Case Number: 2011-0355-F

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Ireland-Northern Ireland Bombing, October 8, 1996 [1]				
Staff Office-Individual: Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy				
Original OA/ID Number: 1397				
Row: 49	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	re: Internal Daily Report, Multi-Party Talks (3 pages)	11/18/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
002a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Telephone Call to John Holmes, September 30 (2 pages)	09/30/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
002b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with John Holmes (1 page)	09/30/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023
002c. cable	re: Northern Ireland: British Reaction to Irish Ceasefire Proposal (3 pages)	11/01/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2023

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:
Ireland-Northern Ireland Bombing, October 8, 1996 [1]

2011-0355-F
rs1686

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



Press Centre, 51/55 Falls Road, Belfast
Tel: 230261 Fax: 231723
Preas Oifig, 51/55 Bóthar na bhFál, Béal Feirste
Teil: 230261 Facs: 231723

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 8/10/96

'Redouble our efforts - Sinn Féin'

Sinn Féin Party Chairperson Mitchel McLaughlin, commenting this evening on a claim of responsibility by the IRA for the two bombs at the British Army headquarters said:

"This morning Gerry Adams spoke for Sinn Féin when he expressed his shock at what occurred yesterday.

The current dangerous vacuum must be filled by political initiatives which create a genuine negotiating process and build confidence and trust.

Ten days ago the Middle East was convulsed in conflict. The British government was among the first to call for direct dialogue between the Israelis and Palestinians. That same focus on dialogue as the basis of any conflict resolution process is required here.

Gerry Adams and I and the Sinn Féin leadership are prepared to urgently redouble our efforts to find a way through this crisis. We stand ready to meet government representatives, political and church leaders and anyone else who can help fill the political vacuum with real and meaningful peace talks.

This is a challenging time for people in political leadership. We are ready to meet this challenge. Is John Major? Is David Trimble or Ian Paisley?

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993

EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

10 October 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Nancy

Herewith the extract from the Taoiseach's speech, about which we spoke.

I will telephone you tomorrow.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

and in good faith to implement all aspects of the Mitchell Report. That Report is the key to a resolution of this issue.

Achievement of full decommissioning, of course, requires in practice the participation of Sinn Fein because the decommissioning we are talking about , is by definition, voluntary decommissioning.

But Sinn Féin's participation is by no means indispensable for the negotiations to proceed and agreement to be reached. No one, armed or unarmed, has a veto.

A fully inclusive agreement would, of course, be preferable.

Accordingly, the Government have worked very hard to enable Sinn Féin to enter the negotiations, which have been under way since 10 June so as to put forward the views of its voters. Channels of communication at the level of officials have been kept open with the sole purpose of bringing about a credible restoration of the IRA ceasefire which, this time, would hold in all circumstances. Logic, and the previous statements of the Republican movement on the peace process dictate that the ceasefire should never have been broken in the first place. That logic, in terms of a restoration, should surely have been reinforced beyond all doubt with the commencement of the multi-party talks on 10 June.

The position now, as it has been since February 1995, is that the Government will continue to carry forward the political process, with or without Sinn Féin.

At the same time, however, the two Governments have demonstrated clearly our commitment to hold open the door to a fully inclusive process. Acts like the Lisburn bombing makes it much more difficult, in the democratic and political sense, to continue to keep open direct channels of communication. It is clear that so far, the Sinn Féin leadership has not convinced the Republican movement as a whole to abandon for good the two-prong approach of politics and violence. Some may well be sincere in trying to do so, but it has been suggested that they have accepted the ground rule that there will be no split in any circumstances. Objectively that means that, in important matters, the hardest of hardliners have been given the final word If that be so, let me say this to the hardliners. If the Republican movement want to be taken seriously as democrats - with all of the benefits which that confers- they will have to get rid of the tactical use of violence - for good. No more Lisburns. No more spectaculars. No more beatings. No more coded warnings. Just the ballot box.

In what way were the ideals of Tone advanced by the years of IRA violence? The answer is: they were not. That violence deepened existing divisions, and

/ / UNCLASSIFIED FRP: , ,3, , , , ,

ACTION: NONE INFO: FILE, CIRAS, DONOVA, EUR/BCI, EUR/FRSR, EUR/GAR, EUR/NBLR, EUR/RIG, FBIS/NFS, IRL, MDSX, NHTC/EUR, NPCEDC, ODPD, ODPS, OPCTR/EURA, ORMS/EUR, PWSTAFF/JR, STATDICT (19/W)

---

96 5711933* SUP PAGE 001 NC 5711933*
TOR: 160925Z OCT 96 BELFAS 00277

PP RUEAIIB
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI1133
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHBL #0277 2900905
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160905Z OCT 96
FM AMCONSUL BELFAST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8906
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8408
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 6106
BT
UNCLAS BELFAST 0277

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS
CA/VO/L/C FOR JPRITCHETT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ULSTER UNIONISTS AND SDLP AGREE AN AGENDA

FOR STORMONT TALKS

1. THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) AND THE SDLP HAVE AGREED ON AN OPENING AGENDA FOR THE STORMONT TALKS. AFTER A FOURTEEN HOUR SESSION OCTOBER 14, THE TWO PARTIES EMERGED WITH A FIVE POINT AGENDA WHICH INCLUDED AGREEMENT ON WHEN THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD BE INTRODUCED.
THE POINTS OF THE PLAN ARE:
(1) THE CIRCULATION AND INTRODUCTION OF PROPOSALS REGARDING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA.
(2) CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S PROPOSALS ON DECOMMISSIONING.
(A) DISCUSSION ON DECOMMISSIONING.
(B) PARTICIPANTS' COMMITMENT TO WOK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO IMPLEMENT AGREEMENTS ON

UNCLASSIFIED

---

96 5711933* SUP PAGE 002 NC 5711933*
TOR: 160925Z OCT 96 BELFAS 00277

ECOMMISSIONING.
(C) CONSIDERATION OF, AND AGREMENT ON, MECHANISMS NECESSARY TO ENABLE FURTHERPROGRESS TO BE MADE ON DECOMMISSIONING ALONGSIDE NEGOTIATIONS IN THREE STRANDS.
(3) DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION OF COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA.
(4) LAUNCH OF THREE-STRANDED NEGOTIATIONS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREED MECHANISMS ON DECOMMISSIONING.
(5) CONCLUDING REMARKS BY INDEPENDENT CHAIRMAN.

2. THE AGREEMENT WAS VIEWED BY THE TWO PARTIES CONCERNED AS A SMALL PROGRESSION. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THERE WERE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES AHEAD, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO DECOMMISSIONING AND THE AGENDA FOR THE THREE-STRANDED NEGOTIATIONS. UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE MAINTAINED THAT HIS PARTY WAS CONCERNED TO SEE THAT SOME "SERIOUS WORK" WAS DONE IN THE TALKS, ACCUSING OTHER PARTIES OF `PLAYACTING," AND "PLAYING TO THE GALLERY." SDLP DEPUTY LEADER SEAMUS MALLON URGED CAUTION BUT COMMENTED "NO MATTER HOW STORMY THE PROCESS GETS THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD JUDGMENT, GOOD SENSE AND PATIENCE PAYING OFF." ALLIANCE PARTY CHAIRMAN STEVEN MCBRIDE SAID HE REGARDED THE AGREEMENT AS "A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION" RATHER THAN A BREAKTHROUGH.

3. THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) AND THE UNITED KINGDOM UNIONISTS (UKU) CRITICIZED THE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THE PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO DECOMMISSIONING. THE DUP SAID IT WOULD RESULT IN A FUDGE OF THE ISSUE, WHILE THE UKU ACCUSED THE UUP OF "BYPASSING" DECOMMISSIONING. DUP LEADER IAN PAISLEY ACCUSED THE UUP OF WORKING IN TANDEM WITH THE SDLP AND DUBLIN AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF UNIONISTS. AND HE VOWED TO RETURN TO STORMONT TODAY TO "FIGHT FOR THE ULSTER PEOPLE"

UNCLASSIFIED

---

96 5711933* SUP PAGE 003 NC 5711933*
TOR: 160925Z OCT 96 BELFAS 00277

AND BATTLE AGAINST SINN FEIN AND THE IRA. TRIMBLE
DESCRIBED HIS COMMENTS AS "HYPERBOLE."
STEPHENS

END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7049

October 22, 1996

WO

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MARK R. PARRIS

FROM: ROBERT WALLER RW

SUBJECT: Letter to Holmes regarding IRA/PLO

You asked that we convert the information memorandum attached at Tab A into a letter to John Holmes. We feel that doing so might be unhelpful or misleading for the following reasons:

The commitments found in the letters attached at Tab B, including the renunciation of terrorism, preceded (by three days) and thus might be deemed prerequisites for the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) also attached at Tab B. However, **it would be very misleading to construe this exchange of commitments as a "pre-condition" for entering into negotiations.** The commitments came at the culmination of negotiations on the DOP. The letters themselves were the products of secret PLO-Israeli talks.

Consequently, we recommend against putting in writing any comparative analysis of the PLO and IRA cases.

Concurrence: Mary Ann Peters

Attachments
Tab A Information memorandum
Tab B Letter from Arafat to PM Rabin; DOP

CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Mark R. Parris
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/22/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 1/5/16
2011-0355-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 15, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MARK R. PARRIS

FROM: ROBERT WALLER

SUBJECT: Pre-conditions for IRA talks: The PLO example

In your meeting with John Holmes on October ~~15~~ 11, 1996, you discussed Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams' contention that the PLO got a better deal than the IRA since it was not required to lay down its weapons to participate in negotiations. Following the meeting, you asked what pre-conditions Arafat had satisfied.

In a letter to Prime Minister Rabin on September 10, 1993, Arafat cleared two important hurdles. First, he recognized the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. Second, the P.L.O. renounced the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and assumed responsibility over all P.L.O. elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators. In a letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst, Arafat pledged to make those actions public. Both letters are attached at Tab A.

Also attached at Tab A is a copy of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP). The agreed minutes to the DOP reserve broad security powers to Israelis subsequent to their withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho.

Concurrence: Mary Ann Peters RW for

Attachment
Tab A Letter from Arafat to PM Rabin; Declaration of Principles

Letters Between Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat, and From PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst, September 9, 1993

Letters reprinted from press reports, Washington, DC, September 10, 1993.

Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of Sept. 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that in light of the P.L.O. commitments included in your letter the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the P.L.O. within the Middle East peace process.

YITZHAK RABIN
Prime Minister of
Israel

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following P.L.O. commitments:

The P.L.O. recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.

The P.L.O. accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The P.L.O. commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

The P.L.O. considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the P.L.O. renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all P.L.O. elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the P.L.O. affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and are no longer valid. Consequently, the P.L.O. undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,

YASIR ARAFAT
Chairman
Executive Committee
Palestine Liberation
Organization

Dear Minister Holst,

I would like to confirm to you that upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles I will include the following positions in my public statements:

In light of the new era marked by the signing of the Declaration of Principles the P.L.O. encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.

Sincerely,

YASIR ARAFAT
Chairman
Executive Committee
Palestine Liberation
Organization

President Clinton

Statement at the White House, Washington, DC, September 10, 1993.

Today marks a shining moment of hope for the people of the Middle East; indeed, of the entire world. The Israelis and the Palestinians have now agreed upon a declaration of principles on an interim self-government that opens the door to a comprehensive and lasting settlement.

This declaration represents a historic and honorable compromise between two peoples who have been locked in a bloody struggle for almost a century. Too many have suffered for too long. The agreement is a bold breakthrough. The Palestine Liberation Organization openly and unequivocally has renounced the use of violence and has pledged to live in peace with Israel. Israel, in turn, has announced its recognition of the PLO.

I want to express my congratulations and praise for the courage and the vision displayed by the Israeli and Palestinian leadership and for the crucially helpful role played by Norway.

For too long, the history of the Middle East has been defined in terms of violence and bloodshed. Today marks the dawning of a new era. Now there is an opportunity to define the future of the Middle East in terms of reconciliation and coexistence and the opportunities that children growing up there will have whether they are Israeli or Palestinian.

I want to express the full support of the United States for this dramatic and promising step. For more than a quarter of a century, our nation has been directly engaged in efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict. We have done so because it reflects our finest values and our deepest interests—our interests in a stable Middle East where Israelis and Arabs can live together in harmony and develop the potential of their region, which is tremendous. From Camp David to Madrid to the signing ceremony that will take place at the White House on

A Commitment to Peace: Signing of The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration Of Principles

Text of Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements

Following is the text of the Declaration of Principles between the Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) signed in Washington, DC, September 13, 1993, and released by the Office of the Spokesman.

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III

ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII

INTERIM AGREEMENT

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII

PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX

LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X

JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII

LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII

REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled

through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel:
(SHIMON PERES)

For the P.L.O.:
(MAHMOUD ABBAS)

Witnessed By:
The United States of America:
(WARREN CHRISTOPHER)

The Russian Federation:
(ANDREI KOZYREV)

ANNEX I

PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:

a. the system of elections;

b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and

c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

a. Gaza-Egypt; and
b. Jericho-Jordan.

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode

of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:

a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

b. a Regional Economic Development Program.

A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:

(1) A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.

(2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.

(3) An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.).

(4) A Human Resources Plan.

(5) Other programs.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

(1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.

(2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

(3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)-Dead Sea Canal.

(4) Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.

(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.

(6) Interconnection of electricity grids.

(7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

(8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

(9) Regional cooperation in other spheres.

3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Article IV

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI(2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.

3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII(2)

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII(5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

ANNEX II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel:
(SHIMON PERES)

For the P.L.O.:
(MAHMOUD ABBAS)

Witnessed By:
The United States of America:
(WARREN CHRISTOPHER)

The Russian Federation:
(ANDREI KOZYREV) ■

Memo

10 October 1996

The problem areas are:

1. The reference to an unequivocal restoration of the IRA's cessation.
The stated position of the two government's up to now in relation to Sinn Fein's participation in talks has been that there must be an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994. In this draft the British government introduce, for the first time, potentially dangerous qualifications to this position. They say that *'if the (British) government considered that there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994 Sinn Fein could enter the talks'*. They then follow on with this sentence; *'We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground'.*

2. Decommissioning
It is essential that this is not a precondition for further progress. The problem is that the British state their own interpretation of the proposals contained in the report of the International Body. The obvious implication of which is that this interpretation must be accepted by the other parties to the negotiation. This is obviously a distortion of the International Body's report and is therefore both contentious and problematic.

3. The Timeframe
This issue is not dealt with in any serious way. The British government draft states: *'We have already proposed that a plenary meeting be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants.'*

A realistic timeframe is the only way to create the necessary urgency and momentum towards agreement. The two governments clearly need to take a lead on this crucial issue, a point which we have been putting to the British consistently since our first meeting with their officials on 9 December 1994.

The two governments should propose a concentrated timeframe to the participants (in the region of 6 months). The two governments have already taken such a leading role in relation to a number of issues including both the chairing of the talks and the ground rules for the talks. The alternative, as we have seen since June 10, is endless stalling and obstruction.

4. Confidence Building Measures
There are broad commitments to confidence building measures but in all of this we need to know the detail of the programme the British

WP
Included
Mac / Adams

Memo

10 October 1996

The problem areas are:

1. The reference to an unequivocal restoration of the IRA's cessation.
The stated position of the two government's up to now in relation to Sinn Fein's participation in talks has been that there must be an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994. In this draft the British government introduce, for the first time, potentially dangerous qualifications to this position. They say that *'if the (British) government considered that there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994 Sinn Fein could enter the talks'*. They then follow on with this sentence; *'We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground'*.

2. Decommissioning
It is essential that this is not a precondition for further progress. The problem is that the British state their own interpretation of the proposals contained in the report of the International Body. The obvious implication of which is that this interpretation must be accepted by the other parties to the negotiation. This is obviously a distortion of the International Body's report and is therefore both contentious and problematic.

3. The Timeframe
This issue is not dealt with in any serious way. The British government draft states: *'We have already proposed that a plenary meeting be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants.'*

A realistic timeframe is the only way to create the necessary urgency and momentum towards agreement. The two governments clearly need to take a lead on this crucial issue, a point which we have been putting to the British consistently since our first meeting with their officials on 9 December 1994.

The two governments should propose a concentrated timeframe to the participants (in the region of 6 months). The two governments have already taken such a leading role in relation to a number of issues including both the chairing of the talks and the ground rules for the talks. The alternative, as we have seen since June 10, is endless stalling and obstruction.

4. Confidence Building Measures
There are broad commitments to confidence building measures but in all of this we need to know the detail of the programme the British

government will implement in relation to the commitments contained in any statement.

This initiative has been based on the need for a formula of words which represents the substance of a programmatic approach to the negotiations and to supplementary confidence building measures. As part of this the British government need to outline, clearly and in some detail, the substance of the programmatic approach they intend to take.

The issues which need to be addressed as part of a programme of confidence building measures are:

A. Those issues which fall into the equality and democratic rights agenda and which address political economic, social and cultural discrimination. These issues do not require any negotation. They can and should be addressed immediately.

The principles of equality of treatment, equality of opportunity and parity of esteem would have to apply across the political, cultural, economic, social, legal and security spectrum.

These would include:
Equality of opportunity in employment.
Equality of treatment for the Irish culture and identity.
Equality of treatment of elected representatives.
Equality in the provision of education, specifically through the medium of Irish
Equality of treatment in economic development.

B. In the event of a new IRA cessation both governments would also need to urgently address a demilitarisation agenda dealing with issues such as:
political prisoners;
emergency legislation; and
policing.

I have raised seperately with the Irish government, matters related to this which are within its jurisdiction.

It is of crucial importance that when the peace process is restored the mistakes of the last process are not repeated. This requires all of us, but especially the two governments to build on any renewed cessation. It cannot be subverted as the last one was.

For Tony Lake

from

John Hume.

DRAFT

10 October 1996

This government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim; to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. But no one party can prevent them continuing by withdrawing from the negotiations. No party has an undemocratic advantage.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate, from that point, in the negotiations. Beyond the unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire the British and Irish governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclulsively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So on entering the negotiations each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute committment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the

need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning which must be resolved without blocking the negotiations. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage and without blocking the negotiations, we, along with the Irish government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding our responsibility to encourage, facilitate and enable agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have difficulties. The British and Irish governments are committed to an agreed timeframe and calendar for the conduct of the negotiations. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiating as a whole. The two governments will also review progress at regular intervals including at a summit meeting to be held before the end of the year.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliations or gender. This will ensure that there is just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspiration of both communities, including equal treatment for the Irish language and culture.

We are also committed to the creation of a policing service which can enjoy the support of the entire community.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force deployments, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-

building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targetting, would demonstrate real committment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally. Accordingly we welcome the contribution of the European Union to the resolution of the problem. Likewise we welcome the interest and involvement of the United States arising from the special affinity shared between all the peoples of these islands and people in the United States. In paritcular we welcome the contribution of areas of successful conflict resolution such as South Africa. The negotiations also benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland and have the overwhelming support of peoples throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all violence. That is our aim too.

URGENT

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)

cc. Peter Westmacott
Peter Bean
Simon McDaniel

STATEMENT BY CLLR REG EMPEY, ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY NEGOTIATOR AT THE MULTI-PARTY TALKS

DOA 9/10/96.

RELEASE : 9 OCTOBER 1996, 3pm

EMPEY DEMANDS US CRACKDOWN ON SINN FEIN/IRA

TO. TL MM. NO

It is a matter of grave concern that Mr Tony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, has stated that the US Administration will maintain contact with the leadership of Sinn Fein/IRA irrespective of the bombing of Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn. The Lisburn bomb should have brought home to the US administration the essentially unreformed and undemocratic character of that organisation. Sinn Fein must be taught that their electoral mandate will not be allowed to be used as a mandate for violence. US Condemnation is only meaningful if it is followed up by action aimed at the perpetrators of the Lisburn outrage - Provisional Sinn Fein/IRA.

The Clinton administration must now realise that by destroying one of the main planks of President Clinton's foreign policy within a month of the Presidential election that the Sinn Fein/IRA feels it owes Clinton nothing for all the assistance they have received from that quarter. The carrot and carrot approach will only serve to encourage Sinn Fein of the belief that they can switch on and off the violence at will without paying any price. To take no punitive action cheapens the loyalist ceasefire and fails to make any distinction between those committed to peaceful methods of pursuing political ends. The US administration does not enter negotiations with their home-grown terrorists in the militias so why with the IRA?

The US administration must implement a series of measures aimed at dismantling the Sinn Fein fund-raising network in the US that has enabled Sinn Fein/IRA to restock their supply of armaments. First, the Cairde Sinn Fein (Friends of Sinn Fein) offices must be forcibly closed down and their assets seized before they are repatriated to Northern Ireland to finance more high-profile terrorist attacks. Second, any further applications for visas by Sinn Fein personnel must be refused, whether for fund-raising or propaganda purposes. Third, the administration must make clear their support for a political process involving democrats alone.

Sinn Fein, contrary to their assertions, were more than amply rewarded by the British, Irish and American governments during their ceasefire and yet they seek more concessions through violence. If the US administration does not believe that Sinn Fein have had concessions enough they should have the courage to state what more should be offered. A policy that always rewards and never punishes will only put off the day when Sinn Fein/IRA calls a credible ceasefire and Northern Ireland will enjoy a real peace.

ENDS

3 glengall street
belfast 12
tel 01232 324601
fax 01232 246738

building your future within the union

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

DUTY CLERKS' OFFICE
FAX NO 0171- 839- 9044

FAX TO: Tony Lake

FROM : John Holmes

CC — NANCY SODERBERG

TO :

DATE OF DOC : 27/9

TITLE :

CLASS : ~~Confidential~~ / ~~Restricted~~ / U/C

DATE FAXED : 27/9

TIME : 13.30

NO of PAGES : This + 7

MESSAGE :

Dave
MAP
Should we do a statt?
M
PLS do tip for read to Him ~~Holmes~~ by R
MJ

Decomm
Timeframe
three relationships
reference to
Dutury cultural traditions

* Dermott 462-3939
Hume-Adams today
Trimble → Belfast mayors/Ancram

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 September 1996

Dear Tony,

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has just sent to John Hume, covering a text setting out our approach to the multi-party negotiations. We would aim to publish this text early next week, probably in the form of a press article under the name of the Prime Minister. I have made clear to John Hume, in sending him the text, that the terms of it are not up for negotiation. It represents what we propose to say, no more no less.

It would be helpful if, in any contacts you have with those concerned, you could underline that this is a reasonable statement of British policy and that more cannot be expected. It is now for John Hume and those to whom he has been talking to deliver on what they said.

Yours ever

John

JOHN HOLMES

The Hon. Anthony Lake

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 September 1996

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 8 August and the text which you faxed on 6 September.

The IRA's position, as you describe it, is that if we were ready to make this statement, and the IRA knew when we were going to make it, they would respond shortly afterwards, at a time specified in advance, with an unequivocal restoration of the August 1994 "total cessation".

When I wrote to you on 24 July, I said that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without any further prevarication. But, in response to the suggestion that reassurances from the British Government on certain issues in line with its established public policy would help to bring this about, I set out words which could be used.

Now they have returned with one significant issue - the timeframe - which is simply not under our control, and an altogether longer text covering a host of other issues. Meanwhile, continued preparation for further IRA attacks goes on, as the arrests and arms finds on Monday demonstrate all too clearly. Intimidation and so-called punishment attacks also continue to increase in

number and brutality. As I have already said publicly, Sinn Fein's talk of peace can have little credibility against this background.

It remains the case that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without further ado and without the need for further statements. The Government is certainly not in the business of negotiating a restoration of the IRA ceasefire, nor in giving secret assurances to bring it about. Sinn Fein must understand that we mean in private what we say in public.

Nevertheless, if there is genuine doubt or uncertainty over the Government's policy, I am happy to look at that. Because I am in no doubt of the benefits, for the people of Northern Ireland and the negotiations, of a genuine and unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, we will repeat and reaffirm our approach on the key issues. The attached text has been prepared for this purpose, and will be published in the near future.

Yours Fraternally,

John H.

John Hume, Esq., M.P.

f\text.pmg

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if the Government considered that there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate in the negotiations. We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground. Beyond that, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering

the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage, we, along with the Irish Government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report. This includes its compromise approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of negotiations. We want to make urgent progress in this area so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a precondition to further progress, but is used to build confidence one step at a time during the negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. No

party has an undemocratic advantage. The negotiations will operate on the basis of consensus, requiring at least the support of parties representing a majority of both the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. But no one party can prevent them continuing by withdrawing from the negotiations.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding, so far as we can, our responsibility to facilitate agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have its difficulties. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

timeframe

CBMs

IRISH Proposal
We will encourage any efforts by the parties to agree an timeframe for talks + seek to ensure any agreed timeframe is met.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. We are committed to increasing community identification with policing in Northern Ireland.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force redeployments, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally and benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all paramilitary violence. That is our aim too.

For Tony Lake

from

John Hume.

WP

→ NES - FYI
(map has CY)

DRAFT

10 October 1996

This government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim; to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. But no one party can prevent them continuing by withdrawing from the negotiations. No party has an undemocratic advantage.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate in the negotiations. Beyond the unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire the British and Irish governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclulsively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So on entering the negotiations each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute committment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the

need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning which must be resolved without blocking the negotiations. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage and without blocking the negotiations, we, along with the Irish government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report.

(6) Deleted paragraph [demonstrate mandate, consensus]

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding our responsibility to encourage, facilitate and enable agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have difficulties. The British and Irish governments are committed to an agreed timeframe and calendar for the conduct of the negotiations. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiating as a whole. The two governments will also review progress at regular intervals including at a summit meeting to be held before the end of the year.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliations or gender. This will ensure that there is just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspiration of both communities, including equal treatment for the Irish language and culture.

We are also committed to the creation of a policing service which can enjoy the support of the entire community.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force deployments, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-

building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targetting, would demonstrate real committment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally. Accordingly we welcome the contribution of the European Union to the resolution of the problem. Likewise we welcome the interest and involvement of the United States arising from the special affinity shared between all the peoples of these islands and people in the United States. In paritcular we welcome the contribution of areas of successful conflict resolution such as South Africa. The negotiations also benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland and have the overwhelming support of peoples throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all violence. That is our aim too.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

The admission by the Provisional IRA of responsibility for the Lisburn bombs is sickening. It shows they still rely on terrorist violence and are indifferent to human life. To return to violence at the same time as the Pittsburgh Investment Conference also makes clear they do not care about the future prosperity of Northern Ireland.

PIRA are trying to provoke a general return to violence in Northern Ireland. We must not let them succeed. I appeal to the loyalists not to fall into this trap. Let the PIRA stand exposed for what they are, for all to see.

I will not be deflected from the search for a political settlement to make possible a lasting peace. We will redouble our efforts at the multi-party talks. Sinn Fein have excluded themselves more clearly than ever. PIRA's actions are totally incompatible with talk of peace and democratic negotiations.

The time for the talks to get on to the substance, and to make rapid progress, is now. I call on all concerned to make that possible. That is the best response to the bombers.

Ostate.pmg

002
002
→→ Lake OEC
EUROPEAN DIR
APNSA
10/08/96 TUE 15:41 FAX

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
Washington, D.C.

For Immediate Release October 8, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The United States condemns in the strongest terms yesterday's barbaric attack on the military base at Lisburn in Northern Ireland, which injured over 30 people. Now the Irish Republican Army has claimed responsibility for this deadly criminal act. These men of violence are acting against the interests and hopes of the people of Ireland, North and South, who want a just and lasting peace. We hope the authorities will swiftly bring those responsible to justice.

These acts of terrorism must not be allowed to derail the important work of peace occurring in Belfast under the chairmanship of Senator Mitchell and his two colleagues. The United States stands with the British and Irish Governments in their determination to see the voices of peace prevail. We hope that the representatives of the people participating in the talks will redouble their efforts to achieve a sustainable settlement. We continue to underscore our support for the courage and determination the loyalists have shown in resisting provocation and refusing to be drawn into the spiral of violence.

The United States will continue to support the British and Irish governments and all those who search for peace.

# # #

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606677
RECEIVED: 03 OCT 96 07

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLMES, JOHN

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

PERSONS: HUME, JOHN

SUBJECT: LTR TO LAKE FM HOLMES RE MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 07 OCT 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

_____

_____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	96100307	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

FOR NSC FILES

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

6677

DUTY CLERKS' OFFICE
FAX NO 0171- 839- 9044

FAX TO: Tony Lake ....

....

....

FROM : John Holmes

TL -
Cy PROVIDED TO
NES
MARY ANN PETERS

TO :

DATE OF DOC : 27/9

TITLE :

CLASS : ~~Confidential~~ / ~~Restricted~~ / U/C

DATE FAXED : 27/9

TIME : 13.30

NO of PAGES : This + 7

MESSAGE :

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 September 1996

Dear Tony,

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has just sent to John Hume, covering a text setting out our approach to the multi-party negotiations. We would aim to publish this text early next week, probably in the form of a press article under the name of the Prime Minister. I have made clear to John Hume, in sending him the text, that the terms of it are not up for negotiation. It represents what we propose to say, no more no less.

It would be helpful if, in any contacts you have with those concerned, you could underline that this is a reasonable statement of British policy and that more cannot be expected. It is now for John Hume and those to whom he has been talking to deliver on what they said.

Yours ever

John

JOHN HOLMES

The Hon. Anthony Lake

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 September 1996

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 8 August and the text which you faxed on 6 September.

The IRA's position, as you describe it, is that if we were ready to make this statement, and the IRA knew when we were going to make it, they would respond shortly afterwards, at a time specified in advance, with an unequivocal restoration of the August 1994 "total cessation".

When I wrote to you on 24 July, I said that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without any further prevarication. But, in response to the suggestion that reassurances from the British Government on certain issues in line with its established public policy would help to bring this about, I set out words which could be used.

Now they have returned with one significant issue - the timeframe - which is simply not under our control, and an altogether longer text covering a host of other issues. Meanwhile, continued preparation for further IRA attacks goes on, as the arrests and arms finds on Monday demonstrate all too clearly. Intimidation and so-called punishment attacks also continue to increase in

number and brutality. As I have already said publicly, Sinn Fein's talk of peace can have little credibility against this background.

It remains the case that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without further ado and without the need for further statements. The Government is certainly not in the business of negotiating a restoration of the IRA ceasefire, nor in giving secret assurances to bring it about. Sinn Fein must understand that we mean in private what we say in public.

Nevertheless, if there is genuine doubt or uncertainty over the Government's policy, I am happy to look at that. Because I am in no doubt of the benefits, for the people of Northern Ireland and the negotiations, of a genuine and unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, we will repeat and reaffirm our approach on the key issues. The attached text has been prepared for this purpose, and will be published in the near future.

Yours Fraternally,

John M.

John Hume, Esq., M.P.

0\text.pmg

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if the Government considered that there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate in the negotiations. We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground. Beyond that, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering

the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage, we, along with the Irish Government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report. This includes its compromise approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of negotiations. We want to make urgent progress in this area so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a precondition to further progress, but is used to build confidence one step at a time during the negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. No

party has an undemocratic advantage. The negotiations will operate on the basis of consensus, requiring at least the support of parties representing a majority of both the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. But no one party can prevent them continuing by withdrawing from the negotiations.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding, so far as we can, our responsibility to facilitate agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have its difficulties. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. We are committed to increasing community identification with policing in Northern Ireland.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force redeployments, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally and benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all paramilitary violence. That is our aim too.

Elements of Deal	Pre-Ceasefire Actions	Post Ceasefire Actions
British - 1) talks inclusive (ESSENTIAL)	- British resume official contacts	- Invite to WH TR? UP?
2) no outcome ruled out in advance	- UP call to Adams? to close deal?	- IFI
3) reasonable timeframe, progress reviewed at PM/Level ~~every~~ 6 months	POTUS calls to Major + Bruton (perhaps to propose)	~~Mitchell~~/ Min British + Major (Dec 15 WH)
4) no victory over IRA	- Major/Bruton summit in lieu of paper setting date for SF talks in Jan if ceasefire is restored	Major to WH.
5) Mitchell language on decommissioning.		?
6) commitment to CBMS. (if possible)		- fundraising
SF 1) unequivocal ceasefire		- terrorism.
?[2: No demand for unconditional]	Irish decommission legislation	
3) acceptance of Mitchell principles		
4) Progress on targeting, recruiting, weapons acquisition, [privately]		
5) Apology + no first use		

Timeframe

Mitchell/Min. British/Irish meetings immediately

Date in Jan. for inclusion in talks. IRA ceasefire week before Christmas, ~~talks~~ by end of Jan

Deal breakers

consent, prior decomm.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1996

Dear Tony,

We spoke about the response to John Hume. As I said, we are exploring with him whether he can produce better evidence of real readiness to declare a lasting ceasefire and stick to it. Meanwhile we are looking again at whether we could respond with a somewhat revised text (not for negotiation). The main change would be the inclusion of a paragraph defining more clearly than before the terms on which Sinn Fein might be eligible to join the talks after a ceasefire. I attach suggested words on these lines. If you and the Irish Government were able to agree to this broad approach, this would encourage us to respond to Hume, and also increase the chances of Hume accepting it and recommending it to others.

Perhaps we could have a further word when you have had a chance to consider this.

Yours ever

John

JOHN HOLMES

The Honorable Anthony Lake

In the light of recent events, both the British and the Irish Governments believe that, unless there were some incontrovertible developments supporting it, a dependable judgment that any restoration was indeed genuinely unequivocal could not be formed in less than three months. In forming a judgment in that period, it would be necessary to consider whether words, actions and all the circumstances were consistent with the declared ceasefire. For example, whether or not any paramilitary activity, including surveillance, targeting and weapons preparation, continued would influence the establishment of confidence that the restoration of the ceasefire was unequivocal.

WG
– Ireland

PRT: DOHSE HARMONPTR SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> RUSH <CLAS> INTERNATIONAL <DTG>

FM FBIS

F3283
FBIS

283OCT23
UNCLAS 7E
UK: Major--IRA Cease-fire Not 'Automatic Entry' To Party Talks LD2310180196
London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1725 GMT 23 Oct 96

By Ian Graham, PA News]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Prime Minister told Sinn Fein tonight that a new IRA ceasefire would not give them automatic entry to the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland.

He issued his warning during debate on the Queen's Speech which confirmed the Government was planning to introduce legislation to set up the framework for the decommissioning of terrorist weapons.

Mr Major said the IRA would have to prove that any new ceasefire was not a tactical move to be abandoned when they wanted. He wanted more than "soft words."

His words were in stark contrast to those of Irish Deputy Prime Minister Dick Spring who said earlier in the day that Sinn Fein could enter the talks within weeks of a decision by the IRA to renew its ceasefire.

Mr Spring's comments followed reports in Dublin that Sinn Fein was trying through behind-the-scenes contacts to establish how and when the party could get into the dialogue in the event of a new IRA cessation.

Speaking in Dublin, he said its entry to the talks should not take long at all "I would say it would take a matter of weeks -- if at all."

Downing Street sources insisted there was no rift with Dublin over the issue but Mr Major took a very different line in the Commons.

"Talks will continue without the IRA and Sinn Fein should be under no illusion that they can join the process until they have demonstrated real commitment to democratic and non-violent methods.

"So even if a new ceasefire is declared there will have to be more than soft words to convince the Government that it does not represent another tactical device to be abandoned at any convenient moment."

The Queen's Speech confirmed the Government was poised to introduce legislation to set up the "nuts and bolts" of decommissioning. The speech said the Government "stood ready" but it is understood that a Bill will be quickly brought before Parliament with the intent of having legislation on the statute book by Christmas.

Similar legislation has been prepared by the Irish Government and will be introduced in the Irish Republic at the same time.

Mr Major signalled his intent to introduce legislation at the Conservative Conference earlier this month.

Some Unionists are likely to be angered about plans to provide a limited amnesty to "ring fence" those actually handing over weapons from criminal prosecution for possession of weapons. The Rev Ian Paisley has already condemned proposals that would prevent police forensic testing of weapons handed in for evidence of crimes committed.

The Ulster Unionist Party security spokesman Ken Maginnis, MP,

said tonight that his party had already seen a draft of the planned Bill and he appeared not to be concerned about the content. But he was disappointed that the Queen's Speech did not specify when the legislation would be brought in.

"We would have liked to have heard something like 'we will introduce legislation in November or December'," he said. "It is important to send out a signal that the process of decommissioning is under way whether or not there are those ready to decommission at this stage," he added.

However, given the talks process the legislation will have to be in place before the end of the year.

THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.) 23 OCT 2209z
smw NNNN
FBIS 10/23/96 17:40:00
<^DIST>
<MSGID> F0489987

AFTER LISBURN

The Path to Peace In Northern Ireland

By Anthony Lake

IN the wake of the recent Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing of the British Army barracks in Lisburn, Northern Ireland teeters between the reality of a bitter past and the hope of a brighter future.

It can slip back into the spiral of terror and violence that has scarred much of its last 25 years. Or it can leave "the Troubles" behind by moving forward on a path of peace that promises a better life for all its people.

Despite the outrageous act of terrorism at Lisburn, there are signs of hope and progress. Start with the peace talks under way just outside of Belfast at Stormont Castle – the seat of Northern Ireland's government before the imposition of direct rule by London in 1972. Once the embodiment of a sadly divided society, Stormont today can become the symbol of a new commitment to dialogue and reconciliation.

Led by George Mitchell, former majority leader of the US Senate, and his two co-chairmen from Canada and Finland, the British and Irish governments and nine political parties made important decisions on rules and procedures during the first session of the talks, which lasted until late July. They returned to the table on Sept. 9 after a difficult summer. And despite the Lisburn bombing, they reached an agreement last week on a comprehensive agenda that will allow negotiations to advance to the next step.

Tremendous difficulties lie ahead. But make no mistake. The vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland want peace.

But the greatest proof and hope that Northern Ireland's future can be different than its past comes from the people themselves. They want peace. While the hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children who filled the streets and squares were cheering President Clinton on his historic trip to Belfast and Londonderry almost one year ago, they were also giving voice to their hope for a day of real reconciliation – a day when they will all live in neighborhoods without walls and the two vibrant traditions of Northern Ireland will flourish side-by-side.

That hope found its fullest expression in the 17-month cease-fire that President Clinton played a key role in achieving – the longest in the history of "the Troubles." Hundreds of lives were spared. We will never know their names or neighborhoods, much less their political loyalties or religious affiliations.

But for all that, they are alive today. And so is the hope for a lasting peace. Even with the breach of the cease-fire by the IRA last February, the renewed sectarian strife over the summer, and the attack two weeks ago, there has been no return to full-scale violence – and there must not be.

None of this is to argue away the tremendous difficulties that lie ahead. But make no mistake. The vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland want peace.

Now it falls to their leaders to tip the balance between history and hope at the Stormont talks. They must agree on how to end a violent conflict – including how to handle the weapons that have helped to fuel it. And they must devise a workable government for Northern Ireland as well as develop relations both between North and South and between the United Kingdom and Ireland.

The talks will have the greatest chance to succeed if all the parties – including Sinn Fein – are sitting at the same table. It can only happen after the IRA restores its cease-fire. Those who would reimpose the hard days of the past can have no legitimate role in deciding Northern Ireland's future.

Loyalist leaders have shown brave resolve in maintaining their cease-fire. They have not allowed the Lisburn attack to provoke them into a futile resort to violence. If they can uphold a cease-fire and remain open to dialogue, surely the IRA can do the same. The only true solution to the conflict lies in painstaking negotiation – in breaking down barriers and building up ties – and in working together to create a better life that all citizens of Northern Ireland can share.

The Clinton administration remains firmly committed to supporting that goal. Our aim is to help the people reach a just and lasting peace of their own choosing. We are neither in favor of a united Ireland nor opposed to the idea. But we are determined to continue helping the people of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments as they take risks for the peace that they themselves must build.

The ways of the past provide no way forward. They must be rejected. The people of Northern Ireland have made their choice clear. Now is not the time to return to the days of the bullet and the bomb, but to continue seeking to end those days once and for all.

■ *Anthony Lake is President Clinton's national security adviser.*

OPINION/ESSAYS

Foreign Policy Beyond Campaign Mush

By John Hughes

IN last week's "debate" between the two US presidential candidates, there was only one reference to foreign policy – a muddled question about sending American troops to the West Bank and Israel, and a mushy response from both candidates.

It is unfortunate that the next president's views on foreign affairs are getting such scant attention. For whether it be President Clinton or Bob Dole in the White House, the next four years are going to see extraordinary change in the world and major challenges for the United States.

There is a very good chance that both Russia and China, two countries of immense importance to the US, will have acquired new leadership. There is a fair chance that Fidel Castro will have relinquished, or been driven from, his grip on Cuba. There is a good possibility that Nelson Mandela, the stabilizing factor in South Africa, will have been succeeded by political heirs.

Meanwhile, the new US president will be wrestling with the struggle for peace in the Middle East; conflict and unarrested war criminals in Bosnia; Hong Kong's submission to Chinese communist rule; troublesome regimes in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Burma (also known as Myanmar); delicate relations with Japan; an expanding NATO; a shrinking UN; not to mention nuclear proliferation and international terrorism.

The next four years are going to see extraordinary change in the world and major challenges for the US.

Russia's lion in winter

Though Russia is no longer a superpower and no longer adversarial, its instability as it forsakes its communist past without a clear vision of its future must be a principal US concern. President Boris Yeltsin, a political lion probably in the winter of his career, has fired as national security adviser his restless rival, Alexander Lebed. But General Lebed's departure by no means resolves the leadership question, nor the country's long-term direction. Lebed has some dangerously unsophisticated ideas, but as the man who ostensibly ended the Chechnyan war and who preaches a brand of nationalism that resonates with an audience yearning for a new Russian identity, he enjoys immense popularity.

Talks in Washington in the past few days both with visiting advisers to Mr. Yeltsin and with some of the most authoritative US experts on Russia, suggest that Lebed is far from finished. His peace in Chechnya will have to stick, and he will have to find backers both financial and political, but as Gorbachev's firing of Yeltsin ultimately elevated the latter, so Yeltsin's firing of Lebed could ultimately elevate Lebed. One must hope that US diplomats are discreetly cultivating Lebed, and educating him out of his more bizarre ideas, against the possibility that he may yet rule Russia.

The way Russia goes is critical to Europe. It has considerable bearing too on events in the Middle East and the continued flow of Arab oil to the West. If Russia is not the power it once was, it can still hinder, obstruct, spoil.

If change in Russia may affect Europe and the Middle East, change in China will surely affect the course of events in Asia. Deng Xiaoping's departure from the scene will bring to a head the struggle for the succession that is already under way. New leadership in Beijing will decide whether China's relationship with Japan will be contentious or not; how amicable will be China's association with Taiwan; and how harshly Beijing will deal with Hong Kong, which becomes part of China next year. A new US president must find a formula for engaging with China, while deploring its internal and external excesses.

Cuba, while not of strategic consequence to the US, is nevertheless ripe for the kind of change that will challenge American diplomacy. Mr. Castro, a lonely relic of discredited communism, presides over a sagging economy and a restless populace. Violent upheaval in Cuba could send another wave of refugees flooding into the United States. More orderly transition would require deftness on Washington's part in dealing with a new regime perhaps not totally to its liking.

Africa has had little strategic value to the United States since the end of the cold war. It has paid the price in neglect by the US.

Facing up to Africa

But the world must ultimately face up to Africa's poverty and chaos. Some see South Africa, the continent's most industrialized nation, as the engine that might help drive development in the rest of Africa. But South Africa is beset by crime, and the unfulfilled economic expectations of its own black majority. South Africa's own direction will be a question mark once the charismatic Mr. Mandela is no longer on the political scene.

These and the other problem areas already cited suggest a bumpy path in foreign affairs for the next president of the United States. America's national interest may require it to project military power – sometimes unilaterally, sometimes in concert with other nations. America's global responsibilities require it to work for the freedom and economic well-being of others. The two are not contradictory. Nations that are democratic and prospering are rarely those that create the wars and conflict that often challenge US interests.

■ *John Hughes, a former editor of the Monitor, has also been US assistant secretary of state and assistant secretary-general of the United Nations.*

CORRECTION

In an editing error in the previous John Hughes column, the word "international" was omitted from a line that should have said the Voice of America "broadcasts international news, and stories about the US ...."

AFTER LISBURN

The Path to Peace In Northern Ireland

By Anthony Lake

IN the wake of the recent Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing of the British Army barracks in Lisburn, Northern Ireland teeters between the reality of a bitter past and the hope of a brighter future.

It can slip back into the spiral of terror and violence that has scarred much of its last 25 years. Or it can leave "the Troubles" behind by moving forward on a path of peace that promises a better life for all its people.

Despite the outrageous act of terrorism at Lisburn, there are signs of hope and progress. Start with the peace talks under way just outside of Belfast at Stormont Castle – the seat of Northern Ireland's government before the imposition of direct rule by London in 1972. Once the embodiment of a sadly divided society, Stormont today can become the symbol of a new commitment to dialogue and reconciliation.

Led by George Mitchell, former majority leader of the US Senate, and his two co-chairmen from Canada and Finland, the British and Irish governments and nine political parties made important decisions on rules and procedures during the first session of the talks, which lasted until late July. They returned to the table on Sept. 9 after a difficult summer. And despite the Lisburn bombing, they reached an agreement last week on a comprehensive agenda that will allow negotiations to advance to the next step.

Tremendous difficulties lie ahead. But make no mistake. The vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland want peace.

But the greatest proof and hope that Northern Ireland's future can be different than its past comes from the people themselves. They want peace. While the hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children who filled the streets and squares were cheering President Clinton on his historic trip to Belfast and Londonderry almost one year ago, they were also giving voice to their hope for a day of real reconciliation – a day when they will all live in neighborhoods without walls and the two vibrant traditions of Northern Ireland will flourish side-by-side.

That hope found its fullest expression in the 17-month cease-fire that President Clinton played a key role in achieving – the longest in the history of "the Troubles." Hundreds of lives were spared. We will never know their names or neighborhoods, much less their political loyalties or religious affiliations.

But for all that, they are alive today. And so is the hope for a lasting peace. Even with the breach of the cease-fire by the IRA last February, the renewed sectarian strife over the summer, and the attack two weeks ago, there has been no return to full-scale violence – and there must not be.

None of this is to argue away the tremendous difficulties that lie ahead. But make no mistake. The vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland want peace.

Now it falls to their leaders to tip the balance between history and hope at the Stormont talks. They must agree on how to end a violent conflict – including how to handle the weapons that have helped to fuel it. And they must devise a workable government for Northern Ireland as well as develop relations both between North and South and between the United Kingdom and Ireland.

The talks will have the greatest chance to succeed if all the parties – including Sinn Fein – are sitting at the same table. It can only happen after the IRA restores its cease-fire. Those who would reimpose the hard days of the past can have no legitimate role in deciding Northern Ireland's future.

Loyalist leaders have shown brave resolve in maintaining their cease-fire. They have not allowed the Lisburn attack to provoke them into a futile resort to violence. If they can uphold a cease-fire and remain open to dialogue, surely the IRA can do the same. The only true solution to the conflict lies in painstaking negotiation – in breaking down barriers and building up ties – and in working together to create a better life that all citizens of Northern Ireland can share.

The Clinton administration remains firmly committed to supporting that goal. Our aim is to help the people reach a just and lasting peace of their own choosing. We are neither in favor of a united Ireland nor opposed to the idea. But we are determined to continue helping the people of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments as they take risks for the peace that they themselves must build.

The ways of the past provide no way forward. They must be rejected. The people of Northern Ireland have made their choice clear. Now is not the time to return to the days of the bullet and the bomb, but to continue seeking to end those days once and for all.

■ *Anthony Lake is President Clinton's national security adviser.*

Kessinger, Jodi

From:	Martinez, Valentino E.
To:	@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc:	/R, Record at A1; Vershbow, Alexander R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Subject:	Possible Hume/TL phone call [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date:	Tuesday, November 05, 1996 2:18PM

Wilma, Mary - Thanks for notice that John Hume wanted to speak to Mr. Lake today. Hume almost certainly wants to brief Mr. Lake on the contents of a proposed British statement that might result in an IRA ceasefire. Hume has been waiting for this paper since Oct 10. Major's private sec John Holmes faxed the proposed statement to Mr. Lake this morning, so we have the document as well. I will have an info memo on it, and what it says and possibly means, ready for Mr. Lake by COB tomorrow. This British proposed statement would also be much on the mind of Gerry Adams on Thursday, should we arrange that call as well. (Sinn Fein local rep M. Keene will get back to me tonight or early Weds on setting that time).

A short preview of the proposed British statement: It offers Sinn Fein a place in the all-party talks once HMG is assured the IRA ceasefire is unequivocal. No time frame for testing this is mentioned. It also pointedly points out that no subject should be excluded from the talks, which means Sinn Fein could raise any issue it wished. HMG also promises to look at more confidence-building measures once a ceasefire is renewed, but notes that CBMs are a two-way street, and that the IRA has to also quit targetting, carrying out punishment beatings, and so on. All in all, a balanced piece of drafting; from the sound of Hume's request it seems as if he is fairly optimistic this might do the trick.

Should you wish me on the line for a TL-Hume call this afternoon, just let me know. I will leave, however, at 6:20 or so because I intend to go VOTE. thanks again, Val

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 1/5/16

96-0355-F

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

DUTY CLERKS' OFFICE
FAX NO 0171- 839- 9044

→ STAFF TO VAL MARTINEZ

Cc: TONY LAKE
NANCY SODERBERG

FAX TO: The Hon. Anthony Lake ..... Cc:
The White House .....
....

FROM : John Holmes

TO :

DATE OF DOC : 5.11.96

TITLE : Northern Ireland

CLASS : Confidential / ~~Restricted~~ ~~UUC~~

DATE FAXED : 5.11.96

TIME : 11.30

NO of PAGES : This + 7

MESSAGE :

IN CONFIDENCE

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1996

Dear Tony,

NORTHERN IRELAND

You will be interested to see the attached letter I sent to Paddy Teahon this morning, covering a further text we propose to send to John Hume. We are anxious to bring this exercise to a conclusion as soon as possible, not least following the leaks over the weekend.

Hume told me yesterday that, on the question of the permanence of any new ceasefire, the IRA/Sinn Fein would probably be prepared to say that the ceasefire was unequivocal, and that they believed that the statement by the Prime Minister provided the basis for an ending to the conflict and a lasting peace. This would be helpful as far as it goes, but that is not far, frankly.

I will keep you in close touch with developments, and am meanwhile happy to discuss with you further.

Yours ever

JOHN HOLMES

The Honorable Anthony Lake

IN CONFIDENCE

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1996

Dear Paddy,

Following our discussion last night, I attach the revised text we plan to send to John Hume and subsequently to publish. As I said, we now wish to move fast and would like to give Hume the text as soon as possible. Publication could follow shortly afterwards.

You will see that we have adjusted the text we last received from Hume in various ways to ensure it continues to reflect our policies, but have tried to keep changes to a minimum. There is a new paragraph on what would happen after a ceasefire, to replace the one discussed between us earlier. Your concerns have been taken into account. I trust you will be able to support the result.

In sending the text to John Hume, we would accompany it with a letter explaining further our position, making clear again that the timing of Sinn Fein's entry into negotiations in the event of a ceasefire is dependent on the words used and the actions which follow. We are bound to take time to evaluate any new ceasefire - paragraph 8 of the Groundrules makes that clear in any case.

You should be aware that this text is the product of much consideration here and represents just about the limits of what we are prepared to say, given our overall approach, and the present circumstances. As we discussed, the kind of words Hume has suggested might be used by the IRA/Sinn Fein in the event of a ceasefire, on the question of "permanence", do not seem to us to change the position. And there is no indication of any move forward on other issues such as parallel decommissioning or the consent principle.

Yours ever

John

JOHN HOLMES

Paddy Teahon, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

Text in response to Hume text of 10 October

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the no-warning attack on Thiepval barracks, Lisburn and various arms finds, including the huge find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The purpose of the negotiations is to achieve a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands. The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent.

They will therefore address all the issues relevant to a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both the British and Irish Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations, in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate and the need for sufficient consensus. But no one party can prevent the negotiations continuing by withdrawing from them. No party has an undemocratic advantage. Both Governments intend that the outcome of these negotiations will be submitted for democratic ratification through referendums, North and South.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. The loyalist ceasefire has made an important contribution. It made it possible for the loyalist parties to join the negotiations. They are now playing their part in shaping Northern Ireland's future, as I acknowledged when I met their leaders in July.

Under the legislation setting up the talks, if there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to join the negotiations.

In the light of recent events, unless there were some incontrovertible developments supporting it, a dependable judgement that any restoration was indeed genuinely unequivocal could not be formed at once. Each atrocity deepens the credibility gap which Sinn Fein must address. Much would turn on whether words, actions and all the circumstances were consistent with the declared ceasefire. For example, whether or not any paramilitary activity, including surveillance, targeting and weapons preparation, continued would be relevant. Sufficient time would be taken to ensure that a well founded judgement could be made.

Beyond the unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. In their report, the International Body said the parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations. We and the Irish Government support this compromise approach. Agreement needs to be reached on how to take it forward, so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a block to progress in the negotiations, but can be used to build confidence one step at a time during them. So both Governments have already said they will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding our responsibility to encourage, facilitate and enable agreement over a period through the negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have difficulties. We will encourage the adoption by the participants of an agreed indicative timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held in December to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. The two Governments will also review progress at regular intervals. Progress in the negotiations will be reviewed again in May 1997, before we decide whether or not to extend the forum's one-year life which expires then.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. We support, with equal respect, the varied cultural traditions of both communities. We are also committed to developing policing arrangements so that the police service should enjoy the support of the entire community.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

redeployment, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The process of peace and reconciliation has received valuable economic support from the United States, the European Union and through the International Fund. The negotiations are widely supported internationally and benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of the people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all violence. That is our aim too.

f\text.sm

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993

EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

Ireland 1996 | Presidency of the European Union

FAX COVER

Date: 20 November 1996

To: The White House

For: Ms Nancy Soderberg

From: Ambassador Gallagher

Telephone number: (202) 462-0017

Fax number: ***(202) 319-9757***

Number of pages (including cover) 7

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

Personal and Confidential

20 November 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Nancy

I am enclosing, on the usual basis, the following: (a) copy of the Unionist Party's paper on Decommissioning; and (b) our internal and confidential daily report, dated the 18th November, on the multi-Party Talks.

I will give you a call in the morning to let you know where things stand, arising from to-night's Conference meeting between Paddy Mayhew and Dick Spring in Belfast, and from our ongoing contacts with the British.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY

DECOMMISSIONING

12 NOVEMBER 1996

Ulster Unionists have, with all other participant parties, declared their desire to see the removal of illegally held arms and explosives from our society. This process requires the oversight of a Disarmament and Verification Commission to be established by legislation in both Westminster and the Dail.

It is clear that the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, and support for, paramilitary violence.

To qualify to participate fully in the current talks process parties must establish a tangible commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and show that they abide by the democratic process.

DECOMMISSIONING PROPOSALS

1. There must be an express declaration by all parties associated with, or deemed to be affiliated to, a paramilitary organisation of a complete, universal and permanent end to the use of violence.

2. Sinn Fein/IRA must subscribe to the Six Principles outlined in the Report of the International Body. Any action incompatible with a genuine and tangible ending of a terror campaign will result in exclusion from the process. This should apply to both actions and omissions on the part of any party, its associate organisation or any proxy thereof.

3. To confirm a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods Sinn Fein/IRA must begin actual decommissioning with a substantial tranche of guns, commercial explosives (e.g. Semtex) and bomb initiating materials before it can be admitted to substantive negotiations.

4. There must be an acceptance that the decommissioning process is independent of the negotiations. Decommissioning, (on the basis of commitment to the Six Principles), must progress to completion irrespective of the progress of the separate political negotiations.

5. Structures should be put in place and methodology outlined prior to the launch of substantive negotiations which would provide for actual decommissioning. The United Kingdom and Irish Governments should publish and enact the necessary enabling legislation as soon as possible.

6. All agreements on decommissioning entered into prior to the launch of the substantive negotiations shall be binding on all current and future participants in such negotiations.

DECOMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY

A core Disarmament and Verification Commission designate should be established consisting of the Chairman designate, ideally some other Commissioners designate, and some support/advisory staff. The first task of the Commission Designate would be to draft and publish provisional decommissioning and verification scheme/s.

Establishment of the Disarmament and Verification Commission proper should take place within a specified period after the enactment of the necessary legislation. Its first task will be to finalise Decommissioning Schemes.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.45)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~Confidential~~

Multi-Party Talks

Daily Report - 18 November 1996

1. In summary:

   - The Plenary met for half an hour this morning and adjourned until Wednesday morning, (not before midday, and subject to the Chairman's call) in order to facilitate further bilaterals.

   - We met the British Government, the SDLP and the UDP. There was general consensus that the talks may shortly break down over decommissioning unless a way can be found through the present impasse.

   - We made clear that the Government would wish to be convinced that the approach proposed by the British Government last week is a viable exit strategy - rather than a potential trap which effectively involves ratcheting us close to the Washington Three precondition and is also at variance with the Mitchell Report.

2. The Government delegation today was led by Minister Coveney.

3. The Plenary, chaired by PM Holkeri, met at noon for half an hour. It was agreed that it would be helpful to let bilaterals continue and that the Plenary would not meet again before noon on Wednesday. (It seems unlikely it will meet before next week).

4. In this session, McCartney (in the unchallenged role of spokesman for the Unionist side) summed up three points from the papers submitted by the three Unionist parties. First, any ceasefire declared must be complete in nature in permanent in extent. Second, the declaration must be accompanied by the handing-over of a substantial amount of weapons. Third, decommissioning must not be linked to progress in the negotiations.

5. At a bilateral meeting, the Secretary of State explained last week's British Government paper in terms of the UUP's need for political cover in the context of possible Sinn Féin entry into the talks. The paper had not been shown to David Trimble but its ideas had been aired with him (and had drawn a less than enthusiastic response). The Secretary of State underlined how close the talks were to collapse.

6. Minister Coveney recognised this but made clear that we could not go along with an approach which involved a retreat towards Washington Three. Efforts were being made to satisfy Trimble's voracious appetite for political cover at the expense of most other interests in the talks process. The Minister recalled the successive steps agreed to by the two Governments in order to meet Unionists concerns. These had been

entirely unreciprocated.

7. The Secretary of State and Michael Ancram denied any intention to revert to Washington Three. We commented that the British proposal was either an exit strategy or a trap. If they could persuade us that it offered the former, and did not simply involve further ratcheting back to Washington Three, our Government would be willing to look at this. If, however, we were being asked simply to "try this out", without any guarantee that it would secure the transition to meaningful three-stranded negotiations and a realistic approach to decommissioning, this would effectively mean that the talks were going to break down over the decommissioning issue. If so there was little point in going to elaborate lengths merely to come up with the same outcome at a slightly later stage.

8. In response, the British emphasised the non-mandatory nature of the judgement which they were proposing for the Commission and also the value of the envisaged liaison committee as a means of ensuring political input to this judgement. They indicated that Trimble had been unenthusiastic about vesting in the Commission anything approximating to a decision on the timing of decommissioning.

9. The meeting ended inconclusively. The discussion will be resumed at the Conference meeting scheduled for Wednesday evening.

10. The SDLP indicated some annoyance to us over the UUP's preparation and subsequent circulation of a paper (which effectively aligns them with the DUP and UKUP positions on decommissioning) at the very time when the SDLP and the UUP were supposedly engaged in bilateral efforts to find a joint solution to the impasse. They were, in consequence, reserved on the Alliance proposal for a trilateral meeting between the SDLP, the UUP and Alliance.

11. The UDP expressed considerable gloom about the prospects for the process and the consequences of a collapse for their own situation on the ground. They showed disappointment with the position reflected in the UUP paper, and asked the two Governments to intercede with the SDLP and the UUP to find an agreed way forward.

12. They expressed extreme unease at the prospect of setting up the verification commission "upfront" and indicated they may now become more overtly critical of the Unionist Parties' position (Ervine seems to be thinking along the same lines).

13. We were told today that General De Chastelain planned to discuss with the two Governments some ideas arising from contacts which he had with "the parties" last week, but is persuaded of the wisdom of clearing this with Senator Mitchell first.

14. The SDLP briefed us on bilaterals they had with the UUP and Alliance this afternoon.

15. The UUP delegation had included Trimble and Maginnis, who seemed to have no knowledge of earlier UUP/SDLP discussion, and denied there had been any bad faith in publishing a paper on decommissioning which bore no relationship whatever to that

discussion. It was unclear to the SDLP whether they were signalling there was any latitude in terms of their stated position, so a further meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow. (They mentioned the forthcoming DUP Conference as an inhibiting factor for discussions next week).

16. Alliance seemed in despair and conceded that the current UUP seemed to vindicate the pessimistic analysis on Unionist intentions which the SDLP had proffered to the Alliance Party proposal last week. They will have a trilateral with Alliance and the UUP tomorrow, but without any great expectations.

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03
PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 SZASZ VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL <DTG> 101506Z OCT 96

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0003
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0001
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0001

////////////////////// ~~INCOMPLETE MESSAGE~~ //////////////////////

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 005206

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

STATE ALSO FOR S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/06
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, UK, EI
SUBJECT: DAIL NORTHERN IRELAND DEBATE -- GOVERNMENT WILLING TO PROCEED ON TALKS "WITH OR WITHOUT" SINN FEIN

REF: LONDON 12400
1. CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE LAWRENCE E. BUTLER. REASON 1.5 (D).

SUMMARY
/------

2. (C) IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER 7 LISBURN BOMBINGS, THE DAIL BEGAN A ONE-DAY SPECIAL DEBATE ON NORTHERN IRELAND THI MORNING. ONLY MARY HARNEY CALLED FOR TIES WITH SINN FEIN T BE SEVERED, BUT PRIME MINISTER BRUTON MADE CLEAR HIS GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE THE TALKS PROCESS "WITH OR WITHOUT SINN FEIN." BERTIE AHERN REITERATED HIS CALL FO AN ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT AND SAID PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD INVITE THE PARTIES TO WASHINGTON FOR "MIDDLE EAST-STYLE" BILATERALS IN A NEUTRAL VENUE. FERGUS FINLAY TOLD US THOSE WHO FAVOR TRYING TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN FOR SINN FEIN TO ENTER TALKS ARE "RUNNING OUT OF ARGUMENTS."

END SUMMARY
/----------

3. (U) A RATHER DISPIRITED DEBATE BEGAN IN THE DAIL (PARLIAMENT) OCTOBER 10, ENLIVENED ONLY BY THE TALKOUT OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR VERONICA SUTHERLAND AT (MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY) FIANNA FAIL LEADER BERTIE AHERN'S CHARGE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD DISPLAYED "INCOMPETENCE" IN ITS HANDLING OF THE PEACE PROCESS DURING THE IRA CEASEFIRE.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By MN NARA, Date 1/5/16
2011-0355-F

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) THERE WAS AGREEMENT AMONG GOVERNING AND OPPOSITION PARTIES ON SEVERAL MAIN LINES: THAT THE LISBURN BOMBINGS WERE A DEPLORABLE ATROCITY; THAT THE LOYALISTS SHOULD BE PRAISED FOR THEIR COURAGE IN (SO FAR) HOLDING TO THEIR CEASEFIRE; AND THAT GREATER EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO GENERATE MOMENTUM IN THE STORMONT TALKS. THERE WAS NO CLEAR CONSENSUS, HOWEVER, ON HOW TO ACHIEVE THE LATTER.

KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN TO SINN FEIN?
/----------

5. (U) ONLY (OPPOSITION) PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS LEADER MARY HARNEY CALLED FOR TIES WITH SINN FEIN TO BE SEVERED. SHE QUESTIONED WHETHER SINN FEIN HAD EVER BEEN SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE AND SAID "IT'S TIME TO CALL THEIR BLUFF." SHE URGED THE GOVERNMENTS TO FOCUS ON TRYING TO CREATE AN AGREEMENT "FROM THE CENTER -- THE UUP AND SDLP."

6. (U) PRIME MINISTER BRUTON MADE CLEAR HIS GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO "CARRY FORWARD THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WITH OR WITHOUT SINN FEIN." HE ALSO NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT GOI AND HMG "HAVE DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY OUR COMMITMENT TO HOLD OPEN THE DOOR TO A FULLY INCLUSIVE PROCESS. ACTS LIKE THE LISBURN BOMBING MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, IN THE DEMOCRATIC AND POLITICAL SENSE, TO CONTINUE TO KEEP OPEN DIRECT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT SO FAR, THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP HAS NOT CONVINCED THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE TO ABANDON FOR GOOD THE TWO-PRONG APPROACH OF POLITICS AND VIOLENCE. SOME MAY WELL BE SINCERE IN TRYING TO DO SO, BUT IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE GROUND RULE THAT THERE WILL BE NO SPLIT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. OBJECTIVELY THAT MEANS THAT, IN IMPORTANT MATTERS, THE HARDEST OF HARDLINERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE FINAL WORD. IF THAT BE SO, LET ME SAY THIS TO THE HARDLINERS. IF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT WANT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AS DEMOCRATS - WITH ALL THE BENEFITS WHICH THAT CONFERS - THEY WILL HAVE TO GET RID OF THE TACTICAL USE OF VIOLENCE - FOR GOOD. NO MORE LISBURNS. NO MORE SPECTACULARS. NO MORE BEATINGS. NO MORE CODED WARNINGS. JUST THE BALLOT BOX."

7. (U) BERTIE AHERN SAID THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT "MAKE THE TERMS FOR SINN FEIN PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS ANY MORE DIFFICULT" THAN THEY ALREADY WERE.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS
/----------

8. (U) THE TAOISEACH AND BERTIE AHERN DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THEIR APPROACH TO NEXT STEPS. PM BRUTON EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO REASSURE UNIONISTS, AND SAID NO SOLUTION CAN BE IMPOSED, "COLONIAL-STYLE." "WE, THE PEOPLE, IN THE RE

PUBLI(
HAVE NO AGENDA OF A PROGRESSIVE TAKEOVER OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AGAINST THE WISHES OF A MAJORITY OF PEOPLE THERE," HE SAID. "THERE IS NO PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT, INTENT ON PURSUING A MALIGN AGENDA TO UNDERMINE THE IDENTITY OR HERITAGE OF UNIONISTS OR THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE U.K." BRUTON STRESSED WIDESPREAD ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC THAT CONSENT (IN THE NORTH) "DOES NOT NOW EXIST FOR A UNITED IRELAND AND IS UNLIKELY TO DO SO IN ANY NEAR FUTURE." HE AFFIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO "STUDY INTENSELY
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>5206
<MSGID> M2440628

PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN SUM SUM2

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL <DTG> 101506Z OCT 96

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0004
IFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0002
RUEHLOB/AMCNSUL BELFAST 0002
INFO ////

////////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////////

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 005206

NSC FOR SOERBERG AND PETERS

STATE ALSO FOR S/IR

E.. 12958: DECL: 10/03/06
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, UK, EI
SUBJECT: DAIL NORTHERN IRELND DEBATE -- GOVERNMENT WILLING TO PROCEED ON ALKS "WITH OR WITHOUT" SINN FEIN

AMENDMENTSTO ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHIH WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN POPLE - AND NOT TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT - THAT WE ARE SEEKING."

9. (U) AHERN, FOR HS PART, CALLED FOR A MORE "ACTIVIST" APPROCH. "WE CAN'T ALLOW THINGS TO DRIFT TO THE OTER SID OF ELECTIONS" IN THE UK AND IRELAND, E SAID. AHERN OUTLINED A SIX POINT AGENDA:

(1) SECURE AN IRA CEASEFIRE
(2) SET A SPECIIC TIMEFRAME FOR THE TALKS
(3) MAKE DECOMMISSIONING "PART" OF, RATHER THAN A PRECONDITION FOR, THE TALKS
(4) LIBERALIZE THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS
(5) ENHANCE PARITY OF ESTEEM IN THE NORTH
(6) EMPLOY BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN A NEUTRAL VENUE

10. (U) AMPLIFYING THIS LAST POINT, AHERN CITED RECENT MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY, AND SAID PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD INVITE THE PARTIES TO WASHINGTON FOR BILATERAL SESSIONS RATHER THAN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY, "WHICH HAS FAILED SO FAR." HE PRAISED SENATOR MITCHELL AND THE U.S. ROLE, AND SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIND ANOTHER PERSON OF HIS STATURE AND COMMITMENT. (HE ASSERTED THAT MITCHELL "HASN'T BEEN AROUND MUCH THE PAST FEW WEEKS" AND "DOESN'T INTEND TO COME BACK.")

11. (U) CLAIMING THAT FIANNA FAIL LOBBYING WAS "INDISPENSABLE" IN GETTING SENATOR MITCHELL INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AHERN "PRAISED" THE GOI FOR "LISTENING TO US' AND URGED PM BRUTON TO LIKEWISE HEED HIS CALL FOR AN ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT. HE PROMISED THAT FIANNA FAIL WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT IF THE SUMMIT FAILED TO PRODUCE RESULTS. HOWEVER, HE LAID INTO THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS "AD HOC" APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND CHARGED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING SHOULD HAVE KEPT HIS FOCUS ON THE NORTH RATHER THAN ON IRELAND'S EU PRESIDENCY, WHOSE HANDLING SHOULD HAVE BEEN DELEGATED TO ANOTHER MINISTER.

COMMENT
/------

12. (C) THE DEBATE, WHICH WILL CONCLUDE LATER TODAY, WAS SPARSELY ATTENDED; ONE HAD THE SENSE THAT THESE ARGUMENTS HAVE ECHOED OFF THE DAIL WALLS MANY TIMES BEFORE. THE CRUX OF THE DEBATE COMES DOWN TO TWO ISSUES OVER WHICH OPINIONS IN IRELAND REMAIN AS DIVIDED AS EVER: (A) CAN A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING MODERATE PARTIES BE "IMPOSED" BY THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS IN A WAY THAT WOULD NOT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE; AND (B) HOW LONG TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN TO SINN FEIN/IRA TO JOIN THE PROCESS. ON THE LATTER POINT, THE TANAISTE'S SPECIAL ADVISER, FERGUS FINLAY, DESCRIBED THE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT THAT EXIST. THERE ARE THOSE WHO THINK THAT DAVID TRIMBLE IS WILLING TO MAKE A DEAL AS LONG AS HE CAN BE ASSURED SINN FEIN WILL NOT BE BROUGHT IN -- AND THAT THIS IS THE WAY TO GO (SHADES OF REFTEL PARA 1). AND THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE VIOLENCE WILL NOTIEND UNLESS SINN FEIN CAN BE BROUGHT INTO THE PROCESS -- AND THAT THIS IS ACHIEVEABLE. FINLAY CONFESSED, HOWEVER, THAT "THOSE OF US WHO HOLD THIS (THE LATTER) VIEW ARE RUNNING OUT OF ARGUMENTS." BUTLER

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN>5206
<^TOR>961010112956 M2440648
<^DIST>
<MSGID> M2440648

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606585
RECEIVED: 30 SEP 96 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: PETERS

DOC DATE: 30 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRELAND GREAT BRITAIN

PERSONS: HOLMES, JOHN

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR LAKE 30 SEP TELCALL TO HOLMES

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 03 OCT 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PETERS
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MI NARA, Date 1/5/16
2011-0355-F

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD ID: 9606585

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96093016	FOR DECISION
001		X	96100811	LAKE APPROVED RECOM

CONFIDENTIAL

National Security Council
The White House

RECD 3:20 pm
9/30

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6585

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	2	M	
Berger			
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	M 10/8	A
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Call to Holmes

Secretariat —

This package is not on computer — pls check

faxed - loaded to APNSA 10/5 Kathy Vert

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.46)
KBH 4/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Phone 1st

6585

September 30, 1996



Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to John Holmes, September 30

Nancy spoke with Dermot today, who asked that you postpone calling Hume until after the Hume-Adams meeting that is taking place today. Dermot will call with a readout of that meeting tonight or tomorrow morning. Dermot also told Nancy that Dublin has requested several fixes to the draft Major statement designed to reassure Sinn Fein and the IRA (Tab A). London has accepted two of Dublin's suggestions: references to the three strands and to nurturing Irish culture.

Of the other two Irish suggestions, we do not think Dublin's request for a change in the wording on the timeframe issue (page 3, paragraph 4) is substantive enough for you to raise with Holmes. But the suggestion that the reference to parallel decommissioning (page 2, paragraph 3) be revised to reflect the Mitchell Report's language that the parties "consider" parallel decommissioning has merit. Depending on how the conversation goes, you may wish to raise it with Holmes.

Your main reason for calling Holmes, however, is to discuss the UUP's unhelpful response to the Anglo-Irish proposal on how to handle decommissioning (Tab C). In essence, it rejects the two governments' suggested "exit strategy" and insists on advance commitment to a timetable for decommissioning. It is clearly based on the fear that Sinn Fein is about to join the talks.

Dermot also gave Nancy a readout of the meetings Bruce Morrison and his group had in Ireland last week. They were buoyed by their meeting with Adams, who told them he wants to get the cease-fire restored "now." One of the group, Chuck Feeney, warned that his funding of Sinn Fein operations in the U.S. would end if there were a "spectacular" bombing on the mainland. Bruce will be meeting with Nancy tomorrow to give her a full briefing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5b
Declassify On: 9/30/06

Adams' attitude and the fact the British have produced a statement that goes quite far to address Sinn Fein concerns suggest we may have window to get the cease-fire restored. The chances will be greatly reduced, however, if Trimble continues to stonewall on decommissioning. You should talk to Holmes about how the meeting between Mayhew and Trimble today went and what HMG has up its sleeve if Trimble remains obdurate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Holmes today, Hume tomorrow and Adams after speaking with Hume.

Approve JR Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Annotated Copy of Draft British Statement
Tab C Hume/Adams Draft of September 7
Tab D UUP Paper on Handling Decommissioning

Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: **TAB A**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.47)
KBH 4/11/2023

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
JOHN HOLMES

- Understand UUP has responded to the proposed "exit strategy" with a paper of its own that does not move issue forward.

- How did bilateral meeting between Trimble and Mayhew/Ancram go today? Any flexibility on Trimble's side?

- Have seen the UUP paper. Still insists on advance commitment to timetable for decommissioning, which is dead end.

- UUP paper seems based on fear that Sinn Fein will join talks. To what extent do you think Trimble's goal is just to keep them out?

- Brings me to second issue -- your draft statement. Think it looks good, addresses substance of all issues Hume/Adams raised.

- Also hearing positive things from Irish American group led by Bruce Morrison that was in Ireland last week. They feel that Adams wants to push for cease-fire on basis of forthcoming British statement.

- May also be that break-up of IRA cell in London means that those republicans who favor restored cease-fire have less time to make it happen.

- Whatever odds of new cease-fire, need to do everything possible to bring it about. IRA will be skeptical about joining talks deadlocked over decommissioning. What can be done to get past the hurdle?

- I plan to call Hume tomorrow to tell him I think your statement is very forthcoming. I will also call Adams.

- If needed: Understand Irish made several suggestions about your text. One that struck us as possibly having merit was to rephrase reference to parallel decommissioning to reflect actual language in Report of International Body.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5b
Declassify On: 9/30/06

PAGE 01 OF 03
PRT: SODERBERG
SIT: COQ SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 011854Z NOV 96

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8622
INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 9613
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0082
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LONDON 013440

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.48)
KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/06
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH REACTION TO IRISH CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

REF: DUBLIN 5482

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL J. HABIB, MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. REASON: 1.5(B).

2. (C) NIO ASSOCIATE POLITICAL DIRECTOR JONATHAN STEPHENS CONFIRMED TO US NOVEMBER 1 THAT MAYHEW'S REACTION "WAS NOT POSITIVE" TO SPRING'S PROPOSAL THAT SINN FEIN BE INCLUDED IN THE TALKS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE IRA DECLARES A CEASE-FIRE. (REFTEL) HOWEVER, AN IRISH POSITION PAPER SUBSEQUENTLY DELIVERED TO HMG DESCRIBED AN "UNEQUIVOCAL" CEASE-FIRE BEING THE OPERATIVE CRITERIA FOR SINN FEIN'S ADMISSION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS NO DIFFICULTY WITH THAT PROPOSITION, IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT WHAT DUBLIN ACTUALLY WANTS.

3. (C) STEPHENS SAID THERE ARE LEGAL AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO PROCEEDING AS FM SPRING PROPOSED. ON THE LEGAL FRONT, THE ENABLING LEGISLATION PASSED BY PARLIAMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR REQUIRES THE IRA'S CEASE-FIRE BE "UNEQUIVOCAL" BEFORE SINN FEIN CAN BE ADMITTED TO THE TALKS. ONCE THE CEASE-FIRE IS JUDGED TO BE GENUINE, ADMISSION IS AUTOMATIC WITH NO OTHER CONDITIONS. THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY PROVISION FOR "A LIMITED ENTRY" FOR THE PURPOSE OF PLEDGING ADHERENCE TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES, ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY SPRING. ADMISSION OF SINN FEIN, THEREFORE, REQUIRES A DETERMINATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS "UNEQUIVOCAL."

4. (C) THAT SUCH A JUDGMENT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR MAJOR'S GOVERNMENT TO MAKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER A CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION IS THE HEART OF THE POLITICAL OBJECTION TO SPRING'S PROPOSAL. NOT ONLY WOULD UNIONISTS WALK OUT OF THE TALKS, BUT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES AND EVEN IN THE CABINET. MOREOVER, THE BRITISH

GOVERNMENT, WHICH FELT IT WAS BURNED BY THE IRA'S TACTICAL CEASE-FIRE LAST TIME, IS NOT INCLINED TO MAKE A SNAP DECISION OR "WORKING ASSUMPTION" THIS TIME AROUND. SOME SORT OF WAITING PERIOD IS "INEVITABLE," ACCORDING TO STEPHENS, AND SPRING'S PROPOSAL IS "JUST NOT A RUNNER."

5. (C) NONETHELESS, STEPHENS REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MAY NOT BE TOO FAR APART ON THIS ISSUE. IN HIS VIEW, IT IS MORE A QUESTION OF HOW THE WAITING PERIOD IS PRESENTED THAN WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A WAITING PERIOD -- BY WHATEVER NAME -- BEFORE SINN FEIN CAN BE ADMITTED. STEPHENS SAID THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS TALKED ABOUT TAKING A LONG CHRISTMAS RECESS STARTING IN MID- OR EVEN EARLY-DECEMBER. IF ONE TAKES THE VIEW IT IS "UNREALISTIC" FOR SINN FEIN TO EXPECT TO BE INCLUDED BEFORE CHRISTMAS, THIS IS A WAY PROVIDE A "NATURAL BREAK" OF TWO MONTHS OR MORE.

6. (C) IN THE MEANTIME, HE SAID, THERE COULD BE "HEAVY HINTS" FROM GOVERNMENTS THAT SINN FEIN WILL BE ADMITTED AFTER THE CHRISTMAS RECESS ENDS. STEPHENS ALSO SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN PRIOR TO ITS ADMISSION TO THE TALKS. SUCH CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE PORTRAYED TO UNIONIST AUDIENCES AS A WAY TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS GENUINE, COULD PROVIDE A INTERIM BRIDGE FOR SINN FEIN'S LEADERSHIP INTO THE TALKS.

7. (C) STEPHENS SAID THAT MAJOR IS WAITING TO HEAR BACK FROM HUME, WHO IS CONTINUING TO WORK WITH ADAMS. STEPHENS' UNDERSTANDING IS THAT, WHILE THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION BETWEEN MAJOR AND HUME OF AN EXPLICIT TIME FRAME FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN AN IRA CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION AND SINN FEIN ENTRY, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SOME TIME WOULD HAVE TO PASS. STEPHENS SAID HMG HOPED HUME WOULD EXPLORE WITH ADAMS VARIOUS FORMULATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION WHICH MIGHT BRING DOWN THE LENGTH OF THAT INTERVAL. THE MORE A DECLARATION WENT TOWARD "PERMANENCE" AND "IRREVOCABILITY," AND THE MORE EXPLICITLY IT RECOGNIZED THE PRINCIPLE OF "CONSENT," THE MORE FLEXIBILITY THERE MIGHT BE ON THE TIME PERIOD.

8. (C) IN ANY EVENT, STEPHENS SAID, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO DO NOTHING WHICH DIMINISHES THE PROSPECTS FOR A GENUINE IRA CEASE-FIRE. IT IS KEEN TO AVOID THE PERCEPTION OF THIS WAITING PERIOD AS A "PRE-CONDITION." HE THOUGHT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MIGHT MEET ON MONDAY TO WORK OUT POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR PRESENTING A WAY FORWARD, UNLESS "SOMETHING HAPPENS FASTER THAN THAT." STEPHENS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE "EXPECTS THINGS TO COME TO A HEAD QUICKLY," PERHAPS EVEN THIS WEEKEND. WHETHER THAT MEANS A CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION OR ANOTHER BOMB, HE WAS NOT CLEAR.

BRADTKE

PAGE 03 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>3440
<^TOR>961101140053 M2474709
<^DIST>
SIT: CLARKER HARMON PASSDOWN PETERS SIMON SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC
PRT: DOHSE HARMONPTR SENS SIT{C2} SODERBERG
<^DIST>
SIT: COQ HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN SUM SUM2
<MSGID> M2474709

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 September 1996

Dear Tony,

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has just sent to John Hume, covering a text setting out our approach to the multi-party negotiations. We would aim to publish this text early next week, probably in the form of a press article under the name of the Prime Minister. I have made clear to John Hume, in sending him the text, that the terms of it are not up for negotiation. It represents what we propose to say, no more no less.

It would be helpful if, in any contacts you have with those concerned, you could underline that this is a reasonable statement of British policy and that more cannot be expected. It is now for John Hume and those to whom he has been talking to deliver on what they said.

Yours ever

John

JOHN HOLMES

The Hon. Anthony Lake

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 September 1996

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 8 August and the text which you faxed on 6 September.

The IRA's position, as you describe it, is that if we were ready to make this statement, and the IRA knew when we were going to make it, they would respond shortly afterwards, at a time specified in advance, with an unequivocal restoration of the August 1994 "total cessation".

When I wrote to you on 24 July, I said that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without any further prevarication. But, in response to the suggestion that reassurances from the British Government on certain issues in line with its established public policy would help to bring this about, I set out words which could be used.

Now they have returned with one significant issue - the timeframe - which is simply not under our control, and an altogether longer text covering a host of other issues. Meanwhile, continued preparation for further IRA attacks goes on, as the arrests and arms finds on Monday demonstrate all too clearly. Intimidation and so-called punishment attacks also continue to increase in

number and brutality. As I have already said publicly, Sinn Fein's talk of peace can have little credibility against this background.

It remains the case that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without further ado and without the need for further statements. The Government is certainly not in the business of negotiating a restoration of the IRA ceasefire, nor in giving secret assurances to bring it about. Sinn Fein must understand that we mean in private what we say in public.

Nevertheless, if there is genuine doubt or uncertainty over the Government's policy, I am happy to look at that. Because I am in no doubt of the benefits, for the people of Northern Ireland and the negotiations, of a genuine and unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, we will repeat and reaffirm our approach on the key issues. The attached text has been prepared for this purpose, and will be published in the near future.

John Hume, Esq., M.P.

ftext.pmg

This Government has made clear its approach to the search for peace in Northern Ireland on many occasions. But we continue to be asked about this or that aspect, particularly about the multi-party negotiations which started on 10 June in Belfast. There has been continued speculation about a new IRA ceasefire, despite the latest huge arms and explosives find in London. This has renewed questions about what effect this would have on the negotiations, and our approach to these negotiations. It may therefore be helpful to spell out our position again.

The negotiations have one overriding aim: to reach an overall political settlement, achieved through agreement and founded on consent. They will address all the issues relevant to such a settlement. Inclusive in nature, they involve both Governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will obviously be much greater if they take place in a peaceful environment. Under the legislation setting up the talks, if the Government considered that there was an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, Sinn Fein would be invited to nominate a team to participate in the negotiations. We would of course need to be sure that any restoration was genuinely unequivocal, particularly in view of events on the ground. Beyond that, the British and Irish Governments are agreed that these negotiations are without preconditions.

It is equally clear that, to be successful, the negotiations must be based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means. There must be no recourse to the threat (actual or implied) or use of violence or coercion. So, on entering

the negotiations, each participant needs to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Report of the International Body chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The parties in the talks have all done just that already.

The range of issues on which an overall agreement will depend means that the negotiations will be on the basis of a comprehensive agenda. This will be adopted by agreement. Each participant will be able to raise any significant issue of concern to them, and to receive a fair hearing for those concerns, without this being subject to the veto of any other party. Any aspect can be raised, including constitutional issues and any other matter which any party considers relevant. No negotiated outcome is either predetermined or excluded in advance or limited by anything other than the need for agreement.

Among the crucial issues is decommissioning. So the opening plenary will address the International Body's proposals on decommissioning of illegal arms. At that stage, we, along with the Irish Government, will be looking for the commitment of all participants to work constructively during the negotiations to implement all aspects of the International Body's report. This includes its compromise approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of negotiations. We want to make urgent progress in this area so that the process of decommissioning is not seen as a precondition to further progress, but is used to build confidence one step at a time during the negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

It is important to emphasise that all parties are treated equally in the negotiations in accordance with the scale of their democratic mandate. No

party has an undemocratic advantage. The negotiations will operate on the basis of consensus, requiring at least the support of parties representing a majority of both the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. But no one party can prevent them continuing by withdrawing from the negotiations.

It is essential that all participants negotiate in good faith, seriously address all areas of the agreed agenda and make every effort to reach a comprehensive agreement. For their part, the two Governments are committed to ensure that all items on the comprehensive agenda are fully addressed. They will do so themselves with a view to overcoming any obstacles which may arise.

For our part, we are wholly committed to upholding, so far as we can, our responsibility to facilitate agreement in the negotiations. This must be based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions. We want to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement.

We are also determined to see these negotiations through successfully, as speedily as possible. This is in line with the hopes and aspirations of people in both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. These have already given momentum to a process which will always have its difficulties. We have already proposed that a plenary meeting should be held at a suitable date to take stock of progress in the negotiations as a whole. We will support any agreed timeframe for the conduct of the negotiations adopted by the participants.

Meanwhile we are committed to raising confidence, both through the talks and through a range of other measures alongside them. The International Body's report itself proposes a process of mutual confidence-building.

So we will continue to pursue social and economic policies based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation or gender. We are committed to increasing community identification with policing in Northern Ireland.

It is worth recalling that, in response to the ceasefires of Autumn 1994 and the changed level of threat, we undertook a series of confidence-building measures. These included changed arrangements for release of prisoners in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995, security force redeployments, a review of emergency legislation and others. If the threat reduces again, the opportunity for further confidence-building measures returns.

But confidence-building is a two-way street. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. An end to punishment beatings and other paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate real commitment to peaceful methods and help build trust.

The opportunity for progress has never been greater. The negotiations are widely supported internationally and benefit from independent chairmen from the USA, Canada and Finland. They also have the overwhelming support of people throughout these islands. They want them to take place in a peaceful environment, free of all paramilitary violence. That is our aim too.

Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: **TAB C**

DRAFT 3 SEPTEMBER 1996

The negotiations which started on 10 June are to secure an overall political settlement and will address all the issues relevant to that.

Clear and firm guidance at government level is critical to a real prospect of resolving the problem. That is our responsibility. We are wholly committed to upholding that responsibility.

The primary interest is to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island of Ireland. Accordingly, with a view to achieving that agreement all relevant constitutional, political, social, economic and cultural matters will be addressed.

An accommodation of the diversity of views and aspirations on these matters mean achieving agreement on the basis of equality of treatment and parity of esteem.

The prospects for success in these negotiations will be greatly enhanced if they are conducted in a peaceful environment. Beyond that the two governments are agreed that these negotiations will be without preconditions.

It is equally clear that to be successful the negotiations must be peaceful, based on exclusively democratic and peaceful means and without recourse to the threat or use of violence or coercion.

The effort to achieve a successful accommodation means that the negotiations must be inclusive, involving both governments and all the relevant political parties with the necessary democratic mandate and commitment.

The spectrum of issues on which an overall agreement is dependent means that the agenda for negotiations must be comprehensive, with all issues on the table ensuring a fair hearing for the concerns of all the participants. No outcome will be excluded or predetermined in advance.

The governments' responsibilities and commitments are clear. So too the responsibilities of all the participants. All must approach the negotiations in good faith, with all parties seriously addressing all aspects of the agreed agenda and making every effort to reach agreement, and the two governments, for their part, committed to ensure that a comprehensive agenda is addressed and that any obstacles which may arise are overcome.

The governments are determined to see these negotiations through successfully. In this we are at one with the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of Britain and Ireland. In large part this has sustained a momentum in a process which will always have its difficulties. These hopes and aspirations will bear fruit in a negotiation process that is conducted within a calendar which ensures that momentum is built up and sustained. The two governments are committed to an agreed timeframe for the conduct

The government is committed to an equality agenda and discipline in relation to all relevant political, social, economic and cultural issues. In particular we are committed to addressing issues which arise out of the divisions among the people who inhabit the island of Ireland and which result in or from the conflict.

These measures will include urgent action on the issues of conflict related prisoners and legislation; the administration of justice a policing service and policing methods, which would enjoy widespread acceptability.

They will ensure equality of treatment for the Irish language and culture.

They will also address and resolve the issues involved in equality of opportunity in the economic matters including equality in economic development, the empowerment and inclusion of deprived communities, the imbalance in the unemployment ratio and the subsequent greater and more equally shared prosperity which all of this enables.

The opportunity to resolve the conflict in Ireland has never been greater. This is universally recognised. Accordingly we welcome the contribution of the European Union to the resolution of the problem. Likewise we welcome the interest and involvement of the United States arising from the special affinity shared between all the peoples of these islands and people in the United States. In particular we welcome the contribution of areas of successful conflict resolution such as South Africa.

Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: **TAB D**

979/2

ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY

ADDRESSING DECOMMISSIONING

On 28 February 1996 the Government, when launching the Forum and the talks, made it clear that the parties would have to make a commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence in the Report of the International Body, which include a commitment to the total disarmament of paramilitary organisations. It was clearly stated that this commitment was to be given "at the beginning" of the talks and "at that stage" the parties would have to address the International Body's proposals for decommissioning.

This paper contains the matters which the Ulster Unionist Party believes must be part of the process of addressing decommissioning.

1. Essential principles

First, before entry into substantive political negotiations (ie "launching the three strands"), structures should be in place and methodology outlined which would provide the basis for actual decommissioning.

Secondly, no additional participant will be admitted to substantive political negotiations before they have adequately demonstrated their commitment to peace.

FROM-EMBASSY OF IRELAND 30-M.R. PETERS SEP 30 96 11:04 T-080 P.02/06 F-341

979/3

2. Immediate Governmental action

Concurrently the United Kingdom and Irish governments should implement their obligations. They should publish and enact the necessary enabling legislation as soon as possible. In advance of the enactment of the legislation, a core Verification Commission designate should be established. This could consist of the Chairman designate, ideally some other Commissioners designate, and some support staff. They could begin preliminary work assisted by experts, some of whom may be seconded from the Governments. The Ulster Unionist party must ~~be~~ be consulted with regard to the appointment of Commissioners and other senior staff.

Draft decommissioning schemes should be published as soon as possible and no later than the Committee stage of the enabling legislation.

Action in Talks

There will be a debate in the opening plenary session on decommissioning. To avoid the time that would be lost in a complicated series of bilaterals, participants could make written submissions before the debate. This would also avoid the need at that stage to create a committee of plenary which would cause undue delay. This phase might take one or two weeks.

At the conclusion of the above debate all participants will make a solemn commitment to implement the principle of disarmament and the proposals of the International Body on decommissioning.

979/4

This must be accompanied by an agreement containing the following elements,

(a) an undertaking to nominate the Core Verification Commission immediately and to ratify it as a Commission proper within a specified period after the enactment of the necessary legislation,

(b) firm indications should be given on

(i) the timescale for the enactment of the necessary enabling legislation,

(ii) the ratification of the Verification Commission proper,

(iii) the finalisation of the decommissioning schemes, although the details may have to be fine-tuned later when actual decommissioning is about to commence,

(iv) the procedures to be followed if and when another paramilitary related party endeavours to enter the talks, and when, upon the entry of all the paramilitary related parties to the talks, the first actual mutual decommissioning should take place (see section 5), and

(v) the manner in which actual decommissioning would continue alongside negotiations; the negotiations and decommissioning proceeding independently of each other - there being no question of weapons for concessions,

(c) agreement on the sanctions for any breach of either above commitments or any of the above timeframes and against any participant who seeks to obstruct the implementation of decommissioning.

It is envisaged that there would be relative short timeframes for the above and it should be made clear the above commitments would not be re-negotiable on the subsequent entry of other parties to the talks.

979/5

On the establishment of the Verification Commission proper a committee of plenary would be created to liaise between plenary and that Commission.

4. Launch of "three stranded" negotiations

Depending on the quality of the above commitments on the part of the British and the Irish Governments it is possible that the three stranded negotiations could be commenced with the present parties to the talks prior to the enactment of the enabling legislation.

5. Conditions of entry of Sinn Fein/IRA

Sinn Fein/IRA must completely and unequivocally end its terrorist campaign. This will require more that a mere restoration of the ambivalent 1994 cease-fire for there can now be no question of their entry to the process on the basis of that fraudulent cease-fire or any other ambiguous formula.

The credibility of any cease-fire will largely depend on whether the actions of the paramilitaries concerned are consistent with an ending of terrorism for good. The continuation of paramilitary recruitment, training, targeting and social or economic terrorism would be incompatible with a genuine ending of the terrorist campaign.

In the event of a genuine cease-fire Sinn Fein would not move immediately into substantive political negotiations with the other parties. Initially entry into the talks will involve for Sinn Fein a session in which they would have to accept the agreements made by the other participants in the

9.79/6

opening plenary session. It would not be necessary for other parties to participate. The Ulster Unionist party does not intend to participate with Sinn Fein until they have complied with the following paragraph including the beginning of actual decommissioning.

This session will involve a catching up process involving,

(i) signing up to the principles of democracy and non-violence,

(ii) acceptance of the Rules of Procedure,

(iii) an undertaking to implement the commitment to decommission in accordance with the agreements in the opening plenary session (see 3b).

Item (iii) will provide for the first and subsequent instalments of mutual decommissioning by the paramilitaries; that first instalment to be within the ambit of the catching up process, ie before the entry of Sinn Fein into substantive negotiations as the Ulster Unionist Party will not enter into negotiations with Sinn Fein until they have demonstrated their commitment to exclusively peaceful means.