

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Working File, Mitchell Report, January 1996

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1398

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
50	2	4	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Dick Spring to Patrick Mayhew (3 pages)	02/05/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
002. email	Mary Peters to Nancy Soderberg re: Peace Process. Next Steps (1 page)	01/03/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
003a. email	Mary Peters to Nancy Soderberg re: More on Twin Track (1 page)	01/17/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
003b. cable	re: Northern Ireland: HMG Ideas on Elected Assembly (7 pages)	01/17/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
004. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Northern Ireland: Report of International Body on Weapons Decommissioning (2 pages)	01/23/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
005. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Getting to Talks (5 pages)	01/17/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
006. memo	re: Soderberg/Durkin Memorandum of Conversation (3 pages)	03/23/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
007. memo	re: Memorandum of Conversation, John Hume and Tony Lake (1 page)	03/23/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
008a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Reply to Message from Prime Minister Major on Northern Ireland (1 page)	03/23/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
008b. cable	POTUS to John Major (2 pages)	03/23/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
008c. cable	John Major to POTUS (3 pages)	03/20/1996	P1/b(1)
009. cable	John Holmes to Anthony Lake (3 pages)	01/25/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, Mitchel Report, January 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1707

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	re: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Evaluation of Sinn Fein/IRA Intentions (5 pages)	01/11/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, Mitchel Report, January 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1707

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY

Address in Dublin

*Block I.
Ship Street Range,
Ship Street,
Dublin Castle,
Dublin 2.*

Tel. No. (01) 4759600

Fax No. (01) 4759614

Senator George J. Mitchell (Chairman)

General John de Chastelain Mr. Harri Holkeri

Address in Belfast

*12th Floor,
Windsor House,
6-12 Bedford St.,
Belfast.*

Tel.No.(01232) 895900

Fax No. (01232) 322988

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY

22 January 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a “ ‘twin track’ process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.”

2. One track was “to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent.” This has become known as the political track.

3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

“ 5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
 - identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
 - report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits.”

4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials and representatives of other organisations and institutions. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts

12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists — so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it. *Consensus for peace*

14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked "to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue." It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility. *Decommission symptom of lack of trust*

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue — or any other issue -- will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland. ★

principles of democracy and non-violence Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

20. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:

- a. *To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;*
- b. *To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;*
- c. *To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;*
- d. *To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;*
- e. *To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,*
- f. *To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.*

21. We join the Governments, religious leaders and many others in condemning "punishment" killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.

22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.

23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy, not one influenced by the threat of violence.

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us “to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve” full and verifiable decommissioning.

25. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full

cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.

29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.

30. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.

31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before all-party negotiations can begin. The other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.

34. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have

been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.

35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

36. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us “to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning.”

37. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the Governments and their security forces. We believe these estimates to be accurate.

38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting

confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.

The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

39. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender.

The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

40. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.
41. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.

42. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

43. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for destruction would include the cutting up or chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.
44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including:
- the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for subsequent destruction;
 - the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,

- the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either Government.

Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.

46. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, verification must occur to the satisfaction of the commission.
47. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the *Garda Siochana* and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

48. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.
49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

The decommissioning process should be mutual.

50. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

51. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other than decommissioning be taken to build confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.

52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held by security forces. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building of trust.

56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Elections held in

accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.

57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

58. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and antagonistic.


59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present opportunity.


60. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.

61. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the "peace line" requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.


George J. Mitchell


John de Chastelain


Harri Holkeri

22 January 1996

10 DOWNING STREET
SW1A 2AA

DUTY CLERKS' OFFICE

FAX NO : 839 - 9044

TO: TONY LAKE ESQ.

FROM: John Holmes

TO:

DATE OF DOC: 24.1.96

TITLE: Prime Minister Major's speech to House of
Commons

CLASS:

~~Secret / Confidential / Restricted~~

(U/C)

DATE FAXED: 24.1.96

TIME: 18:00 hrs

NO OF PAGES: 12000 + 11.

MESSAGE: Please confirm receipt to Duty Clerk.

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT

THE MITCHELL REPORT

24 JANUARY 1996

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

**MITCHELL REPORT:
STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT
24 JANUARY 1996**

With permission, Madam Speaker, I shall make a statement on the report of the International Body on the decommissioning of illegal arms which was published earlier today.

The key to progress in Northern Ireland is confidence - confidence to enable the parties to sit down together without threat of force. The retention of arms by the paramilitaries on both sides is the biggest single factor in holding back that confidence. It has so far prevented the holding of all-party talks.

That is one of the reasons why we and the Irish Government established the international body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue as one track of the Twin Tracks Initiative John Bruton and I launched last November.

- 2 -

The Body's remit was to identify¹ and advise¹ on acceptable methods of verifiable decommissioning, and to report on the commitment of the paramilitaries to work constructively to achieve that. We set the Body the challenging target of reporting by mid-January. I am extremely grateful to Senator Mitchell and his colleagues for the energy and determination with which they have completed their task.

The Body's main conclusions are:

- that the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations has nearly universal support and must continue to be a principal objective.

- that to reach an agreed political settlement and take the gun out of politics, all parties should commit themselves to, and honour, six principles embodying the path of democracy and non-violence. These principles include

- 3 -

- the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations,
 - the renunciation of force and the threat of force,
 - agreement to abide peacefully by whatever agreement is finally reached,
 - and an end to so-called punishment killings and beatings.
-
- that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of illegal arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations. The Body make a series of recommendations on the modalities of decommissioning of illegal arms. They emphatically declare that there is no equivalence between such arms and those held by the security forces. They rightly emphasise the need for independent verification.

- 4 -

- that other confidence building measures are needed, such as an end to targeting of potential victims by the paramilitaries, information on missing persons and the return of those previously intimidated out of their homes.

The Body also record their conclusion, on the basis of their discussions, that the paramilitaries will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. The House will note that the Body did not conclude that they cannot decommission but that they will not. The House will draw its own conclusions. Although the Body make no formal recommendation on this point, they suggest an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.

Madam Speaker, the Government welcome the Body's endorsement of the seriousness of the decommissioning issue. We welcome and fully endorse the six principles they set out. We call on all parties to do the same.

- 5 -

If all concerned were to accept these principles, and honour them, as the International Body also rightly emphasise, that would be a significant step forward. Even more significant would be if, in addition, all parties, particularly Sinn Fein, also joined the two Governments in supporting the wide principles of consent set out in the Downing Street declaration.

The Government also welcome the Body's broad recommendations on the modalities of the decommissioning process. We are ready to implement them. It is now for those in possession of illegal arms to say whether they will accept and act on them. We look forward to an early and definitive response from the paramilitaries on both sides.

We welcome too the emphasis on other confidence-building measures. If the paramilitaries give up their present practice of keeping themselves ready for a return to action, that will be a most welcome sign of real commitment to peaceful methods. Otherwise gun-law continues to hang over the heads of the people of Northern Ireland.

- 6 -

There is therefore much in the report we can welcome and endorse. But the practical problem remains: how to bring all the parties together. Self-evidently the best way to generate the necessary confidence is for the paramilitaries to make a start to the decommissioning process. We see no reason why they should not.

There can be no justification for the maintenance of private armies by those who claim to be committed to exclusively peaceful means. Opinion polls in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic have shown overwhelming public support in both communities for decommissioning before talks. We shall therefore keep up the pressure for an immediate start to this process.

However I am not prepared to accept that any one group should, through their intransigence, stand in the way of peace and a comprehensive settlement for the people of Northern Ireland. We will not be deflected from our aim. It is now apparent that there may well be another way forward, consistent with the basic principles we have always adhered to.

- 7 -

One of the confidence-building measures taken up by the International Body is the idea of an election. The Body made clear that a broadly acceptable elective process, with an appropriate mandate and within the three-strand structure, could contribute to the building of confidence.

Madam Speaker, the Government believe that such an elective process offers a viable alternative direct route to the confidence necessary to bring about all-party negotiations. In this context it is possible to imagine decommissioning and such negotiations being taken forward in parallel.

The election proposal originated in Northern Ireland and, as recent opinion polls have shown, has widespread cross-community support there. A number of parties, including those led by the hon. Members for Upper Bann and North Antrim, as well as the Alliance Party, have put forward proposals for some form of elected body as a means of bringing all parties together, even if the paramilitaries persist in their refusal to decommission prior to negotiation.

- 8 -

It is true that other parties have registered their concerns. They will certainly need to be addressed. We will discuss urgently with all the parties how to overcome them. But in a democratic system like ours I cannot see how elections could be regarded by any of the parties as a side issue or as a block to progress.

As the Mitchell report says: "Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will". So let me make it quite clear to the House that we are ready to introduce legislation, and to seek both Houses' urgent approval for it, in order to allow an elective process to go ahead as soon as may be practicable. I would hope that this will attract support right across the House.

To sum up, Madam speaker, we believe that, in the light of the Mitchell report, there are two ways in which all-party negotiations can now be taken forward. Both are fully consistent with the six principles set out in the report.

- 9 -

The first is for the paramilitaries to make a start to decommissioning before all-party negotiations. They can - if they will. If not, the second is to secure a democratic mandate for all-party negotiations through elections specially for that purpose.

Two routes to all-party negotiations and to decommissioning. The choice between them is ultimately for the parties themselves. I believe that the people of Northern Ireland have every right to expect that one or other of these routes will be taken and taken soon.

For our part we, together with the Irish Government, will intensify our discussions with all the parties. I intend to meet the Taoiseach again in the middle of February to review progress.

Madam Speaker, the people of Northern Ireland are enjoying today's peace. They want it to be permanent. They also want and deserve political progress. It is time to put old enmities aside and to allow the people of Northern Ireland and their representatives once again to have a normal say in their future and their affairs.

- 10 -

The proposals I have put forward today require all concerned to take risks for peace. We have done so before and will do so again, consistent with our principles. That is what is needed if we are to build on the achievements of the past two years.

Let us never forget that we are dealing here with the lives of innocent men, women and children. We are dealing with their future and the future of Northern Ireland. In the end our obligation as politicians is to the people we govern.

I pledge that I will leave no stone unturned to deliver to the people of Northern Ireland on a permanent basis the precious privilege of peace they have now enjoyed for seventeen months.

To sum up, Madam speaker, we believe that, in the light of the Mitchell report, there are two ways in which all-party negotiations can now be taken forward. Both are fully consistent with the six principles set out in the report.

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

FAX COVER SHEET

FAX NO. —

DATE: 24 JANUARY 1996

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: MS NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: AMBASSADOR GALLAGHER

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVERING SHEET: 2
TRANSMITTED FROM FAX NUMBER: (202) 319-9757

For information, please.

Issued by the Government Information Services,
Government Buildings, Dublin 2.
Tel. (01) 880 7555 FAX (01) 880 3281

Ó Sheirbhíais Eolais an Rialtais,
Tithe an Rialtais, Baile Átha Cliath 2.
Tel. (01) 880 7555 FAX (01) 880 3281

Press statement by the Irish Government
on publication of the Report of the International Body

The Irish Government welcomes the timely publication of the Report of the International Body which was established as part of the twin-track process launched on 28 November last year. The Irish and British Governments will be making statements on the report in the Dail and the House of Commons respectively this afternoon.

The Government wishes to record its deep appreciation to Senator George Mitchell, to his distinguished colleagues and to the staff of the Body for discharging their mandate with such dedication and skill in the short time envisaged. The Irish Government believes this carefully-considered report will significantly advance the task of achieving the launch of all-party negotiations by the end of February 1996, which remains the firm aim of the Irish and British Governments.

Working on the basis of this report and addressing the many other issues involved in the political track, the two Governments will now intensify their consultations with the parties in the preparatory round of talks with a view to agreeing the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda for those negotiations.

The two Governments will hold a Summit meeting during the month of February to review progress on these issues.

24 January 1996

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

FAX COVER SHEET

FAX NO. —

DATE: 24 JANUARY 1996

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: MS NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: AMBASSADOR GALLAGHER

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVERING SHEET: 9
TRANSMITTED FROM FAX NUMBER: (202) 319-9757

Relevant section of Taoiseach's address to Council of Europe, Strasburg, 25th January 1996 follows, for information.

2

obvious, of course, that different States will be at different stages of development in these matters.

What is important is that States be committed to the "principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within their jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms" as described in the Charter and identified more concretely in the European Convention on Human Rights. There can be no compromise on this.

In this regard it is important that the procedure for implementing the declaration on compliance with commitments accepted by member States should come into operation soon.

This afternoon you will consider the application for membership of the Council of Europe by the Russian Federation. The people of Russia have shown unshakeable tenacity and unquenchable hope over a long period. It is my earnest hope that Russia will become a member of the Council of Europe with a full commitment to all that membership entails. I welcome Russia's declared willingness to assume the obligations of membership and to comply with the procedures of the Council of Europe for monitoring the observance of these obligations.

Northern Ireland Peace Process

The lessons of history in Ireland show clearly that political differences can only be resolved through peaceful and democratic means.

In the Irish peace process, my Government attaches priority to achieving a political settlement which all parties and traditions on our island can support by their allegiance and consent. This task will not be easy. We will have to build strong foundations of trust between communities divided for centuries. The absence of trust continues to cast shadows over the peace we have enjoyed for the past 16 months.

25 JAN-96 THU 11:09

TROTSEACH'S OFFICE

FAX NO. 353 1 6764048

P. 04

3

It is against this background that the two Governments have been working together to prepare the way for full-scale negotiations in which all parties can participate.

Last November, the two Governments set in motion what we call a "twin-track process" with the firm aim of launching all-party negotiations by the end of next month, involving all the parties in Northern Ireland. I stress that we agreed that our firm aim was all-party negotiations starting by the end of next month.

In the first track, preparatory talks between the two Governments and the Northern Ireland parties, aimed at paving the way to all-party negotiations, have been under way since before Christmas. Various ideas are being discussed in this track, including the role an election might play. But these are no more than ideas, at this stage, because discussions in this track are not complete.

In the second track, the Governments established an International Body, chaired by Senator George Mitchell of the United States, to make an independent assessment of the issue of the decommissioning of paramilitary arms. The existence of arsenals of paramilitary weapons, on both sides of the community divide, has been a major source of mistrust and suspicion between the people and parties of Northern Ireland.

Yesterday, this International Body published its Report.

The Irish Government warmly welcomed the report, which we believe gives everyone a basis to move forward without loss of principle, on the basis of reasonable compromises.

The report, in a balanced and judicious way, presents a challenge to those parties associated with paramilitary groups - and also to those parties who find it nearly impossible to sit in the same room with parties previously associated with violence because of past hurts.

25-JAN-96 THU 11:10

TAOISEACH'S OFFICE

FAX NO. 353 1 8784048

P. 05

4

The International Body has set out a stringently clear set of principles which are designed to enable, all those who accept them, to sit down together. I think it is important that I list these crucial principles for true peace, on the record, here before this Council of Europe.

They include, a total and absolute commitment to:

- exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving political issues.
- the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.
- agreement that such disarmament must be verifiable.
- renunciation of the use of force, and opposition to the use of force by others, and renunciation of the threat of force to influence the course or the outcome of negotiations.
- Agreement to abide by the terms of any accord reached in negotiations - and to resort only to democratic and peaceful methods in trying to alter the outcome of negotiations.
- Finally, the parties must urge that so called "punishment" killings and beatings, which have marred and distorted the paramilitary ceasefires in Northern Ireland, stop, with the parties taking effective steps to prevent such actions.

✓ I believe that the trust created through the full and unequivocal acceptance of these principles by all parties could get all those parties together in the one room.

Any device, however well crafted or logical, which attracts one set of parties, but repels another, is not enough.

25-JAN-96 THU 11:10

TAOISEACH'S OFFICE

FAX NO. 353 1 6164048

P. 06

5

The truth is that both sides must be present at talks. Both sides must be there if there is to be a partnership for peace.

I have said that accepting the six principles is a challenge to those parties associated with paramilitaries - particularly to Sinn Fein.

But there is an equally straight-forward challenge to Unionists - those who support continued union with Britain. Why not sit down and talk with Sinn Fein? After sixteen months without violence, surely Unionists have now become confident enough to take the risk of talking to Sinn Fein? As Yitzak Rabin said, you make peace with your enemies, not with your friends. So why not talk? You do not have to agree, but you can start talking, and that can be done directly by the two parties themselves, even without any Government structure or format. And it can be done straight away.

The two Governments do want to create a supportive three stranded structure for talks, but even before that structure is agreed, all the parties have a right, and an obligation, to talk to one another of their own accord.

Each party has a right not to be put in a corner, a right not to be set an impossible political test. But, equally, each party has a responsibility to take the ideas put forward by their former political antagonists, and use them for a constructive purpose.

Momentum is vital in any negotiation. If momentum is maintained, the insoluble becomes soluble. If momentum is lost, minor issues can be elevated into road blocks.

The Irish and British Governments agreed to maintain rapid momentum, when we set ourselves the ambitious, but firm, aim of starting all-party negotiations by the end

25 JAN 96 THU 11:10

TAOLSEACH'S OFFICE

FAX NO. 353 1 6764048

P. 07

6

of next month. New ideas can be considered within the time frame we have set, but must not be used to divert or delay us from our shared objective.

The absence of dialogue leaves fertile ground for the prophets of war. Talking cannot hurt, it can only help. Many people find it inexplicable, that after 16 months of relative peace, the antagonists are not yet sitting together in the same room.

The Irish and British Governments will now be intensifying the work already underway in the political track of preparatory talks, to get the parties together at last.

We want to draw on ideas that have helped resolve conflicts elsewhere in Europe, and to which the Council of Europe has contributed greatly.

The Governments have also suggested that democratic representatives from both parts of Ireland might adopt a charter or Covenant, in which they could pledge their solemn and enduring commitment, in any future political framework, to the support and protection of the rights and interests of both communities, and to certain basic principles - including that of consent before any fundamental change takes place, and that only non-violent methods of persuasion may be used.

Agreement on a Bill of Rights or some other means of protecting basic rights (such as the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into national law) would reassure both communities that any new agreement we seek, will never allow any reversion to a pattern of supremacy and subordination, from any quarter.

For that reason the Government is anxious to ensure that any future bill of rights adequately embraces, not just individual rights, but also communal rights.

I am aware that the Council of Europe, with its European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, to which Ireland is a signatory, is at the very forefront of this difficult but important area of international jurisprudence.

7

We will bear this valuable work in mind in developing our own distinctive approach in this area.

Of course, at the end of the day the recognition of legal minimum standards, does not, on its own, remove communal tensions. That is why talks are so important.

There is no substitute for negotiation or for human tolerance.

That is why, as I said earlier, the Irish and British Governments are determined to move forward to all party negotiations, involving the two Governments and all the parties, in the very near future.

European Union

Ireland will assume the Presidency of the European Union on 1 July next. The recent Madrid European Council identified the challenges which the Union must meet to prepare Europe for the 21st Century notably, the Inter-Governmental Conference, Economic and Monetary Union, future Enlargement and to contribute to making the whole continent of Europe a more secure and prosperous place. Ireland will discharge with vigour its responsibility during our Presidency of the Union to seek to ensure advancement on all the vital tasks facing the Union.

One of the primary tasks facing the negotiators at the Inter-Governmental Conference will be to make Europe more relevant to its citizens. Many think that a gap has opened between the EU and its citizens.

Our ambitions for Europe will come to nothing if we lose the support of our citizens. The Inter-Governmental Conference must therefore agree measures to bring the Union closer to its people, by taking practical steps to tackle issues of direct concern to them, such as unemployment, crime and the scourge of illegal trafficking in drugs.

Unemployment is a key issue. Europe's employment performance has been very poor compared to that of the US and Japan. Jobs do flow from the single market, and will hopefully flow from Economic and Monetary Union. I realise that there is a view within the European Union that action on employment is primarily the responsibility of National Governments. The reality is that lack of employment affects people's perception of Europe. Therefore concerted action to deal with unemployment at European level is called for. I am very pleased to see that employment has been made a central issue of the current Italian EU Presidency, and it will have the same priority for the Irish Presidency. I believe this Assembly should discuss the employment issue in the wider European context, to reinforce the EU's work.

Crime and drug abuse are undoubtedly amongst the adverse consequences of unemployment to which I referred a moment ago. There is a well-organised crime network across Europe willing and able to take advantage of this situation. It must be a priority task of all European states to act in a fully co-ordinated way to counter the gangs who direct the drugs and crime syndicates. One has only to see the misery which drug abuse wreaks on individuals and communities to realise the urgency of this task. A problem that does not stop at national boundaries will only be confronted by co-operation across boundaries. The Council of Europe can play a vital role in the fight against drug abuse.

I know that the Council of Europe, through the Pompidou Group, has a special interest in the drug problem and I would be most interested in hearing the views of members of this Assembly as to what are the most effective ways to tackle this scourge.

The European Union and the Council of Europe should complement one another. They are not rivals. The Council of Europe has more than forty years experience in developing human rights instruments and in promoting co-operation in other areas. It is important that co-operation between the Council of Europe and the EU be

25-JAN-96 THU 11:12

TAOISEACH'S OFFICE

FAX NO. 353 1 6764048

P. 10

9

developed, and that the relationship be put on a more formal basis. I would welcome your ideas on this.

Conclusion

Madame President, I spent many fruitful and fulfilling hours at this Assembly. I believe that the Council of Europe is a unique institution, with a truly remarkable record in the field of Human Rights. It must, and will, continue to have an important and distinctive role to play in European Affairs. I wish you well for the future.

Thank you.

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

30 January 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

*Ireland
wp*

Dear Nancy

Herewith the letter to the President, about which we spoke.

I look forward to talking to you this afternoon.

Yours sincerely

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

30 January 1996

My dear Mr President

I have the honor to enclose a faxed copy of a letter from the Taoiseach in which Mr Bruton expresses his deep appreciation to you, Mr President, for having made the services of Senator George Mitchell available to chair the International Body on Decommissioning. The original of the letter will be sent on as soon as possible.

The Taoiseach also sets out in his letter the Irish Government's view on the steps that are now needed to move the peace process forward.

I have the honor to be, Mr President,

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Dermot Gallagher', with a horizontal line drawn underneath it.

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

The President
The White House
WASHINGTON DC 20500



30 January 1996.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

The Hon. William J. Clinton
President
The United States of America.

Dear Mr President,

I am writing on behalf of the Irish Government to express to you our deep appreciation for having made the services of Senator George Mitchell available to chair the International Body, which published its excellent Report last week. The work of the Body benefited enormously from the commitment, judgement and common-sense which Senator Mitchell brought to his task, and these are reflected throughout this excellent Report.

I believe it correct that I should inform you of the Irish Government's position on the most effective next steps in underpinning the peace process in particular because of the current controversy surrounding the 'election' issue. Our position is that both Governments now use the intensified political track to:

- Put the principles of the Mitchell Report and the Report's approach to decommissioning to all the parties and ask them to agree to accept and honour them. Acceptance would form the basis of a move to all party talks by end February which is our joint firm aim as agreed in the Communiqué of 28 November;


Provide for a discussion of the "elective process" question to see if there are any proposals in this area which can meet the Mitchell Report tests - i.e. be broadly acceptable, have an appropriate mandate and respect the three strands. The Irish position is that it is premature to reach a conclusion on whether such proposals can be arrived at until the discussion in the political track has been brought to a conclusion. If the criterion of broad acceptability is to be met, the Unionist parties must persuade the Nationalists parties that their fears are unfounded. The political track is there for exactly that purpose.

My view, which I have put to John Major, is that on this basis the British and Irish Governments should resume the approach of steps agreed between us which has served both sides well in the recent past.

I will close by asking for your continued support and that of your Administration in our efforts to work with the British Government on the basis proposed. Your support will prove invaluable in reaching the outcome I trust we both wish for - all party talks by end February leading to a political settlement based on consent.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,



Taoiseach.

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

FAX COVER SHEET *u*

FAX NO. —

DATE: 24 JANUARY 1996

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: MS NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: AMBASSADOR GALLAGHER

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVERING SHEET: 4
TRANSMITTED FROM FAX NUMBER: (202) 319-9757

For information, please.

*To the
MAD
The return
2
file
working
list*

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939

FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 January 1996

Mr Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Tony

I thought it important that you would have a copy (enclosed) of the letter which the Taoiseach sent to the British Prime Minister today.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Dermot Gallagher', with a checkmark and a flourish.

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

cc: Ms Nancy Soderberg



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

26 January, 1996.

The Right Honourable John Major, MP
Prime Minister.

Dear *John*

I have now had the opportunity to study your letter of 25 January and to speak to Dick Spring and other Government colleagues on the Irish Government position.

My proposal is that both Governments now use the intensified political track to

1. Put the principles of the Mitchell Report and the Report's approach to decommissioning to all the parties and ask them to agree to accept and honour them. Acceptance would form the basis of a move to all party talks by end February which is our joint firm aim as agreed in the Communiqué of 28 November.
2. Provide for a discussion of the elective process question to see if there are any proposals in this area which can meet the Mitchell Report test, i.e. be broadly acceptable, have an appropriate mandate and respect the three strands. The Irish Government position is that it is premature to reach a conclusion on whether such proposals can be arrived at until the discussion in the political track has been brought to a conclusion. If the criterion of broad acceptability is to be met, the unionists parties must persuade the nationalists parties that their fears are unfounded. The political track is there for exactly that purpose.



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 2 -

I would ask then that you consider this proposal as the basis for forward movement. This approach by both Governments could create the space in which the "election" issue might be discussed in a less confrontational manner. Matters could be taken forward on this basis by Dick Spring and Paddy Mayhew.

I hope you will find my proposal helpful.

Yours sincerely,

John B. Spring

Taoiseach.

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939

FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

7 February 1996

W4

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Nancy

I thought you might like to have a copy of a letter sent earlier this week by Dick Spring to Patrick Mayhew. This sets out in particular the rationale behind the Government's proposal for a two-day "Dayton" type Conference of all the parties.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

*I hope you will be here
to-morrow evening.*


Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador



OIFIG AN TÁNAISTE AGUS AN AIRE GNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHA
OFFICE OF THE TANAISTE AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2
DUBLIN 2

5 February 1996

The Rt Hon Sir Patrick Mayhew QC MP
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
The Northern Ireland Office

Dear *Patrick*,

I found it very valuable, as I hope you did, to have the opportunity for a full and very open discussion between us at last Thursday's meeting of the Conference.

I thought it might also be helpful, in preparation for our resumed Conference discussion next Wednesday, to summarise for you the position as we see it:

We are very conscious of the credibility gap which is now looming in terms of our firm aim of achieving the launch of all-party negotiations by the end of this month.

It is not only the onset of our deadline which raises this issue. Sceptical questions are also being asked, particularly in view of reaction to the Mitchell Report, about the quality of our efforts to reach our stated goal, and even in some quarters about the sincerity of the initial commitment. The sudden espousal of the elective process, which is at present supported only by the pro-union parties, and opposed strongly by all the nationalist ones, is interpreted by many as endorsing, or even rewarding, the only parties who have so far refused to engage in the agenda we both solemnly set in November. Any perception that intransigence pays would send a most unfortunate signal to both communities.

I believe therefore we need to send a strong public message that our commitment to

achieving our goal is resolute and for real, and that the means we are pursuing to this end are equally so.

What we have in mind is to bring all the parties together in one venue for two days' intensive discussion. We see this as a natural development of our stated commitment in the November communiqué to develop the multilateral dimension of the preparatory talks. We accept that it may not be possible to bring all the parties around a single table in the first instance. We are prepared to vary the geometry of the talks to take care of all reasonable sensitivities, and to work on the basis of a "proximity format" if that is the most acceptable formula.

The rationale behind our proposal is two-fold:

In the first place, it will ensure that our two Governments are clearly seen to use our best endeavours to meet the specific goals we set ourselves in the November Communiqué and, more generally, to honour the commitments in the Downing Street Declaration to foster agreement and reconciliation, leading to a new political framework founded on consent. I believe such a signal would help to convince all parties of the Governments' firm determination to see negotiations in place. This would help motivate those parties who at present refuse to enter negotiations to reconsider their position.

Secondly, we are very conscious of the practical requirements and difficulties of establishing the basis for future negotiations. This is now even more complicated, given that the elective process has been added to the agenda. The logistics of a range of separate meetings with both Governments, with so many parties and over such a complex agenda are almost unmanageable unless we draw the parties together in one venue.


(We need an opportunity to bounce ideas and proposals off the parties interactively over a

sustained period as part of a concerted drive to bring the preparatory talks to a conclusion. Without it, I fear we will not even be able to form a coherent judgement of their collective position in time for consideration at the Summit at the end of the month. Such an intensive process of discussion would be a valuable opportunity for those parties who believe in the need for an elective process to show how the serious misgivings felt by other parties on this issue can be overcome.

I hope you find this elaboration of our proposal useful in your preparation for next week's meeting. If of course you have alternative proposals of how to restore credibility to the objectives we set in our November communiqué and to inject the necessary fresh momentum into the preparatory political track, we will be prepared to consider them on their merits. However, we put the proposal for multilateral proximity talks over two days only after the most careful consideration of the alternatives. No other option, in our view, will give the same signal of genuine commitment to the parties. None offers a more practical way of handling the issues which are to be decided, given the complexity of the agenda, the number of parties involved and the need to minimise logistical problems and to maximise the focus of both Governments on resolving the issue.

I very much hope you will be in a position to agree to our suggestion on Wednesday.


Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'D. Spring', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Dick Spring T.D.

Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs

P.S. I enclose a copy of a speech which I delivered in Bandon last Saturday which summarised my views on the present situation.

**COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS****2170 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515****** Majority Office ****

Phone: 202: 225-5021

Fax: 202: 225-2035

TO: *Nancy Soderberg*FAX #: *456-9460*FROM: *John Mackey / Barb Scantlebury*SUBJECT: *U.K.'s PM letter*TOTAL PAGES: (including cover sheet): *3***MESSAGE/COMMENT:***J.Y. = C**I sent
a copy to
MAP**File*

DATE:

1/31

TIME SENT:

5:20

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

January 29, 1996

The Honorable John Major
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, England
SW1A 2AH

Dear Prime Minister Major:

Just prior to President Clinton's visit to Great Britain and Ireland late last year, both governments issued a joint communique and agreed on late February as a target date for all-party inclusive talks on the future of Northern Ireland.

The President, like so many of us, and people around the world, warmly welcomed that important development. We envisioned all-party talks, quickly following the report issued on the arms question by the International Body, chaired by our distinguished former colleague, Senator George Mitchell.

The people of both the north and south of Ireland shared that vision and hope for progress towards lasting peace through all-party talks. They delivered that message loudly, and unambiguously throughout President Clinton's recent visit to Ireland. Permanent peace through dialogue and reconciliation is what the people of all of Ireland clearly want for themselves, their children, and from their political leaders.

It was a message that Members of Congress who accompanied the President, as well as all of us here, and around the globe interested in the fate of Northern Ireland clearly saw, heard, observed, and warmly welcomed.

Former Senator Mitchell and his colleagues have now completed their work on the International Body's report on the arms issue in a timely and professional manner. It is obvious that all-party talks must now begin, and that arms decommissioning by all sides, become a part of the negotiation process, as his report envisioned.

Yet sadly, your government is once again moving the goal post on the playing field, as we all seek lasting peace. You are creating yet another needless barrier to a lasting peace and justice in Northern Ireland by insisting on elections of the negotiators in an assembly before any such all-party talks.

The Honorable John Major
January 29, 1996

Some of the Unionist voices who insist on such an elected assembly first approach, fail to recognize that Sinn Fein (who they resist negotiating with), is already a duly recognized legitimate party in the north. In Belfast for example, the party out polls, in first preference votes, the official Ulster Unionist Party.

The people of all of Ireland have already spoken. They shared the joy and hope with President Clinton for lasting peace, as the joint communique envisioned through dialogue at the negotiating table. They do not need another assembly election, nor any other dilatory efforts, that will only serve to harden divisions and stall the peace process, once again.

It is time to end the endless preconditions and dilatory tactics by your government, and by others in Northern Ireland to prevent all-party inclusive talks.

Only through negotiation, not polarization, can we all begin together to make the current fragile peace a permanent peace. At this critical moment in the peace process, through leadership and courage, we must help the people chart the future of Northern Ireland, free of violence and hatred and move quickly towards establishing a lasting peace, justice, and prosperity through dialogue.


We urge your government to set a fixed and concrete date in late February, as envisioned, for all-party inclusive talks.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman
Committee on International
Relations




PETER T. KING
Member of Congress



THOMAS J. MANTON
Member of Congress



RICHARD E. NEAL
Member of Congress



JAMES T. WALSH
Member of Congress

TODAY PROGRAMME MICHAEL ANCRAM INTERVIEW

24 JANUARY 1996

*Nancy -
F.I.
pi*

John Humphries: Your position that there must be decommissioning, the IRA must get rid of weapons before all party talks can begin, that is no longer sustainable.

Michael Ancram: I'm not going to comment on the details of a report in a newspaper when the report is going to be formally published this morning. It would be wrong of me to do so and I'm pretty certain you would not expect me to do. What I can say is that our response to the report which is a very full and interesting report will be measured, it will be constructive, our response will be positive and above all it will be realistic and we will be continuing to pursue our objective of securing the confidence that will bring all parties to the table to begin the talks without which we cannot get a settlement for Northern Ireland.

JH: And you believe that objectives can be achieved without necessarily the IRA and the other paramilitaries handing over weapons before they sit around that table.

MA: What we've always said is that we want to see a start to decommissioning because we believe that that created the confidence to bring all parties round the table. And that's what is the key to all this. We can talk about all party talks til we're blue in the face but the practical reality is that you have to create the situation of confidence which is going to bring all parties around the table so that talks can begin in practice. And so we will be looking at this report very carefully, its been carried out by three very eminent people. We will look at all the recommendations in it, we will look at all the various comments and findings in it and we hope to be able to move forward constructively on the basis of that report in order to try and achieve the confidence which will bring all parties to the table.

sds/28181

JH: So that if there are other ways of creating that feeling of confidence, a commitment to purely democratic means, an end to punishment beatings, an agreement to the principle of decommissioning arms and so on and so on, if there are other ways of doing it then you will look at those and you are not totally wedded to physically handing over weapons.

MA: It is important to remember that what we have been looking for is not a total hand-over of weapons before talks started.

JH: No a gesture was what has always been suggested.

MA: The beginning of a process, there's never been any question that decommissioning and talks would be carrying on together. What we have been talking about is how you start those talks, how you create the confidence to start those talks. I'm not going to preempt the government's response later today. But we will be hoping to move forward constructively as I say, and realistically in our response in order to try and help create that confidence which will bring the parties to the table - it is worth remembering this report is part of one track of two tracks. The second track is the political track, the talks we have been having with all the parties which is designed to try and create the situation to get the talks started.

JH: Those are bilateral talks, separate talks with the parties.

MA: Some of them have been trilateral. The purpose of those talks has been to look at the basis and the agenda and structure for talks. Obviously we will wish to see what the Mitchell Commission report says in detail. We will wish then to consult the parties in those talks in order to take this process forward.

JH: And the difficulty is going to be, if you accept anything less than physically handing over weapons, how do you persuade the Ulster Unionist parties to go to the table?

MA: The practical question, and it remains there as the practical question is how you get all the requisite parties to the table. And

sds/28181

that is what the job of the political track is, to try and assess the best way of doing that. Now the first track, the report on which we are hearing today has been looking at the whole question of the commitment to decommissioning of paramilitary arms and ways in which that can happen. We obviously will wish to look very closely at the comments that are made within the report and the recommendations that are made in regard to those subjects.

JH: But the report is going to be 'helpful' as far as you are concerned.

MA: What I've said is that we are very grateful to these three very eminent persons who have carried out this work in a very short time scale and have done an enormous amount of work on it. It is our hope that we can, in our response, produce a measured, constructive positive and realistic way forward.

JH: It would be very difficult for the British Government, having set up this Commission to reject its recommendations. I know they are not binding on it, but they have given a lot of thought to this, as you say very distinguished people, and they have worked very hard at this and they are independent. It would be very difficult for the British government to say 'we hear what you say, we are not going to go down that road'.

MA: I'm not going to comment on the detail of the report until it's published. And obviously we want to look very closely at the recommendations that are made in the report and those recommendations as I said earlier will largely concentrate on the question of arms.

JH: My broad point is that it's going to be very difficult for you to say 'forget it we've heard what you've said, we don't like it'.

MA: I've already said that I would hope that our response will be measured, constructive, positive and realistic.

E N D

eds/28181

If the majority in Ulster is thwarted, Major will fall⁶

BE IN NO doubt, when Senator George Mitchell today unveils his long-awaited report on arms in Northern Ireland, what is at stake. The issue is victory. It is about who "won" the 25-year conflict which has claimed thousands of British lives. And in any war between two sides, there can only be one winner.

The IRA has sworn it will not give up its arms until all-party negotiations begin on the future of the province. To do so would be to admit to the world that the British Government, assisted by the retaliatory savagery of loyalist paramilitaries, has forced them to the negotiating table. For their part, the Unionists have sworn not to enter into talks until at least some IRA weaponry has been handed over. Any other outcome, to their minds, would be tantamount to a victory for the Provos.

It is difficult to overstate how primitive and simplistic this argument is. If a single weapon clanks to the floor before the talks begin, the Unionists have won. If Sinn Féin/IRA sits down to talks with its arsenal intact, the victory is its. On this conundrum the so-called Northern Ireland "peace process" has been stuck for months. It may yet founder. John Major's greatest achievement as Prime Minister is in the balance, as is peace itself.

If the nine Ulster Unionists feel themselves betrayed by the Mitchell commission, they could withdraw their support from the Government, and precipitate its fall this autumn. If Sinn Féin/IRA feels insufficient progress is being made towards negotiations, the gunmen could return. Neither side can move. It is no wonder that Senator Mitchell "feels disappointed with the quality of the submissions to his commission". So all the signs last night were that at 10 am today the lobby of the Europa Hotel in Belfast will be filled with the rich aroma of fudge; or at least, that is how it will be presented.

There will be some warm words for Unionist ears about the principle of consent — though it may be ambiguous whose consent is to be sought: the people of Northern Ireland, or the people of the entire island. And yet you cannot fudge the unfudgeable. The Government's absolute precondition for talks, that the IRA should

begin to hand over its weapons, will be shaded, if not erased. The condition has already been rejected by Dublin. The signs are that Senator Mitchell will encourage those who believe it to be dispensable.

From a purely military point of view, that is not perhaps disastrous. It always seemed curious that the IRA did not trigger negotiations simply by handing over a couple of rusty shotguns, which would have fully satisfied the letter of the British demands. And if the IRA was cynical enough to do just that, it would be difficult to pretend that it was no longer a fighting force, and that talks could go ahead as with

Some reactions to today's report may be confidently predicted. Ian Paisley will reject it in a bull-calf roar. But it will be far more important to watch the reaction of a bespectacled, ginger-haired man who has become a real force in British politics since taking over from Jim Molyneux last year. David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, is arguably the first top-rank politician the province has produced since Brian Faulkner. He has seen a way round the impasse caused by the arms issue. Mr Trimble's plan has been welcomed alike by polite Protestant opinion, by the Alliance party of John Alderdice, and even, or so

assembly. At first they predicted that it would be a "return to the old Stormont", in which the Protestant majority is remembered as tyrannising the Catholic minority. As one Dublin source put it, the assembly "smacks too much of an internal solution" to Northern Ireland, meaning that nationalist feeling is not respected; or, to put it another way, Dublin is not involved.

Mr Trimble has refined his idea, though, to make clear that North-South issues such as the environment and tourism would be discussed within the assembly. He envisages an institution of 90 people, elected on a single transferable vote system. The Government has recently been nervous that Mr Trimble is moving too fast for them, and undercutting its stance on decommissioning. But London has made clear that it is willing to legislate at least for an interim assembly of 45 members.

And in truth, Mr Major has little choice but to follow pretty closely what Mr Trimble wants. The Ulster Unionists have no particular enthusiasm for Labour, though Mo Mowlam is seen as some improvement on Kevin McNamara. But in 1979 the Unionists discovered the error of backing the losing horse, sticking with their pact with Jim Callaghan and irritating Mrs Thatcher. That was the error which they believe led to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This time, they will have no compunction about ditching Mr Major if they believe he is about to lose office. "We don't support the Government," Mr Trimble said yesterday. "We're deciding things on an issue-by-issue basis. If I was Major," he added, chillingly, "I'd be saying, 'What can I do to give myself a fighting chance in October?'" With a majority dwindling to vanishing point, Mr Major cannot afford to offend the Unionists, and that means backing the assembly.

For the nationalists, the disadvantage is that the trial of electoral strength will expose their weakness, at about 35 per cent for the SDLP and Sinn Féin combined. But the advantages to Sinn Féin should be obvious. Once the assembly is constituted, its debates will effectively be the negotiations. It will be up to the nationalists to prevail in argument. If they are to come to the table with the gun in one hand, the least they can do is submit to the ballot box.

Politics

If there is any suggestion that decommissioning does not come first, the Unionists will need something substantial to appease their followers

Boris Johnson

genuine men of peace. But if the issue of decommissioning was always symbolic, that is because symbols are more important in the political culture of Northern Ireland than anywhere else except, perhaps, among the American Indians.

The people of Ulster, according to a recent Belfast poll, are 83 per cent in favour of the IRA making a start with decommissioning before negotiations begin, but not because they are worried about the latent terrorist threat — they know the Semtex and the Armalites will always be in the shadows. It is because they are offended by the idea that the Republican terrorists will be seen to have killed and maimed innocent people as a way of reaching the negotiating table. If there is any suggestion from Senator Mitchell that decommissioning does not come first, the Unionists will need something substantial in return to appease the opinion of their followers; and that will depend on the creativity of their leaders.

say the polls, by some of the nationalists.

As he said yesterday before seeing the Mitchell report: "If we don't have decommissioning before talks, then the only way forward is through an elected body". If the talks are to begin, he wants a new Northern Ireland assembly as part of the package. The first question to ask an alleged Unionist is how he squares this parliament with unionism. Surely he should be in favour of full-scale integration of Northern Ireland with the political institutions of Westminster? And does not a separate assembly for Northern Ireland undermine that?

To which the answer is yes, in logic; but that, in the real world, full integration is not possible for the foreseeable future. In the real world, Unionists must be content with an institution which is at least likely to bolster those who would keep the union. And that, naturally, is why Dublin and the Catholic SDLP's John Hume are so passionately against the proposal for an

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY JANUARY 24 1996



ARMS AND THE MEN

Mitchell alone may not be enough to secure talks

Since the guns first fell silent in Northern Ireland, peace has depended more on building confidence by patient diplomacy than on great leaps forward. It would be too much to expect that the Mitchell report on decommissioning, to be unveiled today, will dramatically advance the peace process. The issues may be clarified by international negotiators but the responsibility for moving matters on still rests with the politicians: in Belfast, Dublin, and, most crucially, Westminster. John Major, in particular, must now consider how to maintain momentum.

Senator Mitchell and his two colleagues were asked to square a circle. Unionists originally argued that they would not enter talks while Sinn Fein/IRA apparently reserved the right, and certainly the resources, to return to violence if they did not get their way. Conscious of these concerns, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew, outlined during a trip to America the key concession required of the paramilitaries before he was confident that all-party talks could begin. Washington Three, as it became known, stipulated at least a token surrender of weapons.

Sinn Fein/IRA regard Washington Three as a delaying tactic. They insist that their numbers give them the mandate to enter negotiations immediately. From Haifa to Harare, they argue, terrorists have kept their weapons until negotiations ended and 17 months of ceasefire should be seen as commitment enough to peace.

The Mitchell solution seems to be an attempt to get the British Government off the hook of Washington Three by substituting a new test for Sinn Fein/IRA's good faith. Sinn Fein is apparently to be asked to endorse the concept of "consent".

British ministers may be only too happy to find a more flexible route for Sinn Fein to approach the negotiating table but much

will depend on how consent is defined. Any declaration from Sinn Fein would do nothing to assuage Unionist fears unless it recognised that the majority of Northern Ireland's voters must agree to any change. Sinn Fein cannot give such a guarantee without accepting the legitimacy of a Province it exists to oppose. So far it has sought refuge in ambiguity. It is unlikely to change now.

Given the elusiveness of agreement on what constitutes consent, other methods of inching towards inclusive talks may have to be explored. David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionists, has argued for the establishment of a body elected by the people of Northern Ireland in which all the parties could explore positions and build trust.

Significantly, he has already conceded that the IRA need not surrender any arms before Sinn Fein could sit in such a body. Moreover, it would not have to commit itself to a notion of consent at odds with its ideology.

Irish nationalists, from Fianna Fail to the SDLP and Sinn Fein, still see the convention as Mr Trimble's Trojan Horse. They suspect that any elected body would be used by the Unionists to reassert majority rule in Ulster. They should think again. The Unionists have accepted that any such body should have a short shelf-life, specifically to prevent it becoming another Stormont. To his credit the Taoiseach, John Bruton, is believed to feel that such a body could have a role, if it operated alongside the two Governments and sought to build links across the border.

Establishing a constitutional convention would require risk-taking on Mr Major's part, but failing to see if such an initiative would work might pose graver risks. An elected body could concentrate minds and consolidate fragile trust. It does not deserve to be sidelined in the search for peace.

Major should take Mitchell's way out

John Major is being offered a way to break nearly a year's political deadlock in Northern Ireland. He has a plan on his desk that should persuade the Government to set aside its demand that the IRA should give up its weapons before constitutional talks can begin. It sets out in detail how to persuade Sinn Fein to make a genuine and irrevocable commitment to ensuring that the days of violence are over for ever.

The plan drawn up by the former US senator, George Mitchell, and his international commission is published today. The Prime Minister should seize upon it.

Senator Mitchell has not gone soft on Sinn Fein. His plan requires Gerry Adams to go further than ever before in accepting the democratic process in Northern Ireland. If Sinn Fein were to join talks, the party would have to promise to be bound by any democratically agreed settlement, even if it opposed aspects of the deal.

This would be a considerable concession for the republicans, for it would require them implicitly to acknowledge that their historic goal of a united Ireland would have to be sacrificed. And Mr Mitchell has not set aside altogether the ambition to disarm the paramilitaries. He proposes it should be staged. Decommissioning of arms would be expected to take place in parallel with all-party talks, as a way of building confidence.

Mr Mitchell is also expected to make concessions to the Unionist side, favouring their suggestion that an elected assembly should be convened to discuss constitutional reform. Nationalists on both

sides of the Irish border will not like this concession.

Nevertheless, John Major will have to swallow some of his pride, if he is to accept the Mitchell report. Not to accept it would risk derailing the peace process completely. He will have to set aside the repeated demand that the IRA must give in at least some weapons before all-party talks can begin.

This was always an ill-judged demand. In Ireland there is no precedent of rebels handing in guns before talks. The Government's own security forces have made plain their view that the IRA would never agree to the demand. It is almost impossible to find a single conflict around the world where surrender of weapons preceded negotiations.

Yet ministers have stuck doggedly to this precondition for nearly a year. Their insistence led to an Anglo-Irish summit being cancelled in the autumn and nearly blighted President Clinton's visit in November.

It has been difficult to understand the Government's determination. Even the Ulster Unionists have wavered on the issue, indicating that the arms question could be fudged, provided an assembly was elected for constitutional talks.

Now there is a way out, providing Sinn Fein and others are prepared to make similarly difficult concessions. Today, Mr Major should give the Mitchell plan his backing. He would call Sinn Fein's bluff: it would then be up to Gerry Adams to prove that he really believes in peace and democracy.

luel.

1/24

Baldwin, Kenneth

Put in Ireland under AL

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Vershow, Alexander R.
Subject: Peace Process: Next Steps [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, January 03, 1996 10:04AM
Priority: High

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.58)
KBH 4/11/2023

TO: AL
NES

FROM: MAP

SUBJ NEXT STEPS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Senator Mitchell and co. will be returning to NI next week for their second, and presumably final, round of hearings. (I have heard no more about the idea that Rod Lyne suggested to Mike Habib -- that the two governments might ask Mitchell to draw out the work of the commission by conducting a third round.) If Mitchell does present his recommendations to London and Dublin o/a January 19, there will be 6 weeks to work out a way to get the talks started on time. That is presumably when the two tracks will have to be woven together; i.e., when the elected assembly proposal can be used to counterbalance a proposal on decommissioning that is less than the unionists want.

CLOSE HOLD: I heard from Peter Westmacott that the internal HMG memo summarizing the NIO submission to the Mitchell body ends with the comment that "it will be difficult to keep the commission from addressing Washington 3.". Peter was concerned by the implication of that comment and checked with London. Seems to reflect real indecision "at highest levels" about how to proceed. (Keep in mind that the Tory majority will be down to ONE when the Tory party loses the upcoming by-elections.) Peter thinks that London's position is still that it will have to look at whatever recommendations Mitchell comes up with, but it is unsettling that HMG seems to prefer that he not even address the nub of the problem. *when*

The big new issue for Mitchell is the series of murders in Northern Ireland by an organization with the acronym DADD (something about drugs) that everyone believes is a front for the IRA. (Dublin believes it too, as evidenced by the fact that the GOI cancelled planned early releases for IRA prisoners in response to the first two killings last month.) There have now been 5 murders in the last month, a total of 7 in the last year. The victims have all been suspected of some link with the drug trade, but are not apparently the kingpins. The murders have increased public support for decommissioning and bolstered the unionists hard-line arguments, making the Mitchell commission's job much more difficult.

I have not come across any compelling explanation of why the IRA is doing this now. Some unionists are saying the murders are a prelude to the resumption of inter-communal violence -- that the grey line of the cease-fire will be crossed when the IRA kills a loyalist suspected of drug trading and provokes loyalist retaliation. Sinn Fein says the killings reflect dissatisfaction with British footdragging on talks as well as the lack of effective community policing. At least one columnist argues that the hard men need something to do to keep them occupied. (This last one strikes me as plausible, but it still does not answer the question of why now.)

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

--Recommend that AL /NES talk with Mitchell asap about his thoughts, implications of the killings, etc.

--We need to decide whether to issue a WH or Presidential statement condemning the killings. I think we should. Please advise.

Reminder: Michael Ancram will probably come to Washington o/a Jan 29 for consultations with AL.

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Mitchell Report [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, January 24, 1996 9:50AM
Priority: High

NES

I made two changes to the talking points -- in bold at top of p. 2. I think the statement and the guidance are ok as they are. If you agree, I will send to State (for Crowe and Smith) and to the two embassies. Please advise!

By the way, I think the report is outstanding! < < File Attachment: NIPTS.DOC > >

TALKING POINTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

ACTIVE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT

- President Clinton is first U.S. President to become actively engaged in supporting the search for peace in Northern Ireland.
- Historic visit to Northern Ireland on November 30, 1995 -- also a first -- galvanized support for peace among people of Northern Ireland, both Protestant and Catholic.
- Provided momentum to twin-track strategy for moving the peace process forward which was announced by British and Irish governments November 28.

MITCHELL BODY

- Twin track established international body, chaired by Senator George Mitchell, to look into the issue of decommissioning, in parallel with preliminary political discussions among the two governments and the parties of Northern Ireland.
- Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, General de Chastelain of Canada and Mr. Holkeri of Finland, have held two rounds of intensive consultations with relevant parties, and studied the many written submissions they received.
- They submitted their report to the British and Irish Governments on Monday, January 22. The report was made public on the 24th.
- Essence of the report is recommendation that parties commit to principles of non-violence and use of exclusively peaceful and democratic means of influencing political and constitutional decisions.
- Concept is that acceptance of these principles would address underlying concerns, assure that negotiations not held in atmosphere of threat or intimidation.
- Report also suggests a possible compromise on decommissioning of having it take place during talks, as opposed to before or after. Not a formal recommendation from the international body, but a suggestion.

- Report notes that an elective process that is **broadly acceptable** could play a useful role in the process.
- Also points to areas where further confidence building measures from both sides, on such issues as missing persons, prisoners, and policing, could help build trust and confidence.
- Report has made a very positive and significant contribution to the peace process. Pleased that a distinguished American, Senator George Mitchell, has played such an important role in moving process forward.
- Important that report be used to maintain momentum of the process, not picked apart by the different parties. Would hope that parties would consider its recommendations seriously and with an open mind.

POLITICAL TRACK

- Political track has been proceeding while international body received submissions and prepared its report.
- In the political track, the Alliance, SDLP, and Sinn Fein have held trilateral meetings with the two governments. The UUP has maintained its dialogue with the British Government.
- Know governments are discussing range of issues, including ideas elections and further confidence-building measures, that will help reach goal of inclusive all-party talks.
- British and Irish Prime Ministers plan to hold a summit in mid-February at which next steps will be discussed.
- We encourage all parties to show leadership and good-will in actively seeking ways to move the peace process forward.
- Administration intends to remain in contact with the governments and the parties and do whatever we can to support their efforts.
- For long-term, will continue to support economic regeneration in Northern Ireland to assure a bright future for its young people. Considering how best to build on the momentum

generated at the White House trade and investment conference last May.

- As President has said so many times, U.S. role is not to take sides, or advocate any particular outcome. We support those who stand for peace.

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: More on Twin Track (CONFIDENTIAL)
Date: Wednesday, January 17, 1996 5:09PM

TO: AL
NES
FROM: MAP

attached

1. After I sent the memo on elements of a possible deal to get talks going, we received a cable outlining London's thinking on the elected assembly idea (London 537) . Worth reading before making any phone calls. London is not 100% sold on the idea because none of the variants proposed by the unionists meet nationalist/Dublin concerns. HMG is more favorably disposed to the idea than Dublin, obviously, but wants the two governments to stay in sync. After the Mitchell report is issued, NIO officials would expect to reach agreement with their Irish colleagues on what kind of assembly would work best and present it to Major and Bruton for a decision at their mid-February summit.

London seems focussed on the concept of an assembly as a venue for negotiations , though the NIO did note the possibility that an election could serve simply as an index of the relative weights of the parties at the roundtable. There was no mention of having an assembly that would ratify or bless the delegations to the talks but would be essentially separate from them. The NIO estimates that elections could not be held before June and concedes that maintaining momentum in the interim would be difficult.

2. Now the bad news: According to a poll commissioned by the moderate unionist "Belfast Telegraph" and reported in Belfast 011) , 60 percent of the people of Northern Ireland believe that ALL terrorist arms should be decommissioned before all-party talks begin, and an additional 23 percent said that some decommissioning should take place before talks. The most amazing result was that 40% of SDLP supporters favor total decommissioning and 34 % favor partial decommissioning, meaning that 3/4 of John Hume's voters back John Major on this. And only 63% of Sinn Fein supporters said there should be no decommissioning before talks.

While the SDLP is claiming that the wording of the questions predetermined the outcome of the poll, Trimble is making hay. He made a speech in the House of Commons calling on the SDLP and the Irish government to join the popular demand for decommissioning. Taken with the poll in the Irish Republic that showed similar pro-decommissioning feeling among the public there, this really strengthens Trimble's hand (and HMG' s if it wants to cling to Washington 3) and makes Mitchell's task even harder.

What was method?

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 0537 MSGID: M2035696

0AACZYUW RUEHLOA0537 0171646-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 171646Z JAN 96

FM AMEMBASSY ~~LONDON~~

FM: AMEMBASSY ~~LONDON~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.60)
K8H 4/11/2023

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7849

INFO: RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7940
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3863

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ~~LONDON~~ 000537

NSC FOR PETERS AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: 01/16/06

TAGS: PGOV PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG IDEAS ON ~~ELECTED ASSEMBLY~~

REF: DUBLIN 155

1. CLASSIFIED BY GEOFFREY W. CHAPMAN, ACTING POLITICAL
MINISTER COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (S) SUMMARY: HMG IS NOT COMMITTED TO AN ~~ELECTED ASSEMBLY~~ AS PART OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS, NOR HAS IT DEFINED A MODEL FOR HOW AN ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE STRUCTURED. BUT IT DOES SEE THE ASSEMBLY IDEA AS A USEFUL WAY TO KEEP UNIONISTS ENGAGED, IF A PROPOSAL CAN BE DEvised WHICH ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT IRISH GOVERNMENT AND NATIONALIST CONCERNS. HMG ASSUMES AN ASSEMBLY LIKELY WOULD CONSIST OF 90 MEMBERS, WITH FIVE MEMBERS ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS FROM EACH OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S 18 CONSTITUENCIES, BUT OTHER DETAILS REMAIN TO BE EXPLORED. QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED INCLUDE: WOULD AN ASSEMBLY MEET IN PERMANENT PLENARY SESSION OR ONLY OCCASIONALLY TO RATIFY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN COMMITTEE OR AT A ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATION; WOULD DECISIONS BE TAKEN BY MAJORITY VOTE OR CONSENSUS; HOW WOULD COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN BE APPOINTED; HOW TO ENSURE ENGAGEMENT OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS; AND HOW TO PROVIDE FOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE LOYALIST PARTIES. HMG REMAINS IN SYNCH WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN

SYNCH WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN
THOUGH LONDON CLEARLY IS LEANING FARTHER FORWARD THAN IS
DUBLIN. THE ISSUE WILL BE ADDRESSED DEFINITELY BY THE
TWO GOVERNMENTS AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ISSUES ITS
REPORT AND BEFORE THE MID-FEBRUARY ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT.
END SUMMARY.

CURRENT THINKING ON AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY

3. (C) NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DAVID HILL (WHO
RECENTLY REPLACED DAVID BROOKER AS HEAD OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT) AND
JONATHAN STEPHENS BRIEFED US JAN 16 REGARDING BRITISH
GOVERNMENT THINKING ON AN ELECTED NORTHERN IRELAND
ASSEMBLY. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT HMG DOES NOT HAVE A
"BLUEPRINT" FOR HOW AN ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE STRUCTURED;
THE ULTIMATE SHAPE OF ANY PROPOSAL WILL DEPEND ON WHAT
CAN BE AGREED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL
PARTIES. INDEED, WHILE HMG SEES DEFINITE POTENTIAL
ADVANTAGES TO PROCEEDING WITH AN ELECTED BODY, IT ALSO
RECOGNIZES POSSIBLE PITFALLS AND AT THIS POINT IS NOT
COMMITTED TO DOING MORE THAN CONSIDERING OPTIONS.

4. (C) REFERRING TO A PAPER RECEIVED FROM THE IRISH
GOVERNMENT (PRESUMABLY THE SAME ONE NOTED IN REFTEL),
HILL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DUBLIN HAS BEEN FRANK IN
EXPRESSING ITS RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE ROLE OF AN
ELECTED BODY IN THE PEACE PROCESS. HOWEVER, HE POINTED
OUT, DUBLIN HAS NOT RULED OUT AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY
UNDER ANY AND ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AND HAS NOTED ITS
WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS ON THEIR MERITS. IT
REMAINS OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTION IF IRISH
CONCERNS ABOUT AN ASSEMBLY'S REMIT AND AGENDA, THE ROLE
OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE INCLUSION OF ALL THREE
STRANDS AND SO FORTH ARE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED. HILL
SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHARES THESE CONCERNS.
THERE IS NO CURRENT PROPOSAL WHICH MEETS THESE CRITERIA
SO, IF THE EFFORT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL, THE TASK MUST BE
TO CONSTRUCT A PLAN THAT DOES MEET THOSE CONCERNS
WITHOUT LOSING THE SUPPORT OF UNIONIST PROPONENTS.

5. (C) THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS CITED THE "POLARIZING"
EFFECT THAT AN ELECTION AND AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN MIGHT
HAVE ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PROCESS AS A
REASON TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT PROCEEDING WITH THE ASSEMBLY
NOTION. HOWEVER, STEPHENS SAID, THE ELECTION ISSUE
ALREADY HAS BEEN PUT ON THE TABLE AND A DECISION TO
IGNORE IT ALSO WOULD BE POLARIZING. PICKING UP ON A GOLF
METAPHOR, HE AGREED THAT "WE MUST PLAY THE BALL WHERE IT
LIES."

LIES."

6. (S) HILL SAID IT IS HMG'S VIEW THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE UNIONISTS, HAVE AN INTEREST IN GETTING INTO SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL TALKS. THUS, THE POLITICAL PARTIES' ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHETHER THOSE TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT A ROUND TABLE OR IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ELECTED BODY ARE IN LARGE MEASURE ABOUT SEEKING PARTISAN ADVANTAGE IN THE PROCESS. IT IS NOT A BLACK AND WHITE, NATIONALIST VERSUS UNIONIST, QUESTION; THERE ARE MANY SHADES OF GRAY WHICH MUST BE SORTED OUT.

A REVIEW OF PROPOSALS

7. (S) AFTER REVIEWING THE UNFRUITFUL EXPERIENCES OF 1975 ASSEMBLY WHICH FOLLOWED THE COLLAPSE OF THE POWERSHARING ARRANGEMENT, THE 1982-86 ASSEMBLY WHICH DEGENERATED INTO AN EXCLUSIVELY UNIONIST BODY AFTER THE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 **LONDON** 000537

NSC FOR PETERS AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: 01/16/06

TAGS: PGOV PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG IDEAS ON **ELECTED ASSEMBLY**

SDLP REFUSED TO TAKE UP ITS SEATS, AND THE NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND FOUR MAIN PARTIES IN 1991-92, HILL BRIEFLY SKETCHED OUT THE PARTIES' MAIN PROPOSALS. ALL THE PROPOSALS ASSUME AN ASSEMBLY WOULD MEET FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME, PERHAPS ONE OR TWO YEARS. THE ALLIANCE PARTY'S IDEAS, CHARACTERISTICALLY, ARE THE MOST FLEXIBLE AND LEAST DEFINED. ALDERDICE HAS PROPOSED A NEGOTIATING CONVENTION THAT WOULD RELATE TO ALL THREE STRANDS AND INVOLVE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE UUP MODEL POSITS A DELIBERATIVE BODY WHICH WOULD MEET IN PLENARY. COMMITTEES REPORTING TO THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE THE MAIN WORKING ELEMENTS, TAKING EVIDENCE AND ISSUING RECOMMENDATIONS. TRIMBLE ENVISAGES COMMITTEES COULD "TAKE EVIDENCE" FROM THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AS A WAY TO ENCOMPASS THE NORTH-SOUTH STRAND. THE UUP HAS DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "MEETING" SINN FEIN IN AN ASSEMBLY AND "NEGOTIATING" WITH IT THERE. TRIMBLE INSISTS THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THE ASSEMBLY UNLESS A START TO DECOMMISSIONING TAKES PLACE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INCENTIVE FOR NATIONALISTS TO ENTER THE ASSEMBLY UNLESS IT PROVIDES A FORUM FOR NEGOTIATION. HILL POINTED OUT THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEETING AND NEGOTIATING IS NOT CLEAR AND THIS MAY BE TRIMBLE'S EFFORT AT A "FUDGE." THE DUP PLAN ALSO SEEKS TO CREATE A

EFFORT AT A "FUDGE." THE DUP PLAN ALSO SEEKS TO CREATE A ELIBERATIVE ELECTED BODY. ALTHOUGH THE DUP PROPOSAL DOES NOT INCLUDE A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION, IT HAS RECENTLY MODIFIED ITS PLAN TO CALL FOR VOTING ON A PARTY LIST BASIS, IN PART TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SDLP CONCERNS.

8. (X) DESCRIBING THE UUP AND DUP PROPOSALS AS "NON-RUNNERS" AS CURRENTLY CONSTRUCTED, HILL SAID THE ONLY CONCRETE IDEA THAT HMG ACCEPTS AT THIS TIME IS THAT AN ASSEMBLY LIKELY WOULD CONSIST OF 90 MEMBERS. FIVE MEMBERS WOULD BE ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS FROM EACH OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S 18 ELECTORAL DISTRICTS. DETAILS OF HOW THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED, SUCH AS WHETHER BALLOTS WOULD BE CAST FOR PARTY LISTS OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES, REMAIN TO BE EXPLORED.

ISSUES FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION

9. (X) NOTING THE PROBLEMS WITH AND OBJECTIONS TO THE VARIOUS MODELS, HILL SAID THAT SOME SORT OF SYNTHESIS WILL HAVE TO TAKE PLACE TO ADDRESSES THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

-- FORMAT: WOULD THE ELECTION CREATE AN "ASSEMBLY" OR "CONVENTION" TO MEET IN A QUASI-LEGISLATIVE ROLE TO DISCUSS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OR WOULD ELECTION TALLIES SIMPLY SERVE AS AN "INDEX" OF THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AT THE ROUND TABLE. RATHER THAN MEET IN PERMANENT SESSION, COULD THE PLENARY MEET ONLY TWO OR THREE TIMES OVER THE COURSE OF ITS TERM TO RATIFY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN COMMITTEE OR AT A ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATION? HMG LIKELY WOULD FAVOR THE LATTER COURSE AS, BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, IT BELIEVES COMMITTEES WOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE.

-- MAJORITY VOTE OR CONSENSUS DECISIONMAKING: HOW WILL DECISIONS BE TAKEN? ALTHOUGH PROPORTIONAL BALLOTING WILL HELP ADDRESS NATIONALIST CONCERNS ABOUT UNDER REPRESENTATION, UNIONISTS STILL LIKELY WOULD TAKE A MAJORITY OF THE SEATS. THE CONSENSUS-BASED PROCESS AND THE "NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED" FORMULA OF THE 1991-92 NEGOTIATIONS WORKED WELL. HOWEVER, A CONSENSUS SYSTEM IN A BODY WITH 90 MEMBERS LIKELY WOULD RESULT IN DEADLOCK. IS IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE MAJORITY RULE IN PLENARY BUT DECISION BY CONSENSUS IN COMMITTEE? OW WILL COMMITTEE CHAIRS BE ALLOCATED?

-- CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENTS: THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT SUBROGATE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS TO A NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY. NOR DO THEY BELIEVE THAT STRAND ONE

IRELAND ASSEMBLY. NOR DO THEY BELIEVE THAT STRAND ONE TAKES PRIMACY OVER THE NORTH-SOUTH AND EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIPS. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE CONVINCED THEY MUST KEEP CONTROL OF THE PROCESS AND SET THE PACE FOR IT. TRIMBLE'S SUGGESTION THAT THE ASSEMBLY COULD "TAKE EVIDENCE" FROM DUBLIN IS NOT ENOUGH, SO SOME MECHANISM FOR MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE THREE-STRANDED PROCESS MUST BE DEVELOPED.

-- INVOLVEMENT OF LOYALIST PARTIES: HMG BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE SMALL LOYALIST PARTIES REPRESENTED IN ANY ASSEMBLY, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CEASEFIRE. BOTH PARTIES IN THE PAST HAVE ADVOCATED AN ELECTED BODY, BUT APPEAR TO BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS PROMPTED BY CONCERNS THAT THEY MAY NOT WIN ANY SEATS. AT BEST, THE PUP AND UDP COULD WIN ONE SEAT EACH AND ARE MORE LIKELY TO TAKE BUT ONE BETWEEN THEM. SHOULD SOME ARRANGEMENT BE MADE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH MINIMAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 **LONDON** 000537

NSC FOR PETERS AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: 01/16/06

TAGS: PGOV PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG IDEAS ON **ELECTED ASSEMBLY**

REPRESENTATION? (THE WORKERS PARTY IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY SEATS.)

-- TIMING: AN ELECTION COULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN TIME TO MEET THE MID-FEBRUARY TIMETABLE SET OUT IN THE NOV 28 JOINT DECLARATION. ENABLING LEGISLATION FROM THE WESTMINSTER PARLIAMENT AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE ELECTION, AND IN ADDITION THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADEQUATE TIME ALLOWED FOR A CAMPAIGN. THUS, NIO ESTIMATES THAT JUNE 1996 WOULD BE THE EARLIEST AN ELECTION COULD BE HELD. HOW COULD THE PROCESS BE SUSTAINED UNTIL THEN?

-- VENUE: HILL SAID THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEET AT STORMONT. IN FACT, AS RECONSTRUCTION TO REPAIR FIRE DAMAGE TO THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING IS NOT COMPLETE, THE ASSEMBLY PHYSICALLY COULD NOT MEET IN THE OLD STORMONT LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS. GIVEN THE PAST ASSOCIATIONS AND SYMBOLISM, THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY A BAD THING. ADJACENT TO NIO OFFICES AT STORMONT CASTLE (AS DISTINCT FROM THE OLD PARLIAMENT FURTHER UP THE HILL) ARE CONFERENCE ROOMS AND OFFICES WHICH COULD SUPPORT COMMITTEE WORK AND OCCASIONAL PLENARY SESSIONS, BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE ADEQUATE IF THE ASSEMBLY WERE TO MEET IN PERMANENT SESSION. THE

ASSEMBLY WERE TO MEET IN PERMANENT SESSION. THE QUESTION OF VENUE REMAINS OPEN.

TIMETABLE FOR NEXT STEPS

10. (Ø) STEPHENS SAID BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS THE **INTERNATIONAL BODY** WILL MAKE NEXT WEEK. HE NOTED THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SATISFIED WITH HIS SESSION WITH THE COMMISSION LAST WEEK. ALTHOUGH THE TOPIC OF ELECTIONS WAS RAISED IN THAT SESSION, STEPHENS SAID HMG CONSIDERS THAT ISSUE TO BE PART OF THE POLITICAL TRACK AND OUTSIDE SENATOR MITCHELL'S REMIT. IF THE COMMISSION DOES TOUCH ON AN ELECTED BODY, GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY AND SENSITIVITY OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED, HMG HOPES THAT ITS RECOMMENDATION WILL AVOID SPECIFICS THAT ARE BETTER ADDRESSED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. HE REAFFIRMED THAT WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THE COMMISSION MAKES WILL BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR MERITS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

11. (Ø) THE MID-FEBRUARY SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH IS THE NEXT ACTION-FORCING EVENT. AFTER THE **INTERNATIONAL BODY** ISSUES ITS REPORT, HMG EXPECTS TO CONDUCT ANOTHER ROUND OF POLITICAL TRACK MEETINGS WITH THE PARTIES TO TAKE SOUNDINGS. BASED ON THOSE SOUNDINGS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A DECISION ON HOW FAST AND HARD TO PUSH THE ELECTION PROPOSAL. HILL SAID HMG OFFICIALS LIKELY WILL WORK WITH THEIR IRISH COLLEAGUES TO HAVE A MODEL READY ON WHICH THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE A POLITICAL JUDGMENT.

12. (Ø) COMMENT: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT TRIMBLE'S OFT-STATED VIEW THAT THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH WILL FALTER WHEN THE **INTERNATIONAL BODY** FAILS TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES ON WASHINGTON THREE, AND THAT AN **ELECTED ASSEMBLY** IS THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP MOMENTUM IN THE PEACE PROCESS AFTER MID-FEBRUARY. BUT IT DOES SEE THE ASSEMBLY IDEA AS A USEFUL WAY TO KEEP UNIONISTS ENGAGED, IF PROPOSALS CAN BE DEvised WHICH ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NATIONALIST CONCERNS. HMG RECOGNIZES THAT EXISTING PROPOSALS WILL HAVE TO BE XTENSIVELY MODIFIED AND HAS NOT MADE ANY BINDING DECISIONS ON WHETHER AND HOW TO PROCEED. IT REMAINS IN SYNCH WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN THOUGH **LONDON** CLEARLY IS LEANING FARTHER FORWARD THAN IS DUBLIN. END COMMENT.

CROWE
BT

BT
#0537

NNNN

DIST:

DIST>

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 171633Z JAN 96

FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8605

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8076

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5835

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELFAST 0011

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: OPINION POLL RESULTS ON DECOMMISSIONING

1. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A THREE-PART OPINION

POLL COMMISSIONED BY THE "BELFAST TELEGRAPH," THE VAST MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND BELIEVE LOYALIST AND REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARIES SHOULD DECOMMISSION THEIR WEAPONS BEFORE ALL-PARTY TALKS BEGIN. 1,051 PEOPLE, AGED 15 AND OVER, WERE QUESTIONED IN THE POLL. (PARTS 2 AND 3 OF THE POLL DEAL WITH AN ELECTED BODY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE PROVINCE; AND WILL BE COVERED IN SEPARATE CABLES).
END SUMMARY.

2. 60 PER CENT OF THOSE QUESTIONED THOUGHT THAT ALL TERRORIST ARMS SHOULD BE DECOMMISSIONED BEFORE ALL PARTY TALKS START, WHILE 23 PER CENT SAID SOME DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD TAKE PLACE. ONLY 13 PER CENT THOUGHT THAT PARAMILITARIES SHOULD HOLD ON TO THEIR WEAPONS WHILE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. FOUR PER CENT DIDN'T KNOW. THE MAJORITY OF UNIONISTS QUESTIONED, 76 PER CENT OF ULSTER UNIONISTS, AND 86 PER CENT OF DEMOCRATIC UNIONISTS, WANTED TOTAL DISARMAMENT. AMONG SDLP SUPPORTERS, 40 PER CENT FAVORED TOTAL DECOMMISSIONING WITH 34 PER CENT FAVORING PARTIAL DECOMMISSIONING. AMONG ALLIANCE PARTY

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SUPPORTERS, 52 PER CENT THOUGHT ALL WEAPONS SHOULD BE DECOMMISSIONED, WHILE 38 PER CENT CALLED FOR PARTIAL DECOMMISSIONING. IN CONTRAST, AMONG SINN FEIN SUPPORTERS, 63 PER CENT SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO DECOMMISSIONING BEFORE TALKS. THE MAJORITY OF PERSONS WHO SUPPORT LOYALIST FRINGE PARTIES FAVORED TOTAL DECOMMISSIONING. 81 PER CENT OF UDP SUPPORTERS AND 66 PER CENT OF PUP SUPPORTERS FAVORED THIS OPTION.

3. TESTING OPINION ON THE RECENT SPATE OF KILLINGS, NEARLY HALF OF THOSE QUESTIONED BELIEVED THE SHOOTINGS WERE A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRES. THERE WAS MORE CONFIDENCE AMONG CATHOLICS THAN PROTESTANTS THAT THE CEASEFIRES WOULD HOLD. AND, YOUNGER PEOPLE WERE MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND THAN OLDER PEOPLE. THERE WAS HIGHER THAN EXPECTED SUPPORT AMONG PROTESTANTS FOR THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND THE SDLP TO THE PEACE PROCESS. 68 PER CENT SAID DUBLIN HAD MADE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION, WHILE 62 PER CENT SAID THE SAME FOR THE SDLP. ONE IN THREE CATHOLICS SAID THEY WOULD BLAME THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IF VIOLENCE RETURNED TO NORTHERN IRELAND, WHILE THE FIGURE AMONG PROTESTANTS WAS ONE IN TWENTY. 44 PER CENT OF PROTESTANTS SAID THEY WOULD BLAME THE IRA

4. BREAKING DOWN THE RESULTS OF THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH POLL INTO RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS, PROTESTANTS WERE OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOR OF DECOMMISSIONING. 76 PER CENT CALLED FOR TOTAL DECOMMISSIONING WITH 19 PER CENT PARTIAL. AMONG CATHOLICS, 40 PER CENT SAID ALL WEAPONS SHOULD BE DECOMMISSIONED AND 28 PER CENT FAVORED PARTIAL DECOMMISSIONING. ON THE ISSUE OF SINN FEIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS, MOST CATHOLICS (60 PER CENT) THOUGHT THEY MADE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION. SURPRISINGLY, 22 PER CENT OF PROTESTANTS AGREED.

5. REACTING TO THE POLL FINDINGS, UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE, SPEAKING IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, URGED MP'S TO SUPPORT THE STRONG DEMAND FOR DECOMMISSIONING. HE CHALLENGED THE SDLP AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO "JOIN THE INSISTENCE THAT ALL PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS ESTABLISH THEIR

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS....." SDLP LEADER SEAMUS MALLON CALLED THE POLL "ANOTHER TENUOUS EXERCISE IN TRYING TO VERBALISE WHAT WAS A VERY COMPLEX MATTER." HE SAID THE NATURE OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED PREDETERMINED THE NATURE OF THE REPLIES. THE DUP'S NIGEL DODDS SAID THE FINDINGS UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 BELFAST 0011

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: OPINION POLL RESULTS ON DECOMMISSIONING

WERE, "A CLEAR WARNING SHOT ACROSS THE BOWS OF

THE INTERNATIONAL BODYWHO MAY BE CONSIDERING SOME SORT OF FUDGE ON DECOMMISSIONING." THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH OPINED THAT WHILE DAVID TRIMBLE AND IAN PAISLEY MAY WELL HAVE EXPECTED THE RESULTS OF THE POLL, JOHN HUME MAY HAVE BEEN SURPRISED AT THE OPINIONS OF SOME OF HIS PARTY'S SUPPORTERS. THE PAPER SAID THEIR POLL RESULTS SHOULD MAKE ESSENTIAL READING FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ON DECOMMISSIONING. STEPHENS

BT

#0011

NNNN

<MSGID> M2035695

UNCLASSIFIED

Source: Reuters

Subject : IRISH

a1772

^BC-IRISH

^Major holds key to N.Irish peace - Sinn Fein

By Martin Cowley

BELFAST, Northern Ireland (Reuter) - The Irish Republican Army's political arm Sinn Fein Wednesday renewed its call on Britain to drop a demand for a handover of guerrilla arms as the price of full Northern Ireland peace negotiations.

``There has to be a peace settlement,'' Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams said, urging London to drop a precondition that has blocked progress toward all-party talks on making a fragile 17-month truce permanent.

``It's within the gift, within the grasp and within the authority of the British government to make that happen. (British Prime Minister John) Major still holds the key, and he should turn it.''

Adams was speaking to reporters after a ground-breaking first talks session between his party and senior British and Irish ministers in Belfast.

London and Dublin are holding a series of tripartite meetings with parties in British-ruled Northern Ireland as part of a strategy to revive the peace process that includes an independent study of options for dismantling extremists' arsenals.

Britain says it would sanction all-party talks by the end of February if the IRA and rival pro-British Protestant extremists give up arms they used in a war over British sovereignty.

The IRA is adamant it will not surrender guns to British troops, whom it regards as an occupation army. Protestant gunmen who want undiluted British rule refuse to disarm unilaterally.

Former U.S. senator George Mitchell, who heads a three-man peace mission conducting a study of the arms issue, will report next Wednesday and has his second meeting within a week with Major in London Thursday.

His so-called ``International Body'' is working flat out on both sides of the Irish border and in Britain to find a way out of the deadlock.

All sides feel his report could be pivotal in defusing fears of a resumption of conflict.

Adams said Britain's minister in charge of Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew, reiterated London's tough stance during the tripartite talks.

The International Body...really can't deliver if the British government insists that there can be no forward movement,'' Adams said. ``This becomes the crux of all of our deliberations.''

Ireland's Foreign Minister Dick Spring told reporters afterwards the mood of the meeting had been ``positive.''

^REUTER

RB-- 01/17/96 16:05:00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0348

January 23, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: MARY ANN PETERS *MP*
SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Mitchell Report

Attached is your memorandum to the President on the report of the international body on decommissioning. The memo describes the body's recommendations (and the likely reactions of the key players) and lets the President know what we plan to do to keep the process going. It also gives him a heads up that we plan to request drop-bys with Spring and Trimble when they come.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 1/23/06

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *MP* NARA, Date *1/11/16*

2011-0358-F

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.61)
KRM 4/11/2023

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Report of International Body on
Weapons Decommissioning

The final report of the international body set up under the twin-track process to look into decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons will be made public January 24. It was submitted to the British and Irish Governments January 22. Senator Mitchell, who chaired the body, has briefed me on the contents of the report.

In essence, the report recommends that acceptance by the parties of a set of principles and commitments be allowed to substitute for prior decommissioning as the condition for convening talks. The report will suggest, rather than recommend, that decommissioning take place during talks, a compromise which is unacceptable to both the British Government and Sinn Fein.

Mitchell told me that virtually no one believes it is feasible to insist that paramilitaries hand over even a token number of weapons before talks begin. Instead, Sinn Fein and the loyalist parties would commit to:

- use exclusively democratic and peaceful means of influencing politics;
- renounce and oppose the use or threat of violence;
- accept total and verifiable decommissioning in the context of a political settlement;
- abide by the outcome of the negotiations;
- use exclusively democratic and peaceful means in the event one party is not satisfied with an eventual agreement on Northern Ireland's constitutional status; and
- help stop punishment killings and beatings.

Sinn Fein is likely to react negatively to the suggestion that it must take further steps to prove its democratic credentials before talks can be held. Both Sinn Fein and the loyalists may have trouble getting their paramilitary colleagues to agree to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 1/23/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

abide by the outcome of negotiations. No one will be completely happy with the report, but the British Government will be the least satisfied because the Mitchell body so clearly found against its insistence on prior decommissioning.

The international body's report is not by itself going to break the impasse and get all-party talks going. Mitchell believes, and I agree, that without prior decommissioning, the UUP's David Trimble is going to insist on some variation of his elected assembly idea as the price for entering talks. That concept is anathema to the SDLP's John Hume, opposed by Sinn Fein, and viewed with suspicion in Dublin. Even if agreement to hold elections is reached, it will mean a delay of several months in the process. But that is the essential tradeoff: in return for "winning" on prior decommissioning, the nationalists need to accept some kind of elective process as well as the principles recommended by the Mitchell body.

We will issue a statement on January 24 warmly welcoming the international body's report and thanking Senator Mitchell and his colleagues for their contribution to the peace process. I will be making a series of phone calls: to John Holmes in Major's office; to Dick Spring in Dublin; and to Adams, Trimble and Hume. I will urge all of them to put as positive a spin on the report as possible and not to foreclose their options at this point. We will underscore that the international body was only one of the twin tracks and that progress needs to be made in the political track as well.

We expect a procession of visitors to come to Washington in the next few weeks to consult with us before the Major-Bruton summit in mid-February at which the two governments will decide whether/how to go forward. I will recommend you see Spring and Trimble (drop-bys only). Trimble is in the strongest position at present, in part because of Major's dwindling majority in Parliament, and therefore needs the most encouragement to compromise.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0186

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0855-F (4.62)
KBN 4/11/2013

January 17, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *h*
FROM: MARY ANN PETERS *v*
SUBJECT: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Getting to Talks

Following is a menu of elements of a possible deal that would allow all-party talks to take place within the next several months. Depending on Senator Mitchell's thinking, you may want to start discussing possible outcomes with Paddy Teahon and John Holmes this week. When you talk to Adams on Thursday, you may want to sound him out on a no-more-violence statement and accepting the consent principle. You could also float the various elections options, though it is risky to suggest the referendum/no assembly option until we know whether it has any chance with Trimble.

Elected Assembly/Elections for All-Party Talks

Trimble originally had in mind a 90-member debating society with a 2-year term as a substitute for all-party talks, but he now appears to be flexible on the number of members and the term. Paisley's version would be a negotiating body that would in fact constitute the "internal solution" so repugnant to nationalists. No one is actually proposing a return to an internal Northern Ireland legislative body à la Stormont.

What concerns Dublin and the nationalists most is the expectation that the assembly would make decisions about the future of Northern Ireland without the participation or approval of the Irish Government. Thus Dublin would insist that the role of the two governments in an eventual settlement be reaffirmed, along with the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." The nationalists also fear that elections would imply acceptance of majoritarianism (proportionalism) for the purpose of negotiations, and they would want reassurance that negotiations would be held on the basis of "parity of esteem" with all parties having equal weight. (Elections would highlight the apparent inequity of giving parties that receive different

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1/15/06

percentages of the vote the same status at the negotiating table.) Finally, there are practical problems with an elected assembly, such as how many seats it will have, what electoral system to use and how long it will take to hold elections.

There are a number of possible alternatives to the Trimble and Paisley concepts that might be acceptable to the nationalists if these concerns were taken into account:

Option 1: Hold a vote to determine which parties will be invited to participate in all-party talks, with the cutoff set low enough (8%?) to assure that both Sinn Fein and the Alliance make it. Voters would be asked simply to vote for the party they want to represent them in all-party talks. Trimble would not get his assembly, but he would get Sinn Fein to seek a democratic mandate, and the vote would serve as a reminder that the UUP is the largest party in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, any cutoff percentage would probably rule out loyalist participation in the talks.

Option 1A: Same as above but voters would also be asked whether they favor having an elected assembly.

Option 2: Hold elections for representatives to an assembly that would begin work at the same time all-party talks commence. The assembly could form committees to hold hearings on specific issues, including increased North-South cooperation, or it could serve to debate the issues publicly while they are being discussed behind closed doors in the all-party talks. This would resolve some nationalist concerns about an internal solution because the talks and the assembly would be completely separate. To make this option work, unionists would have to be convinced that the assembly had real, important work to do.

Option 2A: Same as above, except the assembly's first act would be to ratify the delegations to the all-party talks. This would increase the legitimacy of the talks in unionist eyes.

Option 3: Hold elections to an assembly that then becomes the negotiating body (for instance by designating a committee). The nationalist concerns outlined above are most relevant to this option.

Progress on Decommissioning

Commitment in Principle to Progress on Decommissioning During Talks: This would allow talks to get started, but it would commit Sinn Fein/IRA to take some action on decommissioning before the final political settlement is reached, which has always been unacceptable to them. The less specific and binding

the commitment, the more palatable it might be to Sinn Fein, but the less persuasive it would be to the unionists.

Commitment to Decommission at a Certain Point in the Process:

Sinn Fein's current position is that decommissioning/destruction of weapons can take place once a political settlement is reached, in the context of the total disarmament of Northern Ireland. That may mean that the IRA would not decommission if the political settlement did not include the removal of all British troops and relinquishing of weapons held legally by private citizens (mostly Protestants). A commitment to decommission at an earlier point in the process would be a step forward. However, it is hard to define a point between the beginning of talks and the conclusion of an agreement, unless you set a date.

More Specifics on Modalities: In its submission to the international body, Sinn Fein said that, in connection with a political settlement and the total disarmament of Northern Ireland, paramilitaries could destroy their own weapons, subject to third-party verification. Further elaboration of this idea would make Sinn Fein/IRA's commitment to eventual decommissioning more believable and help ease unionist concerns. Key questions are who would do the verifying and how. Church of Ireland (Anglican) Archbishop Eames has already offered to help with verification. A detailed modalities plan coupled with the commitment in principle might carry some weight with unionists.

Destruction of Some IRA Weapons: A voluntary "gesture" by Sinn Fein, presumably the destruction of some weapons verified by an unimpeachable person, would make it difficult for the British Government not to convene talks.

Destruction of Some Loyalist Weapons: The loyalists refused Trimble's challenge to put Sinn Fein/IRA on the spot by making a decommissioning gestures of their own (a safe bet by Trimble, since the loyalist position is also that decommissioning cannot take place prior to a political settlement). If the loyalists were to change their minds, it would put pressure on Sinn Fein/IRA to follow suit.

Simultaneous Gesture/Talks: The British would like to see the commission recommend a start to decommissioning in tandem with the start of talks. This would amount to taking the "pre" out of pre-condition, but otherwise leaving Washington 3 intact. It is conceivable that Sinn Fein/IRA would agree to this if it meant that the elected assembly idea would be dropped. The "gesture" would have to be made voluntarily and would involve the destruction, rather than the handover, of weapons.

Statements Forswearing Violence

The IRA has yet to match the "no first use" of violence statement issued by the Combined Loyalist Military Command, nor has Sinn Fein ever made an unequivocal public statement that there are no circumstances under which it would countenance a return to violence. Not only would such statements be difficult for IRA/Sinn Fein to make (because of the tradition of armed struggle dating back to 1798) but unionists would be highly skeptical in light of the recent drug-related murders. The farthest Sinn Fein has gone was Adams' statement of October 9 pledging that the threat of violence would not be used by republicans in all-party negotiations. "It is self evident that threats of any description from any quarter have no role in any such process. They are certainly no part of any talks in which we will engage," is the most quotable part of the statement.

End to Punishment Beatings/Murders

An end to the punishment murders is a *sine qua non* for unionist participation in all-party talks. An end to punishment beatings would create confidence, but not until a significant period of time had elapsed without an incident.

Acceptance of Consent

Sinn Fein has not accepted the principle of consent enshrined in the Downing Street Declaration and the Joint Framework Document. They still see consent as an unacceptable "unionist veto" over the future of Ireland, which they regard as a single entity. They will not use the word "consent," nor have they agreed that a referendum of the people of Northern Ireland would have independent validity. What Sinn Fein has done is moderate their rhetoric markedly and acknowledge that a settlement would require unionist participation. If Sinn Fein were to acknowledge that, as a practical matter, the status of Northern Ireland can only be changed with the consent of a majority of the people there, that would be a significant confidence-building measure.

Amending Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution

This would be major overture to unionists by the Irish Government and would make the cross-border element of an eventual solution easier for unionists to swallow. Dublin has agreed to modify the Constitution in the context of an overall settlement and would be reluctant to give up that leverage before all-party talks even commence.

Confidence-Building Measures by HMG

Civil Rights: The most important step London could take would be to repeal the emergency legislation that suspends the rights of suspects arrested for terrorist crimes. That legislation was renewed by Parliament last fall. Similar legislation is on the books in Ireland too and presumably would also have to be repealed.

Prisoners: HMG could further reduce the remission rate for paramilitary prisoners (unlikely so soon after the reduction last year) or ease the conditions in which paramilitary prisoners are kept.

Security Measures: The British could further reduce the number of checkpoints and other security measures in effect.

Withdraw Troops: They could also rotate additional roulement battalions back to Britain. (Those are the battalions sent to Northern Ireland specifically to combat the Troubles, as opposed to the troops normally based there and the National Guard equivalents.)

Policing: The British could make the white paper meaningful and substantive by proposing changes to the RUC that would attract more Catholics to the ranks. There may be other CBMs related to policing that could be undertaken (community meetings, community questionnaires), though any measures designed to increase the Catholic community's willingness to depend on the RUC for law enforcement would be opposed by Sinn Fein.

Pls edit +
send to
mypp, h2
Done

SODERBERG/DURKIN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
23 March 1996

Durkin: We've been asked to declare ourselves on elections and a body versus negotiations. Hunch is we will stand in elections. We want to stick by February 28 announcement -- elections leading to negotiations without further preconditions.

Unionists will go to forum not negotiations. Our fear is you have bi-cameral negotiations - opt in and out of one. Major trying to use referendum as a trade off for us getting into forum.

Lot of anger in our support base. We need to keep them from drawing a line in the sand.

Regarding Sinn Fein -- all previous understanding was gone. Will try and use recent events to justify Canary Wharf.

Ancram and Mayhew were dishonest. Said they didn't want forum. Presented as occupational therapy. That's why we like our proposal -- just present chairs at the table 13-21 percent seats above 21 to 6 seats etc.

Unionists saying won't negotiate on basis of proportion. Elective process we had less than 40 negotiators. Would have ensured smaller parties. We can't rely on Dublin, London, or D.C. Why did U.S. welcome the British announcement on 21 March? We're just going to have to go on our own. It will only take a small amendment to give forum powers.

Unionists have option to leave negotiations and be in body. So were better off saying we won't go into body. In '92 Unionists proposed an assembly or committee system, elected as modified list systems. If we accept that, hard to argue as unacceptable later. We're being asked to agree to a predetermined outcome.

Soderberg: What was your reaction to British paper on ground rules for negotiations?

Durkin: No details on how the elections get to the negotiations. We were relatively happy about it. Then Ancram made it clear not final. Unionists saying not going into negotiations on basis of that document since 28th, still not welcomed talks.

Governments have to make clear announcement on February 28th stands -- no further preconditions, subject to ground rules paper. People aren't going to stop negotiations by staying out.

If governments are saying that negotiations are going ahead regardless. Need to be made clear. Government is saying we have to go through elections and forum to go to negotiations. Referendum was in announcement made on February 28; now its been ditched for a forum.

If negotiations are going forward -- regardless of whether SDLP is in body. We can't veto things by opting out but unionists can.

Major accused us of threatening boycotting -- best chance for peace.

All left to London; still don't' know why Dublin did that. We can't rely on Dublin or U.S.

Need no requirement to participate in body to participate on negotiations.

Encourage Brits to make clear no requirement to be in forum, that negotiations will go forward regardless.

Major told Paisley that they'd have to sign up to Mitchell principles and give monthly installment of weapons. Even Paisley laughed at that.

Ulster Unionists will join and say even if two governments say they are satisfied they're not and stay out of negotiations.

Brits shouldn't think they can trade that forum for a referendum.

Strand #1 chaired by British. We've conceded that. Others staying we should recover that.

Strand 2: Unionists won't sit in talks that are co-chaired by Irish and British. Won't accept joint authority. So independent chair avoids predetermining outcome.

Strand 3: Spring and Mayhem run.

Unionists: Already ruling out Mitchell because of Martha greeting Adams at dinner.

Perhaps need a special channel on decommissioning -- Stephens, Mitchell-DeChestelain.

Strand 4: People starting to talk about it.

Re Dublin --- re body - Dublin is just saying body issue for Northern Ireland parties. They are focusing on negotiations. Dublin hopefully will be putting up fight to retain most of what's in consultations paper.

Unionists been told by British can bring back suggestions on paper. We've already indicated a broad degree of satisfaction.

Ends up British again get last word. Big test is whether Dublin keeps that paper in tact. If don't, game, set, match for Unionist.

Any violence from IRA and INLA no excuse.

Mood really hardening in nationalist community, aimed at Dublin, Major, Mayhew, even Blair. Blair's running about saying Major can't be trusted, but then stands up and praises Northern Ireland.

There is a danger of INLA going off for a spectacular argument at loyalist targets and loyalists responding.

On January 24, Major said elections would build confidence. Hope he sees on March 24, they don't.

Scrap about negotiations ground rules. Need to clarify how get from elections to negotiations. Need to clarify question of decommissioning.

I think Sinn Fein can live with Mitchell. But depends on conditions. Don't look good now.

Body language of Brits -- can't stand to be in same room with us. They say they know your fear will be a return to Stormont - we say it is not. The issue is you are giving the Unionists what they want.

Hard to see how any of these issues will get easier. People will flex muscles on decommissioning, ground rules on negotiations.

We want to be in position to able to work February 28 Communiqué.

Memorandum of Conversation

John Hume and Tony Lake, March 23, 1996 12:15pm

Hume: Disastrous, complete mess. Brits are playing very strange game. All we asked for was all-party talks. Unionists are now going to block everything.

Lake: Talks are by consensus.

Hume: Unionists will use the forum and ask for majority votes. Government will not act because all majority says don't want it. We wanted all negotiators at the table. They're trying to get things before talks. Mood in the street is bad. See this as disastrous. This is not the way to get talks going. A few months ago, all we needed was a date for talks. They don't even talk privately with us. Present bunch never even talk to us. Very serious, Tony.

Lake: We all have to be driven by one imperative -- getting talks going.

Hume: Agree. Need talks.

Lake: The hoops are unfortunate, but you have a firm date and they will insulate talks from the forum. Working on statement you mentioned. We're so close - have date. Have to get through elections.

Hume: Don't know about that. Elections are about getting their forum. We won't go down roads that don't lead in the right directions. Forum will pass resolutions and they won't go to talks. Cease-fire will be harder after last few days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

NS-FYI per JAH
WUP 2046
3/27

March 26, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS *WUP*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Prime Minister Major

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft message to be sent to British Prime Minister Major on Northern Ireland.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Draft Message to PM Major
Tab B Incoming correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL, W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 3/26/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *MI* NARA, Date *1/14/06*
2011 0385-F

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Reply to Message from Prime Minister Major on
Northern Ireland

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.45)
KBM 4/11/2023

Purpose

To advise Major that nationalist confidence in the peace process is low following his March 21 announcement of an election plan and to suggest that involving Senator Mitchell could bolster confidence in the process.

Background

Prime Minister Major sent you a message on March 20 previewing his announcement the following day of an election in Northern Ireland on May 30 leading to an elected forum independent of the negotiations that begin June 10. None of the Northern Ireland parties liked the "hybrid" electoral system HMG chose, though the unionists dislike it less than the nationalists.

In recent conversations, Hume and Adams and their colleagues have been very distrustful of unionist and British intentions, fearing that the forum will be allowed to control the negotiations and that unionists will prevent discussion of substantive issues until they are satisfied on decommissioning. In addition to reassurance on their specific concerns, one step that could boost nationalist confidence would be the announcement of a role for Senator Mitchell in the talks. Senator Mitchell is amenable to this proposal, and your message to Major offers Mitchell's services.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Major at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Draft Message to Prime Minister Major
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: THE CABINET OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.66)
KBH 4/14/2023

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND -- MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK OUTLINING THE METHOD TO BE USED FOR THE ELECTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE FUNCTION OF THE RESULTING FORUM. AS YOU KNOW, WE WELCOMED YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT AS A FURTHER STEP TOWARD THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BEGINNING JUNE 10. WE ARE TAKING THE POSITION THAT ALL THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE TALKS. TONY LAKE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH JOHN HUME AND GERRY ADAMS WITH THIS MESSAGE. LAST FRIDAY, I ALSO HAD A CHANCE TO SEE IAN PAISLEY, WHO SEEMED FAIRLY UPBEAT ABOUT THE WHOLE PROCESS.

I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BY THE MOOD IN THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY, WHICH IS MORE DEPRESSED AND DISCOURAGED THAN AT ANY TIME WE CAN RECALL. I THINK THERE IS A NEED TO ENGAGE THE NATIONALISTS DIRECTLY ON THEIR CONCERNS AND TO TAKE STEPS TO REASSURE THEM ABOUT THE SCOPE AND AIM OF THE TALKS THAT BEGIN JUNE 10. AS YOU KNOW, THE ISSUE FOR THEM IS ONE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE TALKS WILL HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE, SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA AND NOT BE DERAILED OVER THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. THERE IS ALSO CONCERN, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ALLAYED BY DAVID TRIMBLE'S RECENT STATEMENTS, THAT THE UNIONISTS WILL SEEK TO USE THE FORUM TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS OR AS AN EXCUSE NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS.

I SEE THE PROCESS YOU AND JOHN BRUTON HAVE LAUNCHED AS A WAY TO GET ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT, AFTER YEARS OF SELECTIVE PARTICIPATION AND BOYCOTTS BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SDLP AND SINN FEIN TO PARTICIPATE IN BOTH THE ELECTION AND THE FORUM. OF COURSE THE UNIONIST PARTIES MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE INDEPENDENT OF THE FORUM AND THAT THEY MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS IF THE VOICE OF THEIR VOTERS IS TO BE HEARD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 3/26/06

AS YOU AND JOHN MOVE AHEAD WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TALKS, I WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER WHETHER GEORGE MITCHELL COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE TALKS, AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NORTH-SOUTH STRAND OF NEGOTIATIONS OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE, WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGES FOR BOTH SIDES. NATIONALISTS AND UNIONISTS BOTH WELCOMED THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AND SEE IT AS A BASIS FOR CREATING THE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST NECESSARY TO MOVE FORWARD. I HAVE NOT YET BROACHED THIS WITH GEORGE BUT IF YOU AND JOHN WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON HIM AGAIN, I WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASK HIM TO TAKE ON YET ANOTHER HERCULEAN TASK.

YOU HAVE MY FULL SUPPORT AS YOU MOVE FORWARD WITH THIS PROCESS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008c. cable	John Major to POTUS (3 pages)	03/20/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, Mitchel Report, January 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1707

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: PETERS, NODIST

PREC: RUSH

CLASS: INTERNATIONAL

DTG:

FM: FBIS

TO:

TL, NES

TRIMBLE REVERTS
TO TYPE!

MAP

F3056

FBIS S 056MAR23

UNCLAS 7E

UK: Ulster Unionist Trimble Urges Bruton

To 'Close Down' IRA LD2303124096 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English
GMT 23 Mar 96

By Deric Henderson, PA News]

[FBIS Transcribed

Text] Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble today urged Irish Prime Minister John Bruton to get tough with the terrorists.

"If you seriously want peace, as you say you do, there is one simple way of getting it. Close down the IRA," he told his party's annual conference in Belfast.

And

he also demanded that all sides must make a commitment to deal with weapons decommissioning once full negotiations on the future of Northern Ireland get under way on June 10.

Mr. Trimble warned: "... if the commitment is not given on day one, there will not be a day two."

In his toughest

speech yet since taking over the party leadership last year he said the May 30 elections would show there was no consent in the Province for constitutional change.

He claimed: "They will be a barrier to Dublin's ambitions.

They will show the people of Ulster yearn for peace and democracy."

Mr. Trimble said the IRA attack at Canary Wharf conclusively proved there was no prospect of the republican movement becoming committed exclusively to peaceful means, but instead of making the terrorists amenable to the law the British and Irish governments had responded to their agenda by asking in return only for a "credible ceasefire."

Instead of a resolute defence of the community there was the degrading sight of democratically elected politicians pleading with terrorists.

It was, according to

Mr. Trimble, like John Major and John Bruton standing as investigating officers outside 25 Cromwell Street and asking Fred West to stop his killing in return for a deal.

The Republic, the U.S. Administration and Britain all needed to do more to fight the terrorists.

INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL

He told Mr. Bruton:

"If you seriously want peace as you say you do there is one simple way of getting it. Close down the IRA. Do not tell us you cannot. Your predecessors did exactly that three times."

Mr. Trimble said the United States had just arranged to supply Israel with 100 million dollars-worth of anti-terrorist technological assistance.

He told President Clinton:

"Why don't you consider supplying the Irish Republic with the intelligence equipment it so obviously lacks? And if from your resources you can supply Dublin with the odd back bone, it would help."

If Mr. Major seriously wanted peace then he could end the common travel area and control the land and sea frontiers.

"Once the Dublin government realises that it can no longer export bombs along with its social problems to England it will become as helpful as a Tory backbencher in search of a knighthood."

The Unionist leader said his party would insist there be a total and absolute commitment to decommissioning once the all-party talks start.

"Making that commitment must be the very first thing to be done on June 10. As John Alderdice (Alliance Party leader) has said, if the commitment is not given on day one there will not be a day two."

Mr. Trimble

added: "Any party failing to make that commitment, or later failing to act in accordance with it, will exclude themselves. If that happens, talks must proceed without them."

The May 30 elections would test the parties commitment to peace and democracy, and there was a challenge as well for the new forum to see whether the participants were capable of working constructively with a body representative of the people of Northern Ireland.

Mr. Trimble said: "The response to that challenge may decide whether the potential new institution implicit in the forum is realised."


The threat by the SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour Party] to boycott it was disappointing, but he said sooner or later they and others would have to come to terms that it was for the people of Northern Ireland to determine to which state they belonged.

Unionists, he said, wanted a new assembly accountable to all people and where every party could participate at every level in proportion to their votes.

THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN
COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT
PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.) 23 MAR 1259z es NNNN
FBIS 03/23/96 07:47:00

FROM:
SITREPT

INTERNATIONAL



THE WHITE HOUSE

To: Nancy Soderberg

Date: 3-5-96

From: Marilyn DiGiacobbe

Page 1 of 7

TALKING POINTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS

Anglo-Irish Announcement

Yesterday's announcement by the Irish and British Governments was a major step forward. They have set a firm date for all-party talks -- June 10. That is what we have all been working toward for so long.

There will be an election several weeks before the talks begin. The election will give the parties participating a mandate from the people to negotiate on the future of Northern Ireland.

Form of election has yet to be decided. Will be one subject of intensive consultations that begin Monday.

If no agreement is reached on this and other issues by March 13, the British (with Irish input) will make a decision on what type of election to hold and go ahead and submit legislation to Parliament.

Other issues on the agenda for the March 4-13 consultations are the ground rules for the negotiations that begin June 10 and whether it would be useful to hold a referendum on support for the peace process, John Hume's idea.

We do not take a position on what type of election should be held or whether a referendum would help the peace process at this point. We do urge parties to be flexible take advantage of this opportunity to get to meaningful negotiations.

Sinn Fein can participate in the intensive consultations but not meet at ministerial level with either government without a cease-fire. Sinn Fein can of course participate in the election. And Sinn Fein can participate in the talks once the cease-fire is restored.

The cease-fire was always the condition of Sinn Fein participation in substantive talks. Neither unionists nor nationalists will sit down to negotiate Northern Ireland's future with Sinn Fein while there is a threat of violence. As John Hume said, there can be no guns "on the table, under the table or outside the door."

At beginning of talks, all parties participating will have to accept the principles of non-violence in the Mitchell Report and address the issue of parallel decommissioning as recommended in the Report.

U.S. Role

President issued a statement welcoming Bruton and Major's announcement as a clear path to inclusive talks on the future of Northern Ireland.

He had spoken to both prime ministers most recently on February 23 on their efforts to get the peace process back on track.

We have been in close touch with both governments and all the parties all along, and on an intensified basis since the cease-fire was broken on February.

What that means in practical terms is intensive telephone diplomacy with party leaders and key government spokesmen.

Our role is not to adjudicate between different positions but to urge all players to keep moving toward the strategic objective of substantive negotiations on the future of Northern Ireland.

Not there yet but have passed a real milestone with the setting of the June 10 date.

Cease-fire/Adams

Our strong view is that with a firm date set, it is imperative for IRA to reestablish the cease-fire.

Hume and Adams met with IRA representatives on Wednesday to argue for the peace process. No commitment from IRA.

Want IRA to understand that the political path offers only way forward now. Important they hear that message loud and clear.

Have decided to renew Gerry Adams' visa for three months so that he can be as active as possible in helping get the cease-fire restored.

Adams was only given a one-month single-entry visa into the U.S. when he came here before the cease-fire, but we believe it is important for him to be able to keep in close touch with Irish Americans in this critical period.

Adams has said his purpose in coming is to work on advancing the peace process, not to raise funds. We accept that is the case and have not reimposed a specific fundraising prohibition on his visa.

Understand Adams already has a number of invitations to speak to Irish American groups later in March.

While there is no cease-fire, Adams will not be invited to the White House or have meetings in other government departments. Will not meet with President or Vice President.

(3/1/96)

**EXCERPTS FROM PRESS BRIEFING
BY MIKE MCCURRY, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
MARCH 1, 1996**

MR. MCCURRY: Mr. Adams -- Mr. Hunt's question. Start with -- to remind you, of course, that on Wednesday a very important historic announcement by Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Bruton really gave us a very important breakthrough in the Northern Ireland peace process itself. That is that June 10th will now be fixed as the date certain for all-party talks, which has long been, as you know, a principal goal of President Clinton and of our foreign policy efforts as they relate to the Northern Ireland peace process.

There's a lot of work that's going to have to be done, but we are encouraging all parties to participate in those discussions. And we believe that the announcement of that date gives Sinn Fein and the IRA something that they have long looked for, which is a date certain for all-party talks. Given that, the cease-fire needs to be restored now, and we have repeatedly encouraged the parties through our contacts to do that, just that.

To further the peace process, we've decided to grant a visa to Gerry Adams to visit the United States. It will be a multiple entry, three-month visa. The purpose of giving him that visa is to advance the very peace process that we believe now holds out such promise because of the announcement earlier this week by the two Prime Ministers.

Mr. Adams, in coming here to the United States, will certainly hear from Irish Americans particularly at the time of the year when many Irish Americans celebrate their cultural and historic ties to Ireland. He will hear how anxious the American people are to see peace brought to Northern Ireland, and he will, hopefully, see that we share the sentiments that have now been expressed by tens of thousands of people in the streets of Belfast and Dublin who demonstrated their commitment to the peace process. We believe it's important for that reason that he be allowed to have meetings with people in the Irish American community, talk to them.

Q Is he coming here?

MR. MCCURRY: But I don't expect that -- at this time there are no plans for him to be here.

Q Is he going to be able to raise funds?

MR. MCCURRY: He has told us that he will not fund-raise while he is in the United States and he will so indicate on his visa application.

Q Didn't the IRA announce that it won't go along with the cease-fire? Does it really mean that you can bomb people back to peace talks?

MR. MCCURRY: The statement that the IRA has made in response to the announcement earlier this week by Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Bruton was nuance, but it did not necessarily rule out a cease-fire.

Q Is this a presidential decision on Gerry Adams?

MR. MCCURRY: He was -- it was ultimately the President's decision. It's one in which there was a good deal of discussion involving the National Security Council, the Attorney General, and the State Department as well.

Q Mike, the cause and effect is a little unclear. When Adams was granted the visas before it was after a cease-fire had been declared and was holding and things were moving forward in such a way that it appeared the administration was trying to encourage --

MR. MCCURRY: No, that's not correct.

Q I'm sorry, the last time he was here.

MR. MCCURRY: The last time he was here. The first time he was granted a visa there was no cease-fire in place.

Q And now the cease-fire has been abandoned, Adams has refused to condemn the bombing in which people were killed, he's blamed John Major for -- at least in part for the bombing, and the IRA has refused, so far as we know, to restore the cease-fire and has not agreed to participate in the talks. What exactly is accomplished by granting him a visa to the extent that it is a reward under those circumstances?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, to not dispute every single element of your question, which if I had lengthy time I would, I will say that the President would not have taken the step of approving a visa for Mr. Adams if he did not believe, based on our contacts with Mr. Adams, that this would further the peace process. He's getting this visa because the President believes that will advance the peace process.

Q Well, I know, but --

Q Did he get any kind of commitment?

Q -- if I were Gerry Adams, I'd tell the President that, too. Do you have any -- is it possible for you -- I realize it's delicate in some respects, but is there any way you can lay out, other than Jerry Adams says it will be a good thing, some reason why this makes sense?

MR. MCCURRY: You can understand there's going to be extensive negotiations between the parties. And we hope there will be participation by all the parties in the all-party talks on June 10th. That's going to be a formal negotiation of one set or

another. And our goal, as always, is to encourage the parties as they negotiate and as they have their discussions, to make progress towards peace.

Now, I could say a lot about Mr. Adams and about the situation that he's in, but it's not likely any of it would further the cause of peace in Northern Ireland. And that's why I'm going to be oblique in saying simply that the President believes that the issuance of a visa limited to the purposes that Mr. Adams intends to come to the United States for, he believes will advance the peace process.

Q Mike, to what extent were the --

Q Mike, was London consulted?

MR. MCCURRY: Both the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom are aware of the President's intentions.

Q Are they supportive, or not?

MR. MCCURRY: I'll let them speak for their own governments.

Q You say they're aware. To what extent were the British consulted about this? They weren't, obviously, too happy the first time he received a visa.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I'm not going to attempt to speak for the government of the United Kingdom, but we have had extensive contacts with them and with the Republic of Ireland as we do everything we can to help them further the prospects for peace in the process that they, themselves, launched at Downing Street.

Q Mike, was there ever any conclusion by the administration on what exactly was the extent of Adams' knowledge of the bombing in London?

MR. MCCURRY: We have commented on that publicly, but I'm not aware of any information that changes what we said.

Q Was there a concern that denying the visa would have undermined Adams' credibility?

MR. MCCURRY: I think there were many factors, as you can well imagine, that went into our thinking. And we do everything we can to understand the dynamic that's at play in Northern Ireland as they wrestle with the very difficult issues that they're going to have to surmount if there is to be peace. And we are cognizant of those factors as we make decisions that are related to what we think is best for us to do using our offices to try to further the peace process.

Q Will Mr. Adams be in the White House again?

MR. MCCURRY: No, we're not -- there will be no meetings at the White House or at other government departments until the cease-fire is restored.

Q Where's he going, do we know?

Q Is he limited to going to New York and Boston?

MR. MCCURRY: He is -- I can't read this. It says, "Enough already."
(Laughter.) I'm sorry, what was the question?

Q Where is he going?

Q I said is he restricted?

MR. MCCURRY: My understanding is that he's got intentions to visit -- I've heard at least one stop is Scranton. He'll make some other stops that are associated with visits he will make to the Irish American communities in celebration of St. Patrick's Day.

Q New York, Boston?

MR. MCCURRY: As I say again, I don't expect him here. We will be having a St. Patrick's event appropriate for the occasion and appropriate for the circumstances we're in now that the cease-fire has been broken -- on March 15th.

Q Does that mean the Taoiseach is coming and somebody from --

MR. MCCURRY: We'll have further information on those who will be here at a later day.

Q Do you expect him to make more than one visit to the United States? You said three-month multiple visit. Or is it one?

MR. MCCURRY: He is only -- I'm only aware of plans in connection with St. Patrick's Day, in a matter of weeks. But he will -- it is a multiple-entry visa.

Q And he's prohibited from fundraising by not putting it on the visa specifically?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, he's indicated to us that he doesn't intend to fund-raise, and he's indicated that on his visa application form. Were he to do so, his visa would be revoked.

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 241635Z JAN 96

FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8614
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8085
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5841
UNCLAS BELFAST 0018

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ASEC, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: INITIAL LOCAL REACTION TO MITCHELL REPORT

1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF IAN PAISLEY'S DUP, NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY LOW-KEY IN THEIR INITIAL PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REPORT, WHICH WAS RELEASED IN BELFAST AT 10:00 HOURS LOCAL TIME JANUARY 24. OUR EARLY READ OF LOCAL REACTION IS THAT IT IS MATTER-OF-FACT, WITH THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS URGING CAREFUL STUDY OF THE DOCUMENT AND MANY PEOPLE HERE TERMING THE MITCHELL REPORT "COMMON SENSE" OR "A FUDGE -- BUT A PRACTICAL ONE." THE REPORT HAS CLEARLY GIVEN MOMENTUM TO THE NOTION OF AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY AS A WAY OUT OF THE DECOMMISSIONING STALEMATE. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

2. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SURPRISES IN THE FIRST REACTIONS OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S VARIOUS POLITICAL LEADERS TO THE BODY'S REPORT. MOST POLITICIANS HAVE TRIED TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO EXPRESSING THE DESIRE TO STUDY THE DOCUMENT IN FULL BEFORE MAKING DETAILED COMMENT.

UUP: ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH SOME COMPONENTS OF

UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THE REPORT, BUT WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE COMMITTEE ADDRESSED HIS PARTY'S CALL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY, REITERATING HIS VIEW THAT ELECTIONS TO AN ASSEMBLY ARE THE ONLY VIABLE WAY OF ENTERING ALL-PARTY TALKS. ALTHOUGH HE AFFIRMED HIS PARTY HAD AGREED TO GO ALONG WITH THE MITCHELL REPORT FINDINGS, TRIMBLE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE BODY'S SUGGESTION OF AN AMNESTY IN CONNECTION WITH WEAPONS DECOMMISSIONING.

DUP: DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY LEADER IAN PAISLEY, WHOSE PARTY REFUSED TO MEET THE COMMISSION, REJECTED THE REPORT. HE DESCRIBED IT AS, "A FUDGE, A FARCE AND A FALSEHOOD."

LOYALISTS: FRINGE LOYALIST PARTIES PUP AND UDP WELCOMED THE REPORT AND SAID IT CREATED A BASIS FOR ENTERING ALL-PARTY TALKS.

SINN FEIN: GERRY ADAMS TERMED THE REPORT AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR MOVING FORWARD BUT DECLINED TO GET INTO SPECIFICS OF THE REPORT UNTIL THE PARTY HAD STUDIED IT.

SDLP: THE PARTY VIEWS THE REPORT AS AFFIRMING ITS POSITION THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS SHOULD BEGIN BEFORE DECOMMISSIONING STARTS. JOHN HUME INDICATED A DESIRE TO TALK WITH OTHER PARTIES ABOUT THE REPORT.

ALLIANCE: SEAMUS CLOSE OF ALLIANCE SAID THE REPORT "FACED REALITY" AND "DEALT WITH WHAT IS PRACTICAL." EVERYONE WISHES AND HOPES THAT ALL ARMS WILL BE DECOMMISSIONED, BUT THE REPORT ATTEMPTED TO "DEAL WITH REALITY."

STEPHENS

BT

#0018

NNNN

<MSGID> M2046940

UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 242046Z JAN 96

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8118
INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0603
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 7172
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7969
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3885
UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000859

SENSITIVE

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS; DEPT FOR EUR/UBI AND S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/23/01

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: REACTION TO MITCHELL REPORT

1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (NOFORN).

2. SUMMARY: SPEAKING TO PARLIAMENT JAN 24, PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR WELCOMED THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S RECOGNITION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. HE ENDORSED THE SIX PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE REPORT AND CALLED ON ALL PARTIES TO DO THE SAME. MAJOR SAID THAT A START TO DECOMMISSIONING PRIOR TO ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS HMG'S PREFERRED OPTION FOR PRODUCING THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY TO GET PARTIES TO THE TABLE. IF THAT OPTION IS NOT AVAILABLE, HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT AN ELECTIVE PROCESS TO SECURE A DEMOCRATIC MANDATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. LABOUR LEADER TONY BLAIR VOICED HIS APPROVAL OF MAJOR'S APPROACH AND PLEDGED BIPARTISAN COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT. LEADERS OF THE UUP, DUP AND SDLP ALL ENDORSED THE REPORT'S SIX PRINCIPLES. PREDICTABLY, DAVID TRIMBLE PUSHED HIS PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY WHILE JOHN HUME VOCIFEROUSLY OPPOSED THE IDEA. ALTHOUGH RESOLUTELY POSITIVE IN PUBLIC, PRIVATELY BRITISH OFFICIALS

CONFIDENCE. END SUMMARY.

PM MAJOR'S STATEMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

3. DELIVERING A PREPARED STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS JAN 24 (COPY FAXED TO EUR/UBI), PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR THANKED SENATOR MITCHELL AND HIS COLLEAGUES FOR THE ENERGY AND DETERMINATION WITH WHICH THEY COMPLETED THEIR TASK. AFTER SUMMARIZING THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REPORT, MAJOR WELCOMED ITS RECOGNITION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE AND ENDORSED THE SIX PRINCIPLES IT SET OUT. MAJOR CALLED ON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO AFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES, SAYING ACCEPTANCE BY ALL "WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD." HE ALSO URGED SINN FEIN AND OTHER PARTIES TO SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSENT CONTAINED IN THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. MAJOR WELCOMED THE BODY'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING AND ITS EMPHASIS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

4. AFTER POINTING OUT THE REPORT CONTAINS MUCH FOR HMG TO WELCOME AND ENDORSE, MAJOR TURNED TO THE "PRACTICAL PROBLEM" OF WASHINGTON THREE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE BEST WAY TO GENERATE THE CONFIDENCE REQUIRED TO GET ALL PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IS FOR THE PARAMILITARIES TO MAKE A START TO THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS. HOWEVER, NOTING THE MITCHELL REPORT CONCLUDED THAT PARAMILITARIES WILL NOT DECOMMISSION ANY ARMS PRIOR TO ALL-PARTY TALKS, MAJOR PROPOSED AN ELECTIVE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS "A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE DIRECT ROUTE TO THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY" FOR SUCH TALKS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE SAID, "IT IS POSSIBLE TO IMAGINE DECOMMISSIONING AND QALL-PARTYQ NEGOTIATIONS BEING TAKEN FORWARD IN PARALLEL."

5. THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THAT SOME PARTIES HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT AN ELECTION, BUT MAJOR SAID HE FAILED TO SEE HOW ANYONE IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM COULD VIEW AN ELECTIVE PROCESS WITH AN APPROPRIATE MANDATE AS A BLOCK TO PROGRESS. HE PLEDGED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH ALL

BEGIN "AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE."

6. MAJOR CONCLUDED BY ACKNOWLEDGING HIS PROPOSALS REQUIRE ALL CONCERNED TO TAKE RISKS FOR PEACE. HE PLEDGED TO TAKE SUCH RISKS TO DELIVER "ON A PERMANENT BASIS THE PRECIOUS PRIVILEGE OF PEACE" WHICH THE PEOPLE

UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

OF NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE ENJOYED FOR THE PAST SEVENTEEN MONTHS.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE

7. LABOUR LEADER TONY BLAIR FOLLOWED MAJOR'S PRESENTATION WITH A BRIEF RESTATEMENT OF HIS PARTY'S POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING ITS SUPPORT FOR A START TO DECOMMISSIONING PRIOR TO ALL-PARTY TALKS. HE ACCEPTED THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE MITCHELL

REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS AND GAVE HIS "UNQUALIFIED
UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 000859

SENSITIVE

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS; DEPT FOR EUR/UBI AND S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/23/01

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: REACTION TO MITCHELL REPORT

SUPPORT" TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO PURSUE PEACE. SAYING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS TRANSCENDS NORMAL PARTY POLITICS, BLAIR PLEDGED BIPARTISAN COOPERATION IN THE PARLIAMENT. LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADER PADDY ASHDOWN ECHOED A SIMILAR THEME.

8. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM BLAIR ABOUT THE ELECTIVE PROCESS, MAJOR SAID THE PURPOSE OF AN ELECTION WOULD BE TO IDENTIFY THE PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS; PROVIDE A FRESH DEMOCRATIC MANDATE, TESTING PARTIES' ELECTORAL STRENGTH; PROVIDE POOLS OF REPRESENTATIVES UPON WHICH DELEGATIONS COULD DRAW; INDEX THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF PARTY VIEWS AND; BY MEANS OF WEIGHTED MAJORITY VOTING, TEST THE OUTCOME OF ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR WIDESPREAD PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE. HE REAFFIRMED HIS DETERMINATION THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE PUT BEFORE ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE FORM OF A REFERENDUM.

9. MAJOR WELCOMED BLAIR'S OFFER OF PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION, SAYING HE HOPED THE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION COULD BE INTRODUCED WITHOUT "TOO LONG A DELAY." ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE FOLLOWED BY OFFERING HIS PARTY'S UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE SIX PRINCIPLES. TURNING TO THE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

IS "THE ONLY WAY FORWARD" IN THE ABSENCE OF PRIOR DECOMMISSIONING AND NOTED THAT OVER 70 PERCENT OF THE RESPONDENTS IN A RECENT NORTHERN IRELAND OPINION POLL SUPPORTED THE IDEA. HE WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFER TO MOVE ON AN URGENT BASIS TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. HE SUGGESTED APRIL OR MAY BE SET AS A TARGET FOR HOLDING ELECTIONS "SO WE CAN GET TO WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON BOTH DECOMMISSIONING AND SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS." DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY SPOKESMAN PETER ROBINSON ALSO ENDORSED THE SIX PRINCIPLES AND WENT ON TO PUSH HIS PARTY'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY.

10. VISIBLY AGITATED, SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME ROSE TO DENOUNCE THE ELECTION PROPOSAL. POINTING OUT THAT THE MITCHELL REPORT MERELY NOTED, AND DID NOT RECOMMEND, SUCH AN APPROACH, HUME ACCUSINGLY TOLD MAJOR THAT "IT IS UTTERLY IRRESPONSIBLE FOR YOU TO PLAY POLITICS WITH THE LIVES OF MEN AND WOMEN OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND PARTICULARLY IRRESPONSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BUY VOTES IN THIS HOUSE AS IT TRIES TO KEEP ITSELF IN POWER." HUME DEMANDED THAT MAJOR IMMEDIATELY FIX A DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS RATHER THAN CONTINUE AS DURING "THE SEVENTEEN MONTHS NOW WASTED." THE SPEAKER HAD TO CALL FOR ORDER AS BOTH BENCHES BOOED HUME'S REMARKS. REGAINING HIS COMPOSURE, HUME CLOSED BY RECALLING HIS PARTY'S PRINCIPLED STAND AGAINST VIOLENCE AND VOICING ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE SIX PRINCIPLES.

11. MAJOR RESPONDED BY ACKNOWLEDGING HUME'S CONTRIBUTIONS AND COMMITMENT TO PEACE OVER MANY YEARS. HOWEVER, WHILE HUME HAS BEEN WORKING FOR PEACE LONGER, NO ONE WANTS PEACE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND MORE OR HAS WORKED FOR IT HARDER SINCE THE CURRENT PROCESS BEGAN THAN ME, SAID MAJOR. THE PM FIRMLY DENIED THAT HIS POLICY HAD EVER BEEN INFLUENCED BY SHORT-TERM ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS. "IF IT HAD, I PROBABLY NEVER WOULD HAVE STARTED THIS PROCESS," HE SAID. MAJOR SAID HE WILL TAKE RISKS FOR PEACE, "BUT WILL NEVER BUY VOTES." MAJOR REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO FIX A DATE OR ALL-PARTY TALKS BECAUSE NOT ALL PARTIES WOULD COME. MAJOR CLOSED BY SAYING HE HOPED HUME WOULD NOT NOW MOVE TO ERECT BARRIERS TO THE PEACE THAT HUME HAD WORKED SO HARD TO ACHIEVE.

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

12. IN AN AFTERNOON PREVIEW OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S
STATEMENT, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ASSISTANT UNDER
SECRETARY STEPHEN LEACH TOLD US THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S
REPORT WAS A "MIXED BAG." HE SAID HMG WOULD CONTINUE TO
RESPOND POSITIVELY IN PUBLIC AND WOULD ENCOURAGE ALL
PARTIES TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE. WHILE LEACH
ACKNOWLEDGED THERE IS MUCH HELPFUL IN THE REPORT,
INCLUDING THE SIX PRINCIPLES AND THE "GOOD AND FAIR"
UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 000859

SENSITIVE

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS; DEPT FOR EUR/UBI AND S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/23/01

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: REACTION TO MITCHELL REPORT

GUIDELINES ON DECOMMISSIONING MODALITIES, HMG NATURALLY
IS DISAPPOINTED WITH ITS TREATMENT OF PRIOR
DECOMMISSIONING. HE SAID HMG'S PRIVATE JUDGMENT IS THAT
ADHERENCE BY ALL PARTIES TO THE SIX PRINCIPLES -- WHILE
A GOOD STEP -- PROBABLY "WILL NOT QUITE DO THE TRICK" IN
BUILDING CONFIDENCE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT WILL EXPLORE
THIS IN THE UPCOMING ROUND OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS
WITH THE PARTIES. OVERALL, LEACH WAS SANGUINE ABOUT THE
REPORT, RECOGNIZING THAT NO ONE GOT ALL THAT IT WANTED.

CROWE

BT

#0859

NNNN

<MSGID> M2047305

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	John Holmes to Anthony Lake (3 pages)	01/25/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, Mitchel Report, January 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1707

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	re: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Evaluation of Sinn Fein/IRA Intentions (5 pages)	01/11/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, Mitchel Report, January 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1707

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]