Hume has engaged Major since those events. But someone from your end needs to be talking to the British. The position that John Hume and I promoted remains on the table. We want assurances that these will be real talks; we want there to be some sort of timeframe, and we want confidence-building measures. As I told John Hume, all of this could be done privately by him or someone else as a go-between. The Brits have handled everything so badly. It may be possible after all this mayhem that they see the need to move forward. We are also talking with Dublin on the same terms, stressing the same things. (C)

I have raised, including with Nancy, that there is a small possibility that Mitchell could play a private role. I will suggest to Hume today that he brief Mitchell. I will arrange that Alex Reed also be briefed. I don't know if the Senator can do anything but he is in a pivotal role. He could play a Holbrooke-type role, especially with the British. I am not sure this will work but it is worth exploring. Our initiative is still there. The biggest job is to manage the situation that is building up around August 10. (C)

There are three Orange institutions: the Black P---s, the House of Orange and the Apprentice Boys; they will be marching on Derry. In August 1969, it was the Apprentice Boys' march that sparked one and a half years of condemnable agitation and 25 years of civil unrest. That is the history and the folk memory. The people in Derry now feel that the Apprentice Boys should not be allowed to march, especially after the despicable behavior of the Orangemen. We have said that all of this can be defused through dialogue. (C)

I have talked to John Hume. Martin McGuinness and George Mitchell wrote a statement yesterday. You should spend an hour reading the news clippings of the last weeks to get a sense of the situation. (S)

Mr. Lake: I saw a lot of what happened on CNN. (S)

Gerry Adams: A head of steam is building up among the Catholics -- indeed, it is more widely than just the Catholics. Trimble was there yesterday, insisting that the marches go ahead. Popular sentiment is not to allow them to march into Derry. My personal preference is that they conduct a dignified protest well away from the march. We have confidence; we believe in pluralism, not division. We don't have a problem with others parading or marching. The difficulty is that they refuse to talk to the people regarding the Garvaghy Road incident. Now they've refused for an entire year to talk. People in Derry can't be treated like that. If you don't talk, you don't walk. (S)

We -- Sinn Fein, the SDLP and others -- have asked Dublin to work out an agreed accommodation that satisfies the marchers. We have also asked Dublin to ask the British to get a similar arrangement among the Unionists. We're getting church leaders and others to serve as conduits or contacts. We understand that the Loyalists favor a dialogue. We made known our views to them. We will make the same public calls for dialogue and accommodation. (S)

Lastly, I need to say something about the talks at Stormont. We had a two-hour meeting in Dublin yesterday. We have no confidence whatsoever in these talks. The other thing that is creating difficulties is the fact that John Major will be meeting with the Loyalist parties on Monday and this again is sending the wrong signal. I have no objection to his meeting with them, but it seems like the Loyalists and Unionists are being rewarded while the Republicans are still excluded. The Unionists and Loyalists clearly broke the Mitchell principles in the last few days. They withdrew from the talks and engineered a show of intimidation which will erode the situation further. One plus is that the traditional IRA response, which would have been military, wasn't. This is a signal to the others that the whole situation is precarious, especially if there is an upheaval around August 10 and also if there are parades in the run-up to August 10. (S)

Mr. Lake: I did see much of this on CNN and Nancy filled me in on your conversations. I know how deep the anger is running in the North. We need to think about how we can move forward. We cannot let the past defeat the future. I'd like to ask you some questions about three issues: 1) how do we get through

August 10; 2) how do we get the talks on track in terms of setting an agenda and agreed procedures (George Mitchell has been working hard on all this, I know); and 3) what is it that you need to get the cease-fire restored? On the first point we will be talking to the British and everyone else, urging flexibility and restraint so that the situation doesn't blow up. What about the marches between now and August 10? (C)

Gerry Adams: I don't think there are any major marches before August 10 but there may be some banned parades. There was one small parade last night which led to trouble when it occurred last year. The real focus has to be on August 10 itself. (C)

Mr. Lake: It doesn't bother me if the Brits are talking to the Loyalists. The key variable, in talking with McMichael and Ervine, is to keep them restrained. The event in Dublin was a concern, but if they are not restrained, the whole thing will go down the drain. (C)

Gerry Adams: I don't object to the meetings but the public will draw comparisons to the fact that the Catholics are excluded. (C)

Mr. Lake: We will be working on everyone to be as flexible as they can. What you can do will be very important. On number two, George Mitchell has been working very hard to keep the talks as substantive as possible to get the procedures agreed. We have been trying to keep at arm's length from the talks, but I will speak to George as well as to the British and Irish governments. I am frankly confused about what it is that you are asking of the British. Some of what you said to me differs from what John Hume said to the British. His letter was more general and not as specific. We don't want to get into the middle but we do need more clarity on what you want. (C)

Gerry Adams: Let me explain: for me, either for practical or strategic reasons, the IRA should restore the cessation in order to move the process forward, as well as to wrongfoot the other elements. There are those who would favor that among the IRA. But you need to understand the reality. The IRA was very disciplined this week. It took no action despite the provocations and the real anger. Those of us who tried to calm the situation were heckled and jostled. Those who favor or are open to a cessation say that the last cessation didn't have any assurances from the British in an upfront way. That is the difficulty with respect to the angling over decommissioning. People are asking whether John Major will deal with the next cessation in the same way that he did the last one. (C)

What we are saying is that we want from the British an assurance that there will be no preconditions (especially with respect to decommissioning) and some sense of an agreed timeframe for the talks. It is now July 21, the talks began on June 10. They are not negotiating for advantage but stalling. If they can do this over the agenda points, then they can prolong the talks in perpetuity over issues like decommissioning. That is why we need a timeframe. But I think this can easily be worked out. (C)

The SDLP and the Irish government -- and probably the Alliance Party and the Loyalists -- have the same position. Our third point is that there need to be some confidence-building measures -- some sense that the British are showing a commitment to serious talks. All these points are in the letter to Major, as I recall. The letter also requested a meeting with the British at the official level. We said that if it was too dangerous for John Major to have the British meet with the Sinn Fein, then formulations could be passed back and forth privately. But it is difficult without a meeting. (C)

In sum, we were quite precise on what we need from the British. Let me stress that the most serious is the first issue. But everything that we have described will be of no avail if the August 10 business is not handled properly. I am at one with you. We need to have a strategic view. There is no point having a standoff that puts the whole peace process off. An accommodation must be sought -- a universal accommodation. As I told Kathy Stephens earlier, if through a dialogue we can get a resolution of the August 10 situation, then this would send a strong signal to the people who have no confidence now that there is a positive element -- that we can, in fact, get an accommodation. (C)

Mr. Lake: It seems to me that the two are not unlinked. If things go badly on August 10, it will blow the talks. But if more people believe the talks are getting somewhere, then they are less likely to take desperate actions on August 10. Everyone should use the events of the last few weeks to drive home how terrible the future could be if we go back to the past. Both governments need to make statements pointing out the shock of recognition. We will talk to everyone. If George Mitchell can succeed in setting the agenda and procedures in a way that is reassuring with respect to decommissioning, then you have come out ahead, not just the British. It would be different from the first ceasefire. Then we were just talking about talking. Now, if Mitchell succeeds, there will be talks with an agreed agenda beginning in September. That is a big difference objectively on the ground. (C)

Gerry Adams: I have only been trying to convey to you the deep sense of anger. For example, after the two governments met and I met with the Irish government and gave a detailed breakdown of the situation, Mayhew responded that there could be no guarantee that what happened at Drumcree wouldn't happen again and that the RUC wouldn't put down the protest in the same way. (S)

Mr. Lake: When did he say that? (S)

Gerry Adams: On Friday. He reminds me of someone who is sulking because he was caught out and is trying to convince you that it wasn't his fault. That was the type of remark which expresses the British lack of will as I see it. (S)

Mr. Lake: You shouldn't take every offhand remark from Mayhew as reflecting official British policy. (S)

Gerry Adams: But it shows that the British feel that they can trample on the rights of people in the Garvaghy Road. I believe we can get the peace process back on the rails. But you need to understand where the anger is at. (S)

Mr. Lake: I understand. When I spoke to Nancy Soderberg from Bangkok, she said that the first thing that I needed to understand was the degree of anger that had been stirred up. (S)

Gerry Adams: Secondly, the Irish government isn't doing it, but the British government is pretending that it's business as usual. It would be good if there were an agreement by the end of next week. They will recommend that talks begin with all issues in parallel, including decommissioning. But there should be no doubt that there will be much cynicism about portraying that as a breakthrough or a progressive step by the Unionists. If by September the British don't have the will then we will, not be able to drive the carriage through. (S)

Mr. Lake: I am not arguing that the Unionists will have had an epiphany or that an age of good feelings will have emerged. I am just saying that you can use with the IRA the fact that, whatever people's feelings may be or your calculations of their motives, unlike in the case of the first ceasefire, there will be a process in place with an agenda and with decommissioning handled in parallel with other issues rather than up front. To argue that the situation is the same as with the first ceasefire would be dishonest. (S)

Gerry Adams: I agree with that. I am not arguing with you over that. I believe that even those in the IRA who have been resisting another cessation would know that when an agenda has been put together in a democratic way, the imperative for a new

cessation would have to be met positively. So, I understand the logic of what you are saying. But if the Unionists or the RUC are unleashed against defenseless Catholics again, it will be seen as evidence that HMG does not have the will to deal with David Trimble. What is of utmost importance is that you talk to the British in terms of an accommodation around these marches. Secondly, you should, on the one hand, get positively engaged around the Hume-Adams efforts to get a cessation and, on the other hand, assist what George Mitchell is trying to achieve. Without those steps, the popular feeling will be too strong. How long are you going to be in Washington? (e)

Mr. Lake: I don't dare leave now. (e)

Gerry Adams: Yes, you need to stay put. I have been keeping in close touch with Nancy through Mairead. The time to resolve the parade business is now. The British tend to leave things like this until the eve of the problem. We cannot leave this issue till August 9. (e)

Mr. Lake: Certainly calling it a law enforcement issue and staying out of it is not sufficient. (e)

Gerry Adams: Yes, any attempt to refer to this problem as simply a security matter is a red flag and a dangerous signal. All of these matters are political issues. I have no doubt that Mayhew, at a personal level, is aggrieved by the antics of the Orangemen. Any decent English person, including those running this place, can't be satisfied. But the problem needs to be dealt with in a fair and evenhanded way. (e)

Mr. Lake: We need to find a way not to go over the cliff but to find a springboard for progress. We will make a round of calls. (e)

Gerry Adams: To conclude, my view is that David Trimble has overstretched himself. The right wing of Unionism that he represents may believe that it scored a victory. But the more thinking elements, the decent Orangemen and Unionists, may want to pull back from the edge of the abyss. We need to give them encouragement. (e)

Mr. Lake: I suspect Trimble may feel that he went too far. (e)

Gerry Adams: I hope so. Thanks again. (e)

Mr. Lake: We will work on it. (e)

-- End of Conversation --

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release

July 25, 1996

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS BURNS, SPOKESMAN

NIGER: U.S. Position on Election Results and Actions Taken

The July 21 acceptance by the Nigerien Supreme Court of the results of the recent presidential election in Niger does not change the view of the United States that the electoral process was fraudulent. The regime of General Ibrahim Mainassara Bare seriously compromised the validity of the process by abolishing the independent electoral commission on the second day of voting and replacing it with a national commission controlled by the government, by barring party representatives and independent observers from the vote counting centers on the second day, and by placing the political candidates opposing General Bare under house arrest. The government-appointed electoral commission subsequently announced provisional results showing voter participation and votes for Bare significantly greater on the second day than on the first. As a consequence, we do not believe the announced outcome of the elections is a true reflection of the wishes of the Nigerien people.

This derailing of the electoral process was particularly regrettable given the compliance with election laws and the strong emphasis on transparency that characterized the 1993 legislative and presidential elections and the 1995 parliamentary elections, which enjoyed the confidence of the Nigerien electorate.

The United States is also deeply concerned by the violations of human rights and repression of civilian freedom conducted by the Bare regime immediately following the dissolution of the independent electoral commission and continuing through the past weekend.

In response to Niger's clear abandonment of democracy, evident in both the military coup earlier this year and the fraudulent election, the United States is:

-- Terminating current bilateral USAID assistance programs to the Government of Niger.

-- Withdrawing and not replacing the Security Assistance Officer in our Embassy in Niamey.

-- Continuing to suspend all military assistance programs.

Just as the U.S. is terminating its current assistance programs to the Government of Niger, we expect other donors are examining their assistance to Niger. If earlier assistance pledges erode significantly, this could regrettably have negative implications for the sustainability of Niger's structural adjustment program with the IMF.

We call upon all interested governments to express their disapproval of the fraudulent elections in Niger and to join with us in taking measures to support the people of Niger by pressing for the return to democracy.



TO R
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FAX COVER

Date: 25 July 1996

To: Ms Nancy Soderberg

From: Ambassador Gallagher

Telephone number: (202) 462-0017

Fax number: (202) 319-9757

Number of pages (including cover) 20

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

Personal and Confidential

25 July 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Nancy

It seems at last we are making some progress in the talks. I know that the encouragement from here has been extremely helpful in focussing people's minds and putting new momentum into the process.

I am enclosing a summary report of yesterday's proceedings together with the documents that are now on the table.

I am speaking at the AOH this evening in Minneapolis but will give you a call before I leave.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely


Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

~~Confidential~~Summary Report (24 July)

For much of the day, the Chairman carried out further consultations with the UUP, the DUP and the SDLP on the draft rules and reported developments at intervals to the two Governments. His compromise text reflecting an agreed outcome of this work (attached - NEG 3/96) was finally circulated to the other delegations at 6pm. The informal round-table session to consider this text was convened at 6.30pm and concluded at 10.30pm.

An unwelcome development was the DUP's notification to the Chairman, very shortly before this session began, that they wished to table a number of amendments which might be discussed when the session resumes tomorrow. They indicated privately that they expected these amendments to be voted down and were essentially going through the motions. They were also willing to accept a time limitation for debating them (a few minutes each). Pointing out that it would in any event not be possible to agree the rules ahead of Monday's Plenary, they proposed that the round-table group would agree that the first item of business at that Plenary should be the adoption of the decision-making section of the draft rules (which enshrines sufficient consensus). This would permit the subsequent adoption of all the other rules.

Senator Mitchell was attracted to the DUP proposal as it appeared to hold out the prospect of avoiding a lengthy dispute at this evening's session on the issue of where authority to take the rules towards decision resided. He was not inclined to view it as a delaying tactic. He understood, furthermore, that the UUP and the UKUP supported it (including the time-limitation aspect).

The two Governments warned that there would be a strong reaction from other delegations to an attempt to extend an already extraordinarily protracted negotiation and to reopen matters which had been settled, after hard-fought compromises all round, in the Chairman's text. There was no guarantee that a time-limitation undertaking would be honoured by each of the Unionist parties. Moreover, valuable time which had been earmarked for discussion of the agenda would be lost.

These and many other concerns were indeed voiced by the SDLP and most other delegations during this evening's session. The general theme was that, after forty days of exhaustive consultation on these rules, the time had come to decide on them. The Secretary of State mentioned a view, inside and outside the talks, that "enough was enough" and the Minister for Justice strongly endorsed his remarks. The two Governments and eight parties signalled their clear support for the Chairman's text.

The DUP duly circulated nine amendments, all of which were familiar from earlier exchanges (attached - NEG 4/96). The UUP said it would not be putting forward amendments, and anticipated decision on these rules next Monday, but expressed support for some of the DUP amendments (not specified).

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
Initials: MM Date: 1/12/16
2011-0355-F

It was ultimately agreed that parties would be free to table amendments up to 11am tomorrow (but no later) and that these would be considered at tomorrow's session.

The second major development today was agreement by the two Governments on a joint paper which will circulate to delegations the proposed agenda for the opening Plenary (as agreed between us on 20 June) and propose the completion prior to the recess of the decommissioning discussion and the discussion/adoption of the comprehensive agenda. This paper also proposes that the three-stranded negotiations would begin no later than 16 September. It will be distributed early on Thursday morning, partly with a view to providing an alternative focus for discussion in the round-table session (which resumes at 10am).

In addition to a round of meetings with the Chairmen and the British Government, the Government delegation had bilateral contact today with the SDLP and the NIWC.

NEG. 3/96

(4)

24 July 1996

Rules of Procedure: Chairmen's Compromise Text

1. (UK 1) The negotiations to which these rules of procedure refer and whose conduct they are intended to govern are, as provided for by Section 2(1) of the Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations, etc) Act 1996, the negotiations referred to in Command Paper 3232 published on 16 April 1996.
2. (UK 1A) The conduct and outcome of these negotiation is exclusively a matter for those involved in the negotiations. These rules of procedure are adopted as the single set of rules governing the conduct of the negotiations. These rules can only be amended by agreement, in accordance with the decision-making process outlined in paragraphs 30 through 35, following discussion in the Business Committee.

Structure of Negotiations

3. (2) Negotiations will be organised so that issues are discussed in the following formats:
 - Plenary;
 - Strand One;
 - Strand Two;
 - Strand Three; and,
 - a Business Committee.

Strand One will cover the relationships within Northern Ireland, including the relationship between any new institutions there and the Westminster Parliament; Strand Two will cover relationships within the island of Ireland; and Strand Three will cover relationships between the British and Irish Governments. Negotiations on Strand One issues will involve the British Government and the political parties. Negotiations on Strand Three issues will be between the two Governments. Negotiations in all other formats will involve the British and Irish Governments and the political parties.

4. (3) The British Government will chair Strand One of the negotiations and the British and Irish Governments will jointly chair Strand Three. Senator George Mitchell, General John de Chastelain and Prime Minister Harri Holkeri will chair the various aspects of the negotiations which require independent chairmanship, as follows:



- Senator Mitchell (Plenary);
 - General de Chastelain (Strand Two and the Business Committee); and
 - Prime Minister Holkeri (Alternate Chairman for the Plenary, Strand Two and the Business Committee).
5. (4) Where appropriate, other committees and sub-committees of the negotiations may be established among the participants in the format to which the sub-group relates. Committees and sub-committees shall be chaired by the relevant Chairman or, by agreement among the participants in that format, by a person nominated by the Chairman.

Role and Responsibility of Chairmen

6. (5) The designated Chairmen shall preside over all the business of the negotiations and will exercise their functions impartially at all times.
7. (6) The Chairmen will moderate in all meetings to allow an opportunity for full discussion of issues on the agenda, guided by the aim of securing agreement of as broad a spectrum of participation as is possible, and doing so as expeditiously and efficiently as possible.
8. (7) In their conduct of these proceedings, all Chairmen will be governed by these rules of procedure, having due regard to the views of the Business Committee on the arrangements of business and the exercise of their functions.
9. (8) The Chairmen will be bound by the same requirement for confidentiality as the participants.
10. (9) The Chairmen may bring forward specific suggestions if it is regarded as helpful by the relevant delegations.

Sequence of the Negotiations

11. (10) Following the conclusion of the Opening Plenary, the appropriate Chairmen will convene meetings of the negotiations within the three strands and any committees or sub-committees subject to their having regard to the views of the Business Committee. Negotiations in each strand will open on the same day and proceed in parallel, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 14.

12. (11) The Independent Chairman of the Plenary may convene further meetings of the Plenary if he considers such meetings to be necessary in the light of developments across the negotiations as a whole. He shall, in addition, convene further plenary meetings at the request of the Business Committee.

Business Committee

13. (12) The Business Committee shall comprise up to two representatives of each participating delegation. It will co-ordinate the progress and procedures of the negotiations. It will not deal with the substance of the negotiations but will address unresolved procedural issues. It may also determine the modalities for dealing with any issue which does not fall exclusively within any of the three strands.
14. (13) The timing and duration of meetings in the various formats shall be determined by the relevant Chairman, having due regard to the views of the participants. However, unless otherwise agreed by the Business Committee, negotiating sessions in different formats, or within formats, will not be held simultaneously, to allow participants, if they so wish, the option of fielding the same negotiating team throughout the negotiations.
15. (14) The Business Committee will be available to advise the Chairmen on the day-to-day exercise of their responsibilities and to facilitate communication between participating delegations and the Chairmen.

Conduct of the Proceedings

16. (15A) All participants in the negotiations will negotiate in good faith, seriously address all aspects of the agreed agenda, and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. They will maintain confidentiality on all aspects of the negotiations except where they may from time to time agree to publicity.

(7)

17. (15) The negotiations in the various formats, committees and sub-committees, will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda for the negotiations as a whole, adopted by agreement in the opening plenary, as it relates to the participants' area of competence. Without prejudice to any participant's negotiating position, each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them and receive a fair hearing for those concerns without their ability to do so being subject to the veto of any other party in the negotiations. Participants may, by agreement, develop or refine the comprehensive agenda.
18. (17A) Any participant in the format in question will be free to raise any aspect of the three relationships, including constitutional issues and any other matter which it considers relevant. The conduct and outcome of the negotiations will be exclusively a matter for the relevant participants. No negotiated outcome is either pre-determined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement. Participation in negotiations is without prejudice to any participant's commitment to the achievement by exclusively peaceful means of its preferred options. It is common ground that any agreement, if it is to command widespread support, will need to give adequate expression to the totality of all three relationships.
19. (17) The agenda for each meeting of the negotiations shall be settled by the participants on the basis of proposals put forward by the Chairman in accordance with the overall agenda in the relevant format, and taking into account the advice of the Business Committee.
20. (16) The relevant Chairman will have responsibility for convening, re-scheduling and adjourning meetings, having due regard to the views of the Business Committee or, as appropriate, of the relevant participants. It is understood, however, that any delegation may request an adjournment of up to 20 minutes at a time and the Chairman shall refuse such requests only if they are made with unreasonable frequency.
21. (15B) Strand One negotiations will take place in Castle Buildings, Belfast. Strand Two negotiations will take place in Belfast, Dublin and London, at times agreed by the Business Committee. The two Governments will determine where Strand Three meetings will take place. The Business Committee shall determine the venue of its own meetings.

22. (15C) The negotiations shall normally occur only on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays.
23. (18) Where any negotiating team does not attend at a previously agreed time and fails to provide notice of their inability to attend, the Chairman of that meeting and the remaining participants may proceed to conduct the meeting in the absence of that team or teams. If a delegation should withdraw temporarily or permanently from any aspect of the negotiations, the Chairman and the remaining participants will be free to proceed with business with the remaining participants, notwithstanding such withdrawal.
24. (19) All remarks shall be addressed through the Chairman, who may time-limit interventions at his discretion.
25. (20) The Chairman's ruling on individual procedural matters shall be binding. In arriving at such rulings, the Chairman may apply the rules for determining sufficient consensus as set out in paragraphs 30 through 35.
26. (21) The Chairman may at any time seek a meeting or accede to a request for a meeting with any participating delegation or group of delegations.
27. (22) Any written submissions which may be received from other groups or individuals will have no status.
28. (20A) Participating political parties may only be represented at formal meetings of the Plenary, or to discuss Strand One, Strand Two or Strand Three issues, by elected delegates. Such delegates may be supported in meetings by researchers or others who are not elected. The numbers of delegates and supporters participating in any one meeting shall be agreed by the Business Committee.
29. (GR17) If, during the negotiations, a formal representation is made to the Independent Chairmen that a participant is no longer entitled to participate on the grounds that they have demonstrably dishonoured the principles of democracy and non-violence as set forth in the Report of 22 January 1996 of the International Body, this will be circulated by the Chairmen to all participants and will be subject to appropriate action by the Governments, having due regard to the views of the participants.

(9)

Decision-Making

30. (23) The negotiations will operate on the basis of consensus. If it appears to the Chairman, after a reasonable period of discussion, that there is no unanimity, he may follow one or more of the courses of action set out below:
- a. consult with the participants, with a view to putting forward a solution that he believes will secure agreement; and/or,
 - b. invite the participants to set up a broadly representative working group, including nominees of both Governments (or of the British Government alone in the case of Strand One issues); and/or,
 - c. obtain the agreement of the participants to refer the matter to an agreed group of experts for advice, requesting a report within an agreed specified period.
31. (24) It will also be open to the participants, acting solely by agreement and only at their instigation, and subject to the provisions set out in paragraph 37 below, to refer the matter to the forum for consideration, requesting a report.
32. (25) If, after the participants have considered any further proposals arising from one or more of the courses of action set out above, there is no unanimity on a particular proposition, the Chairman may propose that negotiations proceed on the basis that the proposition has been approved by sufficient consensus, as defined in paragraph 34.
33. (26) Sufficient consensus may apply to all decisions taken in any format.
34. (27) A proposition would be deemed to have sufficient consensus when supported by participating political parties which, taken together, shall have obtained a majority of the valid votes cast in the elections held on 30 May 1996 and which between them represent a majority of both the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland respectively and which also constitute a majority of the participating political parties. With the exception of Strand One, both Governments must endorse the particular proposition for it to be deemed to have sufficient consensus.

(10)

35. (28) Where it does not prove possible to achieve either unanimity or sufficient consensus, the Chairman will work, in consultation with the participants, to remove obstacles to the reaching of agreement, or, with the agreement of the participants, may decide to move on to the next item on the agenda.
36. (28A) The negotiations will proceed on the principle that nothing will be finally agreed in any format until everything is agreed in the negotiations as a whole. Subject to this principle, it would nevertheless be possible, solely on the basis of agreement among the participants, to proceed on the assumption of contingent agreement on any individual aspect of the negotiations.

Referral to the Forum

37. (29) The negotiating teams in any format of the negotiations, by agreement and on the formal proposal of the participants in that format, may direct the relevant Chairman of the format in question to request the members of the forum, through the Secretary of State, to consider, investigate or discuss a specified subject and to submit a report on that subject to the negotiating teams within a specified period. Any such report from the forum may only be formally taken under notice by the negotiating teams if it has consensus support in the forum according to the forum's rules of procedure.

Liaison Arrangements with the Irish Government in Relation to Strand One

38. (30) The British Government, as Chairman of Strand One, will keep the Irish Government informed and will report on the status, as determined by the Strand One participants, of the Strand One negotiations.

Meetings Between the Governments and the Political Parties in Relation to Strand Three

39. (31) Negotiations on Strand Three issues will be between the two Governments. However, with a view to providing a meaningful role for the political parties, the two Governments will, during the course of their negotiations:

~~72~~ (11)

ensure regular meetings at which the political parties will be briefed and, as appropriate, consulted on progress in the negotiations, and at which they would be able to put forward their views on Strand Three issues under discussion; and,

meet the political parties at their request for further discussion of Strand Three issues.

40. (32) To this end, the two Governments will convene regular meetings involving up to three members of the negotiating team of each political party.
41. (33) In addition, in relation to Strand Three issues, each political party, acting independently or in conjunction with others, may, on its initiative or otherwise, confer with either or both Governments in order to consult on issues under discussion and advance its own views, orally or in writing. In response, each Government will explain its own views and take full account of those put to it by the parties.
42. (34) The outcome of the Strand Three issues will be considered by all the participants alongside the outcome of the other elements of the negotiations as a whole.

Records of Meetings

43. (35) Records of formal meetings will be prepared by note-takers under the general direction of the Chairman of the format within which the meeting takes place. A draft record of each formal meeting will be circulated as soon as possible to the negotiating team of each Government and political party participating in the meeting and will be subject to their approval at the next meeting of that format, or earlier if appropriate.
44. (36) The British Government will provide a team of civil servants responsible for taking the record of formal Strand One meetings. The two Governments will provide a pool of civil servants responsible for taking the record of formal meetings in other formats. The Chairman of the format in question shall appoint note-takers for each meeting from among the officials nominated by the two Governments.

DUP Amendments to Chairman's Compromise Text of 24/07/96

NEC- 4/96

(12) (★)

Rule 1 Delete the words "the negotiations referred to in Command Paper 3232 published on 16 April 1996" in lines 4 and 5.

Rule 2 Delete the words "the conduct of" in lines 3 and 4.

Rule 3 Insert "Opening" before "Plenary" in line 3.

Rule 4 Delete "Senator George Mitchell, General John de Chastelain and Prime Minister Harri Holkieri will chair the various aspects of the negotiations which require independent chairmanship as follows:

- Senator Mitchell (Plenary)." [lines 3-6]

Rule 12 Delete entire rule.

Rule 16 Replace "all aspects of" with "all subjects on" in line 2.

Rule 18 Delete the final sentence beginning "It is common ground....."

Rule 28 Insert "opening" before "Plenary" in line 2.

Rule 29 Replace "Governments" with "Government" in line 7.

NEG 596

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**A PROPOSITION FROM THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS,
25 JULY 1996**

1. It is common ground that all participants wish to see the maximum possible progress before the summer recess. The two Governments have considered how this could best be facilitated.
2. The Opening Plenary session must complete the following points:
 - (a) adoption of the rules of procedure;
 - (b) establishment of the Business Committee;
 - (c) consideration of the International Body's proposals on decommissioning, including agreement on the mechanism necessary to enable further progress to be made on decommissioning alongside negotiations in the three strands;
 - (d) discussion and adoption of the comprehensive agenda for the negotiations;
 - (e) opening statements; and
 - (f) the launch of the three-stranded negotiations in parallel with the establishment of the agreed machinery to carry forward work on decommissioning.
3. With a view to achieving the desired progress, the two Governments believe that the Opening Plenary should aim to complete its work on points (a) to (d) before the summer break.

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- 2 -

4. We welcome the independent Chairmen's decision to publish draft rules of procedure reflecting their best judgement of what is likely to prove acceptable to all delegations. We support these proposals.
5. In order to assist further progress in the negotiations, we attach a draft agenda for the remainder of the Opening Plenary for the consideration of the parties.
6. We propose that the agenda and the rules of procedure be agreed and formally adopted by the reconvened Opening Plenary on Monday 29 July.
7. We believe that it should be possible to reach agreement on the proposed rules of procedure and agenda relatively quickly. We support the proposal that the draft rules on decision making should be agreed first.
8. We would also propose, with a view to preparing the ground for next week's work in the Plenary, that the relevant participants should be invited to forward to the Chairmen of the relevant strands by 6 pm on Monday 29 July, any written additions or amendments proposed to the attached draft agendas for the three strands. (The draft agenda for Strand One issues is tabled by the British Government alone.)
9. Following ratification of the rules of procedure and the agenda for the Opening Plenary, the reconvened Plenary meeting would proceed to work through the remainder of its agenda, beginning with the establishment of the Business Committee, before moving on to consideration of the International Body's

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(LFA)

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR RESUMED OPENING PLENARY

1. Adoption of Agenda for Opening Plenary.
2. Adoption of Rules of Procedures.
3. Establishment of Business Committee.
4. Consideration of International Body's proposals on decommissioning:
 - (a) Discussion of Proposals:
 - (b) Participants' commitment to work constructively to implement all aspects of Report of International Body;
 - (c) Consideration of mechanisms necessary to enable further progress to be made on decommissioning alongside negotiations in three strands.
5. Discussion of comprehensive Agenda for negotiations.
6. Adoption of comprehensive Agenda.
7. Opening Statements.
8. Establishment of agreed machinery to carry forward work on decommissioning; launch of three-stranded negotiations.
9. Concluding remarks by Independent Chairman.

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- 3 -

proposals on decommissioning.

10. We also take the view that, before rising for the summer break, the Plenary should consider any proposals on the agendas, if necessary in sub-committee, and proceed to the adoption of the comprehensive agenda for the negotiations.

11. Following adoption of the comprehensive agenda, we would propose that the Opening Plenary should be adjourned until 9 September, and reconvene with opening statements, followed, not later than 16 September, by the launch of the negotiations in the three strands in parallel with the establishment of the agreed machinery to carry forward work on decommissioning.

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PROPOSED AGENDA FOR STRAND ONE ISSUES

1. Discussion of requirements for a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland.
2. Consideration of possible principles and criteria for new arrangements within Northern Ireland.
3. The question of institutional and other practical implications of these discussions.

Topics likely to arise include:

- The constitutional position of Northern Ireland;
- The nature of institutional arrangements for and within Northern Ireland, which meet any agreed criteria, including, nature and extent of powers eg legislative, executive, administrative; structures for exercising these powers; safeguards to maintain cross-community confidence and financial arrangements;
- The extent to which present or proposed arrangements attract the assent and support of both sides of the community and ensure equity of treatment;
- Relationships with other institutions eg Westminster Parliament, any new North/South relationships, any new Intergovernmental arrangements and the European Union;
- Consideration of arrangements for the protection of rights;
- law and order matters.

This list is not comprehensive and other issues may emerge in discussion.

4. Report to Plenary

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PROPOSED AGENDA FOR STRAND TWO ISSUES

1. Discussion of requirements for a new beginning for relationships within the island of Ireland, including fundamental aspects of the problem: underlying realities; identity; allegiance; constitutional.
2. Common interests (including matters such as economic co-operation and development, security co-operation and law enforcement co-operation) and themes.
3. The question of institutional arrangements and any other practical implications to meet agreed requirements (including principles to govern any such arrangements).
4. Relationship of such new institutional arrangements to other structures - eg: UK Government and Parliament; Irish Government and Parliament; Northern Ireland structures; Irish-UK intergovernmental structures; the European Union.
5. Measures for the guarantee and protection of rights.
6. Consequential measures needed to implement, support and underwrite such new structures.
7. Report to Plenary.

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(7A)

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR STRAND THREE ISSUES

1. Opening presentations by the two Governments.
2. Establishment of necessary mechanisms to provide a meaningful role for the political parties in respect of Strand Three issues.
3. Examination of the causes of the conflict in Northern Ireland, its impact and its implications for the two Governments.
4. Principles and criteria which should underpin new arrangements, including requirements to acknowledge and recognise the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland.
5. The question of institutional arrangements and provisions of any new agreement or structure.
6. Arrangements needed to implement, support and underwrite any new agreement or structure.
7. Constitutional issues.
8. Consideration of arrangements for the protection of rights.
9. Arrangements for the approval and implementation of a comprehensive agreement.
10. Report to Plenary.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.96)
KBH 4/11/2023

July 13, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Northern Ireland Peace Process

ing March
-10/1/11
George
Prisoners

We need to use the debacle of the past week to push hard for progress in the peace process. There are three things we need to do.

1. First, we need to be sure that John Hume participates when the Belfast talks reconvene July 16. (See my e-mail of July 12.) You should call him and sound him out on his intentions. If he is at all undecided, you should argue strongly that he should return to the talks, pointing out that he cannot be seen to be one to put an end to this process. You should also make the point that the nationalists have the high ground now and should keep it. He will probably tell you he does plan to withdraw the SDLP from the forum; I think you should urge him to reconsider doing that.

2. The British are not arguing that the Drumcree decision was a good one; merely that the alternative would have been worse. They are well aware that in the eyes of the world they crumbled before a mob and allowed the threat of force to dictate their decisions. You need to persuade them to redeem themselves with bolder efforts to get the cease-fire restored (even though HMG will fear being accused of caving first to one side and then the other). The most obvious way to do that would be a meeting between Sinn Fein and British officials at the sub-ministerial-level (Ancram's deputy Quentin Thomas). This would strengthen Adams' credibility with the IRA leadership and avoid possible misunderstandings if John Hume is in the middle of the process.

Since it would be in Adams' interest to have such a meeting become public, you would have to get his agreement to keep it quiet, assuming that is the British preference. You would also have to nail down with Adams what he should seek to accomplish in such a meeting and hold him to it. He would have to explain what he needs to take to the IRA in order to get the cease-fire restored and be prepared to agree on what form the assurances should take. The opportunity will be squandered if Adams tries

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to leverage it into an open-ended channel of communication or a separate negotiating forum.

It will not be easy to get the British to agree to this; you may want to send a letter from the President to Major or arrange a phone call. If the British are adamant about not meeting Sinn Fein, you will have to act as go-between. You should get Adams to spell out in concrete terms what he needs from the British. If what is required is a public statement reiterating that the talks will be serious, that decommissioning will not be a roadblock and that there will be some kind of timeframe, that should be do-able. If Adams adds actual confidence-building measures to the list, like concessions on prisoners, police reform, etc., that will probably sink the initiative. (It would amount to a separate negotiation.)

3. Without endorsing any particular Irish proposal, we need to urge the British to respond positively and quickly to the ideas the Irish will advance at Thursday's meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (Spring-Mayhew). They will argue for a parades commission to make the tough decisions on disputed marches, which would (and should) have input from the police and affected communities. We should urge both governments to try and make this happen *before* the next round of disputed marches (around August 10-12) rather than assuming it cannot be operational before next year.

The other Irish proposal is to impose a timetable on the talks. This probably means that the two governments would ensure that the procedural and agenda discussions would be completed before the talks adjourn at the end of this month so that substantive talks in the three strands can begin when the talks reconvene September 2. Another option to give the sense of urgency would be to have the talks continue through August, but I doubt anyone would be enthusiastic about that. You should talk to Mitchell about what kind of timetable he would like to see.

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Washington

3100 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

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(CMM)

Please fax to:

Nancy Soderberg, NSC
 Nancy Ann Peters, NS

11 JULY 1996

Paul van Son, SEA

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE, SIR PATRICK MAYHEW QC MP

The following statement was issued today by the Secretary of State,
 Sir Patrick Mayhew QC, MP:

"I entirely support the further operational decision which the Chief Constable has made, which I know was informed by a wide range of contacts and discussions, including the valuable contribution made by the four Church leaders.

"It is self-evidently right for police decisions to take account of changing and developing circumstances.

"The violence which has disfigured the Province has to stop.

"The events of the last few days have exposed how divisive the issue of marches and street parades can be in our society. There is no simple and easy way to resolve this problem. But neither can there be any question of ignoring it. The Government agrees with the Church leaders that the long-term solution and the immediate problems cannot be separated, and for its part will be considering urgently over the next few days what steps need to be taken to avoid in future years the conflict and the dangers we have witnessed this month."

Peter,

There will be no march in the area on 12th JULY

Richard

PRESSOFF/1355/MD

TOTAL P.02

Wedded to the past



The new disturbances in Ulster suggest that unionism is bankrupt

A MARCH by the Orange Order in Londonderry in 1969 provoked the sectarian rioting that first brought the deployment of British troops in Northern Ireland. This week a disputed Orange Order march sparked disturbances that could yet destroy, once and for all, current efforts to find a political solution to Ulster's troubles.

To most people outside the province, the initial confrontation between police and marchers of the exclusively Protestant Orange Order at Drumcree church, near Portadown, seems incomprehensible. How could the police's deci-

sion to reroute a march to avoid a Catholic housing estate justify such fury? Of course, the fury was unjustified—but hardly unpredictable. Unionist leaders have condemned the Protestant rioting which this year's "Siege of Drumcree" has provoked, but this is disingenuous. Disputes about the "traditional" routes of Orange Order marches, in which Protestants play martial airs to celebrate their victory over the Irish 300 years ago, have resulted in violence for more than a century.

On July 11th, the police appeared to capitulate to unionist demands. Using force and provoking great anger among lo-

cal residents, they began to clear Catholic protesters from the street to let the Orangemen march through (see page 51). Violence threatened to spread as July 12th, the climax of the five-month Protestant marching season, approached. Even if the situation deteriorates no further—and that seems unlikely—the stand-off has already brought chilling scenes. A Catholic taxi-driver murdered, apparently by loyalist terrorists. Catholic families burnt out of their homes in Belfast. Arson, riots and barricades in scores of neighbourhoods. A full-scale resumption of violence in Ulster by both loyalist and IRA terrorists now seems closer than ever.

The behaviour of senior unionist leaders at Drumcree has been shameful. Perhaps it was to be expected that Ian Paisley would try to inflame, rather than restrain, passions. For 30 years Mr Paisley has offered nothing but denunciation and demagoguery. But David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, is supposed to speak for moderate unionist opinion. If his defiance of the police and his ranting about the supposed machinations of the IRA in Portadown now pass for moderation, then Ulster is doomed to more bloodshed.

The most ominous thing of all about Drumcree is that it has confirmed the political bankruptcy of unionism. If the current crop of unionist leaders cannot achieve, or even propose, a compromise about a short stretch of road in Portadown, what chance is there that they can bring themselves, or their followers, to accept any kind of broader political compromise that would also be acceptable to moderate nationalists?

Almost as ominous as this is the unionist leaders' sheer boneheadedness. Until Drumcree, the political advantage lay with them. The IRA's return to violence had, rightly, excluded Sinn Féin from the multiparty talks which are backed by Britain, Ireland and America. Gerry Adams's carefully nurtured reputation as a peacemaker had been shredded by the IRA's bombs in England and the killing of a policeman in the Irish Republic. Support for Sinn Féin in Dublin and Washington was evaporating. The unionists seemed in control not only of the talks but of the political agenda.

Then came Drumcree. Sinn Féin propagandists could not have devised a better scenario. Mr Trimble and other unionist leaders abandoned the multiparty talks to participate in the protest. As if to confirm nationalist accusations of unionist bigotry and brutality, Orange Order leaders bellowed about the plots of "Jesuit priests" and declared that they could bring Ulster to a "standstill". Across the razorwire at Drumcree, Protestant churchgoers, those supposed champions of law and order, stood taunting the overwhelmingly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary and defied the forces of the crown to which they claim loyalty. To protest against any restriction of their right "to walk the queen's highway", unionists chose the bizarre tactic of establishing dozens of roadblocks of their own. In an eerie echo of Mr Adams, unionist leaders gave warnings of further violence which sounded more like threats than warnings.

The missing voice of moderation

To the rest of Britain, such behaviour is not only alien, but alienating. Ironically, scenes of unionists flinging petrol bombs at police and overturning cars do far more damage to Ulster's union with Britain than any number of IRA bombs. The vast majority of people elsewhere in Britain, as in the Irish Republic, are thoroughly fed up with Northern Ireland's violent tribulations and want both sides to negotiate.

Despite the IRA's bombs, nationalist leaders such as John Hume are calling for compromise and restraint. Mr Trimble was supposed to be Mr Hume's negotiating partner. But, sporting his Orange Order sashes on the front line at Drumcree, he looked less like a man ready to make history than one determined endlessly to repeat it. The British and Irish governments have little choice but to hope that the majority of unionists—who stayed peacefully at home this week, and who want a new political settlement with their nationalist neighbours—can find a voice. That has not yet happened. One wonders, given the present unionist leadership, if it ever will. Until it does, the prospect of achieving the political accommodation needed to end Ulster's agony looks remote.

law in short term, says Annesley

Sir Hugh Annesley has again defended his decision to allow Orangemen down Garvaghy Road. Gerry Moriarty reports

THE rule of law suffered a "set-back" at Drumcree, the RUC Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Annesley, has stated. But he was not prepared to risk one life at Drumcree and Garvaghy, even if the alternative was the "potential over-run of law in the short term", he added yesterday in a BBC radio interview.

Sir Hugh again denied that there was any British government pressure on him to allow the Orange parade through Garvaghy Road on Thursday.

"The allegation that there was political interference is unadulterated rubbish," he stated.

He said the RUC was within a "whisker" of an accommodation at Drumcree and Garvaghy. He did not elaborate on what that accommodation might have been.


A sufficient number of people can overrun the police in the short term, and this has been evidenced previously in race riots in London, in the burning of the British embassy in Dublin and in farmer protests in France, he said.

"If there is a rule of law it must be accepted by the Orangemen as well as everybody else, otherwise there is no long-term future for law and order in this province," he added.

"In any assessment of what may have been open to the Portadown Orange Lodge to express their protest about the (Drumcree) decision, nothing but nothing could justify bringing this province to a standstill, with the burning, the violence, the attacks on ordinary members of the public," the chief constable told BBC Radio Ulster.

"And their stance should have been condemned roundly by constitutional politicians, and the public, — they should have obeyed the rule of law."

The Orange Order should have obeyed the public notice to march back from Drumcree by a non-contentious route. "They talk frequently about being part of the United Kingdom, of fighting for the United Kingdom. If they want to do that they will have to take on board the cohesion and the support for law that exists everywhere else in the United Kingdom."



Sir Hugh Annesley: allegation of political interference "rubbish"

Sir Hugh said that there was "significant paramilitary involvement in the Ormeau Road and Garvaghy Road. The public order situation has been specifically manipulated by the Provisional IRA/Sinn Féin, and by loyalist paramilitaries."

"At the same time, I do not and would never suggest that the Garvaghy Road consists of people who are republicans and who are against the police and law and order. That is not so. There are very large numbers of decent people there who object to these marches."

"And I have to remind you of the scenes in the aftermath of an agreed solution last year. Let me

stress again there was an agreed accommodation between the Orange Lodge and the Garvaghy Road residents. Each side stuck to it honestly and in accordance with that agreement."

"When that march finally got into Portadown there were scenes of Messrs Paisley and Trimble in circumstances which the Garvaghy Road and subsequently the Ormeau Road described as triumphalist."

"And that had a significant and deep bearing on the failure of the Garvaghy Road residents to move an inch throughout this entire year."

Sir Hugh said that the 3,000 RUC officers and British troops

Hermon backs independent marches body

The former RUC chief constable, Sir John Hermon, said it was "absolutely essential" to establish an independent mechanism for deciding which marches went ahead, rather than leaving it to the RUC.

Asked on a British TV programme on Saturday about Sir Hugh Annesley's decision to let the march go through, he said:

"I think the ultimate consequence of the original decision was such that they had no alternative but to take the action of reversing that decision."

He described Portadown as "the Vatican of Orangeism".

"The ban on their (unionists) right to march, not least in that area, was total but so deep were their feelings and are their feelings that they would believe that if that was lost, they would lose everything."

He said that in a similar situation in 1986, he had allowed an Orange march to proceed. The Taoiseach of the day subsequently congratulated the RUC for the way they handled it. — (PA)

at Drumcree could not have contained the threat from the Orangemen and their supporters. "There was no issue of using live rounds. You simply do not contemplate using live rounds on a public order crowd in the United Kingdom."

"I would not have traded one life at the Garvaghy Road. If the rule of law had to be turned back in the short term, then so be it. That patch of road is not worth one human life."

A mechanism must now be put in place to avoid a Drumcree Mark III, he added. "I, and my officers, are sick to death of it. We cannot win. We are always blamed, and many of the people

who could and should have something to broker an agreement are sitting on the sidelines at me. Well I reject blame."

Asked about nationalist objections that it was always the police to confront "the rather than the Prods", Sir said he could understand if nationalist people felt up with what had ensued.

"I feel unhappy about force feels unhappy about. What happened here was a rageous attempt by one to impose their will on the other the sheer weight of force. In the short term, the RUC failed to be able to deliver the alternative," he admitted.

"In seven years, I have made a decision that was based on impartiality. We lost ground with the nationalist community. I bitterly regret I hope the people in the nationalist community will realise how hard we tried to fair liver a situation."

He did not accept that a police force had been directed against nationalist protesters against Orangemen and loyalists. The RUC had confronted Orangemen and loyalists "an terminedly and robustly them in accordance with the of law".

His officers were direct ensure the march went Garvaghy Road as "effective and peacefully as possible. People must consider that: march began to go down many petrol bombs were all in place, ready to be fired at RUC."

"We do not want confrontation. There are no winners violence."

He would not consider bringing forward his resignation. "I do regret the earlier decision, I do not regret the second decision which I regard as one of the difficult I have made. But I glad it was made with courage. I may say so myself, and will support of those around me, with the moral judgment Garvaghy Road was not worth life."

Inside
Sectarian
attacks

An Phoblacht

REPUBLICAN NEWS

50p

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Sraith Nua lml 16 Uimhr 27

Déardaoin, 4 Iúil 1996

4

IRA

Full IRA
interview
— PAGE 10/11

points to the key to a real peace

IN AN INTERVIEW in this week's *APRN*, the IRA accuses the British of being stuck in a security mindset. A spokesperson for the IRA's GHQ Staff says "the key to a real peace lies with the British and unionists looking for a political settlement to our political problems instead of being stuck in the mindset of still dealing with the conflict from a purely security point of view."

Asked about the possibility of a restoration of the IRA cessation, the spokesperson says that the British government used the 18-month cessation from August 1994 to try to defeat the republican struggle, adding, "does anyone really expect that the IRA would be prepared to allow the British government to abuse such an opportunity again?"

On board
the US
warship

5

Women's
Coalition



— REPLY

7

Euro
presidency
examined



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LEATHANACH 10

Thursday, 4 Ju

INTERVIEW WITH A MEMBER OF THE G

IRA challenges military

AP/RN: There has been continuing speculation about splits in the IRA. Are there any grounds for such speculation?

IRA: It should be realised that the main strategic objective of the British government is to defeat the republican struggle and from their point of view the ideal method would be to split the IRA. So you have to suspect ongoing reports feeding that objective. Sometimes it is fed directly into the media by British intelligence or RUC sources which the media adopt without question; sometimes it's individuals with their own axe to grind and sometimes it's just journalists making up sensationalist stories.

So to be clear, there is no question of a split within the IRA. Our Volunteers are thinking activists who have voiced and will continue to voice their individual thoughts on the political situation up the channels of command. This is sought after and welcomed. Looking for splits is a media pastime not an activist's endeavour.

AP/RN: What significance had the Manchester and Omagh bombings?

IRA: In ending the cessation in February of this year we said that it was with great reluctance that we returned to military operations. The British government in using the 18 months of cessation to try once more to defeat republicanism — instead of using that time to try to bridge the gap between opposing sides — made a return to armed struggle inevitable. The resumption is the result of a British government continually introducing new obstacles to inclusive negotiations which may have had the potential to move us all towards conflict resolution.

AP/RN: Is there no hope then of a restoration of the IRA cessation?

IRA: Well, in March of this year we repeated our "desire to see the peace process restored but that this must mean from our perspective, the establishment of a meaningful and viable process".

The fundamental reason for the breakdown of the cessation in February was the British government's abuse of this unprecedented window of opportunity to move towards conflict resolution. It wasn't just that a year-and-a-half was wasted, it was that the British government used this period to try to defeat the republican struggle after having failed to do so throughout 25 years of war.

Does anyone really expect that the IRA would be prepared to allow the British government to abuse such an opportunity again? Remember that during a year-and-a-half of peace instead of the British government introducing confidence-building measures they took a contrary stance which manifested itself in a marked deterioration in prison conditions for republican POWs in England, which continues to this day. Patrick Kelly, who is terminally ill, was refused medical attention at the same time as a British soldier who murdered a young Belfast girl was not only released after two years of a life sentence but was allowed to remain in the British army.

While Lee Clegg was being transferred to England to be closer to his family POWs in England serving life sentences were entering their third decade of imprisonment, not only with no hope of release but still being refused transfer to prisons closer to their families. Some of our prisoners have been languishing in solitary confinement

for months on end. Orange parades were being forced through nationalist areas in Ireland in such a way that nationalists were being made prisoners in their own homes.

These actions could only be seen as indicative of a British government's misuse of the peace process to achieve its own narrow party-political interests.

The key to a real peace lies with the British and unionists looking for a political settlement to our political problems instead of being stuck as they appear to be in the mindset of still dealing with the conflict from a purely security point of view. Let them honestly address the problem as a political one and not as a security one.

But yes, there is always hope. There needs to be a

It wasn't just that a year-and-a-half was wasted, it was that the British government used this period to try to defeat the republican struggle after having failed to do so throughout 25 years of war.

Does anyone really expect that the IRA would be prepared to allow the British government to abuse such an opportunity again?

good-faith engagement involving real all-party negotiations with no preconditions and no predetermined outcome. All-party negotiations cannot be allowed to become a decommissioning conference. Negotiations need to deal with the fundamentals of the conflict. Blocks on that must need to be removed. A time frame is essential. A time frame for negotiations is now a well tried and tested method of introducing momentum into any peace process. It also prevents any single party from running negotiations into the sand. Everything including constitutional change has to be on the table. There needs to be confidence-building measures and not confidence-wrecking measures as witnessed during the '94 cessation.

AP/RN: Can the gap of mistrust between the British government and the IRA be bridged since you have diametrically opposing political positions?

IRA: I think there are issues raised in your question which need to be separated.



July 1996

LEATHANACH 11

GHQ STAFF OF OGLAIGH NA HÉIREANN

British to end mindset

Firstly, distrust between enemies and opponents is normal. I would say that all political parties distrust each other to different degrees. This includes the two governments and is quite well demonstrated at the moment between the two main unionist parties. Trust in that sense only comes during negotiations.

It is of course true that the British government and the IRA are diametrically opposed. The British government holds on to a part of Ireland which they took by force and keep through military occupation. They never asked the Irish people for a political mandate to be here and their primary objective is to maintain the union.

The IRA derives its mandate from the British government's denial of the fundamental right of the Irish people to national self-determination and sovereignty. Our primary objective is a united Ireland, independent and free. We remain fully committed to our goals.

The distrust between opposing sides is therefore massive. However, the issue at stake is really one of integrity. Even enemies can act with integrity and good faith with each other. In August '94 the IRA announced a complete cessation of military operations on the specific understanding, publicly given, that all-party negotiations would start within three months of an IRA cessation.

The IRA declared a cessation which lasted an unprecedented year and a half. The British government did not act with integrity. It reneged on its commitments and as result all-party negotiations did not begin. We took our responsibilities seriously and enhanced dramatically, we believe, the potential for conflict resolution and

The key to a real peace lies with the British and unionists looking for a political settlement to our political problems instead of being stuck as they appear to be in the mindset of still dealing with the conflict from a purely security point of view. Let them honestly address the problem as a political one and not as a security one

the chances for a just and lasting peace. We remain prepared to do so again if the circumstances are right.

But the British government must take its responsibilities in this situation seriously. Let John Major be unequivocal in removing the obstacles placed by his

government to meaningful all-party negotiations. If he is committed to talks being meaningful let him demonstrate that commitment. Let us see evidence of a new approach to enable real negotiations.

For John Major to state that a restoration of the '94 cessation is now not enough or for John Wheeler to demand surrender by decommissioning within weeks only creates further problems and increases the logjam.

AP/RN: What is your view of the talks at Stormont?

IRA: To me the Stormont talks are very reminiscent of the failed forums, conventions and assemblies of the past in which republicans were not involved. They are obviously not all-party negotiations since 15.5% of the electorate have been excluded and therefore cannot bring about the resolution of the conflict. There is much talk of a summer recess which puts it all on the long finger yet again. The question in the public mind must be are we facing into another sterile round of talks about talks about talks?

AP/RN: What is your view of John Bruton in light of his recent remarks about the IRA especially in the aftermath of the Adare shooting?

IRA: Well, first let me repeat our regret for what happened in Limerick. It was wrong and was damaging to our struggle. More importantly it was a great tragedy for the grieving relatives involved.

John Bruton is clearly coming at the present situation from a different perspective than republicans. The search for a just and lasting peace presents all of us with great difficulties and challenges but everyone must try to overcome these difficulties. This is especially so for those in political leadership and particularly for the two governments.

AP/RN: The Dublin government was very critical of arms finds in Leale and elsewhere. Do you have a comment?

IRA: Put simply, any army while it exists sees it as its duty to be prepared. The cessation ended in February of this year — that's nearly five months ago. I should point out that the British have not only maintained their military machine, but continually reinforced it over the full period of the cessation. There was a massive military building programme which continues as we speak.


Loyalists also targeted nationalists over the last 22 months and in the last number of weeks there have been orchestrated attacks by loyalist paramilitaries on individual Catholics and on housing estates in Belfast and elsewhere.

The job facing us in knowing all this is to concentrate on the search for a true resolution of the conflict.

AP/RN: Are you optimistic or pessimistic for the future?

IRA: I don't think it comes into it. We've spoken about building trust and integrity and that's a two-way street. We have an historical problem. In our opinion it is not an intractable one.

Armed struggle is there in the absence of a viable democratic alternative route to national democracy in Ireland. The challenge to all the parties involved is to find a way to a lasting peace with justice in Ireland. We remain prepared to rise to that challenge.





10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 September 1996

Dear Tony,

... I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has just sent to John Hume, covering a text setting out our approach to the multi-party negotiations. We would aim to publish this text early next week, probably in the form of a press article under the name of the Prime Minister. I have made clear to John Hume, in sending him the text, that the terms of it are not up for negotiation. It represents what we propose to say, no more no less.

It would be helpful if, in any contacts you have with those concerned, you could underline that this is a reasonable statement of British policy and that more cannot be expected. It is now for John Hume and those to whom he has been talking to deliver on what they said.

Yours ever
John

JOHN HOLMES

The Hon. Anthony Lake



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 September 1996

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'John Major'.

Thank you for your letter of 8 August and the text which you faxed on 6 September.

The IRA's position, as you describe it, is that if we were ready to make this statement, and the IRA knew when we were going to make it, they would respond shortly afterwards, at a time specified in advance, with an unequivocal restoration of the August 1994 "total cessation".

When I wrote to you on 24 July, I said that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without any further prevarication. But, in response to the suggestion that reassurances from the British Government on certain issues in line with its established public policy would help to bring this about, I set out words which could be used.

Now they have returned with one significant issue - the timeframe - which is simply not under our control, and an altogether longer text covering a host of other issues. Meanwhile, continued preparation for further IRA attacks goes on, as the arrests and arms finds on Monday demonstrate all too clearly. Intimidation and so-called punishment attacks also continue to increase in

- 2 -

number and brutality. As I have already said publicly, Sinn Fein's talk of peace can have little credibility against this background.

It remains the case that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without further ado and without the need for further statements. The Government is certainly not in the business of negotiating a restoration of the IRA ceasefire, nor in giving secret assurances to bring it about. Sinn Fein must understand that we mean in private what we say in public.

Nevertheless, if there is genuine doubt or uncertainty over the Government's policy, I am happy to look at that. Because I am in no doubt of the benefits, for the people of Northern Ireland and the negotiations, of a genuine and unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, we will repeat and reaffirm our approach on the key issues. The attached text has been prepared for this purpose, and will be published in the near future.

Yours Faithfully
John H.

John Hume, Esq., M.P.

Text.png

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if the Government considered that there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate in the negotiations. We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground. Beyond that, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering

- 2 -

the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage, we, along with the Irish Government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report. This includes its compromise approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of negotiations. We want to make urgent progress in this area so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a precondition to further progress, but is used to build confidence one step at a time during the negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. No

- 3 -

party has an undemocratic advantage. The negotiations will operate on the basis of consensus, requiring at least the support of parties representing a majority of both the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. But no one party can prevent them continuing by withdrawing from the negotiations.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding, so far as we can, our responsibility to facilitate agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have its difficulties. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

- 4 -

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. We are committed to increasing community identification with policing in Northern Ireland.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force redeployments, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally and benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all paramilitary violence. That is our aim too.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

DUTY CLERKS' OFFICE
FAX NO 0171- 839- 9044

FAX TO: *Tony Lake*

.....

.....

FROM: *John Holmes*

TO :

DATE OF DOC : *24/7*

TITLE : *Discussions with John Home*

CLASS :

Confidential / Restricted / U/C

DATE FAXED : *24/7*

TIME : *19.40 (UK)*

NO of PAGES : *4*

MESSAGE :



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 July 1996

Dear Tony,

Following further discussions with John Hume, you may be interested to see the attached further letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Hume. As before, I would be grateful if knowledge of this could be restricted as far as possible. Publicity at this stage can only be damaging.

Yours ever

John

JOHN HOLMES

The Hon. Anthony Lake



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

24 July 1996

THE PRIME MINISTER

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D Lloyd George'.

Since my letter to you of 8 July, you have given further accounts of Sinn Fein's position about a renewed IRA ceasefire and all-party negotiations. It is obviously vital that there is no misunderstanding on these issues.

You have presented Sinn Fein's position as follows:

(i) Sinn Fein would like to know from the British Government:

- that the negotiations will be serious and comprehensive;
- that decommissioning will be tackled in parallel with the negotiations; and
- that the British Government will do all in its power to promote confidence-building during the talks.

(ii) If Sinn Fein were told in advance that the Government would repeat publicly their position on these points, they would undertake (before such a public statement was made) that the IRA would respond to the statement by declaring a genuine and unequivocal ceasefire. Such a ceasefire would be for good this time.

- 2 -


- (iii) Once allowed to enter the negotiations following the establishment of such a ceasefire, Sinn Fein would affirm their total and absolute commitment to the Mitchell principles, as the other participants have done.

The truth is that Sinn Fein and the IRA should restore their ceasefire without any further prevarication. There is no possible justification for continued violence. And I have to say that I remain sceptical, given all the other evidence of continued preparation for further attacks, including the recent arrests in London, that more words from us can make a crucial difference.

However, if your presentation of Sinn Fein's position is correct, what Sinn Fein wants to know from the Government is no more than the Government has said publicly already. I attach words which could be used if we were convinced that this would make a material difference to the prospects of a new ceasefire.

We have also been told that Sinn Fein wants a meeting with British officials. There is of course no question of any Ministerial meeting with Sinn Fein in the absence of an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire. If Sinn Fein believe a meeting with British officials for the purpose of confirming and explaining the position you have set out to us is needed, we would be prepared to consider such a request in the light of all the circumstances including, crucially, events on the ground.

John Hume Esq MP

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'John Hume', with a long horizontal line extending from the bottom right.

The negotiations which started on 10 June are to secure an overall political settlement and will address all the issues relevant to that. Any participant can raise any issue. No outcome is predetermined or excluded in advance. The Government cannot answer for any other participant but, for its part, along with that of the Irish Government, it is committed to ensure that a comprehensive agenda is addressed with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise. The Government is determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible;

The negotiations will also address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning. At that stage, the Government, along with the Irish Government, will be seeking the commitment of all participants to work constructively to implement all aspects of the International Body's report, including its proposals for some decommissioning during the negotiations. The Government wishes to make urgent progress in this area, so that the negotiations on political issues can proceed in parallel with decommissioning;

We are committed to raising confidence through the Talks process. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building and we are committed to this as to all aspects of the report. Confidence-building is a two-way street. Against the background of the recent serious setback to confidence we hope that all parties will play their part in making it possible for future marches and parades to be handled without confrontation.

DAILY/DEFERRED INTERNATIONAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW

SIT: NODIST

wt

<PREC> DAILY/DEFERRED<CLAS> INTERNATIONAL <DTG>

FM Reuter

a0780

^BC-IRISH-TEXT

^Text of IRA statement calling for calm

DUBLIN, July 13 (Reuter) - Following is the text of a statement issued by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) guerrilla group to its supporters on Saturday (approximately 200 words):

''Hoglaigh Na Heireann (The IRA) applauds the resilience and strength of nationalists in areas under virtual siege from the combined forces of this Orange statelet.

''Whilst sharing the deep resentment and anger felt in the face of this mass intimidation and violence, we appeal for calm and for people to desist from actions which add to the litany of hardships piled on top of our beleaguered communities.

''We make this appeal knowing that the state forces are deliberately provoking the righteous anger of nationalist youth.

''As communities we know our own strength built up over decades of trouble. Let us use those strengths with confidence to move forward towards our goals.

''For our part we assure nationalist areas that this is not 1969 and neither the loyalist hordes or state forces will be permitted to overrun or burn down nationalist housing estates.''

(Ends text)

It was signed P O'Neill of the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin, the name often used on IRA statements.

^REUTER

<MSGID> R0024496

INTERNATIONAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG *NS*

SUBJECT: Call to Adams

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4.97)
KBH 7/11/2023

The purpose of your call is to:

1. Clarify exactly what Adams needs from the British in order to obtain a cease-fire.
2. Discuss with Adams what steps the U.S. might take that could be helpful (statement etc.)
3. Urge him to engage constructively in parade issue.

Below are the discrepancies on what Adams needs:

Adams' points to TL:

1. Issue of decommissioning resolved as part of other issues, not as a precondition.
2. Real, substantive talks.
3. Confidence building measures such as prisoners, etc.
4. Clear statement that he can get the cease-fire restored if he gets all three points.

Adams' letter to Major (attached):

1. Removal of reluctance of the British to move to all party negotiations.
2. Removal of precondition of decommissioning.
3. British assurances that these obstacles will not be resurrected.
4. Direct dialogue with Sinn Fein.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 7/19/06

Major response to Hume:

1. SF must show good faith on decommissioning.
2. Convince British IRA cease-fire will be real next time.
3. Commit to Mitchell principles.
4. Accept outcome of talks.
5. Rejection of a meeting at this time (points to Feb. 26 official meeting when SF only asked for a firm date).
6. Agreement to review future requests for meetings.

Hume's points to NES:

1. Talks are deadly serious, comprehensive, inclusive, etc.
2. Something about a time frame, i.e. "determined to get an agreement asap."
3. Decommissioning not as a precondition.

MAP argues that we should urge Adams not to raise confidence building measures at this stage as the British would interpret them as trying to negotiate entry into the talks. Below are suggested talking points. Note: he may not know we have seen his letter to Major. Holmes sent it to us.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points

Tab B Hume/Adams Initiative cable

Points for Call to Adams

- Had a good trip to Asia. Sorry to hear about all the problems last week.
 - Nancy has filled me in on your conversations of last week and I think I have a very good idea of the deep anger that exists.
 - Want to talk today about how we move forward, not about last week.
 - First, important that the parades in August go smoothly. Understand discussions ongoing. Simply have to ensure there is prior agreement on how to handle.
 - Second, important to move forward on your effort to get cease-fire restored. [If asked: we, the British and Irish won't drop that demand]
 - Third, believe there is some confusion on exactly what you need in order to convince IRA to restore cease-fire. Your letter was vague and John Hume phrased his presentation slightly differently.
 - Want to clarify:
 - 1) Talks need to be substantive and address the key issues. I believe once Mitchell succeeds in setting the agenda and procedures, that should be clear. What else do you need? Statements from US? British?
 - 2) Assurances that decommissioning will not be or resurface as a precondition. Again, believe Mitchell's efforts should provide comfort in that area. What else do you need?
- [Direct dialogue, CBM's -- I'd not raise unless he does]
- Understand Mitchell had some difficult talks this week but the process continues.
 - Best approach is to get Mitchell's work done so the substantive talks can begin in September.
 - How can we be helpful in working your proposal with the British?
 - I understand they have responded to your letter. What is the next step? [Adams and NES discussed earlier whether Mitchell could help]

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: Kessinger, Jodi
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Number 10 message ~~SECRET~~
Date: Friday, July 19, 1996 12:23PM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BAKERJ, HARMON, LAKEA, SUM, SUM2, BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMONPTR, LAKE,
SENS, SIT{C2}, SODERBERG, HOTLINE_IN, PETERS, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:092100Z JUL 96

FM: CABINET OFFICE

TO:
WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.99)
KBH 7/11/2023

////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABO CHANNELS
QQQQ
TO MS NANCY SODERBERG
TEXT
BT

FROM THE PRIVATE SECRETARY 9 JULY 1996

DEAR NANCY,

HUME/ADAMS INITIATIVE

WE HAVE SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT THE APPROACH TO THE PRIME MINISTER LAST WEEK BY JOHN HUME. YOU MAY FIND HELPFUL A FEW MORE DETAILS. AS YOU KNOW, MR. HUME TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT, ON THE BASIS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GERRY ADAMS, IF WE COULD MAKE A FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENT - TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SERIOUS, COMPREHENSIVE AND INCLUSIVE, THAT IN OUR VIEW SOME DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD TAKE PLACE DURING NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN AS A PRECONDITION, AND THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO LOOK AT OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES - THE IRA WOULD BE READY TO DECLARE AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE. THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER SUGGESTIONS THAT SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO LIKE SOME KIND OF TIMEFRAME FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.

... JOHN HUME ALSO GAVE THE PRIME MINISTER THE ATTACHED LETTER FROM GERRY ADAMS WHICH, AS YOU WILL SEE, FOCUSES MORE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

... THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW SENT THE ENCLOSED LETTER TO JOHN HUME TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR.

YOURS EVER,

JOHN HOLMES

MS NANCY SODERBERG

JOHN MAJOR, MP
PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON
26/6/96

A CHARA,

I AM WRITING DIRECTLY TO YOU IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE WHETHER WE CAN COLLECTIVELY IDENTIFY A MEANS TO SALVAGE THE PEACE PROCESS.

I HAVE SAID A NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE RECENT PAST THAT I BELIEVE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT A LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT STILL EXISTS. CLEARLY HOWEVER THIS OPPORTUNITY IS DIMINISHING AND THE SLIDE BACK TO CONFLICT QUICKENS.

RECENT EVENTS HAVE CAUSED ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES FOR ALL OF US. DESPITE THIS I AM CONVINCED THAT WE CAN DEVISE A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE WHICH PRESENTLY EXISTS BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I BELIEVE WE CAN SALVAGE THE PEACE PROCESS BEFORE IT IS TERMINALLY DAMAGED.

RECENT IRA ATTACKS IN ENGLAND HAVE CREATED GRAVE DIFFICULTIES FOR YOU. I DO NOT ATTEMPT TO MINIMISE THESE BUT THIS IS THE REALITY WHICH OBTAINS AT THIS TIME. THIS IS NOT TO EXCUSE OR JUSTIFY THESE ATTACKS. THEY ARE CLEARLY A SYMPTOM OF A DEEPER PROBLEM. THE SINN FEIN PEACE STRATEGY IS ABOUT RESOLVING ALL THIS AND BRINGING ARMED STRUGGLE, FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, TO AN END. THIS IS THE OBJECTIVE WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING.

MANY PEOPLE WITHIN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE SCEPTICAL ABOUT SINN FEIN'S SINCERITY ON THIS. BUT FOR THE PAST 9 YEARS THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE GUN PERMANENTLY FROM IRISH POLITICS. IN SHORT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DEVELOP A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO CONFLICT AND, WHILE DOING SO, TO BRING A POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY WITH US.

A SLOW AND PAINSTAKING PROCESS OF DIALOGUE WITHIN NATIONALIST IRELAND AND IRISH AMERICA, COUPLED WITH THE ASSURANCES WHICH YOU AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT GAVE THAT INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOLLOW AN IRA CESSATION, ALLOWED US TO CONVINCE THE IRA LEADERSHIP THAT THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT FOR A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THIS LED TO THE IRA CESSATION IN AUGUST 1994. WHILE YOU MAY NOT AGREE WITH THE REPUBLICAN OR NATIONALIST VIEW OF YOUR STEWARDSHIP OF THE PROCESS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU TRY TO SEE THIS FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE IF YOU ARE TO GET AN INSIGHT INTO THE REASONS FOR THE DEEPENING OF DISTRUST OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUENCY AND THE SUBSEQUENT END OF THE CESSATION.

ONCE THE IRA ANNOUNCED THEIR CESSATION, THE PEACE PROCESS WENT INTO STAGNATION, PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RELUCTANCE TO MOVE, WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD, INTO ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS AND YOUR INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW PRECONDITION OF DECOMMISSIONING. AT THE VERY TIME WHEN IT WAS MOST NECESSARY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN THE EFFICACY OF PEACEFUL POLITICS, CONFIDENCE WAS BEING STEADILY ERODED. THIS HAS IN TURN MADE THE TASK OF THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP MUCH MORE DIFFICULT IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE A COLLAPSED PEACE PROCESS.

*remove reluctance
of Brits to move to
all party negot.
Remove precondition
of decommissioning*

FROM MY CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE IRA IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY VIEW THE STANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AS THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE TO A RESTORATION OF THEIR CESSATION. IT IS THEIR VIEW (AND

ONE WHICH IS SHARED BY MANY OTHERS) THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT ACTED IN BAD FAITH, ATTEMPTING TO USE THE IRA CESSATION AS A MEANS OF DEFEATING THE IRA. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE DEMAND FOR DECOMMISSIONING IN ADVANCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS VIEWED.

IF WE ARE TO MOVE FORWARD IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THESE OBSTACLES BECAUSE THIS IS HOW THEY ARE VIEWED, ARE NOT RESURRECTED AND THAT ASSURANCES TO THAT EFFECT ARE PROVIDED. HOW THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION.

*Not government
obstacles
provide assurances.*

THE MEETINGS BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE NOT HAD THE REQUIRED EFFECT OF MOVING TOWARDS AN AGREED SETTLEMENT OR IN GENERATING CONFIDENCE IN THE COMMITMENT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO THE SEARCH FOR AN INCLUSIVE, NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENT.

IF THE PRESENT TALKS UNDERWAY AT STORMONT ARE THE BEGINNING OF A SERIOUS EFFORT, ON YOUR PART, TO MOVE TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT, THEN YOU CLEARLY HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO CONVINCE THOSE WHO ARE SCEPTICAL OF YOUR INTENTIONS THAT THEIR SUSPICIONS ARE ILL-FOUNDED.

THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF CONVINCING IRISH REPUBLICANS OF YOUR GOOD INTENTIONS IS THROUGH DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. SUCH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD ADDRESS AND POSSIBLY OVERCOME THE DEEP SUSPICION AND DISTRUST WHICH EXISTS ON THE PART OF IRISH REPUBLICANS AND WHICH I AM IN NO DOUBT EXISTS ON YOUR SIDE ALSO.

*Direct dialogue
Q SF*

WITH POLITICAL WILL I AM SURE THAT AN AGREED MEANS TO BRING THIS ABOUT CAN BE ACHIEVED.

THIS IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SINN FEIN'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO BE AT THE STORMONT TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THE MANDATE WE RECEIVED ON MAY 30. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ASSERT THIS RIGHT.

I WOULD URGE YOU TO GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR URGENT CONSIDERATION AND I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE.

IS MISE LE MEAS

GERRY ADAMS

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER
IN CONFIDENCE
DEAR JOHN,

WHEN WE MET ON 2 JULY, I SAID I WOULD CONSIDER WHAT YOU HAD SAID, TOGETHER WITH THE LETTER FROM MR. ADAMS OF 26 JUNE WHICH YOU GAVE ME.

THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, SHARED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, HAS OFTEN BEEN SET OUT IN PUBLIC. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT IT.

WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE COMPREHENSIVE AND INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNDER WAY IN BELFAST SINCE 10 JUNE. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO SECURE AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND WILL ADDRESS ALL THE ISSUES RELEVANT TO THAT. AS YOU KNOW, ANY PARTICIPANT CAN RAISE ANY ISSUE. NO OUTCOME IS PRE-DETERMINED OR EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE, OR LIMITED BY ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT. BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE CLEAR, IN

THE GROUND RULES AND ELSEWHERE, THEIR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA IS ADDRESSED WITH A VIEW TO OVERCOMING ANY OBSTACLES WHICH MAY ARISE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH SUCCESSFULLY, AS SPEEDILY AS WE CAN.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE, WITH OR WITHOUT SINN FEIN. THE REQUIREMENT FOR SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION REMAINS AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE. OBVIOUSLY IRA ATTACKS MAKE IT PROGRESSIVELY HARDER TO CONVINCE THE GOVERNMENT, AND OTHERS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE WILL BE GENUINE AND UNEQUIVOCAL.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO ADDRESS THE INTERNATIONAL BODIES PROPOSALS ON DECOMMISSIONING. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL APPROACH THIS ON THE BASIS OF SECURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODIES REPORT, INCLUDING ITS PROPOSAL FOR SOME DECOMMISSIONING DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, IN A PROCESS WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES NEITHER VICTORY NOR DEFEAT. IF SINN FEIN WISH TO JOIN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS FOR SINN FEIN AND THE IRA TO CONSIDER HOW THEY CAN NOW DEMONSTRATE CONVINCINGLY, THROUGH THEIR WORDS AND ACTIONS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE IS GENUINE AND UNEQUIVOCAL AND NOT MERELY A FURTHER TACTICAL DEVICE. IN THE LIGHT OF THE MANCHESTER BOMB AND OTHER ATTACKS, IT IS FOR THEM TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR GOOD FAITH.

Good faith in decommissioning

WILL THE IRA TREAT ANY CEASEFIRE THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE AND ABANDON IT WITHOUT WARNING WHENEVER THEY WANT TO? IS THE IRA READY TO BRING TO AN END THE VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH PERSISTED THROUGHOUT THE CEASEFIRE AND HAVE CONTINUED SINCE? HOW, SINCE THERE IS NOW INEVITABLY SUCH GRAVE MISTRUST OF THE IRAS INTENTIONS, DO THEY PROPOSE TO CONVINCE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND THAT THEIR WORD SHOULD NOW BE RELIED ON?

Consider Bits of IRA ceasefire for real

WILL SINN FEIN, IF THEY ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS, MAKE A TOTAL AND ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE, AS ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY DONE? DO SINN FEIN ACCEPT THAT THE OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE FREELY AGREED BY THE PARTICIPANTS, WITH NO OUTCOME PRE-DETERMINED OR EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE? DO SINN FEIN ACCEPT THE NEED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS THE MITCHELL PROPOSALS ON DECOMMISSIONING? IF SO, WILL SINN FEIN BE ABLE AT THAT STAGE TO SHOW THEIR INTENT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO SECURE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODIES REPORT?

Mitchell principles accept not come

THESE ARE QUESTIONS SINN FEIN NEED TO CONSIDER IF THEY GENUINELY WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. IF IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED CONVINCINGLY THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA GENUINELY WANT TO TAKE FORWARD THEIR OBJECTIVES BY EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS, THAT WOULD BE GREATLY IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND MORE WIDELY, AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.

I AM ALWAYS HAPPY TO SEE YOU ON ANY MATTER TO DO WITH NORTHERN IRELAND. AS FOR MINISTERIAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, THAT REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY PURPOSE OR JUSTIFICATION IN A MEETING WITH OFFICIALS SUCH AS OCCURRED ON 26 FEBRUARY WHEN, IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED, SINN FEIN WANTED ONLY A FIRM DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. ANY REQUEST FOR A SIMILAR MEETING WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THE BASIS OF THE CASE MADE FOR IT AND IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING, CRUCIALLY, EVENTS ON THE GROUND.

YOURS SINCERELY,

Consider requests

*Manahan -
Parliament*

*cc Nancy Suderberg
ASC*

Post-it Fax Note 7671		Date 15 July	# of pages 11
To	P.O. BOX 26024		From P. WESTERST
Co./Dept.			Co.
Phone #			Phone # 588 6832
Fax # 456 9460			Fax # 588 7851

STATEMENT: 15 JULY 1996

With permission, Madam Speaker, I will make a statement about the events of the past 10 days in Northern Ireland.

Throughout this period massive and completely unacceptable civil disorder has occurred, on both sides of the community, totally wrongful in character and unjust in its consequences for all its victims.

In the course of this period two men have tragically lost their lives.

The RUC have been stretched to the limit of their ability to maintain order and preserve life.

Violent manifestations of sectarian antagonism have occurred.

Intimidation, including intimidation of RUC officers and their families, has been rife. The Killyhevlin Hotel at Enniskillen has been gravely damaged by a bomb, with many people shocked and injured.

SENT BY: BRITISH EMBASSY, 7-15-98 2:24PM; 2028984455 => 202 438 9480, #2

All this represents, without doubt, the worst set-back for many years: a return towards what so many people in Northern Ireland, and far beyond, had prayed was over for good. This has been a black period for Northern Ireland, with deep fears and anxieties generated on all sides. Trust and confidence have suffered greatly.

In this statement I will examine briefly with the House what has happened, and what the way forward from here now should be.

At the outset, however, I wish to say three things.

First, I warmly commend, as I think the whole House will, the maintenance by the Loyalist paramilitary organisations of their ceasefire. It is of critical importance that this should be sustained.

Secondly, if the people of Northern Ireland are to be helped to move back from the abyss, and move forward to a better future, then all of us who claim a right to speak on these matters must seek to be

SENT BY: BRITISH EMBASSY, 7-15-96 2:25PM; 2028984455 202 430 3400;
objective and fair. To seize on what is no more than a partisan perception, and to proclaim it as an established truth without examination, is immensely dangerous and damaging.

Lastly, I want to say that the scene, grave though it undoubtedly is, does have a crucially positive element.

We have in place a democratic process of political talks, for which a large majority of the electorate has voted. I shall return to this, and to its paramount importance.

Sir Hugh Annesley, the Chief Constable, yesterday gave an extensive interview to the BBC. He described the background to these events, and the events themselves. I have placed a transcript of that interview in the library. I commend it strongly to the House. It sets out the facts.

Unprecedented efforts had been made by the Government, by Church Leaders, by the RUC, and by others, to secure an accommodation at Portadown.

The Chief Constable makes it clear that ever since January he personally, and his Deputy Chief Constable Mr Flannigan, had tried with both sides at Portadown to negotiate a compromise.

I pay special tribute to the entirely independent efforts of the Church Leaders, who strove for two days and two nights to bring the two sides together, sadly without achieving success.

The Chief Constable is required by law to consider the likelihood of serious disorder if a notified march proceeds.

He has to make an operational, professional and impartial judgement.

That judgement, under our clearly established constitutional arrangements, is for him alone.

On Thursday 6 July the Chief Constable had duly decided to order that the return stage of the Orange Order Parade at Portadown, to take place the following day, should be re-routed away from the Garvaghy Road.

SENT BY: BRITISH EMBASSY, 7-15-96 2:25PM; 2028984455 => 202 430 9400, #3

A lawful order was accordingly made to that effect. That decision was made because he anticipated serious organised disorder, not limited to Portadown protesters, if the intended return stage of the march went ahead. A counter march planned by the Garvaghy Road residents also had restrictions placed upon it, though, in the event, it did not take place.

I wish to make it clear that in taking that operational decision at that time and in those circumstances the Chief Constable had, and retains, the full support of the Government.

Over the next four days there occurred serious disorder both at Drumcree and in many other parts of the Province. There was a clear and reprehensible intention to over-stretch the capacity of the RUC to maintain public order.

At Drumcree itself the Chief Constable has said, in his own language, that the most insidious, despicable and disgusting threats to his officers in the front line were made, to the effect that their wives or families would be got at. Elsewhere the RUC were

SENT BY: BRITISH EMBASSY, 7-15-96 2:26PM; 2028984455 => 202 436 9460, #7711

He has made clear that it was foreseeable that by the night of the 11 July some 60,000 to 70,000 Orange Marchers would be invited by the Orange Order to converge on Drumcree. And an attempt had already been made to get through the fence.

In that event he foresaw that they would overrun the wire, obliging the police and the military to withdraw and to attempt to protect the Garvaghy Road Estate.

He concluded that there would be serious risk of lives being lost, including on the Garvaghy Estate, and he has said that he would not in any circumstances have "traded one life for the Garvaghy Road".

In that decision also the Chief Constable has the full support of the Government. We also share his regret at what the Chief Constable has described as "an outrageous attempt by one side to impose their will on the other by the sheer weight of force."

I recognise, of course, that the nationalist community, or many of them, are bitterly critical of this decision. But it was taken very much with the safety of the Garvaghy Road residents in mind.

I am in no doubt, however, that under the circumstances, it was the right one. The violence which followed in many nationalist areas was no more justified or acceptable than that formented by loyalists earlier in the week.

Once again, the Security Forces came under intense attack, from gun fire as well as petrol bombs and other missiles.

The police have responded proportionately and with great courage and professionalism to these attacks.

The police investigation into the bomb attack on the killyhevlin Hotel is now underway.

While it is too early to say which organisation was responsible, it seems clear that preparations for this attack began well before the events of Drumcree.

These events surrounding Drumcree, and those surrounding the march on the Lower Ormeau Road in Belfast on the 12 July, have underscored the potential destabilising effect of controversial parades. There are no immediately obvious answers. "My Rt Hon Friend the Minister of State the Member for Westminster North has over many months been seeking to help the avoidance of conflict in this year's Marching Season. As I said in the House last week I now have in mind a general review that will make recommendations about the better management of future controversial parades.

I therefore confirm today that the Government intends to establish a review based on evidence which any interested party will be free to submit. I envisage that the review would examine the current arrangements for handling parades and marches in Northern Ireland.

I shall announce later further details of the review including the name of the Chairman and detailed terms of reference.

Recent events are however but a symptom of the much deeper divisions which plague Northern Ireland. We must, along with all politicians committed to a peaceful solution, continue to seek to overcome those.

This can only be done in a Talks process in which all these issues can be addressed, and which is committed to securing an agreed outcome which respects the aspirations and principles of both parts of the community. I referred earlier to the democratic process of Talks which is in place. It is now more imperative than ever that it begins to address the substantive issues that lie at the heart of the divisions which have had such terrible consequences. I am pleased that this process continues tomorrow.

For our part the Government is fully committed to the Talks process. I and the Prime Minister will be meeting with the leaders of each of the parties involved over the coming days to hear their views of the way forward, and to emphasise our commitment to the Talks process.

I shall also be making arrangements in consultation with the Irish Government to meet them in an Intergovernmental Conference to discuss the mutual security interests between our two countries and to demonstrate the reasons behind the decisions taken last week. We

intend on this basis to rebut very firmly quite unjustified and unwarranted criticism which has been made of the Government and of the RUC. In particular my purpose will be in the presence of the Chief Constable to rebut any suggestion of political interference in his operational decisions.

Madam Speaker, All those who wish to lead Northern Ireland towards a more peaceful future, and they certainly include the Government, must now work together to re-establish trust and dialogue.

None of us can accept a return to the violence of the last 25 years. All of us have a responsibility to do what we can to avoid that, and to demonstrate beyond all doubt that it is truly possible to find political and peaceful means of resolving Northern Ireland's profound problems. That is the challenge that confronts us now.

Office of the Independent Chairmen

Castle Buildings, Stormont, Belfast BT4 3SG
Tel. (01232) 522957, Fax (01232) 768905

FAX MESSAGE

Date: 17 July 1996

No of pages (including cover page): 2

To: Nancy Soderberg
NSC

Fax No: 202 456-9460

From: Kelly Currie

Telephone No: (01232) 522 950

FYI - Please call with any
questions.

To R
Brophy
Denver

fyi.

Bill, can you get to
Members + staff on hill.

m

General John de Chastelain

Senator George J. Mitchell

Prime Minister Harri Holkeri

Office of the Independent Chairmen

Castle Buildings, Stormont, Belfast BT4 3SG

Tel. (01232) 522957, Fax (01232) 768905

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

16 JULY 1996

STATEMENT BY SENATOR GEORGE J. MITCHELL, GENERAL JOHN de CHASTELAIN AND PRIME MINISTER HARRI HOLKERI

We express our regret over the circumstances of the past week which have seen such violence, destruction and fear return to Northern Ireland. In particular, we voice our concern and condolences to those who have suffered loss as a result of these events.

We restate our strong and unequivocal condemnation of the use or the threat of violence to achieve political objectives.

We recognize the extreme difficulties of the talks now underway, especially in the current climate. But we are convinced that progress is possible. In any event, the talks represent the only acceptable alternative. An end to the talks could condemn the people of Northern Ireland to a renewal of widespread sectarian violence.

We have consulted with the participants. There was a clear consensus among them to continue with the talks and to do so with a sense of urgency and increased determination. We will do all we can to further that objective. We remain convinced that the solution to the problems so evident during the past week lies in dialogue and in the resolution of differences around the negotiating table.


END

For more information, contact: Kelly Currie (01232) 522950 or (01232) 327000 Rm. 723

NEWS FROM THE House International Relations Committee

Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman

*To R
S Brophy -
So much for
my talking
him out of it.
Nancy*



DATE: July 18, 1996
CONTACT: Jerry Lipson, Communications Director

FOR RELEASE: Immediate
202-225-5021

GILMAN LEADS CALL FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS NOW

IN N. IRELAND WITH NO PRECONDITIONS

WASHINGTON -- After a briefing Thursday by key Clinton Administration officials on the situation in Northern Ireland, Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman (20th-NY) led a Congressional call for immediate all-party talks with no preconditions.

Gilman, Co-Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for Irish Affairs, wrote to President Clinton urging him to call for all-party talks and also work to end the "provocative forced" marches of Protestants through Catholic Communities.

Also signing the letter were the other three co-chairs of the Ad Hoc committee, Congressman Peter King (3rd-NY), Thomas Manton (6th-NY), and Richard Neal (2nd-MA), and Congressman James Walsh (25th-NY), Chairman of the Friends of Ireland in the House. Following is the text of the letter:

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Mr. President:

We, the undersigned Members of Congress, urge you to call on the British and Irish Governments to immediately commence all-party talks on the future of

Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein, without any preconditions. Northern Ireland is slowly sinking into an "abyss". Other key leaders have also lent their names to the need to commence talks without any preconditions.

We urge you to do all you can to bring an end to the provocative forced Orange Order marches through Catholic communities, and to work to restore order in Northern Ireland.

SENT BY:

7-19-96 :11:19AM :

NYS AFL-CIO-

212 779 1198:# 2/ 3

CC + new an

To TR
CC MAP
SV.

From Niall O'Dowd.

Probably will be seen
by Adams' folks too~~Confidential Memorandum~~

TO: The National Security Council
 FROM: The Irish-American Peace Delegation
 SUBJECT: For A New US Approach to the Peace Process.
 DATE: July 19, 1996

New Realities.

We believe the seriousness of the situation in Northern Ireland has not fully hit home. The events of the last week have completely altered the circumstances. The British government has abrogated treaties with the Irish government by refusing to consult on matters of grave importance. The Ulster Unionist leadership has been revealed to be complicit in mob rule, while the RUC has become a totally unacceptable police force. As a result, for nationalists, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Framework Document, the Joint Declaration, milestones on which the entire nationalist engagement in the peace process was conditioned, are seen to be not worth the paper they were printed on. It now seems that the only reliable guarantor of the peace process for Northern nationalists is the US government.

The White House said in its Wednesday conference call briefing for community leaders that it welcomed suggestions for bold strokes. We think that routine recovery measures by the US are not good enough any more.

Key Congressional leaders such as Representatives Manton, King, Neal, Gilman and Walsh have jointly made a bipartisan appeal to the Administration on the urgency of immediate, inclusive all-party talks. With the Mitchell Principles having been violated on all sides, many sense the need for dramatic steps.

The US Administration appears to be on a path of letting tempers cool, seeing if the two governments can get back together, working existing structures, encouraging Senator Mitchell to press ahead with his existing assignment, making sure that the August dangers --- internment anniversaries and Apprentice Boy marches -- are foreseen and avoided. Good.))

But, the larger truth is that good-faith efforts by the U.S. Administration, by the Irish government, by Hume and Adams, by moderate Unionism and loyalism, and by Irish America have come to naught because the British have erected preconditions and have been unwilling challenge hardline Unionists to come to the conference table.

US mainstream media fail to reflect the intensity of the political earthquake in Ireland. It is only beginning to register here.

Last week's breathtaking British about-face on security policy allows no fig leaf of pretense that the peace process is a priority of this dying Tory government. Security policy was changed because John Major caved in to the Tory Right with its links to Trimble's extreme

Unionism.

The Main Danger

We fear that the President will heed risk-averse campaign advisers and do little more to rescue the peace process when, ironically, the Orange rampages offer enormous opportunities to put the peace process back on track. It is not adequate that the US should merely express private protest to the British, which we assume has taken place. As violence recedes, media attention wanes, but the political crisis of the peace process is as acute as ever. A US holding action will not do. As Tony Lake once observed, if the peace process bicycle is not maintained at a certain speed, the bike falls.

Our conclusion, from the failure of the Irish peace process so far, is: there is no reason for long-term or even medium-term pessimism. The historical, objective factors arguing for a successful negotiated settlement are still present. More than ever, the people want peace. The main missing ingredient has been the willpower of the British government and some Northern politicians. A more assertive US role is necessary.

The Goals:

- * to restart the peace process, put more intense US pressure on all the parties to come together.
- * to re-assert the prestige, value and importance of the American card.
- * to get as much done as possible in the next six months before the next UK general election. Even this British government, having blundered badly, can be pushed to push Trimble *et al.*
- * to position the US Administration role to be reasserted even more forcefully soon after the Clinton re-election and the UK election.]?

The Proposal:

The chief contribution of the US Administration is the presence of Senator Mitchell in the talks in Northern Ireland. If, by August 1, matters are little or no better, think Bosnia. The Vance-Owen stage is over. The Holbrooke stage must begin:

Change and redefine Senator George Mitchell's role. Senator Mitchell, who was asked in by the two governments to play a limited, defined role in the talks, should be empowered, in a completely fresh way, to challenge authoritatively the two governments and all the parties and paramilitaries to rebuild the peace process on new foundations, to undertake aggressive independent American diplomacy, to get serious talks going -- now, without further delay, with no more song-and-dance about preconditions, to twist arms -- British and Unionist arms as well as republican arms. Start progressively: insist on appropriate rules for marches reflecting parity of esteem. Insist on no RUC collapse at the August flashpoints -- internment commemorations and August 13 in Derry. Demand structural reforms of policing. Demand other, bold confidence-building steps, and thereby win a new IRA ceasefire and hold the Loyalist ceasefire. Mitchell can draw a line in the sand for his involvement, and require an end to the political posturing and delays that have prevented progress thus far.

The changed circumstances in Northern Ireland demand a qualitatively different US response than before Drumcree. Fundamentals have changed.

1. Mitchell twist arms
2. appropriate rules for marches
3. CBI → ceasefire.

Fax Message

To: Nancy Sodenburg

From : Gary McMichael


Copies sent to
TL and MAP
7/1

Nancy,

Could you please pass this letter on to
Anthony Lake. It is of course self explanatory.

I shall give you a ring soon

Thanks

 Gary McMichael



Ulster Democratic Party

Central Office

36 Castle Street, Lisburn, County Antrim BT27 4XE
Telephone: 01846 667056 Fax: 01846 605159

Anthony Lake
National Security Council
The White House

1st July 1996

Dear Anthony

First of all let me offer my deepest sympathy for the Americans who lost their lives at the hands of terrorists in Saudi Arabia. It was a terrible event which reminds us all of the dangers posed by these fanatics who have no regard for human life. I fully hope that those responsible are made amenable for their actions.


I must welcome the determination expressed by President Clinton in the aftermath of the bombing to see a firm stance taken against international terrorism. And it is with those remarks in mind that I write now. The recent bomb attack on the British Army base at Osnabruck in Germany has caused immense concern. It appears that the IRA are prepared to engage a sustained terrorist campaign. I fear, as I am sure do many others that this return to international terrorist activity signals that the IRA are moving further away from any possibility of a renewed cease-fire.

We fully appreciate that all possible efforts must be made to bring Sinn Fein and the IRA back into the peace process, and Loyalists deeply yearn for another cease-fire, but patience is not limitless. In our view the time has come for a more stern approach to the IRA and Sinn Fein. Their cessation of August 1994 afforded them with many advantages and opportunities internationally, in particular the United States rewarded their apparent transgression into the democratic process by opening the way for Sinn Fein to raise substantial amounts of funds in the U.S. They have experienced the benefits of legitimacy

and recognition, yet they have now abandoned the democratic process and resorted to blatant terrorism.

Accordingly I wish to urge that President Clinton puts action behind his words and addresses the channels which Sinn Fein and the IRA have available for their exploitation in the United States. Loyalists feel strongly that all the doors which have been opened for Sinn Fein must now be closed and that decisive action should be taken against their capability to fundraise and propagandize in the U.S.

I would be interested in hearing your views upon this.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gary O'Neil".A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gary Michael".



Embassy of the United States of America

Dublin, Ireland

FAX TO: Nancy Soderberg
(202-456-9460)

FROM: Jean Kennedy Smith

DATE: June 28, 1996

To R
I'll need to
show passport
You please otherwise

I thought that President Clinton might like to see the attached copy of a letter I received from Cardinal Daly this week.



ARCHDIOCESE OF ARMAGH

Ara Coeli, Armagh BT61 7QY
Telephone 01861 522045
Fax 01861 526182

June 20, 1996.

Your Excellency,

I am grateful for your kind invitation to me to join with you and your party for a pre-reception gathering on board the USS John F. Kennedy on 4th July.

Unfortunately, I am on that date leaving home for a few days and cannot be free. I sincerely regret having to miss what is sure to be a very prestigious and indeed historic occasion – I am sure it will be very enjoyable for all concerned.

You very kindly suggested that we could meet sometime on the occasion of a visit by me to Dublin. I have never been able to arrange this but would very much hope to be able to do so at a future date.

The political situation in the North is very depressing at present. I greatly deplore and sincerely regret some of the outrageous insults which have been directed at that good and great man, Senator George Mitchell. These have caused acute embarrassment and indeed shame to the vast majority of people across this island, whatever their religious or political background. They would wish to apologise to the Senator, to the President and to yourself for these outrageous remarks.

With all kind wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

+ Cahal B. O'Sullivan

Archbishop of Armagh

Her Excellency,
Jean Kennedy Smith,
Ambassador,
Embassy of the United States of America,
DUBLIN 4.

BILL & TED'S IRISH MISADVENTURE



The Clinton administration's meddling has put Ireland on the road to becoming another Bosnia.

But it's not too late to change.

By Michael McMenamin

Bill Clinton's attempt to make peace in Northern Ireland blew up in his face on February 9, when the Irish Republican Army ended its 17-month cease-fire with a 1,000-pound bomb in the Canary Wharf area of London, injuring 43 and killing two. The main component of Clinton's initiative, inspired by Massachusetts Sen. Ted Kennedy and commenced in 1994, was appeasement of the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein. By most accounts, Clinton and Kennedy were surprised and embarrassed by the IRA's betrayal. They should be embarrassed, but not surprised.

After the Oklahoma City bombing, Clinton talked tough about anti-terrorist measures and the need for right-wing talk show hosts to tame their rhetoric. He has not applied a similar standard to the IRA or the head of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams. Unlike Adams, the talk show hosts have all explicitly renounced violence and those who perpetrate it. Since the IRA did its own imitation of Oklahoma City in London, Bill and Ted have maintained an appropriate, if uncharacteristic, silence on matters Irish.

Bill and Ted had their fun. Bill got a trip to Ireland, and both pretended for a time they were peacemakers. But now the fun is over, the body count is higher, and the fatal flaws in Clinton's Irish initiative remain for all to see. If it is not repudiated, either by Clinton himself or by a new American administration, it may forever stand as a milepost on the road to an Irish Bosnia, complete with ethnic cleansing in both Protestant and Catholic areas of Northern Ireland by the private armies of the IRA/Sinn Fein on the one hand and the equally violent Protestant/Unionist paramilitaries on the other. That is one of the more likely scenarios facing both Irelands today, especially if a) the Labor Party's Tony Blair becomes Britain's next prime minister; b) the IRA wins U.S. forgiveness by reinstating a temporary cease-fire and Clinton continues his appeasement of the IRA; c) the United States resumes, with Tony Blair's encouragement, its pressure on Britain to bring the "unreasonable" Ulster Protestants into line; and d) the Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland terminate their own cease-fire and resume hostilities after seeing how successful violence can be against democratic governments who believe in the appeasement of political terrorism.

Clinton's policy in Northern Ireland—formulated in response to the 1993 bargain between Adams and John Hume, head of the largest Catholic party in Northern Ireland—is based on two dubious propositions. The first is that the "peace process" initiated by the Hume-Adams

pact will lead to some form of Irish "unity," short of a 32-county republic, sufficient to persuade the IRA to decommission its weapons. The second is that the British will coerce the Ulster Protestants to accept whatever "unity" the IRA agrees to swallow and will actually stick around to suppress the inevitable violence from the Protestant/Unionist paramilitaries that will follow.

The first proposition is hopelessly naive and betrays a shocking ignorance of the origins and history of the IRA, whose bedfellows and allies in its near century-long trail of blood have included Imperial Germany, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, East Germany, the Soviet Union, Castro's Cuba, Basque terrorists, the PLO, and Gadhafi's Libya. The second proposition is equally naive and even more dangerous. Forget for a moment, as most people have, the implacable hostility of the Protestant paramilitaries, which killed nearly twice as many Catholics in 1992 as the IRA did Protestants. Consider, instead, that the second proposition assumes the British will do the right thing and not unilaterally leave Northern Ireland, something they have been trying to do, without success, since 1921. Trusting the British to do the right thing about Ireland—talk about the triumph of hope over experience. The British have, after all, been known simply to leave unpleasant situations, followed by sectarian violence and civil war on a large scale. Think India (and Pakistan) in 1947 and Palestine (and Israel) in 1948. On both occasions, Britain was led by a Labor government, as it likely will be again in the near future.

The IRA knows this about the British and, since the early 1970s, its political and military policies—which it continues to follow—have been designed to bring about just such a hasty departure and bloody outcome. Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein are key participants in this overall strategy. Any American government that doesn't recognize this doesn't know Ireland, doesn't know the IRA,

SCOTT STANTIS

doesn't know the Ulster Protestants, and is helping to bring an Irish Bosnia closer. The comparison with Bosnia is not far-fetched. Irish politicians, North and South, including John Hume, former Prime Minister Jack Lynch, and former Irish and U.N. diplomat Conor Cruise O'Brien, have all forecast a bloodbath should the British pull out of Northern Ireland on short notice. The number of Catholic refugees who would flee from the North to the South has been projected at 250,000, more than 40 percent of Northern Ireland's Catholic population. To put that in perspective, consider that Ireland's total population is only about 3.5 million, compared to roughly 1.5 million—900,000 Protestants and 600,000 Catholics—in the North. Consider also that support for IRA/Sinn Fein in regular elections is only 2 percent in the South and 10 percent in the North.

The United States does not have any vital interests at stake in Northern Ireland. But having meddled in Irish affairs for the past two years and made the situation worse, the U.S. government has a moral obligation to understand what went wrong and, perhaps, try to make amends. Exploring the origins, premises, goals, and likely consequences of the Clinton-Kennedy initiative may enable either Clinton or a new administration to fashion a policy toward Ireland that will contribute to a genuine peace, not the Orwellian one advocated by Gerry Adams, the IRA, and Sinn Fein, for whom the only acceptable peaceful result is an unlikely Protestant capitulation. The Clinton-Kennedy folly notwithstanding, the United States can play a useful role in the all-party talks that began in Northern Ireland on June 10—if invited by all sides. Appropriate U.S. participation could be a way of making up for the damage caused by the Clinton administration's misguided interference. But the U.S. government won't have credibility with

all sides to the talks unless it publicly admits it was wrong to appease those who refuse to permanently renounce violence as a means to an end in a democratic society.

A review of the Clinton administration's failure also teaches valuable lessons about how not to conduct foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It is bad foreign policy for the United States to unilaterally intervene as a broker in the domestic politics of friendly democratic nations operating under the rule of law. It is worse foreign policy to unilaterally intervene on behalf of (or in a manner that tilts toward) an extremist political faction with a long history of encouraging and condoning violence to achieve political goals. It is still worse foreign policy to engage in such a unilateral initiative for what are essentially domestic political reasons. Finally, it is both naive and dangerous to pursue such a unilateral foreign policy initiative when that initiative has no realistic chance of achieving its stated goals. Bill and Ted's Irish Misadventure broke all four rules. It was nothing more than domestic politics masquerading as foreign policy.

Irish-American support for Irish Republican violence against the British government and Ulster Protestants is a time-honored tradition. A considerable number of Irish Americans have been ready to contribute funds to "keep the struggle alive" against what they perceive to be the British "occupation" of all or part of the country, starting with the creation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in the United States in the 1850s, through the 1916–1920 guerilla war with the British that resulted in the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921, to the 26 years of sectarian violence by the IRA in Northern Ireland beginning in 1970. Most Irish Americans, myself included, consider

the pre-1921 struggle for independence morally justified, while only a relatively small minority have endorsed the IRA's subsequent violence. The IRA and its supporters are known in Ireland as "physical force nationalists."

The seeds for the current conflict were sown by the 1921 treaty with Britain that created the Irish Free State and left the six predominantly Protestant counties of the Ulster province in Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom—mostly because the Ulster Protestants used physical force themselves to make it clear they would never voluntarily submit to Catholic rule. The Ulster Protestants continued oppressing Catholics, politically and economically, without incident, until the summer of 1968, when the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement—non-sectarian but mainly Catholic—staged massive, nonviolent demonstrations to protest the government's political and economic discrimination against the Catholic minority. Protestant mobs responded with violence; Catholic neighborhoods were overrun; many Catholics died; the government of Northern Ireland stood by; the largely dormant IRA did nothing; and in August 1969, the British (most Irish Americans have collective am-



Gerry Adams and Bill Clinton at the White House: Adams is by many accounts, a cold blooded-killer and, at a minimum, a believer in the threat of violence, if not violence itself, as an acceptable, even preferred method of achieving political goals.

nesia on this) sent in their troops to protect the Catholic minority from the Protestant mobs, much as Eisenhower sent federal troops to Little Rock in 1957 to protect African Americans from white mobs. This was the first time British troops had been anywhere in Ireland, North or South, since 1922 (save for World War II, when U.S. and British soldiers trained in Northern Ireland and served as targets for the IRA's terrorism). Hiding safely behind the weapons of the British Army, the IRA was revitalized and, with substantial support from Irish Americans, started raising money for arms to attack the British troops in Northern Ireland who had saved the Catholics from the Protestant mobs when they could not. This may not seem logical, but then little about the IRA does.


By most accounts, Gerry Adams, the current president of Sinn Féin, is an engaging, articulate, charming and thoroughly cunning Northern Irish politician who once served (and may still secretly sit) on the IRA's ruling military council. He is, by many accounts, a cold-blooded killer and, at a minimum, a believer in the threat of violence, if not violence itself, as an acceptable, even preferred, method of achieving political goals.

John Hume, by contrast, professes to abhor violence. Hume's influence on the Irish government's policies toward Northern Ireland has been immense. As Conor Cruise O'Brien's biographer wrote in 1994: "Hume acquired in the 1970s a license granted him willingly by all the major political parties in the Republic: the franchise to speak for Northern Ireland's Catholics. If John Hume does not approve of something, no southern government will touch it. And, equally important, the provisional IRA have granted him recognition as the constitutionally-elected leader in the Catholic community with whom they will speak with any degree of seriousness. Thus, he has been able to serve as the sole conduit between the Northern Catholics and southern politicians, and as the primary conduit to both London and Dublin governments on what the [IRA] might be willing to accept in any peace negotiations." While Hume cultivates a nonviolent image, he is in fact bitterly anti-Protestant. O'Brien, who became a distinguished journalist and historian and who participated in Irish politics for many years after his diplomatic career ended, observes that Hume's "actual attitude to Ulster Protestants is the implacable and relentless hostility of the seventeenth century."

Hume's approach, since becoming leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party in 1979, has been to isolate the Ulster Protestants by going over their heads to London and convincing the British to coerce them into some form of a united Ireland. The culmination of that approach was the Hume-Adams initiative in April 1993, when he and Gerry Adams issued a joint statement, the essence of which was the right of "the Irish people as a whole...to national self-determination"—*not* the right of "the people of Northern Ireland as a whole," a majority of whom are quite content as they are. As O'Brien wrote at the time, it was a pact with the devil—physical force nationalism: "In terms of political influence, the men of violence—in this case specifically the Provisional IRA—have actually moved in from the margins to dominate the centre. Gerry Adams, with the full approval of

the IRA leadership, has taken his place at John Hume's side as joint leader of a pan-nationalist and pan-Catholic consensus on Northern Ireland: a consensus that now drags the republic in its wake."

Hume-Adams was endorsed by the Irish government and served as the basis for the December 1993 Downing Street Declaration, in which the British renounced any "selfish interest" in Northern Ireland. The declaration was designed to lead to an IRA



cease-fire, but O'Brien presciently predicted in October 1993 how it would all end: "[I]t will be a conditional cease-fire and will hold only as long as the IRA believes progress is being made towards the acceptance by Britain of the right asserted in the joint declaration—the right of the Irish people to national self-determination. That means that Britain must be seen to be abandoning the unionists, at least by stages, or the cease-fire will break down."

At the time, Hume undoubtedly expected the British to be more forthcoming in pushing the Unionists (so called because they favor remaining part of the U.K.) than they were. By early 1994, however, it was the IRA's leaders who were uncooperative. They didn't trust the British. They couldn't agree to a cease-fire. They needed more reassurance than simply appeasement from Ireland and Great Britain. They needed to be reassured with one of the oldest Irish myths: America as savior. So, having co-opted the foreign policy of the Irish Republic, Hume set out to do the same with the United States. He would show the IRA that he could get the Americans to push the British, who in turn would push the Unionists.

Hume had long since co-opted most of the leaders of the Irish-American lobby in Congress, but Ted Kennedy was their de facto leader. So in December 1993 Hume had dinner in Dublin with Kennedy, who was visiting his sister, Jean Kennedy Smith, the U.S. ambassador in Ireland, to solicit the senator's help in getting a visa for Gerry Adams. Kennedy was persuaded that the Hume-Adams pact made sense, and he agreed to push for the visa.

Kennedy then set to work on Clinton. It wasn't a walkover, but the president was favorably predisposed. Clinton felt guilty because he already had reneged on hasty campaign promises made in the 1992 New York presidential primary to appoint a

"special envoy" to Northern Ireland and to grant a visa to Gerry Adams. Now Ted was asking to redeem more than Clinton's campaign promises. He and John Hume wanted the United States to join the Irish government's appeasement of Gerry Adams and the IRA, disregarding the wishes of its ally, Great Britain. This didn't bother Clinton because he and some of his senior advisers relished the chance to step on the British lion's tail as a payback for the Conservative Party's ill-advised assistance to the Bush re-election campaign.

In convincing Clinton to grant Adams's visa, Kennedy and Hume had two aces in the hole. One was the Clintons' faltering health care proposal. To support his request for a 48-hour visa for Adams, Kennedy recruited key Senate Democrats, including Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, Patrick Leahy of Vermont, John Kerry of Massachusetts, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York. All told, Kennedy managed to get 40 members of Congress to sign a letter urging Clinton to grant Adams the visa. If Clinton acquiesced in the visa for Adams, he would have a call on them when crunch time came for health care. The second ace in the hole was a senior member of the National Security Council, Nancy Soderberg, who had been Kennedy's chief foreign policy aide and a foreign policy adviser in the presidential campaigns of Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis, and Clinton. Soderberg knew John Hume, admired him and his nonviolent policies, and opposed the IRA's physical force nationalism. But the Hume-Adams pact and Kennedy persuaded her to reconsider her opposition to the IRA, and she in turn was very influential in persuading Clinton and her boss, NSC chief Anthony Lake.

When Adams's visa was granted, the White House did not pretend that vital American interests were involved. A February 10, 1994, story in *The New York Times* quoted American officials to the effect that Clinton had decided to grant the visa "mainly for domestic political reasons," citing the influence of the Irish-American delegation in Congress. Soderberg herself

heart where it belongs and rely on her principles and values rather than the lilting blandishments of a provincial politician like John Hume. Appeasement of political violence in a democracy is wrong. Nancy Soderberg once knew that.

To Bill and Ted's disappointment, the February 1994 visa didn't produce an IRA cease-fire. That took until the end of August 1994, after Clinton gave a visa to 74-year-old Joe Cahill, who had been convicted in Dublin in 1973 of attempting to import arms and explosives from Libya. Like Adams, he had served on the IRA's ruling military council. What did the British and the Ulster Protestants think of all this? Not much. But then, they were never asked. As one anonymous White House official said, "It obviously ticks off the Brits, but equally obvious, that is acceptable to a lot of us."

The Unionist paramilitary cease-fire was announced in October 1994. After that, it was all downhill, culminating in Adams's third visa in early 1995, which explicitly permitted him to raise funds for Sinn Féin. As before, the British and the Ulster Protestants weren't consulted. During the rest of the year, to the IRA's disappointment, the United States failed in its attempts to persuade the British to pressure the Ulster Protestants into peace talks. The Protestants had little reason to be enthusiastic, since the IRA refused to declare its cease-fire permanent and refused to consider a token "decommissioning" of its weapons before all-party talks in Northern Ireland.

Nevertheless, the cease-fire held just long enough for Clinton to make his December 1995 trip to Ireland and Northern Ireland, becoming the first sitting American president to visit both. While there, Clinton showed superficial signs of sensitivity to Ulster Protestants: his visit to Violet's Fruit Store in Belfast, next door to where 10 people had died in an IRA bombing in October 1993; his purchase there of six oranges and two green apples; and his reference in a speech to the land of the "harp and the fiddle, the fife and lambeg drum," an evenhanded tribute to both wings of Northern Ireland's musical movement. But for militant Protestant Orangemen, who have been in Ireland longer than we have been in America, it will take more than six oranges to erase the image of Gerry Adams scarfing Dublin Bay prawns and Irish whiskey truffles with Bill and Ted at the White House.

In one Northern Ireland speech, Clinton dismissed the IRA and the Unionist paramilitaries, telling them, "You are the past; your day is over." He was premature. A month later, in January, IRA killings resumed at a pace of one a week. They shot Francis Collins in his fish and chips shop. They murdered Martin McCrory through his living room window as he watched television. They shotgunned Ian Lyons as he sat in his car with his girlfriend, Sheena McAlinden. The IRA initially denied the killings, but as one West Belfast Catholic politician said, "I think the very dogs in the street know it's the IRA that are doing this."

Bill and Ted helped hasten the cease-fire's end by mishandling the weapons issue, misunderstanding the British and the Ulster Unionists, and promising more to the IRA than they could

The U.S. government won't have credibility with all sides to the talks unless it publicly admits it was wrong to appease those who refuse to permanently renounce violence as a means to an end in a democratic society.

was aware of the risk the administration was running. In the same story the *Times* quoted "one staff member of the National Security Council"—undoubtedly Soderberg—as saying: "In the end, it might do some good. I must admit that my heart is in my throat when I think about how it could all go wrong." It *might* do some good? Not a very sophisticated rationale for a foreign policy—and this from its architect. The next time, Nancy should keep her

deliver. After the initial cease-fire from both sides in late 1994, the Irish government, the British government, and the Unionists made clear that all-party talks must be preceded by a permanent cease-fire—an unequivocal repudiation of violence—and at least token gestures from both the IRA and the Protestant paramilitaries toward decommissioning their weapons. The IRA stonewalled on both issues, and the Irish government caved in to the IRA's hard line. So did Bill and Ted. The Unionists didn't. They refused to come to the table with an IRA gun at their back.

British Prime Minister John Major then came up with a new approach in late January. He acknowledged the IRA's intransigence and agreed to the all-party talks *without* a permanent cease-fire and *without* decommissioning of weapons, but only on the condition that the all-party talks take place *after* special elections to choose delegates to the all-party talks. It was a good idea because it persuaded the Unionists to agree to what they previously had rejected: all-party talks before a permanent cease-fire and before decommissioning. The Unionists relished the opportunity to contrast their political base with the IRA's in a free election. The IRA and Gerry Adams accused the British of stalling, but that wasn't the point. Elections were. The IRA had earned its place for Adams at the table through terrorism. Now, that place would have to be earned through freely cast votes.

Accepting Major's proposal was an act of courage on the part of David Trimble, the Unionist leader. By abandoning his position on decommissioning, he risked a resumption of Unionist violence and renewed political strength for the ultra-militant Rev. Ian Paisley. Unfortunately, Trimble's courageous gesture was not met with a comparable response from the White House, where the only profiles in courage are located in Bill's copy of Jack Kennedy's book on the subject. Refusing to acknowledge the Unionists' concession and Major's breakthrough in getting them to buy it, the White House took a neutral stance. Privately, Bill apparently encouraged his pal, Ted, joined by Sen. Christopher Dodd, to give the IRA a different—and dangerous—message. "There cannot be an added precondition," said Kennedy, rejecting the idea of special elections. Dodd went further, saying "it is the British who have to be nudged to give us a specific plan quickly"—about as explicit an invitation to violence as you can imagine from a sitting member of Congress. The IRA was listening carefully, and exactly seven days later it delivered the "nudge" Christopher Dodd's careless words had invited: the 1,000-pound bomb in Canary Wharf.

Bill and Ted still don't get it. *New York Times* foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman expressed well the vision Clinton has for Northern Ireland: "There is no room for a territorial solution here. The Northern Irish are doomed to live together. That is why the only solution is some variation of the London-Dublin Framework Document, worked out in February, under which Catholics would have to settle for blurry links to the Irish

Republic and Protestants blurry links to Britain, and they would both have to accept a blurry power-sharing arrangement, in which neither side would have the upper hand."

Have to accept? Have to settle? It makes you want to pick Clinton up by the shoulders, shake him, and shout: "It's the bloody Protestants, stupid! You can't ignore them!" The key to peace in Northern Ireland lies with persuading the majority. Noting how the Catholic Church dominates Ireland's politics and culture, the Protestants are understandably wary of "links" to the



David Trimble at the White House: The Northern Irish Protestant leader is every bit as articulate as Adams in justifying his side's positions. It's still not clear whether he has the stature to move beyond his militant Orange background to a new Northern Ireland where Catholics have power in proportion to their electoral strength.

republic, blurry or not. They know they don't have to accept or settle for anything unless they are persuaded to do so. And certainly not at the point of a gun, because many of them have guns, too. Sadly, all God's children have guns in Northern Ireland.

There are a few positive signs, however. After some initial posturing and finger-pointing, the Irish and British governments got down to business and, without the meddlesome Americans, quickly agreed in March to Major's proposal for special elections to choose delegates to the all-party talks. They scheduled the elections for May 30, with the talks beginning on June 10. Sinn Fein was permitted to take part in the special elections but denied a role in the all-party talks unless the IRA resumes its cease-fire. Sinn Fein has also come under criticism in the South. After the May 30 elections, the *Sunday Independent* in Dublin called on the Irish and British governments to "end the appeasement of the Republican movement," warning that to do otherwise "would be a betrayal of democracy on this island...that could set the stage for civil war." Another encouraging development is that the Unionist paramilitaries have maintained their cease-fire despite the resumed violence from the IRA.

John Hume, whose initiative with Adams was another casualty of the Canary Wharf bomb, no longer has the kind of influ-

ence over the Irish government's policy toward Northern Ireland that he once did. On the other hand, the reputation and influence of the Ulster Unionist Party leader, David Trimble, is on the rise. He has forged a temporary unity among the two major Unionist parties. His agreement to all-party talks before decommissioning is evidence of his political strength, and it is only from strength that compromises can be made. Moreover, unlike his predecessors, he is every bit as articulate as Gerry Adams in justifying his side's positions. It's still not clear whether he has the stature and generosity of spirit to move beyond his militant Orange background to a new Northern Ireland where Catholics have power in proportion to their electoral strength.

As always in this troubled land, the negative signs are still there as well. The May 30 special election provided a number of them. Sinn Fein gathered 15 percent of the vote, a record high for the IRA's political wing. And it did so at the expense of Hume's SDLP. What went unnoticed in the United States however, was that Sinn Fein's Protestant physical force counterparts—the political wings of the Protestant paramilitaries, the outlawed Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association—polled 6 percent of the vote. That means 21 percent of the vote in Northern Ireland supported the political terrorists on one side or the other. Add to that an increased vote for the militant Rev. Ian Paisley—at the expense of David Trimble—and you have a volatile mixture. Forty percent of the voters now back the extremists on both sides.

The IRA still holds the match, and Gerry Adams has made no public appeal that they put it down. Indeed, in the run-up to the special election, the IRA carried out a “dummy run” bomb attack on a security base in Belfast as if to reinforce the message on a defaced Sinn Fein campaign poster where “Vote Sinn Fein for Peace” had been altered to read “Vote Sinn Fein—or else.” Adams used the election results to again demand a seat at the all-party talks without a new IRA cease-fire, a position supported by the Unionist paramilitaries who want to keep their own violent options open. In response, SDLP M.P. Joe Herndon, who knocked Adams out of his seat in the British Parliament in 1992, unexpectedly denounced Sinn Fein as “fascist” and “sectarian.” Meanwhile, Clinton maintained his silence.

The best thing the United States can do is to follow the policy enunciated by Ronald Reagan when he addressed the Irish Parliament in 1984. He offered America's “good will and support to Ireland” before adding that the United States “must not and will not interfere in Irish matters.” Good advice from a man with far deeper Irish ancestry than the tenuous links recently discovered by Bill Clinton and Al Gore. The United States has no strategic national interest at stake in Northern Ireland. It never did. And it should strictly stay out of any matters involving Northern Ireland unless and until both the Irish and British governments seek U.S. participation. In the meantime, the U.S. government should



Clinton and John Hume: Hume's approach since becoming leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party has been to isolate Ulster Protestants by going over their heads to London and convincing the British to coerce them into some form of a United Ireland.

close any back channel it may still have with Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein, and the IRA. If the political wing of the IRA wants its voice heard, let it come through Dublin and Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring, not Washington, D.C., and Nancy Soderberg.

There is something else the Clinton administration can do: It can admit its mistake. A window of opportunity exists for it to do so. While all-party talks formally started on June 10, serious discussions weren't expected until later in the summer. Neither was a new IRA cease-fire. The administration ought to tell the Irish and the British that, at a time and place of their choosing, the U.S. government will formally announce that its policy of the past two years was based on a mistaken trust in the good faith of the IRA. Henceforth, the United States will support the British and Irish governments in setting stringent conditions for allowing Sinn Fein to participate in the all-party talks, including a) Sinn Fein's unequivocal renunciation of violence for political ends; b) a declaration by the IRA's ruling army council that any new cease-fire is permanent; and c) an agreement by the IRA, along with the Protestant paramilitaries, to give up 10 percent of their weapons before participating in decommissioning talks, to be conducted at the same time as the talks on political issues.

If the United States does that with the full backing of both the Irish and British governments, it may well be enough to persuade the Ulster Protestants to take the real risks that making peace will entail. If the Clinton administration can't bring itself to do this—and, in an election year, it probably cannot admit having made a mistake of this magnitude—then it ought to do the next best thing: nothing.

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