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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. cable~~	~~re: DUP on Political Talks, U.S. Envoy (2 pages)~~	~~09/27/1993~~	~~P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023~~
~~002. memo~~	~~Trina to Senator [Kennedy] re: Meeting with Niall O'Dowd (3 pages)~~	~~07/20/1993~~	~~P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023~~
003. cable	re: Provisional Army Council Support for Northern Ireland Peace Process (5 pages)	07/23/1995	P1/b(1)
~~004. memo~~	~~re: Northern Ireland (3 pages)~~	~~00/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023~~
~~005. cable~~	~~re: Promoting Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (3 pages)~~	~~10/23/1993~~	~~P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023~~
~~006. cable~~	~~[Duplicate of 005] (3 pages)~~	~~10/23/1993~~	~~P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023~~
~~007. cable~~	~~re: Promoting Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (3 pages)~~	~~09/22/1993~~	~~P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023~~
~~008. cable~~	~~re: Northern Ireland: A Role for U.S.? (7 pages)~~	~~10/07/1993~~	~~P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023~~

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Working File, 1993

2011-0355-F

rs1698

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.91)
KRM 4/11/2023

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
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PREC PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 270828Z SEP 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9970
INFO RUFDDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0787

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 17528

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UK, EL

SUBJECT: DUP ON POLITICAL TALKS, U.S. ENVOY

REF: LONDON 17474

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE CONSUL GENERAL PAID A CALL ON DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) SECRETARY NIGEL DODDS ON SEPTEMBER 23. DODDS INDICATED THAT THE DUP WAS HOLDING NIO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR MICHAEL ANCRAM AT ARM'S LENGTH AS ANCRAM TRIED TO COBBLE TOGETHER A NEW ROUND OF POLITICAL TALKS. DODDS STRESSED THAT THE DUP WAS NOT OPPOSED TO TALKING PER SE, BUT THAT THE PARTY STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT REVIVING THE PREVIOUS SET OF TALKS WITH BUT SOME TINKERING ON FORMAT SIMPLY WOULD NOT DO. IN ANY CASE, DODDS ADDED, THE DUP ALWAYS MAINTAINED "INFORMAL CONTACT" WITH NIO MINISTERS; IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO DO SO IN A PLACE AS SMALL AS NORTHERN IRELAND. DODDS NOTED THAT BETWEEN THE SEPTEMBER 17 PM MAJOR-IAN PAISLEY MEETING AND THE REGULAR IF INFORMAL SOUNDINGS WITH THE NIO IN BELFAST, HE WAS FAIRLY CONFIDENT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO INCLUDE THE DUP IN SOME KIND OF TALKS.
3. EMBASSY COMMENT: DODDS' REFERENCE TO "INFORMAL CONTACTS" WITH THE NIO APPEARS TO CONFIRM NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS' ACCOUNT OF AN UPCOMING MEETING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

BETWEEN PAISLEY AND ANCRAM (REFTEL). END COMMENT.

4. MEANWHILE, DODDS SAID, THE DUP REMAINED VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED TO ANY U.S. ENVOY OR FACT-FINDER. THE PARTY COULD NEVER SEE SUCH A MISSION AS ANYTHING BUT BLACKMAIL AGAINST THE UNIONISTS, COURTESY OF DUBLIN AND THE SDLP. AN ENVOY WAS PLAIN INTERFERENCE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS. DODDS AVERRED. A FACT-FINDER WAS EVEN WORSE, HE CONTINUED, FOR THIS IMPLIED THAT CONGEN BELFAST AND EMBASSY LONDON HAD NOT SUPPLIED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO WASHINGTON OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS. NO ONE IN NORTHERN IRELAND COULD BELIEVE THAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN THE CASE, DODDS CONCLUDED, SO IT WAS STILL NOTHING MORE THAN BLACKMAIL, ALBEIT VEILED.

5. IN A SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH THE EMBASSY, ON SEPTEMBER 23, NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS SAID DUBLIN IS WELL AWARE THAT A U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IN FINDING A SETTLEMENT. HE THOUGHT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF AN ENVOY AND USED IT ONLY TO "JERK OUR CHAIN". THOMAS NOTED THAT A U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY WOULD BE COMPLETELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WITH THE UNIONISTS. MOREOVER, CALLING FOR AN OUTSIDE ENVOY WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO SAYING THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT HAD FAILED. THIS WAS NEITHER IN LONDON'S NOR IN DUBLIN'S INTEREST.

SEITZ

BT

#7528

NNNN

<MSGID> M0626301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 20, 1992

MEMORANDUM

TO: SENATOR
FR: TRINA
RE: MEETING WITH NIALL O'DOWD

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.92)

KSH 4/11/2023

Last week, I met with Niall O'Dowd of Irish Americans for Clinton/Gore (i.e. the Flynn/Morrison group). Niall is also the publisher of the Irish Voice and Irish America Magazine.

The following is an account of what Niall had to say. He asked me inform Jean and Nancy Soderberg of our discussion. Other than that, he wants to keep this quiet for now.

Niall spent most of the time talking about the special envoy issue. He briefly talked about Gerry Adams and Irish immigration. I simply listened to Niall. I didn't promise him anything on any of these matters.

Special Envoy

Niall has been making numerous trips to Northern Ireland to talk with Sinn Fein and the IRA. He says he has their assurance that the IRA will cease-fire if the Clinton Administration sends a special envoy. The length of the cease-fire would last the length of an envoy's visit.

Niall and a group which will include Bill Flynn (the guy you wanted me to hook up with Brendan) will visit Northern Ireland in early September. Niall won't say exactly what will occur, but he says the IRA will "give a generous response" which will serve as a signal to us.

I told Niall of my own view that an envoy wouldn't even be considered without a definite agenda and without assurances that the envoy would be able to demonstrate success from such a mission. Niall feels the IRA cease-fire would be a success in and of itself.

He says the IRA is not calling for a withdrawal of British troops. Although hard-line members of the IRA want a date set for withdrawal, the moderates (Adams) aren't demanding that, and the moderates dominate the organization. Niall is confident that Adams can control the hard-liners and achieve a cease-fire.

Niall supports the idea of interim joint authority (British/Irish) for Northern Ireland. Dick Spring has been talking about this recently. Niall thinks a UN force should be deployed, allowing British troops to withdraw to barracks. Then policing would be turned over to local police with Catholics

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

policing nationalist neighborhoods and Protestants policing Unionist neighborhoods. (One of the big problems at present is that there are very few Catholics join the RUC.)

Once the IRA maintains a cease-fire for a legitimate period of time, they would be brought into talks. It seems to me that a cease-fire would have to last a significant period of time before people would consider it serious enough to include Sinn Fein in any talks.

Niall thinks Jimmy Carter would be the right person to serve as envoy. Ray Flynn apparently talked to Carter about this and Carter said he wouldn't consider it unless invited by both the British and Irish governments. Carter also suggested Andrew Young for the job.

Niall thinks Adams is moving to the center. He noted that Eamon de Valera and Michael Collins had done the same. He says Sinn Fein just wants to be sure that if they make a move in the right direction, it won't be in vain.

He wants you and Jean to "look seriously at the envoy idea" after we get "the signal" in September.

Niall mentioned that the IRA will want to see the release of prisoners who have just about served out their time but he didn't know at what point they would raise this. [There are several prisoners who have served 10 or 12 years on life sentences and can be released at any time now at the discretion of the Secretary of State (Mayhew).]

I asked about Sinn Fein renouncing violence. Niall says they won't do so until this is much further down the road.

I asked why the Unionists would be willing to go along. After all, it is Paisley who is currently keeping the talks from resuming. Niall feels that the Unionists know demographics are against them -- the majority of children under age 12 are now Catholic, 4 of the 6 counties in the North have a Catholic majority, and Queens University used to be 15% Catholic, now it's 65%.

I asked why the IRA is suddenly interested in talks. Niall says the IRA leaders are in their mid-forties and they want to see a resolution in their lifetime so they can claim their actions were not in vain. He also finds they are simply more realistic than they used to be.

Niall believes an envoy could serve as the catalyst. Ultimately, the parties must solve this themselves.

Irish Immigration

When I agreed to see Niall, I expected he would spend most of the time talking about visas but he only spent a few minutes on this issue.

His interest is in long-term access for the Irish. His group is not looking for any kind of quota, they just want to be sure the door isn't shut again like it was prior to the Donnelly visas.

As you know, after the final year of 16,000 visas, the permanent diversity program kicks in and it is estimated that the Irish will get about 4,000 visas per year. Niall is concerned because the number 4,000 is only a ceiling based on some mathematical computation that is difficult to understand. He is concerned that, while the Irish may get up to 4,000, they may also get zero. [I have talked to Jerry and Michael about this. They say this computation is based on best estimates and we will simply have to see how it plays out.]

Niall also wants to assure that any visas left over from the three years of 16,000 can be carried over. Current law doesn't provide that. Niall wants a Kennedy amendment. [I will talk Jerry and Michael about this, but it seems like something you might want to consider. We won't know how many visas are left over until the end of the fiscal year. You might want to introduce an amendment which will allow those visas to carry over for all of the countries in the program -- that way it wouldn't be just Irish-specific.]

Gerry Adams

Niall feels that the Irish American community, which his organization rallied to support Clinton, is disappointed that Clinton has not abided by his campaign pledge to let Gerry Adams into the US. He argues that people with worse records -- such as Dolours Price -- are allowed in the US. (He was referring to actor Stephen Rea's wife. Price and her sisters were jailed for life because of their involvement in a 1973 IRA bombing which injured 170 people. They were released from prison for medical reasons after 8 years.)

Bruce Morrison recently spoke at an event in Massachusetts (Ancient Order of Hibernians) and he was booed because Irish Americans feel let down by Clinton.

He also argued that Robinson and Hume have both met with Adams.

cc: Ambassador Smith, Carey, Nancy

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

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CC TL
SANE Hall -
NOTE: Jean
Smith travel

11/15
ms

Washington moves to limit Irish Times damage on Adams visa denial

FOLLOWING the dispute between the Irish and US governments over the refusal of a US visa for the Sinn Féin leader, Mr Gerry Adams, moves were made in Washington yesterday to limit the damage to relations between the two countries during next week's visit to the US capital by the Tanaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Spring.

Mr Spring is now likely to hold an unscheduled meeting with Mr Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser to President Clinton, or, if it can be arranged, with President Clinton. However, the chances of Mr Spring meeting the President are rated by officials as less than 50 per cent because of work pressures.

The Tanaiste and Mr Lake are expected to discuss "misunderstandings" over Mr Clinton's claim that the Irish Government approved the administration's decision not to issue a visa to the Sinn Féin leader. The Government has said it was not consulted on the matter.

The controversy has highlighted a new, emphasised by officials in Washington, to sort out conflicting signals coming from Dublin, which has blown old and often hot over the Hume/Adams process. This has led to confusion in the US administration over its Irish policy.

A stark example of this confusion

The Tanaiste and a senior Clinton administration official are expected to meet over the issue next week, Conor O'Clery reports from Washington

sion has emerged in the widely-differing tones struck in two different letters written by Mr Clinton in recent days about Northern Ireland policy: one to the Mayor of New York, Mr David Dinkins, in which he refused to grant a US visa to Mr Adams, and another, a copy of which *The Irish Times* saw yesterday, to Congressman Robert Menendez.

In the letter to Mr Menendez, Mr Clinton struck a positive note about the Hume/Adams initiative. The administration was following it closely, he said, and "we hope these talks will produce progress towards peace".

The President concluded: "I have asked Anthony Lake, my National Security Adviser, to



meet with representatives of the Congressional Ad Hoc Committee for Irish Affairs to discuss how the United States might best use its energies at this stage to promote the renewal of serious talks."

The meeting took place on November 4th. At it, Mr Lake promised greater White House attention to what was going on in

Ireland, and said that the US ambassador to Ireland, Mr Jean Kennedy Smith, was being urged to travel more in Northern Ireland.

Congress members said they were happy with the meeting, but Congressman Tom Manton said yesterday that Mr Lake "seemed to imply that Adams hangs out with terrorists".

The letter to Mr Menendez was dated October 29th, one day before the letter sent to Mr Dinkins, the tone of which led former Congressman, Mr Bruce Morrison, leader of a group campaigning for a US convey to the North, to complain it was "dismissive of the most important event in recent months, the Hume/Adams initiative".

Following calls to the White House by Irish-American Congress members about the letter to Mr Dinkins, Mr Lake is understood to have discussed it with his Nancy Soderberg, the White House official concerned with Irish affairs. It is not known, however, who in the White House inserted the line which embarrassed the Irish Government — that "neither the British nor the Irish government favour granting Adams a visa". The Government said on Thursday evening it was not consulted on the visa issue.

There were also believed to have been direct contacts yesterday between Mr Lake and Government officials over the drafting of Mr Clinton's letter to Mr Dinkins, which was first published in *The Irish Times* on Thursday and received widespread coverage in the US media yesterday. The letter was seen as a victory for the traditional pro-British views of the US State Department on Northern Ireland.

Nancy ↑ ?
Irish

DRAFT

Statement by The Friends of Ireland
St. Patrick's Day, 1993

On this St. Patrick's Day, the Friends of Ireland in the United States Congress join with all Irish Americans, and indeed Irish people everywhere, in celebrating Irish heritage and in calling for renewed efforts to achieve peace, reconciliation, and justice in Northern Ireland. We welcome the Prime Minister of Ireland, An Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, to Washington and look forward to working closely with him, and with the Deputy Prime Minister, Tanaiste Dick Spring, in seeking ways to achieve these ends over the coming years.

We also take special note of the recent gains made by the women of Ireland. The historic election of President Mary Robinson in 1990, the victories of twenty women in the recent parliamentary elections, and the appointment of the first woman to the board of directors of the International Fund for Ireland are all developments which will enhance the important role of women in the political life of Ireland.

Our concern for a peaceful and just solution in Northern Ireland springs not only from our personal commitment to Ireland but also from our awareness of the exceptional contributions that generations of Irish men and women have made to the building of this nation. The recent census records 44 million Americans who claim Ireland as the home of their forebears. It reminds us how significant an impact that small island has had on our nation and how disproportionate it has been to its size. It is a source of great sadness, therefore, that this celebration of our common Irish heritage is overshadowed by the continuing tragedy of violence in Northern Ireland.

On this day of Irish affection and friendship, the Friends of Ireland warmly welcome and endorse last year's round-table talks between the Irish and British governments and the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland. We reiterate our full support for the earliest possible renewal of such talks, and their ambitious objective of bringing about a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland, within Ireland, and between Ireland and the United Kingdom. The people of Northern Ireland today are crying out for an end to the bitterness and hatred of the past. They demand a political agreement that can bring an end to the violence. They know there can be no real political progress without genuine dialogue between those of all traditions who seek a constitutional way forward towards solving the problems of Ireland.

We unreservedly condemn the violence of the IRA, loyalist paramilitaries, and all paramilitary groups, whatever their political persuasion. Violence begets only more violence and, with it, a cycle of reprisal and revenge. We abhor the violence perpetrated by terrorists through their indiscriminate bombing and shooting campaigns and the misery they bring to ordinary people's lives. Such

violence fosters division, bitterness, and distrust. It seeks to destroy the bridges between the two communities which are an essential avenue to a peaceful political compact by Irish men and women of all political persuasions or allegiances. We are convinced that terrorism will never bring justice and peace and so urge all terrorists to lay aside their arms if they truly wish to achieve their goals.

While recognizing that the primary responsibility for resolving the problems of Northern Ireland lies with the Irish and British governments as well as the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland, the Friends believe that the United States can play a constructive role in advancing the political process. We enthusiastically welcome the interest that President Clinton has shown in Irish affairs, and we join with him in offering our support as the people of Ireland search together to find a way forward. We share the view of the Taoiseach that the constructive interest and support of the President and Congress of the United States has the potential to be uniquely helpful. There should be thorough consultation to ensure that this concern is structured in the most effective and helpful manner possible.

The Friends of Ireland attach great importance to the continued and active implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement by the two governments. The Agreement, and in particular the role in Northern Ireland assigned to the Irish Government under it, has introduced a new dynamic into the situation through its effort to give formal recognition to the legitimacy and status of the political, economic, and social aspirations of the nationalist community. The Agreement should remain in force until transcended by new arrangements acceptable to the two governments and the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland.

We also continue to have serious concerns involving human rights. The abuses which have been documented by Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch include incidents involving the use of lethal force by the security forces, collusion between these forces and loyalists paramilitary groups, harassment of young nationalists by the British Army, and the denial of basic civil liberties. Such abuses must end, specific cases of abuse must be independently investigated, and those responsible must be punished.

Confidence in the forces of law and order, and in the impartial administration of justice, is fundamental to the construction of a just and peaceful society in Northern Ireland. We strongly urge the British Government to put in place a series of measures to respond to the lack of confidence which so clearly exists in the nationalist community. A first step in this direction would be to ensure that all military patrols which come into contact with the public are accompanied by experienced and trained police officers, as agreed in the 1985 arrangements between the two governments.

The British Government should also work to implement the recommendations made in reports by Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, and

most recently, by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Committee on the Administration of Justice which is based in Northern Ireland.

In addition, an end to discrimination in employment would help greatly to establish hope and confidence among the nationalist community, especially the young people. We are encouraged by the terms of the 1989 Fair Employment Act and support its implementation with all necessary powers to redress decades of discrimination.

The Friends are convinced that new investment from overseas can also be a positive catalyst for change. We are very pleased that Congressional support for the International Fund for Ireland has enabled it to play a constructive role in economic development, especially in the disadvantaged areas of both Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic. In fostering economic and social progress, and building a record of success through cooperation and incentive, the Fund is providing a measure of real hope for those who have suffered the most from the conflict in Northern Ireland. It has, most importantly, become a concrete force for reconciliation and healing through the creation of thousands of permanent jobs and with them, a constructive alternative for those who otherwise might have chosen the path of violence.

We believe the International Fund for Ireland with its independent Board jointly appointed by both governments can be a model for other efforts of cooperation and confidence-building between the two great traditions and the two political communities of Ireland. We welcome such initiatives that offer the prospect of reinforcing reconciliation among the Irish people.

It is now critical that both communities reach out to, and further reassure, one another. The Irish and British governments have the central responsibility to encourage and develop this process. In doing so, they will have our full and enthusiastic support. As Friends of Ireland, it is our dearest wish to see all of Ireland at peace, reconciled, and newly energized, free from the dissensions of the past, playing its full, distinctive, and dynamic part on the European and world stage.

On this St. Patrick's Day, the Friends of Ireland in the United States Congress join friends of Ireland everywhere in urging all parties to make special efforts this year to bring about peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

AMBASAID NA hEIREANN

(202) 462-3939



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

5 November 1993

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Special Assistant to the President
and NSC Staff Director
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

A handwritten signature, possibly "JH", in dark ink.

A handwritten signature that reads "Dan Nancy" in dark ink.

I thought you might be interested in the attached extract from a speech by the Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, in Parliament on 4th November.

You might like to note in particular that in the final paragraph the Taoiseach warmly welcomed the recent statement by the President of his support for the efforts of the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister to reinvigorate the negotiations for peace in Northern Ireland.

With best personal wishes.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature of Dermot Gallagher in dark ink.

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

CC R, Jenanne
Jane Holl

EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT ON 4TH NOVEMBER BY TAOISEACH
(PRIME MINISTER OF IRELAND) IN DÁIL (PARLIAMENT)
ON HIS RECENT MEETING WITH THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER

I gave the Prime Minister an account of the outcome of the Hume-Adams dialogue, in the light of the Government's own assessment of these and other related matters. We both paid tribute to John Hume's courageous and imaginative efforts. Indeed, only last week in this House I acknowledged the crucial part he has played in advancing the acceptance of principles, which carried to their logical conclusion should help bring about peace.

Recognising the need for a peace process to be more widely based, we said in Brussels that such a process has to involve the two Governments, conscious of both their international obligations and their wider responsibilities to both communities. We also stated that the two Governments must work together to reach a common understanding in their own terms towards a framework for peace. Any initiative can only be taken by the two Governments. This simply reflects the reality of the situation, and it of course places an onerous responsibility on both Governments, who have to take a broad view of vital concerns on all sides.

As I stated last week in the Dáil, the Irish Government have been working for some time past on the elaboration of a formula for peace, and our view is that both Governments must work together to provide a framework. It is ultimately for the Governments to decide what in their best judgement is likely to produce lasting peace on all sides.

We set out certain parameters or ground rules, many of them previously stated elsewhere, for instance that:

- the situation on Northern Ireland should never be changed by violence or the threat of violence;
- any political settlement must depend on consent freely given.

I would like to make it very clear that what we are talking about here is the consent of a majority to constitutional change, as precisely defined in Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Government have in no way departed from that position.

Other ground rules were:

- negotiations on a political settlement can only take place between democratic governments and constitutional parties;
- there could be no secret agreements or understanding with paramilitary organisations;
- those claiming an interest in peace should renounce violence for good.

The most important point however was the statement that if and when such a renunciation of violence had been made and sufficiently demonstrated, new doors could open, and both Governments would wish to respond imaginatively.

We also expressed our support for the talks process, and urged the Northern Ireland parties to intensify their efforts to find a basis for new talks. Both Governments are continuing their discussions to provide a framework to carry the process forward. It is our intention to hold a further meeting, one of our scheduled biannual Summits, in the next four to five weeks prior to the next European Council. By then, it should be clear, whether a breakthrough is likely to be possible. Nobody should underestimate the difficulties and the obstacles that have yet to be overcome.

In conclusion, I welcome the support expressed the following day by the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, in a statement^{*} issued on 30 October, in which he welcomed the efforts of the Irish and British Prime Ministers to reinvigorate the negotiations for peace, and "our common resolve to work for peace, justice and reconciliation in Northern Ireland". He added that "the United States stand ready to support this process in any appropriate way".

* * * * *

AMBASAID NA hÉIREANN

(202) 462-3939



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

23 November 1993

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Special Assistant to the President
and NSC Staff Director
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

TB TL

Jane Holl -

Gallagher called
today to urge DC to call
Major in Ireland.

us.

Dear Nancy

I very much appreciated our discussion this morning, and also last evening. As promised, there follows the editorial in yesterday's New York Times.

I agree strongly with the overall theme of the article. As Dick Spring said to the President last week, there is now a historic opportunity for peace in Northern Ireland, perhaps the best in the twenty-five years of the conflict. While seizing it will require courage, imagination and risk-taking on the part of both Governments, it would be tragic if this opportunity to bring the conflict to an end, and create a new era of peace and reconciliation, was not wholeheartedly grasped.

The Taoiseach and the Government deeply appreciated the encouragement and warm words of support which the President conveyed last week. They greatly value the continuing interest, concern and encouragement of the President and the Administration.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Dermot Gallagher
Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

To Jane Fyfe
m

Thursday 27 Nov 93

Women throughout Ireland want peace, and an end to the killing and the grief in Northern Ireland. I cannot understand the suggestion that this search is futile, still less, sinister statements to the effect that any talk of peace should be a signal to prepare for war. If basic principles are safeguarded in clear and unequivocal language, then who is going to stand in the way of peace? Who is afraid of it?

Let me sound a note of warning to all whom it may concern. I will not be diverted by anyone from the search for peace. I am not prepared to undo or abandon at anyone's behest the long patient work in which I have been engaged for 18 months, so long as I remain convinced that it is capable of producing peace. All people of goodwill would support a peace initiative by the two Governments. Who is going to quibble over words, when what is at stake is the saving of lives? If there is a failure on whatever side to grasp the present opportunity for peace, and an end to violence, do we fully realise that this is equivalent to signing the death warrants of hundreds of innocent lives that will be lost on this island in the years ahead? I believe the people of Ireland and the people of Britain will severely blame anyone taking upon themselves the responsibility of rejecting a peace process, which offers no injustice to anyone, and which protects all essential rights and interests of both communities. Statesmanship, not calculation of party advantage, is required from every political leader at this time. No one should be allowed to exercise a veto on peace.

We are at a decisive moment in our history. I need your support, the support of all the people of this island, and the support of the people of Britain to make it clear to the paramilitary organisations and to all political leaders that we want peace, and we want it now.

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Clinton Library

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003. cable	re: Provisional Army Council Support for Northern Ireland Peace Process (5 pages)	07/23/1995	P1/b(1)

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TRANSCRIPT OF:

THE PRIME MINISTER/PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS - JOINT PRESS
CONFERENCE - DUBLIN - 3 DECEMBER 1993 - 19 PAGES



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FROM JAMES LEE FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, JOHN MAJOR

AND THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER, ALBERT REYNOLDS

IN DUBLIN

ON FRIDAY, 3 DECEMBER 1993

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

Today, we had a very long and productive meeting. There was some very open and frank talking, many issues discussed and indeed we started off by clearing the air between the Prime Minister and myself and between our colleagues, on our side the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, and Maire Geoghegan Quinn, the Minister for Justice and on the Prime Minister's side Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary and Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Northern Ireland Secretary.

We had long and frank discussions, we cleared the air and then we got down to the real business of the day which in the first instance was of course Northern Ireland and its problems. While the Prime Minister and myself were at that, the other ministers took the opportunity of dealing with other issues that were on the agenda and we came back to them later on this evening. Between the whole lot of us, we discussed the European Council upcoming next week and of course the GATT talks.

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In relation to Northern Ireland, we got through quite a lot of very serious work today and very productive work. We still have commissioned more work to be done. We never expected that the road was going to be easy, we always believed there would be road-blocks along the way and difficulties along the way, we anticipate some of them, some of them we don't but nevertheless we are committed to the objective of trying to produce an agreed statement that hopefully would be a formula for peace commanding support across both communities which at the end of the day have to live together. We have commissioned more work on the areas still to be resolved. We made quite a considerable amount of progress today and we will review our position next week in Brussels. In the meantime, officials from both governments will continue the work that is there.

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

As the Taoiseach made clear, we have had some very frank discussions today and we have also made some very useful progress on the back of them. We have had during the day six ministers spending seven hours together discussing a range of important problems.

When the Taoiseach and I met in London early last year, we set ourselves on that occasion twin objectives: firstly, to bring about a permanent cessation of violence and also to establish the basis for a lasting political settlement. We have been and are continuing to work hard to achieve those objectives.

When we met in Brussels a week or so ago, we both agreed that any initiative in this area should only be undertaken by the two governments and there can be no question of us adopting the results of other non-governmental exercises. This is a responsibility for governments and we are both clear about that.

Both governments remain committed to the talks process. Today, we have shared a range of ideas about the prospects of achieving a permanent end to the violence. We have both been working today on a joint statement, a statement consistent with our principles and wider responsibilities to both communities, a statement that will address our understanding of constitutional realities and political policies.

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There is no question of bargaining for an end to the violence. Both of us made that entirely clear at Brussels and we re-endorse that today. The Provisional IRA present themselves as interested in securing peace yet they have signally failed to deliver an end to the violence and I believe they should do so at once.

We have agreed today that there is scope for further discussions to continue our work on the joint statement; that will be taken forward in the first instance very speedily by officials who I would expect to meet early next week. I am then looking forward to meeting the Taoiseach again in Brussels at the European Council at the end of next week; at that time, we will take stock of progress and decide how to take it forward.

It has been a useful day today. There was a lot to be done, some has been done, there is more yet that remains to be done.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

=====

QUESTION:

Taoiseach, you have said that you seek British acknowledgement of the right of Irish people living on this island to self-determination based on consent north and south. How do you manage to persuade the Prime Minister of the legitimacy of that position?

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

We are not going to go into the details of our discussions here. Indeed, the end objective is to find a formula that hopefully can bring a permanent cessation of violence.

In relation to the question of any change in the status of Northern Ireland, I have indeed repeatedly made our position abundantly clear and that is that there can be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of people living there. That is our position, quite clear, unequivocal and nobody need question it any further.

In relation to any other issues that arose, of course we had many issues, of course we had some very difficult questions to put to each other and of course there are more difficult questions still to be answered but at the end of the day peace is paramount.

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MICHAEL BRUNSON (ITN):

You have made clear that the joint statement will obviously have to consider the issue of consent in the north. Are you both agreed that it would also have to address the matter of constitutional change in the south?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

As the Taoiseach said a moment or so ago, we have been discussing today all the matters that need to be discussed. Many of them have advanced in our discussions today, some haven't. Neither of us are going to go into the details of either the points that are agreed or the points that are outstanding. Our objective is to continue with those discussions firstly at official level, for us then to take further stock in Brussels and then thereafter there may well be further meetings. We are committed to finding an agreement to the matters that are outstanding between us. Neither of us believe that airing any of those matters publicly in advance of that agreement is going to make that agreement any easier to reach so I am afraid I have nothing further to add than that.

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

Can I just add in relation to the Irish Government's position that I have made that clear on quite a number of occasions and it is that if at the end of the talks process, which is a separate process to the peace initiative that we are engaged in, a balanced

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agreement is the outcome the Irish Government - and I repeat it on their behalf - will be prepared to put to the Irish people the agreement for their approval and whatever that may entail.

QUESTION:

Following the Taoiseach's statement about Unionist consent, I would like to ask the Prime Minister if he is prepared to acknowledge and give parity to the legitimacy of the aspirations of Nationalists in Northern Ireland?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

We are discussing all these matters. We are discussing the natural aspirations of both communities whether the natural aspirations of the Republicans, the natural aspirations of the Unionists. All these are matters that we are discussing but I don't think we are going to say very much about them until we have reached conclusions.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, are you intending to join the persuaders and what do you mean by that?

Taoiseach, when you talk about a formula in the permanent cessation, what do you mean and what does Mr. Major mean or does he understand that phrase from you?

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

I think "permanent cessation of violence" has only one clear meaning, that it is clear that the men of violence have indicated that they are not going to continue with the way of violence. There is no possibility of misunderstanding what is meant by either of us over the question of cessation of violence, none whatever.

As far as joining the persuaders is concerned, we have made it clear from the outset that we don't see that as the role of the British Government.

QUESTION:

Gentlemen, can I just clarify this statement? Do we take it that there will be a statement? Can you give us some idea of when we might expect to see that statement and can you be specific as to what exactly you hope this statement will achieve, a ceasefire by one particular group, by all groups? I am particularly interested to know if you have committed yourselves today to issuing a statement.

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:) (In unison said "We have committed
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:) ourselves to..")

(prolonged laughter)

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

There you are! You can see now the extent to which we are working together!

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

We have committed ourselves today, after a long and arduous day, and a good day with a lot of progress made. We have indeed achieved progress today. We have commissioned more serious work. We have always said there are difficulties ahead. We have never made any excuses for that, we say they are there. We have commissioned more work. We will review the progress of that work in Brussels and we will take it from there. It is one step at a time.

At the end of the day it is our objective and we are both committed to trying to produce an agreed statement at the end of the period that hopefully will command the respect and the support of both communities and hopefully lead to a cessation of violence that can then open up the way for the talks process to have a far better chance of success in a changed environment.

We want to stop the killing. Both of us want to stop the killing. That is what we committed ourselves to two weeks after I became Taoiseach because if we were to do anything for the divided communities in the north it was to try and end that conflict up

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there and give the people a better way of life for the future and a better quality of life. We are as committed to that today as we were the first day we met.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

I think the last point is worth reiterating again. This isn't something that we have started on as the result of any event over recent months. This is something that we committed ourselves to seeking - not necessarily the mechanism of seeking it - on the first occasion we met in Downing Street a very substantial time ago. Nothing has changed in the interim. We have been looking consistently to see what can be done.

As far as the joint statement is concerned, we are working on a joint statement. Self-evidently, we haven't got there yet. A good deal of it I think is now common ground between us. There are still differences between us. We are working to try and resolve those differences. We cannot be certain we will resolve those difficulties but I can promise you we will do all we can to see whether they can be resolved and if they can, we will be able to issue a statement.

QUESTION:

Taoiseach, did Prime Minister Major satisfactorily answer your concerns and the Irish Government's concerns about the recent allegations of critical Anglo-Irish documents being handed over by the British Government to Sinn Fein?

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PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

There was some straight talking today, some very frank talking today and after a period of time we put those issues aside and got on with the real business of the day because as I said, peace is paramount. That is what has to be the objective.

We are not denying that there was a strong exchange of views on both sides in relation to them but beyond that, as I say, we put them aside and got on with the real business of today and that is to continue our search for a peace formula.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

Both of us came into the room today with frustrations over events over recent days over the last week to a fortnight. Both of us came into the room with frustrations about that but we are determined to work together if we can to achieve a satisfactory solution and a satisfactory outcome.

The first thing to do was to lay to rest those concerns that have arisen over the last fortnight or so. We did so satisfactorily this morning in private. What we are now concerned with is moving forward.

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QUESTION:

Prime Minister, the Taoiseach has talked about the possibility of peace before Christmas. Do you believe that at the end of this series of meetings which you have embarked upon that you might be able to subscribe to a joint statement which will do what he wants?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

Everyone would like peace. We would have liked peace some time ago, there is absolutely no doubt about that. At the end of the day, whether there is peace - whatever joint statement we produce - depends upon whether those people who disrupt peace are prepared to stop. Ultimately it is for the IRA to decide that they are going to stop and for other Loyalist paramilitaries to make sure that they are going to stop. Ultimately the decision is theirs.

There is always a danger that people actually lose track as we talk of who is actually doing the killing. It is they who should stop and I hope they will stop immediately, there is no reason for them not to.

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

We have continued to work for peace at the earliest possible date. Everybody recognises that there have been difficulties put in our way, that there have been developments in recent times that were not helpful towards the peace process. We have to overcome those difficulties and there is no doubt that there will be more

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difficulties that we can't anticipate put in our way but it is up to the two prime ministers and the two governments to transcend those difficulties and indeed not be deflected off the path that we have chosen and that is the path to peace.

QUESTION:

Arising out of those differences and the fact that you have both said you had straight talking, could I ask the Prime Minister if the contact between the British Government and the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein will continue during the period of the talks between yourself and the Taoiseach and could I ask the Taoiseach if he made any such request today?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

I don't think that people perhaps have fully taken on board the nature of the contacts. The British Government was approached by the IRA with the statement that we issued and we subsequently published the exchanges between us. What has happened is that we have indicated to them privately that our public position is our real position. That is the position. It hasn't been a question of negotiation with the IRA - it has been a question of responding to their questions and confirming to them that our public position is our private position. I don't know whether they are going to ask me any more questions, that is a question for them.

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PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

I am satisfied from what I have heard from the Prime Minister today that it will not interfere with the continuation of our talks process.

ELINOR GOODMAN (CH4 TV):

You referred, Prime Minister, to having reached agreement on certain points. Can you amplify which areas you did reach agreement on and did it extend to the formula for self-determination? Are you essentially going to build on existing statements like the Spring Principles?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

That is an extremely ingenious way, Elinor, of finding out the areas where we haven't agreed and I will, if I may, simply admire the way in which you put the question without responding to it
(laughter)

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, do you think that any agreement between the two governments must be acceptable to the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland or do you think this is an agreement like the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 that could be settled without the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland?

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

We are never going to get a permanent settlement of the troubles in Northern Ireland unless we are able to carry the consent of the people of Northern Ireland with us; that has never been a point in dispute between the Taoiseach and I.

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

We have two different communities with two different identities, two different cultures, two different traditions. Our challenge and the challenge to both of us and both governments is to find accommodation for those different traditions, different identities and different cultures so that people can work out a way of working together, living together and get rid of the violence out of that society.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, could I ask you to address yourself to the northern Unionists who may be concerned about the track that you are on at the moment and could you say whether or not you would agree anything with Mr. Reynolds without the prior agreement of Mr. Molineaux?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

I am here talking government-to-government to the Taoiseach. That is the status of the discussions that we are having, government-to-government, but we are both aware of the need to retain the consent of the people of Northern Ireland and the

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communities in Northern Ireland, both of them. We are aware of that in every moment of our discussions.

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

Our commitment and our approach to this whole initiative and indeed the proposals are grounded on agreement and consent and we want to continue to address that message to the Unionist community in the north of Ireland, that there will be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority and that the present peace initiative is grounded on those principles which indeed should be a consolation to those that have genuine fears and genuine uncertainty as to what we are trying to do. There is no hidden agenda between us behind our back. We seek peace and we will have the talks afterwards.

QUESTION:

In your continuing contacts with the IRA, Prime Minister, will you be keeping the Dublin Government informed given that they were furious that they weren't kept in the picture previously?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

What continuing contacts with the IRA?

SAME QUESTIONER:

You suggested that the lines of communication are open and therefore contact may continue.

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

The lines are there if the IRA wish to send us messages as they have done in the past. I don't know whether they will avail themselves of that. I have no idea whether they will avail themselves of that. As the Taoiseach has said, I don't think that is going to affect the discussions between the two governments.

QUESTION:

Taoiseach, you have said that time is not on your side in relation to this peace process that you are now engaged in. When for you is the final deadline? Is it before Christmas or what? When is the final deadline that this unique opportunity runs out?

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

We are not into deadlines. We have continued to express the urgency of the matter. One more death is one too many - that is the urgency of it - and as soon as we can get an agreement between us we won't delay. We will work day and night as our officials will work day and night. What we want to do is not to dwell on the last atrocity but try and prevent the next one.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

We want to get an agreement if we can as speedily as we can. If we can't, then we will continue and go on and on and on. This isn't something that is suddenly going to be cut off. Until such

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time as there is a solution to the difficulties, it is incumbent upon the two governments to continue to look and see if they can find such a solution so there is no question of a deadline.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, could I ask you a question on a different subject? Can you make any comment about the Princess of Wales reducing her official engagements and whether this in any way alters the constitutional position outlined in the House of Commons by yourself?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

I understand, of course, and sympathise with the reasons given by the Princess of Wales for her decision today. I hope she will, as she has asked, be given the opportunity to combine a suitable public role with a more private life. I think that would be the wish of most people.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister and Taoiseach, you have said there is a possibility that you may not reach agreement this time round. What do you think the consequences of failure to agree this time round might be? Do you think there would be serious immediate repercussions?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

One consequence is that we keep on trying.

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PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

The other one is that we are better to have tried and failed than not to have tried at all.

QUESTION:

Taoiseach, can I ask you what single thing Mr. Major can do which would most help the process of bringing about a peace agreement and can I ask the Prime Minister what single thing the Taoiseach can now do which would most pave the way to that agreement?

PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS:

I think after this long meeting today, both of us are well aware of what each of us believe are the crunch issues in this particular process and we will continue to try and find agreement on them.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

Taoiseach, I have nothing to add to that.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)

Nancy
most recent

BACKGROUND NOTE

RECENT DISPUTED SHOOTINGS BY
THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECURITY FORCES

The Whiterock Road shooting

1. On 18 January 1990 two men, Eddie Hale and Peter Thompson, armed with replica weapons were shot dead by an undercover British Army unit outside a bookie shop on the Falls Road which they had tried to rob. Another man, John McNeill, was allegedly shot repeatedly at close range as he sat, unarmed, in the getaway car outside the bookie shop. Allegations were made by eye-witnesses that the soldiers had shot the men without warning. The incident gave rise to widespread disquiet and despite numerous calls for an independent public inquiry the British authorities refused to do this and the incident was investigated by the RUC. In December 1990 the DPP announced that the soldiers involved would not be prosecuted.
2. In July, 1991, following a Panorama programme on the killings which raised a number of disturbing questions regarding the shooting of John McNeill, the DPP reopened the investigation and asked the police to make further enquiries. However, in February 1992 the DPP announced that the soldiers would not be charged with any offences arising out of the second investigation.
3. The inquests into these deaths have yet to be held but given the restricted scope of inquests in Northern Ireland and the fact that the soldiers involved in the killings cannot be compelled to testify it is unlikely that the inquest will allay public concern over these shootings.

Karen Reilly and Martin Peake

4. Karen Reilly (18) and Martin Peake (17), both alleged "joyriders", were shot dead by a British army patrol on the Upper Glen Road in West Belfast on 30 September 1990. In October, 1991, six British soldiers were charged with offenses arising out of these killings, including murder, attempted murder, and attempting to pervert the course of justice.

Fergal Caraher

5. Fergal Caraher was shot dead and his brother Micheál was wounded as a result of shots fired by an unaccompanied patrol of Royal Marines operating a vehicle checkpoint in Cullyhanna on 30 December, 1990. The British Army claimed that Fergal and Micheál Caraher were in a car which failed to stop at a checkpoint and injured two soldiers. Local eyewitnesses contradicted the Army's version of events and said that the two brothers were fired on without warning and that no member of the Army patrol had been injured during the incident. In February, 1992, a soldier was charged with the murder of Fergal Caraher and another soldier was charged with the attempted murder of Michael Caraher.

Gerald Maginn

6. Gerald Maginn was an 18 years old alleged "joyrider" from West Belfast who was shot dead by the RUC in a stolen car on the Glen Road in West Road in West Belfast on 3 November, 1991. Another youth in the car, John Brady (16) was shot in the arm and shoulder. Concern was expressed by many local community figures that the police had not been justified in opening fire. The incident was raised in the Secretariat and the ongoing RUC investigation was supervised by Bernard Turkington, a Catholic solicitor from West Belfast, on behalf of the Independent Commission for Police Complaints. We understand that the ICPC has pronounced itself satisfied

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with the conduct of the investigation. The DPP has decided not to prosecute the RUC officers involved.

Kevin McGovern

7. Kevin McGovern, was shot dead by the RUC in Cookstown, Co. Tyrone on 29 September, 1991, after he and some friends who were going to a disco apparently failed to stop when challenged by the RUC. The RUC were investigating reports of a hijacking and possible mortar attack at the time. The RUC confirmed that he was not engaged in any terrorist activity and the Chief Constable issued a statement in which he expressed his deep regret at the shooting. A police investigation was carried out under the supervision of solicitor Fionnuala McGrady on behalf of the ICPC. The ICPC issued a statement that the investigation was conducted to its satisfaction. A member of the RUC, Timothy Hanly, has since been charged with McGovern's murder.

Peter McBride

8. Peter McBride was shot dead by the British Army on 4 September 1992 in the New Lodge area of North Belfast. At the time of the shooting he was being chased by soldiers, having fled from a security force patrol which had sought to question him. All accounts of the incident are agreed that McBride was unarmed and was running away from the soldiers when shot. The following day the RUC announced that two members of the Scots Guards (Mark Douglas Wright and James Fisher) had been charged with murder arising out of the incident. They were remanded into military custody.

Pearse Jordan

9. Pearse Jordan (22), a member of the IRA, was shot dead by the RUC amid controversial circumstances on the Falls Rd. on 25 November 1992. Jordan, who was unarmed, was shot after the car in which he was travelling was forced to

stop by police vehicles. The Chief Constable appointed an RUC officer from outside the Belfast area to investigate the incident. (This appointment was criticised by local elected representatives and by the Committee on the Administration of Justice, who had called for the appointment of an investigating officer from outside the RUC.) The Chairman of the Independent Commission for Police Complaints, Mr. Seamus Grew, criticised the delay in calling upon the Commission to supervise this investigation. Jordan's family have since initiated a civil action against the Chief Constable of the RUC, claiming that the RUC caused his death by negligence. It is unlikely that this action will be heard for some time, however.

~~REDACTED~~
1 February, 1993.

OFFICE OF SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY
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Facsimile Transmission Request

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CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
CONNECTICUT

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0702

February 22, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge you to raise the subject of human rights in Northern Ireland during your upcoming visit with British Prime Minister John Major.

We appreciate your many statements in support of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, such as your suggestion that the United States send an envoy to help mediate a political solution to the conflict. Indeed, it is our hope that such statements presage a significant change in U.S. policy toward Northern Ireland. With over 3,000 dead in "the Troubles" since 1969, such a change is urgently needed.

We continue to condemn the violent actions of the Irish Republican Army, a clandestine paramilitary organization that has waged a relentless and bloody war against British rule in Ulster. The ruthless tendencies of the IRA were underscored once again in the past few months, in the course of a violent bombing campaign during the holiday shopping season.

But another element in the conflict stands out as deeply troubling: the continuing human rights abuses of the British security forces. These abuses, long documented by the State Department and organizations like Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, have only served to fuel and extend the conflict. We believe the hour has come for the United States to end its long tradition of silence on this very important subject.

Perhaps the most serious charge of human rights abuse in Northern Ireland concerns the use of lethal force. The actions of security forces continue to suggest a de facto "shoot-to-kill" policy, such as the recent shooting of an 18-year-old Catholic youth, Peter McBride, while he was reportedly running away from police. According to human rights monitors in Belfast, there have been 358 killings by security forces since 1969 but only 33 officers charged for such killings -- and only two convicted.

Grave concerns have also been raised about the protection of civil liberties in Northern Ireland. Under the Emergency Provisions Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, for example,

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

The President
February 22, 1993
Page Two

authorities have wide discretion to make arrests without a warrant and to detain suspects. In addition, the use of jury trials can be suspended in certain cases and a suspect's right to remain silent is often limited. These practices are in clear violation of accepted international standards.

Finally, there have been serious allegations of collusion between British security forces and Loyalist paramilitary factions such as the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force. These allegations were brought to light by the recent case of Brian Nelson, a British army agent who was accused of giving UDA officials detailed military intelligence that was later used to carry out attacks on suspected IRA members. In the last two decades, Loyalist paramilitary groups have accounted for roughly 800 deaths, including 38 of the 84 terrorism-related killings recorded in 1992.

We recognize that the British Government has taken some positive, if belated, steps to end some previous injustices in Northern Ireland. We note, for example, the overturning of the wrongful convictions of the "Guildford Four" and the "Birmingham Six," along with the establishment of a Royal Commission to examine the justice system. However, recent events such as the shooting of Peter McBride and the Brian Nelson episode raise serious questions about the commitment of British security forces to true and lasting reform.

In short, we look to the British Government to take further steps to improve the human rights climate in Northern Ireland -- and we look to the Clinton Administration to encourage those changes. We value the long-held friendship between the United States and Great Britain, and we are committed to seeing that friendship endure. But we believe this "special relationship" also carries with it a special responsibility: to engage in an honest and forthright manner with one another about the protection of human rights and the preservation of civil liberties.

We have no illusions about the conflict in Northern Ireland or the many violent, disparate forces that shape it. But of one thing we are utterly confident: the discussion on human rights in Ulster must not be removed from the political dialogue. British human rights abuses may not be the sole cause of the violence in Northern Ireland. But reform of those abuses, in our view, must be an integral part of the solution.


PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

The President
February 22, 1993
Page Three

We hope you will keep this principle in mind during your upcoming meeting with Prime Minister Major. We appreciate your attention to our concerns and your longstanding interest in the difficult question of Northern Ireland, and we look forward to working with you in the future on this very important issue.

Sincerely,


EDWARD M. KENNEDY
United States Senator


JOHN F. KERRY
United States Senator

PAUL WELLSTONE
United States Senator

HARLAN MATHEWS
United States Senator

HARRIS WOFFORD
United States Senator

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
United States Senator

PAUL SIMON
United States Senator

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD
United States Senator

ALFONSE M. D'AMATO
United States Senator

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN
United States Senator

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

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Admitted in CT and NY

Telephone: (203) 498-0086
Fax: (203) 782-9181

June 25, 1993

Ms. Nancy Soderberg
Staff Director
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Nancy:

Enclosed is a recent article from the Irish Voice regarding the meeting held by President Mary Robinson of Ireland in West Belfast. It reflects the view, which I share, that President Robinson gained enormous credibility in the potential peace process in the North by her willingness to meet with all of the interested parties, from Queen Elizabeth II to Gerry Adams and his supporters.

This is the kind of credibility that should be sought for President Clinton and his representatives. It was, in my view, a mistake and a missed opportunity to deny Gerry Adams a visa. I hope that decision can be revisited in the future. Regardless of the outcome on that point, it is time to press forward in seeking the appointment of an envoy. If a fact-finding process is required initially, a broad-based group of varying viewpoints should be assembled at once to undertake that task. Meanwhile, I would hope that someone of the stature of former President Jimmy Carter would be recruited to undertake the envoy job itself.


When we spoke immediately following the Adams visa denial, you indicated you would ask whether I could receive a briefing on the underlying facts which the State Department relied upon for the denial. I remain extremely interested in such a briefing. I will be in Washington on July 20 for a Commission on Immigration

Ms. Nancy Soderberg
June 25, 1993
Page Two

Reform meeting. It would be a convenient time for me to meet with you and to obtain whatever briefing might be offered.

I would appreciate hearing from you in the near future about these matters. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bruce".

Bruce A. Morrison
Attorney at Law

BAM/khh

Across the Great Divide

President Mary Robinson's meeting last week with Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams caused a major storm in political and media circles. ED MOLONEY reports from Belfast on the historic meeting, and the reaction of people North and South of the border.

THE scene was as emotional as many in the room could remember.

Sean Maguire, one of Ireland's and the North's finest traditional fiddlers, led student musicians from all over West Belfast in a slow, moving lament. Facing them a few feet away sat President Mary Robinson, her husband Nick at one side and Eileen Howell of the Falls Community Council on the other.

Surrounding them in an eager semi-circle, struggling for a view over the heads of a horde of unruly journalists, stood some seventy community workers, political activists, clerics, language enthusiasts and sportspeople, the old, the young, the fit, the disabled of West Belfast. At the very back stood Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams with Emma Groves, the Andersonstown woman blinded by a British soldier's plastic bullet, at his side. A few feet away was his successor as MP for West Belfast, the SDLP's Dr. Joe Hendron.

What brought a cough to many a throat that afternoon as Sean Maguire's lovely music filled the Rupert Stanley community college on the Whitelock Road was the knowledge that the people Mary Robinson had come to spend an hour with were the pariahs of Ireland, the people who are normally shunned and ignored by many in the rest of the country.

At least half of them were Republicans of varying shades of activism, the rest either non-political or firmly SDLP. Most of them would normally find themselves censored off the airwaves, excluded from normal politics or abused in the media as the savages of West Belfast. But what made the group special was its ordinariness, the fact that it was about as representative a slice of Nationalist West Belfast as you could get.

Yet it was because the people in that room were the real West Belfast and that one of the hands she shook belonged to the undisputed Nationalist leader of the area that Mary Robinson now finds herself at the eye of a storm, criticized by former friends and the bane of Unionism and the British government.

For virtually a whole week much of the weight of Britain and of establishment Ireland, North and South, bore down on Mary Robinson and the community groups who had invited her to West Belfast, in an effort to get her trip called off.

In the North, Sir Patrick Mayhew conducted what can only be described as a dirty tricks campaign

against her. He warned Dublin ministers, in a move regarded as a threat by all those at the receiving end, that there could be trouble between British troops and Nationalists from nearby Ballymurphy if the visit went ahead.

"The implication was clear," recalled one of those involved in the delicate negotiations. "If she went ahead he was going to send a heavy security force presence into the area, ostensibly to guard her, but really to goad people and if that provoked a clash with locals, then on her head be it."

Lies were told. The most fantastic one was a story relayed by the

Gerry Adams, he warned.

In Dublin, Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) Dick Spring, worried about the adverse impact on Unionists and the talks, traveled twice to Robinson's residence at the Phoenix Park to get her to change her mind. The British Ambassador, David Blatherwick, delivered "the stiffest diplomatic note" to his opposite numbers, effectively asking Dublin to order her to stay at home.

Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Albert Reynolds played a more obtuse game. While British newspapers, the BBC and RTE were



Gerry Adams

"Dick Spring, worried

about the adverse impact on Unionists and the talks, traveled twice to Robinson's residence at the Phoenix Park to get her to change her mind."

Northern Ireland Office to Dublin that British Intelligence had uncovered a plot by the invitees to lock out NIO officials accompanying the President as soon as she passed the college's threshold, thereby effectively kidnapping her.

Unionist politicians lobbied officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs to say that the talks process would be killed off and Mary Robinson's good standing with Unionists irreparably damaged.

The SDLP in West Belfast — though noticeably not elsewhere in the North — also lobbied hard against her coming (although that changed afterwards when it was clear the people of West Belfast liked the visit). On the day of the trip, Councillor Alastair McDonnell, the SDLP man who helped formulate Joe Hendron's successful electoral foray into Loyalist areas at the last election, went on BBC radio to rail against her. She would be playing into the hands of the IRA if she met

briefed to the effect that the Irish government shared many of the British reservations and had told Mrs. Robinson so, other briefings from within the Reynolds camp sold a different message to the Irish papers. The Taoiseach, we were told, had stood up to British premier John Major at the London "summit" when the complaint was made again.

"The pressure on her was enormous," said Geraldine Holland of the West Belfast Anti-Poverty Network, one of the six community groups who had invited the President to West Belfast. "But she stood by her word. She said she was going to come and she did. Her office acted with enormous integrity throughout."

Concessions were made — the media were banned from witnessing or recording her handshake with Gerry Adams, the trip was trimmed by 45 minutes, controversial photographs were removed from the walls of the college and the IRA sent messages that she would be safe in West

Belfast. But the visit went ahead.

The reaction has been predictable. Right wing columnists — with ex-soccer star and Jack Charlton critic Eamon Dunphy leading the charge — have slated her venomously. "She has disgraced her office and tarnished her Presidency beyond redemption," he wrote in the *Sunday Independent*. Fine Gael Euro MP Paddy Cooney said he was "outraged" by the Adams handshake and a later meeting she had with Sinn Féin councillors in Coalisland, claiming that she had given the IRA and Sinn Féin a new legitimacy. His party leader, John Bruton, called the trip "ill-advised." Unionists foamed at the mouth. Ian Paisley said her trip was a "Jesuitical trick."

The ferocity of the attacks on her were in direct proportion to the significance of what she had done. It wasn't just that she had shaken hands with Gerry Adams, although that was significant and symbolic enough. It was that she had also deliberately chosen to shake hands with Gerry Adams' people, knowing them to be Provos but recognizing them to be as Irish

commemoration at Bodensstown. In the clearest indication yet that the IRA might be ready to relax its rigid conditions for a British declaration of intent to withdraw — and thus the terms for an IRA ceasefire — he hinted at a new pragmatism.

Calling for a peace process to be started, he said: "The initiation of such a process requires a clear and unambiguous indication from the British government that it accepts the right of the Irish people to self-determination and that it intends to make an enthusiastic contribution towards the unification of the Irish people. The adoption of such a scenario would create a dynamic which would undoubtedly transform the political situation throughout Ireland."

Translated, that means that the IRA would no longer have to see British shiploads of troops setting sail from Belfast harbor before agreeing to put away the armalites. A situation short of that, a declaration that Britain no longer has any political interest in staying in Ireland and would encourage Unionists to think so too, might be sufficient.

The wording this declaration might take is believed to be at the heart of the John Hume-Gerry Adams dialogue. And what John Hume is also saying by talking to Gerry Adams is that there can be no final settlement in the North until Sinn Féin is involved.

Bringing Sinn Féin in from the cold, allowing the IRA a way of honorably ending violence has become the name of the game. Mary Robinson played a part in that last week, signalling that Sinn Féin's isolation could end and would end if the conditions were right.

The real importance of her visit to West Belfast was



Mary Robinson

as anyone on the island. She had done this too when she could just as easily have arranged a meeting with "safe" Catholic Church-controlled or SDLP-inclined groups in the area and avoided all the flack.

It is because she must have known precisely with whom she was rubbing shoulders and what the effect of meeting them would be that Mary Robinson's trip carried such an important political message, albeit one too subtle for some.

A clue as to what that message was came two days after the West Belfast trip when Gerry Adams' Sinn Féin colleague, Martin McGuinness, gave the oration at the party's traditional Wolfe Tone

that she resisted the pressure to stay home in Dublin. For that, and the recognition she gave to Republican West Belfast, that it is Irish and should not be eternally shunned, the community groups, Provos and all, were enormously grateful.

Mary Robinson now has a credibility in West Belfast — and with Northern Republicans — few would ever have dreamed possible. And with that credibility has come an influence over Republicans no other Dublin politician has ever had. Before last week she would have been quickly dismissed by most Republicans; now they will have to listen to her. After all, the Provos owe her one.

~~SECRET~~

NORTHERN IRELAND

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.93)
KRBH 4/11/2023

British Sensitivity

Few issues have more potential for creating problems in Anglo-American relations than Northern Ireland.

- The British regard it as an internal matter.
- They believe that the U.S. tends to view it from the nationalist perspective.
- The extension of terrorist campaigns to England, innocent loss of life, and the targeting of Britain's political leadership have made HMG sensitive to advice from outside.

In Northern Ireland, the President's campaign statements aroused hopes in the Catholic community and fears among the Unionists that the USG would weigh in on the nationalist side.

Status of the Talks

The political talks, which broke off in November without agreement, contain three "strands" -- devolved government in Northern Ireland, relations between North and South in Ireland, and ties between the UK and Ireland.

- The major stumbling blocks are: 1) who will exercise executive power in Northern Ireland, 2) Dublin's role in Northern Irish affairs, and 3) the Unionists' demand that Ireland revise its constitutional claim to the North.
- Informal talks continue and formal sessions may resume soon. Dick Spring, the new Irish Foreign Minister, is expected to press for an agreement.

Terrorism

The level of violence (84 deaths in 1992 in Northern Ireland) is well down from its 1972 peak of more than 450 deaths. Two recent trends, however, are worrisome: 1) the increased proficiency of the loyalist (Protestant) paramilitaries, who caused more deaths last year than the IRA: 2) the IRA's bombing campaigns in Northern Ireland and on the British mainland.

MacBride Principles

British American groups have pressed for an investment code of conduct called the MacBride Principles, modeled after the South Africa-related Sullivan Principles. You spoke favorably about them during the campaign. You should know, however, that generally among responsible leaders in Northern Ireland, the Principles have little support because they impede urgently needed investment. The distinction is drawn with South Africa

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

because discrimination is legal there; it is illegal in Northern Ireland. Major is not likely to raise the issue.

Human Rights

Human rights issues have become a key concern in Northern Ireland. The issues transcend specific incidents and point to a pattern of collusion between British security forces and Loyalist factions as well as an environment of intimidation and fear. Excessive force (including "shoot to kill" practices), harassment by security forces (stopping people unnecessarily or conducting arbitrary and disruptive house searches), unfair detention (holding people for up to seven days with trial) and trials without juries have been prevalent.

Current cases in Northern Ireland with human rights implications (the first two are the most widely known):

- Two Royal Marines were charged in February 1992 with murder for the December 1990 killing of Fergal Caraher.
- In February 1992 four acknowledged PIRA terrorists were killed by security forces shortly after having attacked an RUC station in Coalisland. Human rights groups claimed that excessive force was used and that the men could have been arrested rather than killed. The police are investigating whether the use of force was warranted.
- In September 1992 Peter MacBride (no relation to the "Principles") was shot and killed while running away from an Army patrol. Two soldiers have been charged with murder.
- In November 1992 Pierce Jordan was shot and killed by police after a car chase. A police investigation has begun, but no charges have been filed.

At the Tab entitled "Letters" are letters from the House and the Senate asking you to raise the subject of human rights in Northern Ireland during the Major visit.

Joe Doherty

Joe Doherty is a PIRA member convicted in 1981 of murdering a British Army officer in Northern Ireland. Just before the conviction was handed down, he escaped to the U.S., where he was picked up in 1983 for immigration violations and remained in jail for almost nine years, while his case was being fought in the U.S. courts. A British extradition request was rejected by a District Court judge on the grounds that his offense was political. The USG then attempted to deport him for having entered the country under false documentation. Doherty asked to be deported to Ireland instead of the UK but, after those two countries signed an extradition treaty, requested asylum in the U.S. Eventually, the matter went to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Attorney General had the discretion to deport

Doherty without further hearings. In January 1992, Doherty was deported to the UK, and he is now in prison in Northern Ireland. The British authorities have turned down Doherty's request that he be given credit for time served in the U.S. and some Irish-Americans groups, for whom Doherty was a major cause celebre, have asked the USG to intervene. The U.S. has no current legal or jurisdictional interest in the Doherty case.

The Gerry Adams Visa Issue

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has been turned down for visas several times in the past few years -- most recently in 1991. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, his advocacy of violence and information that he was a member of the PIRA Army Council, which decides on terrorist actions, makes him ineligible for a visa. (Executive Branch rulings were supported by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990.) To overcome his ineligibility, Adams would need a waiver -- granted by the INS at the recommendation of the State Department. It would be odd to do so now, since Sinn Fein is losing support and Adams himself was defeated in the 1992 Parliamentary election. Nor has Sinn Fein agreed to abandon its support of violence.

A current complication is the request by the defense in the Smyth extradition case that Adams testify. (Smyth was convicted of attempted murder, was imprisoned in Northern Ireland, and escaped in 1983.) The U.S. consul still has the final say about granting a visa, but Justice could be asked to parole Adams into the country. Justice would resist on the grounds that Adam's testimony is not germane in an extradition hearing. Even if it were, he could make it by deposition.

During the campaign, you spoke favorably of providing him a visa, since at the time he was a member of the British Parliament. However, he has since lost his seat in Parliament and this, the main rationale is no longer relevant.

NORTHERN IRELAND-HUMAN RIGHTS

Q: During the campaign you accused the British government of wanton use of lethal force and collusion with Protestant paramilitary groups. Do you stand by that statement? Did you discuss it?

A: - We agreed that everything must be done to ensure respect for human rights, even in a difficult situation that includes acts of terrorism and illegal violence. We also agreed that the best way to achieve that goal is through a negotiated settlement.

URUGUAY ROUND

Q: What did you and Prime Minister Major agree on the Uruguay Round? What are your intentions toward completing the negotiations?

A: - The Prime Minister and I are fully agreed to work for a successful Uruguay Round. We agree on the importance of a GATT agreement for both of our countries and for the world economy. I assured the Prime Minister of my intention to seek from Congress renewal of our fast track authority. At present, we are consulting with Congress, the private sector and our other trading partners on that process. You can be assured that I am very committed to achieving a good GATT agreement.

AIRBUS

Q: What is your stance on Airbus? Are you reopening the U.S.-EC agreement on this?

A: - Our aircraft industry has been greatly disadvantaged by huge government subsidies given to foreign competitors, particularly Airbus. The bilateral agreement negotiated with the EC last July is an important step in placing serious constraints on government support for Airbus. We will be carefully monitoring compliance with this agreement and its effectiveness in "leveling the playing field." We will also be seeking tough new multilateral discipline on subsidies. I am committed to maintaining the vitality and competitiveness of our industry. I will not let our trading partners maintain an unfair advantage through vast government subsidies.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Feb-1993 13:16 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Nancy Soderberg (SODERBERG)
M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)

FROM: Natalie S. Wozniak
(WOZNIAK)

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland

US-UK: Special Envoy

Q: Are you going to appoint Thomas Foley as Special Envoy on the Northern Ireland issue?

A: -- During the campaign, I expressed a willingness to appoint a special envoy if the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland felt such an action would be helpful.

-- We are reviewing the issue; no decision has been made.

Q: Will you discuss this issue with Prime Minister Major?

A: -- Prime Minister Major and I will cover a range of issues.

CC: Records (RECORDS)

CC: Paul Clarke (CLARKE)

October 25, 1993

→ NS

MEMO TO: Files

FROM: Nancy Soderberg

RE: Ambassador to Ireland's mandate

Attached is a cable sent by State to Ambassador Smith outlining her role. At NSC request, State added the phrase, "including on the question of a possible U.S. Special Representative and other initiatives to promote peace in Northern Ireland."

At Bruce Lindsey's request, I suggested State change the wording relating to visits to Northern Ireland from "approximately one every six months" to "approximately two to three every year." State did not accept this request and went with the original language.

FYI, Ambassador Smith is in town this week.

cc: Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger
Bruce Lindsey

who made that decision?

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

10-26-93

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 4665 MSGID: M0681917

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**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.94)
KRH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665** TOSEC 170387

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY (ADDED CAPTION)

FOLLOWING SECSTATE **324665** DTD 23OCT93 SENT ACTION

DUBLIN REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMAIOTN 23OCT93

QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665**

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

- NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 5293

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR JEAN,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT TELEGRAM ON YOUR ROLE IN
FROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROLE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN IN
CONNECTION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND, AS WELL AS PAST
PRACTICES.

3. FIRST, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE DECISION TO ASK
YOU NOT TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NORTH DURING
YOUR LAST VISIT REFLECTED OUR BEST JUDGEMENT OF WHAT WOULD
BE APPROPRIATE IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE

APPRECIATED YOUR COOPERATION IN ADHERING TO THAT GUIDANCE. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE

AGREED TO YOUR ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PEOPLE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR ATTACKING AN ARMY PATROL.

4. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE VISITS, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LIMIT THEM TO APPROXIMATELY ONE EVERY SIX MONTHS. SINCE 1982 YOUR PREDECESSORS VISITED ONCE OR TWICE PER YEAR, AND THESE WERE PRIVATE VISITS. THEY WERE ARRANGED BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. THESE PRIVATE VISITS BY YOUR PREDECESSORS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH A RANGE OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FIGURES. AS WELL AS VISITS TO PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI). THESE VISITS PROVIDED A MEANS OF FAMILIARIZING OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN WITH NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUES AND ENHANCED THE AMBASSADOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH SENIOR REPUBLIC OF IRELAND OFFICIALS.

5. A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS, PARTICULARLY BY AN AMBASSADOR AS VISIBLE AS YOURSELF WOULD SEND A CONFUSING SIGNAL, IN LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH TO RESTART THE TALKS, AND THE CURRENT VIEW OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT EITHER BY SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY OR SOME OTHER MEANS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES, BUT WE CAN DO THAT THROUGH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN BELFAST AND OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON AS WELL AS OUR EMBASSY IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS SENSITIVE TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN.

6. WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, A KEY POLICY ADVISOR AND WE GREATLY VALUE YOUR:

-- KEEPING THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON THE ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- ENCOURAGING THE GOI TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ENGAGING AND EXPLAINING TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- TAKING THE LEAD IN FOLLOWING IFI ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS. WHARTON
UNQUOTE WHARTON

BT

#4665

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

SIT: NODIST WHSR_SPECIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 26, 1993

MEMO TO TONY

FROM: NANCY *W*

You asked who made the decision not to accept Bruce's request.

According to Sandy Vershbow, he discussed it with Dan Russell in Peter Tarnoff's office. Russell gave Tarnoff the original cable and Bruce's suggested edit and he thinks that Tarnoff discussed it with the Secretary.

The Secretary had cleared on the earlier language.

FYI, Bruce told me to "suggest" not "insist" on his suggestion.

Do you want me to follow up in *no* any way?

OK

October 25, 1993

→ NS

MEMO TO: Files

FROM: Nancy Soderberg

RE: Ambassador to Ireland's mandate

Attached is a cable sent by State to Ambassador Smith outlining her role. At NSC request, State added the phrase, "including on the question of a possible U.S. Special Representative and other initiatives to promote peace in Northern Ireland."

At Bruce Lindsey's request, I suggested State change the wording relating to visits to Northern Ireland from "approximately one every six months" to "approximately two to three every year." State did not accept this request and went with the original language.

FYI, Ambassador Smith is in town this week.

cc: Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger
Bruce Lindsey

who made that decision?

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

10-26-93

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 4665 MSGID: M0681917

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FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: ****

INFO: USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F(3.95)
KBM 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665** TOSEC 170387

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY (ADDED CAPTION)

FOLLOWING SECSTATE **324665** DTD 23OCT93 SENT ACTION

DUBLIN REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMAIOTN 23OCT93

QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665**

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

- NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 5293

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR JEAN, ---

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT TELEGRAM ON YOUR ROLE IN
FROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROLE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN IN
CONNECTION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND, AS WELL AS PAST
PRACTICES.

3. FIRST, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE DECISION TO ASK
YOU NOT TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NORTH DURING
YOUR LAST VISIT REFLECTED OUR BEST JUDGEMENT OF WHAT WOULD
BE APPROPRIATE IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE

APPRECIATED YOUR COOPERATION IN ADHERING TO THAT GUIDANCE. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE

AGREED TO YOUR ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PEOPLE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR ATTACKING AN ARMY PATROL.

4. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE VISITS, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LIMIT THEM TO APPROXIMATELY ONE EVERY SIX MONTHS. SINCE 1982 YOUR PREDECESSORS VISITED ONCE OR TWICE PER YEAR, AND THESE WERE PRIVATE VISITS. THEY WERE ARRANGED BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. THESE PRIVATE VISITS BY YOUR PREDECESSORS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH A RANGE OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FIGURES. AS WELL AS VISITS TO PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI). THESE VISITS PROVIDED A MEANS OF FAMILIARIZING OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN WITH NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUES AND ENHANCED THE AMBASSADOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH SENIOR REPUBLIC OF IRELAND OFFICIALS.

5. A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS, PARTICULARLY BY AN AMBASSADOR AS VISIBLE AS YOURSELF WOULD SEND A CONFUSING SIGNAL, IN LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH TO RESTART THE TALKS, AND THE CURRENT VIEW OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT EITHER BY SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY OR SOME OTHER MEANS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES, BUT WE CAN DO THAT THROUGH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN BELFAST AND OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON AS WELL AS OUR EMBASSY IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS SENSITIVE TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN.

6. WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, A KEY POLICY ADVISOR AND WE GREATLY VALUE YOUR:

-- KEEPING THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON THE ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- ENCOURAGING THE GOI TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ENGAGING AND EXPLAINING TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- TAKING THE LEAD IN FOLLOWING IFI ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS. WHARTON
UNQUOTE WHARTON

BT

#4665

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<^DIST>

SIT: NODIST WHSR_SPECIAL

-UNCLASSIFIED (Personnel Sensitive)

U.S. Ambassadors to Dublin
Private Visits to Northern Ireland

<u>September 1993</u>	Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith
<u>August 1993</u>	Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith
<u>February 1993</u>	Ambassador William Fitzgerald
<u>September 1992</u>	Ambassador William Fitzgerald
<u>January 1991</u>	Ambassador Richard Moore
<u>1985-88</u> (exact dates being sought)	three roughly annual visits by Ambassador Margaret Heckler
<u>July 1984</u>	Ambassador Robert Kane
<u>January 1984</u>	Ambassador Peter Dailey
<u>December 1982</u>	Ambassador Peter Dailey

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

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SIT: FILE HOLL SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR^SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 220156Z SEP 93

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ****

INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 8765

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 288750

NODIS

FOLLOWING DUBLIN 05293 DATED 21 SEP 93 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ DUBLIN 05293

NODIS

PASS THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - TONY LAKE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY
SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN
IRELAND

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON MARCH 17, IN ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION TO APPOINT
ME AS AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS
STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE IRISH AND
BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE THE NECESSARY DIALOGUE TO
BRING ABOUT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH
THE SITUATION IN IRELAND. CLEARLY THE MOST IMPORTANT
PART OF MY MANDATE IS TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH MY
BEST ADVICE ON THE SITUATION HERE AND ON HOW BEST THE
UNITED STATES MIGHT HELP THE VITAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE
PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
3. IN THIS REGARD I HAVE ALREADY TRAVELED TWICE TO

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2011-0355-F (3.96)
KSH 4/11/2023

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

NORTHERN IRELAND; VISITED THE EMBASSY IN LONDON FOR TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW (WHO INCIDENTALLY ENCOURAGED ME TO VISIT NORTHERN IRELAND, BUT TO BE "EVENHANDED" IN MEETING WITH BOTH COMMUNITIES); ATTENDED A TWO DAY SEMINAR IN CAMBRIDGE ON NORTHERN IRELAND SPONSORED BY THE BRITISH-IRISH ASSOCIATION; AND HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND HERE AT THE EMBASSY AND MY RESIDENCE. THE COMMON THREAD RUNNING THROUGHOUT THESE MANY AND VARIED CONTACTS IS THE BURNING DESIRE OF EVERYONE FROM POLITICIANS TO SOCIAL WORKERS, CLERICS TO BUSINESSMEN, ARTISTS TO CIVIL SERVANTS TO FIND PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. JUST AS EMOTIVE IS THE STRONGLY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE DIALOGUE WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO RECONCILIATION.

4. DURING MY VISIT TO BELFAST, THE CONSUL GENERAL ORGANIZED A MEETING OF WOMEN FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES PROMINENT IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS, INCLUDING BUSINESS, ACADEMIA AND COMMUNITY WORK. FOR MOST OF THEM IT WAS THE FIRST OCCASION THEY HAD EVER HAD TO MEET WOMEN ENGAGED IN SIMILAR WORK IN NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES. THEIR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR OUR BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WAS GENUINE AND DEMONSTRATES THE VALUE OF OUR ROLE IN PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THEY URGED ME TO RETURN OFTEN AND CONTINUE TO REACH OUT TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. ONE OF THEM, JANE MORRICE, HEAD OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN BELFAST, COMMENTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LUNCH THAT IT HAD BEEN THE BEST POLITICAL DISCUSSION SHE HAD PARTICIPATED IN IN THIRTY YEARS. FOLLOWING ANOTHER MEETING, IAN PAISLEY, JUNIOR, SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN GENUINELY WORTHWHILE TO TALK WITH ME GIVEN MY INTEREST IN THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD RETURN OFTEN. FINALLY, THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH, A MODERATE UNIONIST NEWSPAPER WITH THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

NORTHERN IRELAND, WELCOMED MY VISIT IN AN EDITORIAL SEPTEMBER 15 AND POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH MY OFFICIAL REMIT EXTENDS ONLY TO THE BORDER, I HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CITING HOW INTERTWINED ARE THE POLITICS AND ECONOMY OF THE TWO PARTS OF THE ISLAND AND THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND WHICH I AM "ENTITLED TO EXAMINE".

5. GIVEN THIS REACTION TO MY VISITS, I FIND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW ME TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS CONVEYED TO ME IN LONDON BY AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND BY TELEPHONE WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTS ME TO ADVISE HIM ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND A PEACE ENVOY OR A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. ONE CAN NOT DO THIS UNLESS, AND I QUOTE FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED BELFAST TELEGRAPH EDITORIAL, ONE GETS "AS ROUNDED A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS POSSIBLE. THAT SHOULD INCLUDE LOCAL POLITICIANS, ESPECIALLY UNIONISTS WHOSE CASE HAS OFTEN GONE BY DEFAULT, PARTICULARLY IN AMERICA." VAGUE REFERENCES TO "SENSITIVE MOMENTS" AND THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT OUTWEIGH MY MANDATE FROM THE PRESIDENT NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 288750

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NORTHERN IRELAND. PERHAPS THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO REMIND THE EUROPEAN BUREAU AND THE EMBASSY IN LONDON OF THIS REALITY. REGARDS.

SMITH UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 07

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7651
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 308157

NODIS

CIA FOR WOOLSEY

THE FOLLOWING LONDON 18251 DATED 07 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE: ~~SECRET~~ LONDON 18251

NODIS

FOR U/S TARNOFF AND A/S OXMAN FROM SEITZ

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI, US

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: A ROLE FOR THE U.S.?

REF: LONDON 12982

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. COMMENT: THE LONG SAGA OF NORTHERN IRELAND IS
HEADED TOWARDS ANOTHER BREAK-POINT, PROBABLY BY THE END
OF THE YEAR. NOTHING IN THE PROVINCE IS MORE DANGEROUS
THAN AN IMPASSE, AND UNLESS DUBLIN AND LONDON CAN WORK
TOGETHER TO FILL THE VACUUM, I SUSPECT THERE WILL BE
RENEWED PRESSURE AT HOME FOR THE PRESIDENT TO APPOINT A
SPECIAL ENVOY.

3. WITHOUT THE CAREFULLY PREPARED SUPPORT OF ALL THE
PARTIES, I BELIEVE SUCH A STEP WOULD RAPIDLY LEAD TO
FAILURE. THERE IS NO SIGN THE NATIONALISTS IN THE NORTH
WOULD ACCEPT SUCH AN EMISSARY, AND THERE IS UNLIKELY TO
BE MUCH ENTHUSIASM IN LONDON OR, I WOULD GUESS, IN
DUBLIN. IN FACT, AN ENVOY WOULD VERY LIKELY MAKE ALL

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.97)
KBH 4/11/2023

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE PARTIES MORE INTRANSIGENT. NOT LESS SO.

4. MY PRINCIPAL CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE RESURRECTION OF THIS OPTION, NO MATTER HOW GENUINELY PROFFERED, WOULD SERIOUSLY CUT ACROSS OUR BROADER RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AT A MOMENT WHEN WE HAVE SO MUCH BUSINESS TO DO WITH THEM IN THE SEASON JUST AHEAD -- BOSNIA, RUSSIA, THE URUGUAY ROUND, THE NATO SUMMIT, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SO FORTH. THE PRIME MINISTER IS ALREADY HAVING A HARD TIME ASSERTING HIS LEADERSHIP IN THE PARLIAMENT, THE PARTY, AND THE PRESS. IF WE PUT THE UNYIELDING ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND BACK IN THE CENTER OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, IT WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO ADVANCE THESE OTHER MATTERS IN THE WAY WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE.

5. BELOW IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHERE THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE CURRENTLY STANDS AND WHERE IT IS LIKELY HEADED. END COMMENT.

6. SUMMARY. PROSPECTS FOR A RENEWAL OF FORMAL TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND THIS YEAR ARE PROBABLY LESS THAN 50 PERCENT. THE NEXT DECISION POINT ON THIS ISSUE COULD COME AFTER THE BRITISH-IRISH CONFERENCE IN LATE OCTOBER. IF THE IRISH CONCLUDE THAT THE BRITISH HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS IN RECONVENING THE TALKS THEY MIGHT REOPEN THE ISSUE OF A U.S. "PEACE ENVOY." IF THEY DO, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUS DOWNSIDES. END SUMMARY

7. WITH THE FORMAL POLITICAL TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND SUSPENDED AND TALK OF AN IRA CEASE-FIRE IN THE AIR, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO REVIEW WHERE THE ULSTER CONUNDRUM STANDS AND WHERE IT IS LIKELY HEADED.

8. THE ALL-PARTY POLITICAL TALKS LAST YEAR CAME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT. THEY BROKE OFF WHEN THE IRISH COALITION GOVERNMENT COLLAPSED FOR EXTRANEIOUS REASONS. SINCE THEN, A COMBINATION OF EVENTS HAS UNRAVELED THAT DELICATE CONSENSUS, AND THE VARIOUS FACTIONS HAVE DRIFTED APART.

9. JOHN HUME, THE PREEMINENT IRISH CATHOLIC POLITICIAN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ANNOUNCED LAST WEEK THAT HE HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS ON A PROPOSAL THAT WOULD RESULT IN A CESSATION OF IRA TERRORISM. HUME WAS IN THE U.S. ON A LONG-PLANNED TOUR SOLICITING INVESTMENT. WE DON'T KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE BRIEFED IRISH-AMERICAN LEADERS ON HIS DEAL WITH ADAMS OR SOUGHT THEIR SUPPORT.

10. WHETHER OR NOT HUME AND ADAMS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A DEAL THAT COULD INDUCE THE IRA TO LAY DOWN ITS ARMS, NOTHING IS GOING TO BRING PEACE TO NORTHERN IRELAND EXCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNIONIST (PROTESTANT) MAJORITY. WE HAVEN'T SEEN THE HUME-ADAMS AGREEMENT, BUT PRESS REPORTS INDICATE IT INCLUDES FEATURES THAT WOULD BE ANATHEMA TO VIRTUALLY EVERY PROTESTANT IN THE PROVINCE. IT'S A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS, BUT NOT THE BASIS OF A SOLUTION.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 308157

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11. MEANWHILE, THE OFFICIAL POLITICAL TALKS PROCESS IS MORIBUND BUT NOT YET DEAD. A NEW JUNIOR MINISTER, MICHAEL ANCRAM, IS TRYING HARD TO BREATHE LIFE INTO IT THROUGH PRIVATE, BILATERAL EXCHANGES WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES. ANCRAM IS GOOD, AND AS A SCOTTISH CATHOLIC ARISTOCRAT, HE HAS CREDIBILITY WITH ALL SIDES. HIS BOSS, NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY PADDY MAYHEW, DESPERATELY WANTS A DEAL ON HIS WATCH, AND WILL ENDORSE ANYTHING HUME AND THE UNIONISTS CAN AGREE TO.

12. AT THE MOMENT, THERE ARE TWO MAJOR OBSTACLES TO GETTING THE PARTIES BACK AROUND THE TABLE. THE OBVIOUS AND MORE SUPERFICIAL ONE IS IAN PAISLEY'S INSISTENCE THAT DUBLIN FIRST REVOKE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM TO THE NORTH. THAT'S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN IN ADVANCE OF A BROADER PACKAGE, AND PAISLEY KNOWS IT. HE'S USING THE DEMAND AS A STALLING TACTIC, AND CAN BACK DOWN WHENEVER

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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HE SEES FIT.

13. THE MORE IMPORTANT OBSTACLE IS HUME'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ADAMS. NO UNIONIST LEADER CAN NEGOTIATE OPENLY WITH HUME IF THE LATTER APPEARS TO REPRESENT PEOPLE WHO ARE MURDERING PROTESTANTS AND BOMBING THEIR TOWNS. PAISLEY AND JIM MOLYNEAUX (THE OTHER MAIN UNIONIST LEADER) GENERALLY TRUST HUME, AND THINK THEY CAN DO A DEAL WITH HIM. BUT BOTH HAVE TO WATCH THEIR FLANKS. PROTESTANT POPULAR SUPPORT FOR LOYALIST TERRORISM IS RISING TO WORRISOME LEVELS, ERODING THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE TOUGH COMPROMISES.

14. PERHAPS THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IN NORTHERN IRELAND LIES NOT WITH THE POLITICIANS BUT WITH THEIR CONSTITUENTS. WHILE THERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A PERVASIVE LONGING FOR PEACE, THERE IS MUCH LESS SUPPORT IN EITHER COMMUNITY FOR THE KIND OF CONCESSIONS EACH WOULD HAVE TO MAKE TO REACH AN ACCORD. THE STATUS QUO, UNPALATABLE AS IT IS, REMAINS EACH SIDE'S FALLBACK POSITION IF IT CANNOT HAVE ITS WAY. THERE MAY BE A "SILENT MAJORITY" FAVORING COMPROMISE, BUT INTENSE VOCAL MINORITIES ON BOTH SIDES ARE PUSHING THEIR LEADERS IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.

15. LOOKING A BIT FURTHER AHEAD, WE JUDGE THERE IS PROBABLY LESS THAN A 50 PERCENT CHANCE OF RENEWED FORMAL TALKS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. AFTER THAT, THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY MAY CLOSE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY AS PARTIES GEAR UP FOR THE MAY 1994 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. WE CANNOT USEFULLY SPECULATE WHETHER THE WINDOW MIGHT REOPEN BEFORE THE NEXT BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS (MOST LIKELY IN 1996). IF THE PARTIES CANNOT GET BACK TO THE TABLE, THE BRITISH WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE SLOW PROCESS OF IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ADDRESSING CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES, AND SUBSIDIZING THE NORTHERN IRELAND ECONOMY.

16. THE NEXT CRITICAL POINT FOR US IS LIKELY TO COME IN LATE OCTOBER, WHEN THE BRITISH REPORT TO THE IRISH THE RESULTS OF THE ANCRAM CONSULTATIONS. IF THE IRISH THEN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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JUDGE THAT NO REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. THEY WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO REOPEN THE ISSUE OF A U. S. "PEACE ENVOY".

17. SO FAR, THE IRISH HAVE USED THE "PEACE ENVOY" IDEA AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO GAIN LEVERAGE IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE BRITISH. WE ARE NOT AT ALL SURE THEY INTEND TO PRESS FOR AN ENVOY. MOREOVER, THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH WHAT AN ENVOY MIGHT DO, HOW THE UNIONISTS OR BRITISH WOULD REACT, OR WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILED U. S. MISSION WOULD BE.

18. MY BEST GUESS IS THAT A U. S. ENVOY WOULD BE RECEIVED WARMLY BY JOHN HUME'S SDLP AND BY DUBLIN, AND GRUDGINGLY BY MOLYNEAUX'S UUP. PAISLEY WOULD PUBLICLY REJECT OUR ENVOY. DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HMG MIGHT ACQUIESCE. THOUGH IT WOULD COME IN FOR A LOT OF DOMESTIC CRITICISM.

19. THE CHANCES FOR A USEFUL DIALOGUE WOULD BE IMPROVED IF THE ENVOY WERE NOT OF IRISH EXTRACTION AND HAD NO TRACK RECORD ON NORTHERN IRELAND. WE WOULD NEED TO CONVINCE THE UNIONISTS THAT THE MISSION DID NOT RESULT FROM THE HUME/ADAMS DIALOGUE OR FROM IRISH GOVERNMENT PRESSURE AND WOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURES FROM THE IRISH-AMERICAN LOBBY. I DOUBT WE COULD DO ALL THAT.

20. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE HAVE TO ADDRESS WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT AN ENVOY TO ACHIEVE. NORTHERN IRELAND DOES NOT NEED NEW IDEAS ON DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES OR NORTH-SOUTH LINKS: THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF IDEAS ALREADY FLOATING AROUND, ALMOST ANY ONE OF WHICH MIGHT WELL WORK IF THE REQUISITE WILL AND GOOD FAITH WERE PRESENT. AT THIS POINT, THEY ARE NOT, AND IT IS NOT CLEAR TO ME HOW WE COULD CONJURE THEM INTO BEING. WE CANNOT SERVE AS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 STATE 308157

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MEDIATOR UNLESS ALL PARTIES WANT US TO, AND THE UNIONISTS (NOT TO MENTION HMG) MANIFESTLY DO NOT.

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21. WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE DOWNSIDE OF A MISSION THAT FAILS TO ACHIEVE WHATEVER OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR IT. THIS IS A DELICATE AND VOLATILE STAGE OF THE PROCESS. UNIONISTS ARE ALREADY DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR MOTIVES. A PERCEPTION THAT WE INTERVENED AT THE BEHEST OF HUME OR REYNOLDS COULD STIFFEN THEIR INTRANSIGENCE AND STIMULATE INCREASED VIOLENCE BY UNIONIST EXTREMISTS. AT THE SAME TIME, IF HUME THINKS WE ARE MOVING INTO HIS CAMP, HE WILL HAVE LESS INCENTIVE TO REENTER SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

22. THERE IS ALSO THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.K. JOHN MAJOR MIGHT GRUDGINGLY ACQUIESCE IN AN ENVOY BUT THE PRICE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE ILL FEELINGS IN HMG AND A HOSTILE PRESS REACTION. THERE IS PROBABLY NO ISSUE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH STIRS MORE EMOTION THAN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET WOULD BE OF A U.S. LOBBY WHICH SUPPORTS THE IRA. THE REACTION HERE, BOTH PUBLIC AND IN THE HALLS OF GOVERNMENT, COULD WELL CUT ACROSS OUR EFFORTS WITH LONDON ON SOME MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS, TO WIT GATT, BOSNIA, A CONCERTED APPROACH TO TURMOIL IN RUSSIA, TERRORISM, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. MOREOVER, THE TRADE OFF, GIVEN THE MARGINAL PROSPECT OF A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT BY AN ENVOY, WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT.

23. ALL THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN DO NOTHING TO FACILITATE THE PEACE PROCESS.

- WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE ALL SIDES TO RETURN TO THE TABLE AND MAKE THE NEEDED COMPROMISES.
- WHILE REITERATING OUR ABHORRENCE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, WE CAN URGE GREATER BRITISH EFFORTS TO RESOLVE LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS SUCH AS THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND REMAINING INSTANCES OF DISCRIMINATION.
- WE CAN KEEP THE IDEA OF SOME KIND OF ENVOY ON THE SHELF, TO BE DEPLOYED IF THE PARTIES REQUEST IT AND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 07

IF IT OFFERS CLEARER GAINS AND FEWER RISKS.
SEITZ UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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