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001. memo	Trina to Senator [Kennedy] re: Meeting with Ted Howe (5 pages)	02/16/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

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Ireland-London Bombing, Outside Comments, February 9, 1996 [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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**United States
Information
Service**

*Embassy of the United States of America
24 Grosvenor Square
London W1A 1AE England*

TELEFAX MESSAGE

(TELEFAX 071/491-2485)

From:

JOHN BURGESS

To:

Forward to:

D. Johnson / N. Soderberg

Pages to follow:

5

Comments:

URGENT

Media Reaction



USIS LONDON MEMORANDUM

DATE: February 10, 1996

TO: White House/NSC: David Johnson/Nancy Soderberg
State Department Ops Center

FROM: USIS/I — John Burgess

SUBJECT: Special Media Reaction: IRA BOMBING

The UK media are thoroughly absorbed with stories, reactions and interviews concerning the IRA bombing of an underground parking lot near a light-rail train station in Canary Wharf last evening which injured approx. 150, eight critically. The major question is whether this spells an end to the peace efforts. Depending upon the source, blame is cast (in order of the frequency of mention) upon 1) the IRA, 2) Sinn Fein, 3) a split between the two, 4) HMG intransigence, 5) Unionist intransigence, 6) inappropriate USG intervention.

BROADCAST MEDIA:

On Friday evening, regularly scheduled broadcasts led with (and stayed with) the story of the bombing, with most of the reporting speculating on whether or not the IRA was responsible. As the evening wore on and Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams was quoted saying that responsibility lay at the door of #10 Downing Street, coverage became more focused. This morning's news programs picked up where this left off, adding comments about President Clinton's "deep concern."

Radio -- still the dominant media in the UK for the transmission of news -- has been nearly completely absorbed with the story. Talk-radio stations are interviewing blast victims as well as taking call-ins from listeners, almost all outraged at the IRA and Sinn Fein. More objective programs (such as BBC Radio 4's *Today* program, are equally focused on the story, but are carrying a wider range of interviews, including Gerry Adams, Sir Patrick Mayhew (the N. Ireland Secretary), Unionist and SDLP politicians from N. Ireland, and MPS. US Congressman King has made himself available to the UK media to condemn HMG's delays in implementing all-party talks.

PRINT MEDIA:

Coverage is predictable. The tabloid press leads with 3" headlines "SCUM," "IRA BOMB LONDON" and "IT'S WAR." The broadsheets (several of which were unable

to publish because of damage caused by the bomb) are a bit more restrained. The *Financial Times* leads "London bombing puts Ulster peace process at risk;" the *Times of London*, "Bomb shatters IRA ceasefire."

BLOCK QUOTES FROM THE TIMES OF LONDON 2/10:

Sir Patrick Mayhew: "Here were the republicans offered a path through to the talks which they claim they have wanted to join for a very long time. That path was by way of elections. Rather than face elections, they appear to have gone back to the bombs."

Michael Mates (former N.I. Minister) said that a resumption of terrorism would rebound badly on the IRA but he insisted that the peace process could be saved. "It is a very sad day for everyone who has been trying to keep the peace process on the rails. It is an enormous tactical mistake by the IRA. The Americans will understand after the experience of Oklahoma."

Andrew Hunter (chairman of the Conservative backbench on N.I. said he understood the bombing had been carried out by mainstream IRA rather than a splinter group. Reacting to the IRA's statement that it had been forced into action: "What happened this evening is that people made the cool, calculated decision to initiate an operation that, in all probability, would kill people and destroy. That was their decision alone. In no way were they forced to do it and it is, of course, monstrous to pretend in any way that they were forced to do it."

David Trimble said the bomb had been designed to prevent elections taking place in N.I. "It is incredible that the people who have been telling us that they want to enter the democratic process should be trying to stop elections."

Rev. Ian Paisley: "We must cut through the lying and the deceit in a statement like this. They say they are trying to enhance the democratic peace process. But this statement is a hellish lie."

Ken Maginnis: "The IRA/Sinn Fein stand alone determined to hold people to ransom by the use of violence. People will now understand why we wanted decommissioning before talks began. It was to a degree predictable that they would pick up where they had left off. It proves the ceasefire was a ploy to gain some sort of political advantage."

Joe Hendron (SDLP) criticized the British Government for "pussyfooting around" with the peace process. "The Government has been playing with fire and playing with the lives of people."

Marjorie Mowlam, Labour Party Shadow Sect'y for N.I.: "It is an appalling act of terrorism, a tragic night not just for the people in Britain but for those in N.I. who have enjoyed the peace so much. Tonight is not a time to start apportioning blame but to see what has happened, to think about the families of the injured and to see how both Major and Bruton continue the search for peace. It is important to look to the future."

Lord Holme of Cheltenham, Lib-Dem. spokesman on N.I.: This may be the result of a dangerous power struggle within the militant republican movement. Sinn Fein must move quickly to disown these terrible developments. If they align themselves with men of violence once again they will forfeit any right to be heard not only by the people of N.I. but by the whole civilized world."

"Gusty" Spence (who announced the loyalist ceasefire) pleaded with loyalist gunmen not to retaliate. "My message to the loyalist paramilitaries at this moment is for heaven's sake, and for the sake of the people of the whole of N.I., hold anything that you may anticipate doing until such time as the situation becomes clear. I am down on my knees begging."

EDITORIALS:

Times of London

BACK TO WAR

Blood on the streets: a blow to hopes of peace

The Northern Irish peace process, on which the hopes of millions rested, is now in serious jeopardy. If it collapses, terrorism could quickly regain its grip on the Province. Some time will elapse before the full implications of this end of the IRA's ceasefire become clear. But it is already possible to hazard some guesses at the political calculations which brought about this return to violence.

A fatal train of events led from the Mitchell commission's proposals — which undermined London's insistence on prior decommissioning of weapons — to this atrocity. All along, John Major's perilous gamble depended on playing for time: only with time would the people of Ulster become so attached to peace that any return to terrorism would become unthinkable. Having relaxed its stance on decommissioning, the British Government offered elections in the Province. Such democratic legitimization of delegates to a peace conference was predictably rejected by Sinn Fein, which fears exposure of its narrow popular base, but also — unnecessarily and regrettably — by the constitutional nationalists and by Dublin.

At such a time, Bill Clinton's reception of Gerry Adams at the White House sent a clear signal that the President saw no reason to help John Major — a signal duly noted by republican hardliners. President Clinton must now look back again at the photographs of his embrace with the terrorists. Dublin mounted a wild demarche this week, in which the Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring demanded an all-party

summit in America on the model of Bosnia's Dayton peace conference. This was a panic measure, designed to head off a resumption of republican violence. Instead, by inviting comparisons between Bosnia and Ulster, it apparently strengthened the hands of those inside the IRA's army council who have long believed that a spectacular act of violence would isolate the British Government.

Were the Irish Government now to react by denouncing the British for procrastination, the IRA would indeed have dealt the peace process a possibly mortal blow. John Bruton, the Taoiseach, must know this. Even if he cannot restrain Mr Spring, he should make it clear to all that the blame for the Canary Wharf bomb lies squarely with the IRA. John Hume and the SDLP should do likewise; it is imperative that they dissociate themselves from any attempt by Sinn Fein to justify a crime which could have caused even greater carnage than it did.

The Prime Minister, whose Northern Irish policy had seemed his greatest achievement, now stares into the abyss. He cannot weaken his resolve to demand a democratic route to a lasting settlement. He can only reiterate his message that terrorism will not be appeased. If Dublin and Washington were to join him in demanding that Mr Adams now declare his repugnance for his friends in the IRA, then some benefit could yet emerge from the smoke over Canary Wharf. Meanwhile war is again the cry: and the price of war is once more paid by the bleeding of innocents passing by.

Financial Times

[Commentary by Philip Stephens]

Cool political heads needed to preserve this precious peace

It is time for the coolest of political heads. The temptation must be to conclude that the massive blast in London's Docklands draws an indelible line under 17 months of peace in Northern Ireland. that may well be so.

Amid the confusion over who was responsible it seemed clear that this was not the impetuous act of one or two lone renegades. Planting bombs demands formidable planning and expertise.

If last night's terrorism was the work of an IRA splinter group, it is a group with the capacity to wreck the ceasefire. The still more dangerous possibility is that the hard men of the IRA have retaken control of the republican movement, that the political leadership of Sinn Fein has been sidelined.

But even a precarious peace is too precious to admit so soon that it has been lost in this single act of horror. The politicians — in London, Dublin and in Northern Ireland itself — must avoid anything that might make a return to the miserable war of the past quarter century a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Crude political instincts will tempt them otherwise and encourage them to shift the blame. The Dublin government will be inclined to point the finger at John Major for stalling over Sinn Fein's demand for all-party negotiations.

Mr John Bruton, his Irish counterpart, was furious at the British PM's decision to sidestep the recent recommendations of the Mitchell commission on the decom-

missioning of IRA arms. So too was John Hume, leader of Northern Ireland's mainly Catholic SDLP. Many nationalists will say that this was the last straw for the IRA.

In London, the reflex reaction will be to say that here is proof that the IRA was never serious in its intent, that Mr Major was right to demand that the organization hand over weapons as the price of a place at the negotiating table.

Perversely, the more extreme unionists may take comfort from the bombing. For those steeped in the sectarian past it is almost better that they are proved right in their pessimism than that the ceasefire endures.

Mr Major and Mr Bruton must act otherwise. The discord of the past few weeks must be put behind them. Lives are more important than political face. Both must show a willingness to take risks. Entrenched positions must be abandoned. One must assume that Tony Blair is sincere in offering the British PM the Labour party's full support in any fresh initiative.

There are still a few shreds of hope. The signs last night were that Gerry Adams and his colleagues in the Sinn Fein leadership were taken unawares by the bomb. Certainly he held back from condemning it, but he would hardly have been party to an act of terrorism which coincided so damagingly with his efforts in Washington to win over the Clinton administration.

The tensions within the IRA have been apparent from the outset. Each time Mr Adams has met with British ministers he has been accompanied by one of the hardliners on the IRA army council. throughout the ceasefire the IRA's so-called active service units have shadowed the province's security forces. A spate of punishment killings in the final weeks of last year underlined the determination of the irreconcilables to return to the gun.

But everyone in the republican movement will be fearful of a permanent rupture between doves and hawks. The IRA is haunted by a history of such splits. Inevitably they lead to republican killing republican.

Perhaps there was a small ray of hope in the fact that the bomb was planted in London rather than Belfast. Those responsible wanted to avoid retaliation from the Protestant loyalists.

Angry they may be at what is seen as British intransigence. But the nationalist communities of Northern Ireland cannot wish to return to an era when they and their children daily walk in fear.

In places like Armagh perhaps, the killers of the IR will always have a supportive following. But elsewhere the benefits of peace have started to take hold. And nationalists are aware that if the IRA campaign resumes then the loyalists will certainly return to the bullet. Terrorism is a two-way street.

Cynics will say that all this is no more than clutching at straws, that the competing demands of nationalism and unionism could never have been resolved in the negotiations sought by Mr Adams and denied him by Mr Major. History lends powerful support to such cynical absolutism. But nothing is easier than pessimism. The peaceful people of Northern Ireland deserve better.

from the office of

*Senator Edward M. Kennedy
of Massachusetts*

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
ON LONDON EXPLOSION**

For Immediate Release
5:00 p.m., February 9, 1996

Contact: Jim Manley
202/224-2633

I'm deeply troubled and saddened by the explosion in London, and my heart goes out to those who were injured.

If the explosion is an IRA bombing, I condemn it unequivocally and I hope the perpetrators are brought to justice as soon as possible.

The IRA announcement of an end to the cease-fire is obviously an extremely ominous development, but it's premature to speculate about what it means for the peace process.

I have been calling for some time for the British and Irish Governments to convene all-party talks as soon as possible. There had been a 17 month cease-fire with very little progress.

This development makes talks more imperative than ever. I hope all sides will do all they can to see that the process goes forward.

Violence has no role in the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict, and I remain committed to working with all those who seek a peaceful settlement.

ELI



Edward M. Kennedy

U.S. Senator for Massachusetts

315 Russell Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20510

202/224-4543

202/224-2417 FAX

FAX TRANSMISSION

DATE/TIME: _____

TO: White House, Nancy Soderberg NSC

RECEIVING FAX#: 9-456-9460

FROM: Trina Vargo, Foreign Policy, 224-2638

NUMBER OF PAGES
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COMMENTS:

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FEBRUARY 16, 1996

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

TO: SENATOR
FR: TRINA
RE: MEETING WITH TED HOWE

I met this morning with Ted Howe of Sinn Fein from 9:30 a.m. until 10:45 a.m. in the Secret Harbor Bistro at the Shelburne Hotel at 37th and Lexington in New York.

Ted's bottom line: We should not assume more bombs won't go off. The IRA went into the cease-fire with the understanding that they would be in all-party negotiations soon, and that didn't happen for 17 months, and they did not believe they were about to happen. The only way to restore the cease-fire is by restoring the commitment -- a date for all-party talks.

Ted arrived with Ciaran Staunton who works for Sinn Fein in New York. Ciaran, through Niall O'Dowd knew that I was going to let Ted have it and as soon as Ciaran looked at me he said he had to go do some errands and he would be back in 10 minutes. He stayed away during most our meeting.

I spent half of the time verbally abusing Ted. In a nutshell, I told him the following: EMK, Jean, Clinton and others had gone out on a limb and were betrayed. Sinn Fein is in very serious danger of losing Irish America for 30 years. No one separates Sinn Fein and the IRA. [I actually do think there is some level of separation which is evident by Adams' surprise by the bombing.] If anyone did this (end the cease-fire) thinking this could help their cause, they made a serious miscalculation. What they've done only plays into the hands of the British Government and Unionists. Whatever justification Sinn Fein/IRA try to give, none of it can be balanced with two innocent people being killed. I also told him that I hope they catch whoever did the London bombing and that I will make it my personal mission to make sure that if there is a lasting peace agreement, and if prisoner releases are part of the package, that those responsible for this particular bombing are never part of any package. I told Howe I expected him to take all of this back to the IRA and let them know how absolutely pissed off we are. I told him they had to restore the cease-fire.

I asked Ted a series of questions. At all times, like Adams, he says that what he's saying is what he thinks but that he can't speak for the IRA.

Ted says he too was surprised and angry when he heard about the bombing. He was at a bar that night and says the first he heard of it was when someone came up to him and told him. He also said he had been talking to Adams just a few hours before and he does not believe Adams had any idea it was coming. Despite his

-1-

FVZ: I gather
Sean O'h Uiginn
got a similar
lead from Adams
today.

surprise he added, "admittedly, this had been coming for some time." (There had been indications prior to Clinton's visit that the cease-fire would end.) Ted said he knew of two occasions before the actual bombing that the IRA had "marched them to the top of hill and back down again."

I told Ted that even if they had decided to end the cease-fire, did they realize how absolutely stupid their timing was -- the end of February talks deadline hadn't passed. Ted thinks they felt that if they didn't move now, they would just get sucked into another 6 - 8 months of stalling over the elections issue.

I asked him when the decision was made. Ted thought it was made after the announcement of the Mitchell report. I told him I found it hard to believe that it wasn't being planned before that. Ted conceded that they could have been preparing for Mitchell's report to come out with the one thing they couldn't live with (handing in of weapons prior to talks). I pointed out to Ted that the report did not demand that. Ted said he believes that the straw that broke it was the "indecent haste with which Major responded to the Mitchell report". He said the report came out at 11:00 a.m. and that Major had discarded it by 3:30 p.m.

While we were on the Mitchell report, I asked Ted if it was something the IRA could live with. He said that "politically, it's something we can work with." I asked again if it could be accepted and he said "with some difficulty, yes -- if the process has forward movement."

I told him that I didn't like Martin McGuinness' comments to Vincent Browne (Irish Times) which indicated that Sinn Fein might not necessarily accept the outcome of a democratic process. Ted feels confident they can accept whatever comes out of a genuine process.

I asked about the Army Council's decision to end the cease-fire -- Ted said he expects there was internal disagreement about it but all it takes is quorum to do it. [Niall, after talking to Ted, said Belfast was not part of this decision. South Armagh "does London" and they did this without telling Belfast in advance.]

Ted said it wasn't that Adams "persuaded" the IRA to go into a cease-fire. Rather, Adams presented the IRA with a package which included the Irish Government, Hume and Irish America. And part of that package were "talks in a relatively short period of time". He also mentioned the prisoners issue but that clearly was of less significance.

Ted indicated that they (both Sinn Fein and the IRA) have no confidence in Bruton dating back to Bruton's visit to the US in March '95 (that's when Bruton stunned Adams and the IRA by talking about decommissioning). Ted says Sinn Fein told Bruton on several occasions that this was not the deal the IRA had agreed to.

Bruton's response is always a legal and academic lecture about Irish government sovereignty.

Ted said that if the White House had not so quickly rowed in behind the British on the elections idea, it "could" have made a difference. I told Ted I was particularly angry that people like you and Dodd weren't given the opportunity to try to persuade Clinton directly on this matter. They never let us know the return was imminent. Ted said Sinn Fein was also angry that we didn't have that opportunity but they didn't know.

I asked Ted why we should continue to deal with Sinn Fein if they can't be relied on to speak for the IRA. I said why shouldn't we deal directly with the IRA? Ted said the Army Council wouldn't let us near it.

I asked what it would take to restore the cease-fire and he said a restoration of the original deal -- a commitment to all-party talks.

I pressed him on whether or not they would accept elections as part of a package. He would not commit but said it might be a "possibility" only with a commitment to talks a clear structure for the talks within a time frame.

When I asked about willingness to decommission while negotiations were going on, Ted thought that was "possible". He reminded me that when we talked in Belfast in August he told me that a "change in conditions can change possibilities". (I checked my notes from our August meeting and Ted had said that "a change of conditions can change people's position.")

The thing I found most surprising is that Ted said Sinn Fein has not met with the IRA since the bombing. He said he has been with Adams most of the time since the bombing and he doesn't believe he has spoken with them either. I asked, why, after the bombing, Adams didn't demand a meeting to demand what the hell happened? Ted said you can't just call the IRA on the phone, you have to arrange for some meeting at "some hole in the arse cottage in Ireland." Ted said they've (Sinn Fein) has had to spend their time defending their position because "the IRA pulled us in on the back of a fait accompli." I argued that Gerry's time would be better spent talking to the IRA rather than giving interviews.

I asked why we should ever believe them again. Ted again argued that the IRA had an agreement (re: talks) and that the agreement was broken. Ted said anything the IRA's said it would do, it has done.

I asked if there would be more bombs. Ted said the IRA called the cease-fire over so we have to assume that there will be. I asked if bombs would just be in London or would they strike Northern Ireland. Ted said he didn't know. He called the situation a "bleak scenario without real negotiations." He said

that everyone keeps telling the IRA what it has to do but never are the Unionists told by the British Government what they have to do.

At about this point Ciaran returned. Since Ciaran is always calling me on the prisoners issue, I reiterated what I told Ted -- if there are ever any deals on prisoners and if the bombers from last Friday are ever caught, I'll do everything I can to make sure they're not part of any deal.

I told Ted he had better explain to the IRA that if more bombs go off, it's more unlikely that they'll get to negotiations. Thinking that way is counter-intuitive. He said he understands that but he noted that the IRA has before "done A hoping to get to B and instead wound up with C".

Ted noted that they have confidence in Spring but not Bruton. They feel Spring has been trying to move the process forward whereas Bruton has just tried "to manage the IRA cease-fire". In a crunch, Ted says Spring gets side-lined.

Ted said that Adams would be meeting today with Sean O hUiginn and Paddy Teahon in Dublin. He said they've requested meetings with the British but there's been no indication that they would meet. Ted expects they won't meet above the Quentin Thomas level (i.e. no Ancram or Mayhew).

I asked him about Hume's referendum idea. He said Hume is "casting about" and that he didn't consult with Sinn Fein on that. He does not believe that Hume is under pressure for continuing to talk to Adams (he said Catholics in Northern Ireland blame the British for stalling).

Ted also brought up Dermot Gallagher's name and complained that they have the impression that Gallagher is just "sitting back" over here while the British are influencing the White House.

On other matters:

Ted said he thought something was up when he arrived at JFK because he was asked for his passport and that didn't happen before -- the passport is checked in Dublin.

He said that Gerry had talked to Jean by phone yesterday. He said Gerry had hoped to meet her but she was leaving for the US. (I don't know if that's true or if Jean is avoiding him by choice or instructions.)

Regarding the recent draft report of the Forum which Sinn Fein refused to sign on to, Ted said there are things they can deal with practically but they can't accept partition as a matter of "principle" which is what he says they were being asked to do.

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On the issue of visas and fundraising, I told Ted that while there appears to be a general understanding about keeping the lines of communication open, I don't think anyone would object if they (the White House) pull fundraising. I also told him I know that Gerry has a pending visa application for March and a decision will have to be made about that. I suggested that maybe Adams should be assessing if it's wise for him to even try to come at that time. Ted said they hadn't made a firm decision (he realizes the decision isn't theirs) but he said they also can't be seen to be running away.

I asked who else he would be seeing and he mentioned Peter King. (I already knew he would be seeing Niall, Flynn, Feeney, and Doherty of the Comptroller's office.)

Ted said he understood my message loud and clear and he would take it back.

Ted said that all things are possible and that they (Sinn Fein) weren't giving up.

While I only gave Ted the hardest line possible, I have to say that I am somewhat sympathetic -- not with what the IRA did but the thinking behind it. The British Government has created hurdle after hurdle to keep Sinn Fein out of all-party talks (the 3 month "decontamination" period went on for 17 months). The IRA felt they had lived up to their part of the bargain but the other side didn't. Sinn Fein/IRA also don't have the faith in Bruton that they had in Reynolds and they were concerned by the White House's quick support for the vague elections proposal.

I've just returned to the office to type this up. I haven't read today's clips yet but Niall tells me there's a poll in the Irish Independent which says that 85% of the people in the South want all party talks now and 56% in the North want all party talks now -- and that is without the IRA even restoring the cease-fire.

Niall also informed me that Bruton called him today to ask his advice. Niall told him proceed directly to all-party talks and that a possible way to do so might be the Gary McMichael plan which McMichael told me and I passed on. Niall said Bruton sounded "manic."

cc: Amb. Smith, Nancy



Edward M. Kennedy

U.S. Senator for Massachusetts

315 Russell Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20510

202/224-4543

202/224-2417 FAX

FAX TRANSMISSION

DATE/TIME: _____

TO: Nancy Soderberg, NSC

RECEIVING FAX#: 9-456-9460

FROM: Trina Vargo/ Foreign Policy 224-2638

NUMBER OF PAGES
INCLUDING COVER: _____

COMMENTS:

FEBRUARY 12, 1996

MEMORANDUM

TO: NANCY
FR: TRINA
RE: DISCUSSION WITH GARY McMICHAEL

I spoke with Gary McMichael this morning and just wanted to pass on to you his views because there may be something in his proposal. Maybe there are some ideas which you can float with Trimble without saying where they came from. The following are Gary's comments:

The Loyalist paramilitaries have been very measured in responding to the IRA bombing. They view this incident as a first strike and thus feel they have the right to return to violence as well.

The Loyalist paramilitaries are waiting to see what the IRA does next. Gary is urging them to allow Sinn Fein/IRA to be seen in isolation.

Gary says that the people on the streets in the Protestant community want to get talks started, they don't want a return to violence, and Gary feels the Loyalist paramilitaries need to make every effort to try to save the peace process.

The IRA has to pay a penalty, and be seen to be paying a penalty, for what they did. He suggests that we cut off their ability to raise funds and not allow them any more visas. [As we discussed, I agree on the fundraising but disagree on the visas.] It has to be demonstrated to Sinn Fein that "doors will be closed, at least temporarily" -- it can't simply be business as usual.

At the same time, Gary is urging the British Government to call all-party talks immediately, but without Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein would be told that they could come to talks if they re-instate the cease-fire and sign on to the Mitchell Principles. Gary feels this would get talks started, slap Sinn Fein in a symbolic but not really substantive way, and get them into talks soon. He also feels it allows the British Government and the Unionists to not appear to be playing to the IRA's tune.

Gary thinks elections at this time are nonsense. He feels Sinn Fein has to fear losing some of their vote in the aftermath of this bombing and therefore elections are a disincentive for the IRA to restore the cease-fire.

Once again, this rests on whether or not the Unionists can be encouraged to do something -- talk -- in order to save the peace process.

cc: Sen. Kennedy, Amb. Smith, Carey



Edward M. Kennedy

U.S. Senator for Massachusetts

315 Russell Senate Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20510

202/224-4543

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DATE/TIME:

2/8/96

TO:

Nancy & Mary Ann

RECEIVING FAX#:

FROM: *Trina Vargo, Foreign Policy, 224-2638*

NUMBER OF PAGES
INCLUDING COVER:

2

COMMENTS:

just FYI

*Could you ask your press people to put me on
the list to fax all WH Intel-related st.s?*

Tx

Press Hit Following Ted Kennedy/Dick Spring Meeting, 2/8/96**Kennedy:**

Well, Tanaiste, let me say that I welcome the opportunity to see an old friend once again.

I think all of us in the United States Senate appreciate the great leadership that he personally has provided, trying to move the process towards all-party talks forward in the North. That is something that there's very strong support from, from Republicans and Democrats, House members and Senate members; and I think all Americans were impressed with the Tanaiste's proposal about getting the Dayton-type of talks to start the whole process.

Every American remembers that it wasn't long ago that different parties came together out in Dayton at a time when the battles were still raging over there. And as a result of those conversations, a process was put in place which I think all of us are hopeful may offer the key for peace in Bosnia. There are no magic bullets, silver bullets, no magic answers, hard work by men and women who are trying to move the peace process. I admire that continuity and commitment towards trying to offer recommendations and suggestions so that talks can take place.

We have seen talks--and they have taken place in the Middle East--offer hopes for peace. When the talks took place in South Africa brought about peace. We have seen it in Central America--in Nicaragua, in El Salvador--and that is the key in terms of Northern Ireland. So we're very glad to have you here. We appreciate very much your presence again, and we value very much your insights in the situation in the North.

Spring:

I would just like to say I'm very glad of having the opportunity of briefing and updating Senator Kennedy. A very good friend of Ireland on the developments in recent times. We're at a very crucial stage in the peace process. We want to bring about all-party talks; it's ultimately--we're only going to bring about agreement between the parties in Northern Ireland by talks, by sitting around the table. We have a number of weeks now remaining within the deadline of the end of February date we set, both governments set, in fact, last November. And we want to intensify the talks and hopefully bring the parties together. The opportunity that is there now in the peace process that many people have worked very hard to achieve can be brought to fruition but ultimately, as I said, it has to be done in the form of all-party talks.

We again, thank you, Senator, for your interest for many many years, a very constructive interest, and of your colleagues here in Washington, and we look forward to working with you in the weeks ahead.

Source: Reuters

Subject : IRISH-STATEMENT

a1636

^BC-IRISH-STATEMENT

^Text of ``IRA'' statement received by Irish TV

DUBLIN, Feb 9 (Reuter) - Following is the text of the statement purported to have been sent to Irish TV on Friday night by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

``It is with great reluctance that the leadership announces that the complete cessation of military operations will end at 6 pm on February 9.

``As we stated on August 31, 1994, the basis for cessation was to enhance the democratic peace process and to underline our definitive commitment to its success.

``We also made it clear that we believed an opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement had been created.

``The cessation presented an historic challenge for everyone and the IRA commended the leaderships of nationalist Ireland at home and abroad. They rose to the challenge. The British Prime Minister did not.

``Instead of embracing the peace process, the British government acted in bad faith with Mr Major and the Unionist leaders squandering this opportunity to resolve the conflict.

``Time and again over the last 18 months selfish party political and sectional interests in the London parliament have been placed before the rights of the people of Ireland.

``We take the opportunity to reiterate our total commitment to our republican objectives. The resolution of the conflict in our country demands justice.

``It demands an inclusive negotiated settlement. That is not possible unless and until the British government faces up to its responsibilities.

``The blame for the failure thus far of the Irish peace process lies squarely with John Major and his government.''

The statement was signed by P O'Neill, the name used at the end of most IRA statements.

^REUTER

RB-- 02/09/96 14:59:00

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Gates, Brian K.
To: Kessinger, Jodi
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Saturday, February 10, 1996 2:25PM

UNCLASSIFIEDPREC: RUSH CATEGORY: INTERNATIONAL NWSID: F0257314SOURCE: FBIS F0116
FBIS S 116FEB10
UNCLAS 7E

UK: Sinn Fein Leader Adams Gives Interview
(Take 1 of 5) LD1002150196 Dublin RTE Radio One Network in English 1345
GMT 10 Feb 96

Interview with Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, by
moderator Rodney (last name unknown) and a panel of commentators and journalist
[Rodney] Gerry Adams, what is
your reading of the situation this afternoon?

[Adams] Hello, Rodney, how are you doing?

[Rodney] Grand. Thanks. What is your reading
of the situation this afternoon?

[Adams] Well, I think we are in a
very, very grave situation. I have had little opportunity to reflect, really. I have been trying to talk to
people over the last short while. I have sought an urgent meeting with the Irish Government and an urgent
meeting with the British Government. I talked to Mr. Hume [leader of the Social Democratic and Labour
Party] this morning. I think there is
a tremendous onus upon all of us who have played a central role in building the peace process to redouble
our efforts to make sure that we salvage it. My sympathy and my thoughts are obviously with the families
of those who were injured last night. I try to work out the best way forward and all I can say at this
moment is that the best way forward is through talks and through dialogue and the quicker we get into that
the better.

[Rodney] What's been coming through from a number of panelists here is that they feel a need to get a
clearer view of where Sinn Fein stands on this, and some people have been asking will you condemn what
happened at Canary Wharf yesterday.

[Adams] Well Rodney, let me be very very clear about this. I am not involved and have never and will
never be involved in the politics of selective condemnation. For 25 years they were used by other
politicians as a substitute for real action. It wasn't selective condemnation or denunciation which put
together the opportunity of the IRA cessation in August 1994. And you have to remember that when John
Hume and I were working away behind the scenes trying to put that together that we were victims. More
precisely he, who was perhaps slightly unused to be a victim of vilification and character assassination on a
grand scale. The news bite, the ritualistic response, of course I can give you that. Of course I could
satisfy John Major or all others in a pragmatic way. But my job is to try and put together this peace process
again.

[Rodney] Right. But...

[Unidentified speaker, interrupting] I think Gerry should be aware that whatever the IRA does, the
democratic politicians of this country north and south and in Britain are determined to achieve peace.

[Adams] Well, I am very glad that (?peace) has your support and that's because I am all for the
democratic [word indistinct] and I am committed to a peace process and to a peace settlement. And I am
quite prepared to sit back and to reflect in my own conscience and
ask was there something which I could have done more in the last 18 months to have consolidated this
peace process. I am not here -- although I am very, very, very critical of John Major's handling of this and
also of the attitude of the two Unionist leaders. But I am prepared also to look at my own position and I

think that Francis last name indistinct]
should do so also.

[Francis] Could I just say that the last thing we need from Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, the party that is associated with the IRA, is to lecture democratic politicians on what we should or should not do. Could I ask him to reflect on that?

[Adams] Francis, I will reflect on it. And I wasn't lecturing. I was asking you simply to do what I am doing, just to think back over the last 18 months. Is there something more that we could have done in terms of consolidating this process. It was put together at a time when you were targeting Mr. Hume and myself for the type of character assassination which was usually synonymous only with McCarthyism in the U.S.A.

Adams] Now, one of the things that Senator Mitchell said was that if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future. And what happened last night is very regrettable and I have said that. And I want to try and make sure that it never happens again. And I have sought an urgent meeting with Mr. de Rossa's government to try and move forward to find some way out of the abyss over which we are all poised, and we need to do that with all urgency.

[Rodney] OK, Gerry. There was a feeling last night that you were taken as much by surprise with this event as the rest of us were. Now, at the same time whether... [pauses] and Sinn Fein talks about its own mandate and being aware of the strength of its own mandate. But other people say that Sinn Fein has an intrinsic link with the IRA, and there is no point in us going into that argument now, except to say that obviously I think a majority of people believe that it is there. Were you surprised by it and what therefore does the event of yesterday say about the relationship between Sinn Fein and the IRA?

[Adams] Well, let me deal with this if I can with some clarity. Sinn Fein is not the IRA. The IRA have never consulted Sinn Fein about operational matters and have never at any time involved us, and I would not wish to be involved or see our party involved in those matters. Those who then are surprised, are shocked that Sinn Fein would not have been consulted either misunderstand or misrepresent the situation. We, in Sinn Fein, are totally committed to a democratic resolution of this conflict. We see negotiations as the way of ending conflict, and we see dialogue as the central vehicle for change. The IRA on the other hand, and this is important, were not defeated in August 1994 anymore than the Loyalists were, any more than the British were. What myself and John Hume and Mr. Reynolds [former Irish prime minister] and people from [word indistinct] were able to do was to persuade physical force-Republicans that there was an alternative way forward. And they obviously have made a judgment 18 months later that there was no evidence and no encouragement for that type of alternative argument. I remain committed to that alternative argument...

[Rodney, interrupting] So when did you know that they were going to do this, because we were reading today that you were talking to Anthony Lake, the national security adviser in America, 30 minutes or so before the statement came out that the ceasefire was ending.

[Adam] Well, that isn't the case. I picked up the rumors, as I am sure you did. In fact, I, when I, when -- I was talking to different people yesterday. It was on the back of all of the rumors that were floating about, and on the back of the media contacting Sinn Fein. In fact, I think that RTE contacted [name indistinct] immediately about an IRA statement.

And if you check with the White House, and I have already challenged one journalist very very hard on this, that they check with the White House and check with me on these mischievous rumors. I had no notice whatsoever about what was going to happen. At the same time, let me say this, and Proinsias de Rossa Democratic Left leader] will bear this out, everyone -- and it was an open secret -- was aware of the anxieties and the frustrations at the way the British were frittering away this peace process. They brought in this new pre-condition three months after the cessation. It's a miracle, and in many ways it's a testimony of the commitment of Republicans, that the cessation didn't end at that time.

We, and Sinn Fein, continued to clear every single obstacle that was put in our way and you know the British strategy was a high-risk one. I actually told Patrick Mayhew this in friendly terms, candidly, sitting across a table from him, I said to him: Look there is an increasing frustration at your refusal to accept a democratic imperative of this process, to engage in all-party talks, to move the situation where all parties can come together to try and work out

some sort of agreement.

[Proinsias de Rossa] Could I ask you Gerry, do you think that frustration with the slowness of politics is a justification for attempting to murder 100 people?

[Adams] Well first of all, Proinsias, I'm not attempting to justify what happened last night and you better start learning that making clever-assed responses to what is a very grave situation and trying to get some sort of party-political game...

[Rossa, interrupting] That kind of reaction is what I would expect. I'm asking you a straight-forward question. Do you think it's justified, do you think it's justified...

[Adams, interrupting] Let me finish, let me finish. I note the response of you and your colleagues when the fund-raising at that time actually killed people at Aldershot. I'm not seeking to justify what happened...

[Rossa, interrupting] I thought you were forgetting the past...

[Adams, interrupting] No, I'm not forgetting the past because we have to learn the lessons of the past in order to make sure that they don't become the future...

[Rossa] You still haven't answered the question.

[Adams] I have answered the question.

[Rossa] No you haven't.

[Adams] My answer to the question, if you would listen to it, is that my sympathy is with those people...

[?Rossa] No, not sympathy. Do you think frustration justifies attempted murder? [multiple voices heard]

[Adams] Is this Proinsias de Rossa?

[Unidentified speaker] Gerry, can I hold you for one second...

[Adams, interrupting] Rodney, I just want to answer Proinsias's question, because it's important that we are very, very clear about all of these matters. My sympathy and my thoughts are with those who were injured last night. My commitment is to make sure that it doesn't happen ever again. Now, Proinsias de Rossa can score cheap political points in the wake of this incident over me... [multiple voices interrupting]

[Rossa] It's not a cheap political point...

[Rodney, interrupting] Gerry, we've run up against a blast here, one of the breaks that we have to take...

[Rossa, interrupting] It's a fundamental democratic question.

[Rodney, continues] ...and I wonder, can you stay with us another few minutes while we take a break.

[Adams] Well, I think I have another interview to do.

[Rodney] Would it be possible for you take another couple of questions after we take a news break?

[Adams] Let me see if I can do that, Rodney.

[Rodney] Gerry Adams, are you still with us?

[Adams] Rodney, I can be here for about five minutes.

[Rodney] OK. I just wanted to ask you what influence...

[Adams, interrupting] Can I just ask you, I am not sure who is on the show, which I know...

Rodney, interrupting] Yes, right. There is Proinsias de Rossa, Marie O'Rourke, Michael McDougal, and Tommy Brouven are here in the studio.

[Adams] Can I just return to the point...

[Rodney, interrupting] And Andrew Hunter is on the line, and Chris McGinsy. No, he is on...

[Adams, interrupting] OK. Well, can I just return and try to do the point very, very briefly and very, very quickly.

[Rodney] Yes.

[Adams] The responsibility for what happened last night is clearly the IRA's. All of us, and this is all of us, and I mean we got into a bit of an argument there a few moments ago. The responsibility upon all of us: All to examine our role in the last 18 months so that we learn the lessons of the last 18 months. Now, although there may be a temptation for people to knee-jerk and to try and score political points, this is bigger than that. It is bigger than party political interest or point-scoring on this radio program. We are in a very grave, in a very serious situation, and we need to use our combined energies and efforts to take us out of it.

[Rodney] Well now. We had, before you joined us, Gareth O'Callaghan was on the line, and he said that he felt that the cease-fire was over and gone, and that you had a situation now where you had a cease-fire being finished, but at the same time a desire from Sinn Fein to have talks. What sort of influence...[pauses] First of all, do you accept that analysis, and secondly what sort of influence would you hope to bring with the leadership of the IRA, influence which you have tried to bring before?

[Adams] Well. One -- I have not had the opportunity actually -- it has been quite hyper and frenetic here over the last short while. So I have not had the opportunity to reflect in any great detail on all of that. I have sought an urgent meeting with the Irish Government. I have sought an urgent meeting with the British Government. I talked this morning with Mr. Hume. My commitment is an absolute one, to getting the peace process back on track and to moving it forward. If you reflect on the years of work that went in to actually presenting the IRA with an alternative means forward, then you get some sense of the task that is facing us. So, the detail I cannot -- you know, I cannot paint out for you at the moment. I can only do it in a very broad stroke. But my commitment to Sinn Fein's peace strategy and to a democratic settlement is absolute.

[Adams] OK. Michael McDougal has been trying to get in.

[McDougal] Could I ask you, Gerry, since you have difficulty with the word condemnation and you have said that you have not attempted to justify what happened in the Canary Wharf, would you go so far as to say that it was unjustified, an unjustifiable circumstance?

[Adams] Well, Michael, I have made my position quite clear. I do not want to bore you or anyone else by repeating...

[McDougal, interrupting] You are not boring me in the slightest. I just would like an answer, you know.

[Adams] Well, I have given you my answer. I have made it quite...

[McDougal, interrupting] You will not say it is unjustified.

[Adams] No, I have made my position quite clear. The politics of selective condemnation which you may find some succor and some refuge in are not the politics...

[McDougal, interrupting] No, no, I am not asking you to use the word condemnation, and I am not asking you to use any particular form, Gerry. I am asking you to indicate -- since --

[Adams still talking] sorry, excuse me, can I finish the question.

I am asking you to indicate...

[Adams, interrupting] Well, I was answering your question.

[McDougal] No, you were not.

[Adams] You are engaged in politics by...

[Rodney, interrupting] We are getting no further with that.

[McDougal] Could I just simply put the question: You did say, and I remember you saying, that you were not attempting to justify what happened at Canary Wharf. And I am merely asking you, would you go that little bit further and say it was not justified.

[Adams] I think the listeners to this program have heard my answer and will make a judgment on it, and I have the right to my opinions as you have the right to your opinions, and...

[McDougal, interrupting] I just want to hear what your opinion is.

[Rodney, interrupting] OK. Let him finish now.

[Adams] My opinion, my opinion is quite simply and quite straightforward that what we need to do after last night is to redouble our efforts, and the nay-sayers in this situation and the begrudgers in this situation have really to reflect upon what is said; and what has to be said in these circumstances has to be very measured and has to have the input, or the import, or the objective of trying to make a difficult situation easier.

[Unidentified speaker] I absolutely agree with you completely.

Subject : UK:SinnFeinLeaderAdams

[Unidentified speaker] OK, Gerry, just on one point: There has been talk about splits in the Republican movement or the broad Republican family. Can you say that there is no split? There has been talk about -- obviously the name Michael Collins has been used in newspapers and elsewhere...[pauses] What are your feelings on issues like that today?

[Adams] Well, first of all, those who are projecting the situation of a split, I think, are either misunderstanding the situation in a genuine way or are misrepresenting it. You see, Sinn Fein is not the IRA. Ask Proinsias de Rossa, you know, the history of all of this; Sinn Fein is our own party, the IRA is its own armed organization. Because they did not consult us, because they took us by surprise on this operation...[pauses] is not really anything new. Now, what we have to do in terms of the Sinn Fein project is to engage with other politicians -- because it is a political challenge, you know, all of this for those of us who are committed to a political way forward. I would think that the IRA -- and it is early days yet -- but I would think that the IRA are united. They certainly showed remarkable unity and discipline over the last 18 months, and for a very long time before that. That may be a good thing -- I tend to think that it is. Other people may think that it is a bad thing. Some people may want the IRA to split -- I think that the more the organization remains cohesive then the better it is and the easier it is, even in difficult circumstances.

[Unidentified speaker] Do you think there will be a renewed cease-fire?

[Adams] Well, I think that what we have to do is to get a democratic peace settlement. Making peace with one's enemies and with one's opponents was never going to be easy. Listen to the sort of argument that goes on between the likes of myself, Proinsias de Rossa, and Michael McDowell. That may be OK in a type of society such as there is in the 26 counties where you do not have military occupation, where you do not have all of the causes of conflict still intact. But in the situation that we have in the six counties we need to tackle the causes of conflict. We can only do that by a dialogue and obviously cessations by all of the armed groups. And the British never called a cessation. That is obviously a very, very [words indistinct].

[Rodney] Gerry, I appreciate that you are going to have to go, but the three people here would like to ask you questions. Can we just do that?

[Unidentified speaker] I would hate to think that Gerry imagines that I was making some kind of cheap point. What I was trying to do was to establish a very fundamental point, a very fundamental difference between the IRA and democratic parties. I do not accept, and nobody around this table accepts, that there is any justification for violence in Northern Ireland or in Britain in pursuit of Republican aims. We accept that. In my asking Gerry whether or not he believes that the IRA had a justification in planting that bomb, in detonating that bomb, I am simply trying to get to the root of the question. [Adams tries to interrupt] Sorry, could I just finish, I am not trying to reopen that argument. Simply saying that that is the point...

[Adams, interrupting] No, no, I just want to respond to what you are saying.

[Unidentified speaker] Could I just say, sorry, I do not want to get into an argument with you, Gerry. That is really a fundamental question.

[Adams] OK

[Unidentified speaker] And I think it is fundamental to how we go from here. [passage indistinct; various voices speak simultaneously for about five seconds]

[Rodney] Sorry, Tommy, let him respond to that.

Adams] First of all, I can agree with what Proinsias de Rossa is saying. But the fact is that no matter what I think and no matter what Proinsias de Rossa thinks or anyone else thinks, there are people who believe that physical force in response to military occupation, to the British connection with our country, is a justifiable and legitimate means of resistance. And that is the reality of this situation. And we persuaded a section of that people in the IRA to cease their campaign 18 months ago in order that we could build an alternative, and the alternative needed the full efforts of everyone involved to make it work.

[Unidentified speaker] But we know the IRA position, what I am trying to establish is if it is the Sinn Fein position.

[Adams] Sinn Fein, as you know, and we have talked about this and I know that you got quite annoyed when your taoiseach [Prime Minister John Bruton] and tanaiste

[Deputy Prime Minister Dick Spring] signed up on a joint statement with me -- Sinn Fein's commitment is quite clear in terms of our commitment to a democratic agreement and to dialogue and to negotiations as a means of [words indistinct]

[Unidentified speaker] That is just the point I wanted to ask. Is it not time that Sinn Fein clearly accepts the democratic principles of the Mitchell report if you, as you say, want to ensure that last night's disastrous event never happens again?

[Adams] Well, we have come very positively to the Mitchell report, and I believe that they do provide the basis for movement into all-party talks, and in Mr. de Rossa's presence I made that quite clear to the taoiseach and tanaiste.

[Unidentified speaker, laughing] Now, Mr. de Rossa, I am afraid your relations are going down the tube. Mary O'Rourke:

[O'Rourke] I think that this whole debate, actually, is very interesting, the way it is unfolding. I accept what Gerry Adams has said about a clear commitment via democratic means and to a peaceful solution. But he adds constantly, and he is correct, that this has to be brought about through dialogue. And for me the difficulty has been that for the last 18 months the meaningful dialogue, which was to ensure following the Downing Street Declaration, has not ensued. And that is a real difficulty. And for us to sit around here and not to recognize and to say that has caused difficulties at various layers -- the matters are very complex. When we ritualistically ask somebody to utter the word condemn I think we are closing a part of our mind. We all condemn -- yes -- but we are closing a part of our mind to the complex layers which are involved in any situation in an emergent peace process such as is evident here in this country.

[Rodney] OK, we are going to leave it there...

[Adams, interrupting] Rodney, could I just say, I just want to say this, and I want to make this absolutely clear. We need to get the talks going. And as we examine our own involvement in the last 18 months and before that, all of us need to accept our responsibility. And we do have to, and I think this is important, I want to reiterate what Mary O'Rourke said: We do have to get dialogue going. There was not a word of negotiations from the British Government in the last 18 months. I and others have been standing at the negotiating table for almost two years waiting for John Major, for David Trimble, and for Ian Paisley to join us. And without that dialogue, without tackling the causes of conflict, we can all talk till we are blue in the face in TV studios. We need to be around a table talking to each other, seeking agreement, and bringing about a democratic settlement.

[Rodney] OK, thank you very much indeed Gerry Adams for taking the call and for staying on to get all that out.

endall)

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FBIS 02/10/96 13:35:00

Source: Reuters

Subject : IRISH-IRA

a0390

^BC-IRISH-IRA 1STLD

^IRA says its guerrillas carried out London bombing
(recasts, adds background, quotes)

By Andrew Hill

DUBLIN, Feb 10 (Reuter) - The IRA Northern Ireland guerrilla group on Saturday claimed responsibility for a Friday bombing in London which injured more than 100 people and shattered a 17-month-old guerrilla ceasefire.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) said in a coded message to Ireland's RTE National radio and television network that it had carried out the attack and said that injuries which occurred could have been avoided if its warnings had been heeded.

The statement said the IRA had carried out the attack on the direct instructions of its military command, the so-called army council which governs all guerrilla affairs, according to RTE.

It was the first time the IRA, which wants an end to British rule of Northern Ireland, had formally acknowledged carrying out the attack.

Gerry Adams, head of the IRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, said on Friday night that he assumed it was the work of IRA guerrillas whose 25-year war on Britain was suspended with an historic ceasefire 17 months ago.

On Friday night RTE received a taped message purporting to come from the IRA which announced an end to its 17-month-old ceasefire because of stalemate in the Northern Ireland peace process launched by Britain and Ireland.

An hour later a bomb exploded in London's docklands residential and office complex injuring more than 100 people and drawing sharp condemnation from the British and Irish governments.

The Saturday IRA statement was issued after Adams appealed to the British and Irish governments for talks to put their joint Northern Ireland peace process back on track.

Adams, in Belfast with Sinn Fein colleagues, said on Friday that the attack was caused by Britain's attitude to the peace process and singled out British Prime Minister John Major for blame.

``Let us not take the focus off the man who is sitting in Downing Street (the British premier's London office) and who has frittered away the peace process for short-term political gain,'' Adams told Irish television hours after the London explosion.

``It's a miracle that we didn't have the type of incidents that we have seen tonight long before this,'' he said.

^REUTER

RB-- 02/10/96 08:28:00

Source: Reuters

Subject : IRISH-CLINTON-ADAMS

a2133

^BC-IRISH-CLINTON-ADAMS URGENT

^Adams called White House before London bombing

WASHINGTON, Feb 9 (Reuter) - Gerry Adams, president of the Irish Republican Army's political wing Sinn Fein, phoned the White House ``with disturbing news'' shortly before a bomb exploded in London on Friday, a senior administration official told reporters.

Asked if Adams had any intimation that a bomb might be in the offing, the official, who asked not to be named, replied: ``Yes. He said he was hearing some very disturbing news and he would call us back.''

The official added, however, that Adams did not explicitly say that he knew that a bomb would go off.

U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and other U.S. officials spoke with all the parties involved in the Northern Ireland conflict during the afternoon, the official said.

The United States did not know who had set off the blast in London's Docklands financial district, which wounded more than 100 people, but the official said there was an ``obvious suspicion'' as to who was responsible. The bomb occurred minutes after Ireland's semi-state RTE radio said it had received a statement from the IRA saying its 17-month ceasefire was over.

^REUTER

RB-- 02/09/96 18:42:00

FAX COVER SHEET

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Washington

3100 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

NES-FYT

To Mary Ann Peters
At NSC
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From Peter Ives MacCott
Telephone _____
Date 8 Feb 96 Time _____
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MESSAGE:

Mary Ann,
This may
complement the points
John made to you
last night. Peter

RESTRICTED

IRISH PROPOSAL FOR "DAYTON-TYPE" PROXIMITY TALKS

- No objection in principle to the proposal. If it ever became feasible we would certainly contemplate it. But - as the immediate Unionist reaction showed - it is simply not a runner in present circumstances.
- Like the Irish, we would like to see all-party talks by the end of February. But it has long been crystal clear that the core Unionist position is that they will not enter such talks until there has been prior decommissioning or an election. Inevitable that the "Dayton proximity" formula would be decoded as all-party talks without either.
- We made clear to the Irish that this was not a starter, and that if it were put up in neon lights it would immediately be rejected by the Unionists as a gimmick (or worse), as it was.
- The resonances of former Yugoslavia in the Irish proposal play very badly with Unionists, since the Bosnia settlement centred on the carving up of territory and the transference of sovereignty - as Paisley immediately pointed out.
- We believe it essential to work for convergence on the one substantive proposal - an elective mechanism - which can bring all parties to the table, not on pieces of theatre which may play well with one side but have no chance of acceptance by the other.
- The elective mechanism does offer a real opportunity to find common ground and create the confidence which would lead directly to all-party negotiations. [Having seen the paper we gave the Irish, the NSC know that we are looking for an elective proposal which is genuinely designed to meet nationalist concerns and offer a real opportunity for convergence.]

RESTRICTED

SMJ/APDL/47514

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

Personal and Confidential

15 February 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
and NSC Staff Director
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

*I sent a copy
to [unclear]*
Yes CC to R + return

Dear Nancy

I am enclosing, for your personal information, copy of a letter about the proximity talks idea which Dick Spring has just sent to David Trimble.

The Liaison Group of British and Irish officials are meeting to-day in order to prepare the ground for a very early Summit between the two Prime Ministers. Our officials are also meeting Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness tomorrow.

I will make contact on Saturday morning to let you have an assessment on all the above.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely


Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

*We need to [unclear] now
more than ever.*



OIFIG AN TÁNAISTE AGUS AN AIRE GNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHA
OFFICE OF THE TÁNAISTE AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2
DUBLIN 2

14 February 1996

Mr. David Trimble MP
Leader
Ulster Unionist Party
3 Glengall Street
Belfast BT12 5AE

Dear David,

In light of your comments in Washington concerning my proposal for proximity talks, I felt that it would be useful to write to you to expand on why I put forward this idea.

I enclose a copy of an explanatory note setting out the details of the proposal, a copy of which, I understand, was forwarded to your office in Westminster by the Irish Embassy on the day on which I made public my idea.

As you will see, what is proposed is not a conference to discuss the substance of a comprehensive settlement. Rather, it is an attempt to telescope, in time and space, the present series of bilateral meetings between the Governments and parties, and between the parties themselves - to "fast track" the preparatory talks, if you like.

My concern, in putting forward the proposal, was that the existing nature of contacts, frequent and welcome though they are, could continue merely as a chain of inconclusive meetings. This would be an inadequate response to the urgent need to move to substantive negotiations. Reaching an agreement on how to get to such negotiations has so far proved elusive. The number of parties involved and the range of issues to be covered has made the preparatory talks far more complex than in 1991. It is difficult to imagine how agreement can be reached on all these interlocking issues without some more collective focus than we have achieved so far.

- 2 -

I believe that a two-day intensive meeting bringing together both Governments and all parties may offer the only realistic prospect of reaching early agreement on such a package. If there are better ways of achieving the necessary agreement within an acceptably short time-frame, I would obviously be prepared to look at them. However, as of now, no such alternatives have come to my notice.

In putting forward my proposal, I made a particular effort to accommodate unionist concerns.

First, the very idea of holding the talks in proximity rather than in direct format was specifically and exclusively intended to cater for the concerns of the unionist parties. (As the attached note makes clear, the Dayton analogy applies only to the proximity format.) At the time I put forward the proposals, the only parties who had difficulty in meeting either Government or any particular party were certain unionist parties, including your own. I felt that holding the meeting in a single venue, or even in adjacent venues, would allow those unionist parties to participate in discussions on the way forward without sacrificing their position of refusing at this stage to talk to certain parties.

Secondly, I went out of my way, in the explanatory note, to confirm publicly the position of the Irish Government in relation to its non-participation in discussions relating exclusively to the internal affairs of Northern Ireland, which I had earlier outlined in my letter to you of 18 December, last year.

Thirdly, I made it clear that one of the issues which the Irish Government wished to see addressed in the proximity meeting would be whether and how an elected body or an electoral process could play a part in all party negotiations.

My proposal for proximity talks is essentially the most practical and sensible way I can think of to meet the overwhelming need for an intensive collective dialogue in the preparatory track while avoiding meetings which would be sensitive or unacceptable for any party. I would ask you to look again at the idea and consider giving it your support, in the interest of the political progress we all so badly need.

The Irish and British Governments are at one with the Ulster Unionist Party in their determination that there can be no concession to any effort to use violence to influence the course of our negotiations, either preparatory or substantive. Nevertheless, I believe that we should do all that we can to deny those who resort to violence the opportunity to justify their actions, unjustifiable as they may be, on our failure to make progress towards a comprehensive political settlement.

- 3 -

One concrete way of demonstrating our shared determination to reach a political settlement would be for us to meet at the earliest available opportunity to exchange views on how we can best make progress. You will recall that we agreed on the desirability of such a meeting when we spoke by phone on 1 February. I regret that my proposal to meet with you in London on Wednesday of last week did not suit you. If you are agreeable, perhaps your office might make contact with mine to arrange a mutually convenient date and venue, so that we can discuss our respective concerns face-to-face.

Yours sincerely



Dick Spring TD
Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Explanatory note for the Information of the Media

Irish Government Proposal for a two-day Multilateral Proximity Meeting

The Irish Government proposes that the Irish and British Governments convene a two-day meeting in the second half of February designed to bring together, on a voluntary basis, all-parties and both Governments in a single venue. An ideal venue would be the Castle Buildings complex at Stormont in Belfast, in which a number of the Northern parties have already established offices.

The meeting would operate on a proximity basis, broadly similar to that which pertained at the Dayton Talks, which achieved the breakthrough in the conflict in former-Yugoslavia. This would leave the parties free to decide with whom they wished to enter discussions. No party would be obliged to share a table with any other party or Government. No surrender of principle would therefore be involved for any party taking part.

The purpose of the meeting would be to reach broad agreement on a basis and timetable for the launch of all-party negotiations. Matters to be touched on would include:

- a) The report of the International Body (on decommissioning);
- b) The basis, participation, structure, format and agenda of all party negotiations; and
- c) Whether and how an elected body or an electoral process could play a part in such negotiations.

The meeting would not discuss matters proper to substantive talks.

The Irish Government would not be involved in matters relating exclusively to negotiations on relationships within Northern Ireland (Strand One). However, it would obviously have a role in arrangements regarding Strands Two and Three and the overall management of the three-stranded negotiations.

Such a meeting would be consistent with the arrangements for preparatory talks set out in the Joint Communiqué of 28 November 1995, and would be a logical and practical way to develop the pattern of meetings envisaged in it.

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

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23 February 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Deputy Assistant to the President
and NSC Staff Director
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
WASHINGTON DC 20500

*cl sent a copy
to MAP*

*FAX to TV
tp in wd
on my desk*

Dear Nancy

I am enclosing copy of a letter which the Taoiseach sent to Prime Minister Major this afternoon.

The two Prime Ministers had a helpful discussion on the phone this morning, and will speak again on Sunday. In addition, senior officials from both sides will meet in London on Monday afternoon.

The Taoiseach very much welcomed and valued the President's telephone call to-day.

I will call you later in the afternoon.

Yours sincerely


Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 2 -

They remain deeply opposed, as you will be aware, to any form of elective process other than a Northern Ireland-wide list approach, and also to any role or function being attributed to an elected body. The sole purpose of any elective process should be the selection of negotiating teams. The inclusion of the loyalist parties must, I believe, also be satisfactorily accommodated in any such process.

As regards your proposed "building blocks" paper, I believe it is essential that the draft should be in the hands of our negotiating teams for definitive discussion as soon as possible.

Reflecting on statements in our Parliaments, our officials' discussions with Sinn Féin suggest that a formal statement from you in the House of Commons would carry particular weight in underlining our joint decision to have all party negotiations on a specific date. An affirmative resolution, approving our agreement, in both Parliaments would be crucial in removing any uncertainty about such a date.

For completeness, may I say Paddy Teahon has informed me that our officials have received a draft Communiqué which in our view requires a number of amendments to be acceptable, especially in relation to having a specific date for negotiations to which we hold. We cannot accept a date for negotiations that is dependant on agreement on the form of an elective process. That would undermine belief in the definitive nature of a specific date.

I look forward to our conversation on Sunday and to an early Summit.

With very warm wishes
Yours sincerely,



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

23 February, 1996

The Rt. Hon. John Major M.P.,
Prime Minister.

Dear 

I found our conversation this morning very positive and helpful.

This letter is intended to identify the key points we will be discussing on Sunday.

I welcome very much our joint determination to have a specific date for all party negotiations to which we will hold. We believe this is key to our endeavours to renew the ceasefire.

We have always been clear between us that an immediate transition, without further preconditions, from any elective process to all party negotiations, on a three stranded basis, was an essential requirement if nationalists were to have any incentive to consider such a process. It is understood, of course, that in the case of Sinn Féin, the restoration of the IRA ceasefire would have to precede entry to the negotiations.

On the election issue, as I said to you, we believe nationalists have made substantial movement in accepting the principle of an elective process. We believe, therefore, that the issues of the form of the process and not having a body as such should be settled as closely as possible to the nationalists' position on these matters.

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FAX COVER SHEET

FAX NO.

—

DATE:

212 MARCH 1996

TO:

THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR:

MS NANCY SODERBERG

FROM:

AMBASSADOR GALLAGHER

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVERING SHEET: 2

TRANSMITTED FROM FAX NUMBER: (202) 319-9757

For information, please.

12x03/96 18:31
12-MAR '96 (TUE) 18:08

***** EMB URGENT

634 P02/02 MAR 12 '96 16:44
110.855 002
P.001

12-MAR '96 (TUE) 17:39 BBC NEWSROOM BELFAST

TEL:01232 338806

P.001

Combined Loyalist Military Command

Belfast

March 1996

We have taken careful note of the last I.R.A. statement which contains the threat to continue the war for the next twenty-five years.

Threats of war, or war itself, will not lessen our resolve for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom so long as the greater number of our citizens require it.

Arrogance and outdated ideology does not impress us and has no place in a modern society.

The I.R.A. must come to terms with the indisputable fact that we, the Unionist people, are the British presence in Northern Ireland and our democratic desire, freely and continually expressed, cannot and will not be changed, as has been clearly demonstrated over seventy years, by threats, bombs or even death itself.

Have no lessons been learned from the past; are our people, all of our people, to be subjected to interminable warfare; must we listen to the cries of our women and children for another lifetime? We must not permit the past to dominate our future.

From a position of confidence, strength and sophistication, we have withstood the recent provocation of I.R.A. bombs on the mainland which have killed our innocent British fellow-citizens. These atrocities cannot be permitted to continue without a telling response from this source.

We are poised and ready to strike to effect. We will give blow for blow. As in the past, whatever the cost, we will gladly pay it.

Now is the time to draw back from the brink!

We genuinely want peace and we truly desire that wholesome society which all decent people demand.

Despite the frustration we all occasionally feel, the democratic process is the only way forward.

Throughout the proceedings of the past eighteen months we have been honest, honourable and principled and, having acknowledged the need for sociological change, we have played our part to the full.

Our society has changed, is changing and will continue to change.

Unprecedented dialogue between political Parties is taking place and will intensify in the future. New ground is constantly being broken and old animosities gradually laid to rest.

We are convinced that sufficient political agreement can be reached in order to allow all of our citizens to have an equal and meaningful stake in the new society that is coming.

We all have had hard decisions to make in the cause of PEACE.