

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Statements

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1397

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	1	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	Mary Peters to Nancy Soderberg re: Adams Memecon; Other Issues (1 page)	11/02/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
001b. memcon	re: Memecon of Mr. Lake's Conversation with Gerry Adams, Nov 1 (4 pages)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002. cable	Roderic Lyne to Anthony Lake (3 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	[Duplicate of 002] (3 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memcon	re: Mr. Lake's September 14[3] Meeting with Gerry Adams (8 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005. telcon	re: Telcon Between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams (3 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
006. telcon	re: Summary of Phone Conversation Between Mr. Lake and Michael Ancram (2 pages)	09/30/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
007. telcon	re: Telcon Between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams (4 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
008. cable	re: Prime Minister's Views on Northern Ireland Peace Process (4 pages)	08/31/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
009. email	Mary Peters to Nancy Soderberg re: Thoughts on Peace Process (2 pages)	09/09/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
010. memo	Trina to Senator [Kennedy] re: Discussion with John Hume (1 page)	09/12/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Statements

2011-0355-F
rs1678

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

GOOD MORNING ULSTER: 12 OCTOBER 1995 - ANDY TYRIE

✓
cm
EL
EO
ML

A former paramilitary leader has urged all parties, including Sinn Fein, to take their seats in any proposed Assembly at Stormont. We have learned that Andy Tyrie, who once enjoyed the title of Supreme Commander of the Ulster Defence Association, who disappeared from the limelight several years ago, was closely consulted by that organisation in the weeks leading up to the announcement of the loyalist ceasefire. As that announcement was read to reporters at Fernhill House in Belfast, Tyrie was sitting at the back of the room, our chief security correspondent, Brian Rowan, asked him to describe his emotions as he listened to words being read by Gusty Spence, from whom we heard earlier in the programme, giving his views of the same event.

Andy Tyrie

It's strange what you do think about. You're inclined to think about is this going to be easier for the people who live in the country areas, who live up the dark lanes, the UDR men, the policemen, the loyalists, the councillors, the people who live in the real bad areas, who every night their wives are worried about and when they're coming home. People mightn't understand that, that people like me would think that way. Also my own grandchildren - you know is this going to be a different future for them? Is there going to be nicer things happen to them? Are they going to look back and say that was a bad period, now we're on the move, we'll change it. There are so many things, and then it's the usual thing, you're saying to yourself, 'maybe I should be up there and then the other part of me saying 'no, just stay where you are. You're far better where you are, stay at the back'.

Interviewer

Did you sense at some stage that we were moving in the direction of two ceasefires?

Red.

12/10 95 14:21 00202 528470 N I INFO SERVICE 444 30.10 0003011

Andy Tyrrie

Yes, it had to come, because talking and listening to people, reading about different hints, different ideas, progress, people were fed up with it. Some of the things that happened over the last maybe 5 years brought it home, that everybody was vulnerable. All the signs were there, and a lot of people said 'it can't go on like this. Even the people who were deeply involved in the evidence were saying 'when is it going to finish? What is going to make us go the right direction for a change'?

Interviewer

Many people within the republican and the loyalist communities have described it as a war. Was it a war with no winners in many senses?

Andy Tyrrie

The security people became more professional, so they did. They were doing a good job, a job but you also had terrorists learning to terrorise terrorists.

Interviewer

Do you accept that many innocent people were killed?

Andy Tyrrie

Quite a lot, there's no doubt about that, that's happened in every theatre of war or terrorist activities. Anything that changed the situation here was coming across very clear was the fact that the American Government had discovered terrorism in their own backyard. Europeans had seen terrorism, the British Government had seen terrorism. So everybody was seeing it for the first time clearly. Especially the American Government. And they no longer seen the IRA's type of terrorism as a romantic type of thing. So there was a big massive combination of things that were happening and were saying terrorism is over, it's no longer fashionable, it has to go away and there's two communities living in Northern Ireland and we need to go a different direction. Instead of supporting violence, whether it's

directly or indirectly, or saying nothing, I mean by saying nothing is almost to approve of what was going on. They were saying we have to be more positive, let's look at the situation, and that's where the change came in the Dublin Government.

Interviewer

When you're on, the process has become bogged down on this decommissioning issue. What are your thoughts on decommissioning. Do you think the guns must come before the talks or do you think they should get on with the talks?

Andy Tyrrie

I think the Provisional IRA have locked their selves into peace and they're the problem, they can turn the war back on again and they'll have the biggest problem they ever came across in their lives, because all the people they made friends with, they'll not be able to justify it. Terrorism in the world is a dying trade at the minute. I hope it continues.

Interviewer

In 1974 you were a central figure in a strike which brought down the powersharing Executive at that time. Is that something now you regret?

Andy Tyrrie

Well, whenever that strike took place, the only thing we requested was the removal of the Council of Ireland, the interference at that particular time, there was a lot of tension about then. The Executive itself was not wrong. Most people were quite happy about it, it was working. The Ministers were getting on well together, everything was happy, but they wanted to impose more and more on us every time and it was too early. I do regret the Executive collapsing under the circumstances, it could have continued; only for that one clause we could have moved it.

12/10 85 14:22 00404 00410 N & INFO SERVICE 444 NO. 10 0005-01

Interviewer

Do you think loyalists are any more willing now to accept a greater Irish dimension to the politics of this?

Andy Tyrrie

We all talk about the Irish dimension. It's not a matter of accepting or rejecting it. The most important thing that matters of society is we have to work together. I think things has changed greatly with a cross-border trade and relationships between industrialists and the people. It has grew. We were conditioned to say we hated each other. That was part of the conditioning. I think we have all got over that now, because it means we walk with each other, we talk with each other, we trade with each other. There's nothing unusual about that. If that's the Irish dimension, well let's get it going. If the Irish dimension means people like Gary McMichael leading his group of people down to Dublin to talk to politicians down there, if that's the Irish dimension that's great. It means we're getting to know each other, we get to know each other's fears, we get to know each other's hang-ups. We never done that before. I think we make too many issues of who we talk to and who we shake hands to. It's back to the same thing again as they do at the City Hall. They talk to each other, they work with each other in the City Hall. I think you could say they're not always happy about. Sometimes it came to fisticuff, but at least they're still there. If we have an Assembly here, they can do all the talking they want. They don't have to live with them, they don't have to get into bed with them. At least they're exchanging ideas. We are the ones going to solve the problem here, we have done it for years and years. We have used every Government possible as a crutch, we have used the Irish Government, the British Government. Every time we have a problem we immediately say to them 'hi, solve the problem'. So they turn round and try and solve the problem and we say 'No, that's not right, we don't want that'. And the only way they're ever going to solve the problem is to get into an Assembly, and once they get in there, they can put motions forward, they can say 'we want to go into a united Ireland' to see what the electorate says. It's different now, they can set up the rules, they can ask for referendums every so often. We could ask for referendums. Maybe we mightn't want to stay

with the British Government. We might find we might enjoy a better relationship with Dublin because we're all living on the one island, and we could work better from a trades point of view, but that's there to be debated.

Interviewer

Play it long, you would say?

Andy Tyrie

Long term. I think that they're all entering into an adventure now. It has to be at the end of the day a good result.

GOOD MORNING ULSTER - 12.10.95 - GUSTY SPENCE**Reporter:**

Continuing our look at the Loyalist ceasefire one year on. The man who read the words of the ceasefire statement in Fernhill House in Belfast a year ago says the time for dialogue is now. Gusty Spence believes there is a determination among Republicans and Loyalists that there should be no return to violence. Our chief security correspondent, Brian Rowan, asked Gusty Spence about his thoughts in the hours leading up to the ceasefire announcement.

Gusty Spence:

All a jumble of thoughts, not only over a 25 year period but perhaps maybe since the state was set up in 1922, that here for the first time ever we had the opportunity for a new beginning and it was exciting and it was very emotional. It was important to in the way that it developed because it came all of a sudden. I hadn't contemplated a ceasefire, a ceasefire was in the offing in my opinion but whenever it did come, whenever they agreed to the ceasefire it came pretty quickly.

Reporter:

Were you able to sleep that night before the announcement?

Gusty Spence:

Very little sleep, very little sleep. You know it was the sense of the occasion and there was tossing and turning and everything else and I felt humble because they had chosen me to read the statement.

Reporter:

You walked into Fernhill House the following morning at nine o'clock, what were your feelings then at that stage?

Gusty Spence:

Again, excitement, emotion and the fella who was sitting beside me, he didn't do my nerves any good because, his legs were shaking like jelly. No but whenever you have it in your mind that I'm going to deliver this statement, you know, in those tones, whatever way the

tones came across, you do get a grip on yourself and you do deliver. On a momentous occasion like this it was invariably people who had lived in the shadows, not necessarily the paramilitary shadows, not necessarily the political shadows but had lived in the shadows of society who really never had a say in the society and here was the opportunity for those people to have a say and deliver it in a responsible way.

Reporter:

The statement contained words of remorse. It offered abject and true remorse to the families of all the innocent victims, who were the innocent victims as far as you were concerned?

Gusty Spence:

As far as I'm concerned, we are all innocent victims in some shape or form. The innocent victims that's being spoken about and I'm trying to paraphrase what people meant whenever they put those words down, for all those people who really had not been involved in the warfare as such. If a soldier is a soldier and he goes out to fight a war there has to be a certain expectancy on his part.

Reporter:

You used the word war to describe what went on here for 25 years, were there any winners in that war as far as you are concerned?

Gusty Spence:

No. No. No, there couldn't be any winners. You see Brian we lived in a divided society and how does a divided society have winners and losers. There are no winners and losers. If there is a winner, if there is a winner, it has to be this much abused and much maligned term democracy. The euphemisms of the present day, you know the greater number because the majority had become aligned to Unionism, the majority of people want the Union to continue. They say it often and they say it loud, that's Catholic and Protestant, Dissenter and people of no religion, or whatever. That's good enough for me.

Reporter:

The statement said that the Union is safe is that still your belief. I mean many Unionists would say that it is not safe, that it is crumbling that its not the Union it was.

Gusty Spence:

Well what was the Union it was. What was the Union, supremacy? We are the people, what was the Unionism that was? No, triumphalism? No, the Union is safe because the people say the Union is safe, the British Government can say it, the Irish Government can say it, whoever likes can say it, but the people have spoken, the people say that the Union is safe, therefore the Union is safe.

Reporter:

One year on what contribution do you think that the Loyalist political representatives have made to what has become known as the Peace Process?

Gusty Spence:

Oh, its a big contribution. Number one they are beginning to redefine Unionism, they are beginning to focus Unionism. Unionism is an honourable, an honourable - I hesitate to use this term traditional because again wrong connotations - an honourable political philosophy. It has been sullied. There are other terms you could use but what the so called fringe parties are doing, and elements in fair play to them, within the Official Unionist Party and indeed within the DUP are beginning to redefine Unionism to cut out this triumphalism. We are legitimate, we have story to tell, let us tell the story without gloss without hurt or disregard for anyone.

Reporter:

Things that have happened in the last year were totalling unthinkable probably 12 months ago. Loyalism has gone to Dublin, the Loyalist political representatives have gone to Dublin they've met John Bruton they've been involved in talks with the SDLP, do you see the point coming closer now where they will eventually engage in dialogue with Sinn Fein?

Gusty Spence:

Of course, now is the time to get rid of the trenches. I'm saying now is the time for dialogue. The Unionist Party, the DUP, whoever doesn't want to come along will be left behind, talk to Sinn Fein, talk to the SDLP, talk to the Unionist parties and again we have difficulties speaking to some of the parties because some of the parties won't speak to us, some of the so called Unionist parties will not speak to us because we're looked upon as not being respectable, whatever that means. So it's important for dialogue, we've been through 25 years, more than 25 years, the campaigns of the 20s, the 30s, the 40s, the 50s, what the people want, I'm asking people what do they want, do they want to go back to warfare or do they want to engage in dialogue, constructive dialogue, without conceding that much of principle of their dearly held beliefs, on both sides.

Reporter:

When you say now is the time to begin the dialogue, are you saying that it should begin before this decommissioning issue is sorted out?

Gusty Spence:

This decommissioning. Let me put it this way, the guns, and I'm not one for guns. The guns are silent, let them remain silent. There will be no need for weapons, it's the same as the old UVF guns there was 30,000 rifles and 3 million rounds of ammunition were run into Northern Ireland here on the night of the 24-25 April 1914, where are they now. They have just been spirited away or they have been destroyed or whatever. There would be no need for weapons.

Reporter:

One year on can it work do you think, can it hold?

Gusty Spence:

Oh yes, yes.

12/10 99 14.10 20101 310470 N I INFO SERVICE 444 NO.10

Reporter:

Is there a determination within the Loyalist community not to go back to what you call warfare?

Gusty Spence:

I think there is a determination in both communities or both aspects of the community not to go back. No-one wants to engage themselves in what people have engaged themselves in for this past 25 years and more. Yes there is a determination.

Facsimile Cover Sheet

10:21 AM 12/8/95

*File
(replied)*

ATTENTION: David Fetig, White House

William Armbruster, USIS

FROM: ROBIN GREER
American Consulate General Belfast
Phone 438837 / Fax 248482
[01232 from within UK
00 44 1232 international]

PAGES (INCLUSIVE): 10

Transcript of radio interviews with John Taylor (Unionist MP) and Gerry Adams (Sinn Fein leader)

Press statements by Sinn Fein and IRA.

Jodi

These arrived after Nbray got sick Friday.

[Signature]

GOOD MORNING ULSTER - 8 DECEMBER 1995
DR JOHN ALDERDICE

Interviewer

It didn't take long for the Clinton bubble to burst, did it?

Dr John Alderdice

Well, I don't think that this is a particularly surprising thing. None of us with any wit thought that the IRA either had gone away or was going to go easily away. The IRA is still there, as Mr Adams of course has told us some time ago and their threats and coercion are still there. They are still beating people up; they were able to turn it off for a little while before President Clinton came, so it's clearly not spontaneous, it's politically motivated and informed and indeed as the Republican movement comes under increasing pressure, both to deal with the arms question and indeed to come up with a more realistic political agenda than the one that they've had, I don't think we should find it surprising that we get threats from the IRA. But what is important of course is that the two Governments don't give in to the threats, that they continue with the twin-track approach, that they confront the Republican movement, both on the question of arms and on the question of political reality on those two political tracks.

Interviewer

Are we also seeing large cracks appearing between Sinn Fein and the IRA in terms of the peace process?

Dr John Alderdice

I don't perceive any cracks between Sinn Fein and the IRA, I have to say. I have always taken the view that these were really one and the same movement. Now, they themselves, I think, are having considerable difficulties because they are at one and the same time trying to maintain this notion that Sinn Fein and the IRA are completely separate and at the same time of course it is clear that if the IRA makes a particular move, Sinn Fein actually has to go along with it. So I don't think there are cracks appearing there. I think there are difficulties coming to bear on the whole of the Republican movement as reality begins to come in and as the whole, not just of the political community throughout these islands, but as President Clinton showed, the whole political community throughout the world is pressing on them to be real about peace, to deal with the arms question and to come up with a political approach that is realistic and accept the principle of consent.

Interviewer

Dr Alderdice, you'll appreciate I ask you that question in the interest of journalism. Thank you very much.

GOOD MORNING ULSTER - 8 DECEMBER 1995 - IAN PAISLEY, JUNIOR

Interviewer

Ian Paisley Junior is with us. First of all, your reaction to the IRA statement that there was no question of it meeting what it calls this 'ludicrous' demand for a surrender of weapons through the front or back door. It blames British bad faith and Unionist intransigence.

Ian Paisley Junior

Yes, I think that the statement highlights the absolute futility of this peace process and makes it absolutely clear that there is no reasoning with the IRA. You just have to read their statement and indeed the penultimate paragraph. It's so one dimensional, that everyone else is to blame except the terrorist organisation, and I think that their statement has single-handedly scuppered the twin-track process which we didn't believe would get off the ground anyway, but it has scuppered it and has demonstrated that there is no way forward as long as you try to negotiate with terrorists. The only way in which we can move this thing forward is to put this onto a democratic footing. First, to have an election to a democratic body and for democratic parties to negotiate a settlement to the internal problems of Northern Ireland.

Interviewer

I'm joined on the line now by the deputy leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, John Taylor. What do you see as the implications of this not just for the work of the International Decommissioning Body but the peace process as a whole?

John Taylor

Well, if there's intransigence, it certainly exists with the IRA. It was they who over a year ago announced the ceasefire and gave the impression that they wished to transform themselves from being a terrorist organisation to becoming a constitutional political party, but I'm afraid they are still intransigent, they still want to keep their firearms and there's just no change in their situation.

Interviewer

Well is there any point in Senator Mitchell and his two other colleagues beginning their work today?

John Taylor

Oh I think there is, yes. It's quite clear that the IRA have not been influenced in any way by the recent visit by President Clinton and that will be deplored by most people throughout Northern Ireland, and indeed throughout the world. They're becoming increasingly isolated. Now as far as the International Commission is concerned it must proceed with its work and come out with its conclusions early in the New Year, and if the IRA refused to respond to that, well then yet again the IRA will be exposed for what it is.

Interviewer

And what then will be the Ulster Unionists' position on even in engaging in bilateral talks with the Government on the prospect of all-party talks?

John Taylor

We will continue to talk to our own Government, we talk to them about many subjects and the Ulster Unionists of course are quite keen to

enter into dialogue on an all-party basis but we will not enter into talks with Sinn Fein/IRA whilst they remain intransigent, whilst they retain the preconditions that they must have their firearms and bombs under the table at any talks. We will not get involved in that kind of talks scenario with Sinn Fein.

Interviewer

What is the minimum the IRA must do to allow them to enter talks so far as the Ulster Unionists are concerned?

John Taylor

We will require them to comply with Article 10 of the Downing Street Declaration and that implies either that they begin the decommissioning of their illegal firearms or get a mandate from the people of Northern Ireland in some election, in which they fight the election on the basis of being exclusively committed to peaceful means and they seem to want to avoid both these choices.

Interviewer

If Senator Mitchell and his colleagues come up with an alternative, are you prepared to consider that?

John Taylor

Well one's prepared to consider anything, that's the reasonable approach of any politician, but one has a bottom line of course and that is that one does not talk to the terrorist organisation if on the one hand it says it believes in the ballot-box, but on the other hand says it wants to retain the Armalite. We'll not work on that basis.

Interviewer

What I'm probably asking you is, if the decommissioning body comes up with a formula that falls short of what it says in the Downing Street Declaration, are you prepared to move?

John Taylor

I'm not too sure what that means, it's very hypothetical.

Interviewer

Well the decommissioning body has been appointed to look at the process of decommissioning to find some way of breaking what is clearly, and it's emphasised in the IRA statement, a logjam so far as the handing over of weapons is concerned. If they can come up with a formula that falls somewhere between what you want and what the IRA is prepared to give, are you prepared to give that consideration, is what I'm saying?

John Taylor

One considers anything. Of course we want to help the political process in Northern Ireland. It is the Ulster Unionists who are being positive about all-party talks. It's the Ulster Unionists who are coming up with the ideas these days. What we are now seeing is that Sinn Fein/IRA, who are now being intransigent, who clearly are showing themselves to the general public in Northern Ireland that they cannot really transform themselves from being what they have always been, a terrorist or killing organisation into becoming a constitutional political party. They can't make that jump.

Gerry Adams

Well I think in many ways the statement is stating the obvious. I think the objective of getting all of the guns out of Irish politics is both necessary and achievable as part of the necessary movement, the necessary change on a whole range of constitutional, political, democratic issues as well as the issues of the prisoners and the general need for a total demilitarisation of society. As a precondition I'm sure that none of the armed groups are going to surrender their weapons... I listened earlier. You know and I think in the interest of journalism Barry (Cowan) asked John Taylor how do the IRA get involved in talks. I have never heard any suggestion that the IRA should be involved in talks. I think the IRA's big initiative, big help, big assistance, historic decision of August 31st is its contribution to the peace process and it's that which needs to be built upon.

Interviewer

Well that's what it says. It repeats that in its statement, but do you see the statement as effectively undermining, if not rendering impotent, the twin-track process?

Gerry Adams

Well I do think that, if you watched and I am sure you did, the press conference in Downing Street where the twin-track process was announced, John Major at the same moment as John Bruton was arguing for the need to remove all preconditions. John Major was reasserting and reiterating his 'ludicrous', as the IRA has described this as 'ludicrous' precondition. You know there is a question mark hanging over this twin-track approach. Sinn Fein is attempting to come to it positively, in an attempt to move the situation into all-party talks and to get issues of equality addressed. And it is the British and the Unionists who are preventing this from happening.

Interviewer

Well there are those who would argue of course that it's all the more reason for the twin-track approach to be approached positively and indeed for Sinn Fein to become involved to try to find a way of

Gerry Adams

Well can I say to you Seamus it's a difficulty between John Bruton and John Major. This is a new precondition that was put up by the British Government 5 months after the IRA ceasefire.....

Interviewer

How do you mean it's a difficulty between Mr Major and Mr Bruton?

Gerry Adams

Because Mr Bruton has clearly said the twin-track process is useless unless it removes preconditions and Mr Major has said that the precondition will not be removed. Now that's where the question mark comes from. I listened to John Taylor talking about Sinn Fein's mandate and again I think it's in the interests of journalism and of your listeners. Sinn Fein has contested a series of elections here in this statelet and we have contested the last number of elections on the basis of our party's peace strategy. Our election slogan going into the last election was 'towards a lasting peace'.

Interviewer

Mr Taylor also says that the intransigence is being shown by the IRA?

Gerry Adams

Well, Mr Taylor I think is putting himself in the position of being the pot calling the kettle black. The reality of the situation is whatever about the IRA's position is that the Ulster Unionist Party have consistently refused to recognise the mandate of any other party except its own. It refuses to recognise the mandate of the SDLP, of the Dublin Government or of Sinn Fein and that's the reality of the situation. Under its previous leader, James Molyneaux, the Ulster Unionist Party refused to engage in the peace process. In fact, even refused to recognise that there was a peace process under its present.....

Interviewer

Well the Ulster Unionists would say of course they would not be including going to Dublin to put their case there?

Gerry Adams

Well under its current leadership that policy of minimalism which James Molyneaux perfected to an art form, that has continued.

Interviewer

One final point to you, and we have to make it a final point, where is the peace process going? Do you still believe in it?

Gerry Adams

Well, first of all, the visit by President Clinton in many ways while being very, very helpful in internationalising the whole situation here clouded the reality, and the reality is the British Government are still putting roadblocks on the pathway to peace, and others are seeking to try and remove those roadblocks, but unless the British Government becomes engaged and unless the Ulster Unionist Party and the DUP become engaged then there's a huge question mark over the whole search for peace.

Sinn Féin

Nuacht raiteas/News release

For immediate release:
8/12/95

Adams comments on IRA statement

Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams commenting on last night's IRA statement said:

"Sinn Féin's position is unchanged by the IRA statement which in many ways is restating the obvious and the widely acknowledged reality of the current situation.

Everyone, including Mr Major and especially Mr Trimble and Mr Paisley, knows that none of the armed groups is prepared to disarm at this time.

Despite this the British government has constantly reiterated its demand for an IRA surrender as a precondition for all party talks.

The Taoiseach John Bruton has made it clear that a twin-track approach is useless unless it removes the preconditions.

That is Sinn Féin's view also. Our party will continue with its consistently positive contribution to the search for peace in our engagement with the twin-track approach.

The British government's position flies in the face of the international experience of conflict resolution. Mr Major needs to stop making propaganda and start making peace."

Mr Adams also challenged MR Trimble and Mr Paisley to stop "vying with each other for the narrow negative ground of unionist intransigence.

Instead of refusing to engage in the peace process they should be leading their supporters in the search for agreement about all the issues which affect the people of this island".

Press Centre, 51/55 Falls Road, Belfast

Tel: 230281 Fax: 231723

IN AUGUST 1994, IN RECOGNITION OF THE POTENTIAL WHICH THEN EXISTED , AND IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PROCESS , THE LEADERSHIP OF OGLAIGH NA h-EIREANN TOOK THE INITIATIVE AND ANNOUNCED A COMPLETE CESSATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

WE NOTED THEN THAT A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WOULD ONLY BE FOUND AS A RESULT OF INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS. OUR INITIATIVE WAS AIMED AT CREATING A CLIMATE WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THIS. WE ALSO NOTED THE OTHERS, NOT LEAST THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT , HAD A DUTY TO FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

IT IS A MATTER OF PROFOUND REGRET THAT RATHER THAN FULFILLING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT , PRESENTED WITH THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY , HAS SOUGHT ONLY TO FRUSTRATE MOVEMENT INTO INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS ERECTED AN ABSOLUTE BARRIER TO PROGRESS WITH ITS UNTENABLE AND UNATTAINABLE DEMAND FOR AN IRA SURRENDER.

THIS DEMAND, WHICH HAS BEEN ELEVATED INTO A PRECONDITION FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF ALL PARTY POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS BLOCKS THE INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE ESSENTIAL IF THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT ARE TO BE REMOVED . IT IS ALSO A DEMAND WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS STRIDENTLY AND REPEATEDLY MADE EVEN OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST WEEK.

WE NOTED THAT BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO ANNOUNCE THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH, ACTUALLY REJECTED IT AS A MEANS OF REMOVING PRECONDITIONS. IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT MR MAJOR IS ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING THE UNIONIST PROPOSITION OF A RETURN TO STORMONT AND ACTIVELY REINFORCES THE UNIONIST LEADERSHIPS REFUSAL TO ENGAGE MEANINGFULLY IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

BRITISH BAD FAITH AND UNIONIST INTRANSIGENCE HAS RAISED A HUGE QUESTION MARK OVER THE POTENTIAL OF THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH.

AS WE STATED ON SEPTEMBER 29TH, THERE IS NO QUESTION OF OGLAIGH NA h-EIREANN MEETING THE LUDICROUS DEMAND FOR A SURRENDER OF IRA WEAPONS EITHER THROUGH THE FRONT OR THE BACK DOOR.

P O NEILL

IRISH REPUBLICAN PUBLICITY BUREAU

DUBLIN

**SECRETARY OF STATE AND DICK SPRING DOORSTEPPED BEFORE A
MEETING IN LONDON 8 DECEMBER 1995**

Sofs: Good morning everybody I'm very glad to welcome the Tanaiste Mr Spring and the Justice Minister Mrs Owen again. We've got a couple of hours or a little bit more to talk about a lot of things and we shall be going in very shortly to do that. I am very glad to welcome in the latest of a long series of discussions that we have been having.

Q: Sir Patrick what is your reaction to the IRA statement last night?

Sofs: I think it is very unhelpful but it is a restatement of a position with which we are familiar.

Q: Your views Mr Spring?

DS: Like the Secretary of State says its a restatement of a position that has been stated just some months ago. As far as I'm concerned everybody knows that both governments want to deal with the arms question as quickly and as permanently as possible, we have set the twin track process in motion that's why we are here this morning to deal with the political phase of that. The International Body has been set up. The cessation of military operations is strong and there is peace in Northern Ireland for 16 months now, we have an opportunity of building on that and that's why we are going to have these meetings.

Q: Is it a setback Secretary of State?

Sofs: I think it is a restatement of a position, I think it is disappointing that the opinion shown by the public right across Northern Ireland when President Clinton was here of great support for the twin tracks process has not found reflection in what they said.

Q: Is it not the two governments are as far apart as ever for Washington Three?

DS: No the situation is that we have as at last week the communique was issued, the twin track process is underway and as the Secretary of State said with President Clinton's very successful visit last week to Northern Ireland and the south there is an opportunity there for us now. We all saw what the people of Northern Ireland want last week in Derry and in Belfast and also what the people of the Republic want by the support that President Clinton got in the south. The opportunity is there for us now and we've all got to take that opportunity and I'm very glad that already, George Mitchell has had for example meetings with Sinn Fein and they have said they are participating and will be co-operating with him.

Thank you.

E N D

JOINT STATEMENT

The two Governments reaffirmed their commitment to approach the twin track scheme purposively, with the objective of bringing all the parties together for substantive political negotiations by end February.

They urged all relevant parties to cooperate with the twin-track scheme.

Each Government will work hard, and in close consultation with the other and with the parties, to carry matters forward.

They noted the IRA's restatement of its position on arms. They believe it important that Sinn Fein cooperate with the International Body and both Governments expect that it will speak authoritatively about IRA arms. Both Governments are committed to consider any recommendation of the Body within its remit on its merits and Sinn Fein has in the past given a similar commitment.

GOOD MORNING ULSTER - 8 DECEMBER 1995 - DR JOE HENDRON

Interviewer

It can't be any surprise this statement, can it?

Dr Joe Hendron

I must admit I'm not terribly surprised. I have had discussions recently with senior Sinn Fein people and I do know that they are having some problems. They feel very bitter in terms of the British Government's precondition about decommissioning before talks. They feel that the agreement between the two Prime Ministers was a sort of a rush job, which it obviously was, the night before President Clinton came and then that particular agreement had of course the imprimatur matter of President Clinton. The Sinn Fein leadership seemed to go along with some reluctance with that, but I do have some understanding on this score here that there is a great annoyance within the republican leadership, and certainly within the IRA. But this morning I want to emphasise that I do not accept at all that the peace process itself is in any danger, or that there is any danger of the paramilitaries going back to violence.

Interviewer

But is there any future for this twin-track process?

Dr Joe Hendron

There is. It centres... and I think it was John Taylor put emphasis on the Senator George Mitchell there, and I do that as well. I think it is important that Senator Mitchell ... well he has made a start. He's a man respected by all, he will be speaking to all of the relevant groups and that includes the IRA and Sinn Fein leadership and I'm sure that he'll be doing that. And both Governments agreed in their joint statement that they would be leaving the decommissioning aspects, although there was a difference between the Governments, we all know about that, that fudge. But nevertheless, they were leaving it to Senator George Mitchell and his people and I would hope therefore that that particular International Body will set about its work right away.

Interviewer

You talk of a fudge there. There were those who looked upon this in a positive way and said well this may be exactly what's required at the moment to try to set aside or find a way round the difficulty. However, the negative view of it is that it simply postponed that difficulty and that, people might say, is exactly what's being highlighted in this IRA statement?

Dr Joe Hendron

I would accept that. The twin-track approach, the political end, and then the decommissioning. The decommissioning end, people have used the word fudge, and I would simply say that that was very necessary. The two Governments obviously had a strong difference, the two Prime Ministers, and that was reflected in that statement, and that's fair enough. I understand why they did that. But I still go back this morning, because people will wonder 'well where is the peace process, where is the twin-track process'? I believe the twin-track process is still on course, but I believe the emphasis must very, very much, once again, be on Senator Mitchell and his people and I believe that the sooner they get talking to the republican leadership and to other relevant groups, then the better.

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 08-Dec-1995 11:46am GMT
From: Malcolm Graves
GRAVES@A1@LONDON
Dept: Information Service
Tel No:

TO: See Below

Subject: IRA STATEMENT : PRIME MINISTER'S WORDS

The PM is reported as saying the following in his constituency this morning:

"We are not going to pre-judge the work of Senator Mitchell but the IRA's intransigence is a slap in the face to the hundreds of thousands of people in Northern Ireland and the Republic who last week demonstrated their massive desire for peace.

"The message of those people to the paramilitaries was that their day was over. It is now up to Gerry Adams and his colleagues to make this message penetrate all corners of their movement.

"The provisional leadership have made promises to the nationalist community and to others. We hope they are not now going to run away from those promises. Let's hope that when they meet the International Body they talk seriously about how they are going to decommission their weapons. It is up to them to agree to practical concrete steps to consolidate peace and open the way to a lasting political settlement."

Distribution:

TO: woods@al@gis
TO: burnett@al@gis
TO: mcaleer@al@gis
TO: ross@al@gis
TO: garrett@al@gis
TO: armstrong@al@gis
TO: cluney@al@gis

CC: wood@al@gis
CC: Christine Jude
CC: David Prior

(JUDE@A1@LONDON)
(PRIOR@A1@LONDON)



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1995

Dear Tony,

Here is the text which Sinn Fein tabled during the talks this morning with Michael Ancram. The text was read to Michael, rather than handed over, and taken down by officials.

*Yours, Mr.,
Roderic*

RODERIC LYNE

The Honorable Anthony Lake

SINN FEIN DRAFT: 3 NOVEMBER 1995

The two Governments have agreed to launch the preparatory phase of all party talks in the peace process to begin, not later than November 30, substantive political negotiations in round-table format to reach an agreed political settlement.

2. The two Governments will work jointly to lay the groundwork for the substantive round-table talks by seeking agreement among the concerned parties on the basis participation and agenda for the negotiations. The Governments will be ready to meet with the parties jointly and to convene a meeting with two or more parties at their request.

3. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body under the eminent chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell to ascertain and advise the two Governments on the commitment of the respective political parties to exclusively peaceful and democratic means of influencing the body politic and on their commitment to the removal of all weapons from Irish politics. The International Body will also examine whether and in what context and manner the question of arms, now thankfully silenced, could be finally and satisfactorily settled. Senator Mitchell will be assisted by two other figures of international standing likely to inspire widespread confidence.

4. The Body will have the remit of reporting by the end of November whether it has established that a clear commitment exists to a satisfactory process for the full and verifiable decommissioning of arms. To reach its conclusions, the Panel can review other political issues that may be relevant to the issue of arms.

5. The International Body will report to the two Governments who will undertake to consider carefully any recommendations it makes and to give them due weight.

KM/TALKS/613

We are now beginning the all party talks process which will lead to round table talks involving all parties by (early November) (fixed November date).

To mark the beginning of this phase both governments will call a two day Convention of all parties to be held on (fixed date) to agree the agenda for all party talks. Parallel to this process both Governments have asked Senator George Mitchell to act as an international arbiter to ensure that the question of all arms now thankfully silent is settled [to the satisfaction of all sides].

[It would be clearly understood that any final agreement would have to contain such satisfaction.] [It is clearly understood that this is essential to any final agreement.]

Baldwin, Kenneth

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: ADams memcon; other issues ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Thursday, November 02, 1995 10:18AM

*Ken
put in
book*

NES

Here is the memcon of TL's conversation with Adams yesterday. You know, I think TL's suggestion could work. If you think about it, the phrase "unauthorised arms now thankfully silent" contains the word "unauthorised", which could make it acceptable to the Brits, but since Adams says the the British presence itself is "unauthorised", the republicans could see it as applying to those arms too. Coupled with a Mitchell statement, I think SF might buy it. But will the Brits?

Another idea would be to go back to "decommissioning". I know Adams told us they don't like that word much, but at least they have used it. If the communique were brief and just said that the international body will deal with "decommissioning", it would be obvious what is meant, but the SF could claim the term is being used, as they in fact used it on March 8, as an element of total demilitarization.

On another issue, State tells me they think the McClinton visa waiver will be granted. << File Attachment: TLGACON.DOC >>

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.09)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMCON OF MR. LAKE'S CONVERSATION WITH GERRY ADAMS, NOV 1

Adams: We opened the meeting saying we were seeking a response to our proposals; we stressed we are willing to cooperate on the twin track, and we told them we would deal authoritatively with the international body, though we would want to put forward our own analysis and views on the issue of other weapons. We said we are preparing a paper; the core would deal with modalities and British concerns. We also said we wanted to engage on the language of the joint communiqué.

They said they wanted to deal only with a shared understanding of what would happen after the communiqué. We went through four points:

- the political track;
- the practical arrangements for talks;
- the international body; and,
- we tried to get to the joint communiqué issue.

They told us they are not prepared to convene all-party talks without the agreement of all parties; that gives the unionists a veto and reneges on the British commitment. They said that situation would remain even if there is a positive outcome to the twin track. They refused to set even target date. After a tight discussion they offered notionally 3 months after the announcement of the joint communiqué. On the body, they refused to allow any ambiguity at all. We offered various formulas, even saying we would accept having them say they interpret it to mean illegal weapons while we would say it meant all weapons.

By the way, we had tried to get a meeting last week and they would not, citing scheduling problems. Because we had told you and Dublin we were anxious to meet we wrote to them and told them we wanted to hold a conclusive discussion and move forward. In response they sent a document dated 10/26 which they said had the support of Dublin. They also sent it to you. Dublin contacted us and said this was bad faith on the part of the British -- the document had been dealt with as a non-paper, and the discussion of it had been inconclusive. The Brits had not had permission to send it around. The British also sent it to the unionist parties which is just like making it public. They told us they had agreement from Dublin, but Dublin says they didn't. In our view the document is worse than the Washington principles.

We will be seeing them again Friday and see a need for your good offices. I will be seeing PM Bruton tomorrow; we think the British are trying to spin this out. They have no interest in moving ahead. They have neutralized Dublin. We have had all of

90 minutes with them since you left. When you have a domestic or personal crisis, you talk till it's resolved.

They refused to move on the two main points: the date and the terms of reference for the body. We need them to move on both-- we have moved considerably and could move more but we can't if they don't. There is impatience on the ground.

Mr. Lake: Tell me more about the "assured" understanding.

Adams: No, "shared". As I understand it, our people said we want a response to our proposals on the twin track and then we want to deal with the joint communique. They wanted only a shared understanding; they did not want to engage in detail, though subsequently they did in the course of 3 1/2 hours. They acknowledged that our willingness to deal authoritatively with the body and the paper we are preparing are new, positive elements in our position. This is what Ancram meant when he said publicly there were some positive points. I myself think they are putting a spin on it and are just trying to spin the whole thing out. I don't know how "au fait" you are but they appeared ready to use the unionist position as a cover for themselves. We accept that it is a hurdle that must be got over but instead of applying themselves to crossing it, they are using it as an excuse for inertia. It is true that only the unionist leadership can deliver the unionists, but they will only seek to do it if governments honor their positions. All-in-all it was not a good outcome and I am depressed about the potential.

Mr. Lake: They did send us a copy of their paper; I have not gone over it in detail...

Adams: I will formally ask Dublin to inform you of the misuse of the discussion paper.

Mr. Lake: I hadn't heard anything about the Irish Government angle. My impression (and we do not want to get into negotiating) is that they were making an effort. I'm glad there will be a meeting on Friday. They did tell me that if you engage on that paper, they will respond. They do not see it as take-it-or-leave-it. I will talk with them about spending sufficient time with you. You said you would accept their saying the remit deals with illegal weapons and they accept that you can raise whatever you want, including British Army weapons. Since this is a document of the British and Irish governments, you are not committed to it.

Adams: I recognize that but I must stress that the terms of reference must not be "sectional", i.e., referring to only one section of the weapons. They can take a sectional view. Whether

the word is "unauthorised", "illegal" or "paramilitary", the fact is the intention is to deal with demilitarization in a sectional way.

Mr. Lake: That is their position and this is their statement. They will not argue if you say you intend to raise all weapons.

Adams: We couldn't live with that. It's been 15 months and we have now reached the point where terms of reference not dealing with weapons are a problem. We have no target date. The situation could implode. We need ambiguity of language but the British interpretation can be specific. They understand that and that we will accept their interpretation, but the terms of reference have to be acceptable.

Mr. Lake: This is becoming a bigger issue than it needs to be. Everybody can state their view of what it means.

Adams: It is important for the republicans to deal with a body whose terms of reference are not so rigid. We need ambiguity in the public description. We are seeking to move forward; we are dealing with their issue.

Mr. Lake: I think the word "unauthorised" was an effort on their part. Do you have a formula?

Adams: "The arms now thankfully silenced". I don't intend to take you through Irish history but many believe that the British presence in Northern Ireland is unauthorised. What is required is not a description of a particular section of the weapons but a broader view.

Mr. Lake: I can't speak for anyone and this is not a U.S. proposal but what if the British and Irish statement said "the unauthorised arms now thankfully silent" and then Mitchell makes a statement saying that anyone can discuss anything and then you say what your position is.

Adams: Any formula like that we would look at positively. A statement from the chair that had the breadth we are looking for would have a positive impact and it is something we would have to be thinking about.

Mr. Lake: That is off the top of my head; I haven't talked to anyone else about it.

Adams: We need ambiguity.

Mr. Lake: The trouble is the British hate ambiguity. Let me urge them to devote time and urgency to this.

Adams: Even the Bosnians are sitting around a table and we are not there. This is a precondition that has not worked in any other situation.

Mr. Lake: I think you should reach agreement on everything else and then argue about the target date. I'll get back to them. I do think they are making a good faith effort that could become the basis for agreement. They are prepared to respond to further work. Let me counsel flexibility and speed. I hope it goes well on Friday.

Adams: I will be in Dublin tomorrow, until Friday. If it would be useful, you can get me through Ambassador Smith.

Mr. Lake: Good.

Adams: Regards to David Trimble. I had a speaking engagement at a university in the U.S. but I cancelled it because of the situation. I am thinking of rescheduling it.

Mr. Lake: There is a lot of travel at the end of this month. We will be going to Asia for the APEC meeting.

Adams: I will ask Mairead to talk to you about your schedule.

End of Conversation

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Roderic Lyne to Anthony Lake (3 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Statements

2011-0355-F
rs1678

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Joli
Pls put
in book under
SMTS

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 190916Z OCT 95

~~also in book~~

FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATEWASHDC 8635
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 809
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5860
UNCLAS BEFAST 0412

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: REACTION TO MAYHEW'S OCTOBER 17 REMARKS.

1. SUMMARY: SIR PATRICK MAYHEW'S OCTOBER 17
STATEMENTS ARE BEING WIDELY INTERPRETED IN

BELFAST AS PRESAGING A BRITISH SHIFT IN ITS POSITION
ON THE QUESTION OF DECOMMISSIONING TERRORIST

WEAPONS. THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONISTS EXPRESSED
THEIR ANGER AT WHAV THEY CALLED THE GOVERNMENT
"CLIMBDOWN." SINN FEIN GAVE MAYHEW'S REMARKS A
CAUTIOUS WELCOME. END SUMMARY.

2. MAYHEW INDICATED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER
THE LATEST ROUND OF THE ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE IN
BELFAST THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING
TO ADOPT A TWIN-TRACK APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF
DECOMMISSIONING IRA AND LOYALIST WEAPONS. THE
SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT CONFIDENCE WAS THE
KEY TO PROGRESS AND THAT THE SHADOW OF THE GUN
AND BOMB SHOULD NOT FALL ACROSS THE TALKS TABLE.
IN A BID TO END THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN THE PEACE
PROCESS, SIR PATRICK SAID, "IT IS THEORETICALLY
POSSIBLE THAT AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION MIGHT
FIND SOME OTHER MEANS BY WHICH THE NECESSARY
CONFIDENCE CAN BE GUARANTEED. IF THAT WAS THE
CASE, AND WE CAN'T SEE IT AT THE MOMENT, WE WOULD
WANT TO LOOK AT IT VERY CLOSELY." AT THE SAME
TIME, THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WOULD
HOLD TALKS WITH ALL PARTIES TO FIND A WAY
FORWARD. SIR PATRICK DENIED CLAIMS THAT THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CHANGING TACK.

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

DECOMMISSIONING WAS STILL THE BEST WAY OF ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

3. POLITICAL REACTION: SIR PATRICK'S REMARKS BROUGHT SWIFT CONDEMNATION FROM THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONISTS. PARTY LEADER IAN PAISLEY DESCRIBED THEM AS A "CLIMBDOWN" AND SAID THE IDEA OF AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SURRENDER OF WEAPONS WAS A "GIANT LIE....THE GOVERNMENT, UNDER PRESSURE FROM DUBLIN AND THE IRA, ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN GIVING GROUND TO THE IRA. THEY MAY BE ABLE TO FIND A FORM OF WORDS THAT SUIT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE IRA/SINN FEIN BUT MERE WORDS WILL NOT CONVINCE ANY UNIONIST THAT THE IRA INTENDS TO EVEN START A DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS. THE ULSTER UNIONIST DEPUTY LEADER, JOHN TAYLOR, SAID THE NOTION OF A TWIN-TRACK APPROACH WAS "SILLY NONSENSE." HOWEVER, HE SAID HIS PARTY WOULD ADOPT A WAIT-AND-SEE APPROACH TO THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON ARMS. RESPONDING TO DUP ACCUSATIONS OF A CLIMBDOWN, STORMONT MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ALTERED ITS POSITION ON DECOMMISSIONING. IT WAS STILL THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME MOVEMENT TOWARDS CREDIBLE DECOMMISSIONING BEFORE ALL-PARTY TALKS COULD GO AHEAD. AT A RECEPTION IN STRABANE IN COUNTY TYRONE LATER, MAYHEW SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THAT DISARMAMENT MUST BEGIN BEFORE THERE CAN BE ALL-PARTY TALKS. HE BLAMED THE PRESS FOR MISREPORTING HIS OCTOBER 17 STATEMENT.

4. SINN FEIN CHAIRMAN MITCHEL MCLAUGHIN GAVE THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ANNOUNCEMENT A GUARDED WELCOME. "CLEARLY, WHAT IS REQUIRED TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD IS THE FIXING OF A DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS AND THE REMOVAL OF PRECONDITIONS TO THOSE TALKS. SINN FEIN IS PREPARED TO LOOK POSITIVELY AT ANY FORMULA WHICH WILL MOVE THE SITUATION FORWARD IN THIS CONTEXT." MCLAUGHLIN SAID SINN FEIN HAD NO ROOM TO MANEUVER ON THE ISSUE OF IRA DECOMMISSIONING ARMS. LATER, A SINN FEIN SPOKESPERSON SAID THAT WHILE THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S REMARKS SHOWED SOME FLEXIBILITY, HIS POSITION WAS ALMOST AS HARD AS IT WAS A FEW DAYS AGO WHEN HE STUCK FIRMLY TO THE WASHINGTON PRECONDITIONS FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS.

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

STEPHENS

BT

#0412

NNNN

<MSGID> M1909206

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	[Duplicate of 002] (3 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Statements

2011-0355-F
rs1678

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 132140Z OCT 95

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

MESSAGE BY DIRECT WHITE HOUSE LINK FROM RODERIC LYNE TO THE
HONORABLE ANTHONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, 13 OCTOBER
1995

DEAR TONY

IN MY MESSAGE ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND EARLIER TODAY, I THOUGHT THAT
MICHAEL ANCRAM WAS GOING TO SEE MARTIN MCGUINNESS NEXT MONDAY. I
NOW UNDERSTAND THAT THE MEETING IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE ON
WEDNESDAY. THIS IS PERHAPS HELPFUL, IN THAT IT ALLOWS YOU MORE
TIME TO EXERCISE BENEVOLENT PRESSURE ON SINN FEIN, TO ENSURE THAT
THEY BRING THE RIGHT ANSWER TO THE MEETING.

YOURS EVER

RODERIC

DECL: OADR

#0001

NNNN

<MSGID> M1901364

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By M NARA, Date 1/5/16
2011-0355-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For NES
from M.A.D.


Sinn Féin

Nuacht ráiteas/News release

The following is the text of a statement by Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams. 9/10/95

Embargoed until 1 pm Monday 9/10/95

Seeking Agreement

Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams, in his first-major response to the election of UUP leader David Trimble has pointed out that the peace process "has to belong to all of the people of this island if it is to succeed" and that "dialogue is at the heart of peacemaking". Consequently, the Sinn Féin President appealed to Unionists "to engage positively and practically in the search for a lasting peace, by removing obstacles to inclusive dialogue and joining with the rest of us in consolidating the peace process, planning the process of negotiation, and securing an agreement which meets our diverse needs".

Commenting on unionist rejection of the party's democratic mandate Mr Adams said: "Sinn Féin is a democratically mandated party. On that basis alone we are entitled to a presence at all-party talks."

Throughout the present peace process we have made abundantly clear on numerous occasions that we are totally committed to the democratic process. The achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to all violence.

We have made clear our commitment to, and wish for, dialogue involving both governments and all parties the objective of which would be an agreement among our divided people that would earn the allegiance of all traditions.

All of the statements we have made on these matters underline Sinn Féin's commitment to the democratic and peaceful process. It is self-evident that threats of any description from any quarter have no role in any such process. They are certainly no part of any talks process in which we will engage.

The time has come for the British government to call all-party talks now based on the democratic and peaceful process and fix a clear date for their commencement.

The full text of Mr Adams comments:

"Unionists speak often of democracy and demand that Sinn Féin prove its 'commitment to exclusively peaceful methods'. Mr Trimble has made this point a number of times since his election. He reiterated it again following his recent visit to Dublin. Irish republicans could dismiss this demand because it is clearly a pretext for the unionist refusal to engage in inclusive dialogue and to accept the rights of others. Of course, we could all make excuses for not talking. All of us have reasons to be distrustful and suspicious. Sinn Féin has acknowledged the difficulties faced by our opponents but that does not mean that we accept that any of them have a right to demand that our commitment to real peace has to undergo some sort of test.

We could find many reasons for not talking to the Unionists. What of their stand on democracy and adherence to democratic principles? How real is it? What evidence can Irish nationalists look to and feel confident that unionism will seek an accommodation based on equality and democracy?

Unionism is an ideology, dependent on British patronage and founded on a denial of democracy - a denial of the Irish peoples right to national independence and the suppression of Irish nationalism. Unionism has consistently rejected the principle of equality, in employment, in housing, in economic investment and in political power. With weapons brought in with the collusion of the British political and military establishment - an event repeated 70 years later in the Nelson affair, when South African weapons were brought in by British Intelligence to enhance the killing capacity of the loyalist death squads - unionists rejected democratic principles and secured by threats and violence the artificial division of Ireland and the creation of a small loyalist homeland in which they were the absolute masters.

For 50 years, and with a permanent state of emergency in place, unionists built an unjust system of political, economic and social apartheid which two decades of British direct rule has failed to undo. The imposition of partition for Ireland has been disastrous. It affects the whole Island. It saps our national morale and consciousness and actively retards our ability as a nation to shape all our affairs, to resolve the causes of poverty, emigration and unemployment, as well as the other more obvious causes of conflict.

Partition locks nationalists in the Six Counties into a state to which

09-10 '95 15:23

they owe no allegiance. It ties unionists to a negative insular view of themselves and their future. The consequence of this is that unionists have fought against every effort, however minimalist, to establish equality. Unionism has a no-change attitude - what it has it holds - it rejects any suggestion of change to the status quo. We have a unique opportunity to put all this behind us.

However, it is clear that in Ireland and Britain and internationally there is a clear recognition that the present structures and policies have failed and that change - political and constitutional - is inevitable. Both governments are committed to seeking peace, stability and reconciliation by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island.

In this climate, created by the peace process, the new leader of the UUP, David Trimble, has a crucial role to play in determining the success or failure of the search for a lasting peace settlement.

Since his election Mr Trimble has visited London and Dublin. He will soon be in the White House. I think all of this is a good thing. The more unionists open up their attitude to public debate the sooner we can move to a democratic accommodation. The more they engage in dialogue the better for the rest of us.

Mr Trimble will now find his democratic credentials questioned. Will he acknowledge the undemocratic practices of unionism both past and present? Does he accept that the role of his party, and of the Orange Order of which he is a prominent leader, have been detrimental to the well being of people in the Six Counties? Will Mr Trimble set as his goals the removal of all injustices and inequalities? Will he repudiate discrimination in all its forms and support the demand for new legislation to make anti-discrimination laws effective? Will he instruct his party to adopt new policies in local councils which will put behind us the depressing spectacle, for example, of unionists abusing their power in Belfast City Council?

Will Mr Trimble accept that all sections of our people have the right to express their cultural identity through language, music, sport and all other means open to them? And will he endorse the democratic principle which seeks agreement and agreed structures for the island as a whole through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on full respect for the rights of all the people of Ireland?

The reality is that Unionism cannot continue to interpret democracy solely in terms of its own priorities and objectives and to the exclusion of all other views.

Seeking to promote and create a new unionist dominated Assembly, repackaging an old unionist proposition, will not build bridges of trust with nationalists. Despite the desire of some unionists to prevent change there will be no return to Stormont rule; no return of majoritarian politics and no internal six county based settlement. Such a scenario cannot provide peace.

Change is inevitable and unionist need to come to terms with that fact, just as they have to recognise Sinn Féin's electoral and democratic mandate. Predictably unionism seeks to ignore that which it dislikes. Sinn Féin stood in the last local government elections on the basis of our peace strategy. It is undoubtedly a source of some annoyance to the UUP that in Belfast in that election Sinn Féin won more votes than it did. But that is the reality and Mr Trimble must stop his efforts to rewrite democratic principles in the image of traditional unionism and accept Sinn Féin's right to represent those who vote for us.

It is that self-centred, sectarian and conservative attitude which has locked unionists into a larger mindset which has not changed for generations. It is an attitude which must be challenged from without unionism but also from within and as leader Mr Trimble must state clearly where he stands.

In contrast to Unionism's narrow view of democracy, its principles and the responsibilities which come with it, Sinn Féin's commitment to a democratic resolution has been repeatedly and publicly spelt out.

Sinn Féin is a democratically mandated party. On that basis alone we are entitled to a presence at all-party talks.

Throughout the present peace process we have made abundantly clear on numerous occasions that we are totally committed to the democratic process. The achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to all violence.

We have made clear our commitment to, and wish for, dialogue involving both governments and all parties the objective of which would be an agreement among our divided people that would earn the allegiance of all traditions.

In April 1993 in the first of my joint statements with SDLP leader John Hume we agreed that: **"everyone has a solemn duty to change the political climate away from conflict and towards a process of national reconciliation, which sees the peaceful accommodation of the differences between the people of Britain and Ireland and the Irish people themselves"**. Mr Hume and I accepted that the **"task of reaching agreement on a peaceful and democratic accord for all in this island"**, was our primary challenge. And we recognised that any agreement, **"is only achievable and viable if it can earn and enjoy the allegiance of the different traditions on this island, by accommodating diversity and providing for national reconciliation."**

Following the IRA cessation in August last year, the then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, John Hume and myself in a joint statement in September spelt out our position; **"we are at the beginning of a new era in which we are totally committed to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving our political problems. We reiterate that our objective is an equitable and lasting agreement that can command the allegiance of all"**.

In July in a further joint statement between the Taoiseach John Bruton, the Tanaiste Dick Spring, John Hume and myself we reiterated **"our total and absolute commitment to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving political problems and our objective of an equitable and lasting agreement that can command the consent and allegiance of all."**

More recently the SDLP and Sinn Fein, in a comprehensive joint statement committed both parties to the pursuit of a permanent peace through the creation of **"institutions which have the loyalty of all sections of our people thus automatically removing the underlying causes of conflict and instability"**. And we stated our confidence that **"a democratic process can be designed to lead to agreement amongst the divided people of this island which will permit for continued political evolution and provide a solid base for peace"**.

Crucially the SDLP and Sinn Fein acknowledged that the **"process of building a lasting peace is a problematic and difficult one"**, which will require courage, flexibility and imagination.

Sinn Fein believes that the consent of all sections of our people can be obtained if the relevant parties but particularly the British and Irish

5

governments demonstrate the political will to achieve it. Unionists say Britain cannot deliver them to all-party talks. We accept that, but there is no denying the relationship between the unionists and the British government, and unionists can have no veto over the calling of all-party peace talks. Of course, they and anyone else have the right to decide when or if they want to attend.

I have always stressed the need for unionist involvement in the peace process. Peace is not possible without them. Efforts to marginalise or to ignore or to exclude the political opinions of others do not work. It is also undemocratic. So, every effort must be made to involve the unionists. A process of democratic inclusiveness built on an open dialogue of equality and respect of other opinions is essential.

How do we do that? We must constantly seek to engage with the unionists and encourage them to recognise that the pursuit of a real peace requires participation and partnership. Dialogue is the means by which the old taboos, antagonisms and fears can be banished and new ideas, new language and new accommodations can be agreed.

I would appeal to unionists to engage positively and practically in the search for a lasting peace, by removing obstacles to inclusive dialogue and joining with the rest of us in consolidating the peace process, planning the process of negotiation, and securing an agreement which meets our diverse needs.

All of the statements I have referred to underline Sinn Féin's commitment to the democratic and peaceful process. It is self-evident that threats of any description from any quarter have no role in any such process. They are certainly no part of any talks process in which we will engage.

Unionism has never needed a leader since the beginning of this century. After partition unionism needed only a safe pair of hands. There was no need to modernise or reconstruct or even examine the tenets of that ideology. Its future was secured because the rest of us were powerless. Now that has changed. There is no going back to the old days and unionism cannot afford to return to the old ways.

As leader of the Ulster Unionist Party David Trimble has the opportunity to lead his party into a future brimming over with potential. Of course, David Trimble may feel that he has only to build a more visible and positive profile for the UUP. If this is the case then

09/10 95 15:28

0006

he too will be squandering the best opportunity on offer to his section of our people.

The time has come for the British government to call all-party talks now based on the democratic and peaceful process and fix a clear date for their commencement.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.13)
KRM 4/11/2023

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT Mr. Lake's September 14 Meeting with Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Mairead Keane, Richard McAuley, Nancy Soderberg, Mary Ann Peters

LOCATION, DATE, TIME: One Washington Circle Hotel, September 13, 1995, 6:00 p.m.

Adams began by saying there had been a story on television in Belfast, on UBT, that Gerry Adams had been "summoned" to the White House, and that the reporter, Ken Reid, had confirmation from Nancy Soderberg.

Soderberg said she had called Reid, who had denied that he had said it and alleged that he had gotten the confirmation from Sinn Fein itself. She had spoken with Reid the previous evening and given him the same readout she gave everyone -- that Lake and Adams had had a good conversation.

Adams said a number of others had claimed to have gotten the meeting confirmed at the White House. This is a problem, though he doesn't take it personally. Mr. Lake pointed out that it is not in our interest to have this come out. He wanted it to remain private to give Adams running room. That is why we were there. He said he had full confidence in Nancy. Adams said that Conor O'Clery had told him that he had White House confirmation of a meeting -- did the fact that there would not be one mean a crisis? O'Clery had added that it would be hard to reset the headline "White House Fails to Broker Agreement", to which McAuley had responded that they had never expected a headline that read "White House Brokers Agreement".

Mr. Lake said that our press guidance would be that we had talked to Adams and to Ancram and that we remain in touch with all the parties. We would refuse to say more. Adams said he did not want to spend too much time on the issue, though it is a matter of confidence. There is a familiar tactic, in his view erroneous, of setting deadlines to corral people -- the British do it all the time. Sinn Fein is left with a double dilemma. It is not a problem for Sinn Fein to say there was no meeting at the White House, though they remain in contact (with the White House). The fact is the story is out there with the word "summoned" -- though that was probably Ken Reid's own sense of

SECRET

it. This was the situation he had sought to avoid. Adams added that he would prefer to cobble together a solution rather than make headlines.

Mr. Lake said he had been accused by of being Greata Garbo when he travelled all over Europe on Bosnia without talking to reporters. We cannot lie to them, but only a few people know about this meeting. Adams said that Senator Kennedy knows. Mr. Lake asked whether he knew about this meeting and Adams replied that Trina had phoned Sinn Fein to assure Kieran that they would make sure Adams was finished with his meeting with Kennedy in time to get to the White House. Mr. Lake said that if this meeting leaks, he'll have the FBI on it, and the next meeting would be just the two of them somewhere in Newfoundland. Adams' confidence is important to him. Mr. Lake added that the Administration is engaged on lots of issues, for the purpose of getting them resolved, not getting credit. He said he understands that the British need room on this and Sinn Fein needs room with the IRA.

On the issue at hand, Adams said he had passed from Mairead to Mary Ann what he needed from this meeting. One thing he wanted to stress, as he had yesterday, was that the IRA have set their head against any dealing with or accepting a commission. He had told Hume and possibly the Taoiseach, but no one else, that he had gone to the IRA about 10-12 weeks ago, because from his perspective it is Sinn Fein that has to keep pushing the process forward -- no one else will do it. (They'd said) okay, what if we get the Brits headed down the track and the movement lasts for 1-3 months and the ground shifts a bit, but at the end the Brits still insist on the third condition?

The British have hammered on decommissioning so long that the IRA thinks this is just a British ruse, Adams continued. Sinn Fein has very little room to maneuver on this. Of course if there were forward movement, then all parties would feel freer. The IRA is not going to give up weapons without a process working, without actually having a settlement or being on the eve of a settlement. What they fear is that if they move to bilateral or trilateral talks the British will keep them hanging until the urgency goes out of the situation, after the President's trip. In 3-4 months the British will say they will not move to all-party talks and the process is stalled again. As (senior GOI official) Sean O'Huiginn says, it is a matter of judgment -- either you believe the Brits want a fig leaf and want to change this from an obstacle to an objective, in which case they will continue to shout about the condition but everyone knows they

~~SECRET~~

will get off it, or they will not move and will jam the condition on again in 2-3 months.

Mr. Lake asked whether there was not a third alternative, though it might not be consistent with the way the IRA thinks. What if the current situation extends into the future and it continues to appear that Sinn Fein is refusing to go along with the commission? That is less attractive than the second scenario Adams outlined, of the British not going along.

Adams responded that he was mindful of what the Vice President had said and what an Irish Times editorial had said about a "vacuum" hanging over us. People are impatient. He stressed that it is very, very important for people to understand that there is an alternative that could work. Mr. Lake responded, "Let's make it work." Adams added that if we knew how tightly people are screwed (wound) up on this ... He asked Mr. Lake to put himself inside the mind of someone who believed in the armed struggle, and imagine their view of the British. It would not suit Sinn Fein to have a PLO-like situation in which there is a separate, more militant faction. On the British, if this is screwed up, and if the (IRA) representatives still retain confidence in him, even if there was never a friendlier Administration, he'd need to be putting it back together again. If it breaks down, after having a nervous breakdown, Adams said he would be back trying, because there has to be something.

"So what is required," Adams asked. He said he would like to go back with something in writing in order to have a firm proposal to show. It should contain the kernel of what has been brokered. Adams said he did not need it that day, necessarily, but it would be useful if he had it. Second, if the British are prepared to go down the road, and if he wants to avoid a situation where the commission brings back its recommendations and the British reject them, can the U.S. act as a guarantor? In a private dimension? Given the opposition to the word "commission" Adams had looked it up in the dictionary, an American edition and talked it over with Hume. He personally had liked the word "arbiter", but also "monitor" and "forum". Mr Lake asked whether the term "Brits" was invidious, to which Adams replied that they refer to themselves that way when they are being partonizing. Finally, Adams said that if a way could be found to move, it should not fall foul of a failure to communicate; there should be a way to keep in contact.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Lake explained that our general principle was not to get involved in actual negotiations. He understands that Adams is committed to peace and needs to bring others along. For our part, he said, we need to maintain good relations with the British, with whom we work on Iraq, Bosnia, etc. Our commitment to peace helps us with the Irish-American community. It is not in our interest to get so deeply involved that we can be blamed if it fails, or to do so in such a way that one side or the other says we did not act in confidence. All of us, I myself, Nancy, Mary Ann, and the President and Vice President do what we are doing to see progress made. I have the sense that now is the time for progress, that the positions are not that far apart. We would not be trying if we did not see a possibility of success. This is not something we expect will bring immediate credit to us, though we may get some credit someday. That is why I am annoyed about the leak. I have told the President to expect stories in the press about lack of a breakthrough.

Adams said that he recognized that the Vice President's attendance at the meeting was an important step. Mr. Lake added that it had come in advance of anything new. Adams said he wanted to get into the details of what is required. No Irish republican, including himself, will make a leap of faith in the British even to allow them to move off their position and offer talks. It would be a different situation if the U.S. says it, though Adams understood that the U.S. does not want to get in the middle. Mr. Lake said, "Unless absolutely necessary, in certain situations".

Adams asked Mr. Lake to explain the terms of reference for the Mitchell entity. Would the parties, Sinn Fein, the SDLP, etc. be expected to make statements to the commission? Would the IRA be expected to? Mr. Lake said that he would think anyone who wanted to do so would be able to, and it would be in their interest to make their views known. Adams said it would have to be the political parties, not the armed groups, who would talk about how demilitarization should be done. Soderberg said that this is where the other track comes in -- if those talks go far enough, the decommissioning track is less important. Adams said that he would be asked by the IRA what they would have to do and he wanted to be able to reply, "Nothing."

Adams then said he had half arranged to meet with Mitchell again prior to leaving the U.S. He'd felt inhibited in their previous meeting because there had been so many people present. Mr. Lake said he would not talk to Mitchell before Adams did. He'd known Mitchell for 25 years -- he is a man who cares about his integrity. Adams added, "As long as the Brits don't catch his

great cousin having an affair", but admitted that he was perhaps being paranoid. Mr. Lake related the anecdote about the French ambassador compromised by the KGB who, when confronted with photos of himself "in flagrante delicto", had responded that he would like to order copies.

Adams said he has known Mitchell a relatively short time but has a sense of Mitchell's integrity; it would be taking a chance but risks have to be taken. Mr. Lake amended his previous decision not to talk to Mitchell before Adams' conversation with him, saying he felt he should brief Mitchell first on where the process stands.

Adams said he keeps coming back to the question of whether this is the right road. He is not negative personally because to do anything one has to be flexible, but the IRA has ruled out cooperating with a commission for very good reasons. When he and John Hume had cobbled together their formula, he had talked informally with 1-2 IRA men. They had indicated that if Hume and Adams worked out the terms of reference so they would be different from what the Brits had wanted, they wouldn't rule it out. That is Adams' answer. He thinks people are intelligent. If this doesn't work then he will get another word. What is required is a date for all-party talks. Mr. Lake added, "Target date."

Adams said the compromise is a formula for dealing with a commission. This is the best answer he could give. It would be a mistake to think he can deliver this, though he can run with it. He had been thinking and talking about it but got nowhere. He would not want us to think he is upbeat about it. Whether he gets it or not, he will call, so he needs a way to communicate. He can give us a commitment to let us know in advance what the response will be so we will not be surprised or deceived.

Adams added that he does need something in writing to take back. Mr. Lake said he would see if we could get the British and the Irish to work on that. Adams said that he would like to have in writing if possible and would keep absolutely confidential an outline of the proposal Mr. Lake had put to him. Mr. Lake said he would rather not provide that but would prefer to work on a document that would eventually be made public. Adams said what he had in mind was something actually expressed that way, saying here's where we are. Mr. Lake said we should think about a secure means of communicating. He would talk to Mairead.

Adams returned to the question of who knew about the meeting. He said Senator Dodd might, as he had asked Adams to phone him at home that evening. Mr. Lake said there was no way around the fact that it was known a meeting had been planned. The

question was who knew about this meeting? Adams said he had explained to Trina that there would be some contact -- either a meeting or a phone call. That's all who know. A good cover for the contact is that Sinn Fein has a mission in Washington and the White House maintains regular contact through Mairead Keane. We can say we have had contact or that we are always in contact.

Mr. Lake said that his impression -- and Adams should tell him if it should be more nuanced -- is that for Sinn Fein the issue of a date for all-party talks is at least as important as the commission, if not more so. The British had accepted the notion of calling it a target date; more needs to be done on this because it goes to the issue of "creating conditions" for talks to take place. Adams interjected that by conditions the Brits meant their Washington principles. Mr. Lake said that the British had told him that if everything else were moving, they would give sympathetic consideration to going forward (with all-party talks). Mr. Lake had asked if that meant movement in the trilateral talks and in the commission and they had said yes. He added that he didn't know whether they would be willing to say that now. Adams said that Mayhew's letter to Hume should give us insight -- he couldn't remember exactly what it said, but it was a considered, written reply. The fact that they were writing to Hume at all indicates that they want their view on the record. Mr. Lake said the British would be talking with Hume.

On the terms of reference, in essence, the British cannot explicitly say that the "when" is included, but they would ask the Mitchell "x" to make recommendations that might include when decommissioning would take place. Mr. Lake had said that in his view, the communique language about "appropriate context and manner" did not rule out "when". If the commission cannot look at "when", then what is the point? The British had agreed that a broad interpretation would not be excluded. In Mr. Lake's view that is a better position for Sinn Fein because the British will have to take account of the commission's recommendations on the issue. Mr. Lake added that no one would be bound by the outcome, and both could restate their positions in the interim, though he hoped neither would do so too often. Ancram had used the phrase "if asked", but then added that he is always asked. It would help encourage trust if some of the voluntary statements were not made, Mr. Lake said.

Adams told Mr. Lake that in a meeting with the three Irish coalition partners and senior GOI officials about 10 days ago, they had said there was no guarantee what the British would do. But when it came to the crunch, the British had backed off. Adams had a sense of déjà vu. The Irish government had been reading the same signs. Mr. Lake said that at the risk of appearing immodest, that had been before the U.S. got involved.

We are the new factor. Adams agreed, saying that the entire dynamic in Ireland wasn't enough to move the process forward -- only "you yourselves" could do it.

Mr. Lake said the British had agreed that the commission's recommendations would be considered on their merits. Neither Sinn Fein nor the British would be bound in advance. The British would maintain their current position while the commission starts its work. The other track would begin and over the next few months, this would develop confidence and address the issue of creating a new reality. Mr. Lake had never talked to Mitchell about it but he hoped the commission could make recommendations all parties could buy off on. This is the simple, clear way to get going without forcing either side to back off. Mr. Lake said this is what he had gotten from London. The Prime Minister had been in meetings all day and had not signed off, but this is a sense of where they are. Mr. Lake would be back in touch to work on a joint communique text. The British would want to get back to the Irish on the communique.

The name did not seem to be a stumbling block. The British have a problem with the word "forum" but had said twice that they would find another word. In response to Adams' question on who had said that, Mr. Lake said he had been talking with Ancram, but Adams should keep that private. Soderberg said that the problem with "forum" is that there is already an entity in the south using the term.

On the composition, Mr. Lake said the British have no problem with Mitchell and two others. They will find acceptable people-- they won't get anyone who is anathema to any of the parties.

Adams said that the language Hume had suggested to the British differed slightly from the version he and Hume had worked out, but it was "not bad". He said that perhaps what he had said about what was required sounded like a shopping list, but it was what he had to deal with.

Mr. Lake said that his goal it is to try and wind up the train so it can go down the track without his having to drive it, though he wanted to stay involved. He wanted to jumpstart the process. If Mitchell heads the commission, it would be better for us not to be in the middle. That said, we do need to stay in touch and we need to find a way to communicate so that we can be helpful as necessary. He asked Adams whether that made sense and Adams said it did, absolutely. Mr. Lake said he did not rule out another meeting. He saw the joint communique as a way to have a document to move forward -- we would work with both governments on it. Adams said there would be no problem with the Irish.

Mr. Lake returned to the question of a guarantee. We have to be precise. The whole notion is that there would be no guarantee of what the British or Sinn Fein will or will not do. We do not know how the Mitchell Commission will turn out, but all would agree to consider its recommendations seriously on their merits.

How do we proceed, Adams asked, through your ambassador to Ireland? He added that he thought he should have a final proposal before leaving the country on Saturday. Mr. Lake said we would need a way to communicate. Adams mentioned Hume's proposal to the British, to which he had gotten a positive response from Mayhew. Soderberg said she had the Mayhew letter. Adams said that with Hume involved, there were four channels of communication going. He saw a danger of a mix-up in that and suggested that Sinn Fein and the USG stay in direct contact. He added that the press was liable to be asking why there had been no meeting and we should say we are in touch. O'Clery will say that there have been private meetings over the last week that are ongoing.

Mr. Lake asked how he should be in touch. It was agreed that he would call Mairead. Adams reiterated his request for a clear "view" of the proposal. It was agreed there could be a meeting in New York Friday or Saturday.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Adams, dr

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.14)
KBN 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon Between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein
Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME: September 28, 1995
AND PLACE: Mr. Lake's Office

Following is a summary of the conversation. The line was bad, and points had to be made several times. (U)

Adams began by saying that he had persuaded the IRA to accept the twin track approach in principle, a considerable achievement from his point of view. The acceptance was conditioned on four provisos:

- a target date for all-party talks;
- agreement that the commission would be a "political project" that would receive submissions from political parties as opposed to the armed groups;
- agreement that no preconditions would be placed on the parties (in their cooperation with the commission); and
- a joint communique reflecting the above. (C)

Adams emphasized the importance of the having the body be purely political, as opposed to military. The IRA would not be involved with it at all. He also said the terms of reference would have to be reflected in the joint communique. Mr. Lake said he had pressed for broad, fuzzy terms of reference. On the target date, his impression of the British position was that they are still willing to talk about a target date when the twin track begins, but with the passage of time, it is not clear what that date would be. Mr. Lake offered to be helpful if necessary on this issue. (C)

Adams told Mr. Lake that his next goal is to was to see if he can get a consensus on the Irish side, among Sinn Fein, John Hume and Dublin, around the position he had just described. The Irish Government needs to "do the rowing" on this, he said. Adams said that the IRA might make a statement on these matters; if it did,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

the statement would wish Sinn Fein well in its efforts to break the impasse in the peace process but would also reiterate that no disarmament was possible except as part of a negotiated settlement. (Note: Such a statement was subsequently issued.)

(C)

Mr. Lake noted that Adams and Hume have a close relationship, but said he would be willing to talk to Dublin if Adams wished.

Adams said Martin McGuinness was to brief Dick Spring. He commended Spring's speech at the UNGA in which he called for the UK to drop Washington Three. Adams said he has no room to maneuver on the military side, on talk of surrender, but if he is given the breathing room of a political project, he will be as creative and flexible as anyone. (C)

On the IRA statement, Mr. Lake reminded Adams that the less said about current positions the better. Adams said the British have been stressing their position in public statements by Major and Mayhew. The court decisions on the killing of the three IRA men on Gibraltar and the unlawful holding of 5 IRA prisoners had hardened the republican mood and made an IRA statement almost certain. He added that Sinn Fein would be holding a conference over the weekend that would assess Sinn Fein leadership's handling of the peace process. It would have been better to hold it earlier in the summer, but that had not been possible. Now the republicans were all "cheesed off". But this is his own problem, Adams added. (C)

Adams then gave Mr. Lake a readout on the just-concluded meeting between McGuinness and Ancram. McGuinness had told him it had been friendly, frank and useful. He had stated Sinn Fein's willingness to negotiate a political way around the present impasse. The British had indicated a willingness to negotiate too, though it remained to be seen on what basis. There had been no satisfactory outcome on a target date. Ancram had indicated it could be before Christmas, but then had said that given the passage of time, it might now slip until after Christmas. Ancram had reiterated the three Washington tests. He had said the remit for the international body would be criteria one and two -- how as opposed to when. Ancram had made clear that the recommendations of the body would not be binding on HMG. (C)

According to McGuinness' notes, Adams said, Ancram had neither accepted nor rejected Sinn Fein's view that the commission would proceed as a political project as opposed to a military one. There had been some question of whether to keep the fact of the meeting private; in the end the British had made it public in spite of Sinn Fein's preferences. There was to be another meeting at the end of the following week. (C)

Mr. Lake asked whether the language on considering seriously the recommendations of the body on decommissioning had been mentioned. Adams replied that there was no mention of it in

McGuinness' notes. Mr. Lake said he had been told the British would reiterate that; he would check on it. He noted that the meeting had been positive and consistent with our previous discussions. Adams said McGuinness had not been disconcerted by Ancram's reiteration of the British position or by the fact that Ancram had neither accepted nor rejected Sinn Fein's view that the body would have to proceed as a political project rather than a military one. He then read the closing sentence from McGuinness' notes, which said that in McGuinness' view, the meeting had shown crucial engagement and marked the first time the British had been engaged in active negotiation since the cease-fire. The crucial step is to get agreement on the central point that the process will be a political project as opposed to a military one. (C)

Adams then gave a brief readout of what the other Sinn Fein representative in the meeting, Gerry Kelly, had had to say. Kelly had noted that neither side had changed its position; and that Sinn Fein had pushed ahead for a resolution. He thought that the British had left open the option of agreeing to proceed on the basis outlined. (C)

Mr. Lake pointed out that it all came down to the words about the terms of reference. There might also be a difficulty about the target date. He would recommend reserving for now the argument over what that date should be. Adams replied that it was important for those republicans who had been brought to agree to the twin track in principle that the target date that had been mentioned be kept to. It would be disconcerting for them to see it moved backward. They would see that as more stalling. Mr. Lake pointed out that that is all the more reason why every day counts. At a certain point the British would have a practical argument for postponing the date. (C)

Adams said he would get back to Mr. Lake on Wednesday or Thursday of next week and would work on a formula of words and talk to Hume and Dublin in the interim. He stressed that even though it had been a considerable achievement to get agreement on the twin track, there was still a lot more to be done, and it would be all the more risky if the British were to slide off. Mr. Lake said he understood and it had been a good piece of work on Adams' part. He said he pass on to Mairead in a secure manner the content of Adams' message. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.15)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary of Phone Conversation between Mr. lake and Michael Ancram, September 30, 1995

Ancram told Mr. Lake he had a constructive meeting with Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness (accompanied by Joe Kelly) , which began with McGuinness stressing SF's desire to find a way through the present impasse by means of debate and discussion. Ancram thought it significant that McGuinness had not warned of a possible return to violence. Ancram had said HMG is also committed to finding a way through, and believes the twin track, especially in terms of the commission, offers the means to look at all the different sensitivities. Neither SF nor HMG would be required to make a commitment to the commission's outcome. Both would stand by their present positions, but would agree to consider the commissions recommendations on their merits. Ancram said the discussion had been very much along the lines he and Mr. Lake had been discussing.

Ancram said that he and McGuinness had discussed the proposal in some detail, including terms of reference and composition of the commission. McGuinness was anxious about the target date -- Ancram had told him HMG would certainly consider it , though not until the twin track was clearly working. They would consider announcing the target date at the same time they announced the twin track. In response to Mr. Lake's question about a possible 12/15 target date, Ancram said they had lost a little time and it might not be possible for the commission to complete its work in time for that. He added that McGuinness wants to meet again next week.

Mr. Lake asked whether McGuinness had indicated whether he had talked with his people (in the IRA); Ancram said he had not indicated how much he had already talked with them, but had said he would take back what he and Ancram had discussed. Ancram mentioned the SF convention to be held in Dublin 9/30. Ancram said McGuinness is interested in the words that would be used (the communique) and would like to negotiate that with Ancram. They remain in touch with Hume on this. Today's meeting, according to Ancram, was not the time for that kind of detail. He emphasized that the atmosphere was good; and the next thing was to analyze the meeting in detail and wait and see what McGuinness comes back with. He told Mr. Lake he had made no bones about the fact that HMG's position had not changed -- McGuinness seemed to accept that that had to be worked through.

Mr. Lake returned to the question of the piece of paper, and agreed with Ancram that there may be too many floating about. He reminded Ancram that we had not told Adams or anyone else about the draft we had sent Ancram, and said Ancram is welcome to use it as he sees fit. Ancram said thank you and repeated that it had been easier to leave that issue to the next meeting. Mr. Lake also told Ancram he had had a brief conversation with SF's Washington representative, who had said the same thing about SF's readiness to be constructive.

Mr. Lake recalled that Ancram has said the Washington criteria were not doctrinal and asked whether there was flexibility in the formula to make the third criteria a judgment rather than a condition. Ancram responded that he thought both sides would be happier if the panel were to look at ways and leave the judgments to the sides. The terms of reference would be general, along the lines of "context and manner" and would cover criteria one and two, though the panel would hear evidence on three. Mr. Lake said he found Trimble's proposal for an elected assembly somewhat vague; what would such body do? Ancram said he thought it was still vague in Trimble's mind, but there had been other (similar) suggestions from other quarters and HMG needed to give the concept some thought. They did not want to rule out any idea put forward in a constructive manner, but he wouldn't rank it higher than "possible" at present. Ancram said that Major had recently met with both Hume and Paisley and both meetings had been conducted in a positive atmosphere.

Mr. Lake said he would be hearing from Sinn Fein later in the day and would let Ancram know of any glitches. He also raised the idea of a trip by Nancy Soderberg and Ambassador Crowe to Belfast and a possible trip by himself to London. Ancram thought his trip would be useful, depending on the response Nancy and Crowe get.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.14)
KBH 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
Kathleen Stephens (in Belfast)
Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters (NSC staff)

Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein
Mairead Keane (in Mr. Lake's office)

DATE, TIME September 21, 1995, 11:15 a.m.
AND PLACE: Mr. Lake's Office

Mr. Adams: Do you have any news for me?

Mr. Lake: I am waiting for news from you. I talked to the British about the question of whether the IRA would have to have contact with the commission or panel. I got a good response -- what matters to them is practicality, not labeling, as long as the commission is talking to someone in authority. I underscored the point about IRA neutrality. That leads to the question of what is talked about. I strongly urged that it not be defined now, but as things go along. The objective is to get the damn thing going and park the issue in an international body. I thought that got a constructive reception.

Mr. Adams: Right. The reality of the situation is that all we can see is for people to be neutral, and we are prepared to undertake and give some sort of commitment on the basis of this being part of the all-party talks process. We want to have a meeting between Ancram and Martin McGuinness, but it is not being processed properly -- we're having some difficulty reaching them, and Mayhew is in Australia this morning. And what I have in terms of our last conversation is that it will not be a runner. I talked to one or two people informally and they have enough goodwill to be neutral if there is a clear date for all-party talks. The Brits are saying they want people to speak with authority on this. What does that mean? Does it mean details or, as it should be, what is necessary to make progress and move forward. We have a bad line.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

Mr. Lake: Please repeat the last part, the last third of what you said.

Mr. Adams: What do they mean by someone who can speak with authority on these issues? I think it means points one and two and fuzzy on three because there is no possibility of persuading people to be anything but neutral.

Mr. Lake: My strong impression is that they want to see movement forward. You should take what you've got. They are saying that you should engage with the panel and the IRA is neutral, as you noted. Neutral means the IRA doesn't have to support it but doesn't oppose your participation. You don't have to try to corner them now by saying what the body will not address, just as I urged the British not to be saying what the body has to address. You have the deal you are looking for.

Mr. Adams: You have said twice that they can be neutral and Sinn Fein or I will be involved. The difficulty that was pointed out to me informally was that if they are neutral on the twin track and if the British continue to insist on preconditions, on a report back from the body before all-party talks, and if the body comes up with a position similar to the British one, the whole republican leadership will be discredited with the republicans. We see that as a real danger.

Mr. Lake: The British have a sincere problem with the unionists, as you do with your constituents. The point I would urge on you both is that all you have to say is, "We are prepared to engage with the body on this issue." You have repeatedly said you would engage on decommissioning. You would not necessarily be bound by the outcome but would treat it seriously. If it comes out the wrong way, you can say that your position has not changed. It is your choice. You can say now that your policy remains the same, but I hope you will say it less.

Mr. Adams: I missed the last bit.

Mr. Lake: You would say that you would not be bound by what the body says, though you would treat it seriously. I don't see how that discredits you if you say it at the beginning. I am concerned that a refusal to deal with the body will let the British corner you and hurt your credibility, and ours.

Mr. Adams: OK.

Mr. Lake: As I said, I have been acting on the belief that you want peace.

Mr. Adams: That goes without saying.

Mr. Lake: To me, yes, but if it appears that you are blocking an approach that would park this issue while you would get to work on the first phase of all-party talks, then it is hard to sustain that position.

Mr. Adams: Anything more in terms of a firm description like the name?

Mr. Lake: No, I would welcome your thoughts. I think the "Mitchell Panel" is not bad. The British are flexible on this.

Mr. Adams: Anything further on who the others would be?

Mr. Lake: I did not discuss anything except that one issue, where I think they came back with a flexible answer. To return to the date, we do have them talking about a target date, which is a step forward. On the issue of membership, it would be a group of three of "appropriate standing, likely to enjoy widespread confidence."

Mr. Adams: Do you have names?

Mr. Lake: No, I would suggest that we get started on the basis of that formula. We would stay involved and weigh in, or George Mitchell would, to make sure the dice were not loaded, that they do not insist on qualifications that would load the dice. We would have to work on it.

Mr. Adams: Let me tell you what I will do, subject to your advice. We are trying to organize a meeting for Martin MaGuinness with Michael Ancram. When is the question-- hopefully as soon as possible. We first called them last evening; Martin is to phone back today. I am also hopeful that we will be consulting with the Irish Government people. I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram, if there is any light between what he says to us and what he is saying to you. And I will take your point about not pressing too hard on some issues. I would like to talk again. I will put the issue formally to the IRA and I will talk to you before then.

Mr. Lake: Would you like me to call London to encourage Ancram to meet with you as soon as possible?

Mr. Adams: We couldn't find them at all. It would be helpful.

Mr. Lake: I will do that.

Mr. Adams: Can we keep the point about formally putting it to the IRA between ourselves? I know you are doing your best. We do see it as step forward, but it will be very much an uphill battle. A small number see the Brits as getting everyone on a hook. I understand and accept the White House role, but the Brits are having success tactically by digging in behind this. We are 13 months down the road and the process is still dominated by a single new precondition, which is causing annoyance. I want to stress that it will be uphill. As I already told you, I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram. I want to go to them with a full proposal. If something is revised in what Ancram tells Martin, perhaps you could take it up for us?

Mr. Lake: What I have told you about speaking with authority, I got from beyond Ancram, from someone not always noted for flexibility, so I hope we are making progress on that side. I agree they are doing well tactically -- and I urge you to deflect that and take the high ground.

Mr. Adams: The difficulty is that what people will sign on for is what is in a joint communique. You can't expect them to read between the lines. At the end of the day, the U.S. cannot act as guarantor or even broker. It is whatever the Brits are saying in consultations with us that is relevant. We cannot explain it as "Tony Lake said."

Mr. Lake: My aim is to get as explicit as possible, but I don't want to make it too detailed now. We talk to the British too. If they tell us something, it has some validity because of our relationship. It is just the same when you tell me something. Let me talk to them and if there is anything new, I will let you know.

Mr. Adams: I will be in Dublin until Saturday morning -- if you have some message that is the way to get me, to set up a call through the ambassador.

Mr. Lake: I am going to Haiti and will be back Saturday around noon, but Nancy will be here.

Mr. Adams: I will not be back to you until after the meeting with Ancram unless there is something new, or you have news for me.

-- End of Conversation --

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: Thank you notes for Belfast [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, July 27, 1995 12:39PM

*put in
msh bag*

Here they are, from Dave Pozorski in Belfast

UUP:
The Hon. Ken Maguinness, Member of Parliament
Jim Wilson, General Secretary
letters to both of above should be sent to:
Ulster Unionist party
3 Glengall St.
Belfast BT 125 AE
United Kingdom

SDLP City Councillors:
Alex Atwood
Patricia Lewsley (wife of the Lisburn councillor who was beaten up 7/8, presumably by IRA)
Mary Muldoon
Aldan Maguinness
letters to all of the above should be sent to :
Belfast City Council
City Hall
Belfast BT 15GS
United Kingdom

One more:
Mark Durken
Derry City Council
Guild Hall
Guild hall Square
Londonderry BT486DG
United Kingdom

From: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
To: Peters, Mary A.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Darby, M. Brooke; Maxfield, Nancy H.
Subject: Thank you notes for Belfast [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 19, 1995 11:49 AM

Hi Mary Ann,

Nancy has asked again if we were able to find the names of the group that hosted dinner for her and Kathy while attending the conference last month. If there is anyway you could contact Kathy to find this information I would be most appreciative.

JOHN STEELE, (OBE)
(UNDER SECRETARY - SECURITY POLICY)
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
STORMONT HOUSE ANNEX
BELFAST
N. IRELAND
BT4 3ST

CHRIS MACCABE
ASST. SECRETARY - POLITICAL AFFAIRS
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
STORMONT HOUSE
BELFAST
N. IRELAND
BT4

DAVID WATKINS
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT
STORMONT CASTLE
BELFAST
N. IRELAND
BT4 3ST

KEN MAGINNIS
OUP MP FOR FERMANAGH AND SOUTH TYRONE
20 BROOKE STREET
DUNGANNON
CO. TYRONE
N. IRELAND
BT71 7AN

JIM WILSON
ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY
3 GLENGALL STREET
BELFAST
N. IRELAND
BT12 5AE

REG EMPEY (OBE, B.Sc)
BELFAST CITY COUNCILLOR AND EX MAYOR OF BELFAST
ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY
3 GLENGALL STREET
BELFAST
N. IRELAND
BT12 5AE

7/21
Nancy -
these are the
names given
by Larny Robinson
regarding your lunch
in Belfast of
Unionists
See



British Embassy
Washington

11 August 1995

BY FAX

3100 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone: (202)

Facsimile: (202)

Ms Mary Ann Peters
European Directorate
National Security Council
The White House
WASHINGTON DC

Dear Mary Ann.

NORTHERN IRELAND

1. Many thanks for sparing the time yesterday to go over so many important current issues. On Northern Ireland, you will have seen the article which I faxed to you about the latest, particularly unpleasant, punishment beating.

2. You may also have seen that the media have got excited about a statement by Albert Reynolds to the effect that he would not have signed the Joint Declaration back in 1993 had he thought that it committed the paramilitaries to decommissioning weapons before All Party talks. You may find it helpful to have the attached briefing note which we have prepared in response to the former Taoiseach's remarks.

Best wishes,

Peter

Peter Westmacott

NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: ALBERT REYNOLDS' REMARKS

Albert Reynolds, former Taoiseach, has said that he would have rejected the December 1993 Downing Street Declaration had he thought that it made the decommissioning of weapons a prerequisite of All Party talks.

When the Joint Declaration was signed, it was already a matter of public record that, in the event of a permanent cessation of violence, the British Government would enter exploratory dialogue within three months.

The purposes of that dialogue were clear for all to see. Mr Reynolds was fully aware of them. They included the practical consequences of the ending of violence - the most obvious of these was the safe disposal of illegal weapons.

It is nonsense to say arms were not mentioned before the IRA cease-fire, or that the two Governments ignored this issue in the context of the Joint Declaration. Dick Spring, Mr Reynolds' Foreign Minister, said when explaining the Joint Declaration to the Dail on 15 December 1993 (the day it was published):

"Questions were raised on how to determine a permanent cessation of violence. We are talking about the handing up of arms'..."

On the following day, the British Northern Ireland Secretary said on the radio:

"We shall be saying to [Sinn Fein], 'Come to exploratory discussions and high on the list of what will be relevant there is what you are going to do with your arms'..."

Mr Adams understood the position. On 8 January 1994 the Irish News reported him as saying:

"Mr Mayhew goes on to say 'well the exploratory dialogue will be so we can discuss with Sinn Fein how the IRA will hand over their weapons'. So I say to myself: 'This is what they want. They want the IRA to stop so that Sinn Fein can have the privilege 12 weeks later, having been properly sanitised and come out of quarantine, to have discussions with civil servants on how the IRA can hand over their weapons!'. And then I hear that reiterated again and again, by Douglas Hurd, by John Major, by Patrick Mayhew."

So the IRA declared its cessation of violence in the full knowledge that Government Ministers had repeatedly said on the record that the question of arms would feature prominently in exploratory dialogue.

There is no question of the British Government breaching some "deal". On 29 October 1993 both Mr Reynolds and Mr Major publicly reaffirmed that:

"There could be no secret agreements or understandings between Governments and organisations supporting violence as a price for its cessation."

We want to see progress to a political settlement achieved through inclusive negotiations in which all parties have the confidence to take part. We are working - with the Irish Government and others - on ways to make progress. We are keen to maintain dialogue with all the parties.

TO: NES
FROM: MAP

8/29

There was no explicit mention of decommissioning in the Downing Street Declaration. The case the Brits and the unionists make is based on the language quoted in paragraph 3 of this cable which says, "democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to *exclusively peaceful means* and which have shown they abide by the democratic process are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the governments and the political parties on the way ahead". The italics are mine, because those three words are used, especially by Molyneaux, to justify the insistence on decommissioning.

The Brits claim that while the declaration was not explicit, both PM Reynolds and Sinn Fein were aware that decommissioning would be part of the exploratory talks HMG had promised within three months of a permanent cessation of violence. Attached is a briefing note HMG prepared to rebut Reynolds' recent comments. It cites statements by Spring, Mayhew and Adams in December 1993-January 1994 which mention handing over weapons.

I don't know whether there were talks between HMG and Sinn Fein on decommissioning or conditions for all-party talks between the Downing Street Declaration in December 1993 and the cease-fire announcement the following August. HMG denies that there was a secret deal.

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 231313Z AUG 95

FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8575
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8040
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5810
UNCLAS BELFAST 0359

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, UK, EI

SUBJECT: DEBATE ON DECOMMISSIONING VS ALL-PARTY
TALKS CONTINUES

REF: A) LONDON 11431 B) LONDON 11429

*lots pull not exact
language in what
was agreed. How,
what private assurances
were made by
British in
int. talks.*

1. SUMMARY. SPEAKING IN A RADIO INTERVIEW ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 18,

NORTHERN IRELAND MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM RENEWED HMG'S INSISTENCE THAT PROGRESS BE MADE ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING BEFORE SINN FEIN PARTICIPATED IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. HMG, HE SAID, CONTINUED TO SEEK WAYS OF WORKING WITH SINN FEIN TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE AND HAD GIVEN SINN FEIN A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE DATES FOR MEETINGS WITH SIR PATRICK MAYHEW. OVER THE WEEKEND, UUP LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX, SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME, THE CATHOLIC PRIMATE OF IRELAND CARDINAL CAHAL DALEY, AND OTHER POLITICAL AND COMMUNITY LEADERS ALL EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS IN THE LOCAL PRESS ON THE ONGOING DEBATE. UNIONISTS CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT SINN FEIN HAS NOT YET DEMONSTRATED ITS COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS AND, THEREFORE, HAS NOT YET MET THE CRITERIA SET IN THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION FOR PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. NATIONALISTS EXPRESS CONCERNS THAT IMMEDIATE TALKS ARE THE ONLY WAY FORWARD, OFTEN IMPLYING THAT THE IRA CEASEFIRE COULD COLLAPSE IF TALKS DO NOT TAKE PLACE SOON. END SUMMARY.

2. MICHAEL ANCRAM, THE NORTHERN IRELAND MINISTER FOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, REITERATED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF IRA DECOMMISSIONING IN ADVANCE OF SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. SPEAKING IN A RADIO INTERVIEW ON AUGUST 18, ANCRAM SAID THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SINN FEIN'S FAILURE TO ACT ON THE ARMS ISSUE HAD RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THE PARTY'S STANCE ON THE PEACE PROCESS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE STATEMENT MADE AUGUST 13 BY SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS THAT THE IRA HAD NOT GONE AWAY (REF A). THIS STATEMENT, ANCRAM SAID, COMBINED WITH THE FACT THAT "NOT ONE BULLET, NOT ONE TON OF SEMTEX, HAS BEEN GIVEN IN SINCE AUGUST 31 LAST YEAR," PLACED A QUESTION MARK OVER SINN FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE. HE NOTED THAT SINN FEIN HAD PUBLICLY DECLARED ITS DESIRE TO SEE THE GUN TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS. ON THAT BASIS, ANCRAM ARGUED, "IT'S NOT REALLYA QUESTION OF WHETHER, IT'S A QUESTION OF WHEN AND HOW" DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD TAKE PLACE. ANCRAM ALSO SAID THAT THE NIO HAD GIVEN SINN FEIN SEVERAL DATES FOR POSSIBLE MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SIR PATRICK MAYHEW, AND THAT HMG WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE ISSUE THROUGH DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN.

3. COMMENTING ON ANCRAM'S REMARKS AND ON THE ONGOING DEBATE, UUP LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX REFERRED TO THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, AS HE HAD DONE IN RESPONDING TO STATEMENTS BY ALBERT REYNOLDS ON THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE (REF B). HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO LANGUAGE SAYING THAT, "DEMOCRATICALLY MANDATED PARTIES WHICH ESTABLISH A COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS AND WHICH HAVE SHOWN THEY ABIDE BY THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, ARE FREE TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND TO JOIN IN DIALOGUE IN DUE COURSE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE WAY AHEAD." WERE SINN FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL MEANS GENUINE, MOLYNEAUX SAID, NOT ONLY WOULD THE IRA BE WILLING TO GIVE UP ITS ARMS, BUT THERE WOULD BE AN END TO PUNISHMENT BEATINGS, INTIMIDATION, AND EXCLUSIONS.

4. SPEAKING ON A LOCAL RADIO PROGRAM AUGUST 19, SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME RENEWED HIS CALL FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS, WITH DECOMMISSIONING AS ONE ISSUE AMONG MANY TO BE DISCUSSED. HE CALLED ON UNIONIST LEADERS TO RECOGNIZE THEY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE PROTECTION OF THE UNIONIST IDENTITY ONCE AND FOR ALL. DECOMMISSIONING, HE SAID, WAS A MATTER "WHICH CAN BE SETTLED IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS PROCESS TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL SIDES." DUP LEADER IAN PAISLEY ASSAILED HUME'S REMARKS, ACCUSING HIM OF "BACKTRACKING" ON STANCES HE TOOK ON DECOMMISSIONING EARLIER IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO UNIONISTS, PAISLEY SAID, TO ENTER TALKS "WITH THE WHOLE ARSENAL OF THE IRA ON THE TABLE."

5. IN AN AUGUST 20 HOMILY AND FOLLOW-ON PRESS INTERVIEWS

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

AUGUST 21, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIMATE OF IRELAND, CARDINAL CAHAL DALEY, ECHOED HUME'S CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE TALKS. SUCH DIALOGUE, HE SAID, WAS THE ONLY WAY FOR DIVIDED COMMUNITIES TO FIND WAYS OF LIVING TOGETHER WITHOUT MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION. HE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT "INSTEAD OF TRYING TO BEGIN DISMANTLING THE OBSTACLES TO TALKS, SOME WERE TRYING TO ERECT NEW BARRIERS." HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN FASTER PROGRESS ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS.

STEPHENS

BT

#0359

NNNN

<MSGID> M1822362

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, SODERBERG, FLANAGAN, GARDNER, NSC, PETERS, SCHMIDT, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 311254Z AUG 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8585

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3628

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3327

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 004285

LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, IR

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
- PROCESS

REF: (A) DUBLIN 4234 (B) DUBLIN 3436

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

/-----

2. I MET WITH TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON ON AUGUST 30. HE EXPLAINED THE RECENT STEPS TAKEN BY THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO BREAK THE LOGJAM OVER DECOMMISSIONING. HIS VIEWS SEEM TO DIFFER FROM WHAT WAS ARTICULATED ON AUGUST 29 BY HIS ADVISER PADDY TEAHON (REF A). CLEARLY THE TAOISEACH FEELS THAT AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND SHOULD WORK IN PARALLEL WITH THE POLITICAL TALKS. HE EXPECTS THAT HE AND JOHN MAJOR WILL BE ABLE TO ISSUE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 6. HE WAS DELIBERATELY VAGUE, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES, SAYING ONLY THAT THIS SHOULD REMAIN AMBIGUOUS AND THAT IT WOULD BE THE "POLITICAL GESTURE" OF ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION THAT THE BRITISH WERE LOOKING FOR. AT THE SAME TIME, TALKS WOULD BEGIN -- BILATERAL, TRILATERAL, AND EVENTUALLY ALL-PARTY TALKS TARGETTED FOR LATE NOVEMBER. HE WENT ON TO OUTLINE SOME STEPS THE U.S. COULD TAKE THAT HE BELIEVES WOULD HELP ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS.

*Pls
Put in
Book*

NES-

*Note requests for U.S.
support on p 3*

*All look do-able
to me. Local*

*Senior Fed office
confirms Adams*

will be here

9/12-14. Naimead

will be in

local next

week w/

*requests for
meetings.*

That

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.17)
KBH 4/11/2023

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

END SUMMARY

/-----

3. THE TAOISEACH HOSTED A LUNCH FOR ME ON AUGUST 30. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIAL ADVISER SEAN DONLON, AND I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF. BRUTON HAS BEEN DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN RECENT DAYS. HE HELD SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH GERRY ADAMS ON AUGUST 28 AND WITH ALLIANCE PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 29, AND HAS SPOKEN BY PHONE TO JOHN MAJOR. BRUTON TOLD ME THAT WHILE DIFFICULTIES REMAIN IN CONVINCING SINN FEIN/IRA TO GO ALONG WITH DUBLIN'S APPROACH, HE FULLY ANTICIPATES BEING ABLE TO PROCEED WITH THE SUMMIT MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 6. BRUTON EXPECTS THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT (1) ON TALKS WITH ALL THE PARTIES, WITH THE GOAL OF ALL-PARTY TALKS COMMENCING IN NOVEMBER, AND (2) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION. WHEN DISCUSSING THE VENUE FOR THE SUMMIT, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY SLATED FOR DUBLIN BUT NOW MOVED TO LONDON, BRUTON SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES THE UNIONISTS WOULD HAVE WITH THE SUMMIT RESULTS EMANATING FROM DUBLIN. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE THOUGHT LONDON A BETTER CHOICE.

DECOMMISSIONING

/-----

4. BRUTON TOLD ME THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION WOULD BE TO (A) VERIFY THE PARTIES' COMMITMENTS TO DECOMMISSIONING AND (B) DISCUSS MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING. HE WAS NOT SEEKING A "PHYSICAL" GESTURE AT THIS POINT. IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT, IN THE PROCESS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE COMMISSION AND WITHIN THE POLITICAL TALKS SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDERWAY, SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE WOULD DEVELOP AMONG THE PARTIES THAT THE ISSUE OF A "GESTURE" WOULD LESSEN IN SIGNIFICANCE. IDEALLY, THE UNIONISTS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO ATTEND ALL-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT AN ACTUAL TURNOVER OF WEAPONS, IF THEY WERE CONVINCED BY THEN THAT SINN FEIN/IRA DID NOT INTEND TO USE ARMS AGAIN. CONTRARY TO OUR IMPRESSION OF AUGUST 29 (REF A), BRUTON EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNIONISTS "WOULD NOT ACCEPT" BEING TOLD THAT NO DECOMMISSIONING WOULD OCCUR UNTIL THE VERY END OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

5. WHEN I ASKED HIM HOW TO SELL SINN FEIN ON THIS APPROACH, BRUTON REPLIED: "ON THE BASIS THAT IT'S A PROCESS, AND THAT THEY DON'T HAVE TO PUT ALL THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE -- JUST ONE," WHICH I INTERPRETED TO MEAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE FORMATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. BRUTON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISSUE OF PRECISELY WHEN THE IRA WOULD BE ASKED TO TURN IN WEAPONS WAS BEING LEFT VAGUE, BUT ASSERTED THAT THIS DEGREE OF AMBIGUITY WAS DESIRABLE IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORDER TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND "BUY A SPACE FOR DIALOGUE."

U.S. ROLE

/-----

6. BRUTON TOLD ME THAT THE U.S. COULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE COMING DAYS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. -- ~~A WHITE HOUSE PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE SEPTEMBER 6 BRUTON-MAJOR SUMMIT~~ WOULD BE GREATLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 004285

LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, IR

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
- PROCESS

APPRECIATED.

2. -- ~~U.S. EFFORTS TO REACH OUT TO THE UNIONISTS~~ -- MOST OF WHOM BELIEVE WE FAVOR THE NATIONALISTS -- COULD HELP IN DEVELOPING THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE NEEDED TO BRING THEM ON BOARD. SPECIFICALLY, BRUTON URGED THE ~~PRESIDENT TO TELEPHONE WHOMEVER IS ELECTED TO REPLACE JAMES MOLYNEAUX AS LEADER OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, AND PERHAPS INVITE THAT INDIVIDUAL TO THE U.S.~~ (BRUTON AND SEAN DONLON SPECULATED THAT WHEREAS KEN MAGINNIS OR JOHN TAYLOR MIGHT BE THE MORE PRAGMATIC INTERLOCUTORS TO DEAL WITH IN THE PEACE PROCESS, WILLIAM ROSS WAS MORE LIKELY TO WIN GIVEN THE INTRICACIES OF THE SELECTION PROCESS.)

3. -- IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF ~~SENATOR MITCHELL, SHOULD HE BE SELECTED TO SERVE AS CHAIRMAN OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION~~, WOULD ASSUME A ROLE IN BROACHING THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE WITH SINN FEIN AND THE UNIONIST SIDE. NOTING THAT KEN MAGINNIS HAD RECENTLY PROVIDED AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE THAT BROKE IT DOWN INTO VARIOUS COMPONENTS (PRINCIPLES, MODALITIES, INVENTORY, SCHEDULE, ETC.), BRUTON SUGGESTED THIS WOULD BE A PRODUCTIVE AREA FOR SENATOR MITCHELL TO EXPLORE WITH SINN FEIN.

COMMENT

/-----

7. THE DETAILS OF THE IRISH PROPOSAL REMAIN VEXINGLY VAGUE -- PERHAPS DELIBERATELY SO -- BUT ONE THING IS CLEAR: BRUTON IS DETERMINED TO PROCEED WITH AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO BREAK THE LOGJAM, AND THAT EFFORT WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE AT LEAST AS MUCH EFFORT TO ADDRESSING UNIONIST CONCERNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ABOUT WEAPONS AS IT DOES TO ADDRESSING IRA CONCERNS ABOUT THE "TRAP" OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. BRUTON IS FRUSTRATED WITH SINN FEIN/IRA ("I'VE SPENT SO MUCH TIME WITH GERRY ADAMS RECENTLY THAT I KNOW HIS VOICE BETTER THAN MY OWN WIFE'S"). HE INTENDS TO GO AHEAD WITH A SUMMIT IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 6 WHETHER SINN FEIN AGREES TO DUBLIN'S LATEST FORMULATION OR NOT. THE GOVERNMENT WILL MEET WITH SINN FEIN TODAY (AUGUST 31), AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS MAY TAKE PLACE OVER THE WEEKEND AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS COUNTING VERY MUCH ON AMERICAN SUPPORT BECAUSE OF THE DISTRUST THAT SINN FEIN HAS ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING, WHICH IS STILL VIEWED AS "SURRENDER" TO THE BRITISH. THE GOVERNMENT IS RELYING ON US TO HELP PERSUADE SINN FEIN THAT THIS IS NOT A "TRAP" BUT A VIABLE WAY TO GO FORWARD.

SMITH
BT
#4285

NNNN
<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>4285
<^TOR>950831085653 M1834284
<^SECT> SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN>4285
<^TOR>950831085657 M1834286

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Baker, Jane E.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: Thoughts on Peace Process [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Saturday, September 09, 1995 12:32PM

*KB -
put in
high level
over SMTR
MS*

Here, finally, is the final version of this message.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: Thoughts on Peace Process [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Saturday, September 09, 1995 12:25 PM

Please ignore earlier version.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Thoughts on Peace Process [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Saturday, September 09, 1995 12:08 PM

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.18)
KSM 4/11/2023**

NES--

The formulation of the British position that Acram used is that the UK "would consider seriously any recommendations within the terms of reference of the commission on their merits". He also said that the NIO had responded to Sinn Fein's concerns about being asked by the commission itself to hand over weapons up front by assuring them that the timing of decommissioning would be beyond the commission's mandate. This is odd, because the draft agreement (not the communique but the diplomatic minute) says under "terms of reference" that the commission would consult with the parties and governments on the terms of arrangements for decommissioning, report on how the decommissioning process might be taken forward, and make proposals outlining the modalities for a scheme on which agreement might be possible. Coupled with the communique's language on "appropriate context and manner" as quoted by Amb Kerr yesterday, it's clear to me that the mandate does include timing. Trina, by the way, also reported that Sinn Fein is worried that the commission itself will recommend a symbolic gesture; I have told her that we cannot limit the commission's mandate by proscribing certain outcomes -- on this one, SF will just have to trust Mitchell.

Which brings us back to what I think is still the crux of the matter -- how to get Sinn Fein to "trust" the British. Once we clarify that the mandate does include timing, then we have to push the British to harden their commitment to consider seriously the commission's recommendations. I see two ways forward:

--First, we would need to get them to add language saying that they would seriously consider the commission's recommendation as THE way to go forward, a tacit promise not to add additional conditions of their own.

--Second, we need to work with Ancram's insistence that the three Washington criteria are "not doctrinal" but reflect HMG's judgment of the practical steps that need to be taken to get the unionists to the table. We should get the Brits to acknowledge explicitly that the commission will indeed "create a new reality" in that a distinguished body will have taken the time to become experts themselves on this knotty issue, and they will then be as competent as HMG is now to define what needs to be done on decommissioning to build the confidence necessary for talks.

As you have said, the other aspect is to get the British themselves to work with the unionists to define in broader or different terms the kind of climate they need for talks.. Trimble's election reduces the chances they will engage on this, but we should still press the Brits to try and do what we can ourselves.

On the Adams visit, do you think we could ask for a public statement from Sinn Fein on their willingness to consider the concept of an international body on decommissioning as an implied condition for a meeting with the Vice President.?

Finally, it might be useful to suggest to JKS Monday that she engage with Hume on the substance of our proposal to the British.

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 231313Z AUG 95

FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8575
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8040
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5810
UNCLAS BELFAST 0359

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, UK, EI

SUBJECT: DEBATE ON DECOMMISSIONING VS ALL-PARTY
TALKS CONTINUES

REF: A) LONDON 11431 B) LONDON 11429

1. SUMMARY. SPEAKING IN A RADIO INTERVIEW ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 18,

NORTHERN IRELAND MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM RENEWED HMG'S INSISTENCE THAT PROGRESS BE MADE ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING BEFORE SINN FEIN PARTICIPATED IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. HMG, HE SAID, CONTINUED TO SEEK WAYS OF WORKING WITH SINN FEIN TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE AND HAD GIVEN SINN FEIN A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE DATES FOR MEETINGS WITH SIR PATRICK MAYHEW. OVER THE WEEKEND, UUP LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX, SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME, THE CATHOLIC PRIMATE OF IRELAND CARDINAL CAHAL DALEY, AND OTHER POLITICAL AND COMMUNITY LEADERS ALL EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS IN THE LOCAL PRESS ON THE ONGOING DEBATE. UNIONISTS CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT SINN FEIN HAS NOT YET DEMONSTRATED ITS COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS AND, THEREFORE, HAS NOT YET MET THE CRITERIA SET IN THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION FOR PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. NATIONALISTS EXPRESS CONCERNS THAT IMMEDIATE TALKS ARE THE ONLY WAY FORWARD, OFTEN IMPLYING THAT THE IRA CEASEFIRE COULD COLLAPSE IF TALKS DO NOT TAKE PLACE SOON. END SUMMARY.

2. MICHAEL ANCRAM, THE NORTHERN IRELAND MINISTER FOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, REITERATED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF IRA DECOMMISSIONING IN ADVANCE OF SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. SPEAKING IN A RADIO INTERVIEW ON AUGUST 18, ANCRAM SAID THAT

*To MAP -
lets pull out exact
language in what
was agreed. How,
what private assurances
were made by
British re
interview
into talks.*

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SINN FEIN'S FAILURE TO ACT ON THE ARMS ISSUE HAD RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THE PARTY'S STANCE ON THE PEACE PROCESS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE STATEMENT MADE AUGUST 13 BY SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS THAT THE IRA HAD NOT GONE AWAY (REF A). THIS STATEMENT, ANCRAM SAID, COMBINED WITH THE FACT THAT "NOT ONE BULLET, NOT ONE TON OF SEMTEX, HAS BEEN GIVEN IN SINCE AUGUST 31 LAST YEAR," PLACED A QUESTION MARK OVER SINN FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE. HE NOTED THAT SINN FEIN HAD PUBLICLY DECLARED ITS DESIRE TO SEE THE GUN TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS. ON THAT BASIS, ANCRAM ARGUED, "IT'S NOT REALLYA QUESTION OF WHETHER, IT'S A QUESTION OF WHEN AND HOW" DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD TAKE PLACE. ANCRAM ALSO SAID THAT THE NIO HAD GIVEN SINN FEIN SEVERAL DATES FOR POSSIBLE MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SIR PATRICK MAYHEW, AND THAT HMG WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE ISSUE THROUGH DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN.

3. COMMENTING ON ANCRAM'S REMARKS AND ON THE ONGOING DEBATE, UUP LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX REFERRED TO THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, AS HE HAD DONE IN RESPONDING TO STATEMENTS BY ALBERT REYNOLDS ON THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE (REF B). HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO LANGUAGE SAYING THAT, "DEMOCRATICALLY MANDATED PARTIES WHICH ESTABLISH A COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS AND WHICH HAVE SHOWN THEY ABIDE BY THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, ARE FREE TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND TO JOIN IN DIALOGUE IN DUE COURSE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE WAY AHEAD." WERE SINN FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL MEANS GENUINE, MOLYNEAUX SAID, NOT ONLY WOULD THE IRA BE WILLING TO GIVE UP ITS ARMS, BUT THERE WOULD BE AN END TO PUNISHMENT BEATINGS, INTIMIDATION, AND EXCLUSIONS.

4. SPEAKING ON A LOCAL RADIO PROGRAM AUGUST 19, SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME RENEWED HIS CALL FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS, WITH DECOMMISSIONING AS ONE ISSUE AMONG MANY TO BE DISCUSSED. HE CALLED ON UNIONIST LEADERS TO RECOGNIZE THEY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE PROTECTION OF THE UNIONIST IDENTITY ONCE AND FOR ALL. DECOMMISSIONING, HE SAID, WAS A MATTER "WHICH CAN BE SETTLED IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS PROCESS TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL SIDES." DUP LEADER IAN PAISLEY ASSAILED HUME'S REMARKS, ACCUSING HIM OF "BACKTRACKING" ON STANCES HE TOOK ON DECOMMISSIONING EARLIER IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO UNIONISTS, PAISLEY SAID, TO ENTER TALKS "WITH THE WHOLE ARSENAL OF THE IRA ON THE TABLE."

5. IN AN AUGUST 20 HOMILY AND FOLLOW-ON PRESS INTERVIEWS

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

AUGUST 21, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIMATE OF IRELAND, CARDINAL CAHAL DALEY, ECHOED HUME'S CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE TALKS. SUCH DIALOGUE, HE SAID, WAS THE ONLY WAY FOR DIVIDED COMMUNITIES TO FIND WAYS OF LIVING TOGETHER WITHOUT MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION. HE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT "INSTEAD OF TRYING TO BEGIN DISMANTLING THE OBSTACLES TO TALKS, SOME WERE TRYING TO ERECT NEW BARRIERS." HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN FASTER PROGRESS ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS.

STEPHENS

BT

#0359

NNNN

<MSGID> M1822362

UNCLASSIFIED



Edward M. Kennedy

U.S. Senator for Massachusetts

315 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
202/224-4543
202/224-2417 FAX

KB -
Put in Book

FAX TRANSMISSION

DATE/TIME: Sept 7, 1995

TO: NANCY

RECEIVING FAX: 2:25 p.m.

FROM: Trina Vargo / Foreign Policy 224-2638

NUMBER OF PAGES 2
INCLUDING COVER:

COMMENTS:

cc to
MA Peters

456-9460

SEPTEMBER 7, 1995

MEMORANDUM

TO: SENATOR
FR: TRINA
RE: DISCUSSION WITH JOHN HUME

I just spoke with John (2:00 p.m.) to get his take on the summit breakdown. I called him because I had heard that he and Gerry Adams had given a counter-proposal to the British and Irish Governments. John confirmed that he had given the British a proposal, with Adams' agreement, and the British turned it down. I told him that you may be seeing Ancram tomorrow and I asked if there was any reason why you shouldn't ask Ancram why this couldn't be accepted. John said you should feel free to do so. He also asked me to pass this on to Nancy. I'll fax to Jean as well.

John suggested the two governments announce the following:

"We are now beginning the all-party talks phase of the peace process which will lead to round table talks involving all parties on a date to be fixed.

To mark the beginning of this phase, both governments will call a two day convention of all parties to be held on a fixed date to agree the agenda for all party talks.

Parallel to this process, both governments have asked Senator George Mitchell to act as an international arbiter to insure that the question of all arms, now thankfully silent, is settled to the satisfaction of both governments.

[It would be clearly acknowledged that any final agreement would have to contain such satisfaction.]"

John says the final paragraph could be left out. John thinks that the British had a problem with "all arms" in paragraph three as that could indicate British troops as well. John noted that the response to that is in the rest of the sentence which says it must be "settled to the satisfaction of both governments.

cc: Amb. Smith, Carey, Nancy

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM

TO: SENATOR
FR: TRINA
RE: DISCUSSION WITH JOHN HUME

John Hume just called me (10:30 a.m.) with his latest version of language. This is very confidential -- I'm only sharing this with Jean and the White House.

John suggested the two governments announce the following:

"We are now beginning the all-party talks phase of the peace process which will lead to round table talks involving all parties by an early November date.

Parallel to this process, both governments have asked Senator George Mitchell to act as an international arbiter to insure that the question of all arms, now thankfully silent, is settled to the satisfaction of both governments."

This new language is an attempt by John to amend his previous language that the British Government rejected. A significant difference from a few days ago is that John dropped the paragraph which called for all-party pre talks as the first step. For Sinn Fein, he's added the "early November date."

John also says that the British want the word "illegal" inserted before the word "arms" in the second paragraph. Tonight at 6:00 p.m., John will talk to Adams and ask him if he'll agree to that language if the governments also add something to the effect of "this will be followed by a necessary removal of troops and necessary movement to civil policing." [This could be read two ways. If it means the order in which which Mitchell will take those two issues up in the commission will be illegal arms first and troops second, maybe that can fly. But if the language is read to mean the actual demilitarization will happen in that order, I doubt that will fly with Adams. I always assumed you'd have some paramilitary weapons handed in and then some troops removed and that it would go back and forth -- I can't believe the IRA will agree to hand in all weapons before the beginning of troops withdrawal. As troops have already begun to be withdrawn, I'm giving that sentence the former interpretation, but that will have to be clarified..

John will also ask Adams if the IRA could possibly agree to a gesture before Clinton arrives -- i.e. let people know where a cache can be found in a field. Again, given all we've heard from Sinn Fein, I don't see it happening but it's always worth a try.

John says Mitchell doesn't like the idea of him alone being mentioned rather than a commission. John says Mitchell would be free to appoint advisers and it would, in effect, be a commission.

cc: Amb. Smith, Carey, Nancy, Mary Ann Peters

KK
put in book

IRELAND

Q: Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams was at the White House last week. What happened?

-- Adams met with my National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, on Wednesday the 13th. Al Gore participated in part of the meeting to underscore the points we wanted to make to Adams:

- that we want to see the peace process get moving again;
- that the best path to peace is for the representatives of the people of Northern Ireland to talk together about their hopes for the future; and
- that those who have weapons -- the IRA and the loyalist paramilitaries -- need to start discussing how to get rid of them.

(If asked about subsequent meetings)

-- We have had a number of constructive discussions with all parties, including Sinn Fein, over the past two weeks. I can't go into details about who or when.

Q: Is the peace process stalled?

-- There has not been any additional progress recently toward a permanent settlement.

-- The issue is whether some of the paramilitaries' weapons should be taken out of service before talks among all the political parties in Northern Ireland are held.

-- The British and Irish Governments have worked out a concept for breaking the logjam -- to start talks on certain issues now and have an international body look at the weapons question. That seems to offer a basis for progress.

-- The crux of the matter is trust. The challenge for the Irish and British governments, who are leading the peace process, is to foster trust and confidence among the parties in the peace process as the way to a better future in Northern Ireland.

Q: Is your Administration trying to jump-start the peace process?

-- We are seeking to be helpful by staying in close touch with everyone involved and encouraging them to be as creative as they can in the search for peace.

-- If we can make a contribution to ending a conflict that has cost over 3000 lives, that is something worth spending our time and energy on.

Q: Do you expect the cease-fire to hold?

-- Yes. The people of Northern Ireland have enjoyed a year of peace and life there has become more normal.

-- Their children can walk to school without worrying, army patrols have ended in Belfast, hundreds of British troops have gone home.

-- The people who have endured the conflict do not want to return to life in the shadow of violence and fear.

Q: Have you changed your plans or are you still going to Northern Ireland in the fall?

-- I am looking forward to my trip to the UK and Ireland, including a visit to a peaceful Northern Ireland.

-- I will be bringing a message of support from the American people for the efforts of the brave people there to overcome decades, centuries of hatred and mistrust and build a better future for their children.