

# FOIA MARKER

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**Folder Title:**

Ireland-London Bombing-Outside Comments, February 9, 1996 [1]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE       | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                              | DATE                  | RESTRICTION                      |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| <del>001. memo</del>           | <del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Next Steps on Northern Ireland (2 pages)</del>              | <del>02/13/1996</del> | <del>P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023</del> |
| <del>002. memo</del>           | <del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Strategy for Northern Ireland Peace Process (3 pages)</del> | <del>02/11/1996</del> | <del>P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023</del> |
| <del>003. talking points</del> | <del>re: Points for Call to John Holmes (2 pages)</del>                                    | <del>02/00/1996</del> | <del>P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023</del> |
| 004. cable                     | John Holmes to Anthony Lake (2 pages)                                                      | 02/01/1996            | P1/b(1)                          |
| 005. cable                     | John Holmes to Anthony Lake (3 pages)                                                      | 02/01/1996            | P1/b(1)                          |
| 006. cable                     | John Holmes to Anthony Lake (2 pages)                                                      | 02/01/1996            | P1/b(1)                          |
| 007. cable                     | Ambassador Crow to Anthony Lake (2 pages)                                                  | 02/22/1996            | P1/b(1)                          |
| <del>008. cable</del>          | <del>re: Northern Ireland: U.S. Policy After the Ceasefire Breakdown (8 pages)</del>       | <del>02/21/1996</del> | <del>P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023</del> |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)  
OA/Box Number: 1397

### FOLDER TITLE:

Ireland-London Bombing, Outside Comments, February 9, 1996 [1]

2011-0355-F

rs1681

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

0898

2/14/96

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.25)

KRH 4/11/2023

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1996

96 FEB 13 08:53

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT:

Next Steps on Northern Ireland

*Agree - Theory*

*-end violence*

We are dealing with two main issues as we seek to get the peace process back on track in the wake of the London bombing: how to keep all parties focused on the goal of substantive negotiations, and how to handle U.S. contacts with Adams and other Sinn Fein members.

#### Negotiations

Prime Ministers Bruton and Major are tentatively scheduled to meet February 21, at which time we hope they will announce a package for getting talks back on track. Major made a helpful statement in Parliament yesterday in which he left open the door to Sinn Fein participation if the cease-fire is restored. The question is what other conditions are placed on Sinn Fein's return to the table. The package must be saleable to Sinn Fein/IRA, while not appearing to reward violence by easing the terms for all-party talks. In the wake of the bombing it must recreate a measure of confidence among unionists.

We think such a package would contain the following elements:

- the *sine qua non* of a restored cease-fire;
- an elective process as a door to all-party talks;
- an elected body that would meet periodically while negotiations continue but would have no legislative or administrative powers, nor any role in negotiations;
- acceptance by Sinn Fein of the Mitchell Report, including the six principles of nonviolence and, in principle, the proposal for decommissioning in parallel with talks; and
- some kind of proximity talks of the kind proposed by the Irish Government before the bombing, in which the parties would ratify the package.

*SF. cont.*

*More difficult than we are*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/13/06

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

W The only element that was not part of the likely package before the bombing is the co-existence of an elected body with the negotiations. While it is not intrinsically necessary to the process, it probably represents the price the unionists will exact for staying engaged. The key will be getting SDLP leader John Hume to go along. We have invited him to come here as soon as possible.

V I will be in touch with the Irish and British governments to urge them to agree on this or a similar package before the Major-Bruton Summit. If it will help get their agreement, I will ask you to call both prime ministers later in the week. Senator Mitchell expects to see both Major and Bruton when he is in Europe on other business next week; we will consider whether it would be useful for him to have other meetings as well.

#### Adams/Sinn Fein Contacts

I THINK  
THIS IS  
PROBABLY  
A MISTAKE  
I think  
this is  
prob. a  
mistake

There is great interest in whether the USG will revoke the visa waivers and fundraising permission given to Gerry Adams and other Sinn Fein members in the context of the peace process. There are four Sinn Fein members who would otherwise be ineligible to enter the U.S. who have valid visa waivers. At least one of them is in the U.S. now lobbying on behalf of Sinn Fein. It is unclear whether he is seeking to raise funds. We could seek his voluntary departure from the U.S. to facilitate the peace process. If, however, we revoke his visa and seek to compel his departure, or curtail his activities, we may be challenged in court on First Amendment grounds. Adams, by far the most visible, just applied for a new waiver last week to replace the one that expired February 12. He wants to come here for several weeks in early March and plans to raise funds while here.

AGREE  
agru  
agru  
AGREE

The key decision is whether to renew Adams' waiver and if so, whether to reimpose the prohibition on fundraising. Justice is inclined to revoke the fundraising permit on all outstanding visas and Congress is likely to raise the issue also. My sense is we should defer a decision until we can judge whether he is having any success getting the cease-fire restored. If nothing changes in the next few weeks, one option is to ask him voluntarily to defer his travel. We will consult with the Attorney General in the next few days and work out an agreed approach for your consideration. We will need to make decisions on the issues well before the St. Patrick's Day events begin March.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2/13/96

0845

S. DEKBERG

96 FEB 11 PG: 02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT:

Strategy for Northern Ireland Peace Process

Purpose

To decide how to try to keep the peace process moving in the wake of the Canary Wharf bombing of February 9.

POLICY

Objective:

The IRA has now claimed responsibility for the bomb, which took the lives of two people and injured scores. Our objective is to keep the peace process moving in spite of this setback. This requires simultaneously pursuing three priorities:

- We must stand with the British and Irish Governments in condemning terrorism and making clear our revulsion at the resort to violence by the IRA.
- At the same time, we must keep alive hope in the peace process. This implies that the Administration needs to remain actively engaged.
- We must give Gerry Adams incentive to try to restore the consensus of the IRA leadership for a political solution rather than a campaign of violence. Adams is the only person with the stature to do this, if it can be done at all. Giving Adams some room to maneuver while not being seen to condone the bombing or his failure to condemn it will be tricky -- but very important.

Without a cease-fire and Sinn Fein's participation, negotiations might achieve a political settlement -- but not peace. Therefore we must do what we can to keep Sinn Fein involved in the process and move to all-party talks as soon as possible. The key issue is what additional steps, beyond the sine qua non of a restored cease-fire, will be required for Sinn Fein to have a seat at the table. Our view is that going through an elective process has now become a minimum requirement. NIO Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 2/11/06

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.26)

KBH 7/11/2023

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

Mayhew and (privately) even Deputy Prime Minister Spring think that agreeing to decommissioning in parallel with the talks (a suggestion in the Mitchell report) may now also be necessary. Other elements that might be included are a total renunciation of violence and acceptance of the Mitchell principles by Sinn Fein. Some type of proximity talks, perhaps with Sinn Fein at one remove, are also a possibility. We will be urging the players to avoid locking themselves into a particular formula at this point.

At some point, if the cease-fire is not restored and Sinn Fein does not distance itself from the resumption of violence (which would in effect mean a split in the IRA), we will want to pursue the second-best option, which is negotiations without Sinn Fein's participation.

#### ISSUES:

One issue that must be addressed is whether we should join with the British and Irish Governments in refusing to conduct business as usual with Adams until the cease-fire is restored. We do not want to undercut whatever influence Adams has in the IRA by publicly taking away one of his "cards," his access to us. We propose to say that we plan to continue to talk to all parties about how to move the peace process forward, but we have no current plans to meet with Adams. (This would not now preclude telephone calls to Adams.)

A second question is whether the permission that was granted to Sinn Fein to raise funds in this country was contingent on the cease-fire. We are pursuing this urgently with Justice. If the privilege did automatically expire, we will announce that fact.

The related issue is whether to revoke Adams' visa waiver. At present we would plan to discourage him from seeking to come to the U.S., so as not to have to decide between undercutting him (and taking heat from the Irish-American community) and appearing to condone terrorism. We are looking into the legal status of other Sinn Fein representatives who have visa waivers.

Finally, we will be asked whether Adams will be invited to the annual St. Patrick's Day event. Publicly we will say the guest list has not been decided. At present we do not see how he can be invited unless the cease-fire is restored.

#### RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO KEEP THE PROCESS GOING:

Senator Mitchell will be Europe February 21-22 for non-Ireland-related business. We recommend that we ask him to meet with Prime Ministers Major and Bruton to discuss where we go from here. Beyond that, there are a number of other options for

diplomatic activity, including a Hume visit here later this week (Nancy has invited him); inviting other Irish and British officials here; or a trip by Nancy and/or me to the UK and Ireland in a week or so.

X ( We would also work on how to orchestrate an expression of popular support for peace. One option, which intrigues John Hume, would be to hold a referendum to allow people to express opposition to violence and support for negotiations. We will work on this and other ideas, such as a rally or letter-writing campaign.

W Ron Brown has proposed a follow-up trade and investment conference that would focus very specifically on the commercial aspect and firm-to-firm "matchmaking." We would go ahead and announce this conference, probably to take place in the U.S. in June.

CONGRESSIONAL/DIPLOMATIC/PUBLIC LIAISON:

If you approve this strategy, we will consult with London and Dublin about what we plan to do. We will also need to keep key members of Congress and Irish-Americans informed.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the strategy outlined above.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

*Don't put  
ideas*

BC-WH-BRFG-MCCURRY SKED  
WH-BRFG-MCCURRY sked  
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TRANSCRIPT  
February 12, 1996  
NEWS CONFERENCE  
MIKE MCCURRY  
WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
REGULAR DAILY NEWS BRIEFING.

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1) willing to endorse  
elections  
didn't object

2) punish / pressure  
adams.

WHITE HOUSE DAILY NEWS BRIEFING

FEBRUARY 12, 1996

+++ Elapsed Time 00:00, Eastern Time 12:38 +++

SPEAKERS LIST: MICHAEL MCCURRY, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

(+)

MCCURRY: Welcome, ladies and gentlemen to the White House daily briefing, proving that if you hold it, they will come. Otherwise I can't think of a reason for you all to be here.

What would you like to talk about today? I'm sorry. Ms. Mitchell?

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) What is he doing or are you (OFF-MIKE)?

MCCURRY: David Trimble will be here for lunch today with the National Security Advisor, Tony Lake. The President will drop by about lunch and I suspect around 2:00. We have very urgent need now to do everything we can -- those who believe in the Northern Ireland peace process -- to encourage a resumption of the cease-fire, to encourage the parties to continue the pathway to resolve all party talks that can resolve their differences and to continue to honor the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland, which very manifestly are in favor of peace.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:01, Eastern Time 12:39 +++

And the purpose of the conversation with Mr. Trimble will be to that end. We will continue our contacts with the parties, with the government of the United Kingdom and with the government of the Republic of Ireland, to urge them in the strongest possible way to find a way through the aftermath of this terrible tragedy and towards the pathway of peace that once looked so promising.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:02, Eastern Time 12:40 +++

QUESTION: Mike, in light (OFF-MIKE) condemn the bombing (OFF- MIKE)

blaming it on the British government, what is the Administration's posture now toward Gerry Adams?

MCCURRY: Mr. Adams is an important leader in this process because he speaks for Sinn Fein. It is hard to imagine a process making progress towards peace without the active involvement of Sinn Fein. But again we call on all parties to honor their commitments, to especially return to the promise of the cease-fire that changed the lives dramatically for the people of Northern Ireland, and we will continue to press that argument.

QUESTION: If I could follow up, Mike, really that would have been true last Thursday, what you just said. Has the bombing and his reaction to it changed anything in terms of our posture toward him, willingness to have him here for visits, direct contacts with him, and so forth?

MCCURRY: Well, I don't believe there are any meetings planned currently with Mr. Adams, but we continue to urge all parties to do what they can to use their office and to use their persuasive abilities to encourage those with whom they are in contact to honor the terms of the cease-fire and to return to peace.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:03, Eastern Time 12:41 +++

QUESTION: What discussions occurred over the weekend between White House officials, Administration officials, and Gerry Adams?

MCCURRY: There may have been some phone contact, but there was a great deal of work by the White House and by others within our government working with all sides to do what we can to try to keep this process on track, especially the need to resume the cease-fire.

QUESTION: If I can follow up, did the Administration or anybody in the White House seek some kind of explanation, assurances from Adams? What was the nature of those discussions?

MCCURRY: Well, we've had strenuous conversations with everyone we've been in contact to do what parties can to return to the cease-fire and to return to discussions that can lead towards peace.

MORE .ETX

\*\*\*\* filed by:RB--(-- ) on 02/12/96 at 13:20EST \*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\* printed by:WHPR(JMAS) on 02/12/96 at 13:39EST \*\*\*\*

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WH-BRFG-MCCURRY 1stadd  
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XXX lead towards peace.

QUESTION: In view of this statement, do you have a view of this statement that he made?

MCCURRY: Well, the statement expressed sympathy for the victims which was encouraging. It did not indicate any less of a desire to continue the process of peace.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:04, Eastern Time 12:42 +++

But parties need to speak for themselves. Our government condemned the attack. We believe that was the right way to address the incident.

QUESTION: When Prime Minister Major is saying that talks with Sinn Fein cannot continue and indeed apparently they're not talking now with Sinn Fein at all. Does the U.S. support that position and the what has to be...

MCCURRY: We are aware of the views that the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. We'll continue to discuss matters with them closely and urgently.

QUESTION: Well, if Major says his ministers can't talk to Sinn Fein representatives does that mean the U.S., since you are saying you might still talk to Sinn Fein representatives, would become sort of an intermediary?

MCCURRY: Well, as I indicated earlier, there are no plans for meetings that I'm aware of at the moment.

QUESTION: Mike, Mr. Tremble is calling for the U.S. to change its policy to granting visas to Gerry Adams. Are you reviewing that policy at all?

+++ Elapsed Time 00:05, Eastern Time 12:43 +++

MCCURRY: I indicated earlier and would continue to indicate that we are urging all parties to do what we believe is necessary to keep the process moving forward. We believe the actions our government has taken have been in furtherance of that process.

QUESTION: So you're not considering changing the policy?

MCCURRY: Well, we will most urgently see what we can do to get the ceasefire back in place and to continue the process forward towards peace. Now if that happens, and we firmly believe we can use every ounce of diplomatic effort at our availability to do that, that would make all these other questions mute. Yes.

QUESTION: Does the U.S. still view Adams as the leader of Sinn Fein and are you still viewing him in that role...

MCCURRY: We're not aware of any change in the nature of that organization's leadership.

QUESTION: ...he said that he didn't know about the bombing in advance and

it supposedly was carried out by the IRA. Does that undermine his authority with them?

+++ Elapsed Time 00:06, Eastern Time 12:44 +++

MCCURRY: Well, the Sinn Fein and Mr. Adams have always taken the position that that organization and its political activity are separate from the Irish Republican Army as you know.

QUESTION: Is the President at this point considering sending an administration officials over to London or Ireland or Northern Ireland to participate in efforts to get this back on track.

MCCURRY: There are no...

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) or Lake or perhaps others?

MCCURRY: There are no definite plans that I'm aware of at the moment for U.S. government officials to travel to work on that issue in particular. Senator Mitchell, who retains his position as a special advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on economic matters related to Northern Ireland, has a previously scheduled trip to London but it's in connection with another subject. I believe the subject is Bosnia and not the Northern Ireland peace process. Yes.

QUESTION: Do you consider that the Mitchell effort to break the deadlock that was rejected by London, is that pretty much dead?

MCCURRY: By all means, no.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:07, Eastern Time 12:45 +++

The Mitchell Commission and its report on the decommissioning issue gave to the parties the pathway they can follow back to the promise of peace, and that's what they need. They need to get back on that path now in the aftermath of this incident.

QUESTION: Do you consider that pathway to be rejected? I mean Major says he...

MCCURRY: It is not the statements of the Prime Minister Major -- were very clear. He had an alternative that he proposed and others commented on the Mitchell report, the international body's report on decommissioning.

MORE

.ETX

\*\*\*\* filed by:RB--(--) on 02/12/96 at 13:33EST \*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\* printed by:WHPR(JMAS) on 02/12/96 at 13:39EST \*\*\*\*

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WH-BRFG-MCCURRY 2ndadd  
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XXX report on decommissioning.

MCCURRY: Our government commented by saying it was a very important and very valuable study of how the parties themselves can move toward all party talks; it would be inclusive. And that remains, in our view, the way that peace can be advanced in Northern Ireland. Yes?

QUESTION: Prime Minister Bruton said today that Prime Minister Major in his insistence on having these elections in Northern Ireland was pouring gasoline on the flames. And it seems that this demand was the thing that really threw a monkey wrench into the talks.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:08, Eastern Time 12:46 +++

Are there any efforts by the Administration to get around this thing and to...

MCCURRY: There are all the efforts that I just described. You will see us refraining from comments on the positions that individual parties have taken or statements they have made because our work will be toward the effort of getting them back to a process in which all party talks are possible and most urgently getting them back to a cease-fire that holds and that protects the people in Northern Ireland.

QUESTION: So, you're not willing even to say that you disagree with Mr. Adams' statement that John Major was to blame for the bombing?

MCCURRY: I carefully answered that question already.

QUESTION: Excuse me, you don't mind if I pose it again?

MCCURRY: OK.

QUESTION: I missed it.

MCCURRY: I'm sorry. Go ahead; pose it again.

QUESTION: I just -- Am I correct in saying you refuse even to say the Administration disagrees with the statement by Mr. Adams that Mr. Major was responsible for the bombing?

+++ Elapsed Time 00:09, Eastern Time 12:47 +++

MCCURRY: We commented on the terrible incident that occurred, expressed our condemnation of that act and by our statement indicated what we believe to be the correct and proper response to such a heinous act.

Yes?

QUESTION: How difficult does it make it for the Administration to serve as an arbitrator in this dispute if, in fact, Gerry Adams will refuse to even condemn the bombing that occurred over the weekend? And was that impressed upon Mr. Adams in the discussions with the Administration officials?

MCCURRY: We had, you know, very candid and very frank discussions with many of those who are part of this process. But we also understand the very complex dynamic that all these leaders face as they take risks for peace. The best we can do is to encourage them to take risks and for many those risks are considerable. That's true of every peace process that the United States works to further.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:10, Eastern Time 12:48 +++

It's true in the Middle East; it was certainly true in the case of Bosnia; it's true elsewhere. The courage of leaders who are willing to risk themselves for the sake of peace is usually a central element in the ability to arrive at peace.

Yes?

QUESTION: Does that mean that you're worried that if you did call on Adams to condemn this act more vociferously than his leadership position could be jeopardized even further than...

MCCURRY: That is the kind of speculation I won't engage in here.

Yes?

QUESTION: As part of encouraging the parties here to take risks, does that include encouraging Gerry Adams, or encouraging opponents of elections to embrace elections as an option to...

MCCURRY: Well, Senator Mitchell's report on behalf of the international body said that an elected process might be a useful element of the process, even though that was outside the remit of the international body and our comments on that report are very clear.

QUESTION: Well, does that mean that you find the elections a possible option here?

+++ Elapsed Time 00:11, Eastern Time 12:49 +++

MCCURRY: We concur that the Mitchell body's review of that issue, even though it was necessarily outside the remit of the international body was a useful contribution to the understanding of the issues.

Yes?

QUESTION: If Gerry Adams can't, in effect, deliver something from the IRA, at least a commitment to peace, then what exactly is the U.S. trying to do in talking to him?

MCCURRY: Well, we don't accept the premise of that question because he has been an important contributor in the discussions that have occurred to date, and we hope he will remain so.

MORE

.ETX

\*\*\*\* filed by:RB--(-- ) on 02/12/96 at 13:35EST \*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\* printed by:WHPR(JMAS) on 02/12/96 at 13:39EST \*\*\*\*

XXX will remain so.

QUESTION: At this point, he seems not to have any ...

MCCURRY: Well, I...

QUESTION: You can't believe he didn't know?

MCCURRY: I don't believe our government will make summary judgments of that nature at this point.

Yes?

QUESTION: How much of a foreign policy setback do you think this is for the Clinton Administration?

MCCURRY: Our effort to advance peace was an important foreign policy objective, and there's no doubt that we are disappointed in this outcome. Yet, we are not willing at this point to say that there is any kind of collapse of the peace process or an end to the peace process.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:12, Eastern Time 12:50 +++

There has been an announcement by one party of an abrogation of the cease-fire, and our most urgent task is to get all parties to, again, honor the cease-fire. We believe that's not without some possibility.

QUESTION: Has the President made any phone calls over the weekend or today to any of the parties?

MCCURRY: Only the calls to Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Bruton that he reported to you already. I'm not aware that there were any additional calls.

QUESTION: That was last Friday?

MCCURRY: It was over the weekend, yes.

QUESTION: I can understand why you sometimes have to talk to people with whom you disagree even strongly in a mediation effort of this kind. But it's not clear what would be lost by the Administration saying that it disagreed with a statement on Adam's part a great many people here and in England must have found abhorrent.

MCCURRY: Well, I don't ...

QUESTION: And the Administration's not even saying that it disagrees with that?

MCCURRY: I can't speak for people in Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland or elsewhere.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:13, Eastern Time 12:51 +++

I can tell you what we said about this tragic incident. I said that we

believe our response was the correct and proper one. I can tell you that we hope that those who judge these incidents will reflect on what's happened, and see the urgent need to return to the peace process. And through my answers to your questions now, you may gather that's trying to make that more possible.

Yes?

QUESTION: Is the Administration now in contact with Adams and others trying to get the IRA back on board on a cease-fire, or do you have independent contacts with the IRA, or its representatives other than Adams, in an effort to bring them back on board?

MCCURRY: We do not have, that I am aware of, independent contacts with anyone who purports to represent the IRA.

Yes?

QUESTION: The Prime Minister is saying that this may not be the last atrocity if the cease-fire is not renewed, and yet the IRA seems to be indicating that this was a one-shot deal, so to speak. Is there any intelligence or information that the U.S. government has as to what...

+++ Elapsed Time 00:14, Eastern Time 12:52 +++

MCCURRY: If we had intelligence information, I obviously wouldn't discuss it.

QUESTION: Do you see any merit on either of those sides, or do you believe one over the other?

MCCURRY: I think that a lot of the information, we'll evaluate it as best we can and make the proper decisions accordingly.

Yes?

QUESTION: Another subject -- is the President going to take a flood-viewing trip to the Pacific Northwest?

MCCURRY: The President plans a trip to the Pacific Northwest to inspect the flood damage in states that he declared major disaster areas. We'll have more details on that. The trip will be Wednesday. Then the President will also make a previously-scheduled trip to the New Jersey-New York metropolitan area on Thursday.

QUESTION: Is that all one trip?

MCCURRY: It's not clear at this point. We'll let you know more on the details of the travel.

QUESTION: Do you have any idea what he'll be focusing on this trip?

MCCURRY: Well, he's going to the Pacific Northwest to look particularly at the damage that's been caused by the flooding there by the storms that began January 26.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:15, Eastern Time 12:53 +++

He'll be very concerned about federal relief efforts, and whether everything is working well.

MORE

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XXX is working well.

MCCURRY: Our report from James Lee Witt, Federal Emergency Management Agency head, is that things have been working very well there. There's great cooperation between local disaster relief officials and the federal officials. The President will, of course, want to be there to do everything he can, one, to provide any comfort to the victims of the flooding; and two, to make sure that all federal efforts are occurring satisfactorily.

QUESTION: What's the trip -- What's the event that's the draw.

MCCURRY: It's been a combination of events. There's a fund-raiser at one point.

(UNKNOWN): (OFF-MIKE)

MCCURRY: There'll be some more work on technology in the classrooms during an event Thursday and the day Thursday.

Yes?

QUESTION: How close is the Administration to making a decision on sanctions against China for sales to Pakistan?

MCCURRY: That's an issue that remains under review.

QUESTION: Is there a deadline for that?

MCCURRY: Not a deadline -- The government addresses the question of sanctions as a result of making a determination, and we evaluate all the information to see if it's necessary to make such a determination.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:16, Eastern Time 12:54 +++

QUESTION: Could you help us by telling us at what stage of the process the matter has reached?

MCCURRY: We obviously are looking at information available to us and trying to understand events like particular transactions all the time. We're looking for new information all the time on subjects of that nature because they're a very real concern to us given our proliferation concerns. When we have satisfactory information to make the kind of determination that would then trigger sanctions, we do so and act according to the requirements of our law.

QUESTION: So, there's a determination, a factual determination. After you've made it, then is there a process here that has to be gone through for a decision to come that takes some time, or what?

MCCURRY: Well, it can occur in different ways depending on the nature of the transaction. It can -- it usually involves an interagency process, and this is a matter of sufficient concern that there's been a great deal of interagency work on the issue.

. QUESTION: Mike, what kind of turnout is the President looking for in Iowa for him tonight?

MCCURRY: Enough to, you know, win the caucuses.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:17, Eastern Time 12:55 +++

(LAUGHTER)

Obviously, one reason for the President to go there this weekend was to stimulate interest since the President is unopposed. He wanted first to thank the people of Iowa for the support he's gotten over the last three years and then encourage those Democrats to go out and participate in what is a grassroots process that really launches, in some ways, the events that culminate in the nomination convention that will occur in Chicago later this year where the President fully well expects to be renominated.

QUESTION: How closely will the President be watching the Iowa caucuses?

MCCURRY: Not very.

QUESTION: Does the President think turnout matters in the Democratic caucuses?

MCCURRY: Well, it's -- yes. It does make a difference because mostly -- not so much for the presidential selection event because there's no drama on that side, but it is a process by which local precinct organizers begin the work of preparing for a general election. Iowa's a state that we hope to do very well in the general election in November.

+++ Elapsed Time 00:18, Eastern Time 12:56 +++

And this is a participatory process in which a party helps rebuild itself at a local level, so it's very important. That's why we've encouraged turnout.

QUESTION: Would you say that a low turnout would be a sign of little interest then?

MCCURRY: A low turnout wouldn't mean much of anything, to be honest with you, but it provides, you know, bodies that can kind of be identified who can work later in the election who can help down ballot candidates who can get out and, you know, do the type of trench work that political campaigns need during election time later this year.

QUESTION: Mike, why do you say the President is not watching this very closely? I mean, isn't he very interested in what comes out of Iowa?


MCCURRY: He's not very intellectually stimulated by the debate on the Republican side.

Yes?

(LAUGHTER)

QUESTION: Would the President be disappointed if he got less than 90 percent of the Democratic vote?

MCCURRY: I can't hear you, Leo. What?



## THE WHITE HOUSE

---

To: Nancy Soderberg

Date: 2-23-96

From: Marilyn DiGiacobbe

Page 1 of 3

---

Attached are updated talking points on Northern Ireland.  
Thank you for speaking out on behalf of the President. We  
appreciate your keeping us informed of your ongoing efforts.

## POINTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

### Bombings

- President has unequivocally condemned the bombings and expressed his sympathy for the victims and their families. Terrorists must be brought to justice.
- He called both Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Bruton the day of the first attack to extend his sympathy.
- Agreed with them that we cannot allow terrorists to derail peace process; offered to do everything possible to assist them in continuing search for peace.
- As President's visit so graphically demonstrated, people of Northern Ireland clearly want lasting peace. No one has right to deny them that.

### Peace Process

- Administration will not be deterred from its support for the peace process.
- Focus of our efforts, and those of the two governments is to restore the cease-fire and move the peace process forward. We will stay in touch with London and Dublin and with all the parties to help find a way to get the peace process back on track.
- We have no current plans to meet with Adams, but we are keeping channels open.
- Policy of Irish and British governments is to keep channels open but not to hold any ministerial level meetings with Sinn Fein until the cease-fire is restored.
- Premature to speculate on details of how the process will move forward from here. Important thing is the wide consensus among governments and parties that it must.
- Irish and British governments are working on this. Hope that Prime Ministers Major and Bruton will meet later this month.

Adams Visa/Fundraising

- First priority is getting the cease-fire restored. Have not taken any decision on Adams' visa or permission to raise funds in the U.S.

What Did Adams Know?

- We do not know who knew what and when. Adams called National Security Advisor Lake shortly before the bomb went off to say he was hearing disturbing rumors, but beyond that, it is all speculation.

Mitchell

- Senator Mitchell was in Europe on other business week of February 19. He met with Prime Ministers Major and Bruton for a discussion of efforts to get the peace process back on track.

Trade and Investment

- U.S. will continue to support economic initiatives for Northern Ireland to help create jobs there. Secretary Brown will host a trade and investment conference later this year. In long run, creating hope and a stake in the future for young people is the way to underpin a lasting peace.

(2/23/96)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

- Deeply sorry about the bomb blast -- and angered. Extend my sympathies to the victims and their families. How many were injured?
- Have issued a statement condemning bombing in strongest terms. Like you, I have declared that I remain committed to the search for peace.
- All of us take the position that terrorism must not be allowed to triumph and derail peace process.
- Tony Lake will stay in touch with John Holmes about how best we can still move forward.
- Again, our thoughts are with you and with the victims.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 2/9/06

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 1/5/16

201-0355-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.27)  
KBH 4/11/2023

POINTS FOR CALL TO JOHN HOLMES

- Had a useful meeting with Dick Spring today. Just as President did yesterday, focused on getting them engaged on elective process idea.
- 
- Want to talk to you about how to move things along and how we can be helpful.
- Irish have a legitimate concern about end of February; need to see something happening by then. Planned Major-Bruton summit offers opportunity to announce a package deal.
- Doubtful we can get there in the Mayhew Spring channel- even if additional meetings were to be scheduled before summit. My impression is that they talk past each other.
- Prepared to quietly talk to all sides, keeping in close touch with you, to make this happen.
- Key Irish concern is link between elective process and all-party talks; they do not hear that link from Mayhew, though we have heard it so clearly in Prime Minister's statement, from you and from Ancram.
- Want to know that if they persuade nationalists to go through an elective process, talks will definitely be convened. Need package deal, with dates for an election and for talks announced at same time, preferably at Summit.
- Will fax you three assurances Spring would need, preferably in writing.
- Have the impression that they would drop the proximity talks proposal if they could be sure of talks. We have made the point that proximity talks would not be necessary if a deal can be reached.
- Also have impression that Spring will not insist on Trimble meeting him prior to all-party talks.
- This is scenario you and I and Ancram have been discussing, implicit in Prime Minister Major's statement. It means bringing Trimble along, and committing to all party talks

once we get agreement on elections. Can not give Trimble a Veto

- Interestingly, Spring's staff commented in an aside that the paper you passed to them on possible election modalities was a good basis, if they could be sure the process will lead to talks.
- **If necessary** : Understand that talks without Trimble would not be useful, but having set the elective process as a gateway, HMG cannot be seen to be deflected by Trimble or the process will lose credibility with all sides.
- Will be seeing Trimble Monday for lunch: President will see him that afternoon. Propose to stress need for him to be prepared to participate in all-party talks via an elective process.
- What other points would it be useful to make?
- If helpful, will be prepared to host people here to get down to specifics, or to travel to London or Dublin.

Irish #'s

Michael Collins. 703.821.6931

Mark Richards - Justice h. 301.439.4555

Alan K 703.893 - 5319

364.4108 Sreshlan

Neill O'Rand <sup>212</sup> 967 5415 h w <sup>212</sup> 684 3366.

011.353.77.82376. June in Donegal.

703-734-9481

EMK 508.776.2020

Edhel - ~~703-734-9481~~  
703-734.1563 fax

Tina Varco 841.5492

Dennis Sandberg 011.353-1.660.8998

660.5227 h.

Residence 011353-1.677.3506

Dermott - 835-0771. h in Ireland (er 2882396  
671.3302

~~011~~ h 232-9305 / 3377 w 232 7282

Larry Robinson - Crowe

Val Marknez - Cm General.

Reynolds: w. 011.353.1.6789385 / 660.2384

Declan Inglesby

h 011.353-1.66.00.955

Hume 44504.265-321h. Donegal - 011353.7782376

011 4471-

Philippa 011.7144930 4433 / 6689612/464

James Molyneaux w 011-44.232-324.601 / 01144712194520  
h 011.44.8494.22545- 4198  
House of Commons

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| 004. cable               | John Holmes to Anthony Lake (2 pages) | 02/01/1996 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)  
OA/Box Number: 1397

### FOLDER TITLE:

Ireland-London Bombing, Outside Comments, February 9, 1996 [1]

2011-0355-F  
rs1681

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Ireland-London Bombing, Outside Comments, February 9, 1996 [1]

2011-0355-F  
rs1681

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

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National Security Council  
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)  
OA/Box Number: 1397

### FOLDER TITLE:

Ireland-London Bombing, Outside Comments, February 9, 1996 [1]

2011-0355-F  
rs1681

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ROUTINE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 230944Z FEB 96

FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8638  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8117  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5869  
RUEHED/AMCONSUL EDINBURGH 3221  
UNCLAS BELFAST 0044

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, UK, EI

SUBJECT: UNIONISTS PUBLISH PROPOSALS FOR ELECTED BODY

1. SUMMARY: THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) HAS PUBLISHED

ITS PROPOSALS FOR AN ELECTED FORUM FOR NORTHERN  
IRELAND. THE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN WELCOMED BY THE

DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY BUT REJECTED BY THE  
NATIONALIST PARTIES. END SUMMARY.

2. THE PROPOSALS - THE PARTY ENVISAGES A NINETY-MEMBER  
BODY WITH 5 MEMBERS ELECTED FROM EACH OF THE 18  
NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUENCIES. THE BODY WOULD  
OPERATE IN A SERIES OF CROSS-PARTY COMMITTEES IN WHICH  
MEMBERS WOULD HAVE A DUAL FUNCTION - TO NEGOTIATE THE  
FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND TO  
NEGOTIATE ON THE "TOTALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS THROUGHOUT  
THESE ISLANDS." THESE COMMITTEES WOULD THEN REPORT  
BACK TO THE FULL BODY WHICH WOULD DEBATE AND APPROVE  
THE REPORTS IN PLENARY SESSIONS. THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND  
WOULD HAVE NO FORMAL ROLE IN THE FORUM, BUT MEMBERS  
COULD TRAVEL TO DUBLIN OR ELSEWHERE "TO RECEIVE  
REPRESENTATIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM.". THE  
FORUM WOULD SEEK TO FORGE CROSS-BORDER LINKS WITH  
DUBLIN PARTICULARLY TO EXPLOIT MUTUAL ECONOMIC BENEFIT,  
AND IT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE "NORTHERN NATIONALIST  
EMPATHY WITH THE REPUBLIC CONSISTENT WITH NORTHERN  
IRELAND REMAINING AN INTEGRAL PART OF  
THE UK." QDER TO BE ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTED  
BODY, PARTIES MUST ACCEPT THE MITCHELL REPORT  
COMPLETELY AND ACCEPT PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE DOWNING

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

STREET DECLAR KLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS." THE UUP HOPES THAT THE FORUM WOULD BE OPERATIONAL BY MAY OR JUNE OF THIS YEAR. IT ENVISAGES A LIMITED LIFE-SPAN FOR THE FORUM, WHICH WOULD PLACE ITS FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND IN A REFERENDUM.

4. DEMOCRATIC UNIONISTS WELCOME PLAN - THE PROPOSALS WERE WELCOMED BY THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP). SPOKESMAN NIGEL DODDS SAID IT SHOWED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DEVELOPMENT IN UUP THINKING SINCE THE DUP HAD FIRST PROPOSED AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY IN SEPTEMBER 1993. "AS WE IN THE DUP HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS, IT IS VITAL THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH TAKE PLACE SHOULD DO SO WITHIN A PROCESS WHICH IS OWNED BY THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS WHOLE," HE SAID.

5. NATIONALISTS OPPOSE PLAN -THE SDLP, WHICH HAS OPPOSED THE IDEA OF ELECTIONS PRIOR TO ALL-PARTY TALKS, SAID IT WILL STUDY THE UNIONIST PLAN IN DETAIL. HOWEVER, PARTY CHAIRMAN MARK DURKAN DESCRIBED IT AS "THE POLITICAL EQUIVALENT OF FANTASY FOOTBALL LEAGUE," AND SAID HIS INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT THE PLAN "WOULD NOT ASSUAGE OUR PROFOUND DOUBTS." SINN FEIN REJECTED THE UUP'S PROPOSALS COMPLETELY. PARTY CHAIRMAN MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN SAID, "TODAY'S ELECTION PROPOSAL IS DIVISIVE AND OFFERS NO PROSPECT OF FINDING AGREEMENT AND A PERMANENT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT...DAVID TRIMBLE NEEDS TO FACE THE FACT THAT NATIONALISTS WILL NOT TOLERATE AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT." HIS PARTY COLLEAGUE, PAT DOHERTY SAID THE PROPOSAL WAS CLEARLY ANOTHER STALLING DEVICE, DESIGNED TO PUSH BACK ALL-PARTY TALKS."

STEPHENS

BT

#0044

NNNN

<MSGID> M2094401

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 08

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 211911Z FEB 96

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9176  
INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 8182  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 4081  
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC//CT//  
RUEAWJA/DOJ WASHDC

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(3.32)  
KBH 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 002197

STATE FOR P, EUR, EUR/UBI, S/CT AND CA/VO

NSC FOR LAKE, SODERBERG AND PETERS

JUSTICE FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL GORELICK AND INS  
COMMISSIONER MEISNER

JOINT EMBASSY/CONGEN BELFAST MESSAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/01  
TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE  
BREAKDOWN

REF: A) LONDON 1806 B) LONDON 2064 C) DUBLIN 694

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.  
REASON 1.5 (D).

2. (c) SUMMARY: IN THE COMING DAYS, WE WILL HAVE TO  
MAKE CHOICES ABOUT U.S. POLICY ON CONTACTS WITH SINN  
FEIN AND ON ISSUANCE OF VISAS AND FUND RAISING  
PRIVILEGES. NOW THAT IT IS CLEAR THE IRA CEASEFIRE IS  
FINISHED AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS HAS  
ENTERED A NEW PHASE, THIS MESSAGE (FOLLOWING UP POINTS  
MADE IN REF A) RECOMMENDS THE U.S IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE  
ADJUSTMENTS TO ITS POLICIES.

3. (c) A KEY OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY OVER THE LAST TWO  
YEARS HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT TO  
SE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL MEANS OF EXPRESSION RATHER THAN  
TERRORIST TACTICS. THIS SHOULD REMAIN OUR POLICY; TO  
CUT OFF ALL POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN COULD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08

ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO SEE VIOLENCE AS THE ONLY MEANS OF ACHIEVING THEIR POLITICAL GOALS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE CAN BE NO RELAXTION OF OUR FIRM POLICY AGAINST TERRORISM. IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT THERE ARE DEMONSTRABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT RESULTING FROM THE IRA'S RETURN TO VIOLENCE. WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS BY MAINTAINING LOWER LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH SINN FEIN BUT REFUSING HIGH-LEVEL, HIGH-PROFILE CONTACT. SINN FEIN MEMBERS, INCLUDING GERRY ADAMS, WHO REQUIRE WAIVERS OF VISA INELIGIBLITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS FOR SINGLE-ENTRY ADMITTANCE, AS WAS THE CASE BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE. THE CIRCLE OF SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WHO ROUTINELY HAVE BEEN GRANTED WAIVERS FOR TRAVEL ON PARTY BUSINESS SHOULD BE NARROWED. FUND RAISING PRIVILEGES FOR SINN FEIN MEMBERS WHO REQUIRE VISA WAIVERS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED BUT SINN FEIN SHOULD NOT BE ADDED TO THE LIST OF PROSCRIBED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THESE ALL ARE INTERMEDIATE STEPS WHICH COULD BE RATCHETTED UP OR DOWN IN THE FUTURE TO ADJUST TO DEVELOPING CIRCUMSTANCES. END SUMMARY

CEASEFIRE DEAD, PEACE PROCESS WOUNDED  
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4. (✓) THE IRA CEASEFIRE APPEARS TO BE FINISHED, AT LEAST FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ANY LINGERING HOPE THAT THE FEB 9 CANARY WHARF BOMB MIGHT HAVE BEEN A "ONE-OFF" INCIDENT HABEEN BURIED BY THE BOMB PLANTED IN THE WEST END THEATER DISTRICT AND BY THE LETHAL BLAST WHICH DESTROYED A LONDON BUS ON FEB 18. SECURITY OFFICIALS HERE ARE BRACED FOR MORE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL AND IN OTHER CITIES AROUND BRITAIN. THEY ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE VIOLENCE SOON COULD RETURN TO NORTHERN IRELAND, AS POLITICAL AND LOGISTICAL OBSTACLES MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE IRA TO SUSTAIN A TERRORIST CAMPAIGN EXCLUSIVELY ON THE BRITISH MAINLAND. LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES THUS FAR HAVE SHOWN RESTRAINT, BUT THEY COULD CITE ANY INCIDENT -- AND CERTAINLY ANY ATTACK IN A PROTESTANT AREA OF NORTHERN IRELAND -- AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR OWN RETURN TO VIOLENCE.

5. (✓) THE PEACE PROCESS IS NOT DEAD. THE GOVERNMENTS IN BOTH LONDON AND DUBLIN CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR A WAY TO BRING ALL PARTIES TOGETHER FOR TALKS AIMED AT FINDING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, THE RESUMPTION OF THE IRA'S TERRORIST CAMPAIGN HAS ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED THE PROCESS, NOT LEAST BY CASTING SEVERE DOUBT ON SINN

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FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. POINTING TO PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, MANY IN THE UK -- NOT LEAST UNIONIST LEADERS WHO BELIEVE THEIR SUSPICIONS HAVE BEEN VALIDATED -- ARGUE THAT SINN FEIN HAS FORFEITED ITS RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

6. (C) MAJOR AND MAYHEW, WHILE REFUSING CONTACT WITH REPUBLICAN LEADERS, HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED "SLAMMING THE DOOR" ON ALL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. BY REACHING AGREEMENT WITH DUBLIN ON A BROADLY-ACCEPTABLE ELECTIVE PROCESS THAT WILL PERMIT A DIRECT MOVE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS, HMG HOLDS OUT HOPE THAT THE IRA CEASEFIRE CAN BE REINSTATED AND THAT SINN FEIN WILL USE THE ELECTION TO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LONDON 002197

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JKINT EMBASSY/CONGEN BELFAST MESSAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/01  
TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE  
BREAKDOWN

DEMONSTRATE ITS DEMOCRATIC MANDATE.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN  
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7. (C) THE END OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE REINFORCES THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION (REF A) REGARDING USG CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN. BY PROVIDING VISIBLE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO SINN FEIN IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO AND DURING THE CEASEFIRE, OUR POLICY HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT TO USE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL MEANS OF EXPRESSION AND STOP RESORTING TO TERRORIST TACTICS. WE DO NOT RECOMMEND THAT THE U.S. NOW CUT OFF ALL POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, AS THAT COULD GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE WHO SEE VIOLENCE AS THE ONLY VIABLE MEANS OF ACHIEVING THEIR POLITICAL GOALS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT ACT AS IF NOTHING HAS

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HAPPENED; THAT THERE ARE DEMONSTRABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT WHICH FLOW FROM THE IRA'S RETURN TO VIOLENCE MUST BE MADE CLEAR. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND HALTING HIGH-LEVEL, HIGH-PROFILE MEETINGS WITH ADAMS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP. THIS IS CRUCIAL TO KEEPING THE U.S. IN STEP WITH DUBLIN AND LONDON, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE MADE A CALCULATION THAT TALKS WITH SINN FEIN CANNOT BE CONDUCTED ON A BUSINESS-AS-USUAL BASIS.

8. (C) UNLESS AND UNTIL THE IRA REINSTATES THE CEASEFIRE AND SINN FEIN CREDIBLY DEMONSTRATES ITS COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS, SINN FEIN LEADERS MUST NOT BE RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE. U.S. OFFICIALS BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WHO MEET WITH ADAMS SHOULD DO SO AT A VENUE OTHER THAN THE WHITE HOUSE/OEOB. A PHOTO OF ADAMS WALKING INTO THE WHITE HOUSE, NO MATTER WHOM HE IS SCHEDULED TO MEET, WOULD SET A MATCH TO THE COMBUSTIBLE ELEMENTS OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION. THIS HAS OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING OF A WHITE HOUSE CELEBRATION OF ST. PATRICK'S DAY; IN OUR VIEW, ADAMS SHOULD NOT BE INVITED. THE BRITISH, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC, SIMPLY WOULD NOT COMPREHEND AN ADAMS APPEARANCE AND WE DOUBT WHETHER THE TAOISEACH WOULD WANT TO BE SEEN IN A ROOM WITH HIM EITHER.

9. (C) BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THEY WANT NO HINT OF THE KIND OF TRANSATLANTIC DISCORD WHICH FOLLOWED THE INITIAL U.S. DECISION TO GRANT A VISA TO ADAMS. THEY HAVE WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE BOMBINGS AND DEEPLY APPRECIATE CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT. THEIR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN "TRILATERAL" SOLIDARITY, AND HMG -- LIKE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, NO DOUBT -- WILL GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO AVOID ANY CRITICISM OF USG ACTION. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A SPLIT WOULD GIVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. HOWEVER, HOSTILE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ADMISSION OF SINN FEIN LEADERS TO THE WHITE HOUSE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE PUT TO MAJOR IN PARLIAMENT. HIS RESPONSES COULD NOT BE FAVORABLE.

10. (C) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE UTILITY OF MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN. EVEN THOUGH ADAMS' ABILITY TO INFLUENCE IRA HARDLINERS APPEARS MARGINAL AND ALTHOUGH MAYHEW IN PARLIAMENT ON FEB 19 DENOUNCED ADAMS'S APPROACH AS "DISGUSTINGLY HYPOCRITICAL," HMG RECOGNIZES THAT AT THIS POINT THERE

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IS NO OTHER FIGURE AVAILABLE AS A CONDUIT TO THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. WE ALSO SHOULD CONTINUE BEHIND THE SCENES CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN LEADERS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

VISAS

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11. (C) AS NOTED IN REFTTEL, WE HAVE A WIDE ARRAY OF OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO OUR TREATMENT OF SINN FEIN REQUESTS FOR VISAS. THE USG HAS A LONG-STANDING POLICY OF DENYING WAIVERS TO INELIGIBLE APPLICANTS WHO ARE INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM. HOWEVER, REFUSING ADAMS A VISA MAY BE INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION THAT WE ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN SERIOUS POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. OUR DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE OUR REJECTION OF VIOLENCE MUST BE TEMPERED BY -- AS  
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JOINT EMBASSY/CONGEN BELFAST MESSAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/01

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE  
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REPUBLICAN SOURCES EMPHASIZE TO US -- THE NECESSITY OF NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON THOSE IN SINN FEIN WHO MAY STILL BE KEY TO RESTORING PEACE. WITHOUT GOING AS FAR AS REFUSING ADAMS AND OTHER KEY SINN FEIN MEMBERS AT THIS TIME, SCALING BACK THE FAVORABLE TREATMENT ACCORDED THEIR VISA APPLICATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE CLEARLY WOULD SIGNAL OUR REJECTION OF ANY ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY THE IRA'S RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THERE ARE TWO ACTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED: 1) ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, RESTRICTING VALIDITY OF VISAS ISSUED TO SINN FEIN OFFICIALS AND 2) NARROWING THE CIRCLE OF SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WHO ROUTINELY HAVE BEEN GRANTED WAIVERS FOR TRAVEL ON PARTY BUSINESS.

12. (C) ADAMS FIRST WAS GRANTED A WAIVER IN FEBRUARY

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1994 BECAUSE HE WAS ~~INTERPRETED AS HAVING ACCEPTED THE~~  
~~PRINCIPLES OF~~ THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. OTHER  
SINN FEIN MEMBERS (E.G., CAHILL AND TREANOR) WHO ALSO  
WOULD HAVE BEEN INELIGIBLE BECAUSE OF THEIR TERRORIST  
HISTORIES WERE ISSUED VISAS ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF  
BUILDING SUPPORT FOR THE CEASEFIRE. AFTER INITIALLY  
ISSUING WAIVERS FOR SINGLE-ENTRY VISAS TO ADAMS AND  
OTHERS, IT WAS OUR STANDARD POLICY DURING THE PERIOD OF  
THE IRA CEASEFIRE TO GRANT SINN FEIN OFFICIALS VISAS  
VALID FOR MULTIPLE ENTRIES OVER A THREE-MONTH PERIOD,  
CONDITIONAL ON THE USG BEING NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF THE  
ITINERARY TO BE FOLLOWED DURING ANY SUCH US TRAVEL.  
THIS ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS WAS PERCEIVED HERE  
AS A SYMBOLICALLY SIGNIFICANT STEP UP FROM THE INITIAL  
SINGLE-ENTRY ISSUANCES.

13. (C) TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. CONCERN, WE RECOMMEND  
DAMS' CURRENT APPLICATION AND OTHER APPLICATIONS BY SINN  
FEIN MEMBERS WHICH REQUIRE A WAIVER OF INELIGIBILITY BE  
CONSIDERED ONLY FOR ISSUANCE OF SINGLE-ENTRY VISAS.  
THIS WOULD BE A RETURN O THE STATUS QUO BEFORE THE  
AUGUST 1994 DECLARATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, AT WHICH TIME  
ADAMS HELD ONLY SINGLE-ISSUE VISAS. IT REPRESENTS AN  
INTERMEDIATE STEP THAT COULD BE TIGHTENED OR LOOSENED,  
DEPENDING ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

14. (C) PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS CNTERED ALMOST  
EXCLUSIVELY ON THE VISAS GRANTED TO GERRY ADAMS AND, TO  
A LESSER EXTENT, TO SIMIARLY HIGH-PROFILE PARTY  
REPRESENTATIVES SUCH A JOE CAHILL AND MARTIN  
MCGUINNESS. HOWEVER, THE LIST OF NAMES SUBMITTED BY  
SINN FEIN LAST YER WITH A REQUEST FOR FAVORABLE WAIVER  
CONSIDERATION WAS SIGNIFICANTLY BROADER IN SCOPE. SINCE  
TEN, SINN FEIN HAS REQUESTED VISAS FOR A NUMBER O  
ADDITIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES NOT INCLUDED O THIS  
LIST. WHILE THE IRA MAINTAINED ITS CEASEFIRE, WAIVERS  
HAD BEEN GRANTED IN ALL OF THESE CASES. FOLLOWING THE  
BOMBING, THE USG COULD DENY WAIVERS TO ALL SINN FEIN  
REPRESENTATIVES OR ELSE NARROW THE CIRCLE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES WHO RECEIVE WAIVER APPROVAL.

15. (C) THE CIRCLE COULD BE IMMEDIATELY TIGHTENED TO  
INCLUDE ONLY ADAMS AND SIMILARLY SENIOR LEADERS, OR  
COULD BE NARROWED INCREMENTALLY OVER TIME SHOULD THE IRA  
CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN ACTS OF TERRORISM. IF THE LATTER,  
AN INITIAL STEP COULD BE TO APPROVE VISAS ONLY FOR THOSE  
SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE LIST, OR OTHERWISE  
SPECIFICALLY DEFINE WHICH REPRESENTATIVE WOULD RECEIVE

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VISAS -- FOR EXAMPLE, LIMITING VISAS ONLY TO SINN FEIN MEMBERS WHO HOLD AN ELECTIVE OFFICE AND THUS CAN BE SAID TO HAVE A DEMOCRATIC MANDATE. AS APPROPRIATE, THIS CIRCLE COULD BE REDUCED FURTHER OVER TIME. ALTERNATIVELY, WE MAY REVIEW EACH APPLICATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SENIORITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL APPLYING, THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE TRIP, AND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE TRAVEL WOULD PROMOTE THE RESTORATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

### FUND RAISING

16. (C) PERMISSION TO RAISE FUNDS WAS GRANTED TO GERRY DAMS IN MARCH 1995 -- MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE IRA DECLARED ITS CEASEFIRE. AT THE TIME THAT THIS PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, A KEY CONCERN WAS THAT THERE BE GUARANTEES THAT SUCH FUNDS WOULD NOT SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. GIVEN THE FUNGIBILITY OF SUCH FUNDS, THESE  
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BREAKDOWN

GUARANTEES WERE ALWAYS VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM. MORE IMPORTANTLY WITH THE REACTIVATION OF THE IRA TERRORISM CAMPAIGN, WE NOW FACE THE MORALLY DISTURBING POSSIBILITY THAT BRITISH CITIZENS (AND POSSIBLY AMERICANS) WILL BE MURDERED BY IRA WEAPONRY FINANCED BY CONTRIBUTIONS COLLECTED IN THE UNITED STATES.

17. (C) IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES FEB 21 AND 22, THE FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTED THAT THE BULK OF THE ESTIMATED \$1.12 MILLION RAISED BY SINN FEIN IN THE U.S. HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO BANK ACCOUNTS IN IRELAND AND THAT AUDITORS ARE UNABLE TO MONITOR THE ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF THE FUNDS AFTER THEY ARE DISPERSED OUTSIDE THE U.S.

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IN LIGHT OF THE IRA'S RESUMPTION OF VIOLENCE, SUCH REPORTS IN THE MAINSTREAM PRESS WILL FUEL VEHEMENT PUBLIC OPPOSITION IN BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO CONTINUED US FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN OFFICIALS. IT WILL UNDERMINE UNIONIST CONFIDENCE THAT USG POLICY IS BALANCED AND IMPARTIAL. UUP MP KEN MAGINNIS TELEPHONED BELFAST CONSUL GENERAL FEB 18 SPECIFICALLY TO UNDERScore THIS POILT.

18. (C) AT LEAST UNTIL THERE IS A RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE, WE RECOMMEND BARRING FUND RAISING BY ALL SINN FEIN OFFICIALS REQUIRING VISA WAIVERS, INCLUDING GERRY ADAMS. THE AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY EMPHASIZES THE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RECOMMENDATION. TO PERMIT FUND RAISING ON THE PART OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WOULD IN NO WAY SQUARE WITH OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE BOMBINGS. SINN FEIN OFFICIALS NOT NEEDING WAIVERS WOULD REMAIN FREE TO RAISE FUNDS. SHOULD THE CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE CONTINUE AND WE WISH TO IMPLEMENT ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING IN THE U.S., WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER DECLARING SINN FEIN A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION TO BAN ALL FUNDRAISING UNDER ANTI-TERRORIST STATUTES. FOR NOW, WE BELIEVE IT SUFFICIENT TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO PRIOR TO MARCH, 1995. THIS MAKES IT CLEAR TO SINN FEIN THAT THERE ARE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORISM, BUT DOES NOT DELEGITIMIZE THE ORGANIZATION AS A POLITICAL ENTITY.

19. (C) COMMENT: WE VIEW THESE RECOMMENDATIONS AS PRAGMATIC REPOSSES TO THE CURRENT SITUATION WHICH KEEP US ON-SIDE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS IN LONDON AND DUBLIN. THESE ARE INTERMEDIATE STEPS WHICH COULD BE RATCHETTED UP OR DOWN IN THE FUTURE TO ADJUST TO DEVELOPING CIRCUMSTANCES.

CROWE  
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#2197

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

7 February 1996

Ms Nancy Soderberg  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
WASHINGTON DC 20500

CCR  
may  
return

Dear Nancy

I am enclosing copy of an internal press briefing note on our proposal for a proximity meeting involving all the parties.

You might find this helpful.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Dermot Gallagher', followed by a checkmark.

Dermot Gallagher  
Ambassador

## Proposal for a two-day Multilateral Proximity Meeting

The Irish Government proposes that the Irish and British Governments convene a two-day meeting in the second half of February designed to bring together, on a voluntary basis, all parties and both Governments in a single venue. An ideal venue would be the excellent Castle Buildings complex at Stormont in Belfast, in which a number of the Northern parties have already established offices.

The meeting would operate on a proximity basis, broadly similar to that which pertained at the Dayton Talks, which achieved the breakthrough in the conflict in former-Yugoslavia. This would leave the parties free to decide with whom they wished to enter discussions. No party would be obliged to share a table with any other party or Government. No surrender of principle would therefore be involved for any party talking part.

The purpose of the meeting would be to reach broad agreement on a basis and timetable for the launch of all-party negotiations. Matters to be touched on would include:

- a) The report of the International Body (on decommissioning);
- b) The basis, participation, structure, format and agenda of all party negotiations; and
- c) Whether and how an elected body or an electoral process could play a part in such negotiations.

The meeting would not discuss matters proper to substantive talks.

The Irish Government would not be involved in matters relating exclusively to negotiations on relationships within Northern Ireland (Strand One). However, it would obviously have a role in arrangements regarding Strands Two and Three and the overall management of the three-stranded negotiations.

Such a meeting would be entirely consistent with the arrangements for preparatory talks set out in the Joint Communiqué of 28 November 1995.

LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 1 STORY

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February 22, 1996

SECTION: THE GUARDIAN FEATURES PAGE; Pg. T2

LENGTH: 4240 words

HEADLINE: NOW OR NEVER;

These are crucial days. Downing Street's bungled handling of the Mitchell report allowed peace to slip away. The IRA's bombing of London jeopardised Sinn Fein's credibility. But, argues Martin Woollacott, the door to a lasting settlement has not slammed shut yet

BYLINE: Martin Woollacott

BODY:

ANOTHER set of mourning parents, shocked relatives, and bemused friends puzzles and grieves over the death of a young man, as so many have before. Is Edward O'Brien, the boy who once served at the altar, the first Republican sacrifice in a renewed Irish war?

The question of whether O'Brien is the first of a new procession of young Irishmen who in taking the lives of others will risk and sometimes lose their own, or whether he could be the last sacrifice, is even more critical to Britain and Ireland than at first sight appears. This may not be "just" a question of going back to the old level of violence, bad though that was. Both the peace option and the war option are now taken to extremes.

Some of those who can guess at the inner workings of the IRA and Sinn Fein believe that the choice is not between the relatively restrained warfare of the past, with its restrictions on targets and its warnings, and the conditional approach to peace of the past 18 months. If it is to be war, they argue, it could be on a bigger and more savage scale. And if it is to be peace, the commitment to non-violence that the movement will have to make, whatever the form of words, will be far more binding than the first ceasefire. Government sources in Dublin point to reports that Sinn Fein is itself putting forward full acceptance of the Mitchell Report's conditions of a complete repudiation of violent action together with parallel decommissioning of arms as conditions for all-party talks. To emphasise Mitchell in this way, they say, suggests that the Sinn Fein leadership is aware that a renewed commitment to peace must be dramatic and total. In other words, the Republican movement faces the same decisions as before, but in a much more extreme form, and at a time when it is in a less organised condition to take them than it was 18 months ago.

When Gerry Adams spoke earlier this week of the two ways of ending a war, by victory - which was impossible, or by negotiations - which was hard, he was addressing his remarks to the British, but they might as well have been directed to his own comrades. But the unhappy logic of that conclusion can point either in the direction Adams points, toward negotiations, or toward deepening and broadening the war. As a well informed Ulster observer of the IRA says: "They



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have a choice. One is to find a way out of this and back to negotiations. I fear the other is to escalate the war to higher levels. One of the things that is not understood is that there have been restraints in the past. We haven't had real terrorism. The pressure will be there to put some of those restraints aside, to go for unrestricted targets, to reduce warning time, and to drop restraints on communal conflict." The outcome could be a bloodier war in every dimension.

The peaceful option equally has sharpened. If a package is produced by the British and Irish governments that Sinn Fein and the IRA accept, it would involve a commitment that could not be set aside again. A chance for the movement to return to negotiations after the bombs of the last two weeks is not only possible, but three governments are urgently trying to create it. But there is only one torpedo in this tube. The IRA would not be forgiven a second return to violence. So whatever games might again be played with words, the reality of a restoration of the ceasefire would be that it would have to be for good. To take up the Armalite again would mean that the political arm of the movement would go down in final and complete disarray.

How did we get to the point where the IRA and Sinn Fein face this terribly heightened choice, between a worse kind of war and a peace process in which they have to invest even more than before? The period of the ceasefire can either be viewed as one in which the IRA and Sinn Fein, dissatisfied at the meagre results of the unarmed struggle, finally gave in to their hard men and went back to doing what they know best. But it is surely better seen as a period in which a potentially divided organisation that needed to be drawn deeper and deeper into non-violent politics was mishandled by governments, particularly in London, who ought to have known better.

Know your enemy is the most ancient adage in conflict, yet the events of the past 18 months have demonstrated that Britain failed, not once but again and again, to comprehend the movement that still holds the key to peace or war in Ulster. An enemy who could have evolved into something between a political opponent and a kind of partner was mismanaged to the point where everything that has been achieved has been put in jeopardy. The breakdown of the ceasefire cannot be understood without asking why Britain lacked knowledge of the mood, let alone of the precise decision-making processes, of Sinn Fein and the IRA. It suggests a double failure, in the intelligence operations which were supposed to give government a clear picture of the intentions and capabilities of the movement, and in a British disregard of more generalised political warnings that came from many quarters.

The British, an expert on Israeli intelligence commented, know far less about the IRA than the Israelis know and always have known about the PLO, across a much more serious linguistic and ethnic divide. The explanation, it is usually suggested, lies in the compact nature of the IRA, and in the absence of an outer fringe of people more or less in the know who can occasionally be suborned and sometimes recruited. Yet there was plenty of evidence, other than the kind provided by agents on the inside. The inadequacies of British intelligence were demonstrated by the fact that MI5 to the end underestimated the increasingly serious strains, of which there were numerous public signs, within the the movement. Royal Ulster Constabulary sources say that MI5 failed to take seriously their warnings late last year that the IRA contingency plan for a return to violent action was becoming more of a real possibility and less



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of a sop to the sceptics than before.

The truth seems to be that it was readying itself to go either way, yet neither London or Dublin was aware of this. A senior political source in Dublin says, "It wasn't appreciated that a breakdown was imminent, although we knew in general terms of the strains within the IRA and that a return to violence was an option. On the day of the British reaction to Mitchell, the feeling was that John Major had thrown a big spanner. But, in retrospect, the evidence is that the conditions of the Mitchell Report were just barely palatable to the IRA. We can see now how Major's electoral proposal got the IRA off the hook and gave them a way, in effect, of rejecting Mitchell. I am almost certain that they would not have rejected Mitchell outright and they would not have abandoned the ceasefire if Britain had accepted the report in a straightforward way. That would have been too abrupt a rebuff to the Clinton administration."

The influential and usually well informed Irish American journalist Niall O'Dowd recalls that "Gerry Adams's first reaction to the Mitchell proposals was that this was the best day since the ceasefire. He knew he could sell it. But the balance was tipped against him by Major's manner of dismissing Mitchell. If the report had been accepted this could have been avoided."

AFTER ALL, serious republican dissent was already being openly expressed by the summer of last year. When Gerry Adams was heckled at a rally outside Belfast's City Hall by a man shouting "Bring back the IRA", he departed from his prepared script and replied: "They haven't gone away, you know." Adams was referring to a reality that was to him full of danger. He needed political progress to keep everybody on board and he had already made it clear that there would be no splits in the movement. That would indeed be victory for Britain. The movement as a whole would go for peace or it would return to war.

By then the spectaculars were running out. He had been to the White House for dinner, shaken hands with Nelson Mandela in South Africa and been awarded a joint peace prize with John Hume, Albert Reynolds and John Major. In spite of all the benefits of financial assistance, democratic respectability, new political alliances and near-saturation publicity, still there was no sign of all-party negotiations or movement on the prisoners. The serious rioting following the release of Paratrooper Lee Clegg, convicted of murdering a west Belfast teenage girl, should have set alarm bells ringing in Downing Street and Stormont Castle. The "imaginative steps" which had been promised prior to the IRA cessation seemed to republicans to have been bogus.

The Government responded to criticism by publishing a glossy booklet outlining a hundred changes to everyday life in Northern Ireland. But there was no explanation offered for why so little effort had been put into convincing the Unionists that their best interests lay in taking the ceasefire at face value and joining their enemies at the negotiating table, even if only to explore their sincerity and see if the peace overtures were genuine.

By late November, when the first IRA prisoners were freed from the Maze prison under the restored 50 per cent remission rule, even those who were being granted their freedom talked as if the ceasefire was nearing its end. Yet the British government still seemed nearly deaf to the obvious signs of a huge shift in mood. Calls for negotiations, stalled by the British insistence on



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decommissioning, were constantly repeated. "If we don't get them, it's over," said a senior figure waiting at the prison gates. A week earlier a 1,300lb vehicle bomb had been intercepted by Gardai in the Republic and several arrests made. Its destination was believed to be Crossmaglen and the couriers were from a new armed wing of republican Sinn Fein - the remnants of a previous split from the Provisionals in 1986. Hardliners from outside the Provisional movement but within the republican family were growing confident enough to show that others were prepared to continue the war if the IRA no longer had the stomach.

At the last moment before President Clinton's visit to Northern Ireland, John Major and John Bruton handed the task of a solution to the arms decommissioning issue to former US senator George Mitchell, in effect the special US envoy for Ireland. They also agreed on the "firm aim" of beginning talks by the end of February. It now seems very likely that at this stage the IRA leadership had already taken its decision in principle to return to war. If the Mitchell commission could deliver a clear, unambiguous path to the talks table, the decision would be revoked. Meanwhile teeth were bared. Five alleged drug-dealers were shot dead over the Christmas and New Year period by the IRA under the cover-name Direct Action Against Drugs.

It should have been clear that Adams and Sinn Fein negotiator Martin McGuinness were running out of ways of keeping frustrated minds and hands occupied. Mitchell and his colleagues, the Canadian General John de Chastelain and former Finnish prime minister Harri Holkeri, worked strenuously to meet their mid-January deadline. They met all the parties, both governments and the security forces on both sides of the border. Doubtless they heard from the RUC of its private view that decommissioning was of no practical value; the IRA's engineers were expert in turning every-day and easily obtainable objects into lethal machines. They would also have heard from the Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble about his requirement for a Northern Ireland election before he would sit down with Sinn Fein.

As publication of the report approached it was evident that for Sinn Fein the direction of the peace process hinged upon its contents. Its main conclusion was that no paramilitary group would hand over weaponry in advance of the commencement of full political negotiations on Northern Ireland's future. It was what all the main political players had known all along and a slap in the face for John Major. However, the climbdown it required him to make on that issue was softened by a series of tough tests for those who wanted to complete a genuine journey from military methods to peaceful democratic means.

These included a compromise proposal for decommissioning to take place in parallel with talks; the eventual destruction of all weapons, to be monitored and verified by independent observers; a declaration of a total and absolute commitment to abide by the democratic outcome of talks, or to oppose it by purely peaceful methods; an end to punishment attacks; and the lifting of paramilitary "exclusion orders" on individuals.

Tucked away at the back of the report in paragraph 56 was the suggestion that "an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence". For a few hours after the report was published Sinn Fein officials indicated that it would be difficult to sell these terms to the IRA but that it might just be possible. If so, it spelt the end of the IRA as a functioning military body. But that Wednesday afternoon John Major announced in the Commons that there were now



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The Guardian, February 22, 1996

two ways into the long-awaited talks for Sinn Fein; decommissioning or participation in a Northern Ireland election. When Sinn Fein's silence was broken 24 hours later, the usual figures who had been arguing that they would keep working to their target of talks began pumping out the same message, but there was despair in their voices.

It would be wrong to assume that Adams had given up on his belief in the fundamental republican goal of a united Ireland, but it is fair to pose the question of what he really expected to gain from all-party negotiations. The Dublin Forum for Peace and Reconciliation - which Albert Reynolds had originally sold to the Provisionals as the all-Ireland body in which negotiations with the Unionists on the island's political future would take place, but which instead became the fast-track for bringing Sinn Fein into the mainstream fold of constitutional politics - had demonstrated that the overwhelming consensus view was that while a united Ireland was a desirable goal, nobody wanted it unless the unionists gave consent. Indeed, according to the published diaries of Reynolds's press secretary Sean Duignan, Adams was well aware that acceptance of the consent principle - which is enshrined in the December 1993 Downing Street Declaration - was central to the success of the peace process. Even so, the month before the IRA ceasefire was declared, that principle was rejected by a special Sinn Fein conference in Letterkenny, Co Donegal.

Given the contradiction, a number of theories have been put forward. Either Sinn Fein and the IRA never intended to accept the framework which the British and Irish governments had agreed but were prepared to see what political progress could be wrung from talks following a ceasefire before the inevitable return to armed struggle. Or Adams was engaging in a degree of deception of the rank and file, preparing to accept a settlement which fell short of traditional republican objectives, selling it as an interim settlement, with the rest of the journey towards full British withdrawal to be reached by non-violent methods. The evidence, while not conclusive, leaned toward this view.

The three most common words heard in any discussion of the IRA's intentions are "I don't know." There is some excuse for not knowing precisely what the IRA intends at any moment, and for doubts over the organisation's objectives. But there was surely enough evidence to show that Britain was playing with fire in ignoring the predicament of the Sinn Fein leadership, and failing to measure the balance of forces within the movement. If Adams was trying to manage his flock into a settlement of the kind indicated, bluffing some of his own people, what an authoritative Dublin source calls his "backwoodsmen problem" was not helped by a British policy that pushed him to the wall. There are chastened politicians, officials, policemen, and intelligence people in London, Belfast and Dublin today.

Now it is even more important to know what the IRA wants and believes. Irish political sources believe that the hard wing of the army has been dismayed by the impact of their decision on public opinion in the Republic and the United States, an impact which has confirmed warnings given by Adams and McGuinness in the internal debate. Blaming the British for the breakdown, which has been the general reaction in both countries, is not the same as endorsing a return to violence. Those who claim some understanding of IRA thinking over the last few days think they may now realise the enormity of what they have done. "They ran away from what they didn't like," said one, "but they didn't realise that it can't be escaped from."



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There may be the beginning of readiness to hand the mess that has been created back to the Adams wing, and the strategy of that wing may be to seize Mitchell and even the originally British electoral proposals that led to the breakdown, making them into conditions the movement demands rather than conditions to which it has to accede. There is a tinge of optimism, as well as a general view that, as Niall O'Dowd puts it, "The future of the conflict is going to be dealt with in the next two weeks for good or ill. What the Irish and British governments do and what input the Americans have is what matters . . . That's what we need now. People really charging at it saying it can be done." Charging at it is about all that is left.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: February 22, 1996

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# FAX COVER SHEET

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FAX NUMBER:

*(202) 456-9460*

FROM: Richard Norland, First Secretary (Political)

DATE:

*2/9/96*

*Text of Jerry Adams' statement.*

*Disc.*

Number of Pages Including This Cover Sheet: 2

09/02/96 21:16 dem ?::?? 123-23ADAMS

23ADAMS TO MR NOLAND. AMERICAN Embassy.

## STATEMENT

My response to tonight's news is one of sadness. I regret that an unprecedented opportunity for peace has floundered on the refusal of the British government and the Unionist leaders to enter into honest dialogue and substantive negotiations.

I appeal for calm. Sinn Féin's peace strategy remains as the main function of our party. It is my personal priority. All those who made genuine efforts to build a peace process must keep our nerve in the face of predictable and hypocritical reaction from public representatives who have done nothing to encourage the risky search for a peace settlement.

That search must be redoubled.

As requested The Sinn Féin Statement.



# **PRESS RELEASE**

The following is the text of a statement issued to our office.  
30/1/94

Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams commenting on the incidents in San Diego, the United States, said:

"I unreservedly condemn these incidents in San Diego, as I do all attacks on innocent civilians anywhere.

"It is absurd to even associate this incident with Irish Republicans.

"It appears to be the work of elements who seek to sabotage efforts to rally support in the U.S. for the peace process in Ireland."

---

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# Alliance

The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland

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To: Ms Nancy Soderberg

KML

From: Paul M. Sloan

Re: Washington Post.

1 page to follow

February 10 1996

From: Paul Mc Erlean, Press Officer Alliance Party of Northern Ireland

Dear Ms. Soderburg,

I note from today's *Washington Post* that both yourself and Mr Tony Lake have reportedly "telephoned political leaders in the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland to deliver the message that the bombing demonstrates the urgency of beginning formal peace negotiations."

Can I make two quick points with no disrespect intended.

\* Alliance party leader, Dr John Alderdice has not been contacted.

\* The line: "demonstrates the urgency of beginning formal peace negotiations" would seem to imply that the US administration is pushing for something that parties (and governments) over here have not been pushing for. This is given further credence by the fact that later in the article, Senators Kennedy & Dodd are quoted, followed up by the view of the writer of the piece (Thomas Lippman) who asserts that John Major "had sabotaged two years of intense effort with a huge political miscalculation". The view attributed to both yourself and Mr Lake seems to add to the general flavour of the article which is that it is the British government who in some way are to blame for what has happened. As you know the political process is a lot more complicated than that. However it seems that your views, as they are being reported, are a lot more politically partisan than the view expressed by the President who has been eloquent in his condemnations of the attack and his support for the two governments.

Sincerely



Paul Mc Erlean

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EDWARD J. CLEARY  
President

PAUL F. COLE  
Secretary-Treasurer



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**IRA says  
'Negotiate'**

In announcing the end of its cessation on 9 February the IRA said: "The resolution of conflict in our country demands justice. It demands a negotiated settlement. That is not possible until the British government faces up to its responsibilities." This message is repeated in an interview in AP/RN this week. It was a week of tragedy for the people of Ireland and Britain but efforts to reconstruct the peace process must now be redoubled.

## **IRA blames Major for end of cessation**

(Intro.) The following is the full text of an interview with a spokesperson for the General Headquarters Staff of Oglagh na hEireann:

**AP/RN:** The shockwaves from the IRA bomb attack in East London on Friday are still reverberating. Many people will be asking: "Just what brought the 18-month-long IRA cessation to an end?"

**IRA:** Put plainly and bluntly, the end of the cessation was brought about by John Major's cynical misuse and betrayal of the historic opportunity offered by the Irish peace initiative.

**AP/RN:** Can you expand on that reply?

**IRA:** The IRA leadership delivered a complete cessation of military operations on a clear, unambiguous and shared understanding that inclusive negotiations would rapidly commence to bring about political agreement and a peace settlement. The British government committed itself to this publicly. So too did the Dublin government. Let us be crystal clear about this. John Major reneged on these commitments, publicly given. He has acted in bad faith throughout the period of the IRA cessation, introducing one new precondition after another. He has betrayed the Irish peace process and has deliberately squandered this opportunity to resolve the causes of the age-old conflict between Britain and the Irish people. He did so to keep himself in power. In place of the promised negotiations we have had a year and a half of stalling, prevarication and provocation with various political devices being put in place for putting off a negotiation scenario for the foreseeable future.

From all of this we could only finally conclude that the surrender or political defeat of Irish republicans was the actual agenda for the tactical engagement by the British government in the Irish peace initiative. For 18 months the British chose to ignore the opportunity which existed and put sectional, party political considerations above progress by underwriting and reinforcing the unionist veto that they themselves had bestowed.

**AP/RN:** Wasn't it naive to expect the British government to deliver on their commitments?

**IRA:** On the contrary. Trusting the British government played no part in our decision of 31 August 1994. Twenty-five years of countering British

political and military strategies were sufficient guard against that. In fact the British government was not consulted. Our approach was based firmly on political realities and on our responsibility in seeking a just and lasting peace settlement.

It was the Irish peace initiative, put together by Irish nationalist parties which we responded to. When it emerged we responded on 3 October 1993 by stating: "Oglaigh na hEireann welcomes this initiative.... if the political will exists or can be created, it could provide the basis for peace."

It was in fact the nationalist parties who persuaded us that the potential existed, within the nationalist consensus, for a viable alternative dynamic for change.

So on 31 August 1994 we announced a complete cessation of military operations stating that it was our wish to: "Enhance the democratic peace process," and to "significantly contribute to the climate," which would allow for "the inclusive negotiations necessary if there is to be a resolution of the conflict".

The political will to make peace and the putting in place of inclusive negotiations as the essential mechanism for doing so are the critical tests which were put to the British government. They were in fact the litmus test of their seriousness about peace-making. They have clearly demonstrated their absence of will. They have clearly rejected the means to peace.

AP/RN: Where then do we go from here? Are you optimistic about the way forward?

IRA: It isn't a question of optimism or pessimism. It is a question of realism. The fundamental issues at the heart of the conflict are unchanged. There is only one place for all the political representatives of the Irish people to go and that is to the negotiating table. Current British policy prevents all those with a democratic mandate from sitting around that table. Their denial of Irish democratic rights is at the core of the conflict. Where national rights are denied; where justice is denied; where the rights of a community are denied then there is inevitable conflict.

AP/RN: Is it your view that the peace process is completely over?

IRA: In our statement announcing the end of our complete cessation of military operations we said: "The resolution of conflict in our country demands justice. It demands a negotiated settlement. That is not possible until the British government faces up to its responsibilities." The peace process, thus far, has been thwarted by British and unionist intransigence but the search for a just and lasting peace must continue.

What is required is a meaningful process that is capable of leading to a negotiated settlement. A peace process which is subverted by Britain, and used in a vain attempt to secure an IRA surrender is no more than a sham. Ogligh na hEireann firmly formed a view, before our 9 February statement, that there wasn't even a glimmer of hope that Britain, and in consequence the unionist leaderships, were remotely engaged in positive engagement at this time. Ogligh na hEireann therefore couldn't persist in a sham whose sole purpose had become the attainment of an IRA surrender.

AP/RN: What then of the role of others in the peace process. Was enough done to press forward?

IRA: Let me again refer you to our statement of 9 February. We noted that our cessation of August 1994 had: "Presented an historical challenge to all involved. We commend the leaderships of nationalist Ireland at home and abroad. they rose to the challenge. The British prime minister did not."

However, we must take John Bruton to task for his speech in Leinster House on Tuesday, 13 February, when he claimed that he was betrayed by the IRA. John Bruton knew well the basis upon which we agreed to a complete cessation of military operations in August 1994. It was a quid pro quo understanding that all-party talks would commence rapidly. It was a clear and unambiguous understanding which the previous Taoiseach was clear about and which John Bruton was informed of when he assumed office. Let him not cry betrayal to us 15 months later.

When we were approached with a possible alternative way forward we acted in good faith even though we were sceptical. We have been open to persuasion. The wrecker of the Irish peace process, the one who acted in bad faith from the outset was the British prime minister. He actually began his 'address to the British people' on Monday, 12 February, with a direct lie lifted from a fabricated communiqué which was exposed in Sinn Féin's document Setting the Record Straight in November 1993.

2 / [The British government version of the communications opens with a message which it claims was sent by Sinn Féin's Martin McGuinness. The message begins: "The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close." No such message was sent. Ed.]

AP/RN: Let us turn to the very immediate consequences of the Canary Wharf bombing. Two innocent civilians died and scores of others were injured. What is your response to that?

IRA: Our claim of responsibility noted that "regrettable civilian injuries could have been avoided had the British forces responded promptly to

detailed and specific warnings which they received." That said, let me say, that we profoundly regret the loss of innocent life and the injury of noncombatants and though it won't be any comfort to those who have suffered we accept totally our responsibility in that regard. However, let us deal with the facts: at 5.30pm we announced an end to our cessation. From 5.35pm multiple warnings were given to various agencies on both sides of the Irish Sea. Warnings were also sent directly to South Quay, Canary Wharf. We indicated that a massive bomb would detonate at South Quay at 7pm and called for its complete evacuation. We persisted with calls right up until 7pm. At 7.01pm the bomb detonated. Two people in a shop, not two hundred yards from the bomb site pinpointed by us, were killed. We deeply regret this. We have given our account which can be independently verified. The British forces must explain why, after a full 91 minutes, they had allowed civilians to remain in proximity to a massive bomb which they had not only been warned about, but which they had actually located. Adequate and verifiable warnings should be acted upon. We can of course speculate why the British forces acted as they did. That is for them to answer. We wish only to offer our condolences to the relatives of the dead and to those injured. We did all in our power to prevent injuries.

AP/RN: Many wonder is Canary Wharf a one-off action or a shot across the bows of the British government. What do you say?

IRA: Let me repeat our statement of 9 February: "It is with great reluctance that the leadership of Oglagh na hEireann announces that its complete cessation of military operations ended at 6pm, Friday, 9 February."

We in Oglagh na hEireann will continue to assert Irish national rights in the face of British denial for as long as is necessary.

AP/RN: What of the possible loyalist response. Do you anticipate that they will end their cease-fire?

IRA: Let us be absolutely clear about this. The IRA have no desire to engage loyalists in any military sense. We do know that they have continued to very actively target nationalists during the last year and a half.

On the other hand they have shown themselves capable of imaginative and radical thinking at times. If their leadership is strong enough to prevent them reinvolving themselves in the murderous sectarian attacks on nationalists and Catholics which have been their stock in trade for the past 75 years then that would of course be welcome.

As republicans we are absolutely opposed to sectarianism but history has

shown that the British government 'dirty tricks department' have armed and unleashed loyalism at any stage where the British are under significant pressure about their own role in Ireland. We can only hope that loyalists will not allow themselves to be used as surrogates or dupes for either the British or the unionist leaders.

The basic flaw in loyalist working-class ideology is that their sole objective has been to maintain an elite British and unionist upper-class establishment. All their killing is based on not wanting change. It is a massive contradiction for organisations made up of working-class people. Let us hope that such contradictions have been resolved.

AP/RN: Could you give us your views of where the nationalist consensus now stands and where does Sinn Féin go from here?

IRA: From our position we feel that nationalism in Ireland has a general consensus on a number of fundamentals:

- 1) There is broad agreement that what is required are real and meaningful negotiations about how a settlement can be achieved;
  - 2) There is agreement that current political arrangements have utterly failed and must be replaced;
  - 3) There is agreement that there can be no internal settlement within the Six Counties;
  - 4) There is agreement that Britain has a central role in enabling and persuading parties to participate in arriving at a settlement in Ireland, but that there cannot be peace unless Britain wants it;
  - 5) There is broad agreement that Britain has, thus far, failed to live up to its responsibilities;
  - 6) There is also agreement that the most urgent task facing all of us is the ending of conflict in Ireland on the basis of a just and lasting peace.
- As to what Sinn Féin now does, that of course is a matter entirely for Sinn Féin. They, like us, will follow their own counsel. Sinn Féin have already stated publicly that they are absolutely committed to their peace strategy. We naturally wish them every success.

AP/RN: Since the ending of your cessation there has been considerable speculation amongst journalists, commentators and some politicians about possible IRA splits and about relations between Sinn Féin and yourselves. Do you have any comment?

IRA: Setting aside the fact that there is a degree of mischief-making in some predictable quarters, let us deal with the question of IRA splits. It is worth pointing to the high levels of discipline shown by IRA Volunteers over 18 long months of cessation in the face of continuous provocation.

Let us not forget that the British forces didn't have any cessation of activities. House raids, arrests, harassment, the firing of plastic bullets, the recruitment of informers and the refortification of military strongholds continued apace.

We take this opportunity to salute the patience, fortitude and discipline of all our Volunteers. They compare more than favourably with activists in any liberation movement worldwide or indeed in Irish history. There are no splits, we are united in all our actions. Our commitment and determination remain steadfast.

As to your latter point, Sinn Féin came forward with a strategy for peace through negotiated settlement some years ago. It has said publicly on many occasions that it will continue, whatever the prevailing circumstances, to pursue that strategy and that goal. We have no problem with that and have only praise for their sterling efforts to introduce national democracy to Ireland. But Sinn Féin is not the IRA. The IRA is not Sinn Féin. We will listen carefully to any parties or persons who have an opinion or advice to offer us, but in the final analysis we make our own decisions and follow our own counsel.

(Quotes)

When we were approached with a possible alternative way forward we acted in good faith even though we were sceptical. We have been open to persuasion.

The end of the cessation was brought about by John Major's cynical misuse and betrayal of the historic opportunity offered by the Irish peace initiative.

(Cap)

Destruction in London's Docklands after the IRA bomb on 9 February