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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Pieces of Northern Ireland Puzzle (2 pages)	12/18/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
001b. email	Mary Peters to Nancy Soderberg re: Peace Process: Next Steps (1 page)	01/03/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
001c. email	Mary Peters to Nancy Soderberg re: Major Bruton Meeting 12/21 (1 page)	12/22/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
002. cable	Ambassador Smith to Tony Lake and Nancy Soderberg (2 pages)	01/31/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
003. memo	re: Summary of Phone Conversation between Mr. Lake and Michael Anoram (2 pages)	09/30/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
004. memo	re: Mr. Lake's September 14 Meeting with Gerry Adams (8 pages)	09/14/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
005. telcon	re: Telcon Between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams (4 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
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[Ireland]-Working File, 1996

2011-0355-F
rs1706

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON GORE '96

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

President Clinton has done more to help achieve peace in Northern Ireland than any other American president. In January 1994, as part of a strategy which succeeded in bringing about an IRA cease-fire, the President granted a visa to Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams to allow him entrance into the United States. President Clinton was the first president to request funding for the International Fund for Ireland, and was also the first to take presidential action to implement the MacBride Principles. The President's unprecedented visit to Northern Ireland in November 1995 galvanized popular support for peace. And President Clinton strongly supports the important role former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell is playing in the peace process as the independent chairman of the talks that began in Belfast on June 10.

Cease Fire: Under President Clinton's leadership, the United States played a key role in bringing about a 17-month cease-fire, the longest in the history of the "troubles." His administration strongly condemned the February 9 IRA bombing and subsequent acts of terrorism and continues to press hard for the IRA to restore the cease-fire. The U.S. remains deeply engaged with the British and Irish governments and parties in efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. The door remains open to Sinn Fein participation in the talks if the IRA cease-fire is restored.

Reduction of Violence: While recent incidents are a cause for serious concern, political violence in Northern Ireland, which used to claim about 100 lives every year, has dropped sharply since the cease-fire was first declared. Hundreds of people are alive today who would have fallen victim to that violence as the loyalist cease-fire continues to hold.

International Fund Ireland: The Clinton administration is the first to request funding for the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). Since its inception in 1986, the IFI has created 29,000 jobs in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic.

Trade: In May 1995 the U.S. Government hosted a conference to promote trade and investment in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic and in June 1996 sponsored a successful info-tech trade mission to Ireland. In the first few months of 1996, companies announced 10 major new investments expected to generate 2,000 jobs in the north. In October 1997 in Pittsburgh, the Commerce Department will sponsor a conference to facilitate business partnerships for the benefit of Northern Ireland and the border counties. Overall, U.S. companies and investors in Ireland employ over 47,000 people with investments over \$8 billion.

McBride Principles: The President in August of this year directed the Administrator of the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Observer to the International Fund for Ireland to implement the fair employment principles (the MacBride Principles) in carrying out their responsibilities with regard to the U.S. contribution to the Fund. The principles are defined in the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act.



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IRELAND IRELAND IRELAND

PRESS RELEASE

IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING RESPONDS TO THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY (MITCHELL BODY)

24 JANUARY, 1996

Responding to the report of the International Body chaired by Senator Mitchell, the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Dick Spring, TD, made the following points:

- The report is clearly objective and fair-minded, representing the unanimous view of three very distinguished individuals from very distinct backgrounds.
- They have clearly gone out of their way to be fair to all viewpoints and to acknowledge the genuine concerns on all sides.
- It is a report which challenges all sides but which, with flexibility and good will, can serve everyone as a road map out of the present dangerous impasse.
- It sets out six carefully considered principles and commitments which, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations.
- We hope that all parties will find it possible to accept these principles in their totality as an essential element in the basis for talks, however challenging that may be.
- We believe the report of the Body gives everyone a basis to move forward without loss of principle and on the basis of reasonable compromise.
- We would appeal to all parties to give it the careful consideration and constructive follow-up which it deserves.
- It remains the firm aim of both Governments to launch substantive all-party talks by the end of February.

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Statement by the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Dick Spring, T.D., to Dáil Éireann

on the Report of the International Body

24th January, 1996

The Report of the International Body has been laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas today. The House will recall that the two Governments established the International Body last November, with a mandate to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The report of the International Body was presented to both the Irish and British Governments simultaneously on Monday, 22nd January, and launched this morning at a press conference hosted by the Body in Belfast.

Before I address the content of the report, I would like on behalf of the Government, and I am sure on behalf of this House also, to express our warm appreciation to the Chairman of the International Body, Senator George Mitchell, and to his colleagues, former Prime Minister Harri Holkeri and General John de Chastelain. The three members of the Body and their staff have displayed enormous commitment, skill and energy in the discharge of their difficult mandate. The Irish and British Governments and the peoples of these islands have every reason to be profoundly grateful to them for the service they have rendered to the cause of peace. I want to take this opportunity also to place on record our thanks to their respective Governments for the practical and moral support they have given to the work of the Body.

The essential goal we seek through the twin-track process is to bring the parties around the table. The ceasefires are an unprecedented opportunity to resolve a tragic conflict on an exclusively peaceful and democratic basis. The democratic process, and the future welfare of all our people, will be poorly served if we allow this opportunity to be lost. The report puts the choice before us very simply:

"This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move

forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century."

For some time there has been a dangerous impasse between two deeply-held and opposing views: Was decommissioning the prior condition for political progress, or, on the contrary, was political progress the prior key to decommissioning? The two Governments launched a twin-track approach, aimed at replacing that essentially sterile and circular debate by a search for complementary progress on both fronts.

The time-frame allocated to the Body was extremely short, reflecting the urgency of the Governments firm aim of launching all-party talks by the end of February. In spite of this pressure, the Body consulted very widely, and I believe their report shows that they used that process to establish a very impressive grasp of the situation and of the difficulties involved.

It is also clear from the report that they have gone to great lengths to be fair to all viewpoints and to acknowledge the genuine concerns on all sides. This report, represents the unanimous and impartial view of three very distinguished individuals, from very distinct backgrounds. It offers all of us a clear and very practical road map to the negotiating table. It sets out the guidelines necessary to ensure that the negotiating process is fully democratic and untainted by any threat or use of force. We accept it without reservation.

I believe the Body, with its valuable outside perspective, has helpfully drawn attention to some positive factors in the present situation which those of us who are totally immersed in it may sometimes be inclined to undervalue. They point to the strength of the deep consensus behind the peace. The very widespread acceptance of the need for total decommissioning, including by former paramilitaries, offers a potentially valuable starting point for the search for an acceptable solution to this problem. They also remind us of the need to give due weight to the sustained observance of the ceasefires (notwithstanding the reprehensible killings and beatings which they so strongly condemn). Our understandable concern with the problems we still need to solve should not blind us to the great

gains already made.

I was particularly impressed at this morning's press conference by Senator Mitchell's passionate appeal to avoid a point-scoring approach to his report. This was, he reminded us, a matter literally of life and death. I hope his appeal will be heeded by all and that the report will be given the careful and positive consideration it so clearly deserves.

I welcome also the focus in the report on the underlying issue of trust, or more accurately, the lack of trust, for which the decommissioning debate is in many ways an over-simplified code. The Body has very skilfully sought to disentangle the different components of the problem, and to treat each in the appropriate way. It recognises that the lack of trust is an essentially political problem, and must be addressed by political means. The six principles it sets out are a stringent and challenging test of commitment to democratic and peaceful methods, including during and after negotiations. I believe accepting and honouring them would be a very persuasive test of the commitment required under Article 10 of the Downing Street Declaration.

However the Body also recognises that there are genuine practical problems arising from the existence of unauthorised weapons which must be resolved as an essential part of a process of total and verifiable decommissioning. These are set out in a realistic and flexible way, leaving many of the details, quite properly, for subsequent negotiation and agreement.

The report of the Body replaces the polemics which had sprung up around the so-called "Washington Three" debate with an alternative, more logical, and ultimately more promising approach. To solve both aspects of the problem in the way they suggest, is ultimately to solve the problem as a whole. That is the crucial point for both Governments, not whether it must be achieved in one step rather than two, or according to one particular prescription rather than another.

While the Body was anxious to stay within its remit, it nevertheless usefully listed a number of further confidence-building measures which, while not the subject of formal recommendations, are

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flagged for the attention of the parties. I believe all these issues should be on the agenda for talks. That includes the proposal for an elective process which, as the report points out, would have to be broadly acceptable if it is to contribute to confidence - or even, I would add, if it is to happen at all. That consideration means that it is for those who support the idea to persuade those who do not. The talks process is there for that.

The next step is for the two Governments working on the basis of the report and addressing also, of course, the various other issues in the political track, to intensify still further the round of preparatory talks so as to achieve the launch of inclusive negotiations. Both Governments remain fully committed to the firm aim and time-frame set out in the November Communiqué in this regard.

The report sets out, in very direct and straightforward terms that every citizen can understand, the unanimous view of the Body on the way forward. I hope that it will be very widely read by the public at large. Even more, I hope all the parties will avail themselves of the opportunity it offers. The unionist parties would gain, perhaps most of all, from an agreed settlement which protected their position and heritage. Political impasse is dangerous for everyone. I believe many unionists recognise that.

The process of negotiation now on offer contains guarantees for the unionist community at every level: The principles set out by the Body guarantee that any attempt to use force or to threaten force will be incompatible with the basis of talks, and will be rejected. The unionists themselves, by participating in talks, will be able to monitor compliance with that directly. Secondly, they have the guarantee that the outcome will be subject to what Prime Minister Major called the "triple lock", including the most stringent possible test of democratic validation, through the process of referendum.

A refusal to negotiate, given all of these safeguards, is only too likely to be decoded as a refusal even to acknowledge the existence of problems for the nationalist community. That attitude has taken a heavy toll in the past, and I hope we can all put it definitively behind us. Negotiations in

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relation to Northern Ireland are not a luxury, and not a favour for any one side to grant or withhold. They are quite simply a necessity, if we are to have a better future for all. Both nationalists and unionists have the duty firstly to listen to each others proposals carefully and constructively across the table, and secondly, to seek a just and honourable accommodation of their differing viewpoints.

The report points the way, but acknowledges that only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress. It challenges all sides to take the necessary risks for peace. The greatest tribute we can pay to the Body for their dedicated work will be to rise to meet that challenge.

END



10 DOWNING STREET

Press Notice

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

27 NOVEMBER 1996

Telephone 0171-930 4433

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

The Government wishes to set out the facts about recent contacts with John Hume and explain its position on the possibility of a new IRA ceasefire.

Mr. Hume has suggested to the Prime Minister over the last few months that a new IRA ceasefire, which would in his view this time become permanent, is available if the Government clarifies its position on various issues, including the nature of the Belfast talks, decommissioning and possible future confidence-building measures.

The Prime Minister has consistently made clear the Government's position that we would welcome a new ceasefire but that we are sceptical about how credible it would be. The Prime Minister has also said from the start that there could be no question of changing our policy, or negotiating with Sinn Fein, to achieve a new ceasefire, which should be declared without further prevarication.

However, he has added that he was prepared to re-state existing policy if that would help.

The Prime Minister accordingly gave Mr. Hume in July the terms of a possible re-statement. Mr. Hume subsequently suggested different forms of words which did not, however, properly reflect the Government's position. The Prime Minister sent Mr. Hume a further text on 23 November. This text included our views, in the light of continuing IRA attacks, notably on the Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn, on the terms and process of entry to apply after any restored IRA ceasefire.

This British Government text is attached. It describes a position which we believe to be fair, balanced and reasonable.

If Sinn Fein want to join the talks, it is for the IRA to declare a restoration of their ceasefire in terms which are convincingly unequivocal, indicate the intention that this ceasefire should be lasting, and reflect commitment to exclusively peaceful means. The fulfilment of paragraph 8 of Command Paper 3232 is directly relevant to this ("parties ... which ... establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process"). If this was followed by the absence of paramilitary activity, including such confidence-building factors as no targeting, surveillance and weapons preparation, the way would be open for the Secretary of State to invite Sinn Fein to participate in the negotiations on an equal basis with other parties, in accordance with the legislation setting up the talks.

The talks are likely to break for Christmas soon and to resume in January at a date yet to be agreed. The statement attached does not determine how early Sinn Fein can join the talks after a ceasefire. That depends on the words and deeds of the IRA and Sinn Fein. We need to see an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire and to make a credible judgement that it is lasting. We need to know that Sinn Fein will sign up to the Mitchell principles. The Government is not erecting new hurdles or seeking delay. We wish to see inclusive talks involving all parties as soon as possible.

But if Sinn Fein continue to exclude themselves from the talks, the talks must of course go on without them.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND TALKS

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the no-warning attack on Thiepval barracks, Lisburn and various arms finds, including the huge find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The purpose of the negotiations is to achieve a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands. The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent.

They will therefore address all the issues relevant to a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both the British and Irish Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations, in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate and the need for sufficient consensus. But no one party can prevent the negotiations continuing by withdrawing from them. No party has an undemocratic advantage. Both Governments intend that the outcome of these negotiations will be submitted for democratic ratification through referendums, North and South.

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The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. The loyalist ceasefire has made an important contribution. It made it possible for the loyalist parties to join the negotiations. They are now playing their part in shaping Northern Ireland's future, as I have acknowledged by meeting their leaders.

The British and Irish Governments agree that, beyond the unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, these negotiations are without preconditions. But in the light of the breaking of the ceasefire and the events since then, assurances are obviously needed that any new ceasefire would be intended to be genuinely unequivocal, i.e., lasting and not simply a tactical device. Consistent with this, the process set out below would follow the declaration by the IRA of an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire with the stated purpose of the conflict being permanently ended.

The successful conclusion of this process would depend on whether words, actions and all the circumstances were consistent with a lasting ceasefire. For example, how far the declaration of a new ceasefire was convincingly unequivocal and intended to be lasting would be an important indicator. Whether or not any paramilitary activity, including surveillance, targeting and weapons preparation, continued would also be directly relevant. Developments which were inconsistent with an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire or Sinn Fein's commitment to the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence would affect consideration adversely. Sufficient time would have to be taken to ensure the requirements of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Command Paper 3232 were accordingly met before Sinn Fein were invited to participate in negotiations.

We envisage that the process would involve:

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- meetings with Sinn Fein at various levels to explore with them what assurances could be given and what confidence-building measures established;
- the British and Irish Governments would invite Sinn Fein to meet them together for the purpose of making an early total and absolute commitment to the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence;
- the two Governments would then propose bilateral and other consultations with all the parties to seek to determine how, if this process were successfully concluded, the negotiations could most constructively be advanced, including the issue of the participants adopting an agreed indicative timeframe for taking stock of their progress;
- following a successful conclusion of the process set out above, including due time for consideration, the two Governments would expect the independent chairmen to convene a plenary session for all participants, with Sinn Fein invited formally to participate, to consider the outcome of these consultations and the future programme of work.

From their entry into negotiations onwards, Sinn Fein would, in common with all the other participants, be subject to all the agreed provisions and rules of procedure. These include those governing the contingency where any participant is no longer entitled to participate on the grounds that they have demonstrably dishonoured the principles of democracy and non-violence.

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The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning. So the opening plenary is addressing the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. In their report, the International Body said the parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations. We and the Irish Government support this compromise approach. Agreement needs to be reached on how to take it forward, so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a block to progress in the negotiations, but can be used to build confidence one step at a time during them. So both Governments have already said they will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding our responsibility to encourage, facilitate and enable agreement over a period through the negotiations.

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This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have difficulties. We will encourage the adoption by the participants of an agreed indicative timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations and, if it would be helpful, will bring forward proposals for this. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held in December to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. The two Governments will also review progress at regular intervals. I will be meeting the Taoiseach on 9 December and the Secretary of State regularly meets the Tanaiste. Progress will be reviewed again by the end of May 1997, a date set in the legislation.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. We support, with equal respect, the varied cultural traditions of both communities. We are also committed to developing policing arrangements so that the police service should enjoy the support of the entire community.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures.

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These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force redeployments, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The process of peace and reconciliation has received valuable economic support from the United States, the European Union and through the International Fund. The negotiations are widely supported internationally and benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of the people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all violence. That is our aim too.

File Ireland

Friends Of Sinn Féin



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 25 January 1996

CONTACT: Mairead Keane, Sinn Féin
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ADAMS REJECTS MAJOR PROPOSAL

Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams speaking today said:

"In my statement yesterday I said that the Mitchell Report had removed all pre-conditions and accepted *'that all issues should be dealt with in open, democratic negotiations.'* This provided a *'basis for moving forward so that all matters can be settled to the satisfaction of all sides as part of the process.'* In other words the Mitchell Report pointed to a possible avenue into all-party talks. This does not suit Mr. Major.

John Major has rejected the Mitchell Report. He has done so because he does not want all party talks and because he feared that Sinn Féin would not reject the principles outlined in the Mitchell Report. The content of these principles already coincides to a large degree with Sinn Féin positions which are a matter of public policy.

The purpose of asking political parties to agree to these principles is, as I understand it, to underscore the commitment of all party who will participate in negotiations to a democratic outcome and to peaceful and democratic methods of influencing that outcome. Sinn Féin's position on this is absolutely clear.

This was most publicly stated in July 1995. Following a meeting in Dublin, the Taoiseach John Bruton, the Tanaiste Dick Spring, John Hume and I jointly reiterated our 'total and absolute commitment to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving political problems,' and the 'objective of an equitable and lasting agreement that can command the consent and allegiance of all.'

John Major does not share that commitment.

Instead, Mr. Major has clearly acted in bad faith, rejecting the core of the Mitchell Report, scuppering the twin track approach and the February date for all-party talks, and in their place has produced a new pre-condition based on a unionist proposal.

Even if this unionist proposal was implemented David Trimble and Ian Paisley have made it clear that unionists will not engage in substantive negotiations."

In conclusion, Mr. Adams said:

"Let me reiterate Sinn Fein's opposition to Major's proposal.

It has nothing to do with consolidating the peace process, it has everything to do with keeping Major in power and with satisfying Unionist resistance to all party talks."

Paid for by the Friends of Sinn Fein, Inc.

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Friends Of Sinn Féin



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 25 January 1996

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British Forces Conduct Raids and Arrests on Morning of US Senator Mitchell's Report

An Irish man in his 70s suffering from cancer is understood to be among a number of nationalists arrested in dawn raids in West Belfast on Wednesday morning, January 24, within hours of Senator George Mitchell's report being published in Belfast city center.

The men are believed to have been taken in armored personnel carriers (APC's) to the notorious Castlereagh interrogation center, itself severally indicted by many international human rights agencies, including Amnesty International.

They were still being held on Thursday evening without access to their legal representatives under British 'Emergency' law enacted over 25 years ago.


Under these draconian 'laws' they can be held for seven days without legal counsel and have no right to silence, a further denial of a defendant's basic human rights removed by the British government several years ago.

British forces would not confirm that other similar house raids or arrests are planned.

Paid for by the Friends of Sinn Féin, Inc.

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Friends Of Sinn Féin



**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
24 January 1996**

**CONTACT: Mairead Keane, Sinn Féin
(202) 331-7886**

Sinn Féin President Responds to Mitchell Commission Report

Commenting on today's report issued by the International Body on Decommissioning, the Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams said:

"In my initial response to the publication of the joint communiqué last November I said that Sinn Féin would seek to explore the possibilities contained in it in a positive way. This was despite our grave and justifiable reservations about the British government's commitment to the peace process. Our party's contribution to each phase of the search for peace has been consistent and positive. Our commitment to inclusive honest dialogue and a democratic peace settlement is absolute.

The impasse in the peace process was caused by the introduction of a new precondition to all-party negotiations by the British government after the IRA cessation. I am glad that the International Body has accepted the argument that this is an unreasonable demand, that it should not be a precondition and that all issues should be dealt with in open, democratic negotiations. This provides a basis for moving forward so that all matters can be settled to the satisfaction of all sides and as part of the process.

The British have already wasted 17 months. There is no justification for further stalling. The onus is very clearly on John Major. He should act now by immediately commencing all-party talks."



For immediate release: 24/1/96

**Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams responding to John Major's comments
in the British House of Commons said:**

**The Mitchell report, published today, was the conclusion of one track of
the twin track which was set up to move us all into all-party talks by
the end of February. In his reaction to this John Major has effectively
dumped the twin-track process.**

**He is quite clearly acting in bad faith by swapping one precondition to
all-party talks for another..**

**John Major has now adopted an entirely unionist agenda in an attempt
to buy unionist votes in Westminster.**

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY

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REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY

22 January 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a “ ‘twin track’ process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.”

2. One track was “to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent.” This has become known as the political track.

3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

“ 5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
 - identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
 - report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits.”

4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials and representatives of other organisations and institutions. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts

of Prime Minister John Major and *Taoiseach* John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other political leaders, institutions, organisations and individuals in the promotion of peace.

9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the peace process.

10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part.

That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

11. Notwithstanding reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.

due weight
to ceasefires

12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists — so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it. *consensus for peace*

14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked “to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.” It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility. *decommission symptom of lack of trust*

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue — or any other issue -- will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland. ★

16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.

17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue to be a principal objective.

18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

*Pol. track
needs
urgency*

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE

19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental

principles of democracy and non-violence Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

20. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:

- a. *To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;*
- b. *To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;*
- c. *To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;*
- d. *To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;*
- e. *To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,*
- f. *To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.*

21. We join the Governments, religious leaders and many others in condemning "punishment" killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.

22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.

23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy, not one influenced by the threat of violence.

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us “to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve” full and verifiable decommissioning.

25. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full

and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal.

27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the need for prior decommissioning before the

cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.

29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.

30. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.

31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before all-party negotiations can begin. The other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.

34. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have

been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.

35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

36. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us “to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning.”

37. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the Governments and their security forces. We believe these estimates to be accurate.

38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting

confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.

The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

39. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender.

The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

40. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.
41. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.

42. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

43. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for destruction would include the cutting up or chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.
44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including:
- the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for subsequent destruction;
 - the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,

- the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either Government.

Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.

46. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, verification must occur to the satisfaction of the commission.
47. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the *Garda Síochána* and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

48. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.
49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

The decommissioning process should be mutual.

50. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

51. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other than decommissioning be taken to build confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.

52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held by security forces. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building of trust.

56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Elections held in

accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.

57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

58. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and antagonistic.

59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present opportunity.


60. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.

61. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the "peace line" requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.


George J. Mitchell


John de Chastelain


Harri Holkeri

22 January 1996

Elements of Deal

- ^{essential}
British - 1) talks inclusive
2) no outcome ruled out in advance
3) reasonable timeframe, progress reviewed ~~at~~ in PM level ~~every~~ 6 months
4) no victory over IRA
5) Mitchell language on decommissioning.
6) ^{if possible} commitment to CBMS.
SE 1) unequivocal ceasefire

~~2) No demand for immediate~~

- 3) acceptance of Mitchell principles
4) Progress on targeting, recruiting, weapons acquisition, [privately]
5) Apology x no fast use

Timeframe

Mitchell / Min. British / Irish meetings immediately

Date in Jan. for inclusion in talks.
IRA ceasefire well before Christmas, ~~talks~~ by end of Jan

Dealbreakers
consent, prior decommissioning

Pre-Ceasefire Actions

- British resume official contacts
- UP call to Adams?
- to close deal?

Potus calls to

Major + Bruton (perhaps to propose)

- Major/Bruton summit in lieu of paper

Setting date for

talks in Jan

if ceasefire is

restored

Irish decommission legislation

Post Ceasefire Actions

- 1 write to WH
TZ? VP?

- IFI

Mitchell / Min Brit

Major

(Dec 15) WH

Major to WH.

?

- fundraising

- terrorism.

Ulster

Democratic

Unionist

Party

SUBMISSION
to the
United States
Administration

INTRODUCTION

Many unfounded allegations have been made about the Unionist people of Northern Ireland and about their political representatives. These allegations, often presented in a plausible manner, have sometimes succeeded in misinforming credulous people.

Northern Ireland's Unionist Parties between them represent over 60% of the electorate. The leader of the UDUP has an influence beyond the confines of his own political Party. Indeed, at each Province-wide election Dr Ian Paisley topped the poll receiving one in every three votes cast. He is the only Unionist politician who has a substantial mandate against the current direction of Government policy.

Contacts between the DUP and the US administration have, in the past, been less than friendly and at times strained. This has not been a direct choice for the DUP. We would far rather be in a position where we felt we could support the administration. We do not however seek an administration partial to the concerns of the Unionist people. We only ask for evenhandedness. We ask that the U.S. administration's opinion of Northern Ireland be guided by knowledge and understanding rather than by Irish Republican and Nationalist clamour.

Unfortunately we cannot detect any attempt by the U.S. administration to seriously take account of the aspirations of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. There appears to be an unrelenting acceptance of the views, demands and position of Irish Nationalists as espoused by John Hume and the Dublin Government and an inert sensitivity and understanding of the position of Irish Republicanism as expressed through its unelected spokesman Gerry Adams.

U.S. ADMINISTRATION POLICY

Indeed, past DUP visits to the U.S. capital have seen attempts by the National Security Advisor to undermine the leader of the DUP. During a previous visit, before the 1994 European election, Mr Lake who had agreed to meet with Dr

Paisley, unexpectedly pulled out of that engagement and sent two officials to insult Dr Paisley with the message that their briefing informed them he would not get re-elected in the 1994 election. In fact the DUP once again topped the poll, receiving more votes than Mr Hume and the Ulster Unionist candidate and is now the largest political party in Northern Ireland. Such an experience has only served to heighten Unionist resentment and suspicion of the administration's agenda.

This suspicion can be traced back to the Presidential election campaign and the three commitments given by the then Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton. Traditionally U.S administrations have viewed the situation in Northern Ireland as a British problem and have seen no proper role there for the United States. The President's election letter of October 1992 to Bruce Morrison, pledged him to send a 'special peace envoy' to Northern Ireland; Secondly, he offered to support the MacBride principles; And thirdly, pledged more pressure on the British Government in the area of human rights. Earlier in the campaign he indicated he would support the granting of a visa to Gerry Adams. Undoubtedly Unionists regard these pledges as anti-British and, as a direct consequence, alien to them.

We would refer you to the *Congressional Research Service Report 93-850F* by Karen E. Donfried of September 1993. This analysis states that **'Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom in domestic and international law, a relationship supported by the majority of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland'**. We would contend that the policy position of the U.S. administration is contrary to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland and at variance with the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland.

The Congressional research report goes on to state the impracticalities of having policy at variance with political reality. It states, **"Nationalists who favor the reunification of Ireland face opposition from unionists and mixed support among Catholics. In an opinion poll (Independent British Social Attitudes Survey) conducted in 1991, 92% of the Protestant and 35% of the Catholic respondents favoured remaining part of the U.K.; 4% of the Protestants and**

53% of the Catholics preferred a United Ireland."

In terms of U.S. administration policy there appears a gross imbalance in favour of the minority point of view in direct opposition to the democratic will of the people of Northern Ireland.

This is a serious departure from a position of neutrality. It is one of sympathy, empathy and direct support for the collective and sectarian position of Irish Nationalism and Irish Republicanism.

The unbalanced approach towards Northern Ireland by the U.S. administration must be addressed in a practical manner. The State Department is keen to point out that the administration is operating in a fair and equitable manner. However, any examples of this are undermined by the constant pro-Irish flow of policy statements.

The most recent Presidential statement on the anniversary of the ceasefire highlighted two matters which lie at the heart of the debate. One is the surrender of paramilitary arms and the second, the call for all-party Talks.

THE SURRENDER OF THE TERRORIST'S WEAPONS.

In March 1994 Assistant Secretary of State Mr Richard C. Holbrooke visited Northern Ireland and reported back to the Committee on International Relations. He said, 'decommissioning must begin now, not just await the end of the talks. Just as no party will be able to have all of its expectations met, in a comprehensive settlement no party can be permitted to retain the means to attempt more violence'.

Your special Advisor to Northern Ireland and the Ambassador to the U.K. now inform my party that this is not the actual position of the U.S. administration. This change in position is disappointing.

The U.S. administration would not sit down and talk with terrorist support

groups in the U.S. yet they are asking Unionists to enter a talks process before the IRA actually disarms. At the time of the Oklahoma bomb we congratulated the President's strong resolve that he would 'not allow the people of this country to be intimidated. Let there be no room for doubt: We will find the people who did this. When we do, justice will be swift, certain and severe'. The underlying principle of revulsion contained in the President's remarks appear, to many in the U.K., as bogus, given his embracing of Gerry Adams. This empathy with Adams is out of place when put beside the President's statement on Sunday, 22nd October to the United Nations calling for a global assault on terrorism.

The twin-track process of having all-party Talks along with an International Commission to *talk* about the modalities of decommissioning is not acceptable. The central issue for the peace process is to prove that it is a real peace. That can only be tested if those organisations capable of wrecking the peace are challenged to abandon undemocratic means. So far they have failed on every count to adhere to democratic means alone. If the IRA does not actually disarm and surrender its guns then there is no real peace process.

Your advisor, Nancy Sodeberg, asked DUP representatives recently was there any point asking the IRA to disarm when we all know they can rearm. If that was actually the case then the IRA would disarm. The fact is that international terrorism has altered considerably. There now exists greater difficulties for a non-state supported terrorist organisation to arm itself than at any previous time. International surveillance and counter terrorism would make a rearmament campaign very difficult. In fact, it would take the IRA years to rearm to its current strength if its existing stockpiles were surrendered.

Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are not some African or Middle-Eastern states whose borders would permit easy access to illegal weaponry. The only practical way to create a lasting peace and to generate the necessary atmosphere for political and security progress is via a credible and actual disarmament of terrorist organisations. The President's statement that he would like to see talks under way before his December visit, without even considering

the enormity of this issue, is incredible when it is suggested that the administration wants to be equal in how it treats all sides in Northern Ireland.

The President has said that **'decommissioning is an essential step towards banishing once and for all the spectre of violence which has haunted Ireland'**. Such words should not be backed up with calls for all-party Talks but rather with an insistence for actual progress on the disarmament issue. Presidential calls to the United Nations should equally apply to IRA terrorism.

ALL-PARTY TALKS

It does not imply that Unionists are unreasonable people because they will not enter unconditional all-party Talks with an armed terrorist group. Such talks would not be sensible because they would give the IRA a political leg-up which it does not deserve, and more importantly, because the terrorists who want access to the talks process remain heavily armed.

"All-party talks now" is a Sinn Fein slogan designed to remove the spotlight of attention from themselves and apply pressure on the British Government. It is an attempt to hold onto IRA arms while slipping into talks. In such talks they would possess the threat that 150 tonnes of weaponry imposes. The fact is, the largest Unionist parties in Northern Ireland who between them represent the majority of Ulster people, will not participate in a talks process designed to enhance the public or negotiating position of a terrorist support group.

This is why the people of Ulster are very concerned about what the President said on 31 August: - **'I urge the parties to sit down together soon to discuss their aspirations for the future as well as their fears and differences.... I would be pleased if talks were underway by the time of my visit.'** For the President to make such a statement either implies he is poorly advised or is peddling the Sinn Fein/Dublin Government position. This position is anathema to the majority of the population of Northern Ireland. For the President to be seen replicating IRA demands is a policy of folly. The administration must desist from such a policy as it will alienate them further from the people of Northern Ireland who

alone will have to agree the way forward.

The idea that all-party Talks would automatically solve our problems is a nonsense. One has only to consider the recent past and recognise that Northern Ireland had a Talks process which failed to reach agreement. Nothing has indicated that participants in all-party Talks would find it easier to achieve success today. What Northern Ireland does not deserve is another talks process failure. That is why Unionists are demanding a democratic process where people enter a Constitutional Convention armed only with their mandate. That Convention will give the people of Northern Ireland, through their elected representatives, ownership of a process which they currently feel excludes them. Each party's influence would be commensurate with their democratically expressed electoral support.

The SDLP and Sinn Fein boycotted the 1982 Constitutional Assembly and the Ulster Unionist Party boycotted the Government's 1980 all-party Talks while the DUP attended both.

CONCLUSION

Such statements give a clear indication of the one-sided nature of the President's position and why there is grave concern about what has been interpreted as outside interference by him in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland.

It is essential for the administration to remain neutral on Northern Ireland. We are not seeking American endorsement for a Unionist position. Each party is only as strong as the people who vote for it. Others seek U.S. intervention because of the weakness of their political position and their failure to attract sufficient electoral support. The administration must recognise that the name of America is being used and abused to defend triumphalistic Nationalism and violent Irish Republicanism which weakens United States in the eyes of the world. We urge the President to encourage progress and avoid interference - listen to all democratically mandated parties in the Province but side with none.

Talks

1. Meeting at official level
2. Loyalist prisoners
3. TL calls
4. Parades
5. Mitchell conf call
6. Gilman letter in SF to talk

Smythe -

Hume - Forum.

MacBride -Hume-AdamsHume: 1) talks are deadly serious,

Comprehensive, inclusive etc

2. Something about a timeframe

3. "asap determined to get
an agreed asap"

3. Decommissioning not a precondition

Harvard Conference -

Hume-Adams Initiative

Adams 1. Issue of decommissioning resolved

as part of one resumption, not as a precondition.

2. Real talks

3. Confidence Bly measures re: prisoners etc.

Aug March -IRA → Terrorist Organization,Martha Pope - W -

Belfast - 522-990 W.

Hume

Forum
Parade deal

Brits

1. Meeting blw SF + Brits
at's administer
Adams's deputy Quentin Thomas
2. Loyalist prisoners
3. Parade deal
4. Host plenary.

Adams

explicit needs
from Hume - Adams

Parade deal
decoms some

Trimble

Mitchell

Get agreement
call Congress

- Hume on Forum
-

US

send signal to
Adams won't help
no sign unless
ceasefire.

Irish

Loyalists

keep ceasefire
Parade deal

Talks

procedural +
agenda discussions
completed

Fire Mayhew

options - don't adjourn Talks

proceeding talks with Adams until ceasefire restored

let Adams into talks

POTUS calls to Mayhew Brits

POTUS strong

Travel by MAP, NES, etc

Write loyalists to WH.



FRONT HOME FINANCE FOREIGN SPORT OPINION EDITORIALS LETTERS

FRONT PAGE

Thursday, June 20, 1996

IRA statement may signal ceasefire

By Geraldine Kennedy, Political Correspondent

The possibility of a ceasefire still seemed to be held open by the IRA last night in a statement admitting responsibility for the Manchester bombing on Saturday.

"We are still prepared to enhance the democratic peace process," the IRA said in a statement issued to RTE. But it also warned that to achieve lasting peace the British government would have to put the democratic rights of all the people of Ireland before "its own party political self-interest".

Sinn Fein president Mr Gerry Adams asserts today, meanwhile, that the Government knew he had been in regular contact with representatives of the IRA leadership to restore the peace process.

In an article submitted to The Irish Times before last night's IRA statement, Mr Adams says he wants to see an end to all armed actions.

He also acknowledges publicly, for the first time, that his party is split on the issue. "Some members of Sinn Fein, like those in other parties, may have a different view," he states.

Responding to the Government's review of its relationship with Sinn Fein after the Adare and Manchester atrocities, Mr Adams firmly believes the opportunity to bring about a peace settlement persists.

In addition, Mr Adams addresses the two questions posed to him by the Government in a more direct manner than before.

To the first - had he yet gone to the IRA to ask for a ceasefire and if not why not - he says: "The Government knows that I have been in regular contact with representatives of the IRA leadership in an effort to restore the peace process.

"I was not acting as a conduit between the IRA and the Irish Government so although I understand the difficulties facing the Government I was surprised by their question and by the way it was put "

To the second question - does his party continue to support the armed struggle of the IRA - Mr Adams says: "Sinn Fein does not advocate

Mary Holland: Increased pressure on Adams politically destructive

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Descriptions issued as police hunt Manchester bombers

Clinton views bomb as effort to undermine SF president

Dispute over role of governments dominates talks

Adams insists SF does not advocate armed struggle

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armed struggle. We are totally and absolutely committed to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving political problems."

Admitting "grave political difficulties" in the aftermath of the Adare and Manchester incidents, Mr Adams maintains that political isolation and exclusion can make no constructive contribution to the development of a real process of negotiation.

"Dialogue provided the only real hope for progress in the present difficult circumstances.

All Sinn Fein's efforts "and the efforts of everyone we were in contact with" had the clear aim of rebuilding the collapsed peace process.

Up to the tragic killing of Garda McCabe, the engagement with the Government was particularly constructive. "We were making progress," said Mr Adams.

He believes the Government was more focused recently than at other times, especially in its negotiations with the British leading up to the agreement on Senator George Mitchell's role in the all-party talks on June 6th.

"From my contact with the IRA representatives, it is clear that they view the British government's stance as the biggest obstacle to any effort to bring about a restoration of their ceasefire," Mr Adams concludes.

The British government's bad faith, so evident during the 18month cessation, was at the core of all of this.

Its refusal to have any contact with republicans exacerbated the difficulty for those of them who wanted to play a constructive role in resolving those difficulties.

Meanwhile, the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister expressed their determination to continue with the all-party talks in a 20-minute telephone conversation yesterday.

In the pre-arranged call, Mr Bruton and Mr Major discussed the aftermath of the Adare and Manchester atrocities. They expressed revulsion towards the IRA in relation to the two outrages.

The "position of Sinn Fein" was also discussed by the two leaders, according to a Government spokesman.

Mr Bruton and Mr Major also talked about the EU summit in Florence this weekend and matters relating to the Irish Presidency.

THE IRISH TIMES

ON THE WEB

FRONT HOME FINANCE FOREIGN SPORT OPINION EDITORIALS LETTERS

HOME NEWS

Thursday, June 20, 1996

Text of IRA statement

The following is the text of the IRA statement issued last night:

An active service unit of Oglagh na hÉireann placed a device which detonated in central Manchester on Saturday morning last. We sincerely regret the injuries to civilians which occurred.

Warnings of one hour and 45 minutes were given to avoid such injuries. Oglagh na nÉireann called a complete cessation of military operations in August '94 to enhance the democratic peace process. We ended that cessation on February 9 because the British Government had squandered that opportunity.

The British Government has spent the last 22 months since August '94 trying to force the surrender of IRA weapons and the defeat of the republican struggle. We are still prepared to enhance the democratic peace process. We appreciate the efforts of those who have made a genuine contribution but if there is to be a lasting peace, if the conflict is to be resolved in Britain and Ireland, then the British Government must put the democratic rights of all of the people of Ireland before its own party political self-interest.

The statement is issued by P. O'Neill,
Irish Republican Publicity Bureau,
Dublin.
19/06/96

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12 March 1996,

Mr Tony Lake,
National Security Advisor,
White House,
WASHINGTON DC,
U.S.A.



When we last met we discussed electoral systems for All-Party Talks. I have produced a paper on this matter and have shared it with the British and Irish Governments, and with a number of the parties here.

I thought that it might be of interest to you and your colleagues.

Hope that I may get a chance to see you later in the week, since my wife and I are coming over for the St Patrick's Day events.

Yours sincerely


Dr John Alderdice
PARTY LEADER

LAKE
BELLER
BASS

SODERBERG
DOHSE
HARMON

How for meeting

Elections to All-Party Talks

An Alliance Party Paper

Principles

Alliance wants to see All-Party Talks on as *inclusive* a basis as possible, starting at the *earliest* possible date, without continuing lengthy debate about electoral systems causing unnecessary delay. It would also be an advantage if a system could be used for which the legal basis was clear, and which did not require the delay occasioned by entirely novel legal drafting.

The electoral system should be easily *understood* by voters, parties, and officials, and should contribute to the election of a body which is *widely representative* of all significant groupings in the community.

After due consideration, we are strongly of the view that the elections should be held on a Westminster constituency basis. Such an approach is *familiar* to the electorate and will provide a sense of *local involvement* and identification with the process across the province. We are convinced that such a system will ensure the election of the most widely representative range of negotiators, and it is also an advantage that candidates seeking election under a constituency STV system will have an incentive to make their appeal as wide as possible, in order to *seek transfers from the supporters of other parties*.

Representatives elected on such a basis will be more likely to be conscious of, and responsive to, the wishes of the wider community (which is likely to be pro-compromise) than representatives who take their authority simply from appointment through party mechanisms and who are answerable only to party committees (which are likely to be more hard-line).

Individuals should be elected rather than parties. Electing individuals not only encourages a sense of identification and involvement for local communities, but also, under STV, allows voters the opportunity to express a preference between candidates of the same party. A party voting system would require a mechanism for party registration, which could be the subject of legal challenge. A system of voting for parties would inevitably lead to party nominees being tied to party manifestos, having to report back continually to party committees and conferences, and lacking the same freedom and confidence to negotiate.

Elections should produce a result which is as proportional and fair as is practically possible, and should involve a transferable vote system, since this vote system undermines the argument about 'wasted votes' which so severely weakens smaller parties.

The lesson of European (province-wide constituency) elections is very relevant to this consideration.

The Electoral Facts - from previous experience

The DUP has consistently beaten the Ulster Unionists in European elections -which are the only NI elections to use a province-wide constituency. The DUP has always vastly overperformed in these elections as compared to the outcomes in any other elections. The SDLP also does better against Sinn Fein in European elections than in local elections, at least since 1984. It is useful to compare the Euro-Results with those achieved in Local Government Elections, Assembly Elections and Westminster Elections.

One element in the difference in election outcomes may be the traditional difference in electoral turnout between the East of the province and the West. Over many years the voters in the West have turned out in much larger numbers, and this skews the results towards parties with a more largely rural base, and against parties which have their main base in the East of the province and in urban areas. While this may account for a proportion of some of the difference it is not one of the more important reasons.

It would appear that the most significant explanation for the marked difference in the results in province-wide constituency elections may be that such elections concentrate attention on certain prominent personalities and that many people set aside their particular policy and party preferences. They may be voting for the candidate they see as being the strongest representative of their section of the community. The result is therefore a divisive two-horse race, with people voting not for the candidate or party they prefer but for the representative of their community who they see as most likely to do well. It becomes in effect a matter of voting for tribal champions in a sectarian headcount.

The first European election in 1979 is particularly revealing and shows in full force the electoral effect of using a province wide voting system, without the added effects of precedent.

In the local elections in 1977 the UUP got 29.6%, the DUP 12.7%.

In the Westminster election on May 3rd 1979 the UUP got 36.6% of the total vote (fighting 11 seats), while the DUP got 10.2% (five seats).

In the European elections on June 7 the DUP got 29.8%. The UUP got 21.9%. The Alliance vote fell from 14.4% in the 1977 locals and 11.8% in the 1979 Westminster to 6.8% in the European election. Oliver Napier got 15,066 votes in East Belfast in May 1979, and 39,026 across the province four weeks later.

There were no dramatic developments between the May and June elections which would account for the changed voting pattern in the European Election, which was seen as a

watershed in Northern Ireland politics. It established Ian Paisley as the dominant figure in Unionism and led directly to the resignation of Harry West as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party. The DUP, riding on the crest of a wave followed the 1979 results with good results in elections in 1981 and 1982. Their vote in constituency based elections has since fallen back sharply, but they continue to achieve very much their best results, and to beat the Ulster Unionist Party by clear margins, in European elections. In the May 1989 Local Government Elections the UUP took 31% against the DUP's 18%; while in the European election in June the result was reversed to UUP 22% : DUP 30%.

Smaller Parties

Much has been claimed about the benefits of a province-wide constituency election for smaller parties. While simple mathematics would seem to support, such a view the political facts would suggest otherwise. The case of the Workers Party, which has actually contested all Northern Ireland elections since 1973, is the most accurate indicator of the likely fortunes of other small parties which have come to the scene more recently.

There has been a very clear trend in Worker's Party results. The *best* result they have ever achieved in a European election was worse than their *worst* result in any other form of election (see appendix 2). In 1989 they took 1.7% in the Westminster elections (fighting 7 constituencies out of 12) against 0.8 in the European election a month later. In 1989 they got 2.1 % in the local elections, fighting a very limited number of seats, against 1% in the province wide European election. The full history of their results is tabulated in Appendix 2.

Why might a small party like the Worker's Party (or the newer Loyalist Parties) do so poorly in such elections? It is clear that the problem is not just one of the voter believing that the candidate cannot be elected, for in Westminster Elections, where there is similarly no chance of election, the results as an overall percentage are much better. One part of the problem may be to do with manpower and other resources. These parties are only organised in limited (usually urban) areas. They do not have the resources to fight a province-wide election effectively. Instead of being able to muster resources locally and target seats, their limited capacity is dissipated province-wide. Differential voter turnout between the urban East and the rural West may also be significant, but it seems likely that much the most important element is the 'tribal champion' ethos of the province-wide constituency.

In a list system - where electors can vote only for a single party - the smaller parties become marginalised, through suffering from the wasted vote and 'one strong voice' arguments. In a pure party system they would also suffer from the unfamiliarity of their names/initials. They will do best, even in overall percentage terms, in multi-constituency elections, where they can concentrate on the areas where they are strongest. In such areas of concentration they may well be able to stay in the race long enough to get transfers from other candidates (eg Hugh Smyth in West Belfast, might well stay in

longer than an Alliance candidate and get transfers which keep him ahead of the DUP/UUP, then taking their transfers be elected.) Such a process of building on transfers is of course impossible in a list system. Even more problematic for the two Loyalist parties is the fact that in a list system both will simply get their own vote, and will not transfer even to each other. In an STV system they could transfer to each other and thus improve the chances for the better performing Loyalist in any area.

If it is felt essential to provide for circumstances in which they fail to be elected in any constituency their involvement could perhaps be ensured by providing, by a simple mechanism, that any party grouping which fights 6 seats and obtains 1% of the total vote is entitled to one seat, though this may not be an easy system to operate. (These figures are of course purely arbitrary.)

It is also worth noting some of the other disadvantages of a party system in which people vote only for a party name. This system could well lead to the election of unknown and idiosyncratic candidates claiming to represent other views. It is also worth remembering that Rev Hugh Ross, standing on an Independent Ulster platform, obtained a significant percentage in the 1994 Euro election, and there are sometimes diversionary attempts to create various Labour and Tory parties. An untried and unpredictable system may have unpredictable results.

A system which is based on individual candidates standing in individual areas, and then topping up the votes of candidates who *associate with each other on their nomination papers and who fought in a minimum number of constituencies*, ought to eliminate the really fringe parties and candidates and might also simplify the problems of party registration. All of these methods of tinkering with the system to address the concerns of very small and divided loyalist opinion will however complicate the legislation, and may create more problems than they solve.

Having examined the facts, as distinct from the purely mathematical possibilities put forward by pundits who have a limited understanding of the political realities in elections, the clear conclusions which one must draw are as follows:

- The form of election influences the way people vote. It will not only affect which party they vote for, but also whether they tend to vote in a way which exaggerates division, or which optimises cross-community agreement.
- The use of province-wide polls has consistently and significantly favoured the DUP, and also the SDLP. It is therefore not surprising that it is these parties which have proposed such a system. Much caution however should be exercised in any proposal which sets Proportional Representation aside. In the past this was done for party advantage in Northern Ireland, much to the detriment of political life here.

- The experience of the Workers Party (the one small party which has consistently fought all elections) shows that small parties are 'squeezed' in 'province-wide' elections, even when the use of STV mitigates against the wasted vote argument.

Voting for a Party, not a Person

As already suggested a system based on voting for parties rather than individuals would result in negotiators who will be mandated by party appointment. They would not be likely to represent the more independent and flexible strands of party thinking. They would be at all times under the direction of the party leader and of the party apparatus, would be tied to party manifestos and would have to report back to party structures.

It is worth noting too that there is no tradition in these islands of voting solely for a political party. The tradition is to vote for a person, who may or may not represent a party. Only with some reticence should one move away from a system which allows small local groups and independent minded individuals to stand for election and represent the views of particular interests and viewpoints. Some would argue that we have already moved too strongly towards large parties governed by a tough 'whipping' system. This at least has gradually grown up by convention. A clear step away from such individualism should not come without due thought and public debate.

A list system obviously requires a party list. Parties as currently ordered have no constitutional mechanism for constructing such lists, and so any party which was going to construct a democratic way of selecting its representatives, would need to immediately introduce internal constitutional change since the absence of precedent means that no local parties have currently the internal mechanisms for democratic selection of such candidates - only for their appointment by party leaders.

A province-wide party list system or a party plebiscite would also require a fool-proof system of party registration, for which there is no British precedent or model. There are models in other countries. The establishment of the bona fides of a political party in Denmark for example requires for registration a petition of names amounting to the number of voters in one electoral area. In Northern Ireland terms this would be 1/90 of the electors, in an election using the (18 x 5) model. It is likely that small parties would not find it easy to create a list of 7-8,000 supportive electors.

The reason for such tight legal arrangements for the registration of political parties comes out of the experience of using such systems. Disputes about ownership of names and variations of names can, and would almost certainly would, cause huge problems, with the very real possibility that such disputes could finish up in court, disrupting the process and reducing it to ridicule. If this seems far fetched it is worthwhile to consider the following:

- ALLIANCE PARTY 01232653663 P:07
- The 'Literal Democrat' in the last European election in the UK, cost the Liberal Democrats a European seat, a matter which was sustained in an electoral court.
 - A person has changed his name by deed poll to Sir Nicholas Lyell and is proposing to stand against the Attorney-General as a 'Conversative'.
 - The party led by David Trimble could hardly stand both as Official Unionists and as Ulster Unionists, leaving the other name, or similar variations, free for others to claim. This technique has been used on Belfast City Council to create a separate Unionist Grouping.

There may seem to be an element of silliness to this issue but actually it is extremely serious. Important elections could be delayed or disrupted by court arguments about the right to use particular names. The ultimate absurdity would be the whole process being delayed for months while various left-wingers dispute through the courts the right to use the name 'Labour'.

Finally, there would need to be clarity on which distributive system were to be used after the casting of votes designed to make the number of votes as nearly as possible equal for all parties. There are a number of such systems in place in countries where a list system is used. The D'Hondt Rule is commonly described, however it tends to benefit larger parties, and other systems such as the Sainte-Lague and Hare-Niemeyer Systems have been developed to address this problem, and indeed in the case of the latter actually to give a slight advantage to small parties. A decision would be required as to which of these methods was to be put into the legislation.

Legislation

Any new electoral arrangement would require new legislation, which would require to be complex and detailed. Any such legislation needs to deal precisely and exactly with every stage of the electoral process, and must be proof as is humanly possible against legal challenge. It must be stressed that it may jeopardise the next stage of the Peace Process if vitally important elections are conducted on the basis of a new, unfamiliar, and ill-considered electoral system. No British legal precedent exists for party registration or for any form of list system, and the legislative problems in devising and introducing such complex legislation at such short notice should not be underestimated. Given the extreme urgency of moving the Peace Process forward the case is overwhelming for the use of the existing electoral system.

There is surely little argument for **changing** a system with little to commend it other than the assumed benefit to some political parties. In the past such changes, calculated to benefit already large parties, contributed heavily to the political problems of Northern Ireland.

Appendix 1: Election results in Northern Ireland since 1970:

European Elections

	DUP	UUP	oth U	Alliance	others	SDLP	SF
1994	29%	24%	2%	4%	3%	29%	9%
1989	30%	22%	5%	5%	3%	25%	9%
1984	34%	21%	3%	5%	2%	22%	13%
1979	30%	22%	7%	7%	9%	25%	

Local Government Elections

	DUP	UUP	oth U	Alliance	others	SDLP	SF
1993 (cllrs)	17% (103)	29% (197)	4% (28)	8% (44)	7% (32)	22% (127)	12% (51)
1989 (cllrs)	18% (110)	31% (194)	6% (32)	7% (38)	6% (27)	21% (121)	11% (43)
1985 (cllrs)	24% (142)	29% (190)	3% (14)	7% (34)	6% (26)	18% (101)	12% (59)
1981 (cllrs)	27% (142)	27% (152)	5% (22)	9% (38)	15% (69)	18% (103)	
1977 (cllrs)	13% (74)	30% (178)	9% (34)	14% (70)	13% (57)	21% (113)	
1973 (cllrs)	4% (21)	41% (233)	11% (53)	14% (63)	16% (73)	13% (83)	

Westminster Elections

	DUP	UUP	oth U	Alliance	others	SDLP	SF
1992 (MP's)	13% (3)	35% (9)	8% (1)	9% (0)	2% (0)	23% (4)	10% (0)
1987 (MP's)	12% (3)	38% (9)	5% (1)	10% (0)	3% (0)	21% (3)	11% (1)
1983 (MP's)	20% (3)	34% (11)	3% (1)	8% (0)	4% (0)	18% (1)	13% (1)
1979 (MP's)	10% (3)	37% (5)	11% (2)	12% (0)	12% (1)	18% (1)	
1974b (MP's)	8% (1)	36% (6)	17% (3)	6% (0)	10% (1)	22% (1)	
1974a (MP's)	8% (1)	32% (7)	24% (3)	3% (0)	10% (0)	22% (1)	

Stormont Elections

	DUP	UUP	oth U	Alliance	others	SDLP	SF
1982 (seats)	23% (21)	30% (26)	6% (2)	9% (10)	3% (0)	19% (14)	10% (5)
1975 (seats)	15% (12)	26% (19)	22% (21)	10% (8)	4% (1)	24% (17)	
1973 (seats)	11% (8)	29% (24)	22% (18)	9% (8)	7% (1)	22% (19)	

Appendix 2: The Workers Party performance in different elections.

1973	Council Elections	3.0%
1973	Assembly Election	1.8%
1974	Feb Westminster Election	2.1%
1974	Oct Westminster Election	3.1%
1975	Convention Election	2.2%
1977	Council Elections	2.6%
1979	Westminster Election	1.7%
1979	European Election	0.8%
1981	Council Elections	1.8%
1982	Assembly Election	2.7%
1983	Westminster Election	1.9%
1984	European Election	1.3%
1985	Council Elections	1.6%
1987	Westminster Election	2.6%
1989	Council Elections	2.1%
1989	European Election	1.0%

After the split into Worker's Party and Democratic Left:

1992	Westminster Election	0.6% (+ 0.3% Dem Left)
1993	Council Elections	0.7% (+ 0.4% Dem Left)
1994	European Election	0.5%

March 1996

Gof Ireland
or Assembly

(2)

Irish paper on a possible role for an election in all-party negotiations:

Some questions to be addressed

1. At their meeting in London on 8 December last, British and Irish Ministers agreed that officials from both sides would examine proposals on a possible role for an elected body with regard to all-party negotiations. As part of that exercise the Irish side undertook to submit a paper on principles which had to be respected, and the practical difficulties which would need to be overcome, if such a proposal were to have any prospect of securing widespread acceptance. The following are some of the key considerations and issues which the Irish side would wish to put forward at this stage.
2. The present debate within Northern Ireland on the possible role of elections/an elected body in all-party negotiations coincides almost exactly with the unionist-nationalist divide. The main pro-union parties all support some version of the proposal, while the principal nationalist parties have made clear their opposition.
3. For as long as this remains the case, the proposal is potentially polarising rather than offering common ground. Nevertheless the Irish Government takes the view that all serious proposals should be considered constructively on their merits. Since it is the Northern parties which would be called upon to contest the elections (which could not in any case realistically take place without their agreement) their views on the issue must carry particular weight with the Governments.
4. If the present polarised views are to be transformed into agreement to proceed with the proposal in some form, it will be incumbent on those in favour of it to persuade the nationalist parties that such an approach would not prejudice basic principles of importance to the nationalist position, and would be conducive in practice to securing the early launch of all-party negotiations on generally acceptable terms.
5. In A New Framework for Agreement the two Governments acknowledged that in Northern Ireland there is a fundamental absence of consensus about constitutional issues.

(3)

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The nationalist community within Northern Ireland have never felt able positively to endorse the existing dispensation of Northern Ireland as their own.

6. Their position in this respect reflects two related and deep concerns:

- (a) the creation of Northern Ireland cut them off from the wider Irish framework, and the political arrangements in force there denied them any practical expression of this dimension.
- (b) since Northern Ireland was deliberately designed to ensure a majority for the unionist community, nationalists were consigned to permanent minority status within that framework. The half-century of total exclusion from power under Stormont was a defining experience in this respect.

7. In every document agreed between the two Governments, including the Downing Street Declaration, the Joint Framework Document and the November Communiqué, it has been agreed and understood that any solution to the Northern Ireland problem requires all party negotiations. In the November Communiqué, the two Governments have committed themselves to the firm aim of achieving the launch of those negotiations by the end of February 1996. Any proposal which is not clearly seen as facilitating the early start of all party negotiations - and especially a proposal which could be seen as impeding or seriously delaying them - would fail to pass the test already set by the two Governments.

8. In assessing proposals for an elected body as part of the process of negotiations, nationalist parties would need reassurance on a number of issues of basic principle reflecting the foregoing concerns. The proposal also raises several problems of a practical order.

Issues of Principle

9. One of the key principles that has been agreed in respect of negotiations is that they will

(4)

be conducted on the most inclusive basis possible, and on a basis of parity of esteem. Elected bodies by their nature can be exclusionary and adversarial, and are likely to have an in-built majoritarian bias. For as long as the notion of elections is inter-twined with the need for negotiations, reconciliation of these factors represents a significant added hurdle in the way of successful all party talks.

10. The Communiqué of 28 November makes clear the agreement of the two Governments that substantive negotiations should address in a comprehensive manner all the relevant relationships in an interlocking three-stranded process. There is a strong consensus across the nationalist community in Northern Ireland (and more widely) that there can be no essentially internal solution in relation to Northern Ireland. For that reason they reject any basis of negotiation which gives primacy or special privilege or status to the internal strand of negotiations compared to the other two, and, in particular, the North/South strand.
11. Holding an election as the first step in the search for a solution might be construed by some as suggesting that the internal framework for a solution is accepted, and that it remains only to establish the wishes of the electorate within that framework. A formal and no less emphatic assertion of the equal importance and independent relevance of the other two strands would be a necessary component of any agreement on elections, to maintain the balance agreed in the 1991-1992 Talks.
12. It has been suggested that the requirements of the three-stranded process might be met by ensuring that the Strand One body would also develop mechanisms to deal with the North/South and East/West relationships. This would however imply that these two strands derived from Strand One, and would therefore be a particularly emphatic assertion of the primacy of the internal strand. It would be vital for Northern nationalists that the independent role of the two sovereign Governments should be acknowledged and reflected in the negotiations, as least as clearly as in the 1991-92 talks.
13. The principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" is particularly important

(5)

in terms of the role of the Irish Government, which, unlike the British Government would not be represented in all strands of the negotiations and could otherwise be committed to arrangements negotiated without its involvement or approval. It should therefore remain a key principle of the negotiations.

14. An election on the lines proposed could also be taken to imply that the negotiations themselves, or the arrangements which might flow from them, could be decided on majoritarian principles.
15. In A New Framework for Agreement the two Governments recognised as one of the guiding principles for their co-operation in the search for agreement that any new political arrangements must be based on full respect for, and protection and expression of, the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland and even-handedly afford both communities in Northern Ireland parity of esteem and treatment.
16. While most nationalists accept that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is to be governed by the principle of consent as defined in the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Joint Declaration, they do not accept that any justification for a majoritarian approach to the governance of Northern Ireland can be derived from that principle. Indeed, the requirements of the principle of parity of esteem and treatment run in precisely the opposite direction.
17. It would be essential therefore that the terms of any such election should make clear that fundamental principles such as the need for clear cross-community support, and the application of the principle of parity of esteem would remain guiding principles for the two Governments, and not subject to veto by the majority community, even if such a position were the majority view endorsed by election.
18. Electoral indexation would also appear to imply some application of the majoritarian principle for the purpose of negotiations, and reassurance would be needed on this point if any such approach were to be mooted.

(6)

19. There is an eagerness across the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, reflected in the policies of their political representatives, to enter substantive all-party talks as soon as the unionist parties will agree. Any suggestion that an elected body is a substitute for negotiations would feed nationalist worries that the unionist parties are exploiting the tactical advantage of their situation, and refusing to acknowledge nationalist concerns or the need for a negotiated settlement to address them.
20. It would be particularly important therefore that any proposal for elections should be presented clearly as an enabling condition for immediate round-table negotiations, and not as an alternative or as a delaying factor in relation to them.

Practical Issues

21. Many of the operational questions which would arise in the formation of any body (such as its chairmanship, rules of procedure, committee arrangements, etc.) would evidently have implications in terms of the principles set out above and would need to be carefully considered in that light.
22. The timescale involved in legislating for and electing a body would inevitably involve a substantial and dangerous slippage in respect of the two Governments' firm aim of launching all-party negotiations by the end of February.
23. A negotiation involving 90 people would be clearly so unwieldy as to be totally impractical, so that the actual negotiations would be carried out by some small proportion of the whole - presumably the leading personalities in the parties at present. The election route to negotiations therefore involves a high degree of redundancy in the personnel involved in the process, with, inevitably, added difficulties for party leaders in managing their teams, and dangers of "grand-standing" by those left on the margins.
24. An election would, in any circumstances, be likely to have some polarising effect on the two communities. To win nationalist participation, it would clearly have to be explicitly linked to the launch of negotiations covering all three strands and fully involving the two

(7)

6

Governments. Conversely, this purpose could have the effect of provoking competition between the unionist parties for the hardest line of resistance to it. It is likely that elections would be dominated by the constitutional issue and that parties would feel obliged to adopt tactical or extreme positions, leading to mandates which would make subsequent negotiations more difficult.

25. Some sort of "non-aggression pact" to moderate the negative effect of elections would not only be hard to guarantee but also sits ill with the unionist view that the purpose of elections would be to see clearly where parties stood and consequently to equip them with a mandate. It is sensible to assume that an election process will generate its own, largely unpredictable and potentially negative dynamic.
26. It is possible that irrespective of the electoral system adopted the loyalist parties would not poll well enough to win representation, which would damage the fully inclusive nature of negotiations and could have destabilising effects at this stage.
27. The choice of electoral system would be problematic. While the list system has certain advantages in terms of allowing for a more compact number of negotiators and promoting the election of individuals capable of playing a valuable role in negotiations (and might possibly work to the advantage of the loyalists and the SDLP), it would almost certainly work to the disadvantage of the UUP and Alliance.

10 January, 1996.

Roy

Maga to Bruton - hope to get back some proposals
+ see if we can go of something, some onchp
as your idea

1 more effort at seeing a joint paper with crisis

try Not Washington 3.

looking to George to get subjects under discussion
do get P

~~Mandela~~ Mandela called Maga re oil sanctions ^{US+UK}
development aid - some aid from Nigerian govt
EU
not NGO

advocating oil sanctions but not forcefully - no
answer on what's left for reserves

Atasha to speak on Friday

adder of possible measure

re UNSC

1/5 Dermot

PAT Dougherty } Said publicly will stop
FIRA } Killings

Paddy Taehon + Sean O'Higgins

Two goats sold next week, Alliance +

Compromise

1. No violence start by SF
2. Election / Assembly
3. Decommissioning
4. Issue of consent
5. Policing / security installation / prisoners.
6. Irish constitution

res

Bruce M, Bill Flynn, Neil O'Druid, Luke, Jan, Crowe

12

SPRING, TAEHON, HOLMES, ~~Adams~~ (Mayhew)

PHOTOS?

Mitchel report Monday - 12 calls to Adams etc. wed start by Mitchell

~~Wendy - Distances to KATI~~

File
Ireland

11/30

Seamus + Home + PM.

Electron asap

Forum met (days)

Sole purpose to nominate negotiators
possibly nature of negotiations

Days later open negotiations

~~Home~~ Listened to w i. Lot of ? + concern

Need commitment to move to negotiations

Trimble Thurs^o_o
painful Wed^o_o
F^o_o

Open on whether Forum stays or not

April 15

13-14 M

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

FAX COVER SHEET

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FAX NO: _____

DATE: Feb 16 1996 TIME: _____

TO: The White House

FOR: Mr. Anthony Lake

FROM: Ambassador Gallagher

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: 4

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President visits Lisburn despite 'setback'

By Marie O'Halloran

THE President, Mrs Robinson, hopes there will be a commitment at political level to secure peace, despite the "appalling setback" of the London bombing. She was speaking after a visit to the Irish Linen Centre and Lisburn Museum in Co Down.

Later, at a trade union conference in Newcastle she spoke of "the subtle shifts of the past two years" and stressed the need to change attitudes. In addition, she emphasised the importance of dialogue and the need to share power

through partnership.

On the first of two Northern engagements, the President met members of Lisburn Council, toured a linen industry museum and spoke to local children. Two political parties, Sinn Féin and the DUP, did not attend.

Afterwards the President said: "A lot has changed since last Friday" and it was time to move forward. She said the linen centre, she said, was the regeneration of past tradition.

"We can build on that in the way in which we reach out to others

with determination. I hope that at political level this will be matched by a commitment to restoring the kind of secure peace that the children that I met here today need."

At the Union/Impact trade union conference, Mrs Robinson said the London atrocity was an appalling setback and people were "shocked and sickened" and worried. "That anxiety is increased by events in London today."

But there had been changes. "We are different now from two years ago. I believe people have begun to reflect and to think and to

open up to each other. Very important subtle shifts are taking place in a kind of openness."

Everyone was realising "the importance of dialogue, the importance of talking and really reaching out to the other person's point of view". There was a "need to change mindsets" in relations between Britain and Ireland and between people as a whole, she added.

The theme of the conference — Empowerment through Partnership — was "at the heart of the capacity of our society to move forward".

End of ceasefire fuels debate on US attitude to Sinn Féin

From Conor O'Clery, in Washington

AS the White House tries to come up with new ideas to save the Northern Ireland peace process, a debate has begun inside the administration on what the US attitude to Sinn Féin should be following the end of the ceasefire.

The second bomb in London yesterday shattered any illusions in the White House — and in Irish-American circles where individuals went out on a limb for Mr Gerry Adams — that the Docklands bomb was a "one-off" act.

As it tries to come up with new ideas, debate is swirling around the administration about the way it handled the Mitchell report, and whether the lack of enthusiasm in Washington for its conclusions contributed to the darkening mood within the republican movement.

On January 24th, the day it was published, President Clinton welcomed the report, which recommended that Britain drop the prior decommitment precondition for all-party talks, as a "valuable tool". He did not, however, urge all parties to adopt its con-

clusions.

"Senator Mitchell did his own thing. There was a sense that it would be wise to be a bit careful, to wait to see reactions. We did not want to get out in front," an official told *The Irish Times*.

Then in the following few days, news leaked out that the National Security Council was planning to "encourage" Mr Adams to consider the election option as the way forward.

Mr Adams subsequently said he was not pressurised in any way but the openness of the National Security Council under Mr Anthony Lake and his deputy, Mr Nancy Scalesberg, in the election idea was by this stage well-established.

There are also rumours that the NSC was not happy with the insistence of SDLP leader Mr John Hume and the Taoiseach, Mr Spring, on the need to move to all-party talks.

Some in the administration were more outspoken on Irish concerns. One official privately expressed anger at Mr Adams being left to "twist slowly in the wind" for 18 months by the British government.

The US is also trying to assess if

Mr Adams knew about the IRA's plans in advance.

The British advice to the White House is that it is unlikely he knew, but possible, an administration source said.

Votes in the US State and Justice Departments which originally warned against giving a visa, high-level access, and fund-raising permission to the Sinn Féin leader are making themselves heard again.

"Nobody's talking about cutting off contacts with Mr Adams but clearly if he gets another visa, restrictions would be considered on fundraising and he might be received at a different level," an administration source said.

Adams took in over half a million dollars — he was a better fund-raiser than we thought he would be," the source said. "It would be difficult to justify now."

Ms Máiréad Keenan, Sinn Féin representative in Washington, said yesterday the gross figure for funds raised since the ban was lifted last March was \$1.5 million.

Mr Adams had planned to return next month but nothing had been finalised, she said.

The fund-raising potential of Sinn Féin has been compromised

by the end of the ceasefire, prominent supporters frankly acknowledge.

"Sinn Féin had the potential to raise \$2 million and become the largest nationalist party and the army council has blown it," one said. "People are very angry. A peace strategy and a war strategy just don't go side by side here."

The second bomb was a blow to White House officials who have been working to get the peace process back on track.

"The White House is not backing away," an administration source said. "There is too much invested."

A "White House aide" was quoted in the *Christian Science Monitor* yesterday as saying that at the Sinn Féin leader's meeting with President Clinton on February 1st, "it had become pretty clear that Adams couldn't hold the line much longer."

The aide said that when the British rejected the Mitchell plan, "and we not only did nothing but started telling the Adams people that they should consider the election proposal, the IRA may have concluded they had lost their fair hearing in the White House."

Seal twice
16/2/96

US Weighs Role in End Of IRA Truce

By Michael Moran
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

LONDON
AS Britain and the Irish Republic work to restore the peace process for Northern Ireland, the Clinton administration is rethinking its role, concerned that its stance may have partly swayed the Irish Republican Army to end its 17-month cease-fire with a bomb in London Feb. 9.

Officials on both sides of the Atlantic indicate the White House unwittingly may have sent signals that helped lead IRA hard-liners - appar-

**In trying to be both
evenhanded and
supportive of Britain,
the White House may
have frustrated the IRA.**

ently hoping for American sympathy - to believe that they no longer had much to gain from the peace process.

Accounts by senior American diplomats, administration officials, and Irish diplomats, requesting anonymity, specifically cite Washington's lack of public support for the Jan. 24 report of the so-called Mitchell commission, which advised that the IRA should not have to start giving up its weapons before all-party talks.

British Prime Minister John Major, foreseeing resistance in Northern Ireland's largely Protestant unionist community, largely ignored the advice of

See IRA Page 7

The White House Rethinks Its Active Role in N. Ireland

IRA from Page 1

the three-man international commission, led by former US Sen. George Mitchell. Mr. Major instead proposed for a new elected body within Northern Ireland to carry forward with talks. His counterproposal, offered the same day Mr. Mitchell released his report, was difficult for many of Northern Ireland's Catholics to take, since they, as a minority, would win less representation than would Protestants in elections.

Officials in all three countries involved in the peace process acknowledge that Washington's support of Britain - rather than the Mitchell advice - may have frustrated long-isolated IRA militants who had envisioned firmer American support. American officials deny any deliberate shift in US policy toward Northern Ireland.

Missed subtleties

"George Mitchell, while independent, was really our guy," said a senior US diplomat in London. "The subtle differences between US policy and the Mitchell report's conclusions may not have been fully understood by all parties."

Indeed, even the Mitchell plan would have been difficult for IRA hard-liners to take, since it included the stipulation that no constitutional changes to Northern Ireland's status could be made without the consent of the majority, which is Protestant.

"Gerry Adams [leader of Sinn Féin, the IRA's political wing] and his associates would have tried hard to sell the Mitchell principles," said Eamonn McCann, a former civil rights campaigner and an expert on the IRA. "It would have been a daunting task, and not without personal danger for those undertaking it, but the Adams leadership might just have pulled it off."

Many IRA militants had been deeply skeptical of the peace process from the start. Mr. Adams has said he only won support for the cease-fire after sketching out a vision of a "pan-nationalist front" comprising Dublin, Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, and for the first time, a sympathetic American president.

trate the IRA cease-fire in 1994.

A dangerous maze

Yet as Britain's former Northern Ireland Minister Michael Mates said this week, "Our American friends... have more leverage on all shades of nationalism, from the Irish government to the IRA, and might use it to help find a way through the maze."

But the maze is a dangerous place, where a simple turn one way or another can lead to unforeseen consequences. On Feb. 1, within days of Major's proposal, Adams met in Washington with Clinton and national security adviser Anthony Lake.

Reports of what transpired are conflicting, but American diplomats in London and Dublin confirm that Adams presented his most serious warning to that date that the cease-fire might come unraveled. Clinton, according to an American diplomat who handles Northern Ireland affairs, warned Adams not to use a public threat of

a return to violence as a bargaining chip.

Adams left that meeting without persuading the White House to pressure London into taking another look at the Mitchell plan. According to Sinn Fein sources, Adams instead was urged by Mr. Lake to accept the British electoral plan.

"It had become pretty clear that Adams couldn't hold the line much longer," said a White House aide who was in Clinton's entourage in Ireland last November. "When the British then rejected the Mitchell plan, and we not only did nothing, but started telling the Adams people they should consider the election proposal, the IRA may have concluded they'd lost their fair hearing in the White House."

In an effort both to appear evenhanded and lend support to Britain's electoral proposal, the US appears to have upset the foundation - fragile as it may seem in hindsight - on which the cease-fire rested.

The senior US diplomat, explaining the decision to lobby Sinn Fein on behalf of

Britain's electoral plan, said before the Feb. 9 bombing that "Clinton feels his trip to Northern Ireland and the tremendous response he got there gave him a kind of street legitimacy on this issue.... So we began making it clear to Sinn Fein and the Irish government that the White House wouldn't mind, if I can put it that way, if they would study the British proposal."

A lower profile in the future

The blast in London last week, which killed two people, seems to have jarred the British and Irish governments to work to restore the peace process in Northern Ireland, even if Sinn Fein's participation remains uncertain.

For now, the Clinton administration is likely to keep a low profile and leave it to the conflict's main actors to reestablish dialogue, according to White House and State Department officials. Even if Adams is allowed to return to the US, he is unlikely to talk to Clinton at the White House.

As an example, Adams could point to President Clinton's unilateral decision in January 1993 to grant Adams a US visa, weathering London's wrath and the objections of the State Department, the CIA, and the FBI. Adams, quoting the poet Seamus Heaney, argued that "a space has been created in which hope can grow." On that basis, the IRA's council laid down its arms.

The White House, meanwhile, maintains that the US is scrupulously neutral on the Northern Ireland question. And Mr. Clinton has gone out of his way to counter the impression that he favors a peaceful yet nationalist solution to Northern Ireland's troubles.

Protestant leaders like David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, the province's largest, have been in the Oval Office as frequently as Adams or the moderate nationalist John Hume, the Nobel Peace Prize nominee who helped orches-

INTERNATIONAL

Tas A

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM: FBIS

TO:

F5164

FBIS S 164FEB15

UNCLAS 7E

UK: Adams Warns Major Not To Leave Sinn Fein

Out of Talks LD1502195696 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1939 GMT
15 Feb 96

By Ian Graham, PA News]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sinn

Fein President Gerry Adams warned the British and Irish Prime Ministers tonight of the dangers of pressing ahead with elections in Northern Ireland.

He said for Dublin to fall in line with London on the plan "would not augur well for the period ahead".

Speaking in west Belfast, he claimed

the Government intended to exclude Sinn Fein from both the elections and the all-party talks.

"Such bare-faced disenfranchising of our electorate, of whole nationalist communities, would be a recipe for disaster. The alienation and disaffection with electoralism which would result is unthinkable"

He revealed that earlier today he sent a letter to John Major underlining his party's commitment to rebuilding the peace process and urging him to fulfill his responsibilities of leadership and commence negotiations.

He said he was prepared to speak to the IRA about restarting the ceasefire but said there was no point in underestimating the difficulties.

"Getting

the IRA to recommence a cessation is only possible, in my opinion, in the context of rebuilding the wider peace process".

In a speech which

made no reference to the latest bomb in London and which largely echoed comments from the IRA leadership earlier in the day, Mr Adams continued to blame John Major for the break-down in the IRA ceasefire.

He said

the Government had used one stalling device and precondition after another in a very high-risk strategy to stall and string out the peace process, stretching it like a piece of elastic and claimed it was because it was frightened of negotiations.

The election proposal was clearly "another stalling device, designed to push back all-party talks", he said.

He said the absence of negotiations led to the breakdown. The commencement

INTERNATIONAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR DOUG SOSNIK

FROM: ALEXIS HERMAN *AH*
SUBJECT: PRIORITIZATION OF IRISH EVENTS

Our Irish-American working group has reviewed all the Irish proposals under consideration for the President's March schedule and prioritized them into three levels of importance.

The President's involvement and success on the Irish Peace Process presents a unique opportunity to reach Irish Americans, the second largest ethnicity in the country. Irish Americans are a major part of the identified ethnic Catholic swing vote and make up an average of 16-18% of registered voters in fifteen key northeast and midwest states. St. Patrick's Day, a day when Irish-Americans pay most attention to their heritage, presents a perfect opportunity to reinforce the President's successes.

Following is our prioritization and justifications for each event.

PRIORITY ONE

**Bilateral Meeting with Irish Prime Minister and Shamrock Presentation
March 15, 1996**

This event is largely driven by foreign policy. It has become a tradition for the President to receive the Prime Minister and the bowl of shamrocks on St. Patrick's Day. Taken the President's role in the Ireland peace process, it would be extremely awkward for the President not to do this event.

**White House Reception for St. Patrick's Day
March 15, 1996**

This event serves both foreign policy and domestic political interests. On the foreign policy side, the reception offers a way to highlight the reconciliation of the two communities in Ireland. On the domestic political side, it affords us an opportunity to take care of Irish-American supporters, particularly those who we are enlisting to help communicate the President's unique accomplishments and organize additional support.

Nancy
To ADS -
Can you follow up?
I also think the 3/11
event cannot be 1/2
hr. I understand
he's the
honoree
ms

PRIORITY TWO

Irish-American of the Year Reception, New York, NY

March 11, 1996

This event will yield a cover story in Irish America Magazine and coverage in an area of the country that is prominently Irish-American. This event was an add on to an already planned political New York trip and should be arranged as a one-half hour time commitment for the President.

St. Patrick's Day Activity, Chicago, IL

March 16, 1996

St. Patrick's Day weekend falls three days prior to the Illinois primary. Travel to Illinois that weekend would be wisely utilized by including some Chicago St. Patrick's Day activity. There is a planned Mass, breakfast and downtown parade on Saturday, March 16 that can be utilized to the President's advantage in the Irish-American community and for broader Chicago political interests. Kevin O'Keefe is vetting ideas and will return to the Irish American working group by next week with specific options.

PRIORITY THREE

American Ireland Fund Dinner, Washington, DC

March 14, 1996

This dinner provides a unique opportunity for the President to deliver a policy address on the success of our Ireland policy. It is attended by 1,000 elite activist and business types from throughout the country. The President's attendance would create an energy and excitement that would carry back through the community much past St. Patrick's Day. The President has never addressed this dinner. The Vice President was the featured speaker last year and in 1993 the President attended a VIP reception prior to the main event.

In addition, we are recommending a Presidential video for the following event:

Project Children Dinner, Washington, DC

March 7, 1996

Project Children has a network of members in 20 states including NY, NJ, CA and IL. A video will not only be used at the dinner, but will be copied and re-played by Project Children networks in 20 states.

cc: Evelyn Lieberman
Anne Walley

bcc: Marcia Hale
Kitty Higgins
Susan Brophy
Kevin O'Keefe
Nancy Soderberg ✓
Mary Ann Peters
Marilyn DiGiacobbe

Lee Satterfield
Holly Carver

THE WHITE HOUSE

January 17, 1996

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. Herman', written in a cursive style.

Dear Friends:

I would like to invite you, as an alumnus of the President's public delegation to Ireland, to participate in a conference call on Friday, January 19, 1996.

The conference call will be an opportunity for an update on the Ireland peace process. Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will provide a briefing and address your questions. We are also interested in hearing any input you may have received in your local community on the President's trip and his role in the Ireland peace process.

The conference call is scheduled for Friday, January 19 at 11:00 a.m. We anticipate that it will last approximately 30-40 minutes.

I will have my office call you to follow-up on this invitation. If you have any questions, please feel free to call Marilyn DiGiacobbe of my office directly at (202) 456-2721.

My best wishes to you for a happy and healthy 1996. I look forward to speaking with you on Friday.

Sincerely,

Alexis M. Herman
Assistant to the President and
Director, Office of Public Liaison

IRELAND TRIP DELEGATION CONFERENCE CALL
JANUARY 19, 1996 11:00 A.M.

Participants (confirmed)

Ms. Mary Boergers, Senior Fellow
Ireland-U.S. Political Leadership Program
College Park, MD

Honorable Mary O. Boyle, President, Board of County Commissioners
Cuyahoga County
Cleveland, OH

Ms. Elizabeth J. Coleman, Chairman and CEO
Maidenform Worldwide, Inc.
Atlanta, GA

Mr. John P. "Jack" Dunfey, Chairman
New England Citizens Circle
Portsmouth, NH

Dr. Thom White Wolf Fassett, General Secretary, Board of Church and Society
United Methodist Church
Washington, DC

Mr. John D. Feerick, Dean
Fordham University School of Law
Mount Kisco, NY

Reverend Duncan Emery Hanson, Coordinator for Ecumenical Relations
and Mission in Europe
Presbyterian Church USA
Louisville, KY

Mr. Neil F. Hartigan, Chairman
World Trade Center Chicago
Chicago, IL

Mr. James McCann, President
1-800-Flowers
Westbury, NY

Mr. Gerald McGowan, Partner
Lukas, McGowan, Nace & Gutierrez
Washington, DC

Mr. Bruce Morrison, Chairman
Federal Housing Finance Board
Washington, DC

Mr. Denis P. Mulcahy, National Chairman
Project Children
Greenwood Lake, NY

Mr. Niall O'Dowd, Founding Publisher
Irish Voice and Irish America Magazine
New York, NY

Mr. Brian O'Dwyer, Chairman
Emerald Isle Immigration Center
New York, NY

Dr. Henry J. Postel, Chairman
Northern Ireland Working Group
Darnestown, MD

Mr. John B. Pound, Partner
Herrera, Long & Pound, P.A.
Sante Fe, NM

Most Reverend Daniel P. Reilly, Chairman, International Policy Committee
National Conference of Catholic Bishops
Worcester, MA

Bishop Melvin G. Talbert, Resident Bishop
California-Nevada Annual Conference
West Sacramento, CA

Honorable Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, Lieutenant Governor
State of Maryland
Annapolis, MD

White House Staff

Alexis Herman	(Call Host and moderator)
Nancy Soderberg	(Briefing and Q&A on the peace process)
Kitty Higgins	
Marcia Hale	
Susan Brophy	
Doug Sosnik	
Flo McAfee	
Marilyn DiGiacobbe	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

9038

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0358-F (4.50)

KRM 4/11/2023

December 18, 1995

NOTED

NES/MAP
let's discuss.Not Sec Advisor
has seen
12-23-95INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS *MA*

SUBJECT: Pieces of the Northern Ireland Puzzle

Following is a description of the possible elements of a resolution of the current impasse. If we assume that Sinn Fein/IRA are not going to cave on Washington 3 at this point, then the challenge is how to get the UUP to participate in all-party talks without a prior start to decommissioning. Therefore, the major pieces of the puzzle all amount to concessions by Sinn Fein and the nationalists. It is by no means clear that Trimble will accept less than Washington 3, strictly defined, or that Sinn Fein is prepared to make any further concessions to get to talks.

PIECES OF THE PUZZLE

Elections to an assembly with some connection to all-party talks. Trimble mooted the assembly idea as a substitute for all-party talks, not a way to reach them. Still, elections to some sort of body would be seen as a Trimble victory, and would therefore be a key incentive for him to participate in talks. The elected assembly could ratify a list of party-nominated negotiators to all-party talks, though presumably the UUP would insist that it have some other function as well. Trimble has mentioned having the assembly form committees that would hold hearings on key issues, including areas for cross-border cooperation.

Sinn Fein and the SDLP oppose any kind of elected assembly, both because they see it as an "internal solution" excluding Dublin and because it would underscore the fact of the unionist majority in Northern Ireland. In addition, Sinn Fein objects to an assembly as yet another precondition for the all-party talks that it believes should have been convened following the cease-fire. To meet nationalist concerns, an assembly would have to have a limited, information-gathering mandate. Dublin would have to be convinced to get behind the idea and sell it to Sinn Fein and the SDLP. We would also have to do some heavy lifting with John Hume.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 12/18/05/

1. Tremble bites 1/2 under Tony's.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

border element of an eventual settlement easier to swallow. The Downing Street Declaration and the Joint Framework Document both envisage the modification of Irish Constitution in the context of an overall settlement, not as a means to reach it. The GOI would argue that it could encounter popular opposition if it were to introduce constitutional changes before the outlines of a political settlement were clear. Nevertheless, if Sinn Fein is unwilling or unable to make any meaningful concessions to get the UUP to talks, Dublin could decide to pay their freight by moving early on constitutional changes.

End to Punishment Beatings: The recent murder of a Catholic man suspected of drug dealing, apparently by an IRA punishment squad, has intensified the unionist focus on this issue. There have been many editorials in the unionist press citing the increased incidence of IRA punishment beatings since the cease-fire as proof that the IRA has not renounced violence. Of course that does not mean that an end to punishment beating would be welcomed as proof that they have. In any case, unionists would be unlikely to believe that punishment beatings had ended until a significant period of time had elapsed without an incident.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 18, 1995

Dear Tony:

I have concluded reluctantly that it is time for me to move on.

My intention is to leave in March and I will be submitting a formal resignation at the appropriate time.

The opportunity to serve again on the NSC staff is one that I very much appreciated.

Sincerely,



Morton H. Halperin
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Democracy

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20504

Peters, Mary A.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: Vershbow, Alexander R.; /R, Record at A1
Subject: Peace Process: Next Steps [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, January 03, 1996 10:04AM
Priority: High

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.51)
KBH 4/11/2023

TO: AL
NES

FROM: MAP

SUBJ: NEXT STEPS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Senator Mitchell and co. will be returning to NI next week for their second, and presumably final, round of hearings. (I have heard no more about the idea that Rod Lyne suggested to Mike Habib -- that the two governments might ask Mitchell to draw out the work of the commission by conducting a third round.) If Mitchell does present his recommendations to London and Dublin o/a January 19, there will be 6 weeks to work out a way to get the talks started on time. That is presumably when the two tracks will have to be woven together; i.e., when the elected assembly proposal can be used to counterbalance a proposal on decommissioning that is less than the unionists want.

CLOSE HOLD: I heard from Peter Westmacott that the internal HMG memo summarizing the NIO submission to the Mitchell body ends with the comment that "it will be difficult to keep the commission from addressing Washington 3.". Peter was concerned by the implication of that comment and checked with London. Seems to reflect real indecision "at highest levels" about how to proceed. (Keep in mind that the Tory majority will be down to ONE when the Tory party loses the upcoming by-elections...) Peter thinks that London's position is still that it will have to look at whatever recommendations Mitchell comes up with, but it is unsettling that HMG seems to prefer that he not even address the nub of the problem.

The big new issue for Mitchell is the series of murders in Northern Ireland by an organization with the acronym DADD (something about drugs) that everyone believes is a front for the IRA. (Dublin believes it too, as evidenced by the fact that the GOI cancelled planned early releases for IRA prisoners in response to the first two killings last month.) There have now been 5 murders in the last month, a total of 7 in the last year. The victims have all been suspected of some link with the drug trade, but are not apparently the kingpins. The murders have increased public support for decommissioning and bolstered the unionists hard-line arguments, making the Mitchell commission's job much more difficult.

I have not come across any compelling explanation of why the IRA is doing this now. Some unionists are saying the murders are a prelude to the resumption of inter-communal violence -- that the grey line of the cease-fire will be crossed when the IRA kills a loyalist suspected of drug trading and provokes loyalist retaliation. Sinn Fein says the killings reflect dissatisfaction with British footdragging on talks as well as the lack of effective community policing. At least one columnist argues that the hard men need something to do to keep them occupied. (This last one strikes me as plausible, but it still does not answer the question of why now.)

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

- Recommend that AL /NES talk with Mitchell asap about his thoughts, implications of the killings, etc.
- We need to decide whether to issue a WH or Presidential statement condemning the killings. I think we should. Please advise.
- Reminder: Michael Ancram will probably come to Washington o/a Jan 29 for consultations with AL.

Peters, Mary A.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Major-Bruton Meeting 12/21 [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, December 22, 1995 2:31PM

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4.52)
KRM 4/11/2023

TO: AL
NES

FROM: MAP

SUBJ: Major-Bruton Meeting, Belfast Killings

Following is based a readout from Mike Habib after his meeting with Rod Lyne and on Dublin 6310.

The Major-Bruton meeting took place yesterday in Dublin as scheduled, after speculation that it would be postponed over British reservations about EU approval for a bailout package for Irish Steel. Purpose of the meeting was mainly social -- Major and Bruton were accompanied by their wives, attended the opera, and visited a pub together. They received standing ovations on entering and leaving the opera. Major stopped in NI on the way and was also warmly received there, per Lyne, including in a Catholic neighborhood he visited for the first time.

There was a one hour one-on-one in the midst of the socializing. It was devoted largely to European monetary union, and to the initiative to deepen bilateral ties that was announced to the press. (That will involve a series of ministerial -level contacts and greater cooperation in such areas as S&T, health and education.) On NI, Major and Bruton agreed the Mitchell body had gotten off to a reasonable start. According to Lyne, neither was convinced that SinnFein is taking it seriously, however. Bruton reportedly was concerned about Sinn Fein's general posture, going beyond just SF's less than indignant response to the killings in Belfast. He suggested that Adams might try to slip past the Mitchell body without getting into details by doing no more than reiterating the IRA's view of the history of the conflict.

At that point, still per Lyne, PM Major pointed out that in HMG's experience it takes time to work through a negotiation with Sinn Fein. It is more important that the Mitchell body do a good job than that it submit its final report by mid-January. Rod hinted (no more than that) that the two governments might suggest to Mitchell that a third round of work (the second will start o/a 1/10) might be useful. Mike H asked how postponing the Mitchell recommendations would affect the end-of-February date for talks. Lyne replied that there were six weeks to play with between the two, implying that the talks would not necessarily be delayed.

Bruton express GOI annoyance over Trimble's refusal to participate in trilateral talks -- Major responded that he couldn't control the UUP -witness the fisheries vote (in which the Tories were defeated). On the elected body, Major thought the idea was gathering momentum. The Brits thought Bruton was open-minded about it, though some of his officials are against it. Publicly, SF is against it, but the Brits said that in private conversations with the Alliance party, some SF reps had been less categorically opposed.

The two government publicly condemned the killings of drug suspects in Belfast, presumably by the IRA. In response to the killings, the Irish Government decided not to grant early release to 10 IRA prisoners -- instead they will get a short Christmas parole.

By the way, Rod is going to be seconded to British Gas for a year, and expects to come back after that as an ambassador. (South Africa did not work out for him.) He still expects to visit, together with his successor John Holmes, sometime next month.

Peters, Mary A.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Update on Mitchell Commission [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, December 20, 1995 10:15AM

TO: AL
NES

FROM: MAP

According to Dave Pozorski who is part of Mitchell's staff at State, the commission members do not yet have an outcome in mind. They do plan to return to Belfast and Dublin (and possibly London) around January 10, and to stay until they have prepared and submitted their final report to London and Dublin, the week of January 15.

Asked at a press conference whether he will make the commission's report public, Mitchell replied that he could not imagine that it will not become public. This probably means he will recommend to the two governments that they make it public, but will not do so himself.

The commission worked 14-hour days during its first session. All its interlocutors, including Sinn Fein, made oral as well as written submissions. Dave said the other commissioners bring different strengths to the group -- de Chastelain is a nuts and bolts type who will be responsible for the report on modalities. This will apparently be based on what would work best in practical terms, not on what the parties have agreed to. (I guess that's the only way to do it, since SF did not really address the modalities issue). Holkeri is more interested in the psychological, symbolic impact of various options. Both of the other commissioners brought with them competent staff from their respective foreign ministries.

By the way, Dave said the office space provided in both Belfast and Dublin is superb.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *MM* NARA, Date *1/11/16*

201-0755-F

Peters, Mary A.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Mitchell Commission [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Tuesday, December 19, 1995 10:38AM
Priority: High

To: AL
NES
From: Mary Ann Peters

The Mitchell body has completed its first round of work, accepting submissions for two days each in Belfast and Dublin. I will try to get a readout from Martha, but expect her to be reluctant to go into details with me. Embassy Dublin did, however, get a copy of Sinn Fein's submission (49 pages, on its way by pouch) which is summarized in Dublin 6242. Gerry Adams has said that if TL wants to talk to him about it before Christmas, he will be available in Belfast. The Sinn Fein submission seems long on rhetoric and short on detail. The main point is that decommissioning can take place only in the context of a political settlement and the total disarmament of the province. Only two sentences relate to modalities:

They are:

-- "It is Sinn Fein's belief that the disposal of arms by those in possession of them is a method which may find acceptance." , and
-- "An independent third party could prove to be of assistance here. This would of course have to be agreed by those in possession of weapons."

Action Recommended:

--Suggest that AL call Senator Mitchell for a readout on the whole 4-day session, and particularly on Sinn Fein's submission. Key question is whether there was an oral exchange in addition to the written submission. How does Mitchell assess the prospects?

--Depending on what Mitchell says, and how he views Sinn Fein's submission, suggest AL follow up with a phone call to Adams ..

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By M NARA, Date 1/1/16

201-0355-P



Embassy of the United States of America

FAX TO: Nancy Soderberg

FROM: Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith

DATE: January 4, 1996

CC MAP
rph

I thought that the attached might be of interest to you.

Best wishes in the New Year,

WORLD DAY OF PEACE**NEW YEARS DAY 1996****"LET US GIVE CHILDREN A FUTURE OF PEACE"****HOMILY BY CARDINAL CAHAL B. DALY****at Mass in St Patrick's Cathedral, Armagh****1st January 1996, 10.00 am**

Twenty-eight years ago, in 1968, Pope Paul VI invited Catholics and people of goodwill everywhere to observe a World Day of Peace on the 1st of January each year. Each succeeding year since then, New Year's Day has been a day of special prayer and reflection centred on the theme of peace. The series of World Peace Days almost coincides with the years of my own episcopate. It virtually coincides also with the years of violence in the North.

PEACE FOR OUR CHILDREN'S SAKE

Pope John Paul's message for New Year 1996 is: "Let us give children a future of peace". He describes the many ways in which children are made to suffer from violence and conflict in the world today. We have ourselves been made very conscious in the past year of the appalling harm done to children by violence, whether physical or sexual, inflicted upon children, especially in the home or from trusted adults. The abuse perpetrated by a small number of priests has been particularly horrifying.

None of the scenes of suffering in regions afflicted by hunger or by war have moved us so much as the photographs of starving or mutilated children. We know of the horrors of child prostitution and pornography. Our own tragic years of violence have left many children orphaned or psychologically scarred by acts of violence.

Pope John Paul speaks of the suffering caused to children by poverty. We know that here in Northern Ireland poverty takes on a special dimension because of the unevenness of its distribution across the population. Recent school statistics have shown that Catholic families are more than twice more likely than Protestant families to qualify for income support and that Catholic children are therefore more than twice more liable than Protestant children to be exposed to poverty. The

elimination of this discrepancy and the struggle to improve conditions and opportunities for families and children in both communities are important elements in the establishment of peace in Northern Ireland.

DANGER OF COMPLACENCY

We thank God earnestly for the silence of the guns over the past sixteen months. But we remember also that guns still brought death to six men in alleged drug-related murders over recent months. This, and apparent threats of the possibility of a resumption of violence, together with the frustrating and dangerous delays in the beginning of inclusive political talks, are reminders to us that the peace we enjoy is still very fragile. They are a call to fervent prayer today and in the days ahead for the consolidation of peace.

There is universal delight in the return to normality since the ceasefires. We are tasting the fruits of peace, and, after more than 25 years of violence, they are indeed delectable. But there is a risk of complacency. Some in responsible positions have seemed to believe that the longer the ceasefires continued, the more improbable or even impossible a return to violence would become. This was and is, I believe, a dangerous illusion. The ceasefires are not yet peace; they are an opportunity and a challenge to build peace. There is too much talk about preconditions, and especially about the precondition of some measure of decommissioning of weapons. There is too little awareness in some quarters that the one essential precondition for permanent peace is a political settlement; and a political settlement can come about only through political talks. The delays in beginning talks have already been much too long. Further delays carry high risk of unravelling the whole process.

THE EVIL OF VIOLENCE

The use of violence for political ends has been proven not to work. It has brought universal suffering to thousands of homes. Its worst effect has been the perversion of moral truth, the calling of evil good. The recent murders are an example of this. The organisation responsible for these has not been identified. They may not technically breach the ceasefires. But their occurrence and the reaction of observers to them starkly illustrate the moral harm done by violence. One unnamed observer, obviously sympathetic to republican violence, has been reported as saying that these killings "strengthen the position of moderates..... and secure the peace

process": for they "give IRA members bored with a 16-month ceasefire, something to do", and show that the IRA "is still capable of operating smoothly".

I quote these reported remarks simply to show how consciences can be debauched and moral standards debased through the use of or support for violence. Could there be a more chilling example of this than to describe these infamous killings as giving bored people "something to do" and showing that killers can "operate smoothly"?

It is not our experience of the benefits of life without violence which should motivate us to reject violence. It is our moral abhorrence of violence which should be our chief motive for doing all in our power to ensure that violence shall never again stalk our roads and our streets.

POLITICAL PROGRESS

But without justice, equality and respect for human rights, there cannot be peace. The words spoken by Pope John Paul in Drogheda on 29th September, 1979, are as relevant now as when he spoke them. Addressing "all who bear political responsibility for the affairs of Ireland", the Pope said:

"Those who resort to violence always claim that only violence brings about change. They claim that political action cannot achieve justice. You politicians must prove them to be wrong. You must show that there is a peaceful political way to justice. You must show that peace achieves the work of justice and violence does not. If politicians do not decide and act for just change, then the field is left open to the men of violence. Violence thrives best when there is a political vacuum and a refusal of political movement."

POLITICAL VACUUM

"Political vacuum" in Northern Ireland has lasted far too long. "Refusal of political movement" is still the greatest obstacle to peace. It may well be politically difficult for Mr John Major to initiate significant political movement in Northern Ireland at this time; but it would be most unfortunate if any plausibility were given to the suspicion that peace in Northern Ireland would be allowed to suffer because of internal party political difficulties at Westminster. I do not believe that the

Prime Minister would wish this to happen. I am convinced of his personal commitment to establishing peace in Northern Ireland. If he can deliver this, it could well be his greatest political achievement and would ensure his place in history. I do earnestly hope that, in cooperation with the Irish government and with the agreement of the political parties in Northern Ireland, he will succeed in bringing this about.

DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS

The decommissioning of weapons has become a major issue. No right-thinking person could question the importance, indeed the necessity, of the disarmament, particularly of weapons held by groups and persons who, up to 16 months ago, were engaged in campaigns of violence, whether republican or loyalist. If peace is to be permanently established, the use of weapons, or the threat to use weapons, must be excluded by all. The principle of disarmament must be accepted by everyone. There is dispute only about the means of bringing this about. The morality of having or of using weapons is one thing, and I have many times declared my own convictions and the Church's teaching on this. But the practical means of getting weapons taken out of commission is something else.

I believe that the only way which offers a realistic hope of getting weapons taken out of commission is for the paramilitary organisations themselves to decide to put them out of commission. In turn, the only people whose influence could persuade them to do so are the political leaders who support their political aims. It is abundantly clear that these political leaders will agree to do so only in the context of an overall political settlement. It is therefore clearly necessary that there should be political talks in which these same political leaders take part. If there are other realistic and practical ways of bringing decommissioning about, I am not aware that anyone has yet identified them.

Do the said political leaders sincerely intend to lay weapons and the threat of weapons aside? Are they genuinely committed to "exclusively peaceful methods" and to "the democratic process"? The sincerity of their intention and the genuineness of their commitment are, I believe, already strongly indicated by the fact that, in spite of obvious internal and external difficulties and pressures, they have succeeded in maintaining the ceasefires for 16 months. No-one should underestimate that fact or dismiss it as of little significance. The leaders have worked very hard and have taken real risks in achieving this. I do not believe that

they deserve political exclusion at this time. The alternative to their failure is truly awful to contemplate.

It is surely the commitment to "exclusively peaceful methods" and to "the democratic process", rather than actual physical decommissioning, which is the ultimate precondition to talks. The British Government has fastened on the actual physical decommissioning of some weapons as the only way to establish the necessary commitment. Surely there are other ways. The International Body in its exploration of the decommissioning issue, will doubtless be exploring other ways. For the sake of peace and for all our futures, I fervently hope that their findings will point to a way around the decommissioning roadblock, a road which leads to political talks and I hope that the governments and Sinn Fein will accept their findings and implement their recommendations.

The British and the Irish governments, in the Downing Street Declaration, declared:

"The British and Irish Governments reiterate that the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence. They confirm that, in these circumstances, democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods, and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the governments and the political parties on the way ahead".

What is the meaning, in the Irish context, of the "democratic process"? The answer is spelled out by the two governments in paragraph 4 of the Downing Street Declaration. The principles set down in that paragraph are the principle of consent, "freely and concurrently given, North and South", including (Par. 5) consent "achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland".

Acceptance of the key principles of agreement and consent seem to me, and I believe, would seem to most reasonable persons, to be enough to "establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.....(and to).....the democratic process". I submit that, if Sinn Fein were to declare their acceptance of the key principles of the democratic process, namely consent and agreement, then the British government could scarcely refuse to accept their declaration as sufficiently establishing their commitment to exclusively peaceful methods. Sinn Fein, for their part, could scarcely refuse to commit themselves to principles solemnly formulated by the Irish government. Given Sinn Fein's distrust of the British

Government's intentions, and their present disillusionment with the peace process, the neglected question of prisoners assumes great importance. Significant movement in respect of prisoners is overdue and urgently needed. Meanwhile, surely Unionists could reasonably enter inclusive political dialogue in the certainty that no final settlement could be concluded without the agreement and consent of the greater number of people in Northern Ireland.

In any event, only direct political dialogue could clarify the preparedness of all parties to make the accommodations and the adjustments of position and could test what has been called the readiness for mutually agreed change which are required from both political traditions in order to ensure consent and agreement on the part of both. It seems to me that no-one can lose from talks but everyone can lose and lose disastrously from their continued refusal.

URGENCY OF TALKS

What is certain is that there is now an urgent need to move into inclusive political talks. I believe, and this belief is widely shared across the community, that prolonged failure to do so is fraught with grave risks. The British Government itself acknowledged, in the "New Framework For Agreement", signed jointly by themselves and the Irish Government only last year, "the widespread desire, throughout both these islands and more widely, to see negotiations underway as soon as possible" (Par. 6). They declared:

"A climate of peace enables a process of healing to begin. It transforms the prospects for political progress".

We have had that "climate of peace" for 16 months now. The recent visit to both parts of Ireland by President Bill Clinton enormously reinforced the climate of peace. However, the euphoria and the manifest good will on the part of all traditions in Northern Ireland, generated by that visit, will soon begin to be dissipated unless there is political movement. It is more than high time now to "see negotiations underway as soon as possible", so that all paramilitary weapons may be decommissioned as a concomitant and as a consequence of political progress.

The first day of the New Year is the Feast of Mary, Mother of God. When this title was solemnly recognised as hers by the Council of Ephesus in the year 431, the year before Patrick came to Ireland, the people spontaneously organised a torchlight procession in her honour. May Mary's prayers keep the light of peace alive in 1996. With her and through her intercession, we must keep praying intensely that Pope John Paul's appeal for today may be heard:

"Let us give children a future of peace"

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939

FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

30 January 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Nancy

Herewith the letter to the President, about which we spoke.

I look forward to talking to you this afternoon.

Yours sincerely

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

30 January 1996

My dear Mr President

I have the honor to enclose a faxed copy of a letter from the Taoiseach in which Mr Bruton expresses his deep appreciation to you, Mr President, for having made the services of Senator George Mitchell available to chair the International Body on Decommissioning. The original of the letter will be sent on as soon as possible.

The Taoiseach also sets out in his letter the Irish Government's view on the steps that are now needed to move the peace process forward.

I have the honor to be, Mr President,

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Dermot Gallagher', with a horizontal line drawn underneath it.

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

The President
The White House
WASHINGTON DC 20500



30 January 1996.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

The Hon. William J. Clinton
President
The United States of America.

Dear Mr President,

I am writing on behalf of the Irish Government to express to you our deep appreciation for having made the services of Senator George Mitchell available to chair the International Body, which published its excellent Report last week.

The work of the Body benefited enormously from the commitment, judgement and common-sense which Senator Mitchell brought to his task, and these are reflected throughout this excellent Report.

I believe it correct that I should inform you of the Irish Government's position on the most effective next steps in underpinning the peace process in particular because of the current controversy surrounding the 'election' issue. Our position is that both Governments now use the intensified political track to:

Put the principles of the Mitchell Report and the Report's approach to decommissioning to all the parties and ask them to agree to accept and honour them. Acceptance would form the basis of a move to all party talks by end February which is our joint firm aim as agreed in the Communique of 28 November;


- Provide for a discussion of the "elective process" question to see if there are any proposals in this area which can meet the Mitchell Report tests - i.e. be broadly acceptable, have an appropriate mandate and respect the three strands. The Irish position is that it is premature to reach a conclusion on whether such proposals can be arrived at until the discussion in the political track has been brought to a conclusion. If the criterion of broad acceptability is to be met, the Unionist parties must persuade the Nationalists parties that their fears are unfounded. The political track is there for exactly that purpose.

My view, which I have put to John Major, is that on this basis the British and Irish Governments should resume the approach of steps agreed between us which has served both sides well in the recent past.

I will close by asking for your continued support and that of your Administration in our efforts to work with the British Government on the basis proposed. Your support will prove invaluable in reaching the outcome I trust we both wish for - all party talks by end February leading to a political settlement based on consent.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,



Tadiseach.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*File
Jean Kennedy Smith*

PAGE 01 OF 02

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**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.53)
KBH 7/11/2023**

FOR NSC -- TONY LAKE AND NANCY SODERBERG ONLY FROM
AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/99

TAGS: PREL, EI

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL -- INFORMAL

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON: 1.5
(B) .

2. (C) ONCE AGAIN, I OPEN THE IRISH TIMES TO FIND THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS OUTLINED BY CONOR O'CLERY. THIS MORNING I FIND MYSELF IN THE AWKWARD POSITION OF DISCOVERING FROM THE IRISH TIMES THAT APPARENTLY MY RECOMMENDATION YESTERDAY THAT TONY CALL THE TANAISTE WAS SUPERFLUOUS BECAUSE TONY HAD REPORTEDLY ALREADY BEEN TELEPHONING SPRING OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. THIS LACK OF COMMUNICATION IS, TO SAY THE LEAST, NOT HELPFUL.

3. (C) MY INTERLOCUTORS IN AND OUT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT EXPECT THIS EMBASSY TO BE PRIVY TO USG POLICY AND ACTIONS. HOPEFULLY SOME MECHANISM CAN BE WORKED OUT TO ENABLE TONY TO TELEPHONE ME AS WELL WHEN HE IS HAVING CONTACTS WITH SENIOR IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT WOULD HELP IF WE WERE ALL SPEAKING IN UNISON.

4. (C) WITH REFERENCE TO CONOR O'CLERY, THE LOCAL PRESS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS HAVE BEEN CALLING US TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF HIS REPORTING AND HIS OBVIOUSLY AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES. A NUMBER OF THESE CALLERS HAVE IMPLIED THAT THE EMBASSY MUST BE THE SOURCE OF THE LEAKS, PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH HIS REPORTING IN ADVANCE ON THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY, AND THIS HAS DEVALUED OUR CREDIBILITY WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORPS. ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTACTS IN THE IRISH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL BODY POLITIC ARE CONVINCED THAT THE LEAKS ARE COMING, ALONE OR IN TANDEM, FROM THE IRISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND THE NSC.

5. (c) THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS ESPECIALLY EXERCISED OVER THE LEAKS OF THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY TO THE IRISH INDEPENDENT AND ARE ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING THE SOURCE OF THIS PARTICULAR LEAK. WE UNDERSTAND THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE WILL TRY TO REIN IN ITS EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. AT THE SAME TIME, PERHAPS WE NEED TO REVIEW O'CLERY'S ACCESS TO THE USG IN WASHINGTON TO INSURE THAT THE USG'S DISCRETION IN THE HANDLING OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS NOT FURTHER CALLED INTO QUESTION. SMITH

BT

#0549

NNNN

<MSGID> M2058449

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To NES
From MAP

Ancram finds receptive White House audience for election proposals

From Conor O'Clery,
in Washington

THE Northern Ireland Office Minister, Mr Michael Ancram, appears to have found a receptive audience among senior White House officials for the British case which he is here to explain.

The case being that an electoral process was always on the cards for Northern Ireland, that Dublin knew it well, and that it is a necessary device to bring unionists into inter-party negotiations with a mandate to talk to Sinn Féin.

The British ambassador to the United States, Sir John Fell, gave a dinner for Mr Ancram at the British embassy on Monday evening, at which US officials gave little indication that they were "blind-sided" by British actions last week, as some reports suggested.

They were all talking about elections as if they were going to happen, said one source about the exchanges among US and British officials concerning the British response to the Mitchell report on decommissioning.

If this is the case, then Sinn Féin president, Mr Gerry Adams, may find senior administration officials trying to nudge him towards agreeing to some form of electoral process when he arrives in Washington for talks at the White House tomorrow.

This could cause problems for Sinn Féin, especially if it concludes that the Americans, by trying to push the situation forward, are in fact leaning towards a British-controlled agenda. Mr Adams has rejected proposals for elections.

As has happened before, he may find his main assets in Washington are not White House officials but friends in Congress such as Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Chris Dodd, who have in the past persuaded President Clinton away from a course adopted by his officials.

However, Mr Ancram's arrival in the United States so quickly



Mr Michael Ancram: British may have the initiative



Mr Anthony Lake: due to meet Sinn Féin president

after the British government's rejection of the Mitchell report, with its recommendation to drop Washington 3, and the subsequent bitter war of words between London and Dublin over the election initiative, appears, for now, to have given the British the diplomatic initiative in Washington.

With fortuitous timing, the British Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser, Mr Rod Lyne, came to town on Friday to introduce his successor Mr John Holmes, and was able to lobby Mr Lake on the British position over dinner on Friday evening. Mr Ancram arrived on Monday afternoon.

The administration will hear nationalist objections to elections when Mr Adams arrives at the White House for talks with the President's national security adviser, Mr Anthony Lake, and other officials tomorrow morning.

The Dublin version of events will be conveyed by the Tánaiste, Mr Spring, when he arrives for talks on February 7th and 8th. The Ulster Unionist Party leader,

Mr David Trimble, will be in town on February 12th and 13th along with Mr Ken Maginnis MP and Mr Jeffrey Donaldson, party secretary.

The unionists will almost certainly find the White House encouraging them to negotiate with other parties after the elections and to drop the decommissioning precondition.

Among guests at the British embassy dinner were Mr Lake and Ms Mary Ann Peters of the National Security Council.

The British-US discussions, at the dinner and in the White House yesterday, apparently involved speculation about the size of an elected body, the merits of the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and the optimum size of delegations to inter-party talks.

The Americans seem convinced that the talks will get under way in due course despite the current crisis, and are taking the view that Mr Major will not back down on the election idea. But then dogged optimism has been American strategy all along.

THE IRISH TIMES, Wednesday, January 31, 1996

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4.54)

KBM 4/11/2023

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Summary of Phone Conversation between Mr. lake and Michael Ancram, September 30, 1995

Ancram told Mr. Lake he had a constructive meeting with Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness (accompanied by Joe Kelly) , which began with McGuinness stressing SF's desire to find a way through the present impasse by means of debate and discussion. Ancram thought it significant that McGuinness had not warned of a possible return to violence. Ancram had said HMG is also committed to finding a way through, and believes the twin track, especially in terms of the commission, offers the means to look at all the different sensitivities. Neither SF nor HMG would be required to make a commitment to the commission's outcome. Both would stand by their present positions, but would agree to consider the commissions recommendations on their merits. Ancram said the discussion had been very much along the lines he and Mr. Lake had been discussing.

Ancram said that he and McGuinness had discussed the proposal in some detail, including terms of reference and composition of the commission. McGuinness was anxious about the target date -- Ancram had told him HMG would certainly consider it , though not until the twin track was clearly working. They would consider announcing the target date at the same time they announced the twin track. In response to Mr. Lake's question about a possible 12/15 target date, Ancram said they had lost a little time and it might not be possible for the commission to complete its work in time for that. He added that McGuinness wants to meet again next week.

Mr. Lake asked whether McGuinness had indicated whether he had talked with his people (in the IRA); Ancram said he had not indicated how much he had already talked with them, but had said he would take back what he and Ancram had discussed. Ancram mentioned the SF convention to be held in Dublin 9/30. Ancram said McGuinness is interested in the words that would be used (the communique) and would like to negotiate that with Ancram. They remain in touch with Hume on this. Today's meeting, according to Ancram, was not the time for that kind of detail. He emphasized that the atmosphere was good; and the next thing was to analyze the meeting in detail and wait and see what McGuinness comes back with. He told Mr. Lake he had made no bones about the fact that HMG's position had not changed -- McGuinness seemed to accept that that had to be worked through.

Mr. Lake returned to the question of the piece of paper, and agreed with Ancram that there may be too many floating about. He reminded Ancram that we had not told Adams or anyone else about the draft we had sent Ancram, and said Ancram is welcome to use it as he sees fit. Ancram said thank you and repeated that it had been easier to leave that issue to the next meeting. Mr. Lake also told Ancram he had had a brief conversation with SF's Washington representative, who had said the same thing about SF's readiness to be constructive.

Mr. Lake recalled that Ancram has said the Washington criteria were not doctrinal and asked whether there was flexibility in the formula to make the third criteria a judgment rather than a condition. Ancram responded that he thought both sides would be happier if the panel were to look at ways and leave the judgments to the sides. The terms of reference would be general, along the lines of "context and manner" and would cover criteria one and two, though the panel would hear evidence on three. Mr. Lake said he found Trimble's proposal for an elected assembly somewhat vague; what would such body do? Ancram said he thought it was still vague in Trimble's mind, but there had been other (similar) suggestions from other quarters and HMG needed to give the concept some thought. They did not want to rule out any idea put forward in a constructive manner, but he wouldn't rank it higher than "possible" at present. Ancram said that Major had recently met with both Hume and Paisley and both meetings had been conducted in a positive atmosphere.

Mr. Lake said he would be hearing from Sinn Fein later in the day and would let Ancram know of any glitches. He also raised the idea of a trip by Nancy Soderberg and Ambassador Crowe to Belfast and a possible trip by himself to London. Ancram thought his trip would be useful, depending on the response Nancy and Crowe get.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (4.55)
KBM 4/11/2023

SUBJECT Mr. Lake's September 14 Meeting with Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Mairead Keane, Richard McAuley, Nancy Soderberg, Mary Ann Peters

LOCATION, DATE, TIME: One Washington Circle Hotel, September 13, 1995, 6:00 p.m.

Adams began by saying there had been a story on television in Belfast, on UBT, that Gerry Adams had been "summoned" to the White House, and that the reporter, Ken Reid, had confirmation from Nancy Soderberg.

Soderberg said she had called Reid, who had denied that he had said it and alleged that he had gotten the confirmation from Sinn Fein itself. She had spoken with Reid the previous evening and given him the same readout she gave everyone -- that Lake and Adams had had a good conversation.

Adams said a number of others had claimed to have gotten the meeting confirmed at the White House. This is a problem, though he doesn't take it personally. Mr. Lake pointed out that it is not in our interest to have this come out. He wanted it to remain private to give Adams running room. That is why we were there. He said he had full confidence in Nancy. Adams said that Conor O'Clery had told him that he had White House confirmation of a meeting -- did the fact that there would not be one mean a crisis? O'Clery had added that it would be hard to reset the headline "White House Fails to Broker Agreement", to which McAuley had responded that they had never expected a headline that read "White House Brokers Agreement".

Mr. Lake said that our press guidance would be that we had talked to Adams and to Ancram and that we remain in touch with all the parties. We would refuse to say more. Adams said he did not want to spend too much time on the issue, though it is a matter of confidence. There is a familiar tactic, in his view erroneous, of setting deadlines to corral people -- the British do it all the time. Sinn Fein is left with a double dilemma. It is not a problem for Sinn Fein to say there was no meeting at the White House, though they remain in contact (with the White House). The fact is the story is out there with the word "summoned" -- though that was probably Ken Reid's own sense of

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it. This was the situation he had sought to avoid. Adams added that he would prefer to cobble together a solution rather than make headlines.

Mr. Lake said he had been accused by of being Greata Garbo when he travelled all over Europe on Bosnia without talking to reporters. We cannot lie to them, but only a few people know about this meeting. Adams said that Senator Kennedy knows. Mr. Lake asked whether he knew about this meeting and Adams replied that Trina had phoned Sinn Fein to assure Kieran that they would make sure Adams was finished with his meeting with Kennedy in time to get to the White House. Mr. Lake said that if this meeting leaks, he'll have the FBI on it, and the next meeting would be just the two of them somewhere in Newfoundland. Adams' confidence is important to him. Mr. Lake added that the Administration is engaged on lots of issues, for the purpose of getting them resolved, not getting credit. He said he understands that the British need room on this and Sinn Fein needs room with the IRA.

On the issue at hand, Adams said he had passed from Mairead to Mary Ann what he needed from this meeting. One thing he wanted to stress, as he had yesterday, was that the IRA have set their head against any dealing with or accepting a commission. He had told Hume and possibly the Taoiseach, but no one else, that he had gone to the IRA about 10-12 weeks ago, because from his perspective it is Sinn Fein that has to keep pushing the process forward -- no one else will do it. (They'd said) okay, what if we get the Brits headed down the track and the movement lasts for 1-3 months and the ground shifts a bit, but at the end the Brits still insist on the third condition?

The British have hammered on decommissioning so long that the IRA thinks this is just a British ruse, Adams continued. Sinn Fein has very little room to maneuver on this. Of course if there were forward movement, then all parties would feel freer. The IRA is not going to give up weapons without a process working, without actually having a settlement or being on the eve of a settlement. What they fear is that if they move to bilateral or trilateral talks the British will keep them hanging until the urgency goes out of the situation, after the President's trip. In 3-4 months the British will say they will not move to all-party talks and the process is stalled again. As (senior GOI official) Sean O'Huiginn says, it is a matter of judgment -- either you believe the Brits want a fig leaf and want to change this from an obstacle to an objective, in which case they will continue to shout about the condition but everyone knows they

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will get off it, or they will not move and will jam the condition on again in 2-3 months.

Mr. Lake asked whether there was not a third alternative, though it might not be consistent with the way the IRA thinks. What if the current situation extends into the future and it continues to appear that Sinn Fein is refusing to go along with the commission? That is less attractive than the second scenario Adams outlined, of the British not going along.

Adams responded that he was mindful of what the Vice President had said and what an Irish Times editorial had said about a "vacuum" hanging over us. People are impatient. He stressed that it is very, very important for people to understand that there is an alternative that could work. Mr. Lake responded, "Let's make it work." Adams added that if we knew how tightly people are screwed (wound) up on this ... He asked Mr. Lake to put himself inside the mind of someone who believed in the armed struggle, and imagine their view of the British. It would not suit Sinn Fein to have a PLO-like situation in which there is a separate, more militant faction. On the British, if this is screwed up, and if the (IRA) representatives still retain confidence in him, even if there was never a friendlier Administration, he'd need to be putting it back together again. If it breaks down, after having a nervous breakdown, Adams said he would be back trying, because there has to be something.

"So what is required," Adams asked. He said he would like to go back with something in writing in order to have a firm proposal to show. It should contain the kernel of what has been brokered. Adams said he did not need it that day, necessarily, but it would be useful if he had it. Second, if the British are prepared to go down the road, and if he wants to avoid a situation where the commission brings back its recommendations and the British reject them, can the U.S. act as a guarantor? In a private dimension? Given the opposition to the word "commission" Adams had looked it up in the dictionary, an American edition and talked it over with Hume. He personally had liked the word "arbiter", but also "monitor" and "forum". Mr Lake asked whether the term "Brits" was invidious, to which Adams replied that they refer to themselves that way when they are being partonizing. Finally, Adams said that if a way could be found to move, it should not fall foul of a failure to communicate; there should be a way to keep in contact.

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Mr. Lake explained that our general principle was not to get involved in actual negotiations. He understands that Adams is committed to peace and needs to bring others along. For our part, he said, we need to maintain good relations with the British, with whom we work on Iraq, Bosnia, etc. Our commitment to peace helps us with the Irish-American community. It is not in our interest to get so deeply involved that we can be blamed if it fails, or to do so in such a way that one side or the other says we did not act in confidence. All of us, I myself, Nancy, Mary Ann, and the President and Vice President do what we are doing to see progress made. I have the sense that now is the time for progress, that the positions are not that far apart. We would not be trying if we did not see a possibility of success. This is not something we expect will bring immediate credit to us, though we may get some credit someday. That is why I am annoyed about the leak. I have told the President to expect stories in the press about lack of a breakthrough.

Adams said that he recognized that the Vice President's attendance at the meeting was an important step. Mr. Lake added that it had come in advance of anything new. Adams said he wanted to get into the details of what is required. No Irish republican, including himself, will make a leap of faith in the British even to allow them to move off their position and offer talks. It would be a different situation if the U.S. says it, though Adams understood that the U.S. does not want to get in the middle. Mr. Lake said, "Unless absolutely necessary, in certain situations".

Adams asked Mr. Lake to explain the terms of reference for the Mitchell entity. Would the parties, Sinn Fein, the SDLP, etc. be expected to make statements to the commission? Would the IRA be expected to? Mr. Lake said that he would think anyone who wanted to do so would be able to, and it would be in their interest to make their views known. Adams said it would have to be the political parties, not the armed groups, who would talk about how demilitarization should be done. Soderberg said that this is where the other track comes in -- if those talks go far enough, the decommissioning track is less important. Adams said that he would be asked by the IRA what they would have to do and he wanted to be able to reply, "Nothing."

Adams then said he had half arranged to meet with Mitchell again prior to leaving the U.S. He'd felt inhibited in their previous meeting because there had been so many people present. Mr. Lake said he would not talk to Mitchell before Adams did. He'd known Mitchell for 25 years -- he is a man who cares about his integrity. Adams added, "As long as the Brits don't catch his

great cousin having an affair", but admitted that he was perhaps being paranoid. Mr. Lake related the anecdote about the French ambassador compromised by the KGB who, when confronted with photos of himself "in flagrante delicto", had responded that he would like to order copies.

Adams said he has known Mitchell a relatively short time but has a sense of Mitchell's integrity; it would be taking a chance but risks have to be taken. Mr. Lake amended his previous decision not to talk to Mitchell before Adams' conversation with him, saying he felt he should brief Mitchell first on where the process stands.

Adams said he keeps coming back to the question of whether this is the right road. He is not negative personally because to do anything one has to be flexible, but the IRA has ruled out cooperating with a commission for very good reasons. When he and John Hume had cobbled together their formula, he had talked informally with 1-2 IRA men. They had indicated that if Hume and Adams worked out the terms of reference so they would be different from what the Brits had wanted, they wouldn't rule it out. That is Adams' answer. He thinks people are intelligent. If this doesn't work then he will get another word. What is required is a date for all-party talks. Mr. Lake added, "Target date."

Adams said the compromise is a formula for dealing with a commission. This is the best answer he could give. It would be a mistake to think he can deliver this, though he can run with it. He had been thinking and talking about it but got nowhere. He would not want us to think he is upbeat about it. Whether he gets it or not, he will call, so he needs a way to communicate. He can give us a commitment to let us know in advance what the response will be so we will not be surprised or deceived.

Adams added that he does need something in writing to take back. Mr. Lake said he would see if we could get the British and the Irish to work on that. Adams said that he would like to have in writing if possible and would keep absolutely confidential an outline of the proposal Mr. Lake had put to him. Mr. Lake said he would rather not provide that but would prefer to work on a document that would eventually be made public. Adams said what he had in mind was something actually expressed that way, saying here's where we are. Mr. Lake said we should think about a secure means of communicating. He would talk to Mairead.

Adams returned to the question of who knew about the meeting. He said Senator Dodd might, as he had asked Adams to phone him at home that evening. Mr. Lake said there was no way around the fact that it was known a meeting had been planned. The

question was who knew about this meeting? Adams said he had explained to Trina that there would be some contact -- either a meeting or a phone call. That's all who know. A good cover for the contact is that Sinn Fein has a mission in Washington and the White House maintains regular contact through Mairead Keane. We can say we have had contact or that we are always in contact.

Mr. Lake said that his impression -- and Adams should tell him if it should be more nuanced -- is that for Sinn Fein the issue of a date for all-party talks is at least as important as the commission, if not more so. The British had accepted the notion of calling it a target date; more needs to be done on this because it goes to the issue of "creating conditions" for talks to take place. Adams interjected that by conditions the Brits meant their Washington principles. Mr. Lake said that the British had told him that if everything else were moving, they would give sympathetic consideration to going forward (with all-party talks). Mr. Lake had asked if that meant movement in the trilateral talks and in the commission and they had said yes. He added that he didn't know whether they would be willing to say that now. Adams said that Mayhew's letter to Hume should give us insight -- he couldn't remember exactly what it said, but it was a considered, written reply. The fact that they were writing to Hume at all indicates that they want their view on the record. Mr. Lake said the British would be talking with Hume.

On the terms of reference, in essence, the British cannot explicitly say that the "when" is included, but they would ask the Mitchell "x" to make recommendations that might include when decommissioning would take place. Mr. Lake had said that in his view, the communique language about "appropriate context and manner" did not rule out "when". If the commission cannot look at "when", then what is the point? The British had agreed that a broad interpretation would not be excluded. In Mr. Lake's view that is a better position for Sinn Fein because the British will have to take account of the commission's recommendations on the issue. Mr. Lake added that no one would be bound by the outcome, and both could restate their positions in the interim, though he hoped neither would do so too often. Ancram had used the phrase "if asked", but then added that he is always asked. It would help encourage trust if some of the voluntary statements were not made, Mr. Lake said.

Adams told Mr. Lake that in a meeting with the three Irish coalition partners and senior GOI officials about 10 days ago, they had said there was no guarantee what the British would do. But when it came to the crunch, the British had backed off. Adams had a sense of deja vu. The Irish government had been reading the same signs. Mr. Lake said that at the risk of appearing immodest, that had been before the U.S. got involved.

We are the new factor. Adams agreed, saying that the entire dynamic in Ireland wasn't enough to move the process forward -- only "you yourselves" could do it.

Mr. Lake said the British had agreed that the commission's recommendations would be considered on their merits. Neither Sinn Fein nor the British would be bound in advance. The British would maintain their current position while the commission starts its work. The other track would begin and over the next few months, this would develop confidence and address the issue of creating a new reality. Mr. Lake had never talked to Mitchell about it but he hoped the commission could make recommendations all parties could buy off on. This is the simple, clear way to get going without forcing either side to back off. Mr. Lake said this is what he had gotten from London. The Prime Minister had been in meetings all day and had not signed off, but this is a sense of where they are. Mr. Lake would be back in touch to work on a joint communique text. The British would want to get back to the Irish on the communique.

The name did not seem to be a stumbling block. The British have a problem with the word "forum" but had said twice that they would find another word. In response to Adams' question on who had said that, Mr. Lake said he had been talking with Ancram, but Adams should keep that private. Soderberg said that the problem with "forum" is that there is already an entity in the south using the term.

On the composition, Mr. Lake said the British have no problem with Mitchell and two others. They will find acceptable people-- they won't get anyone who is anathema to any of the parties.

Adams said that the language Hume had suggested to the British differed slightly from the version he and Hume had worked out, but it was "not bad". He said that perhaps what he had said about what was required sounded like a shopping list, but it was what he had to deal with.

Mr. Lake said that his goal it is to try and wind up the train so it can go down the track without his having to drive it, though he wanted to stay involved. He wanted to jumpstart the process. If Mitchell heads the commission, it would be better for us not to be in the middle. That said, we do need to stay in touch and we need to find a way to communicate so that we can be helpful as necessary. He asked Adams whether that made sense and Adams said it did, absolutely. Mr. Lake said he did not rule out another meeting. He saw the joint communique as a way to have a document to move forward -- we would work with both governments on it. Adams said there would be no problem with the Irish.

Mr. Lake returned to the question of a guarantee. We have to be precise. The whole notion is that there would be no guarantee of what the British or Sinn Fein will or will not do. We do not know how the Mitchell Commission will turn out, but all would agree to consider its recommendations seriously on their merits.

How do we proceed, Adams asked, through your ambassador to Ireland? He added that he thought he should have a final proposal before leaving the country on Saturday. Mr. Lake said we would need a way to communicate. Adams mentioned Hume's proposal to the British, to which he had gotten a positive response from Mayhew. Soderberg said she had the Mayhew letter. Adams said that with Hume involved, there were four channels of communication going. He saw a danger of a mix-up in that and suggested that Sinn Fein and the USG stay in direct contact. He added that the press was liable to be asking why there had been no meeting and we should say we are in touch. O'Clery will say that there have been private meetings over the last week that are ongoing.

Mr. Lake asked how he should be in touch. It was agreed that he would call Mairead. Adams reiterated his request for a clear "view" of the proposal. It was agreed there could be a meeting in New York Friday or Saturday.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (4.56)

K8H 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
Kathleen Stephens (in Belfast)
Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters (NSC staff)

Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein
Mairead Keane (in Mr. Lake's office)

DATE, TIME September 21, 1995, 11:15 a.m.
AND PLACE: Mr. Lake's Office

Mr. Adams: Do you have any news for me?

Mr. Lake: I am waiting for news from you. I talked to the British about the question of whether the IRA would have to have contact with the commission or panel. I got a good response -- what matters to them is practicality, not labeling, as long as the commission is talking to someone in authority. I underscored the point about IRA neutrality. That leads to the question of what is talked about. I strongly urged that it not be defined now, but as things go along. The objective is to get the damn thing going and park the issue in an international body. I thought that got a constructive reception.

Mr. Adams: Right. The reality of the situation is that all we can see is for people to be neutral, and we are prepared to undertake and give some sort of commitment on the basis of this being part of the all-party talks process. We want to have a meeting between Ancram and Martin McGuinness, but it is not being processed properly -- we're having some difficulty reaching them, and Mayhew is in Australia this morning. And what I have in terms of our last conversation is that it will not be a runner. I talked to one or two people informally and they have enough goodwill to be neutral if there is a clear date for all-party talks. The Brits are saying they want people to speak with authority on this. What does that mean? Does it mean details or, as it should be, what is necessary to make progress and move forward. We have a bad line.

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Mr. Lake: Please repeat the last part, the last third of what you said.

Mr. Adams: What do they mean by someone who can speak with authority on these issues? I think it means points one and two and fuzzy on three because there is no possibility of persuading people to be anything but neutral.

Mr. Lake: My strong impression is that they want to see movement forward. You should take what you've got. They are saying that you should engage with the panel and the IRA is neutral, as you noted. Neutral means the IRA doesn't have to support it but doesn't oppose your participation. You don't have to try to corner them now by saying what the body will not address, just as I urged the British not to be saying what the body has to address. You have the deal you are looking for.

Mr. Adams: You have said twice that they can be neutral and Sinn Fein or I will be involved. The difficulty that was pointed out to me informally was that if they are neutral on the twin track and if the British continue to insist on preconditions, on a report back from the body before all-party talks, and if the body comes up with a position similar to the British one, the whole republican leadership will be discredited with the republicans. We see that as a real danger.

Mr. Lake: The British have a sincere problem with the unionists, as you do with your constituents. The point I would urge on you both is that all you have to say is, "We are prepared to engage with the body on this issue." You have repeatedly said you would engage on decommissioning. You would not necessarily be bound by the outcome but would treat it seriously. If it comes out the wrong way, you can say that your position has not changed. It is your choice. You can say now that your policy remains the same, but I hope you will say it less.

Mr. Adams: I missed the last bit.

Mr. Lake: You would say that you would not be bound by what the body says, though you would treat it seriously. I don't see how that discredits you if you say it at the beginning. I am concerned that a refusal to deal with the body will let the British corner you and hurt your credibility, and ours.

Mr. Adams: OK.

Mr. Lake: As I said, I have been acting on the belief that you want peace.

Mr. Adams: That goes without saying.

Mr. Lake: To me, yes, but if it appears that you are blocking an approach that would park this issue while you would get to work on the first phase of all-party talks, then it is hard to sustain that position.

Mr. Adams: Anything more in terms of a firm description like the name?

Mr. Lake: No, I would welcome your thoughts. I think the "Mitchell Panel" is not bad. The British are flexible on this.

Mr. Adams: Anything further on who the others would be?

Mr. Lake: I did not discuss anything except that one issue, where I think they came back with a flexible answer. To return to the date, we do have them talking about a target date, which is a step forward. On the issue of membership, it would be a group of three of "appropriate standing, likely to enjoy widespread confidence."

Mr. Adams: Do you have names?

Mr. Lake: No, I would suggest that we get started on the basis of that formula. We would stay involved and weigh in, or George Mitchell would, to make sure the dice were not loaded, that they do not insist on qualifications that would load the dice. We would have to work on it.

Mr. Adams: Let me tell you what I will do, subject to your advice. We are trying to organize a meeting for Martin MaGuinness with Michael Ancram. When is the question-- hopefully as soon as possible. We first called them last evening; Martin is to phone back today. I am also hopeful that we will be consulting with the Irish Government people. I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram, if there is any light between what he says to us and what he is saying to you. And I will take your point about not pressing too hard on some issues. I would like to talk again. I will put the issue formally to the IRA and I will talk to you before then.

Mr. Lake: Would you like me to call London to encourage Ancram to meet with you as soon as possible?

Mr. Adams: We couldn't find them at all. It would be helpful.

Mr. Lake: I will do that.

Mr. Adams: Can we keep the point about formally putting it to the IRA between ourselves? I know you are doing your best. We do see it as step forward, but it will be very much an uphill battle. A small number see the Brits as getting everyone on a hook. I understand and accept the White House role, but the Brits are having success tactically by digging in behind this. We are 13 months down the road and the process is still dominated by a single new precondition, which is causing annoyance. I want to stress that it will be uphill. As I already told you, I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram. I want to go to them with a full proposal. If something is revised in what Ancram tells Martin, perhaps you could take it up for us?

Mr. Lake: What I have told you about speaking with authority, I got from beyond Ancram, from someone not always noted for flexibility, so I hope we are making progress on that side. I agree they are doing well tactically -- and I urge you to deflect that and take the high ground.

Mr. Adams: The difficulty is that what people will sign on for is what is in a joint communique. You can't expect them to read between the lines. At the end of the day, the U.S. cannot act as guarantor or even broker. It is whatever the Brits are saying in consultations with us that is relevant. We cannot explain it as "Tony Lake said."

Mr. Lake: My aim is to get as explicit as possible, but I don't want to make it too detailed now. We talk to the British too. If they tell us something, it has some validity because of our relationship. It is just the same when you tell me something. Let me talk to them and if there is anything new, I will let you know.

Mr. Adams: I will be in Dublin until Saturday morning -- if you have some message that is the way to get me, to set up a call through the ambassador.

Mr. Lake: I am going to Haiti and will be back Saturday around noon, but Nancy will be here.

Mr. Adams: I will not be back to you until after the meeting with Ancram unless there is something new, or you have news for me.

-- End of Conversation --