

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Lyne, Rod, 1995

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Roderic Lyne to Anthony Lake (4 pages)	09/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	[Duplicate of 001] (6 pages)	09/16/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Roderick Lyne to Anthony Lake (3 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Roderick Lyne to Anthony Lake (2 pages)	11/18/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake re: Your Call to Rod Lyne on Northern Ireland (2 pages)	11/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Rod Lyne (2 pages)	11/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005c. cable	re: Bruton Letter to Major: Summit Suggested for Late November... (2 pages)	11/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Lyne, Rod, 1995

2011-0355-F

rs1684

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER LAKE SIT SODERBERG

SIT: HOTLINE_IN LAKEA SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 181400Z NOV 95

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PERSONAL

MESSAGE FROM RODERIC LYNE TO THE HONORABLE ANTHONY LAKE,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR.

BEGINS:

DRAFT STATEMENT

17 NOVEMBER 1995

(NOTE: TARGET DATES PROPOSED ASSUME A LAUNCH BEFORE THE END OF
NOVEMBER 1995.)

THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH MET TODAY TO REVIEW PROGRESS
IN THE PEACE PROCESS. AFTER INTENSIVE EFFORTS BY BOTH
GOVERNMENTS, AND WITH THE BENEFIT OF CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES
IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO LAUNCH A TWIN
TRACK PROCESS TO MAKE PROGRESS IN PARALLEL ON THE
DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE AND TOWARDS ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS.

2. BOTH GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO SECURING THE
LAUNCH OF ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. BY WAY OF THE TWIN TRACKS, THE
TWO GOVERNMENTS TARGET IS TO ACHIEVE THIS BY THE END OF FEBRUARY
1996. IT IS THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED VIEW THAT, WITH
COOPERATION FROM ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES IN BOTH TRACKS, THAT
OBJECTIVE SHOULD PROVE ACHIEVABLE. BOTH GOVERNMENTS COMMIT
THEMSELVES TO WORKING, WITH OTHERS, TO ACHIEVE IT.

3. TO THIS END, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO INVITE THE
PARTIES TO PREPARATORY TALKS WITH A REMIT TO REACH AGREEMENT,
ACCEPTABLE TO ALL, ON WHAT THE BASIS, PARTICIPATION, STRUCTURE,
FORMAT AND AGENDA FOR SUBSEQUENT ALL-PARTY POLITICAL NEGOTIATION
SHOULD BE. THESE TALKS WILL HAVE AN OPEN AGENDA, ALLOWING ANY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By ML NARA, Date 1/5/14
2014-0358-P

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PAGE 02 OF 03

PARTY TO RAISE ANY RELEVANT MATTER, INCLUDING HOW BEST THE STRUCTURE AND FORMAT OF ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS, DIRECTED TO ADDRESSING IN A COMPREHENSIVE MANNER ALL THE RELEVANT RELATIONSHIPS IN A SINGLE PROCESS, CAN PROPERLY TAKE ACCOUNT OF DEMOCRATIC MANDATES AND PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING WHETHER AND HOW AN ELECTED BODY COULD PLAY A PART.

4. IN MANAGING THE PROCESS OF PREPARATORY TALKS, EACH GOVERNMENT WILL BUILD ON EXISTING EXCHANGES AND BILATERAL CONTACTS, TREATING EACH PARTY ON AN EQUAL BASIS, AND WILL ENCOURAGE OTHER FORMATS FOR MEETINGS WITH THE PARTIES AND AMONG THE PARTIES WHICH MIGHT FURTHER THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

5. IN PARALLEL, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY TO PROVIDE AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE.

6. RECOGNISING THE WIDELY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO SEE ALL WEAPONS REMOVED FROM IRISH POLITICS, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL ASK THE INTERNATIONAL BODY TO REPORT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE REMOVAL OF THOSE ARMS AND OTHER MATERIEL SILENCED BY THE STATEMENTS OF 31 AUGUST 1994 AND 13 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE POLITICAL EQUATION.

7. IN PARTICULAR, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL ASK THE BODY TO:

- IDENTIFY AND ADVISE ON A SUITABLE AND ACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR FULL AND VERIFIABLE DECOMMISSIONING? AND
- REPORT WHETHER THERE IS A CLEAR COMMITMENT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THOSE IN POSSESSION OF SUCH ARMS TO A SATISFACTORY PROCESS TO ACHIEVE THAT.

8. IT WILL BE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BODY TO DETERMINE ITS OWN PROCEDURES. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS EXPECT IT TO CONSULT WIDELY, TO INVITE RELEVANT PARTIES TO SUBMIT THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE AND, IN REACHING CONCLUSIONS ON ITS REMIT, TO CONSIDER SUCH EVIDENCE ON ITS MERITS.

9. IN ESTABLISHING THE BODY, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMS ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO TAKE RESPONSIVE MEASURES, ON THE ADVICE OF THE SECURITY FORCES, AS MOVEMENT ON SUCH ARMS REDUCES THE THREAT.

10. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE INVITED SENATOR GEORGE MITCHELL TO

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PAGE 03 OF 03

CHAIR THE BODY, AND HAVE INVITED (....) TO SERVE AS THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BODY.

11. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE ASKED THE BODY TO SUBMIT ITS REPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS BY MID-JANUARY 1996. NEITHER GOVERNMENT, NOR ANY OTHER PARTY COOPERATING WITH THE WORK OF THE BODY, IS BOUND IN ADVANCE TO ACCEPT THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS, WHICH WILL BE PURELY ADVISORY AND NOT OPERATIONAL.

12. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY RECOMMENDATIONS IT MAKES AND GIVE THEM DUE WEIGHT ON THEIR MERITS. TO THIS END, AND TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN PREPARATORY TALKS AND TOWARDS THE TARGET DATE FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS PLAN TO MEET AGAIN BY MID-FEBRUARY 1996.

MESSAGE ENDS
#0001

NNNN
<MSGID> M1957106

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8133

November 7, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Your Call to Rod Lyne on Northern Ireland

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.39)
KBH 7/11/2023

There have been several developments since Nancy's and my memo of November 3. On Saturday, the New York Times published an article, reportedly picked up by the International Herald Tribune, which says that Adams plans to put the IRA's case to you and Nancy and hopefully to the President later this month. In fact, Adams has requested, through Mairead, a meeting with you on November 15. Reuters reports that Bruton discussed the Northern Ireland peace process with both Prime Minister Major and the President on the margins of the Rabin funeral. Most important, Bruton has sent a letter to Major (see attached cable) outlining what the GOI sees as the six key issues and the solution to each of them. Bruton proposes that the twin track be launched at a summit the third week of November.

The tone of the letter is undiplomatic in part ("your unilateral insistence on 'Washington Three'"), but the substance of the six points is not bad. The main problems are an unrealistic target date six weeks after the international body's first meeting and the absence of the "seriously consider" language. (From the cable traffic out of Dublin it is clear that no one besides Adams--including in our own embassy--understands the concept that both HMG and Sinn Fein would maintain their current positions on Washington Three while the body does its work.) There are several other problems with the Bruton letter, which are flagged in the attached talking points.

Now that Dublin is back in the game, we have a choice between urging Rod to respond quickly and positively to Bruton's letter and suggesting the draft we sent you on Friday as an alternative.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: November 7, 2005

The advantage of our draft is that it is shorter than what would emerge from the Bruton suggestions and therefore will attract fewer objections. The disadvantage is having our fingerprints on it. If you decide to proffer our draft, we suggest you talk Rod through it, rather than faxing it.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Dublin 5430

Tab C November 3 Memo with Draft Announcement

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR OVERSEAS AFFAIRS ROD LYNE

- Sorry we did not connect earlier -- I of course have been in Israel.
- We are deeply disappointed that the Ancram-McGuinness talks have not resolved the issues. See need to move process back to two governments -- at highest levels.
- We are concerned less about the President's trip than about the danger of stalemate setting in with the whole process.
- It is doubly disappointing because the basic agreement on substance already exists.
- Understand PM Bruton has written to PM Major. Agree with premise that twin track is still doable.
- Before last Friday's meeting, Sinn Fein had already agreed to speak authoritatively on the issue of IRA weapons.
- Adams had also agreed that the main remit of international body would be to deal with paramilitary arms, though Sinn Fein does not want the communiqué to say so.
- HMG agreed that Adams can discuss additional issues with the body, including his views on other categories of arms.
- Issues of date and remit still outstanding. Six weeks from first meeting of body, as proposed by Bruton, seems unrealistic.
- As Ancram has noted, remit issue is one of presentation. Should be able to find way around it.
- (If you decide to describe our proposed text): Since we are so close, one way forward would be a very short announcement, to be made jointly but without fanfare of a summit.

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Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 7, 2005

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.40)

KBH 4/11/2023

- Narrow language would get around the cumbersome negotiation of a communiqué and leave it to the two governments to bring along the other parties.
- It would be useful to move this as soon as possible. The President's visit will be a success in any case, but better not to have it overshadowed by uncertainty and fear of stagnation.
- It could simply say: (See text at Tab B.) Date for start of twin track up to you and Dublin.
- If a date is named, unlikely Sinn Fein will reject twin track over a question of a few weeks.
- (If you do not mention our text): Bruton's six suggestions offer basis for progress. Pleased Dublin is back in the game.
- First: date. Six weeks unrealistic, but Dublin unlikely to insist on that.
- Second: preparatory talks. Sinn Fein will not like the reference to creating conditions for all-party talks. Perhaps not necessary to address this.
- Third: speaking authoritatively. Our view is that this issue has been resolved.
- Fourth: remit. Bruton suggests having no adjective. HMG would clarify that remit deals with paramilitary arms. (FYI: Bruton says Ancram proposed this, which does not square with our understanding.) Dropping adjective easiest way forward. Everybody know the body is being created to deal with paramilitary arms anyway.
- Fifth: mandate: Bruton proposes Washington 1,2,&3, not just 1&2. We've always thought 3 should be included at least tacitly, but the important thing is the commitment to seriously consider the body's recommendations.
- Sixth: elected body. Bruton says any mention of the idea must reflect nationalist opposition. No reason to prejudge it now -- could be mentioned as one of many ideas to be discussed in political track.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:061559Z NOV 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8962

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST IMMEDIATE 3706

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3476

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

1. CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON: 1.5 (B) .

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

2. (C) TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON HAS WRITTEN TO UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR TODAY (NOVEMBER 6) SUGGESTING THAT THE TWO OF THEM HOLD A SUMMIT IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE LONG-DELAYED TWIN-TRACK PROCESS. IN THE LETTER, A COPY OF WHICH WAS PASSED TO US BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FULL TEXT AT PARA 4), BRUTON OUTLINES WHAT HE SEES AS THE SIX KEY ISSUES AND "THE SOLUTION WITHIN OUR GRASP ON EACH OF THEM":

- DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS: THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD SET A "REASONABLE TARGET DATE WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE UTMOST ENDEAVORS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT." THE DATE SHOULD BE SIX WEEKS FROM THE TIME THE INTERNATIONAL BODY BEGINS ITS WORK.
- PROCEDURE FOR PREPARATORY TALKS: PROCEED AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE OF THE POSTPONED SEPTEMBER 6 SUMMIT.
- BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS: A "REASONABLE" FORMULATION IS THAT THE RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LOYALISTS WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS."
- DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL ADDRESS: LEAVE THE REFERENCE TO ARMS AMBIGUOUS (I.E. NO ADJECTIVE SUCH AS ILLEGAL, PARAMILITARY, OR UNAUTHORIZED) AND "ALLOW ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH."
- EXTENT OF INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT: THE INTERNATIONAL BODY SHOULD "TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW, NOT JUST WASHINGTON 1 AND 2."
- POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY: THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE GIVEN "A RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING," BUT ANY MENTION OF IT IN A JOINT TEXT MUST REFLECT THE OPPOSITION OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS TO "ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND."

3. (C) COMMENT: BRENDAN SCANNELL, COUNSELLOR FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN DFA'S ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, TOLD US THAT THE LETTER HAD ALSO BEEN SHARED WITH OPPOSITION PARTY FIANNA FAIL, BUT WAS OTHERWISE BEING CLOSELY HELD. HE SAID THE PROPOSALS IN THE LETTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP ON NOVEMBER 8. WITH THE FAILURE OF SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS AT THEIR NOVEMBER 3 MEETING, DUBLIN FEELS IT MUST NOW RE-ENGAGE TO RESTORE FORWARD MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. BRUTON SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN TO HEART GERRY ADAMS'S ARGUMENT TO HIM LAST WEEK THAT THE UK AND SINN FEIN ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO WORK THIS OUT ON THEIR OWN. WHILE IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE IRISH WILL BE ABLE TO DO IN THIS REGARD, THEY NEVERTHELESS SEE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AS A VALUABLE SOURCE OF LEVERAGE TO PRESS SINN FEIN AND LONDON TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR LONG-HELD POSITIONS, AND DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY SLIP BY. END COMMENT.

4. (C) FULL TEXT OF BRUTON'S LETTER TO MAJOR:

6 NOVEMBER, 1995

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN MAJOR, MP,
PRIME MINISTER.

DEAR JOHN,

I AM WRITING TO YOU TO GIVE YOU MY VIEWS ON THE CURRENT POSITION IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND MY VIEWS ON HOW WE CAN NOW MOVE SPEEDILY FORWARD WITH A JOINT APPROACH, THAT WILL LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES.

OUR CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS SO FAR HAS BEEN BASED ON OUR ADOPTING A JOINT APPROACH, AND ON PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE THE TAKING OF ANY IMPORTANT INITIATIVE. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND I REGRET TO HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT I WAS SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN THAT YOUR "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER, WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN THE LIAISON GROUP SPECIFICALLY AS AN AID TO YOUR ON-GOING DISCUSSION WITH SINN FEIN, WAS SENT TO ALL THE PARTIES, AND TO THE U.S., AND WAS MADE PUBLIC ON FRIDAY, ALL WITHOUT OUR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OR AGREEMENT.

I NEED HARDLY ELABORATE ON THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CAN BE CAUSED BY A UNILATERAL DEFINITION, ON EITHER SIDE, OF WHAT PURPORTS TO BE - AND INDEED CAN ONLY BE - A BILATERAL AND AGREED PROCESS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

WE BOTH CAME TO THE TABLE AT CANNES WITH PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY. FOR MY PART I PUT IT FORWARD IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME THE PROLONGED AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS STALEMATE I FORESAW ARISING FROM YOUR UNILATERAL INSISTENCE ON "WASHINGTON THREE" AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND MY OWN CONCLUSION, WHICH I ARRIVED AT RELUCTANTLY AND ONLY AFTER SERIOUS EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE SITUATION, THAT THAT PRE-CONDITION WAS NOT ACHIEVABLE.

THE VALUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL BE DIRECTLY PROPORTIONATE TO THE PROSPECT THAT ITS WORK WILL TRANSCEND THIS IMPASSE, AND NOT MERELY POSTPONE IT. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW AT THE LAST ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE ENCOURAGINGLY INVOKED THIS POSSIBILITY, ADMITTEDLY WITH SOME PERSONAL SCEPTICISM. I HAVE DONE WHAT I CAN IN THE BACKGROUND TO PROMOTE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF SINN FEIN ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES ALSO.

AS I SEE IT THERE ARE SIX KEY ISSUES AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SOLUTIONS WITHIN OUR GRASP ON EACH OF THEM.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.41)

KBM 4/11/2023

CONFIDENTIAL

THESE SIX ISSUES ARE

A DATE FOR ALL PARTY, ROUND TABLE TALKS

THE PROCEDURE FOR HOLDING PREPARATORY (SIC) TALKS

THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING
AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THE INTERNATIONAL
BODY WILL DEAL WITH

THE EXTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT IN
TERMS OF THE "WASHINGTON" CONDITIONS, AND

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY.

ON A DATE FOR ROUND TABLE TALKS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S
POSITION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT A REASONABLE TARGET DATE
SHOULD BE SET WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE UTMOST
ENDEAVOURS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT. I BELIEVE THE DATE
SHOULD BE SIX WEEKS FROM THE DATE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
COMMENCES WORK.

ON PREPARATORY TALKS I BELIEVE WE WOULD PROCEED AS IN THE
DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR THE POSTPONED 6 SEPTEMBER SUMMIT, I.E.

"THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER
TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS IN
ROUND TABLE FORMAT AIMED AT REACHING AN AGREED
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD
COMMENCE (REFER TO SIX WEEKS). A SERIES OF
MEETING (SIC) WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED BY
BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE
GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENT SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING
CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL
ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE
MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS."

THERE SHOULD BE A COMPLETELY OPEN AGENDA FOR THOSE TALKS.

ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND ARMS I BELIEVE THE FORMULA OF THE
RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL
BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LOYALISTS
WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF
IRISH POLITICS" REPRESENTS A REASONABLE BASIS FOR MOVING
FORWARD.

ON THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS/THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
BODY ISSUE, I BELIEVE THE OPTION MICHAEL ANCRAM PUT TO
MARTIN MCGUINNESS OF HAVING NO ADJECTIVE
(ILLEGAL/PARAMILITARY/UNAUTHORISED) IN THE COMMUNIQUE TEXT
AND ALLOWING ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH
REPRESENTS THE WAY FORWARD. I UNDERSTAND YOU, ON BEHALF OF
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL SAY THE ISSUE IS ONE OF
PARAMILITARY ARMS. WE WILL NOT DISAGREE WITH YOU ON THIS
BUT WILL UPHOLD SINN FEINN'S RIGHT TO PUT ITS OWN POSITION
ON THIS ISSUE TO THE BODY AS IT SEES FIT.

ON 'WASHINGTON' 1, 2 AND 3 I BELIEVE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
SHOULD TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW,
AND NOT JUST 'WASHINGTON' 1 AND 2, AS YOUR 'PRESS LINE' HAS
IT IN THE "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER.

A POSSIBLE WAY OF DEALING, IN PRACTICE, WITH BOTH THE
'WASHINGTON' CONDITIONS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS, IS TO
DESCRIBE THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AS REPORTING ON
THE ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMS AS

INSTRUMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR OR OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL AIMS
AND ACTIVITIES.

ON THE POLITICAL TRACK, THE IRISH SIDE IN THE LIAISON GROUP
MADE CLEAR WE EXPECTED THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL
TRACK TO BE MORE PROACTIVE THAN IN YOUR PAPER. THE CHANGES
SUBSEQUENTLY MADE DID NOT REFLECT THIS, BUT INSTEAD FLAGGED
AN ELECTED BODY.

I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION, AND ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO ACCEPT,
THAT UNIONIST PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A BODY SHOULD BE GIVEN A
RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING.

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT OPPOSITION TO AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
IS A COMMON RALLYING POINT FOR NORTHERN NATIONALISTS
(COMPARABLE IN THIS RESPECT TO A UNITED IRELAND PROPOSAL
FOR UNIONISTS). CONSEQUENTLY, THEY ARE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED
IN PRINCIPLE TO ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR
PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND. IF AN ELECTED BODY IS TO
BE FLAGGED THEN ANY JOINT TEXT MUST ALSO ADEQUATELY REFLECT
THE CONSISTENT VIEW OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS I HAVE TOUCHED
ON ABOVE.

I BELIEVE YOU AND I SHOULD NOW MOVE QUICKLY TO HOLDING A
SUMMIT, SAY IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER, AND HAVING A
REASONABLE JOINT POSITION TO PUT TO ALL SIDES.

I WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A TELEPHONE DISCUSSION
WITH YOU ON THESE MATTERS BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. I WOULD PARTICULARLY WELCOME AN
ACCOUNT OF YOUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE UNIONIST
POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS, IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR CONTACTS
WITH THEM.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JOHN BRUTON
TAOISEACH

END TEXT OF BRUTON LETTER. SMITH

FROM:
SITREPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTOHNY LAKE

THROUGH: NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Suggestions on Ireland Peace Process

Attached is our suggested text for moving things forward.

We suggest you fax it to Rod with a follow-up telephone call to discuss. It represents the essence of what we think is needed to move things forward.

If he agrees, you should offer to get Sinn Fein and the Irish on board.

Rod would take on the responsibility of obtaining Unionist acquiescence.

We'd suggest they do not hold a summit meeting but rather simply issue the joint announcement.

Once we get agreement, we would try to get State to finalize the Body's members and mandate for the announcement with the British and Irish. They have already begun to discuss names.

We might also want to keep open the possibility of having Mitchell issue a statement launching the body if necessary.

If Rod balks, we need to think about pushing for a more direct role, either through the Irish or directly from POTUS to Major. Mary Ann also suggests possibly using a Christopher-Rifkind route. We might also try and use the upcoming visits of Ancram and Adams to have some meetings here or we could use Kathy Stephens or even send one of us over to help close the effort.

For now, we would recommend informing Tarnoff of the status but see no need to get them involved further unless the British balk at the above approach. Nancy can call Peter if you prefer.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the attached proposal to Rod and call to discuss.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Announcement

Tab B Sinn Fein Proposal

Tab C British Building Blocks Proposal

Proposed Joint Announcement

The two governments have decided to convene by November 15 the twin track process to advance the peace process in Northern Ireland.

In addition to all-party preparatory talks with the parties in Northern Ireland, an independent international body will be established in parallel to address the issue of decommissioning and will be headed by a distinguished American, assisted by two other prominent individuals who inspire widespread confidence.

The two governments will seriously consider the recommendations of the International Body on their merits. The goal is to lay the groundwork for the convening of talks in an all party format not later than January 31/February 1, 1996.

Understandings already reached with Sinn Fein and the British:

- Sinn Fein will speak authoritatively on the issue of IRA weapons.
- The International Body will be headed by George Mitchell, two others and staff as needed to be selected by the members,
- The Body will focus on how to resolve the issue of unauthorized weapons but is free to review other related issues as it sees appropriate. For example, Sinn Fein is free to raise the issue of other arms.

Understandings to be reached with the Unionists:

- They are free to discuss their proposals for an elected assembly or convention in the twin tracks.
- They will seriously consider on their merits the recommendations of the International Body.
- The two governments do not rule out the elected assembly or convention as part of talks in an all party format.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 09

IS THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCED BY SINN FEN:

1. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO LAUNCH THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH WILL, NOT LATER THAN 30 NOVEMBER, LEAD INTO SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT, TO REACH AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
2. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AVE ALSO AGREED TO ASK GEORGE MITCHELL TO HEAD UP AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, TO ASCERTAIN AND ADVISE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC METHODS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE REMOVAL OF ALL WEAPONS FROM IRISH POLITICS.

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL ALSO BE ASKED TO ASCERTAIN ADVISE ON HOW THE QUESTION OF ARMS, NOW (THANKFULLY) SILENCED, CAN BE FINALLY AND SATISFACTORILY SETTLED.

GEORGE MITCHELL WILL BE ASSISTED BY TWO OTHER FIGURES OF INTERNATIONAL STANDING LIKELY TO INSPIRE WIDESPREAD CONFIDENCE.

3. ACCORDINGLY, THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL HAVE THE REMIT OF REPORTING, BY (-----) ON WHETHER IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A CLEAR COMMITMENT EXISTS ON THE PART OF THE RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES TO AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, ACHIEVED THROUGH DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO THE SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION ^{Of Arms?} ~~QUESTIONS~~ ^{BHET9_XL} REPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WHO WILL UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY RECOMMENDATIONS HE (SIC) MAKES AND TO GIVE THEM DUE WEIGHT. END OF SINN FEIN PROPOSAL.

END OF SINN FEIN PROPOSAL

B. THE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN A NUMBER OF AREAS INCLUDING:

1. ENSURING THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK WOULD BE A GENUINE PROCESS AIMED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS.
3. RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES TO A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, SHOULD ONE BE SET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2008
By JP NARA, Date 1/5/16
20160205-F

DRAFT CONCEPT PAPER

This paper is intended to facilitate a shared understanding among all those involved of the building blocks for a twin track approach to the way forward. It is not a draft text itself, although such a text would need to be prepared and agreed by the two governments.

Twin Tracks

- 1) All-party preparatory talks and in an independent international body to consider the decommissioning issue will be convened in parallel by the two governments.
- 2) A target date for the beginning of all-party political negotiations might be announced at the outset. Achieving the target would depend on success in creating the necessary conditions to enable all parties to join in talks constructively. Both governments will commit themselves to working with others to create those conditions. Much would depend on the cooperation relevant parties gave to both tracks.

Track 1: Preparatory Talks

- 3) These talks will be sponsored by the two governments with a remit to reach agreement, acceptable to all parties, on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda for all-party political negotiations.
- 4) It will be open to any party to raise any relevant matter, including how best the structure and format of all-party negotiations can properly take account of democratic mandates and principles, including whether and how an elected body could play a part.
- 5) The process of preparatory talks will be jointly managed by the two governments. Each will build on existing exchanges and bilateral contacts, treating each party on an equal basis. The two governments will jointly encourage other formats for meetings with the parties and among the parties which might further the objective of the preparatory talks.

Track 2: The International Body

- 6) The international body would be established by the two governments. It would be composed of three people of international standing likely to enjoy widespread confidence. It is hoped the chairman would be a distinguished American.

7) The body would be asked to ascertain and advise on how unauthorised arms and other materiel which had been used to advance political ends could forever be removed from the political equation. In particular the body would have the remit:

--to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning;

--to report whether there is a clear commitment, by or on behalf of the relevant paramilitary organizations, to a satisfactory process to achieve that.

8) Neither government, nor any other party cooperating with the work of the body, would be bound in advance to accept its conclusions.

9) The body would be advisory rather than operational at this stage. Subsequently, in light of its report and subject to its acceptability to all concerned, the body might have role to play in verification.

10) The body would determine its own procedures to give effect to its remit. It would, for example, be open to the body to listen to any suggestions or representations it thought relevant, or make suggestions of its own and gauge their acceptability.

11) The body would report by to the two governments, who would consider carefully any recommendations it made and give them due weight on their merits.

12) In establishing the body with the Irish Government, HMG will be ready to reaffirm its own willingness to take responsive measures, on the advice of its security forces, as movement on unauthorised arms reduced the threat.

13) If the body were established, the British Government would also explain its position in these terms:

"HMG's position on the need for decommissioning is on the public record and is well understood. The (body) is expected to give advice on the commitment to decommissioning and on acceptable methods of achieving it (i.e., Washington 1 & 2). The government firmly hopes that, if all the relevant parties cooperate, the (body) will succeed in charting a way forward acceptable to all sides. The government will consider its recommendations carefully, giving them due weight on their merits."



10 DOWNING STREET
SW1A 2AS

DUTY CLERKS' OFFICE

FAX NO : 839 - 3712

TO : The White House

FROM : Roderic Lyne

TO: Tony Lake

TITLE: Delay in Visit to the UK.

CLASS : ~~Secret~~ / ~~Confidential~~ / ~~Restricted~~ / (UIC)

DATE : 22.11.95

TIME : 18:55

NO OF PAGES : Leader + 2.

MESSAGE :



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 November 1995

Dear Tony,

You are not such a good prophet after all! Anyone with a knowledge of the US calendar and the Congressional problem over Bosnia could have foreseen at least twenty-four hours ago that the President would need to go up to the Hill as soon as he could after Thanksgiving. So much for the prescience of the National Security Adviser!

I gather the President was hoping to have a word on the telephone to explain things personally to the Prime Minister. Unfortunately it doesn't look as though their schedules contain a mutual window this evening. But can I assure you that the Prime Minister completely understands the reasons for the rescheduling and that you need have no worries at all about any *amour propre* at this end. Genuinely.

The Prime Minister doesn't trust me to convey this adequately to you and has insisted on writing the attached letter. I would be grateful if you could pass it to the President.

Yours ever,
Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

The Honorable Anthony Lake



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

PERSONAL

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1995

Dear Bill,

Bill Crowe has just telephoned to explain that you are going to have to delay your departure for London next Tuesday; and I understand that you were hoping to call me this evening (when I am afraid I shall be out at Buckingham Palace for The Queen's annual Diplomatic Reception).

Please don't worry in the slightest about the rescheduling of your trip. As you will have seen from the message I sent you only last night, I fully understand the importance of getting Congressional support for the Bosnia agreement and the deployment of US forces. These things happen in our lives, and no one can foresee precisely when they are going to come to a head, so I assure you that, genuinely, no offence will be taken here. I am only sorry that your visit will be more of a rush, and that your first day's engagements will be lost.

We look forward to seeing you here on Wednesday morning. I think our officials are already looking at the programme together to see whether we might have a chance of having supper in Belfast on Thursday evening.

*Warm regards,
Chris Egan,
John*

The President of The United States of America



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1995

Dear Tony,

... You might find the attached cuttings from the less disreputable end of the British press worth a glance.

As the Financial Times piece records, there is a widening gap between the reality of progress on the ground in Northern Ireland and the artificial atmosphere of crisis which Sinn Fein are seeking to portray.

There is also a widening gap between the Government's response to the improving security situation (with a large number of convicted paramilitaries* about to be released from jail on licence) and the continuing violence practised by the Provisionals. There have now been 250 punishment beatings in the 14½ months since the IRA ceasefire - over 150 of them attributable to the Provisionals. I hope you will take this up with Adams. It is an obscene practice. Virtually every day brings a new, gruesome report across my desk. On Monday, for example, seven self-proclaimed PIRA members in Londonderry smashed up a house in Londonderry: while their intended victim was not there, a 67 year old woman in the house had to be taken to hospital suffering from shock. In Newry recently, eight men smashed the left arm and leg (and severed an artery) of a man who had ignored a summons to go to the local Sinn Fein office. In another incident in Newry a man had his head, chest, ribs, knees and legs beaten with a sledgehammer, and he was told to leave the town within 24 hours.

The editorials in The Times and Evening Standard reflect the very strong feeling here that we should not be panicked by Sinn Fein's crisis tactics and that "insisting that Sinn Fein - IRA begin disarmament before its representatives are admitted to all-party talks is absolutely fundamental to the future of the peace."

Yours ever,
Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

The Honorable Anthony Lake

* 88 will leave prison on Friday.

Financial Times, 15th November 1995, Page 12

Business hope in N Ireland at new height

By John Murray Brown
in Belfast

Business confidence among manufacturing companies in Northern Ireland is higher than at any time since the paramilitary ceasefires 14 months ago, according to a survey published yesterday.

The survey by PA consultants of 100 companies - representing about half of the manufacturing workforce - suggests the Northern Ireland economy continues to out-perform the rest of the UK.

The survey estimates the province has seen a 14 per cent increase in planned investment in the 12 months to the end of October compared with the previous year. The figures are expected to be further underscored by actual output and employment data for the third quarter to be published today.

The Industrial Development Board, the government body entrusted with approving new investment, reports that the number of inquiries from companies seeking to locate in the province has more than trebled to almost 750 in the six months to October compared with the first half-year.

"I am confident it will be the best-ever year for foreign investment," said Mr Bruce Robinson, the new IDB chief executive yesterday. Mr Robinson said the investment projections were "entirely consistent" with the current strong performance of the domestic economy.

The survey predicted output growth of about 5 per cent in the year to October and a 4 per cent increase in order books. The results will give a further boost to Northern Ireland's investment profile before the visit of US President Bill Clinton at the end of this month.

Northern Ireland manufacturers saw a 7.3 per cent jump in output in the year to March compared with a 3.5 per cent increase for the UK economy as a whole. The province also enjoyed a 1.5 per cent increase

in employment, representing real productivity gains of about 5 per cent.

Equally encouraging is the diversification of the exports, with 16 per cent going to the European Union and 12 per cent to the Irish Republic, hitherto a tiny market for Ulster products. The IDB is targeting 60 new projects in the three-year period 1995-98, 45 of which are earmarked for the most disadvantaged areas, creating a total of 12,000 jobs.

Mr Robinson also said the current robust recovery reflected the improved labour mobility as a result of the end of the paramilitary violence. The survey findings contrast with a report last month by the accountants Coopers & Lybrand, which suggested that the feelgood factor following the ceasefires had not yet translated into jobs.

The Times
15th November 1995
Page 17

ANGLO-IRISH DISAGREEMENT

A decade of diplomacy over Ulster's future

Ten years ago today, the Anglo-Irish agreement was signed by Margaret Thatcher and Garret Fitzgerald at Hillsborough Castle. The immediate sequel was the resignation of Ian Gow, the Treasury Minister later murdered by the IRA, on the ground that "the involvement of a foreign power... will prolong, and not diminish, Ulster's agony". In an outburst hysterical even by his own standards, the Rev Ian Paisley described the then Prime Minister as a "wicked, treacherous lying woman". Fifteen Unionist MPs resigned their seats shortly after.

A decade later, the legacy of the Agreement is still a matter of acrimonious debate. In her memoirs, Baroness Thatcher says its results were "disappointing" and alienated Unionists "without gaining the level of security co-operation we had a right to expect". The agreement's defenders would say it has been vindicated by the Downing Street declaration, the IRA ceasefire and the imminent visit of President Clinton to the Province.

The agreement is certainly one of the most sweeping constitutional measures in the history of the United Kingdom. Its first article established the crucial principle that "consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland" was required for any change in its status. This check on nationalist aspirations has been at the heart of the Government's campaign to persuade the Unionist community that it is not about to be betrayed. The Downing Street declaration would have been impossible without this earlier endorsement by both Governments of what is crudely called the "Unionist veto".

The cost of this recognition by Dublin was considerable, however. The agreement established an inter-governmental conference to deal with political, legal and security matters and the encouragement of cross-border co-operation. It gave the Irish Government an institutional say in the affairs of the Province, somewhere between consultative rights and full joint authority. In this sense, the 1985 agreement was the

direct ancestor of this year's Anglo-Irish framework document which proposed far more extensive powers for the South as part of any future settlement. The constitutional trend to which the Hillsborough summit gave rise has been manifestly green-tinged. The British Government continues to reassure the people of Ulster that nothing will be done without their agreement. But the Unionists fear they will soon be confronted with a Hobson's choice between a return to bloodshed or a constitutional package which heavily favours the pan-nationalist front.

Anglo-Irish diplomacy may be necessary but it is not sufficient for a lasting peace. Like the Irish Government's cancellation of the Ulster summit in September, John Bruton's profoundly ill judged speech at the weekend showed how unpredictable relations between Dublin and Whitehall can be. In a thinly veiled attack on John Major's management of the peace process, the Taoiseach demanded compromise from the British Government and insisted that the obstacles to peace were "comparatively minor in historical terms" and "little more than semantic". This is delusion on a grand scale. Insisting that Sinn Fein-IRA begin disarmament before its representatives are admitted to all-party talks is absolutely fundamental to the future of the peace. Unionist politicians should not be expected to negotiate with men retaining the option to bomb them; nor will they do so.

Mr Bruton's speech was a reminder that a lasting settlement is not in the gift of the British and Irish Governments. The Taoiseach must please his nationalist compatriots; he must heed the concerns of republican paramilitaries. Given his weakness in the Commons, Mr Major must also appease David Trimble, the Ulster Unionist leader, far more than he may wish to do. The Anglo-Irish agreement has spawned many clauses. What it cannot spawn is a lasting settlement. It is Ulster's people, not diplomats, who will decide the prospects of peace.

Evening Standard City Prices
14th November 1995
Page 9

Foot dragging

DELAYS to the Irish peace process — or eventualities liable to endanger it — are naturally to be deplored. But it is vitally important that nobody in Dublin and London panics. Recently the Irish premier, Mr John Bruton, has complained about the British side dragging their feet about negotiations. And from another underground quarter, republican opinion has contrived to convey its impatience and displeasure: a van full of arms belonging to a breakaway republican faction has been found. So the pressure is on London and the Northern Ireland Office, who in recent weeks have found themselves on the back foot. Dublin is evidently impatient to reach a peace settlement. So are we all. But they could endeavour to exclude from their diplomacy the note of suspicion and ill-temper that is threatening to sour these talks. Observers both sides of the Irish Sea must bear in mind that each and every step of the way, every agonised millimetre, the British Government must bring with them the Ulster Unionists, a community which contains elements who regard the British with quite as much hatred as they do anyone in Dublin. The British do not have an interest in deferring the day of reckoning indefinitely — that could only rebound against them. They could, in fact, arrive at the negotiating table almost at once. But without the Unionists at their side, it would be quite meaningless. The political *dramatis personae* has changed from the time of the original Downing Street Declaration: Albert Reynolds is gone, and so is Jim Molyneaux. We are in a state of flux, and the ground is shifting. A hundred tortuous acts of backstage diplomacy have to take place to keep the show on the road. So let us not lose our nerve with regard to the Irish peace process. After all, when we think of the terrible murder of Yitzhak Rabin, we can see what a remarkable achievement our peace process is — albeit unfinished.