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Folder Title:

Ireland-Northern Ireland Bombing, October 8, 1996 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Your Meeting and Lunch with John Holmes (8 pages)	10/10/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
001b. cable	re: Approaching the Turks on Northern Iraq (3 pages)	10/05/1996	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Recommended Calls to Holmes and Adams (3 pages)	10/22/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
003. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Comments on Adams' Paper (2 pages)	10/18/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
004. report	re: Northern Ireland Chronology (2 pages)	11/00/1996	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Designation of Terrorist Organizations (2 pages)	09/13/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
005b. cable	re: Designation of PIRA as Foreign Terrorist Organization (1 page)	09/10/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
005c. cable	re: Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (6 pages)	09/10/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
006. memo	Val Martinez to Anthony Lake re: Sequence and Strategy for Northern Ireland (3 pages)	11/19/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

Ireland-Northern Ireland Bombing, October 8, 1996 [2]

2011-0355-F
rs1687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

October 10, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS, ACTING *MP*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting and Lunch with John Holmes,
October 11, 1996, 10:30 a.m.

Agenda

10:30-11:30: Northern Ireland
11:30-11:45: Iraq
11:45-12:00: ACRF/Nigeria
12:00-12:20: Bosnia
12:30-2:15: Lunch: NATO Enlargement/Adaptation; Other Issues

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**2011-0355-F (3.49)
KRM 4/11/2023

Nancy and I will attend the whole session. Mark Parris, Mac DeShazer, John Feeley and John Schmidt will join us for the discussion of their issues. Peter Tarnoff will join the meeting at about 11:00. Ambassador Kerr will join us from 11:30 on with John Sawers from the Embassy.

Northern Ireland

You will want to have a very frank exchange with Holmes about what to do next to keep the political process going. Virtually everyone, including Dick Spring, has made a statement to the effect that the Stormont talks cannot be held up for Sinn Fein, which has only itself and the IRA to blame for its exclusion. Adams did not help matters by implying that the IRA attacks will continue until Sinn Fein is let into the talks. (What he actually said was, "If we don't fill the political vacuum with real talks, then it is going to be filled by the type of incident we saw yesterday.")

The good news is that the police have arrested a suspect in the Lisburn bombing, identified only as a Belfast man. The bad news is that police have announced that the planning for the Lisburn attack began at least as far back as June, when one of the cars used was purchased. The press coverage in Ireland is focusing on the weight of evidence that even during the cease-fire there was no abatement in preparations for military activities.

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 10/9/06

The Irish response to the Lisburn bombing has been as strong as the British. Major accused Sinn Fein of "sickening hypocrisy," while Bruton accused the IRA of "cynical betrayal" of the peace process and compared the republican movement to the Nazis. Bruton has also ordered a full review of Dublin's policy toward Northern Ireland, in particular its attitude toward the republican movement. The question of continued contact by sub-ministerial officials with Sinn Fein is under discussion, but Dublin will probably not cut off contact yet. It remains to be seen whether the shared outrage among the governments and the parties will galvanize them to defy the IRA and prove the talks worthwhile.

Talks: You should ask Holmes for his assessment of the mood in the Stormont talks and see if he is as optimistic as Gary McMichael was that the parties may find a way to move to substantive talks within weeks. Trimble is calling for a definitive exclusion of Sinn Fein from the talks, but so far London and Dublin are considering more nuanced approaches. One option would be to set aside decommissioning and move to substance, with the understanding that any prospect of Sinn Fein's entry would require that decommissioning be addressed first. That would amount to a "bye" for the loyalists, which would be a fitting reward for their restraint. Another option reportedly under discussion between the two governments would be to set a date by which time Sinn Fein would have to enter the talks (on the basis of a cease-fire of course) or be excluded from this round. London and Dublin are also discussing the option of firming up the conditions under which Sinn Fein could enter the talks; i.e., define "dependable." This could also include actions like an end to punishment beatings.

Depending on what Holmes says, you may want to explore other ways to get the talks moving without closing the door completely to Sinn Fein participation, including the idea, supported mainly by nationalists, of a more "directive" approach by the two governments. The British tend to oppose this concept, because it implies acknowledging that the talks have failed. However, having the governments fill the vacuum is something that will need to be revisited if the talks do not move to substance by the end of the month. We do not recommend suggesting an off-site meeting between Trimble and Hume at this point because that would undercut the loyalist leaders when they need us most.

Cease-Fire: You should urge Holmes to follow through on the Hume/Adams initiative, however unlikely it seems that it will succeed. You will have spoken with Hume and should have an idea of the IRA's response to the British text. You should tell Holmes that you declined to respond to Adams for a few days but see no purpose in cutting off contact at this point and plan to

talk to him early next week. As you know, Ancram has adopted Bruce Morrison's modifier, "dependable," to describe a cease-fire that is backed by actions or appropriate circumstances as well as words. Unless it is the price of progress in the talks, you should urge that HMG not define this term any further.

Mitchell: Martha told Nancy that she thinks Mitchell would be willing to clear his calendar and return to Belfast for a week or so if the two governments think that would be useful. Frankly, from our perspective it would be very useful to have Mitchell return at this point as a symbol of U.S. engagement and a catalyst for progress. We have also heard that Holkeri is a less effective chairman than Mitchell, in part because of the language difference. **You should indicate to Holmes that Mitchell is probably available and suggest that his return for a short period could galvanize efforts to get the talks into the substantive phase.**

Trimble: We think it is time to contact Trimble again, particularly as the UUP have criticized our willingness to maintain contact with Sinn Fein. The UUP office here has said Trimble may be interested in visiting the U.S. at the end of November. **You should confirm with Holmes that he thinks it would be useful for you to call Trimble and ask what message would be most helpful to convey.**

U.S. Role: The Pittsburgh conference showcased at a critical moment our long-term commitment to the peace process. Your speech got good press in Ireland, as in "Lake Signals Continued U.S. Support for Peace Search." However, the fact that the bombing took place during the highly-publicized Pittsburgh conference raises the question of how much importance IRA decision-makers now attach to the USG role in the process. You should tell Holmes that the President wrote to Major and Bruton (in case he left before the message arrived). **You should mention that you are thinking of making a trip to London, Dublin and Belfast just after the election and see how he reacts. Your purpose will be to talk with both governments and encourage the parties to make real progress before the holidays. You should also offer to invite the loyalists, as well as Trimble and Hume to come here when they can be spared from the talks.**

Forum: Time permitting, you should raise the forum and whether there is any prospect the SDLP would rejoin if progress were made at Stormont. You should also ask whether the unionists, who control the forum now, have adopted rules that would make SDLP's return even more difficult.

Iraq

Holmes will probably want to review several aspects of Iraq policy:

- **The situation in the south:** Trends continue to move in the right direction. The risk is acceptable; however, we are monitoring the situation closely.
- **Next steps in the north:** We are continuing to refine our thinking about the north, even as we have begun a new round of consultations with the Turks. (See cable at Tab A.) The Turks have not responded formally, but are pleased with this presentation. We have scheduled talks with KDP in Washington for October 17 and 18. We will want to explore the KDP's commitment to cut ties to Baghdad, their security concerns, their willingness to engage on the PKK issue and their thinking about a political/administrative framework for northern Iraq.
- **Reaction to British proposal for a Coalition Military Observers Group (CMOG):** The Brits believe that an on-the-ground presence in the north is required if Barzani is to cut his ties to Saddam and cooperate on issues such as the PKK. Hence, they have proposed that the MCC be reconfigured, redefined and renamed. CMOG, the new presence, would monitor Iraqi activities in the north, support of Resolution 688, maintain contact with the Kurdish factions and liaise with the aid organizations. While there could be civilians attached to the organization, it would be primarily a military operation. We have not progressed very far in our thinking about a presence in northern Iraq. Though State is favorably disposed to some type of returned presence, DOD is strongly opposed to a renewed military ground presence. **Therefore, if Holmes raises the issue, you should indicated that we are still reviewing the British proposal**

We do not see any need to discuss Iran. Though Holmes may reiterate HMG's request to be informed if investigations reveal an Iranian involvement in the Al Khobar attack.

ACRF

Nancy met with the British DCM, David Logan, on ACRF this week. We also have a cable suggesting that Foreign Secretary Rifkind may want to discuss it with Secretary Christopher. **You should underscore to Holmes how important we think it is that the British participate in ACRF and ask for further clarification of what HMG is willing to contribute.**

Nigeria

Holmes may ask about Secretary Christopher's Africa trip and recent press reports that the U.S. is launching a fresh effort for sanctions against Nigeria. You should emphasize that there is no change in our policy on Nigeria; our goal remains to promote a credible transition to civilian, democratic rule and respect for human rights and to advance counternarcotics and anti-crime efforts. We still believe a combination of pressure through sanctions and dialogue is required to spur progress. HMG recently denied Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi's wife a visa for medical treatment. Holmes may express concern that we might grant her a visa. You should tell him that no decision has been made; we are seeking to determine the nature of her illness and will evaluate the request on humanitarian grounds.

Bosnia

Holmes will likely reiterate the UK's willingness fully to support a NATO follow-on security force in Bosnia if the Allies, and especially the United States, decide to accept such a mission. The UK supports the U.S. position of a smaller force committed for up to a year. You should emphasize that we will continue to be engaged in Bosnia (economically, politically, etc.) after IFOR leaves, but that our decision on a follow-on force awaits the deliberations at NATO. You should also emphasize the importance of Allies not presupposing too early in the NATO decision-making process that one post-IFOR option is a winner. The NMA study should address all four options even-handedly when it is eventually presented for NAC discussion on or after November 6. In addition, you may want to state that the United States will expect Allied support on several "fronts" if the President decides to commit U.S. troops to a follow-on force, including arms control, funding for economic reconstruction and assistance, support for an enhanced international police task force, and a unified strategy regarding the "outer wall."

NATO Internal Adaptation

The big issue remains the French demand that the U.S. relinquish command of AFSOUTH. This demand, set out in an August 28 Chirac letter to the President, represented a sharp escalation in what the French were seeking in the way of European visibility within NATO. It came, annoyingly, almost immediately after we conceded to them on giving the Deputy SACEUR responsibility for managing ESDI. At any rate, we have now put our foot down and made clear that we will not give up AFSOUTH. Although some within the French bureaucracy are taking us at our word, Chirac remains

insistent on the issue. There are even hints that, if we do not change our mind, not only will France not reintegrate, but "enlargement" could be affected.

The British support us on this issue, but hope we can come up with some compromise that will satisfy French desires for command. There are things that can be done for the French. For instance they could aspire to the deputy and chief of staff slots in AFSOUTH, to overall command (on a rotational basis with other Europeans) of a second regional command, and to the Deputy SACEUR position if it becomes rotational. We could certainly live with any of these possibilities. **You should make clear our bottom line, suggest we are prepared to be flexible short of this, and seek British views on where they see the issue leading, particularly in light of German support of the French position.**

NATO Enlargement

It is up to you how much detail you want to go into here. On timing for a NATO summit, we have announced our formulation of spring/early summer. The Germans are on board. The French have hinted they might want it to slip until the fall. The British have suggested March might be a good time since they would like it to precede their parliamentary elections. We can live with July but no later; March seems too early, particularly since the Germans are likely to insist on "early summer." The British may tease you out on the "who." USG views seem to be coalescing around the obvious three plus Slovenia, with Romania a dark horse that will probably not make it.

You should identify the question of what to do about aspiring NATO members who do not make the first cut as a critical problem. We know you have your own strong views on this. Within the USG generally, there is some staff-level support for institutionalizing the intensified dialogues in some way, stating at the summit that the first group will not be the last, and establishing a regular review process. The British are very nervous about making any commitment to a second tranche and will probably need to be convinced about a review process as well. You should feel them out on these points.

Holmes may also probe you about what Christopher meant by the Atlantic Partnership Council he proposed in his Stuttgart speech. As we conceive it, the APC would replace the NACC while establishing, for the first time, a multilateral forum for discussion of PFP issues.

NATO-Russia

You should summarize the current two-track Russian approach as it has surfaced in the Talbott-Mamedov discussions and in conversations with Primakov. Moscow continues publicly to oppose enlargement -- with varying degrees of protest -- while privately agreeing to talk about formalizing a stronger NATO-Russia relationship. Moscow wants a treaty instead of a political charter, negotiated prior to enlargement, and a clear voice in decisions. We have said that negotiations with Russia can parallel enlargement decisions, but that enlargement will not depend upon reaching agreement with Russia. **Our view is that we should agree on a NATO-Russia charter that would establish a partnership based on regular 16 plus 1 meetings at the Permrep and Political Committee level (possibly others as well) under the rubric of a "Standing Consultative Commission" or other fancy name.** While NATO could never agree to a Russian veto on anything, this new relationship could take decisions on issues where there was mutual interest in so doing. We are also prepared to restate our NATO enlargement study undertakings on forward and/or nuclear deployments, but our watchwords are "no negotiations," "no diminution in NATO flexibility," and "no second class status for new NATO members."

Other Issues

BBG: Over lunch you should also raise the need to move quickly to identify a suitable successor for Boutros Ghali. The British are among those who understand that our position on this is firm. **You should emphasize that we want to avoid wrangling that will damage the UN and ask Holmes how we think we should proceed to get other governments to put forward candidates.**

Helms Burton: The British are not less opposed to Helms Burton (and the Iran Libya Sanctions Act) than their European colleagues but they are more pragmatic about the constraints we are operating under, particularly with regard to Title III. With the Spanish, the British are looking for the right time to get the EU to make a statement conditioning improved EU-Cuba ties on a political/economic opening (consistent with the EU's decision last spring to break off talks with Cuba on a trade and cooperation agreement). Nevertheless, the UK supported the EU decision to take us to the WTO over Helms Burton and the UK's own laws against complying with other countries' extraterritorial legislation are among the strictest in Europe. **You should underscore with Holmes the need for parallel European action, (as Stu Eizenstat has laid out), to foster democracy in Cuba, in addition to an EU statement along the lines the UK has in mind.**

Concurrences by: Dan Fried, John Schmidt, Ki Fort, Mac
DeShazer, Steve Grummon, John Feeley } *AKG*

Attachment
Tab A Cable

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. cable	re: Approaching the Turks on Northern Iraq (3 pages)	10/05/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

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2011-0355-F
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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7027

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 22, 1996

WJ

- 6 weeks plus
Christmas break
- publish?
- Surveillance + targeting
- 3 month CBM's.
→ 11 decomming

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS (ACTING)

SUBJECT: Recommended Calls to Holmes and Adams re
Hume/Adams Initiative

Last week Adams faxed you his paper explaining the rationale for the points Sinn Fein wants made in a British public statement on the peace process (Tab A). On Friday Holmes faxed you a draft paragraph that the British propose adding to "a somewhat revised text" (Tab B). The gaps between HMG's text of September 27 and the October 10 Hume/Adams draft are probably bridgeable -- the only substantive difference is about the timeframe.

Even if the textual and timeframe issues can be resolved, however, we still face the catch-22 of the new paragraph spelling out the conditions for Sinn Fein to enter the talks, including the decontamination period. If that paragraph is added (instead of the words "from that point") it will be more difficult for Adams to get the IRA's assurance that it will restore the cease-fire in response to release of the text. But without such an assurance, HMG will be reluctant to issue the statement at all.

Holmes has said that he is seeking our views and Dublin's on the new paragraph and the "decontamination period" concept. Dublin seems inclined to stick to the position that Sinn Fein should be allowed to join the talks after an unequivocal cease-fire; they want to leave the words "from that point" in the text. They can argue that the legislation HMG passed last spring to allow the May 30 election envisages Sinn Fein taking its seat following an unequivocal cease-fire without further delay. At the end of the day, I suspect Dublin will recognize the need for a waiting period of some duration. (At Tab C are Dublin's composite of the latest HMG and Hume/Adams texts and a close-hold paper with Dublin's comments on the differences.)

Another potential problem is the paragraph on CBM's in the paper Gerry faxed. The October 10 Hume/Adams draft adds a sentence on equal treatment of both communities that is probably acceptable, with a fix or two. However, Adams' paper focuses on the need for a detailed program of CBM's from HMG. He says, "As part of this,

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 10/22/06

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KBH 4/11/2023

the British government need to outline clearly and in some detail the substance of the programmatic approach they intend to take." That suggests another precondition for a cease-fire -- not only an agreed public statement but also an agreed program of CBM's.

POINTS FOR HOLMES

- Would like to clarify point in your cover letter of Friday -- does "somewhat revised text" mean revision of your text of September 27? Were you able to accept any of the language Hume gave you on October 10?
- Hope you will accept as much of the Hume/Adams language as possible.
- On decommissioning, know Dublin thinks reference should be to actual language of International Body's report. Able to do that?
- Timeframe has become central concern for Sinn Fein. See difficulty with it (may even play into unionist hands). What about language committing you and Dublin to try to get parties to set timeframe?
- Agree on need for some way to define or recognize "unequivocal" or "dependable" cease-fire. Though unwelcome to IRA, probably preferable to ambiguity about the hurdles Sinn Fein would face.
- To preserve some chance of new cease-fire, definition of conditions for SF entry needs to be accompanied by movement to substance in talks.
- If Trimble is not prepared to go to substance while there is even slight possibility of eventual Sinn Fein participation, can you and Dublin take initiative and move talks forward anyway?
- What is Dublin's reaction to proposed new paragraph?
- Question whether explicit reference to surveillance and targeting is good idea -- might be better to pass message informally that you will be looking at that. (Note: This was Mitchell's concern.)

POINTS FOR ADAMS

- Have looked at your paper. Have you shared it with others?

- On cease-fire, you are aware of reaction of other parties to Lisburn bombing. Question of what constitutes "unequivocal" is going to have to be addressed. *Borke has been raised*
- On decommissioning, convinced London wants to move to substantive negotiations on basis of Mitchell Report. Don't know whether HMG will look at new language.
- At some point Sinn Fein will be expected to sign on to concept of decommissioning in parallel with political progress. Arguing that all Mitchell suggested was that parties consider such an approach is pure semantics.
- Understand desire to see timeframe imposed on talks. But aren't you concerned that unionists would be tempted to "run out the clock?" Don't know how far two governments can go on this without agreement of parties.
- Concerned by paragraph on CBM's in your paper. Language on equal treatment, CBM's in October 10 draft not far from HMG language. But your paper appears to suggest new requirement for agreed program of CBM's.
- CBM's important, but Mitchell Report foresees them in tandem with political progress, not as result of cease-fire.

Attachments

Tab A Adams' paper

Tab B Holmes Letter/New Paragraph

Tab C Irish Composite Text and Comments

Oct 14 '96 13:05 PM 222

ADAMS

Memo

10 October 1996

The problem areas are:

1. The reference to an unequivocal restoration of the IRA's cessation.

The stated position of the two governments up to now in relation to Sinn Fein's participation in talks has been that there must be an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994. In this draft the British government introduce, for the first time, potentially dangerous qualifications to this position. They say that 'if the (British) government considered that there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994 Sinn Fein could enter the talks'. They then follow on with this sentence: 'We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground'.

2. Decommissioning

It is essential that this is not a precondition for further progress. The problem is that the British state their own interpretation of the proposals contained in the report of the International Body. The obvious implication of which is that this interpretation must be accepted by the other parties to the negotiation. This is obviously a distortion of the International Body's report and is therefore both contentious and problematic.

3. The Timeframe

This issue is not dealt with in any serious way. The British government draft states: 'We have already proposed that a plenary meeting be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants.'

A realistic timeframe is the only way to create the necessary urgency and momentum towards agreement. The two governments clearly need to take a lead on this crucial issue, a point which we have been putting to the British consistently since our first meeting with their officials on 9 December 1994.

The two governments should propose a concentrated timeframe to the participants (in the region of 6 months). The two governments have already taken such a leading role in relation to a number of issues including both the chairing of the talks and the ground rules for the talks. The alternative, as we have seen since June 10, is endless stalling and obstruction.

4. Confidence Building Measures

There are broad commitments to confidence building measures but in all of this we need to know the detail of the programme the British

government will implement in relation to the commitments contained in any statement.

This initiative has been based on the need for a formula of words which represents the substance of a programmatic approach to the negotiations and to supplementary confidence building measures. As part of this the British government need to outline, clearly and in some detail, the substance of the programmatic approach they intend to take.

The issues which need to be addressed as part of a programme of confidence building measures are:

A. Those issues which fall into the equality and democratic rights agenda and which address political economic, social and cultural discrimination. These issues do not require any negotiation. They can and should be addressed immediately.

The principles of equality of treatment, equality of opportunity and parity of esteem would have to apply across the political, cultural, economic, social, legal and security spectrum.

These would include:

Equality of opportunity in employment.

Equality of treatment for the Irish culture and identity.

Equality of treatment of elected representatives.

Equality in the provision of education, specifically through the medium of Irish

Equality of treatment in economic development.

B. In the event of a new IRA cessation both governments would also need to urgently address a demilitarisation agenda dealing with issues such as:

political prisoners;

emergency legislation; and

policing.

I have raised separately with the Irish government, matters related to this which are within its jurisdiction.

It is of crucial importance that when the peace process is restored the mistakes of the last process are not repeated. This requires all of us, but especially the two governments to build on any renewed cessation. It cannot be subverted as the last one was.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1996

Dear Tony,

We spoke about the response to John Hume. As I said, we are exploring with him whether he can produce better evidence of real readiness to declare a lasting ceasefire and stick to it. Meanwhile we are looking again at whether we could respond with a somewhat revised text (not for negotiation). The main change would be the inclusion of a paragraph defining more clearly than before the terms on which Sinn Fein might be eligible to join the talks after a ceasefire. I attach suggested words on these lines. If you and the Irish Government were able to agree to this broad approach, this would encourage us to respond to Hume, and also increase the chances of Hume accepting it and recommending it to others.

Perhaps we could have a further word when you have had a chance to consider this.

Yours ever
John

JOHN HOLMES

The Honorable Anthony Lake

In the light of recent events, both the British and the Irish Governments believe that, unless there were some incontrovertible developments supporting it, a dependable judgment that any restoration was indeed genuinely unequivocal could not be formed in less than three months. In forming a judgment in that period, it would be necessary to consider whether words, actions and all the circumstances were consistent with the declared ceasefire. For example, whether or not any paramilitary activity, including surveillance, targeting and weapons preparation, continued would influence the establishment of confidence that the restoration of the ceasefire was unequivocal.

fxcase.sml

18/10/96 19:15

COMPOSITE TEXT (10 OCTOBER 1996)

Note: this text incorporates the Hume/Adams amendments of 10 October into the text sent to Hume with the Prime Minister's letter of 27 September. Normal type represents the 27 September text, and italics the 10 October amendments.

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

[changed placing:]

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. No party has an undemocratic advantage. [omits sentence: "The negotiations will operate on the basis of consensus, requiring at least the support of parties representing a majority of both the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland."]

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if [omits "the Government considered that"] there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate, *from that point*, in the negotiations. [omits: "We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground."] *Beyond the unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire*, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning, *which must be resolved without blocking the negotiations*. So the opening plenary will address the

- ⑦ International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage *and without blocking the negotiations*, we, along with the Irish Government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the
- ⑧ International Body's report. [*omits*: "This includes its compromise approach, under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of negotiations. We want to make urgent progress in this area, so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a precondition to further progress, but is used to build confidence one step at a time during the negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps, in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence."]

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

- ⑨
⑩ For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding [*omits*: "so far as we can"] our responsibility to *encourage, facilitate and enable* agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given

momentum to a process which will always have [omits: "its"] difficulties. The

⑪ *British and Irish governments are committed to an agreed timeframe and calendar for the conduct of the negotiations.* [replaces: "We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants."] We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole.

⑫ *The two governments will also review progress at regular intervals including at a summit meeting to be held before the end of the year.*

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

—
So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. This will ensure that there is just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspiration of both communities, including equal treatment for the Irish language and culture.

⑬
⑭ We are also committed to the creation of a policing service which can enjoy the support of the entire community. [replaces: "increasing community identification with policing in Northern Ireland"]

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force redeployments, a review of emergency legislation and

others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

(15) The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally. Accordingly we welcome the contribution of the European Union to the resolution of the problem. Likewise we welcome the interest and involvement of the United States, arising from the special affinity shared between all the peoples of these islands and people in the United States. In particular we welcome the contribution of areas of successful conflict resolution such as South Africa. The negotiations also benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all [omits: "paramilitary"] violence. That is our aim too.

1. This idea is already enshrined in the Rules of Procedure of the negotiations (30-36). It is presumably not helpful to SF to highlight that sufficient consensus could theoretically occur without them. Since its omission will not in any way diminish the force of the existing Rules of Procedure there is no real need to include it and it should go. The British should be told this is different from the issue of consent. A fall-back might be a reference to accepting the existing rules and procedures of the Talks.
- 2,3. This affects the issue of whether an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire is sufficient to admit SF to Talks without any further "purgatory" period. The amended version seems an accurate reflection of the face of the British legislation.
4. The British Government will worry that accepting to drop this sentence could be misinterpreted as a signal that they might be flexible on "unequivocal". SF will worry that this masks the intention to apply new tests (on the lines of the "permanency" debate earlier). The best compromise might be to keep the sentence but seek an understanding on what it means in practice, confirming it is not intended as a new hurdle.
5. This is merely a drafting change consequent on earlier SF amendment.
6. The word "resolved" could have connotations of "implemented". Would "taken forward" or "progressed" be better?

7. The second "without blocking" is probably a bit pointed for an article over Major's name. If accepted in the first - overall - reference that should cover this particular case also.
8. "All aspects of the International Body's report" covers, of necessity paragraphs 34 and 35 which are paraphrased (a bit tendentiously) here. We should seek to persuade the British that their position is covered by "all aspects" and to drop the rest. If they insist on some extensive reference it should not be the paraphrase they put forward.
9. "As far as we can" is weakening the commitment and should be dropped.
10. These verbs are an echo of the Joint Declaration and should not cause a problem.
11. The time-frame is a substantive problem, and the drafting must take its cue from whatever is agreed in substance. Perhaps a draft linked to "momentum": e.g.

"To enhance this momentum the two Governments will seek the support of the participants for an agreed timeframe and calendar which they will seek to achieve for the conduct of the negotiations."

12. There is an existing commitment to twice yearly summits, where a review of negotiations must inevitably feature. This should not be a problem.

13. The British will have a problem with "equal treatment" for the Irish language, which they will argue means a fully bilingual policy. One might either add (linguistic and) cultural heritage after identity, ethos, etc., or substitute "practical measures of support for the Irish language and cultural heritage, on the lines of corresponding measures in Scotland and Wales" (??)
14. The British will balk at the open admission that the RUC would have to be replaced, clearly implicit in "creation of a policing service etc.". They might live with e.g.

"We are committed to seek as one of the outcomes of negotiations a policing service which can enjoy the support of the entire community."

15. The reference to EU, South Africa would have some presentational difficulties for Major. They might be asked to rework the EU reference in a way more comfortable for them (e.g. reference to the Peace Fund). SF might be persuaded to forego S.A. reference.

Kessinger, Jodi



From: Peters, Mary A.
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Subject: Response to Adams Paper ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Monday, October 21, 1996 9:47AM

Tony,

Here are some thoughts on the paper Gerry faxed to you after your last conversation. In response, Nancy thinks you should try to get the British to take some of Adams language and resolve the parallel decommissioning issue and that you should give Adams our reaction next time he calls. I will do points for a call to Holmes and contingency points for Adams. Also plan to do points for a call to Trimble this week.

<< File Attachment: HUMADMS.DOC >>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 18, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Comments on Adams' Paper

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.51)
KBH 4/11/2023

After talking with you on October 14, Adams faxed us a copy of a paper (Tab A) that goes into more detail on the thinking behind the latest Hume-Adams text provided to the British. It is not clear whether we are the only ones who have it or what Adams plans to do with it. He did say that if you have any comments, he would welcome them. In the context of the call, it is possible that he is seeking to have you make the points in the paper to the British on Sinn Fein's behalf.

The paper makes more explicit the gap between what Adams wants and what the British are likely to be prepared to do. There is even a chance that Adams is deliberately setting the bar too high for the British because he knows there will be no cease-fire. More likely he is trying to get as much as possible from the British in order to sell it to the IRA.

There is a real question about whether you should get in the middle. If you do, the first step would probably be to call Holmes to see how close they think they can come to the latest Hume/Adams text. You could then call Adams and give him your sense of how far the British are prepared to go. However, the addition of the new paragraph specifying a decontamination period would almost certainly kill the possibility of a cease-fire in response to the editorial, at least in the short term. Since it is only to get a cease-fire that the British are prepared to do this, we may have to figure a way past this stalemate.

Below is a short analysis of the issues Adams raises and the likely British position.

Paragraph 1: Adams is clearly concerned that the British are moving to add qualifiers to the condition of an unequivocal cease-fire. In other words, he is not willing to pay a price for Lisburn, and would strongly oppose the language Holmes faxed you today. The British, however, believe that they are already taking the high road by not slamming the door on Sinn Fein participation; they see a definition of "unequivocal" or

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 10/18/06

"dependable" as the minimum they can get away with in light of unionist and general public opinion.

Paragraph 2: This is the issue of how to refer to parallel decommissioning that the Irish have already raised; it is probably bridgeable.

Paragraph 3: The timeframe issue continues to puzzle me because it seems more logical for unionists than republicans to favor a set ending date. Sinn Fein may assume that if the talks don't reach agreement in a set period, the alternative is an imposed solution, whereas it is more likely to be the status quo. The difference on this may be bridgeable.

Paragraph 4: This is the section that raises the most questions about the seriousness of this initiative. Adams calls on the British to commit to unilateral steps on issues he views as related to equality and democracy and therefore not subject to negotiation. However, the unionist community does not yet accept the need for equality of treatment for the Irish "culture and identity;" in some respects that is what this whole process is about. And Adams says that the governments would have to commit to action on prisoners, emergency legislation and policing in the event of a cease-fire. All these are CBM's that the Mitchell Report relates to progress in the talks, not to the existence of a cease-fire.

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FOLDER TITLE:

Ireland-Northern Ireland Bombing, October 8, 1996 [2]

2011-0355-F
rs1687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 13, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Designation of Terrorist Organizations: Northern
Ireland Dimension**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.52)

KBH 4/11/2023

The new Anti-Terrorism Act authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a list of foreign terrorist organizations for the purposes of the Act. To qualify for designation, an organization must be foreign and engage in terrorist activity which "threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States." According to Global, the bill is probably elastic enough to include groups that are terrorist, even if they are not carrying out terrorist acts. And a separate section of the law says that a group can be designated if it threatens U.S. "foreign relations." (Thus the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) is expected to be designated, though it does not target Americans, nor are American interests likely to be directly affected.)

Designated organizations may have their assets seized and it will be illegal for U.S. citizens to make financial contributions to them. (Heretofore contributions to the IRA, for instance, were only illegal if they were to be used in the commission of a criminal act.) The list of foreign terrorist organizations is expected to be finalized and published in the federal register within several weeks.

State has sent a draft list of terrorist organizations to overseas posts for comment. Dublin responded by supporting the designation of PIRA, while suggesting the designation should be reviewed in the event of a cease-fire (Tab A). London also endorsed the inclusion of PIRA but recommended as well that we designate the splinter republican groups and, more problematical, the loyalist paramilitary groups as well (Tab B). The groups in question are the Ulster Defense Association, Ulster Freedom Fighters, Ulster Volunteer Force and the Red Hand Command, which comprise the Combined Loyalist Military Command. London argues that failure to designate these groups will appear inconsistent, especially since the loyalist paramilitaries are proscribed as terrorist organizations by the British. However, the Embassy

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 9/13/06

recognizes the weight of arguments against designating the loyalists and would defer to Senator Mitchell if he felt that doing so would be detrimental to his efforts in the talks.

In the European Directorate's view, designating the loyalist paramilitaries as terrorist organizations risks being seen as a repudiation by the U.S. of the loyalist political leaders. Ervine and McMichael would have difficulty explaining why, when the loyalists did not follow the IRA in breaking the cease-fire, they now find themselves on the same list with the IRA. We should not take the risk that our action would tip the scales and bring about an end to the loyalist cease-fire.

However, we should recognize that if we do not designate the loyalists, we may have to seek to remove the IRA from the list at some point after the cease-fire is restored. Removing organizations from the list on the basis of a cease-fire may turn out to be difficult.

Concurrences by: Steve Simon, Alan Kreczko 

RECOMMENDATION

You do not have to make a decision yet on whether to designate the loyalists, but we recommend you call Mitchell as soon as possible to get his views on the issue.

Attachments

Tab A Cable from Dublin
Tab B Cable from London

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NODIST, PETERS, SIMON

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 101458Z SEP 96

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1075

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.53)
KBM 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 004566

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT, S/IR AND EUR/UBI

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/06

TAGS: PTER, ASEC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF PIRA AS FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 180482

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON 1.5 (D).

2. ~~(C)~~ EMBASSY DUBLIN AGREES WITH REFTEL LISTING OF PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION FOR PURPOSES OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (P.L. 104-132). WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT INTENSE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS INVOLVING THE U.S., IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS, AS WELL AS POLITICAL FIGURES ON THE GROUND IN NORTHERN IRELAND, HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY SINCE FEBRUARY TO PERSUADE PIRA TO RESTORE ITS CEASEFIRE PERMANENTLY. SHOULD THESE EFFORTS SUCCEED, THE ISSUE OF PIRA BEING LISTED AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WOULD NEED TO BE REVIEWED. SMITH

<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN> 4566

<^TOR> 960910130958 M2393205

FROM:

SITREPT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: APPEL, BEERS, CLARKER, MCCARTHY, PASSDOWN, PETERS, SIMON, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, NSC, SIT{C2}

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 101611Z SEP 96

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6821

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 9388

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5048

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.54)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 011052

EXDIS

FOR S/CT AND EUR/UBI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/01

TAGS: PTER, ASEC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: UK

REF: STATE 180482

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION. REASON: 1.5(D)

2. (X) EMBASSY STRONGLY SUPPORTS PROPOSED DESIGNATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS

3. (X) IN ADDITION, WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT LOYALIST GROUPS NOTED BELOW, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ALSO BE DESIGNATED AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS:

- A) IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (INLA)
- B) IRISH PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (IPLO)
- C) REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN (RSF)
- D) ULSTER DEFENSE ASSOCIATION (UDA)
- E) ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS (UFF)
- F) ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE (UVF)
- G) RED HAND COMMANDO (RHC)

4. (X) AS OUTLINED IN PARA 12 BELOW, THESE GROUPS HAVE ENGAGED

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IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WHICH THREATEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH THESE ORGANIZATIONS GENERALLY ARE SMALLER AND LESS INFLUENTIAL THAN THE PIRA, THEY ARE NOT LESS VIOLENT OR DANGEROUS; ALL HAVE REFUSED TO RENOUNCE TERRORISM UNCONDITIONALLY. EMBASSY BELIEVES FAILURE TO INCLUDE THESE GROUPS ON THE LIST OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS COULD LEAD TO ACCUSATIONS THAT WE ARE SINGLING OUT THE PIRA SOLELY FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THUS ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO INFLUENCE KEY PARTIES IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS.

DESIGNATION OF LOYALIST GROUPS: POLITICAL CONTEXT

5. ~~(C)~~ HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH APPLY TO THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES. THE GROUPS -- THE UFF, UVF, UDA AND RHC -- CURRENTLY ARE OBSERVING A CEASE-FIRE DECLARED IN 1994 BY THE COMBINED LOYALIST MILITARY COMMAND (CLMC). THIS CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN HELD TOGETHER WITH GREAT DETERMINATION BY LOYALIST POLITICAL LEADERS EVEN AFTER THE IRA ABANDONED ITS CEASE-FIRE IN FEBRUARY, 1996. ALTHOUGH INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE IN THE WAKE OF THE DISTURBANCES AT DRUMCREE LAST JULY AND WEAKENED BY INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE IN RECENT WEEKS, THE CEASE-FIRE REMAINS IN PLACE. MOREOVER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THESE GROUPS ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PEACE TALKS CHAIRED BY SENATOR GEORGE MITCHELL. WHILE THIS DOES NOT MEAN THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE FORMALLY RENOUNCED VIOLENCE, THEY ARE PARTICIPATING IN A PROCESS WHICH, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD LEAD TO THE DECOMMISSIONING OF TERRORIST WEAPONS AND A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

6. ~~(C)~~ U.S. POLICY HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE THE LOYALISTS TO MAINTAIN THEIR CEASE-FIRE. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF PRAISING PUBLICLY THE RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE LOYALIST ORGANIZATIONS. OUR PUTTING THE LOYALISTS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE CONDUCTING ACTIVE TERRORST CAMPAIGNS COULD UNDERCUT THE LOYALIST LEADERS WHO ARE TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY CRITICAL IN THESE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 9 REOPENING OF THE PEACE TALKS WHEN THE LOYALIST CEASE-FIRE HAS COME UNDER PARTICULAR STRAIN. SOME LOYALISTS COULD USE THE "LACK OF INTERNATIONAL RESPECT" FOR THEIR EFFORTS AS A POST HOC RATIONALIZATION SHOULD THEY GO OFF THE RESERVATION.

7. ~~(C)~~ ON THE OTHER HAND, DESIGNATING ONLY IRISH REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND NOT INCLUDING LOYALIST GROUPS COULD LEAD TO CHARGES OF POLITICAL BIAS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE LOYALIST ORGANIZATIONS CONTAIN DANGEROUS ELEMENTS CAPABLE OF THREATENING U.S. INTERESTS, EVEN IF THEY GENERALLY HAVE REFRAINED FROM CONDUCTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FOR TWO YEARS. MOREOVER, AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED THE UDA, UVF, UFF AND RHC PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS, OUR FAILURE TO DO SO COULD BE SEEN AS INCONSISTENT: IF EVEN THE BRITISH CONSIDER

THE LOYALIST GROUPS TERRORISTS, WHY DOESN'T THE U.S.? (SEE PARA 10-11 BELOW.) EVEN THOUGH THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN DECLARED ILLEGAL, THE LEADERS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THEM HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO ATTEND THE TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ELECTORAL MANDATE, AS LONG AS THE CEASE-FIRE HOLDS. DESIGNATION BY THE U.S. OF THE UDA, UFF, UVF AND RHC AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WOULD NOT CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE LOYALIST POLITICAL LEADERS, ALTHOUGH IT COULD BE CITED BY THOSE WHO WISH TO SEE THE LOYALISTS EXCLUDED.

RECOMMENDATION ON LOYALISTS: DO THE WORK, HOLD THE FINDING

8. ~~10~~ UNLESS THERE IS COMPELLING REASON TO BELIEVE THEIR DESIGNATION WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO SENATOR MITCHELL'S EFFORTS, EMBASSY BELIEVES THE LOYALIST GROUPS SHOULD BE NAMED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. BUT THE DECISION TO SO DESIGNATE THE LOYALIST GROUPS REQUIRES A SENSITIVE POLITICAL JUDGMENT. WE WOULD NOT WANT U.S. ACTIONS TO BECOME A FACTOR, EVEN TANGENTIALLY, IN A DECISION BY THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES TO END THEIR CEASE-FIRE. CLEARLY, THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IS BETTER SERVED BY THE LOYALISTS' CONTINUING PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE TALKS. BY MID-OCTOBER WE WILL HAVE A CLEARER SENSE OF THE DURABILITY OF THE LOYALIST CEASE-FIRE AND OF THE TALKS' PROSPECTS. THEREFORE, WHILE THE GROUNDWORK FOR FORMALLY DESIGNATING THEM SHOULD PROCEED, WE BELIEVE THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVIEWED AGAIN JUST BEFORE THE SECRETARY SIGNS THE FINDING, AS WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION AT THAT TIME TO MAKE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL DETERMINATION.

9. ~~10~~ WHATEVER DECISION IS MADE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BE ABLE TO BRIEF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN ADVANCE OF PUBLICATION OF THE LIST AND THAT WE HAVE CAREFULLY PREPARED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE READY.

BRITISH LEGAL FRAMEWORK

10. ~~10~~ UNDER THE NORTHERN IRELAND EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ACT (EPA), WHICH WAS RENEWED BY PARLIAMENT IN 1996, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DECLARE ILLEGAL ANY ORGANIZATION WHICH APPEARS TO HIM TO BE "CONCERNED IN TERRORISM OR IN PROMOTING OR ENCOURAGING IT" IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ALL OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN, IDENTIFIED IN PARA 3 HAVE BEEN DECLARED "PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS" BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. UNDER THE EPA, IT IS ILLEGAL TO BELONG TO OR GIVE FINANCIAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT TO A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION, OR EVEN TO ARRANGE OR ADDRESS A MEETING OF A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION. MEMBERSHIP BY ITSELF IS PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 10

YEARS IN PRISON, ALTHOUGH IN PRACTICE HMG HAS NEVER BROUGHT A PROSECUTION FOR MEMBERSHIP ALONE BUT ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER CRIMINAL OFFENSES.

11. IN ADDITION TO THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED IN PARA 3, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED THREE OTHER GROUPS -- CUMANN NA BAN, FIANNA NA EIREANN AND SAOR EIRE -- AS PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND EPA. HOWEVER, THESE ARE FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES DEFUNCT ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT CAPABILITIES TO UNDERTAKE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. EMBASSY DOES NOT THEREFORE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO DESIGNATE THESE GROUPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE "PROVISIONAL" IRA AND THE "OFFICIAL" IRA: IT IS THE "IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY" WHICH IS PROSCRIBED. HOWEVER, AS THE "OFFICIAL" IRA HAS BEEN LARGELY INACTIVE SINCE 1972 WHEN IT DECLARED A CEASE-FIRE, EMBASSY BELIEVES SPECIFIC DESIGNATION OF THE PIRA ACCURATELY REFLECTS CURRENT REALITY AND THAT NO SEPARATE DESIGNATION OF THE OIRA IS REQUIRED.

12. ~~(C)~~ EMBASSY PROVIDES FOLLOWING OUTLINE DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPOSED DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. WE WILL SEND MORE DETAILED INFORMATION BY SEPTTEL AS REQUIRED.

A) IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (INLA)

THE INLA WAS SET UP IN 1975 AS THE MILITARY WING OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST PARTY (IRSP), ALTHOUGH IRSP LEADERS DISCLAIMED THE LINK. IT WAS DECLARED A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1979 BASED ON ITS ENGAGEMENT IN VIOLENT ACTIVITIES AND ITS CONTACTS WITH TERRORIST GROUPS OUTSIDE BRITAIN AND IRELAND. IT HAS GAINED A REPUTATION FOR RUTHLESSNESS AND CALLOUS INDIFFERENCE TO SUFFERING OF INNOCENTS. ALTHOUGH MANY OF ITS ATTACKS HAVE BEEN ON MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES, IT ALSO HAS TARGETED POLITICAL FIGURES. IN 1979 IT ASSASSINATED A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, AIREY NEAVE, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY SPOKESMAN ON NORTHERN IRELAND, WITH A CAR BOMB IN WESTMINSTER. THE INLA PROBABLY HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED DEATHS. IT HAS NEVER DECLARED A CEASE-FIRE AND BITTERLY CRITICIZED PIRA LEADERS WHEN THEY CALLED A CEASE-FIRE IN 1994. JUST BEFORE PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT IN NOVEMBER 1995, IRISH POLICE INTERCEPTED A TRUCK CARRYING EXPLOSIVES NEAR THE BORDER, PROBABLY BEING MOVED INTO PLACE FOR AN ATTACK ON BRITISH SECURITY FORCES. SINCE THE ORGANIZATION'S INCEPTION, AND ESPECIALLY IN RECENT YEARS, INLA LEADERS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED NEARLY CONSTANTLY IN DEADLY FEUDS AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH

OTHER REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY GROUPS. ONE OF ITS FIRST ACTS WAS TO KILL THE OFFICIAL IRA BELFAST BRIGADE COMMANDER IN 1975. SIX PERSONS, INCLUDING A NINE-YEAR OLD GIRL, HAVE BEEN KILLED THIS YEAR IN ATTACKS RELATED TO THE INTERNAL INLA FEUD. THE MOST RECENT MURDER TOOK PLACE ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1996.

B) IRISH PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

A 1986 SCHISM IN THE IRISH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST PARTY LEAD TO FORMATION OF THE IPLO AS A FACTION OPPOSED TO THE INLA. IT ENGAGED IN A BLOODY FEUD WITH THE INLA THAT LED TO THE KILLING OF MORE THAN A DOZEN PERSONS BEFORE A TRUCE WAS CALLED IN 1987. ITS BASE OF STRENGTH IS THE DIVIS/FALLS ROAD AREA OF BELFAST. FROM 1988-90, IT ENGAGED IN A BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN BELFAST, INCLUDING THE ATTEMPTED MURDERS OF TWO UNIONIST MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT USING LETTER BOMBS. BY THE EARLY 1990'S THE IPLO WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN DRUG-DEALING AND A MURDER CAMPAIGN AGAINST LOYALIST PARAMILITARY MEMBERS. IN DECEMBER 1992 THE PIRA THREATENED TO TAKE "MILITARY ACTION" AGAINST THE IPLO. THESE IPLO CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES CONTINUE TO DATE. THE IPLO WAS LISTED AS PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN 1990.

C) REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN

REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN BROKE AWAY FROM THE PIRA FOLLOWING THE GENERAL ARMY COUNCIL MEETING OF 1986 IN WHICH COUNCIL VOTED TO END THE POLICY OF ABSTENTION FROM THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. RSF HAS VOWED TO CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE; IT SEEKS TO ESTABLISH A "DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC" ON THE ISLAND OF IRELAND. RSF OPPOSED THE PIRA CEASE-FIRE IN 1994 AND, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE ACCOUNTS, WORKED TO UNDERMINE THE CEASE-FIRE. RSF HAS CLOSE CONTACTS (OR PERHAPS UNITY OF MEMBERSHIP) WITH THE "CONTINUITY ARMY COUNCIL" THE GROUP BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING OF THE KILLYHELVIN HOTEL IN ENNISKILLEN IN JULY, 1996.

D&E) ULSTER DEFENSE ASSOCIATION/ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS

THE UDA HAS REMAINED THROUGHOUT THE TROUBLES THE LARGEST PROTESTANT PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION. IT WAS DECLARED ILLEGAL IN 1992. THE UFF IS A COMPONENT PART OF THE UDA, OFTEN REGARDED SIMPLY AS A COVER NAME FOR MURDER OPERATIONS. IT HAS BEEN A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION SINCE 1973.

F) ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE

THE MODERN UVF WAS CONSTITUTED IN 1966 AS AN "ANTI-IRA FORCE." IT HAS CONDUCTED HUNDREDS OF MURDERS OF REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY AND INNOCENT CATHOLICS. IT IS A SMALLER ORGANIZATION THAN THE UFF, BUT AS DEADLY. THE UVF WAS PROSCRIBED IN 1975.

H) RED HAND COMMANDO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE RHC WAS LAUNCHED IN 1972 AND IS BELIEVED TO BE INVOLVED IN
SECTARIAN ASSASSINATIONS. IT WAS DECLARED ILLEGAL IN 1973.
THE RHC HAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE UVF.

CROWE

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KRM 4/11/2023

November 19, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: VAL MARTINEZ ^{3/11}SUBJECT: Sequence and Strategy for Northern Ireland,
November 20-27, 1996

The next week to ten days may well be critical in Northern Ireland. The British and Sinn Fein can only keep up their public signaling for so long before the unionists rebel or one side or the other sends a wrong signal. I recommend a series of phone calls in the coming week, in the following sequence and with the following rationale.

Wednesday, November 20: Call to Gerry Adams

This call is already scheduled for 1100 on November 20. You should speak to Adams first in any event in order to get a sense of what he knows of a possible British public statement. The message to him should be straightforward: the IRA needs to strip down superfluous demands and focus on what is attainable. Prisoners and police reform are important issues, but they are also long-term problems that can block the short-term necessity - an IRA ceasefire followed by Sinn Fein's entry into all-party talks.

Adams will complain that the British are not serious, that they keep creating new "pre-conditions." You can point out that the British are leaning Sinn Fein's way in a number of areas -- the inclusive nature of the talks, the comprehensive agenda they will have, the recognition that they cannot drag on forever. Further, Patrick Mayhew went out of his way on November 15 to reiterate yet again that HMG does not seek "victory" over the IRA. Adams must be made to see that, despite the chasm of distrust and antipathy between Sinn Fein and HMG, they in fact share one key interest: Sinn Fein's inclusion in the Stormont talks.

To get Sinn Fein into those talks, however, remains the problem. The British need assurance that any IRA ceasefire is unequivocal;

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 11/19/06

this British need is the IRA's stumbling block. Adams has to be convinced, and then convince the IRA Army Council, that this airlock issue has to be finessed. Recent IRA planning and operational activities only make this more obvious -- and more difficult.

We should be blunt with Adams about this, yet sweeten it with an offer that if the ceasefire/Sinn Fein-in-talks scenario pans out, Adams should come here to brief you and that the White House would give his visit good visibility. You might also point out to Adams that you are prepared to speak to the British about the need for them to be as reasonable as possible as well -- that is, pressing HMG to stay with the idea of an unequivocal ceasefire and away from problem areas for Sinn Fein like consent.

Thursday, November 21: Call to Dick Spring

Spring sees Mayhew in Belfast on November 20. You will want to ask him how the British saw things developing. The Irish also had a meeting with Martin McGuinness on November 15. You will want to get Spring's sense of what is possible and where we go from here. You will want to note the airlock issue won't go away, but that we know it needs to be finessed.

Thursday or Friday, Nov 21-22: Call to John Holmes

With Holmes, you will want to flip-flop the approach with Adams. Let Holmes know you have been pressing the Sinn Fein president to come up with a good ceasefire declaration, one that avoids demands (prisoners, police reform) HMG clearly cannot meet, and that you have stressed to Adams the British need for assurances that this ceasefire is for real. You might then note to Holmes that it would help if the British also kept to the key issue -- a dependable IRA ceasefire and the ways for HMG to judge that ceasefire.

The British want Sinn Fein in the talks, albeit not at any price. You should query Holmes on how much flexibility HMG has in being imaginative about the period of time needed to judge a ceasefire and whether quick bilaterals with Sinn Fein are a possibility, and at what level the British might hold them.

Friday or Monday, Nov 22 or 25: Call to David Trimble

You should call Trimble and tell him you look forward to seeing him in early December. Trimble will grouse about the British betraying him and the UUP once again. When he's finished we will need to get a sense of just how hard up the Ulster Unionists are about an airlock and where they stand, precisely, on decommissioning. You should explore with Trimble the creative

possibilities of a Christmas break in the talks as a natural airlock.

Friday or Monday, Nov 22 or 25: Call to John Hume

At some point, you will need to touch base with Hume again, both to get his sense of where things are going, and where we might be helpful.

Should you agree with this basic approach, I will provide separate talking points for each conversation.

1. This idea is already enshrined in the Rules of Procedure of the negotiations (30-36). It is presumably not helpful to SF to highlight that sufficient consensus could theoretically occur without them. Since its omission will not in any way diminish the force of the existing Rules of Procedure there is no real need to include it and it should go. The British should be told this is different from the issue of consent. A fall-back might be a reference to accepting the existing rules and procedures of the Talks.
- 2,3. This affects the issue of whether an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire is sufficient to admit SF to Talks without any further "purgatory" period. The amended version seems an accurate reflection of the face of the British legislation.
4. The British Government will worry that accepting to drop this sentence could be misinterpreted as a signal that they might be flexible on "unequivocal". SF will worry that this masks the intention to apply new tests (on the lines of the "permanency" debate earlier). The best compromise might be to keep the sentence but seek an understanding on what it means in practice, confirming it is not intended as a new hurdle.
5. This is merely a drafting change consequent on earlier SF amendment.
6. The word "resolved" could have connotations of "implemented". Would "taken forward" or "progressed" be better?

7. The second "without blocking" is probably a bit pointed for an article over Major's name. If accepted in the first - overall - reference that should cover this particular case also.
8. "All aspects of the International Body's report" covers, of necessity paragraphs 34 and 35 which are paraphrased (a bit tendentiously) here. We should seek to persuade the British that their position is covered by "all aspects" and to drop the rest. If they insist on some extensive reference it should not be the paraphrase they put forward.
9. "As far as we can" is weakening the commitment and should be dropped.
10. These verbs are an echo of the Joint Declaration and should not cause a problem.
11. The time-frame is a substantive problem, and the drafting must take its cue from whatever is agreed in substance. Perhaps a draft linked to "momentum": e.g.

"To enhance this momentum the two Governments will seek the support of the participants for an agreed timeframe and calendar which they will seek to achieve for the conduct of the negotiations."

12. There is an existing commitment to twice yearly summits, where a review of negotiations must inevitably feature. This should not be a problem.

13. The British will have a problem with "equal treatment" for the Irish language, which they will argue means a fully bilingual policy. One might either add (linguistic and) cultural heritage after identity, ethos, etc., or substitute "practical measures of support for the Irish language and cultural heritage, on the lines of corresponding measures in Scotland and Wales" (??)
14. The British will balk at the open admission that the RUC would have to be replaced, clearly implicit in "creation of a policing service etc.". They might live with e.g.

"We are committed to seek as one of the outcomes of negotiations a policing service which can enjoy the support of the entire community."

15. The reference to EU, South Africa would have some presentational difficulties for Major. They might be asked to rework the EU reference in a way more comfortable for them (e.g. reference to the Peace Fund). SF might be persuaded to forego S.A. reference.

COMPOSITE TEXT (10 OCTOBER 1996)

Note: this text incorporates the Hume/Adams amendments of 10 October into the text sent to Hume with the Prime Minister's letter of 27 September. Normal type represents the 27 September text, and italics the 10 October amendments.

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

[changed placing:]

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. No party has an undemocratic advantage. *[omits sentence: The negotiations will operate on the basis of consensus, requiring at least the support of parties representing a majority of both the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland.]*

- 2 -

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if [omits "the Government considered that"] there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate, *from that point*, in the negotiations. [omits: "We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground."] *Beyond the unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire*, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning, *which must be resolved without blocking the negotiations*. So the opening plenary will address the

- 3 -

- ⑦ International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage *and without blocking the negotiations*, we, along with the Irish Government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the
- ⑧ International Body's report. [*omits*: "This includes its compromise approach, under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of negotiations. We want to make urgent progress in this area, so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a precondition to further progress, but is used to build confidence one step at a time during the negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps, in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence."]

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

- ⑨
⑩ For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding [*omits*: "so far as we can"] our responsibility to *encourage, facilitate and enable* agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given

momentum to a process which will always have [omits: "its"] difficulties. *The*
British and Irish governments are committed to an agreed timeframe and
calendar for the conduct of the negotiations. [replaces: "We will support any
agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the
participants."] We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be
held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole.
The two governments will also review progress at regular intervals including at
a summit meeting to be held before the end of the year.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the
talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International
Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the
principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem
irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. *This will*
ensure that there is just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and
aspiration of both communities, including equal treatment for the Irish language
and culture.

We are also committed to the creation of a policing service which can
enjoy the support of the entire community. [replaces: "increasing community
identification with policing in Northern Ireland"]

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994
and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building
measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in
Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act
1995, security force redeployments, a review of emergency legislation and

others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

(15) The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally. *Accordingly we welcome the contribution of the European Union to the resolution of the problem. Likewise we welcome the interest and involvement of the United States, arising from the special affinity shared between all the peoples of these islands and people in the United States. In particular we welcome the contribution of areas of successful conflict resolution such as South Africa.* The negotiations also benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all [omits: "paramilitary"] violence. That is our aim too.

The Philadelphia Inquirer

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
TO: NANCY SODERBERG

FAX NUMBER: 202-456-9460

FROM: TRUDY RUBIN

NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW: _____

MESSAGE: I SAW TONY LAKE'S
COMMENTS ON PROTESTANT
PARAMILITARIES AS
"UNSUNG HEROES"
AND THOUGHT THIS
MIGHT BE OF
INTEREST.



Wednesday, October 9, 1996

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

COMMENTARY

Trudy Rubin Worldview

IRA bomb damages peace prospects

BELFAST — David Ervine spent five years in a Northern Ireland jail in the 1970s for possession of explosives. His Protestant paramilitary group was planning to blow up something or someone Catholic.

But change can come to Northern Ireland (despite the pessimists who insist that history will always rule). Take Ervine's example. He now insists the Irish question cannot be solved with guns, but only by dialogue with all Protestant and Catholic factions that renounce violence.

A compact, cheerful man in a dark suit, Ervine heads the small Progressive Unionist Party that fronts for an armed Protestant militia, with guarded headquarters in a tiny storefront on the tough, working-class Shankill Road.

A poor kid who felt the struggle with the Catholics was a life or death matter, Ervine realized the futility of violence during years in prison. He argues "neither side can win a military victory; there aren't enough guns to exterminate the other." He's absolutely right, and everybody, except a few diehards, knows it. Yet, the two-year-old cease-fire adhered to in Northern Ireland by both the Irish Republican Army and Protestant paramilitaries — bringing hints of peace to ordinary people — is on the verge of collapse.

On Monday, the IRA bombed a British military barracks in Northern Ireland, the first IRA bombing in Ulster since the cease-fire. The Protestant paramilitaries who have stuck with the cease-fire are debating whether to retaliate. Leaders like Ervine are begging them to keep it.

Unless the arbiters of the Northern Irish peace process — England, Ireland and America — take immediate action to defuse the situation, the whole peace process will fall apart.

This harsh reality is hard to grasp while traveling around Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The issue of violence in Northern Ireland seems incredibly outdated.

In the Irish Republic, membership in the European Union has brought prosperity. Last year, the number of Irish emigrants was equalled by those who returned. Ireland holds the presidency of the European Union; last week, continental leaders were trooping to Dublin to discuss European monetary union, not Irish union. The yuppies of Dublin, flocking to posh shops on Grafton Street, care little about the North.

As for Northern Ireland, ordinary people have gotten used to strolling again on Belfast and Derry streets that used to be

blocked by barricades. Belfast's Hotel Europa, the most bombed in Europe, is bustling with businessmen. Downtown pubs are crowded with young couples whose parents used to forbid them from going into the city center at night.

Clearly both publics want the cease-fire to continue. According to a poll published this summer in the Irish Times, the two most popular politicians in Belfast were Ervine and John Hume, the Catholic moderate who has crusaded tirelessly to keep the peace talks going and to oppose sectarian violence.

This public yearning for an end to violence had some impact on the "hard men" who want to renew the killing. The IRA, angry at British government

preconditions for allowing its political wing Sinn Féin to join the peace talks, broke the cease-fire last February with an attack in London. But until now, it only hit targets on the British mainland, not in Northern Ireland.

Since then the political atmosphere has grown more rancid. British soldiers failed to prevent ugly violent Protestant demonstrations against Catholics during the summer. The IRA refused to reinstate its cease-fire. Catholics have boycotted shops owned by Protestant hard-liners; Protestants retaliated with counterboycotts, including one effort to ban Catholics from a bowling competition at a Protestant church.

Both Protestants and Catholics are weary of violence and fear a return to the "troubles."



This week's IRA bomb, accompanied by a demand that Britain invite Sinn Féin to the table, will shake the talks. Protestant Unionists will harden their positions and Britain will be hard put to pressure them without appearing to acquiesce to blackmail. The vicious conundrum: One party can't be permitted to bomb its way into the negotiations, but without Sinn Féin the talks won't reach a solution.

So can Northern Ireland's cease-fire be saved?

Not if the talks are frozen or abandoned in the face of IRA provocation. Neither London nor Washington can afford to hold off until spring — after their respective elections. That would leave a vacuum into which more violence would certainly flow. Take note: The Northern Irish situation fell apart at the same time as the Mideast peace process, both victims of insufficient attention.

But at this point there is no hope the talks can resume before America and Ireland press Sinn Féin and the IRA to restore the cease-fire, permanently and publicly, period.

That would require the British to convince Protestant Unionists to drop demands that the IRA disarm before Sinn Féin can join the talks. Instead, disarmament talks would be held parallel to the broader negotiations. Before the IRA bombing, this approach was desirable and seemed possible; now it will be much more difficult to carry out.

The IRA has made a dangerous mistake. They can't drive the British out, nor conquer the Protestants, with bombs. David Ervine could tell them that. "Too many boys have gone to jail or died on both sides and what did they achieve?" Ervine asks. He learned the hard way that the Irish question will be solved by dialogue or not at all.

Trudy Rubin's column appears on Wednesdays and Fridays.

BARRIE MAGUIRE



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*To Peter Bean
Peter Reid
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From: Press office

Pages to follow: 3

*cc. P.S.
Minister
Mr W. Whitelaw
Mr McDonald
Mr Alexander
Mr Philpott
Mr*

10/11 11/11

PRIME MINISTER : PARTY CONFERENCE SPEECH, BOURNEMOUTH : FRI 11 OCT '96
(SECTION ON NORTHERN IRELAND)

Earlier this week the IRA once again spat their hate at the British nation. This morning, as a result of that attack a British soldier died. For many months Sinn Fein leaders have mouthed the words of peace.

Warrant Officer James Bradwell was 43 with a wife and children, Mr Adams. He joined the army prepared to lose his life defending the British nation. Soldiers do. But he was murdered in cold blood in the UK. I sent him there, Mr Adams, so spare me any crocodile tears. Don't tell me this has nothing to do with you, I don't believe you Mr Adams, I don't believe you. [rapturous applause] I hope his family can find tranquility and peace and I'd just like to say to James Bradwell, well done for all you've done for our peace and our security. It was in the best and most honourable traditions of the British army.

Good people tell me I shouldn't bother with NI. There are no votes in it they say. Maybe not but there are lives in it and that is why I bother with NI. I don't believe that NI will leave the UK, nor do I wish it to.

But I know there can only be a peace in NI if all its citizens, catholics and protestants alike, feel that their traditions have a welcome place in our UK and there will only be peace of mind in NI if we remove the causes that have given rise to so much conflict over so many years.

The political task, grindingly hard I know and that is what the Multi Party Talks are for. Progress has been slow, painfully slow, but progress has been made and there is no other show in town. Bombs will never bring Sinn Fein into the talks. All they mean is that Sinn Fein have slammed the door on themselves by their own action.

I applaud the way the Loyalists have maintained their ceasefire in the face of the IRA's provocation. Their political leaders have gained in influence and standing as a result of that. I urge them today to stand firm further yet and not to throw away all they have achieved.

The IRA's latest betrayal of NI means the demand for decommissioning of illegal arms is justified ever more clearly. We must have decommissioning in parallel with the talks. And so there is no hiding place for those arms, those missiles and those explosives Paddy Mayhew will introduce legislation into Parliament this autumn to set out how they can be taken out of circulation. I want those weapons off the street and I want to remove the false excuses peddled by the men of violence for keeping their

weapons. Let us expose those men to the world for what they really are.

I also intend to make government in NI more accountable and to give MPs from NI more responsibility. We've already given the Scottish and Welsh members greater ability to question Ministers. This autumn I shall do the same for NI. MPs from there should be able to question Ministers and scrutinise government policy directly in the Grand Committee, meeting sometimes in NI. I will consult the parties about how best to achieve that. The IRA have always believed Britain can be deflected by terrorism. They have always been wrong and they are wrong now. No one will take Sinn Fein seriously ever again until they show a serious commitment to end violence for good. I believe in the politics of reason, backed by strong law enforcement. I know in the end that reason will prevail and I promise the people of NI this. For as long as there is a political breath in my body I will fight for a secure way of life in NI and a settlement fair to all its citizens.

[End of section on Northern Ireland]

SIR PATRICK MAYHEW : SKY NEWS 11am : FRIDAY 11 OCTOBER 1996

Interviewer: How do you react to the death of Warrant Officer Bradwell?

Sir Patrick: With great grief and one immediately thinks of course of his poor family. He had been desperately badly burned and he had lingered on and of course one thinks with really revulsion of the contrast between the words of peace and acts of murder.

Interviewer: Where does this leave the peace process?

Sir Patrick: The peace process lies in the hearts and minds of the people of NI. The political process continues. This is a process by which decent parties and decent politicians strive their hardest to help the people of NI through to a political settlement based upon consent and agreement and that will continue.

Interviewer: But he and other leaders will now be considering hard of exactly how they do start the peace process.

END

FROM: MISS R K HUSSAIN
SECURITY POLICY AND OPERATIONS DIVISION
11 OCTOBER 1996

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PS/Secretary of State (B&L) - B	Mr Maccabe - B
PS/Sir John Wheeler (B&L) - B	Mr Stephens - B
PS/Michael Ancram (B&L) - B	Mr Beeton - B
PS/PUS (B&L) - B	Ms Jude - B
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Mr Thomas - B	Mr Brearley - B
Mr Steele - B	Mr McAleer - B
Mr Watkins - B	Mr Perry - B
Mr Daniell - B	Mr Burnett - B
Mr Ray - B	Mr Clarke - B
Mr Bell - B	Mr Maye - B
Mr Shannon - B	Mr Myles - B
Mr Leach - B	Miss Meldrum - B
Mr Wood - B	
Mrs Collins - B	
Mr T Smyth - B	
Mr D Lavery - B	

DEATH OF WARRANT OFFICER BRADWELL

You will be aware from this morning's Duty Officer's Report that the soldier who was critically injured in Monday's PIRA bomb attacks at Thiepval Barracks died from his injuries.

Background

2. Warrant Officer (ASM) James Bradwell REME (aged 43) of the Equipment Support Branch of HQNI, was in the intensive care unit of the Royal Victoria Hospital since the explosions, suffering from 50% burns to his body, a fractured skull and compound fractures to his left shoulder and forearm.

3. He died this morning at 6.45 of his injuries. His wife, who came to Northern Ireland with their three children after the explosions on Monday, was at his bedside when he died. Their children were being looked after in Musgrave Hospital.

Investigations

4. The RUC are continuing their investigations and are currently questioning a man at Castlereagh in connection with the bombs. Details at this stage are unclear, but it is believed he may have been connected to a car found burnt out in Poleglass shortly after the explosions.

Lines to Take

5. In the event that Ministers may be door-stepped, lines to take are below:

- it was with great sadness that I heard of Warrant Officer Bradwell's death this morning;
- express my sincerest condolences to his wife, family and colleagues at this time;
- this bomb attack was a wicked and cowardly attack intended to kill and maim by a group with nothing to contribute to the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland and have now caused the death of a fine officer who was working to protect the community from this type of terrorist atrocity;
- RUC will continue to carry out their investigations and will bring those responsible to justice.

Signed

RAFIA HUSSAIN
SHA Extn 27037

RUSH

INTERNATIONAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

wp

PAGE 01

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NODIST

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FM FBIS

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FBIS S 177OCT08 (REOPENING 172OCT08)

UNCLAS 7E

UK: Daily Provides IRA Statement on Lisburn Bombings

//civilians were regretted. LD0810192496 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1910 GMT 8 Oct 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The IRA statement read in full:

Volunteers of Oglagh na hEireann (the IRA) planted two 800lb bombs that detonated within the confines of the headquarters of the British occupying forces in Ireland yesterday.

"The target was personnel connected with the Thiepval barracks and we regret any injuries caused to civilians.

"Contrary to media speculation that this action was designed to provoke loyalist paramilitaries, this action should be viewed in the context of our statement of February 9, announcing the end of the 18-month complete cessation of military operations.

"As we outlined on that occasion, we called the cessation to enhance the democratic peace process. The British Government responded by squandering that historic opportunity in a vain attempt to defeat the IRA.

"The resolution of the conflict demands an inclusive negotiated settlement. This is not possible unless and until the British Government faces up to its responsibilities.

"The blame for the failure thus far of the Irish peace initiative lies squarely with John Major and his Government."

As usual with IRA statements, it was signed with the name "P. O'Neill" and a codeword was given.

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INTERNATIONAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EUROPEAN DIRECTORATE

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**NATIONAL
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COUNCIL**

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Washington, D.C.
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Did you get a complete,
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(202) 456-9151

From: Mary Ann Peters

To: Mr. Lake, Ms. Soderberg

Agency:

Fax:

Date/Time:

No. of pages to follow: 3

Message: From Irish Embassy, text of joint proposal
to Trimble to get him to move on decommissioning.

PAGE.001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT: 24 SEPTEMBER 1996
(Agreed between Officials ad referendum: 19.00)

SUGGESTED CONCLUSIONS TO THE PLENARY ADDRESS TO DECOMMISSIONING
(to be tabled by the two Governments)

The participants in the multi-party negotiations, meeting in plenary session:

- note the commitment of the two Governments to all aspects of the report of the International Body including their support for the compromise approach to decommissioning set out in paragraphs 34 and 35, which state:

"The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.

In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence".

- note the commitment of the two Governments to work with all other participants to implement all aspects of the Report.
- note that as an important step towards implementation, each Government will publish at the conclusion of the opening Plenary session draft enabling legislation which will provide the basis for giving effect to the International Body's recommendations on the modalities of decommissioning. Having considered any comments which the committee referred to below may have they intend to introduce legislation in their respective Parliaments in the forthcoming session so that as progress is made on political issues the legislative framework is enacted by Christmas 1996.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

Initials: N Date: 1/12/16

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25/09/96

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- agree to work constructively and in good faith to secure the implementation of all aspects of the Report of the International Body, in the context of an inclusive and dynamic process in which mutual trust and confidence is built as progress is made on all the issues of concern to all participants. A reality for all present and future participants is that progress in the negotiations will only be possible on this basis.
- agree to establish a committee charged with working to secure implementation of all aspects of the International Body's Report on this basis. The Committee will comprise representatives of all the participants and be chaired by the Independent Chairman of the Plenary. With a view to ensuring continuity between the work of the Committee and the operation of the Independent Commission proposed in the report of the International Body and provided for in the draft legislation, the two Governments will make available to the Committee a range of expert personnel, including independent experts of international standing whom they would envisage playing an appropriate part in the work of the Commission when it is established. The Committee will follow the attached working agenda. It will first meet on [7/14 October].
- agree that a plenary session should be convened in December to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole, including the work of the Committee. At that meeting, all participants would review the position, and the progress which has been made across the entire spectrum of the negotiations. It would also be possible, under the provisions of paragraph 12 of the rules of procedure, for the plenary to be convened specifically to enable the Independent Chairman to brief participants on the progress made by the Committee.
- agree that the adoption of the above proposals will conclude the address to decommissioning by the opening Plenary.
- agree, on this basis, to complete the remaining business of the opening plenary session in time for the appropriate Chairmen to convene meetings of the negotiations within the three strands and the proposed Committee on Decommissioning, opening on [7/14 October] and proceeding in parallel.

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PAGE. 003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**COMMITTEE ON DECOMMISSIONING
WORKING AGENDA**

- Governments' legislative proposals: consideration of draft Bills and ongoing review of programs towards enactment.
- Conditions necessary for decommissioning: consideration of the circumstances in which mutual decommissioning would be expected to occur.
- Modalities: development of detailed scheme or schemes for decommissioning and determination of the precise functions of the Independent Commission in respect of each scheme, including its role in relation to verification of the decommissioning process.
- Role of other confidence-building measures: consideration of those other aspects of the International Body's report which participants may wish to raise in this format.
- Determination of detailed arrangements for decommissioning: agreement on detailed decommissioning arrangements, including commenting on the necessary subordinate legislation.
- Review of implementation: ongoing review of implementation of all aspects of the Report.

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BDT/1234