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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip-Soderberg Trip, Fall 1995

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: Memorandum of Conversation, Department of Justice, Dublin, Ireland (3 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002. memo	re: Soderberg's October 6 Meeting with Foreign Minister Diek Spring (4 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
003. memo	re: Soderberg's October 6 Meeting with Social Welfare Minister Proinsias de Rossa (2 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
004. memo	re: Soderberg's October 6 Meeting with Fianna Fail Leader Bertie Ahern (3 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005. memo	re: Soderberg's October 6 Meeting with Taoiseach Advisor Sean Donlon (4 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
006. memo	re: Soderberg's October 6 Meeting with Progressive Democrat Leader Mary Harney (2 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
007. letter	Stephen Leach to Kathleen Stephens (2 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: DNSA and Ambassador Lunch with the Ulster Unionist Party (10 pages)	10/10/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
009. cable	re: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Nancy Soderberg's October 6 Meeting with PD Leader Mary Harney (3 pages)	10/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
010. cable	re: Discussion with Senior FCO Official on Reaction to Abacha's October 1 Statement (3 pages)	10/03/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
011. cable	re: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Nancy Soderberg's October 7 Meeting with Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams (6 pages)	10/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip-Soderberg Trip, Fally 1995

2011-0355-F

rs1677

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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012. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Soderberg Meeting with Aneram (5 pages)	10/03/1995	P1/b(1) KEM 6/14/2023

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Schedule
Visit of Ambassador Wm. J. Crowe, Jr., Embassy London
and Nancy Soderberg, National Security Council, Washington, D.C.
October 4-5

Wednesday, October 4

- 9:40 a.m. - Arrive Belfast International Airport on BA 4552. Drive to Ardnally, the official residence
- 11:00 a.m. - Meeting with following members of the Democratic Unionist Party
Peter Robinson, M.P., Deputy Leader
Nigel Dodds, Party Secretary
Ian Paisley, Jr., European Office
- 12:30 p.m. - Lunch with following members of the Ulster Unionist Party
David Trimble, M.P., Party Leader
Josias Cunningham, President
Jeffrey Donaldson, Honorary Secretary
Ken Maginnis, M.P., Spokesman on Defence & Home Office
Jim Wilson, Party Secretary
- 3:00 p.m. - Meeting with John Hume, Leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party
- 4:00 p.m. - Ambassador Crowe departs Ardnally for Belfast International Airport
(BA 4633 departing 1700 hours arriving Heathrow 1810 hours)
- 4:15 p.m. - Meeting with Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein, at Culturlann, 216 Falls Road
- 7:30 for
8:00 p.m. - Dinner with Tom Collins, Editor, Irish News and his wife at their home,
68 Raw Brae Road, Whitehead, County Antrim
- RON Ardnally

Thursday, October 5

- 9:00 a.m. - Meeting with Dr. John Alderdice, Leader of the Alliance Party, at Ardnally
- 10:30 a.m. - Meeting with Billy Hutchinson, Progressive Unionist Party and David Adams, Ulster Democratic Unionist Party at Consulate General
- 12:30 p.m. - Lunch at Ardnally (see separate guest list)
- 3:00 p.m. - Ms. Soderberg and Ms. Stephens depart for Dublin

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: OCTOBER 6, 1995 TIME: 4-5:00 P.M.

LOCATION: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DUBLIN, IRELAND

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

NANCY SODERBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND
RICHARD NORLAND, POLITICAL OFFICER, AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

IRELAND

NORA OWEN, MINISTER OF JUSTICE
TIM DALTON, SECRETARY OF MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
LINDA O'SHEA FARREN, PROGRAM MANAGER, MIN. OF JUSTICE
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE STAFF

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: FOCUS ON
 DECOMMISSIONING AND PRISONER ISSUES

Minister Owen outlined the Justice Department's role in the Anglo-Irish negotiations. Whereas the Garda (police) had previously concentrated on stopping illegal arms and terrorist training, these concerns had eased with the ceasefire. The opening of the border meant significant improvements in people's lives. Nevertheless, the Department still kept an eye on areas of perceived threat; "the arms are still there." She expressed appreciation for the significant U.S. role in lessening the level of violence. U.S. help was now needed to bring the UK and Sinn Fein closer together. Decommissioning should not be a roadblock.

DALTON-CHILCOT GROUP

Department of Justice Secretary Tim Dalton described the activities of the Dalton-Chilcot group, which has focussed on counter-terrorism structures (in the past) and decommissioning issues (more recently -- especially since the ceasefire). Dalton said the previous Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, and John Major had discussed the need to tackle arsenals in October 1994. Modalities had been a problem. But it was never the Irish government position that decommissioning should be a precondition to all-party talks. This would have not only prevented the talks from starting, but would have prevented arms from being turned in as well.

Dalton said that agreement was reached in December 1994 on the general principle of flexibility, on legal arrangements and on third party involvement -- the need for the latter had already been foreseen. When the Prime Minister and Taoiseach met at

Cannes on June 27, 1995, they started discussion of an international commission. The Dalton-Chilcot group began looking at this issue seriously. The group proposed three phases: discussions with the paramilitaries, discussion of how to accomplish the decommissioning, and an implementation phase. Decommissioning had to be a voluntary act by the paramilitaries, it was agreed.

The aim was to report back on modalities by the end of the preparatory phase of political talks, Dalton said. The paramilitaries signalled an interest in decommissioning and began to discuss how this would take place (e.g., would they hand weapons in or turn them over to someone else?). Legal protections were also discussed. Sinn Fein believed the British would be prepared to cover these issues in the preparatory phase, prior to all-party talks, but this did not happen.

The British "body language," Dalton said, was such that the Irish felt a "powerful report" from an international party, conveying (1) a strong commitment to non-violence on the part of the paramilitaries and (2) workable modalities, would "put the British over the Third Washington Condition." But the British were divided on this, even though Chilcot himself was flexible.

DECOMMISSIONING

In Dalton's view, the British were looking for a way to get to all-party talks without a physical handover of weapons. Instead, decommissioning became a major stumbling block when Mayhew -- quite by surprise -- raised it in his speech in Washington. This was attributable to unionist pressure on John Major at the time. "But Major is more secure now," Owen added. Owen said that recent talks with Michael Ancram supported Dalton's view. The British won't let go of the Third Washington Condition, she said, but they would accept something that takes its place. The U.S. could help achieve this. "The issue isn't decommissioning, it's how to get to all-party talks."

Asked by Ms. Soderberg how to get "out of the box," Dalton replied that the British were pulled in two directions. On the one hand, they needed to protect John Major, who had said that arms must be turned over before talks. On the other hand, if the British persisted in their current stance, they risked losing the huge benefits of peace for the sake of the "mere icing on the cake" represented by a physical gesture on arms. Dalton observed that while Sinn Fein leaders are not under threat now, there is a sense that "time is limited." The recent Sinn Fein conference (September 30 in Dublin) showed real disillusionment with the peace process, according to police sources. What is needed is language that will enable an international commission to report positively, that the paramilitaries are ready to address arms and are committed to non-violent methods. The latter is more important than decommissioning itself, since the paramilitaries retain the technology to construct new weapons.

Returning to this theme later in the meeting, Soderberg emphasized the need to bridge the gap between the parties on the arms issue. The UK and Sinn Fein were moving in the right direction. Perhaps a revised joint communique launching the twin-track approach could help. The U.S. would remain engaged in trying to find a process acceptable to both sides. She asked whether any thought had been given to the composition of an international commission, other than Senator Mitchell. Dalton responded that no specific names had come up, though Canada, South Africa and the Scandinavian countries had been mentioned as possible sources of qualified members. Some thought was being given to the need for commission staff to come from countries other than the UK or Ireland. Soderberg agreed strongly.

PRISONERS

Owen noted that 32 PIRA prisoners had been released by Ireland. Several Irish National Liberation Army prisoners were now seeking compassionate parole. Dublin was looking for a way to achieve this in return for prisoner support for the peace process. Dalton indicated a difficult hunger strike -- "that could have threatened the peace process" -- involving these prisoners had recently been resolved with Father Alec Reid's help. He criticized British Home Secretary Michael Howard for the UK stance on treatment of prisoners. Ireland hoped prisoners in the UK would be allowed to finish their terms in Ireland after November 1, when the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons comes into force.

Approximately 12 Irish prisoners are in the U.S., and Ireland hopes they will also be returned, as this could have a positive effect on the British approach. Soderberg indicated this could be a problem, as these prisoners had broken U.S. laws. If anything, the U.S. position on this issue could end up reinforcing the British position. Owen indicated there would be increased political pressure after November 1 to do something for the prisoners, with possible intervention from the Dail. The prisoners were a key issue, as some of them had been instrumental in securing the ceasefire. Perhaps their return could be justified on humanitarian grounds.

PRESIDENT'S VISIT

Owen accepted an invitation to consider issues of interest to the Department of Justice that might be relevant to the President's visit. She noted that Ireland's number one problem is illegal drugs. Heroin is the main problem, and there is a huge growth in use of "ecstasy" tablets. Ireland is clearly seen by some narcotics traffickers as a logical distribution center for West Europe.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
DICK SPRING

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH TANAISTE/FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING OVER BREAKFAST AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. ON THE IRISH SIDE, SPRING WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SEAN O'HUIGINN, SECOND SECRETARY OF DFA AND HEAD OF ITS ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, AS WELL AS COUNSELLOR FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BRENDAN SCANNELL AND AMERICAN DESK OFFICER ORLA O'HANRAHAN. END SUMMARY. ✓

POSITIVE ON TRIMBLE

2. SODERBERG BEGAN BY GIVING A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HER MEETINGS IN LONDON AND BELFAST. SHE NOTED THAT DESPITE HIS HARD-LINE REPUTATION, NEW UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE SEEMED LIKE SOMEBODY WITH WHOM WE COULD DO BUSINESS. IF NOTHING ELSE, TRIMBLE WAS AT LEAST WILLING TO TALK, SOMETHING THAT HIS PREDECESSOR HAD BEEN VERY RELUCTANT TO DO. SHE ALSO NOTED THAT TRIMBLE HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO TAKE ANY PUBLIC POSITIONS THAT MIGHT HAMPER HIS FLEXIBILITY LATER. THAT WAS A GOOD SIGN. STILL, THE UNIONISTS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE READY TO ENGAGE RIGHT AT THE START IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT ARE ENVISIONED UNDER THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN. THEY WOULD NEED MORE TIME. SHE NOTED THAT THE CURRENT UNIONIST LINE IS THAT, UNTIL IRA WEAPONS ARE DECOMMISSIONED, THEY CANNOT SIGN ON TO ANY PROCESS THAT PUTS SINN FEIN ON AN EQUAL STATUS.

3. SPRING AGREED THAT TRIMBLE WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER MOLYNEAUX, WHOM ONE IRISH PARTICIPANT LATER CHARACTERIZED AS A "POLITICAL HERMIT." HE SAID IT WAS A GOOD SIGN THAT TRIMBLE WAS SEEKING ACCESS TO THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON. HE SUPPORTED GIVING TRIMBLE AS MUCH PUBLICITY AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. ON THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN, SPRING SAID THAT NOTHING WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN UNTIL AFTER NEXT WEEK'S TORY PARTY CONFERENCE. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE BRITISH WERE READY TO "MOVE DOWN THIS ROAD." HE SAID THE IRISH ARE WAITING FOR "STRONG INDICATIONS" FROM THE BRITISH THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO SO.

GOING FORWARD WITH AN OPEN-ENDED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

4. SODERBERG SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR FROM HER MEETINGS IN LONDON THAT THE BRITISH ARE NOT READY AT THIS TIME TO FALL OFF THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION (W3), EITHER PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY. SHE SAID IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN REMAINED WEDDED TO ITS POSITION. AS A RESULT, THE BEST WAY FORWARD WAS FOR BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT AN OPEN-ENDED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, IN WHICH THIS ISSUE COULD BE THRASHED OUT. SHE SAID THAT WHILE THE BRITISH

REFUSE TO ABANDON W3 AT THIS TIME, THEY HAVE SOFTENED THEIR LANGUAGE RECENTLY, NOTING THAT W3 IS SIMPLY THEIR "JUDGMENT" ABOUT HOW TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS AND THAT THERE MAY BE OTHER WAYS OF ACHIEVING SUCH CONDITIONS IF "CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE." HOPEFULLY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION'S REPORT WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SUCH A "CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES."

5. SODERBERG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AN OPEN-ENDED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD BE A RISK FOR BOTH SIDES BECAUSE IT WOULD START A PROCESS WHOSE OUTCOME WAS NOT ASSURED. SHE SAID SHE FELT THE BRITISH WERE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN THE COMMISSION ON THIS BASIS, BUT THAT SINN FEIN STILL HAD "A LITTLE WAY TO GO." SODERBERG SAID THAT GERRY ADAMS'S DEMAND THAT THE COMMISSION ADDRESS LEGAL AS WELL AS ILLEGAL ARMS WAS OBVIOUSLY A NON-STARTER. SINN FEIN ALSO HAD TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK "AUTHORITATIVELY" ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING WITH A FAIR AMOUNT OF SPECIFICITY. SINN FEIN DID NOT HAVE TO ACCEPT W3, BUT IT DID HAVE TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY ON THE MODALITIES -- WHAT, WHEN, AND TO WHOM. IT WAS INCUMBENT ON SINN FEIN TO THINK CREATIVELY ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. PERHAPS ONE WAY FORWARD WAS FOR SINN FEIN TO RESPOND TO THE BRITISH PAPER ON DECOMMISSIONING THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION.

GETTING THE BRITS OFF THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION

6. SPRING SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT SINN FEIN HAD SIMPLY "RUN OUT OF THINKING." HE SAID THEY CERTAINLY NEED HELP ON THAT SCORE. HE LAMENTED THAT SINN FEIN/IRA HAD NOT FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO TURN IN A TOKEN AMOUNT OF SEMTEX OR WEAPONS EARLIER IN THE PROCESS, ALLOWING THEM TO TAKE "THE HIGH ROAD." O'HUIGINN SAID THE U.S. WAS IN A GOOD POSITION TO PUT PRESSURE ON BOTH THE BRITISH AND SINN FEIN. HE SAID THAT W3 WAS "TOTALLY UNREALISTIC." HE SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE U.S. "CONDITIONED" THE BRITISH TO START THINKING ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING AS AN "OBJECTIVE" OF NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN A "PRECONDITION." CONTINUING TO HIGHLIGHT THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. HE CLAIMED THAT AS RESULT OF THE CURRENT STALEMATE, MANY SINN FEIN CONSTITUENTS HAD ALREADY LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS; THE ONLY THING HOLDING THINGS TOGETHER WAS CONTINUED CONFIDENCE IN THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP. *JP*

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

7. SODERBERG NOTED THAT IF THERE WAS ANY HOPE OF GETTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION UNDER WAY BY THE END OF NOVEMBER, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD START THINKING NOW ABOUT WHO SHOULD BE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AND WHAT ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE SHOULD BE. SPRING REPLIED THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO APPROACH ANYONE FORMALLY ABOUT SERVING ON THE COMMISSION UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN WOULD AGREE TO

COOPERATE WITH IT. SPRING AND O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE IRISH WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF A THREE-COUNTRY COMMISSION LED BY SENATOR GEORGE MITCHELL. THE OTHER TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE CANADA -- WHICH THE UNIONISTS SEE AS SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR POSITION -- AND SOUTH AFRICA -- WHICH WOULD FIND FAVOR WITH NATIONALISTS. SPRING ALSO MENTIONED FINLAND AS A POSSIBLE COMMISSION MEMBER. SODERBERG NOTED THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, THE ~~BRITISH~~ UNFORTUNATELY SEE THE U.S. AS BEING ON THE "NATIONALIST SIDE" OF THE EQUATION.

FINANCING THE COMMISSION

8. SODERBERG RAISED THE ISSUE OF FINANCING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. SPRING INDICATED THAT THIS WAS NOT A BIG PROBLEM. QUOTING MARGARET THATCHER, SPRING SAID IF THE PROBLEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND WAS SIMPLY ONE OF MONEY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SOLVED LONG AGO. COMPARED TO THE AMOUNT OF MONEY POURED INTO NORTHERN IRELAND OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS, THE COST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD BE MINUSCULE.

PRISONERS

9. SPRING SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE BRITISH MOVED ON THE PRISONER ISSUE. HE SAID IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE UK HAD NOT MADE ONE GESTURE IN THIS REGARD SINCE LAST YEAR'S CEASEFIRE. HE DISMISSED MAYHEW'S AUGUST SPEECH, AND ITS PROMISE OF INCREASING THE PRISON REMISSION RATE, AS "A BIT OF A WAFFLE." HE COMPLAINED THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR REPUBLICAN PRISONERS IN BRITISH JAILS WERE WORSE THAN EVER. HE CITED THE CASE OF PATRICK KELLY AS AN EGREGIOUS EXAMPLE OF POOR TREATMENT. O'HUIGINN PUT THE BLAME SQUARELY ON UK HOME SECRETARY MICHAEL HOWARD, WHO WANTED TO SHOW THAT HIS "TORY RED BLOOD CELL COUNT WAS VERY HIGH." WHILE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF HOWARD, BOTH O'HUIGINN AND SPRING INDICATED THAT THEY THOUGHT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRISONER ISSUE. UNFORTUNATELY, HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO OVER-RULE HOWARD.

10. NOTING THAT THE CONVENTION ON THE TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PERSONS COMES INTO EFFECT FOR IRELAND ON NOVEMBER 1, O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE UK SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER TO NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE REPUBLIC ALL THE REPUBLICAN PRISONERS CURRENTLY SERVING IN BRITISH JAILS. O'HUIGINN PUT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPUBLICAN PRISONERS IN BRITAIN AT 27. HE SAID THAT JAILS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARE IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO DEAL WITH REPUBLICAN PRISONERS THAN ONES IN MAINLAND BRITAIN BECAUSE THEY UNDERSTAND THE REPUBLICAN "THEOLOGY" AND HAVE MUCH GREATER EXPERIENCE. IN ORDER TO FORCE THE BRITS TO MOVE, O'HUIGINN SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. TELL THE UK THAT IT EXPECTS THE TRANSFER ISSUE TO BE SOLVED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BRITS WOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT HOW THE IRISH WOULD RESPECT SENTENCE TERMS FOR CERTAIN EGREGIOUS OFFENDERS, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT A "MIDDLE GROUND."

*Unionist
and would. plus want
a Canadian to handle*

*Said I guess we'd pay. Perhaps
some St Dept stuff for Mitchell, they could
perhaps reimburse*

POINTS ON PRESIDENT'S TRIP

11. SODERBERG REVIEWED THE TENTATIVE PLANS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP AND THEN SOLICITED IDEAS. SOME OF THE MAJOR POINTS MADE BY SPRING AND OTHERS:

-- SPRING SAID THE U.S. SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE SECURITY FOR THE PRESIDENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS "DISCREET." IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IMAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO BE SEEN BEHIND "AN RUC RING OF STEEL."

-- SPRING DID NOT THINK IT WAS "ALL THAT IMPORTANT" FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STAY OVERNIGHT IN BELFAST. HE SAID THE DECISION ON OVERNIGHTING SHOULD BE BASED ON LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

-- BOTH SPRING AND O'HUIGINN PICKED UP ON SODERBERG'S COMMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT PLAN TO DELIVER A "MAJOR POLICY ADDRESS" IN DUBLIN AS HE WAS PLANNING TO DO IN LONDON AND BELFAST. O'HUIGINN SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE PARLIAMENT TO BE "SUBSTANTIVE."

-- THE STATE DINNER AT DUBLIN CASTLE WILL ACCOMMODATE, AT MOST, ABOUT 240 GUESTS TOTAL -- HALF OF WHICH WILL BE IRISH. GIVEN THE LARGE SIZE OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, THE IRISH SUGGESTED A PRE-DINNER RECEPTION THAT EVERYBODY WOULD ATTEND. (LATER, IN A SEPARATE MEETING, TAOISEACH ADVISOR SEAN DONLON SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE A POST-DINNER ENTERTAINMENT EVENT TO WHICH EVERYONE WOULD BE INVITED.)

-- SPRING SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET TOM WATSON TO PLAY GOLF WITH THE PRESIDENT AT BALLYBUNION, IF THE PRESIDENT WAS SO INCLINED. HE CLAIMED THAT BALLYBUNION WAS WATSON'S FAVORITE COURSE.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH SOCIAL WELFARE
MINISTER PROINSIAS DE ROSSA

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH SOCIAL WELFARE MINISTER PROINSIAS DE ROSSA AT HIS OFFICE TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. ON THE IRISH SIDE, DE ROSSA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS PROGRAM MANAGER PATRICK NOLAN. END SUMMARY.

BRIEFING ON LONDON AND BELFAST MEETINGS

2. SODERBERG BEGAN BY GIVING A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HER MEETINGS IN BELFAST AND LONDON. SHE SAID THAT THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS STILL SEEMED TO BE THE MOST PROMISING WAY FORWARD. ONCE THAT IS UP AND RUNNING, THE NEXT CHALLENGE WILL BE BRINGING THE UNIONISTS ONBOARD. THE UUP PROBABLY WON'T PARTICIPATE RIGHT AWAY IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT ARE ENVISIONED UNDER THE TWIN-TRACK PROPOSAL. TRIMBLE FEELS THAT, AT THIS POINT ANYWAY, HE CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY PROCESS THAT GIVES SINN FEIN EQUAL STATUS UNLESS IRA WEAPONS ARE FIRST DECOMMISSIONED.

CEASEFIRE IS SECURE

3. DE ROSSA SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE IRA CEASEFIRE REMAINED QUITE SECURE. HE SAID MOST REPUBLICANS AND NATIONALISTS ARE "EXREMELY ANXIOUS" THAT THE IRA NOT RETURN TO VIOLENCE. HE SAID THE OVERWHELMING VIEW IS THAT THE PEACE IS "THE BEST THING" THEY HAVE GOING FOR THEM. THEY FOUGHT "A WAR" FOR 25 YEARS AND GOT NOTHING; SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, THEY ARE BEING TREATED AS ALMOST EQUALS BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT; THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS IS THE "ONLY GAME IN TOWN." WHILE NOT RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME SMALL, MAVERICK ELEMENT COULD GO BACK TO VIOLENCE AT SOME POINT, DE ROSSA SAID THE CHANCES WERE PRACTICALLY "NIL" THAT THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD GO THAT WAY.

NEED FOR A "BALANCED ACCOMMODATION"

4. ASKED WHAT THE PRESIDENT COULD DO DURING HIS VISIT TO FACILITATE THE PEACE PROCESS, DE ROSSA SAID THAT HE SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR A "BALANCED ACCOMMODATION." HE SAID THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ALSO IMPORE PEOPLE BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH TO PUT ASIDE THE "GREIVANCE POLITICS OF THE PAST" AND LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE. DE ROSSA NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS A GREAT DEAL OF LEVERAGE WITH THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, WHICH COULD BE VERY USEFULLY EMPLOYED TO BRING REPUBLICANS ALONG IN THE PROCESS.

PREDICTING AN EASY "YES" FOR DIVORCE

5. DE ROSSA PREDICTED THAT THE NOVEMBER 24 REFERENDUM TO REMOVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON DIVORCE WOULD WIN EASILY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE "YES" VOTE WOULD BE CLOSE TO 60 PERCENT. HE SAID HIS CONFIDENCE WAS PARTLY BASED ON A RECENT POLL THAT SHOWED 2-TO-1 SUPPORT FOR DIVORCE, WITH ONLY NINE PERCENT OF THOSE SURVEYED INDICATING THAT THEY MIGHT CHANGE THEIR MIND BEFORE REFERENDUM DAY. NOLAN POINTED OUT THAT RECENT TROUBLES WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HAD UNDERMINED MUCH OF ITS MORAL AUTHORITY AND REDUCED ITS EXPECTED INFLUENCE ON THE REFERENDUM. HE SAID MUCH HAD CHANGED IN IRISH SOCIETY SINCE 1986, WHEN A SIMILAR DIVORCE REFERENDUM WAS OVERWHELMINGLY DEFEATED. FOR ONE, A WHOLE STRUCTURE OF FAMILY LAW WAS NOW IN PLACE TO ADDRESS COMMON CONCERNS ABOUT DIVORCE. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE HAD BEEN A REVOLUTION IN THE ROLE OF FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN IRELAND. FOR EXAMPLE, IRELAND NOW HAD A LOWER BIRTH RATE THAN SWEDEN, AND 20 PERCENT OF ALL IRISH BIRTHS WERE OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE.

FOCUS ON UNEMPLOYMENT

6. ASKED WHAT ISSUES PRESIDENT MIGHT RAISE WHILE HE IS IN IRELAND, DE ROSSA FOCUSED ON THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT. HE NOTED THAT DESPITE SEVERAL YEARS OF HEALTHY ECONOMIC GROWTH, IRELAND STILL HAD VERY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT. EVEN MORE WORRISOME, THE LEVEL OF LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT CONTINUED TO RISE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT STOP BY A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT TO SEE HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM. SODERBERG NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S TIGHT SCHEDULE WOULD PROBABLY PRECLUDE SUCH A VISIT, BUT HELD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FIRST LADY MIGHT INCLUDE THAT IN HER PROGRAM.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH FIANNA FAIL LEADER
BERTIE AHERN

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH FIANNA FAIL LEADER BERTIE AHERN ON THE MARGINS OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AT DUBLIN CASTLE. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. AHERN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MARTIN MANSERGH, HIS SPECIAL ADVISOR ON NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH TRIMBLE

2. AHERN NOTED THAT HIS RECENT MEETING IN DUBLIN WITH UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE HAD BEEN "SURPRISINGLY FRIENDLY." ALTHOUGH TRIMBLE HAD TAKEN TOUGH STANDS ON MANY ISSUES, THE FACT THAT HE WAS EVEN WILLING TO COME TO DUBLIN TO TALK TO FIANNA FAIL, THE "GREENEST PARTY" IN THE REPUBLIC, WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. HE SAID TRIMBLE "TOOK PAINS" TO MAKE A FEW POINTS, ONE OF WHICH WAS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULDN'T TELL HIM WHAT TO DO. TRIMBLE SEES A NEW LABOR GOVERNMENT COMING TO POWER WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR, SO HE HAS DECIDED HE WILL NOT LET PRIME MINISTER MAJOR DICTATE TO HIM. FOR HIS PART, AHERN SAID HE IS NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE TORY GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE HAD "FAR MORE FAITH" IN JOHN MAJOR'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS THAN TONY BLAIR'S.

3. AHERN SAID TRIMBLE WAS PERSONABLE DURING THE ENTIRE ONE-HOUR MEETING, EXCEPT WHEN HE WAS ASKED HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. AHERN SAID TRIMBLE WENT "A LITTLE GAH-GAH" AT THAT POINT. AT THE OTHER EXTREME, AHERN SAID TRIMBLE SOUNDED LIKE HE HAD COMPLETELY ADOPTED THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND MADE IT HIS OWN.

ELECTED ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL

4. AHERN SAID JOHN HUME WAS WORRIED THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SEEM DISPOSED TO TAKING UP TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. HUME, OF COURSE, HAS MANY MISGIVINGS WITH THE PROPOSAL AND COULD NOT SUPPORT IT. AHERN NOTED THAT TRIMBLE HAD NOT PUSHED THE IDEA TOO HARD IN THEIR RECENT TALKS.

TWIN-TRACK APPROACH

5. AHERN AGREED THAT THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH WAS THE BEST WAY FORWARD AT THE MOMENT ("THERE'S NOTHING ELSE"). HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT TRIMBLE HAD BLUNTLY REJECTED FIANNA FAIL'S PROPOSED TIME SCHEDULE OF BEGINNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, WITH A VIEW TOWARD BEGINNING ALL-

PARTY TALKS TWO WEEKS AFTER THE VISIT. NONETHELESS, AHERN SAID HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT DECOMMISSIONING WOULD "GET LESS IMPORTANT" AS TIME WENT ON, AND THAT TRIMBLE WOULD MOVE INEXORABLY TOWARD TALKS.

THE BRITISH/HUME NON-PAPER

6. MANSERGH SAID HE WENT THROUGH THE BRITISH NON-PAPER ON ESTABLISHING THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS WITH SINN FEIN "LINE BY LINE." HE SAID SINN FEIN WAS READY TO COMPROMISE. ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE DOCUMENT, MANSERGH SAID IT WAS "WEAK" IN SOME AREAS. HE PARTICULARLY MENTIONED THE LAST PARAGRAPH, WHICH HE SAID SHOULD INCLUDE STRONGER LANGUAGE ON DEMILITARIZATION (I.E., REMOVING WATCH TOWERS, ETC.).

FRUSTRATION OF WORKING WITH SINN FEIN

7. ECHOING IRISH GOVERNMENT COMPLAINTS, MANSERGH SAID IT WAS SOMETIMES VERY FRUSTRATING WORKING WITH SINN FEIN BECAUSE THEY OPERATE IN A "VERY SLOW AND BUREAUCRATIC FASHION." THERE IS CLEARLY A "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP" THAT MUST VET ALL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS. ADAMS CLEARLY FEELS THE NEED TO "CLEAR HIS BACK" BEFORE COMMITTING HIMSELF TO ANYTHING. IN THAT RESPECT, SINN FEIN STILL OPERATES LIKE AN UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION.

VIABILITY OF THE CEASEFIRE

8. AHERN SAID HE THOUGHT ADAMS WOULD NOT HAVE ANY TROUBLE SUSTAINING THE IRA CEASEFIRE THROUGH PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT. BUT IF THINGS DRIFTED PAST CHRISTMAS AND INTO FEBRUARY WITHOUT MORE MOVEMENT, HE COULD START COMING UNDER PRESSURE. AHERN SAID THE KEY THING WAS GETTING A TARGET DATE SET FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. WHILE ADAMS WAS PUSHING FOR TALKS TO START BY YEAR'S END, THAT WAS LESS IMPORTANT THAN GETTING A DATE SET, EVEN IF THAT DATE EXTENDED INTO NEXT YEAR.

GOING FORWARD WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS

9. AHERN AND MANSERGH SAID THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO CONTEMPLATE ALL-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT TRIMBLE AT THE TABLE. MANSERGH RECALLED THAT THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES HAVE MADE THREATS ABOUT RETURNING TO VIOLENCE IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN.

PRESIDENT'S VISIT

10. AHERN SUGGESTED THAT ONE OBVIOUS THEME FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IS THE FAMINE. THIS YEAR MARKS THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE START OF THE FAMINE, WHICH BROUGHT TWO MILLION IRISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS THE BASIS FOR THE

STRONG IRISH-AMERICAN CONNECTION THAT EXISTS TODAY. IT IS ONLY
NATURAL THAT THE PRESIDENT ADDRESS THE FAMINE IN SOME SIGNIFICANT
WAY DURING HIS VISIT.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH TAOISEACH ADVISOR
SEAN DONLON

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH TAOISEACH ADVISOR SEAN DONLON OVER LUNCH IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. ON THE IRISH SIDE, DONLON WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL DERMOT GLEESON AND MINISTER OF STATE AUSTIN CURRIE. END SUMMARY.

DONLON BRIEFING

2. DONLON BEGAN BY BRIEFING SODERBERG ON THREE NORTHERN IRELAND CONTACTS THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD HAD OVER THE PAST WEEK: (1) A 2-1/2-HOUR MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS ON SEPTEMBER 29, (2) A MEETING WITH UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE IN DUBLIN ON OCTOBER 2, AND (3) A COUPLE OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR.

SINN FEIN SEEN AS MOVING

3. WITH REGARD TO SINN FEIN, DONLON SAID THAT THE IRISH DETECTED "SOME MOVEMENT" IN THE PAST WEEK. HE CLAIMED THAT SINN FEIN WAS "MORE POSITIVE" ON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH THAN IT HAD BEEN. AS BEFORE, SINN FEIN WAS INSISTING THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION BE A "POLITICAL BODY." THAT BEING THE CASE, IT WOULD BE SINN FEIN -- NOT THE IRA -- THAT WOULD INTERACT WITH THE COMMISSION. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER SINN FEIN WOULD "SPEAK FOR" THE IRA. HE SAID THE FOCUS OF EFFORTS WAS ON THE BRITISH NON-PAPER THAT HAD BEEN PASSED THROUGH JOHN HUME.

"DEPRESSING" MEETING WITH TRIMBLE

4. DONLON SAID HE FOUND THE TAOISEACH'S MEETING WITH TRIMBLE TO BE "DEPRESSING" BECAUSE IT CONFIRMED HIS WORST FEARS ABOUT TRIMBLE'S HARD-LINE STANCE. DONLON NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TRIMBLE HAD BEEN VERY "CLEVER" TO GIVE HIMSELF FLEXIBILITY TO CHANGE HIS POSITION LATER.

MIXED REVIEW ON BRITISH STANCE

5. DONLON SAID THE LATEST EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH POSITION HAD POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS. ON THE PLUS SIDE, THE BRITISH REMAINED COMMITTED TO WORKING ON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. ON THE MINUS SIDE, MAJOR SEEMED TO BE "LATCHING" ONTO TRIMBLE'S IDEA OF AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY, WHICH THE IRISH SAW AS A NON-STARTER. SODERBERG SAID SHE GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM HER MEETINGS IN LONDON THAT THE BRITISH, IN FACT, WERE NOT THAT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE

PROPOSAL, BUT WANTED TO BE SEEN GIVING IT FULL AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

U.S. RECOMMENDING AN OPEN-ENDED COMMISSION

6. DONLON SAID PRIME MINISTER MAJOR HAD BEEN "VERY UPSET" WITH STORIES COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON THIS PAST WEEK ABOUT FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. SODERBERG SAID SHE HAD ASSURED LONDON THAT THE U.S. HAD, IN FACT, NOT AGREED TO PURSUE A COMMISSION THAT WOULD LOOK ONLY AT WASHINGTON CONDITIONS ONE AND TWO. THE U.S., INSTEAD, FAVORED AN OPEN-ENDED COMMISSION THAT WOULD LET BOTH SIDES MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS. SODERBERG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS "A RISK FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED" BECAUSE IT MEANT PARTICIPATING IN A PROCESS "WHOSE OUTCOME IS NOT ASSURED." NONETHELESS, IT SEEMED LIKE THE BEST WAY FORWARD.

PROSPECTIVE COMMISSION MEMBERS

7. DONLON SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, THE BRITISH HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO SEE SENATOR MITCHELL "ALONE." THEY ARE STILL LOOKING TO STAFF THE COMMISSION WITH SOME "MILITARY TECHNICIANS." DONLON SAID THAT WHEN THE TAOISEACH WAS ON HIS STATE VISIT TO CANADA LAST WEEK, HE HAD ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A LIST OF CANADIANS WHO MIGHT BE SUITABLE TO SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. DONLON NOTED THAT THE UNIONISTS ARE PRE-DISPOSED TO HAVING A CANADIAN ON THE COMMISSION, BELIEVING THAT HE OR SHE WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE UNIONIST VIEWPOINT. DONLON SAID THAT ONE HIGHLY TOUTED CANADIAN CANDIDATE (MACKENZIE-SP?) WAS PROBABLY OUT BECAUSE HE "TAKEN THE GREEN SHILLING" IN WORKING PREVIOUSLY FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON CONTRACT. SODERBERG STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF BEGINNING TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT WHO SHOULD SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. OTHERWISE, THERE WAS LITTLE HOPE OF GETTING IT UNDER WAY BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER.

AFTER TWIN-TRACK IN PLACE -- THEN WHAT?

8. THE CONVERSATION THEN SHIFTED TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ONCE THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN WAS IN PLACE AND OPERATING. HOW WOULD THE GOVERNMENTS GET THE UNIONISTS ONBOARD? THE IRISH THOUGHT TRIMBLE'S UPCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S. (OCT 28-30) WAS ONE WAY TO DO THIS. THEY ENCOURAGED THE U.S. TO GIVE TRIMBLE AS MUCH PROMINENCE AS POSSIBLE. GLEESON ARGUED THAT THE KEY WAS GIVING TRIMBLE "OWNERSHIP" OF THE PROCESS. UNIONIST VIEWS MUST BE SEEN TO COUNT. DONLON ARGUED THAT IN THIS RESPECT, THE GOVERNMENTS HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT SETTING A DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. IF A DATE WAS SET THAT TRIMBLE "DOES NOT HAVE OWNERSHIP OF," HE SIMPLY WON'T COME. DONLON CLAIMED THAT TRIMBLE WANTS TO HOLD UP ANY PROGRESS ON TALKS UNTIL AFTER PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THE VISIT "TILTS THE BALANCE" AGAINST HIM.

THE BRITISH/HUME NON-PAPER

9. DONLON ASKED SODERBERG WHAT SHE UNDERSTOOD THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH NON-PAPER TO BE. SHE RESPONDED THAT ADAMS OWED MAJOR AND HUME A RESPONSE. WHILE ADAMS "WOULD LOVE TO DRAW US IN," THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT ADAMS HAD TO WORK OUT WITH HUME AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY. DONLON REPORTED THAT THE IRISH HAD FOUND IT "VERY DIFFICULT" TO ENGAGE ADAMS ON THE DOCUMENT. NONETHELESS, THEY HAD GONE THROUGH IT WITH HIM PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN HUME SOME SUGGESTED "AMENDMENTS," BUT THOUGHT IT WAS GENERALLY A GOOD BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

NO LEVERAGE WITH SINN FEIN

10. DONLON CLAIMED THAT THE IRISH HAD NO LEVERAGE WITH SINN FEIN BECAUSE ALBERT REYNOLDS HAD ALREADY "SOLD THE STORE." THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WAS SIMPLY IN THE POSITION OF DELIVERING THINGS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN PROMISED. DONLON SAID HE FELT LIKE HE HAD MORE LEVERAGE WITH THE UK THAN WITH SINN FEIN.

PRISONERS

11. DONLON EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRISONER ISSUE WAS THREATENING TO BECOME MUCH MORE SERIOUS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. WITH HOME SECRETARY MICHAEL HOWARD HOLDING THE REINS, THE BRITISH WERE STEADFASTLY REFUSING TO MOVE. MAJOR HAD A MUCH MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE ON THIS ISSUE, BUT EVEN AS PRIME MINISTER, HE WAS NOT IN A STRONG POSITION TO GET HOWARD TO MOVE. DONLON SAID THAT WHILE MAJOR'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS WAS UNDOUBTED, THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT THE CASE WITH MICHAEL HOWARD -- OR WITH SIR PATRICK MAYHEW FOR THAT MATTER.

TIMELINE

12. DONLON, GLEESON AND CURRIE QUESTIONED SODERBERG CLOSELY ABOUT WHAT TIMELINE SHE ENVISIONED FOR THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN AND ALL-PARTY TALKS. GIVING THE OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO, SODERBERG SAID SHE THOUGHT THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN COULD BE APPROVED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WITHIN TWO WEEKS OF THE END OF THE TORY PARTY CONFERENCE, AND THAT THE COMMISSION COULD BE UP AND OPERATING THREE WEEKS AFTER THAT. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN WOULD ^{be} IN PLACE BY MID- TO LATE-NOVEMBER, BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. FOR THIS TO COME TO FRUITION, HOWEVER, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAD TO GET MOVING ON FINALIZING PLANS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION.

BALL IN SINN FEIN'S COURT

13. SODERBERG SAID SHE THOUGHT THE "KEY MOVEMENT" REQUIRED FOR GETTING THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN OFF THE GROUND WAS FOR SINN FEIN TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS READY TO SPEAK "AUTHORITATIVELY" FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND THAT IT WOULD DO SO WITH A "FAIR AMOUNT OF SPECIFICITY." SHE SAID THAT SINN FEIN HAD TO FOCUS LESS ON THE "WHEN" OF DECOMMISSIONING (IN OTHER WORDS, STOP BEING PREOCCUPIED WITH BRITISH DEMANDS FOR THE PROCESS TO START BEFORE ALL-PARTY TALKS) AND LOOK MORE CLOSELY AT THE "HOW." IN ORDER FOR THE COMMISSION TO WORK, SODERBERG SAID THERE HAD TO BE A "SERIOUS DISCUSSION." SINN FEIN, SHE SAID, IS "NOT THERE YET."

SUGGESTIONS FOR PRESIDENT'S TRIP

14. DONLON SAID IT WOULD BE "VERY HELPFUL" IF THE PRESIDENT MADE A "SERIOUS POLICY STATEMENT" WHILE HE IS IN THE REPUBLIC. SODERBERG SAID ~~THIS~~ WAS PROBABLY UNLIKELY AS HE WAS ALREADY SCHEDULED TO DELIVER MAJOR ADDRESSES IN LONDON (ON EUROPEAN SECURITY) AND BELFAST (ON PEACE/INVESTMENT). IT WOULD BE ~~"TOO HARD"~~ *too difficult* FOR THE PRESIDENT TO GIVE THREE MAJOR SPEECHES IN THREE CONSECUTIVE DAYS. DONLON ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT, IN HIS SPEECH AT WESTMINSTER, TALK ABOUT IRELAND AND THE PEACE PROCESS. HE ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD HIGHLIGHT AN ISSUE WHICH IS VERY MARGINALIZED IN BRITISH POLITICS AND SOCIETY. FINALLY, DONLON PROPOSED THAT THE PRESIDENT STOP AT SOME AMERICAN INVESTMENT SITE WHILE HE IS IN THE COUNTRY. DONLON SAID THAT A SIMPLE 10-MINUTE DROP-BY WOULD GENERATE GOOD PUBLICITY FOR IRELAND AND COULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER INWARD INVESTMENT FROM THE U.S.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT
LEADER MARY HARNEY

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT LEADER MARY HARNEY ON THE MARGINS OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AT DUBLIN CASTLE. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. HARNEY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DES O'MALLEY, THE PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATIC SPOKESMAN ON NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

ISSUES FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT -----

2. AFTER BRIEFLY DISCUSSING EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THE PRESIDENT'S IRISH LINEAGE, SODERBERG ASKED HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WHAT THEMES WOULD RESONATE HERE IN THE REPUBLIC DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HARNEY MENTIONED THE ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY UNEMPLOYMENT. O'MALLEY STRESSED THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION AS WELL, NOTING THAT IRELAND TAKES OVER THE EU PRESIDENCY DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1996, WHEN THE EU IS EXPECTED TO BE DEEP INTO ITS MAASTRICHT REVIEW CONFERENCE. AS THE EU STRENGTHENS ITS COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, IRELAND WILL COME UNDER PRESSURE TO MOVE AWAY FROM ITS STRICT ADHERENCE TO NEUTRALITY, WHICH COULD PROVE QUITE CONTROVERSIAL.

PRAISE FOR U.S. ROLE -----

3. O'MALLEY PRAISED THE PRESIDENT FOR TAKING SUCH AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED THUS FAR.

TRIMBLE -----

4. BOTH HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WERE VERY COMPLIMENTARY OF NEW UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE. HARNEY SAID HE WAS A CHARISMATIC LEADER WHO COULD CARRY UNIONISTS, AND WAS SOMEBODY WITH WHOM OUTSIDERS COULD DO BUSINESS. O'MALLEY THOUGHT IT WAS VERY POSITIVE THAT TRIMBLE WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE PARTIES FROM THE SOUTH IN DIALOGUE. THAT WAS A BIG CHANGE FROM HIS PREDECESSOR, WHO HAD BEEN A "POLITICAL HERMIT." IT WAS ALSO GOOD THAT TRIMBLE WAS GOING TO THE U.S., WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN VIEWED AS A "NATIONALIST ALLY." THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. TO DISPEL NOTIONS THAT IT IS A PART OF THE "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT."

ALL-PARTY TALKS COULD TAKE YEARS -----

5. HARNEY SAID THAT EVEN IF ALL-PARTY TALKS CAN BE STARTED SOON, A LASTING PEACE AGREEMENT IS PROBABLY YEARS AWAY. IT WOULD BE

VERY DIFFICULT TO "SQUARE THE CIRCLE," GIVEN THAT NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST VIEWPOINTS AND ASPIRATIONS WERE SO DIFFERENT. SHE THOUGHT IT COULD TAKE 3 TO 5 YEARS TO COMPLETE TALKS.

ELECTED ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL

6. O'MALLEY SAID HE HAD MIXED VIEWS ON TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. ON ONE HAND, IT WAS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE WHY PEOPLE WANTED TO HAVE AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. BUT WITHOUT EXECUTIVE POWERS, THE PROPOSED 85-MEMBER ASSEMBLY WAS UNLIKELY TO AMOUNT TO VERY MUCH. EACH REPRESENTATIVE WOULD, OF COURSE, WANT TO HAVE HIS OR HER SAY ON ANY PARTICULAR ISSUE, MAKING THE BODY EXTREMELY UNWIELDY AS A NEGOTIATING FORUM. O'MALLEY SAID THE IDEA OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS TO GIVE PEOPLE ELECTORAL "MANDATES," BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY PROVE TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, THE CANDIDATES FROM EACH TRADITION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FORCED INTO ADOPTING EXTREME POSITIONS IN ORDER TO WIN VOTES. THAT WOULD NOT AUGUR WELL FOR A COOPERATIVE, POST-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE. HARNEY SAID THAT NO MATTER HOW IT WAS "DRESSED UP," THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE SEEN AS "OLD STORMONT."

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Laser2:

ACTION: POLUNC4

INFO: CONSUNCL USISUNCL SULOUNCL DCMUNCL COPYUN12
GEPUNCL AMBUNCL ODCUNCL EMINUNCL

lpnet01:

INFO: DAO

pctwi01:

INFO: RSO

lpnet02:

INFO: FIN

DISSEMINATION: POL

CHARGE: STA

VZCZCTVO896LOO093

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FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8632

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8095

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5858

RUEHED/AMCONSUL EDINBURGH 3209

BT

UNCLAS BELFAST 0409

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE TO MEET OCTOBER 17;

SINN FEIN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN REITERATES

HIS PARTY'S POSITION

1. A MEETING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE WILL TAKE

PLACE IN BELFAST ON OCTOBER 17. IT WILL BE ATTENDED BY SECRETARY OF STATE PATRICK MAYHEW AND IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, AND WILL BE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY THE TWO MEN HAVE HAD TO DISCUSS THE IMPASSE IN THE PEACE PROCESS SINCE THE CANCELLED SUMMIT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND IRISH PRIME-MINISTERS IN SEPTEMBER. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THE MEETING WILL INCLUDE DISCUSSION ON THE "TWIN-TRACK" APPROACH DESCRIBED BY MAYHEW AT HIS PARTY CONFERENCE LAST WEEK, IN WHICH HE FORESAW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO OVERSEE THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS AND THE SETTING-UP OF "PRELIMINARY" TALKS TO WHICH ALL PARTIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE, TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. A REPORT IN THE NATIONALIST "IRISH NEWS" OF OCTOBER 17 DOUBTS THAT THE MEETING WILL HERALD AN

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"EARLY BREAKTHROUGH" AND SUGGESTS THAT "MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE BEHIND THE SCENES, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF BUILDING COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE SITUATION AS REPRESENTED BY SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT."

2. SPEAKING AT THE OPENING OF NEW OFFICES FOR THE REPUBLICAN NEWSPAPER, "AN PHOBLAHT", (A CEREMONY WHICH WAS PERFORMED BY THE US PRESIDENT OF THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN", LARRY DOWNES), THE PARTY'S NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN SAID THE PARTY WOULD "SERIOUSLY CONSIDER" ANY POSITIVE SUGGESTION FOR ENDING THE IMPASSE. BUT HE WARNED THAT ANY SUGGESTION WHICH STILL REPRESENTED A MECHANISM FOR THE SURRENDER OF IRA ARMS WOULD BE "A WASTE OF TIME." MCLAUGHLIN DESCRIBED THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE AS "A SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVEN A NECESSARY CONFIDENCE ACROSS THE SPECTRUM." HOWEVER, HE INSISTED, SINN FEIN WANTED THE PEACE PROCESS TO SUCCEED AND HE RENEWED HIS CALL FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF ALL-PARTY TALKS.

STEPHENS

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Laser2:

INFO: AVISUNCL GSOUNCL DCMUNCL CONSUNCL POLUNCL
USISUNCL USSSUNCL COPYUN10 EMINUNCL FMCUNCL
AMBUNCL

lpnet01:

INFO: DAO

pctwi01:

INFO: IMO RSO

lpnet03:

ACTION: AMC

DISSEMINATION: PRZU

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R 171421Z OCT 95

FM AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8633

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8096

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5859

RUEHED/AMCONSUL EDINBURGH 3210

BT

UNCLAS BELFAST 0410

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, BILL), PREL, PGOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST DEPUTY LEADER

CRITICIZES CLINTON VISIT AND U.S. PRESSURE BUT

SUGGESTS PAISLEY READY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT

REF: BELFAST 0403

1. IN A CONTINUATION OF PUBLIC HARDLINE STATEMENTS BY UNIONISTS REGARDING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, THE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY, PETER ROBINSON HAS DESCRIBED THE FORTHCOMING CLINTON VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND AS POTENTIALLY A "NORAID TOUR" ACCUSING THE PRESIDENT OF PLANNING TO VISIT "EVERY NATIONALIST AREA HE CAN FIND." ROBINSON CLAIMED, "CLINTON IS GOING TO FOLLOW ST. PATRICK WITH EDDIE MCGRADY IN SOUTH DOWN, TOUR WEST BELFAST WITH JOE HENDRON AND THEN HAVE A FROLIC ON THE FOYLE WITH JOHN HUME." THE DUP DEPUTY LEADER ALSO TOOK ISSUE WITH COMMENTS MADE BY THE NSC'S NANCY SODERBERG THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN EVEN-HANDED IN ITS APPROACH TO NORTHERN IRELAND, WHEN ROBINSON INSISTED, THE MAN "WITH MORE VOTES THAN ANYONE ELSE

UNCLAS

BELFAST 00410

UNCLAS

BELFAST 00410

HERE, DR. PAISLEY, IS CONSISTENTLY SIDELINED." HOWEVER, ROBINSON SUGGESTED THAT HIS PARTY LEADER MAY MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS VISIT, IF IT COULD BE ORGANIZED "SO AS NOT TO BE INTERPRETED" AS PART OF AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SINN FEIN. ROBINSON ALSO FORECAST THAT HMG WOULD BOW TO PRESSURE FROM THE "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT AND THE WHITE HOUSE" OVER THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. BUT HE INSISTED, THE DUP WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN SUCH TALKS. "IT WOULD BE LUDICROUS TO SUGGEST THE DUP WILL SIT DOWN WITH SINN FEIN WITHOUT ANY GUNS BEING HANDED OVER," HE SAID.

STEPHENS

BT

#0410

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INFO: AVISUNCL GSOUNCL DCMUNCL CONSUNCL POLUNCL
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lpnet03:

ACTION: AMC

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BELFAST 00410

We are now beginning the all party talks process which will lead to round table talks involving all parties by (early November) (fixed November date).

To mark the beginning of this phase both governments will call a two day Convention of all parties to be held on (fixed date) to agree the agenda for all party talks. Parallel to this process both Governments have asked Senator George Mitchell to act as an international arbiter to ensure that the question of all arms now thankfully silent is settled [to the satisfaction of all sides].

[It would be clearly understood that any final agreement would have to contain such satisfaction.] [It is clearly understood that this is essential to any final agreement.]

Facsimile Cover Sheet

To: Richard Norland
Company: Embassy, Dublin
Phone:
Fax: 00 353 1 667 0056

From: Kathleen Stephens
Company: Consulate General, Belfast
Phone: 01232 328239
Fax: 01232 239016

Date: 10/06/95
Pages including this cover page: Seven

Comments:

As discussed. Please treat as sensitive - close hold.

FOR NANCY
SODERBERG.

Copy of a
paper which
Michael Antram
agreed to give
you. RV

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. letter	Stephen Leach to Kathleen Stephens (2 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip-Soderberg Trip, Fally 1995

2011-0355-F
rs1677

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

HANDED TO SINN FEIN AT 6TH MEETING OF XD ON 10 MAY

MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING ARMS: PAPER BY THE GOVERNMENT SIDE

1. During an initial exchange with Sinn Fein on 7 February on arms decommissioning, the Government side read out a paper listing some of the practical issues on which, in its view, it would be valuable to reach an understanding through future exchanges. These included possible methods of decommissioning; verification/ validation arrangements; practical considerations; legal issues; and possible phasing. The paper stressed the need for early progress on decommissioning, noting that, while this did not mean that comprehensive decommissioning had to take place immediately, it did involve a willingness in principle to disarm progressively, a common practical understanding of modalities, and the decommissioning of so arms to test practical arrangements and demonstrate good faith. The position has subsequently been repeated publicly by Ministers on a number of occasions.

2. The Government side is tabling this paper, which explores in more detail some of the practical aspects of decommissioning to enable a further, and fuller, discussion of modalities.

Methods of Decommissioning

3. The Government has already made clear its willingness to be ~~flexible about the manner of decommissioning~~ and to consider any workable proposals put to it. It envisages, however, that decommissioning will involve one or more of the following methods: direct transfer of arms to the authorities, North or South, for subsequent destruction; depositing arms for recovery and destruction or the destruction of arms by those in possession of them.

Operation of Possible Scheme

4. The Government believes that, in the interests of consistency even-handedness and openness, decommissioning would appropriately take place by means of a formally promulgated and widely publicised scheme it recognises, however, that less formal interim arrangements may be

needed at the outset of the decommissioning process. The same arrangements would apply to all groups or individuals who wished to decommission illegally-held arms. Complementary arrangements may be required on both sides of the border: this is an issue on which the two Governments are consulting closely.

5. For illustrative purposes, a decommissioning scheme might operate broadly along the following lines. Those wishing to hand over arms would be able to do so by first notifying the authorities, whether directly or through an intermediary; arrangements would then be made for the arms to be either collected or handed over at an agreed location. Alternatively, information on the whereabouts of arms could be passed, anonymously or otherwise, to the authorities, perhaps utilising a publicised telephone number; the authorities would then arrange for the recovery of the arms. All arms so recovered would be destroyed.

6. The destruction of arms by those currently in possession of them, while not an option which the Government would wish to rule out at this stage, raises a number of potentially significant practical and legal difficulties, including problems of verification and the risk to public safety. The Government could agree to proceed on this basis only if fully satisfied that these difficulties could be successfully and safely overcome.

Verification/Validation

7. The Government attaches considerable importance to the verification and validation of the decommissioning process. It recognises that third parties, such as community leaders or others, may have a role to play in any scheme, both in facilitating the recovery of arms and in verifying their subsequent disposal. The extent and nature of that involvement would depend on the method of decommissioning adopted. It has also been suggested that the involvement of third parties might be formalised through the establishment of a commission of some kind; the Government, while anxious to avoid over-elaborate arrangements, would be prepared to

consider this option if it were clear that such a step would materially assist the process of decommissioning. The precise role and composition of such a body would be for consideration in the light of the method of decommissioning employed.

8. For the reasons given above, the Government envisages that the destruction of illegal arms recovered by it under the scheme would be independently supervised.

Practical Considerations

9. It will be important that any scheme takes full account both of safety factors, in terms of avoiding risk to the public and of avoiding misunderstandings at the point of handover, and of the need to secure arms intended for decommissioning from misappropriation by others.

Legal Issues

10. A decommissioning scheme may need to be underpinned by specific legal arrangements in respect of those involved in decommissioning. Any such arrangements would be strictly defined and linked directly to the operation of the scheme: their purpose would be to facilitate the decommissioning process, and would not extend more widely. The precise scope of such measures would depend on the method of decommissioning adopted.

Phasing

11. The holding of illegal arms and the use of violence and threats of violence have no place in a peaceful, democratic society. As a matter both of principle and of political reality, substantial progress on the issue of decommissioning of arms is needed before Sinn Féin can or will be included in substantive multi-party talks. The most urgent requirement at this stage is to begin that process as soon as possible. The first step is to reach agreement on the three priorities identified in paragraph 1 above: a willingness in principle

to disarm, a common practical understanding of the modalities, and to get decommissioning underway. This paper is intended to assist in that process.

To: "O'Brien, Michael"
From: Armbruster, William
Subject: Lake's activities
Date: 10/17/95 Time: 10:40a

Oct 17 Irish Times

I case you want to know what Lake et al are up to....

Lake visit to finalise new arms proposal

From Conor O'Clery, in Washington

PRESIDENT Clinton has sent his National Security Adviser, Mr Tony Lake, to London to try to put the final touches to a package which will get an international commission on arms up and running before Mr Clinton's visit to Belfast in six weeks, according to well-informed sources in Washington.

The package is almost finalised, and if the US officials, who arrived in London yesterday, get British government approval, they will discuss it with Sinn Fein, the sources said.

This could mean that Mr Lake, who is accompanied by his special adviser on Northern Ireland, Ms Nancy Soderberg, will possibly travel on to Belfast this week before returning to Washington. Ms Soderberg visited Belfast and Dublin last week.

Despite some reports that Mr Lake's trip to London was mainly concerned with Bosnia, a US administration source said last night "the whole deal is Northern Ireland". A White House spokesman said earlier in the weekend that the focus of the visit by Mr Lake and Ms Soderberg to London was to "try to make the President's visit a successful trip which would require some kind of progress in the peace process".

Mr Lake's visit is a high-risk one for the Clinton administration. If he and Ms Soderberg do not succeed in engineering a breakthrough in the deadlock over arms, it could be seen as a failure for American diplomacy.

The international commission suggested will be headed by former Senator George Mitchell and is expected to include at least two other international figures. There is speculation in Washington that these may be an ANC judge - who would meet with the approval of Sinn Fein - and a representative of a Commonwealth country, who would have unionist trust. One informed source said the other two members might come from Canada and Scandinavia.

The commission would not be expected to report until after the President's visit to London, Belfast and Dublin from November 28th to December 2nd. However, a British-Irish summit would take place before the visit to announce an agreed package, which would include accelerated momentum towards inter-party talks in the new year.

The key question facing the US officials in London this week is how to fine-tune a formula which would mean the British not backing down on "Washington three", or Sinn Fein "blinking" by giving in to a precondition it has said all along was unacceptable.

"Washington three" is the insistence, spelled out in March in Washington

by Sir Patrick Mayhew, on tangible evidence of decommissioning by the IRA before Sinn Fein is invited to allparty talks.

''All this has to be seen in the context of the President's visit,'' said one senior US administration official. ''The level of activity increases enormously when a President is about to make a visit. The lines in the sand change. In this case we need a result.''

Even without a result, the President's trip will almost certainly go ahead, the official said, explaining, ''the administration still wants to claim political credit for peace in Northern Ireland''.

An Ulster Unionist Party delegation led by Mr David Trimble is scheduled to visit Washington on October 30th. Mr Trimble has advocated new Northern Ireland elections and is expected to make the case for talks to take place in a newly-elected Northern assembly.

The US administration is likely to give proposals by Mr Trimble a sympathetic hearing to demonstrate its even-handedness on Northern Ireland, and lessen the prospects of unionist opposition to his visit.

on the need to move to all

TEXT FOR 6 SEPTEMBER BILATERAL SUMMIT
AGREED ON 1 SEPTEMBER

*to restore stability
on a target
date of Dec. 15th
for such
rules.*

The two Governments have agreed ~~to work together to create conditions so that~~
all-party talks, aimed at reaching in round table format an agreed political
settlement based on consent, ^{as soon as possible. Ryaguzov} ~~could commence before the end of 1995.~~ A series
of meetings will now be jointly convened by both Governments with all parties
to lay the groundwork for these talks. *→ and to address outstanding issues*

Both Governments share the aim of creating conditions in which all the relevant
parties will attend these talks and will participate on the most constructive
possible basis.

*a Forum, chaired by Sen. James Hansen
Sen. Mitchell.*

The two Governments have agreed to establish ~~an International~~
^{The "Mitchell"} Decommissioning Commission. This Commission will have the initial and
limited remit of reporting to the two Governments by mid-November, 1995, on
whether it has established that a clear commitment exists on the part of the
relevant paramilitary organisations to the full and verifiable decommissioning of
all illegally held arms in the appropriate context and manner. The two
Governments intend to meet again before the end of November, 1995, to agree
the appropriate way forward.

Text, edit

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The two governments have agreed to launch the preparatory phase for all-party talks in the peace process with a target date for beginning, not later than December 15, substantive political negotiations, in round table format, to reach an agreed political settlement based on consent.

The two governments will work jointly to lay the groundwork for the substantive roundtable talks by seeking agreement among the concerned parties on the basis, participation and agenda for the negotiations. The governments will be ready to meet with the parties jointly and to convene a meeting with two or more parties at their request.

In parallel the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body under the eminent chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell to ascertain and advise the two governments on whether and in what context and manner the question of arms held by the paramilitaries, now thankfully silenced, could be finally and satisfactorily settled. Senator Mitchell will be assisted by two other figures of international standing likely to inspire widespread confidence.

The Body will have the remit of reporting by mid-December whether it has established that a clear commitment exists on the part of the relevant organizations to a satisfactory process for full and verifiable decommissioning of arms held by the paramilitaries. To reach its conclusions, the panel will consider among other factors the commitment of the relevant political parties to exclusively

peaceful and democratic means of influencing the body politic. In addition, the Body can review other political issues that may be relevant to the issue of arms. The British Government reaffirms that movement on the issue of illegally held arms would open the way to further responsive measures, including further troop reductions. The British Government reaffirms that if progress were maintained these measures would lead ultimately to its objective of totally civilian policing.

The Body will report to the two governments who undertake to consider seriously any recommendations it makes and to give them due weight on their merits.

Draft Revised Text

The two Governments have agreed that their over-riding objective is to reach inclusive all-party round table talks. To generate the confidence amongst all the relevant parties to ensure that they will participate, we have agreed to begin the first phase of the all party talks by the end of this month.

These inclusive preparatory talks would lay the ground work for the start of all-party round table talks with a target date of not later than December 15, 1995. The preparatory talks would not rule out the prospect of moving to a round table format in the preparatory phase if all were agreeable.

The two governments agree to establish an international body which would make recommendations as soon as possible but not later than mid-December on whether a clear commitment exists on the part of the relevant paramilitary organizations to the full and verifiable decommissioning of all illegally held arms, now thankfully silent, in the appropriate context and manner. The body would be comprised of distinguished individuals acceptable to all parties and would include as its Chair a distinguished American, two co-chairs and staff as needed. The two governments agree to consider seriously on their merits the recommendations of the international body.

The two governments intend to meet again no later than mid-December to agree on the appropriate way forward.

10/8

Sinn Fein has commissioned a paper on modalities to respond to the British paper.

Sinn Fein will seriously consider on their merits the recommendations of an international body on the weapons issue.

Sinn Fein's understanding of the commission's mandate and role is as follows:

- the ^{body}~~commission~~ is being established to deal with the issue of paramilitaries' arms, in parallel with the talks track;
- Sinn Fein will speak to the commission authoritatively and substantively on the question of IRA arms;
- Sinn Fein is free to discuss with the commission the issue of the complete demilitarization of Northern Ireland, including British and licensed arms;

Mayhew listed four key points for HMG in talks with Sinn Fein:

- Sinn Fein must engage seriously on the arms issue;
- Sinn Fein must consider seriously recommendations made by the commission;
- The political track must be a genuine process;
- The commission's timetable must be sufficient to allow time for sensible discussion.

What HMG Needs to Hear

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- the commission is being established to deal with the issue of ~~paramilitaries' arms~~, in parallel with the talks track;
- Sinn Fein will speak to the ^{international body} ~~commission~~ authoritatively and substantively on the question of IRA arms;
- Sinn Fein is free to discuss with the commission the issue of the complete demilitarization of Northern Ireland, including British and licensed arms.

1. The two Governments have agreed to launch the preparatory phase for all party talks in the peace process with the aim of beginning, not later than [...], substantive political negotiations, in round table format, to reach an agreed political settlement based on consent.

2. To this end, building on existing exchanges and bilateral contacts, the two Governments will work jointly to establish and promote the necessary conditions to fulfil this objective, with the aim that all relevant parties will participate on the most constructive basis. In particular they will seek to lay the groundwork for these talks by securing all-party agreement on the basis, participation and agenda for the negotiations.

3. The two Governments will be ready to meet parties, jointly if they wished or, at the right time, to convene meetings among two or more of the parties and the two Governments when they judged it appropriate and with the consent, or at the request, of the parties concerned.

4. The two Governments have also agreed to establish an International Body under the eminent chairmanship of [...], who will be assisted by two other figures of international standing likely to inspire widespread confidence. The [...] Body will be charged to ascertain and advise on whether and by what means the question of illegal arms, now [thankfully] silenced, can be settled to the satisfaction of both Governments and all parties.

5. Accordingly, the Body will have the remit of reporting, by [end], whether it has established that a clear commitment exists on the part of the relevant paramilitary organisations to a satisfactory process for the full and verifiable decommissioning of all illegally held arms.

6. The British Government reaffirms that movement on the issue of illegally held arms would, by reducing the threat, open the way to further responsive measures including, on the advice of the Chief

Constable, further troop reductions, leading ultimately, if that progress were maintained, to its objective of totally civilian policing.

7. The Body will report to the two Governments who will undertake to consider carefully any recommendations it makes and to give them due weight on their merits.

VISIT TO LONDON OF
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER LAKE
AND PARTY

October 15-17, 1995

Sunday October 15

2120 Arrival at Heathrow via United 908. Met by Political
Minister Counselor Michael Habib. Proceed to
Winfield House.

Monday October 16

1100 Meeting with SDLP leader John Hume, at Winfield House.

1600 Meeting with the Prime Minister's Private Secretary
for Overseas Affairs, Rod Lyne, at no. 10 Downing
Street.

1800 Meeting with UUP leader David Trimble, at Winfield
House.

Tuesday October 17

1215 Meeting with Sir John Coles, Permanent Under
Secretary, FCO

1315 Meeting with Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind (over
light lunch), at the FCO. (The Foreign Secretary
will need to end the meeting at 1445.)

1500 Marjorie Mowlam, Labour Party Shadow Northern Ireland
Secretary, at Embassy.

1615 Meeting with Northern Ireland Secretary Sir Patrick
Mayhew and Northern Ireland Minister Michael Ancram,
at the NIO. (Sir Patrick will need to leave at about
1700 for an engagement in Northern Ireland.)

MEMO

FROM: ROBIN GREER
American Consulate General, Belfast
Phone (01232) 438837 / Fax (01232) 248482

TO: KATHLEEN STEPHENS, CONGEN BELFAST
TOM RAMSEY, CONGEN BELFAST
WILLIAM ARMBRUSTER, USIS LONDON
JOHN BURGESS, USIS LONDON
LYNNE CASSEL, *USIS DUBLIN.*

10/5/95

Ambassador Crowe, Nancy Soderberg - text of statement made
in Belfast October 4 1995.

Ambassador Crowe: I have nothing to say on the OJ trial.
That's why you're here?

I have just a short statement to make. Ms. Soderberg has
been visiting my Embassy in London, then we have come her
for the day. I have to go back to host a reception, she will
be here tomorrow and then go to Dublin.

This is part of long standing ^{consultation} consultation we have had, both
in Washington and here with the major players in the Irish
situation. We saw a number of people representing the
various fractions today. I think the talks were very
successful, very forthcoming, and we go away very pleased
with what we have heard, and feel they are very worthwhile.

Apart from that I have nothing to say.

Nancy, have you anything?

Nancy Soderberg: Just, I might add that the President is
very much looking forward to his visit and we are here to
make it as successful as possible.

Question (Eammon Mallie, Downtown Radio): What is the
president looking for out of this visit?

Ambassador Crowe: First of all he is looking forward to
seeing Ireland, and to interchanging with the people and so

forth. And to assure US support for the parties when they feel it is constructive and positive and the US can help.

Question (Eammon Mallie, Downtown Radio) to Nancy Soderberg: Do you think the whole process of commissioning has been progressed at all out of your visit here?

Nancy Soderberg: I think we should keep our conversations private. But if I can just add one to what Ambassador Crowe said it is that we are hoping to promote investment and trade while we are here. That will be an essential element of the President's visit also.

Question (Deric Henderson, Press Association): Do you like to think that by the time the President does come here that all the parties will be sitting round the table?

Ambassador Crowe: This is your negotiation - not ours. It is up to the people that are involved whether this is going to be true or not.

Question (unidentified): the President has said he would like to see talks before he arrives?

Ambassador Crowe: It is all our wishes in the United States that there should be on-going progress.

Question (unidentified): Are you more or less optimistic after your discussions today?

Ambassador Crowe: I'm neither.

Question (unidentified): What do you mean when you say your talks were successful?

Ambassador Crowe: We have learned a lot. That is always success?

Question (unidentified): Did you meet Sinn Fein?

Ambassador Crowe: No I did not.

Question (Eammon Mallie, Downtown Radio): Peter Robinson of DUP wants the President to put pressure on Sinn Fein on the decommissioning of arms. Do you see that as your role:

Ambassador Crowe: No I do not. Most of the world wants the President of the United States to put pressure on somebody or other.

No further questions were taken.

ENDS

Dear Kathleen,

I have enclosed directions on how to get to my house. I hope they are not too complicated. I'm delighted you are bringing Nancy Soderberg along. She agreed to see me when I was in Washington with the USIA, and I'm delighted to be able to return her hospitality. I hope 7.30pm for 8pm suits.

Here are some details on the other people who will be at the house.

Jim Fitzpatrick is the proprietor of the Irish News and its chief executive. He has owned the company since 1982 and it is one of the few remaining family-owned independent newspapers in these islands. His training is in the law, but he has worked as a journalist and was editor in chief of the Irish News for a period after he took it over. Among other interests, he served six years on the board of Laganaside, retiring from it in June.

Alice Fitzpatrick is his wife. She is a member of the Irish News board of directors, and runs Utopia, a gift shop in the Fountain Centre which is owned by the Fitzpatricks.

Noel Doran has been deputy editor of the Irish News since 1993. Before that he worked as a duty news editor at Downtown Radio. During his time on the staff of the Belfast Telegraph he was on the Derry staff and later was its local government correspondent. Noel visited the United States on a USIA programme during his time at the Belfast Telegraph.

Seamus Boyd is business correspondent of the Irish News, and he covered the Washington Conference for us. His career with the paper has included work in our advertising and farming departments.

I have been editor of the Irish News since 1993, before that I was deputy editor. I began my career in the Carrickfergus Advertiser, a weekly newspaper, I moved to the News Letter in 1985 where I worked until 1990. In February I visited the United States as part of the USIA International Visitor Programme. My wife Maureen is the administrative officer in charge of the academic registry at the University of Ulster in Jordanstown.

The Irish News is a daily paper which was founded in 1891 as a nationalist anti-Parnell daily paper, rivalling the pro-Parnell Belfast Morning News. The Morning News (founded 140 years ago this year) was later taken over by the Irish News. Our circulation is 44,443, with the bulk of our sales in Northern Ireland. We are available in the Irish Republic and London, and are working on plans for an electronic publication on the internet. The Irish News wants to see the reunification of Ireland, but through constitutional means. Earlier this year it was named United Kingdom Regional Newspaper of the Year and was given an outstanding achievement award by the British newspaper industry for its contribution to the press.

All the best,

Tom

GUEST LIST

Lunch at Ardnally
Thursday, October 5, 1995
12:30 p.m.

HOST: Kathleen Stephens, Consul General

GUEST OF HONOR: Nancy Soderberg, National Security Council

GUESTS:

Sir David Fell, Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service

Mrs. Breidge Gadd, Chief Probation Officer, Probation Board for Northern Ireland

Mr. Edmond Curran, Editor, Belfast Telegraph

Mr. Robin Wilson, Democratic Dialogue

Mr. Doug Riley, Chairman, Confederation of British Industries

Mr. Tony McCusker, Assistant Secretary, Making Belfast Work

Mr. Jackie Redpath, Director, Greater Shankill Development Agency

Very Rev. Dr. John Dunlop, Presbyterian Minister

Ramsey

GUEST LIST

Lunch at Ardnally
Thursday, October 5, 1995
12:30 p.m.

HOST: Kathleen Stephens, Consul General

GUEST OF HONOR: Nancy Soderberg, National Security Council

GUESTS:

Sir David Fell, Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service

Mrs. Breidge Gadd, Chief Probation Officer, Probation Board for Northern Ireland

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Mr. Doug Riley, Chairman, Confederation of British Industries

Mr. Tony McCusker, Assistant Secretary, Making Belfast Work

Mr. Jackie Redpath, Director, Greater Shankill Development Agency

Very Rev. Dr. John Dunlop, Presbyterian Minister

Schedule
Visit of Ambassador Wm. J. Crowe, Jr., Embassy London
and Nancy Soderborg, National Security Council, Washington, D.C.
October 4-5

Wednesday, October 4

- 9:40 a.m. - Arrive Belfast International Airport on BA 4552. Drive to Ardnavalley, the official residence
- 11:00 a.m. - Meeting with following members of the Democratic Unionist Party
Peter Robinson, M.P., Deputy Leader
Nigel Dodds, Party Secretary
Ian Paisley, Jr., European Office
- 12:30 p.m. - Lunch with following members of the Ulster Unionist Party
David Trimble, M.P., Party Leader
Josias Cunningham, President
Jeffrey Donaldson, Honorary Secretary
Ken Maginnis, M.P., Spokesman on Defence & Home Office
Jim Wilson, Party Secretary
- 3:00 p.m. - Meeting with John Hume, Leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party
- 3:30 p.m. - Ambassador Crowe departs Belfast International Airport
- 4:30 p.m. - Possible meeting with Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein (venue to be determined)
- 7:30 for
8:00 p.m. - Dinner with Tom Collins, Editor, Irish News and his wife at their home,
68 Raw Brae Road, Whitehead, County Antrim
- RON Ardnavalley

Thursday, October 5

- 9:00 a.m. - Possible Meeting with Dr. John Alderdice, Leader of the Alliance Party (venue to be determined)
- 10:30 a.m. - Meeting with Billy Hutchinson, Progressive Unionist Party and David Adams, Ulster Democratic Unionist Party at Consulate General
- 12:30 p.m. - Lunch at Ardnavalley (see separate guest list)
- Ms. Soderborg departs for Dublin

Facsimile Cover Sheet

To: Blair Hall, POL
Company: Embassy London
Phone: 2143
Fax: 0171 409 1637

From: Kathleen Stephens
Company: Consulate General, Belfast
Phone: 01232 328239
Fax: 01232 248482

Date: 10/02/95
Pages Including this
cover page: Two

Comments:

Here follows copy of schedule for Ambassador Crowe and Nancy Soderberg.

October 5, 1995

Nancy,

We heard from Mary Ann Peters this afternoon that Tony Lake would like a read-out on your meetings as soon as possible. Tony met with the Irish Ambassador in Washington this morning, and he also would like to give you a read-out of that discussion. He asks that, if he is hard to get hold of, you give your read-out to Mary Ann.

If you need to make a secure phone call, we can call from the STU-III at the Embassy (though this will be time-consuming). Otherwise you could make your call from the Residence, before dinner tonight.

Dick Norland. *fn*



Home: 260-2156

Richard B. Norland
First Secretary
(Political Affairs)

American Embassy
42 Elgin Road, Ballsbridge
Dublin, Ireland

Tel: (353) 668-7122
668-9612

Guest List -- Friday, October 6, 1995 -- Residence
(Dinner in honor of Nancy Soderberg)

Confirmed:

Ambassador
Alan Pakula
Nancy Soderberg
Jim Clarity - *pres*
Jim and Fran Sheridan → *in the name of father*
Neil and Brenda Jordan - *on request*
Sean Donlon and Caroline Gill
Mr./Mrs. Michael Colgan *(dancer-producer)*

Waiting to hear from: Paul McGuinness and Kathy Gilfillan

Not yet contacted: Barry Devlin and Caroline Erskine
(285-9285 / no answer yet)

Regrets:

Seamus and Marie Heaney (in Greece)
John Behan and Emer McHale
Mike Murphy (RTE) and guest
Prof. and Mrs. Ronan Fanning
Rosaleen and Fergus Linehan

NOTES: Paul McGuinness may still be in the USA
Have not yet tried to call the O'Huiginns

London 10 Downing Meeting

Tues - breakfast with Hillary Major - Best on Tuesday. Press

→ Bosnia meeting

Lunch w/ Queen. Up to 8/16. Smaller better.

Prince Charles volunteered to show West Minister or to Windsor. / Walking tour, Westminster Abbey,

Running Meade / Magna Carter; JFK memorial.

US. hosted dinner. Embassador's house 25-96 limit.

Wed

2 1/2 w/ Major 1 1/2 meet 1/2 press 1/2 break
12:30 speech to Parliament House Lords / Commons.

Down afternoon

[Major of London Lunch] - precedent

Tony Blair's

Small Dinner + met on Mon

Thurs

830 wheels up

To Derry? Community?

City Hall in Belfast - meetings + reception

Lighting of Christmas Tree. US tree?

Training Centers Springvale. Thomson Center / Queens
1400 seats

Fri

Roselina?

Rally at Trinity College

RE: ACTION ITEMS FROM UK/IRELAND TRIP

- 1) Adams - Needs to accept language in Joint Communiqué with parliamentary/illegal/relevant arms/parties. Work out better channel of communication with Ancram.
- 2) Commission - Mitchell, Canadian, Fin/Scandinavia, plus staff. Try and have in place by time Joint Communiqué is announced.
- 3) Who pays for Mitchell/staff. Get UK/Ireland to reimburse?
- 4) Look at some language on Ireland in London speech. Donilon feels important to encourage Brits to take the issue seriously.
- 5) Finalize plans for Churchill ships. Crowe needs to let families know.
- 6) Set POTUS/Trimble drop by.
- 7) Set Dail remarks, themes.
- 8) Need to respond to Sean Donilon/Michael Colgan suggestion of producing a show during POTUS visit to Trinity College.
- 9) Get details on prison issue. Press for resolution before November trip.
- 10) Transfer of Prisoners convention. US party? US prisoners will be raised. Need firm position. Alan K. should update. Humanitarian flexibility? State vs. federal issue?
- 11) Patrick Kelly - cancer IRA prisoner. Irish prisoners in Britain total 27 question of respect for sentence terms.
- 12) Take note of Irish taking EU presidency fall 96/unemployment/ecstasy drugs/famine.
- 13) Fact sheet on POTUS/US involvement in peace process.
- 14) Adams said conditions for cease-fire gone. He and McGinniss only thing holding together, especially his assurance to IRA that US believed Brits looking for a way out of Washington 3.
- 15) Social Welfare Minister request for POTUS to stop by community development project re: employment. Perhaps HRC.
- 16) Get Adams' public statement on non-violence/no threat.

- 17) Security is NI should be discrete.
- 18) Who does POTUS want to play golf with him. Tom Watson?
Tom's favorite course is Ballybunion
- 19) Kenny McClinton request for visa waiver. Convicted in 1979 for two 1977 murders. Since renounced violence, active Christian actively opposes sectarian terrorism. Early release in 1991.
- 20) In meeting, Ancram agreed commission could include a political dimension and process of decommission.
- 21) Jean does not accept prohibition on substantive meetings in NI. Said to have POTUS speak to her if there's a problem. Told me none of my business. Push? Let go?
- 22) Kathy Stephens will need 3-5 additional staff people ASAP to be able to handle the President's trip adequately, recommend do ASAP. Perhaps Canada?

VISIT OF NANCY SODERBERG, NSC
TO DUBLIN, OCTOBER 5-8, 1995

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 5

7:30 P.M. ARRIVE BY TRAIN FROM BELFAST (MET BY
CONTROL OFFICER DICK NORLAND)

8:00 P.M. ARRIVE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

8:30 P.M. DINNER WITH THE AMBASSADOR, JOHN HUME,
SEAN O'HUIGINN, KATHY STEPHENS, BRENDAN SCANNELL
RON AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6

8:30 A.M. BREAKFAST WITH TANAISTE AND FOREIGN MINISTER
DICK SPRING AT DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Sean o'hUiginn, Fergus Finlay, Niall Burgess,
Brendan Scannell)
(Accompanied by Amb. Smith, PolOff Moeller)
(POC Brendan Scannell: 478-0854)

10:00 A.M. PROINSIAS DE ROSSA, MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE,
AT DEPT. OF SOCIAL WELFARE, STORE STREET
(Acc. by Amb. Smith, PolOff Moeller)
(POC Angela Evans: 704-3885)

11:00 A.M. FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION,
DUBLIN CASTLE

11:15 Mary Harney, Des O'Malley
(POC Brigid 671-5302)

Confirmed (P) 11:45 Bertie Ahern, Martin Mansergh
(Tel. 678-9911)
(Acc. by Amb. Smith, PolOff, PAO)

12:30 P.M. LUNCH WITH SEAN DONLON AT GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS
(With Attorney General Dermot Gleeson)
(Acc. by Amb. Smith, PolOff)
(Tel. 668-9333)

4:00 P.M. JUSTICE MINISTER NORA OWEN AT DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, ST. STEPHEN'S GREEN (with Tim Dalton)
(Acc. by Amb. Smith, PolOff)
(POC Tim Dalton 678-9911)

8:30 P.M. DINNER AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE
(guest list attached)

478-0822
D.O. 662-1129

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 7

OPEN (possible meeting with Gerry Adams)
(possible departure for London or U.S.)

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 8

A.M. DEPART FOR LONDON OR U.S.

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 10

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 101602Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4658

INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7488

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3488

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTY

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F(3.04)
KBH 4/11/2023

REF: LONDON 13642

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: VISITING DNSA NANCY SODERBERG AND AMBASSADOR CROWE LUNCHEDED OCTOBER 4 IN BELFAST WITH DAVID TRIMBLE AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY. THE UNIONISTS DISCUSSED THEIR VIEWS ON THE PEACE PROCESS, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE THEY CONTINUE TO PLACE ON THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION -- WHICH THEY REFERRED TO AS WASHINGTON 3 -- REQUIRING SOME ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS BEFORE SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTER-PARTY TALKS. TRIMBLE EXPLAINED THE UUP'S PROPOSAL THAT A NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY BE THE SECOND TRACK IN A "TWIN-TRACK" APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE UUP ALSO EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT BE BALANCED BETWEEN LOCATIONS AND EVENTS OF A NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST CHARACTER. END SUMMARY.

3. ON OCTOBER 4, BELFAST CONSUL GENERAL HOSTED LUNCH AT HER HOME FOR VISITING DSNA NANCY SODERBERG AND AMBASSADOR CROWE WITH OFFICIALS OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST ARTY. REPRESENTING THE UUP WERE RECENTLY ELECTED PARTY LEADER AND UPPER BANN MP DAVID TRIMBLE, FERMANAGH AND SOUTH TYRONE MP KEN MAGINNIS, UNIONIST COUNCIL PRESIDENT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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JOSIAS CUNNINGHAM, PARTY SECRETARY JIM WILSON, AND HONORARY SECRETARY JEFFREY DONALDSON. BELFAST VICE CONSUL ATTENDED AS NOTETAKER.

THE PEACE PROCESS -- DECOMMISSIONING AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

4. MAGINNIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF DECOMMISSIONING, ASKING SODERBERG WHETHER HER DISCUSSIONS WITH ADAMS INDICATED ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION, AND PARTICULARLY ON THE "WASHINGTON 3" CONDITION THAT THERE BE SOME ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS. SODERBERG EXPLAINED THAT THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH HAS POTENTIAL IN THAT IT WOULD PERMIT FORWARD MOVEMENT WHILE STILL RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF DECOMMISSIONING. WHILE THE PARTIES STILL SEEM QUITE FAR APART, SINN FEIN IS BEGINNING TO SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING QUESTION, PROVIDED THERE IS RECOGNITION THAT NO GESTURE ON DECOMMISSIONING WILL BE FORTHCOMING IN ADVANCE OF FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

5. TRIMBLE RESPONDED THAT THIS RESERVATION ON SINN FEIN'S PART -- ITS REFUSAL TO ADDRESS OR PERMIT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO ADDRESS WASHINGTON 3 -- REMAINED UNACCEPTABLE TO UNIONISTS. TO UNIONISTS, THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH REPRESENTED AN UNACCEPTABLE "FUDGE" ON WASHINGTON 3. IT MUST CONTINUE TO BE MADE CLEAR, TRIMBLE MAINTAINED, THAT WASHINGTON 3 WAS STILL OUT THERE AND MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE SINN FEIN COULD PARTICIPATE IN "INTERPARTY TALKS."

6. (COMMENT. IN A WHISPERED ASIDE, CUNNINGHAM POINTED OUT TO CONSUL GENERAL THAT TRIMBLE USED THE TERM "INTERPARTY TALKS" IN CONTRAST TO THE TERM "ALL-PARTY TALKS" WHICH SODERBERG HAS USED. AS THE CONVERSATION CONTINUED, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT TRIMBLE WAS MAKING THIS DISTINCTION WITH GREAT CARE. ALL-PARTY TALKS IS GENERALLY TAKEN TO MEAN TALKS IN WHICH ALL NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES, INCLUDING SINN FEIN, WOULD SIT AROUND A TABLE AND NEGOTIATE TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN SAYING THAT SINN FEIN MUST ADDRESS WASHINGTON 3 BEFORE PARTICIPATING IN "INTER-PARTY TALKS," TRIMBLE INTENDED A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH'S PROPOSAL THAT SINN FEIN ENGAGE IN "EXPLORATORY" BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL TALKS IN PARALLEL WITH SUBSTANTIVE TALKS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TAKING PLACE SEPARATELY WITH EACH OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES. TRIMBLE REJECTED SUCH A PROPOSAL. END COMMENT.)

7. TRIMBLE ASSERTED THAT PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION EXPLICITLY SET OUT PRECONDITIONS TO TALKS. PARAGRAPH 10 STATED THAT ONLY PARTIES WHICH HAD ESTABLISHED A COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS TO BE ORGANIZED TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. TRIMBLE SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO BETTER WAY FOR SINN FEIN TO ESTABLISH ITS COMMITMENT THAN THROUGH THE DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA ARMS. ADDITIONALLY, SINN FEIN HAD BEEN TOLD FROM THE BEGINNING THAT IT MUST ADDRESS THE "PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES" OF THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, AN UNAMBIGUOUS REFERENCE TO DECOMMISSIONING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY

8. WITH REGARD TO ESTABLISHING SINN FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS, TRIMBLE SAID THAT THE WASHINGTON 3 CONDITION WAS A NECESSARY MINIMUM CONDITION, BUT MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE A SUFFICIENT ONE. OTHER STEPS THAT MIGHT NEED TO TAKE PLACE TO ESTABLISH THAT COMMITMENT WERE FOR SINN FEIN TO ACCEPT THE CONSENT PRINCIPLE OF THE DECLARATION AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (I.E. THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN TRIMBLE'S PROPOSED ASSEMBLY). ALTHOUGH ELIMINATION OF THE PUNISHMENT BEATINGS OR A DECLARATION OF NO FIRST STRIKE WOULD BOTH BE WELCOMED STEPS, PARTICULARLY A NO FIRST STRIKE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE THAT MUCH TO ESTABLISHING SINN FEIN'S BASIC COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL MEANS.

9. MAGINNIS POINTED OUT THAT NORTHERN IRELAND HAD EXPERIENCED REPEATED IRA CEASE-FIRES, NONE OF WHICH REPRESENTED A FUNDAMENTAL RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE. THE UUP AND THE OTHER POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE "97 PERCENT" OF NORTHERN IRELAND PEOPLE WHO WERE PEACEFUL AND LAW-ABIDING, HAD AN OBLIGATION TO GUARANTEE THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SAFETY OF THOSE PEOPLE AND THE PERMANENCE OF THE PEACE. DECOMMISSIONING WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THAT. TRIMBLE ECHOED MAGINNIS' SENTIMENTS AND EXPLAINED THAT HE REJECTED THE COMMON ARGUMENT THAT DECOMMISSIONING HAD NO SIGNIFICANCE FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT A LARGE PORTION OF IRA ATTACKS INVOLVED IMPROVISED OR READILY OBTAINED WEAPONRY, TRIMBLE POINTED TO THE SEMTEX EXPLOSIVES AND DETONATORS -- USED IN THE MOST DEVASTATING IRA BOMBINGS, THE "SPECTACULARS" -- AS ITEMS THE IRA COULD NOT READILY REPLACE. FURTHERMORE, SECURITY SERVICES HAD A VERY GOOD IDEA HOW MUCH SEMTEX AND DETONATORS THE IRA HAD, AND WITHOUT THIS ORDINANCE, THE IRA COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY LAUNCH A LARGE SCALE BOMBING CAMPAIGN. APART FROM REASSURING UNIONISTS, MOST IMPORTANTLY SUCH A STEP WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO REPUBLICAN AND IRA RANK-AND-FILE THAT THE IRA WAS SERIOUS AND INTENDED THE WAR TO BE OVER.

10. MAGINNIS REMINDED US THAT HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO ADDRESS THE DECOMMISSIONING OF PARAMILITARY WEAPONS. HE HAD CONCEIVED OF THE COMMISSION AS A BODY TO WHICH THE IRA COULD HAND OVER ITS GUNS, SO AS NOT TO REQUIRE THE IRA TO "SURRENDER" THEIR ARMS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE HAD ENVISIONED THE COMMISSION AS BEING COMPRISED OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENT OBSERVERS. TRIMBLE ECHOED MAGINNIS' CONCERN THAT CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A COMMISSION DEVIATED FROM THIS CONCEPTION OF ITS ROLE AND FUNCTION. TRIMBLE INSISTED THAT THE COMMISSION'S REMIT MUST INCLUDE WASHINGTON 3 AND THAT THE COMMISSION MUST HAVE A ROLE IN OBSERVING HANDOVERS OF ARMS. MAGINNIS SAID THE COMMISSION MUST ESTABLISH: 1) THE COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSION, 2) THE QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO BE HANDED OVER, 3) MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING, AND STEMMING FROM THE FIRST THREE, 4) THE SCHEDULE FOR DECOMMISSIONING.

TWIN TRACK APPROACHES -- WHY YES TO AN ASSEMBLY BUT NO TO TALKS

11. TRIMBLE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE PROPOSED TWIN TRACK APPROACH BY WHICH, IN TRACK 1, SINN FEIN AND THE OTHER PARTIES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN TALKS WITH HMG IN PREPARATION FOR EVENTUAL ALL-PARTY TALKS. IMULTANEOUSLY, IN TRACK 2, AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD ADDRESS DECOMMISSIONING. TRIMBLE SAID THAT SINN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO DRAG THE DECOMMISSIONING TRACK TO A SNAILS PACE, WHILE INSISTING THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK MOVE AHEAD AT BREAKNECK SPEED. SODERBERG ASKED, GIVEN THAT ALL PARTY TALKS WOULD REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE DISCUSSION ON THE NATURE OF AND AGENDA FOR SUCH TALKS, WHY NOT PERMIT SINN FEIN TO ENGAGE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS, EVEN IN ADVANCE OF SINN FEIN'S HAVING ESTABLISHED ITS QUALIFICATIONS FOR ALL PARTY TALKS. IN REPLY, JEFFREY DONALDSON POINTED OUT THAT SINN FEIN HAD BEEN IN EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR ALMOST A YEAR AND ASKED, RHETORICALLY, HOW THE "EXPLORATORY" TALKS ENVISIONED IN THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH WERE DIFFERENT FROM THESE TALKS. TRIMBLE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE WHOLE INTENTION OF THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH WAS THAT SUCH TALKS WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH OTHER PARTIES AND WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT SINN FEIN WAS ALREADY IN INTERPARTY TALKS. MAGINNIS FOLLOWED ON, SAYING THAT, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS, SINN FEIN HAD CONTINUALLY BEEN MOVING
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTY

THE GOAL POSTS WITHOUT MOVING ANY CLOSER TO RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. WHILE STILL THREATENING TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE, SINN FEIN NOW USED EVERY PRIOR STEP AS EVIDENCE THAT OTHER PARTIES ALREADY RECOGNIZED ITS MANDATE AND ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE.

12. TRIMBLE SAID THAT THE UUP HAD NO FURTHER ROOM TO MANEUVER ON DECOMMISSIONING. THE PARTY HAD ALREADY BEEN VERY PATIENT AND TOLERANT OF HMG, AND ALSO THE USG, ON THE ISSUE AND HAD BORNE A GREAT DEAL OF CRITICISM FROM ITS CONSTITUENTS AND RIVALS AS A RESULT. NOW, HOWEVER, THE PARTY COULD NOT GIVE ANY FURTHER GROUND ON THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. NOR COULD IT PRETEND THAT THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ALL PARTY TALKS AND SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN "PARALLEL TALKS". MAGINNIS ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH DRAGGED UNIONISTS BLINDLY FORWARD ON THE POLITICAL TRACK WITH NO CLEAR WAY FORWARD ON THE DECOMMISSIONING TRACK.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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13. THE UUP'S COUNTERPROPOSAL ON THE POLITICAL TRACK WAS A LOCAL ASSEMBLY. TRIMBLE EXPLAINED THAT HIS PROPOSAL ENVISIONED AN ASSEMBLY WITH ACTUAL, THOUGH PROBABLY LIMITED, LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. HE EXPLAINED THAT SUCH AN ASSEMBLY COULD BE ESTABLISHED UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION AND COULD BE IN PLACE AS QUICKLY AS A MONTH, ALTHOUGH CUNNINGHAM POINTED OUT THAT ALL OF THE LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES WOULD PREFER MUCH MORE TIME IN WHICH TO SELECT CANDIDATES AND MOUNT CAMPAIGNS. TRIMBLE INSISTED THAT HE DID NOT VIEW THE ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL AS A FINAL STEP OR AS AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT BUT AS AN INTERMEDIATE STEP ALONG THE WAY TO AN EVENTUAL OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

14. AN ASSEMBLY WOULD PERMIT DEBATE WHICH, TRIMBLE ARGUED, IS IMPORTANT TO POLITICAL PROGRESS EVEN IF IT IS DIFFERENT FROM NEGOTIATION. MOREOVER, SUCH AN ASSEMBLY WOULD PERMIT SINN FEIN TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. TRIMBLE PREFERRED AN ASSEMBLY WITH REAL LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO A CONVENTION OR OTHER MERE DEBATING SOCIETY. AN ASSEMBLY WOULD BOTH ENABLE AND INSPIRE NORTHERN IRELAND'S POLITICAL PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN POSITIVE AND EFFECTIVE WAYS, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EXEMPLARY FUNCTION OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THE TWO COMMUNITIES CAN WORK TOGETHER AND GOVERN THEMSELVES.

15. MOREOVER, AN ASSEMBLY WOULD MAKE FOR "REAL DEMOCRATIC MATHEMATICS." THIS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF FORCING SINN FEIN TO FACE UP TO ITS OWN, QUITE LIMITED, DEMOCRATIC MANDATE, AND TO CLIMB DOWN FROM THE INFLATED LIMITED, DEMOCRATIC MANDATE ITS RHETORIC CLAIMED AND ITS GUNS ENFORCED. MAGINNIS BELIEVED THAT AN ASSEMBLY WOULD DRAW SINN FEIN INTO ORDINARY, MUNDANE, PEACEFUL POLITICS AND SEND A MESSAGE TO THE REPUBLICAN RANK AND FILE THAT THE MOVEMENT HAD ENTERED A NEW DEMOCRATIC PHASE OF POLITICS AND WAS NOT SIMPLY ENGAGED IN A BRIEF HIATUS FROM VIOLENCE.

16. TRIMBLE REMARKED THAT HE HAD FOUND IT QUITE INTERESTING THAT SINN FEIN HAD REACTED IN A MUCH MORE OPEN-MINDED WAY TO HIS ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL THAN HAD THE SDLP. TRIMBLE SAID THAT JOHN HUME, THROUGH "HIS MOUNTPIECE MARK DURKAN," HAD REACTED IN A "KNEE-JERK" FASHION AND REJECTED THE SUGGESTION. SINN FEIN, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN VERY RESTRAINED IN ITS RESPONSE AND MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN HAD CALLED IT A PROPOSAL WORTHY OF FURTHER STUDY. TRIMBLE BELIEVED THAT HUME WOULD NOT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ACCEPT ANYTHING IN NORTHERN IRELAND UNTIL THE PROVINCES FIRST BECAME A CONSTITUTIONAL "HALFWAY HOUSE" BETWEEN THE UK AND THE IRISH REPUBLIC.

THE UUP'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO NORTHERN IRELAND

17. TRIMBLE PLANS TO VISIT THE U.S. AT THE END OF OCTOBER. HE AND HIS DELEGATION WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 29, SPEND OCTOBER 30-NOVEMBER 1 ON MEETINGS IN THE CAPITAL AND NOVEMBER 2 ON MEETINGS IN NEW YORK CITY. TRIMBLE PUSHED STRONGLY TO MEET THE PRESIDENT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THE SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. THE OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR HOPES THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO GENERATE SIGNIFICANT MEDIA ATTENTION DURING THEIR U.S. VISIT AND TO EXPLAIN UNIONIST POSITIONS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH TRIMBLE WILL CEREMONIALLY OPEN THE PARTY'S U.S. OFFICE DURING HIS STOP IN WASHINGTON, IT IS ALREADY UP AND RUNNING. TRIMBLE AND THE OTHERS ALL EXPRESSED THEIR GRATIFICATION THAT THE PARTY WAS FINALLY ENGAGING U.S. PUBLIC OPINION AND ASSERTING ITS POSITIONS AGAINST SINN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTY

FEIN'S U.S. OPERATION.

18. SODERBERG TOLD TRIMBLE THAT THE USG WAS DETERMINED TO STRIKE A BALANCE DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND AND WOULD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS OR VIEWS HE OR HIS PARTY MIGHT HAVE ON HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THAT, TRIMBLE ADVISED THAT ANY TIME SPENT IN LONDONDERRY WOULD BE VIEWED AS A "NATIONALIST JAMBOREE", WHATEVER "TOKEN PROTESTANTS THE LONDONDERRY CITY COUNCIL MIGHT WAVE AROUND". HE ADDED THAT LONDONDERRY COULD NOT BE BALANCED BY VISITS TO STORMONT OR WITH THE NIO, THE PRESIDENT HAD TO VISIT WITH UNIONISTS AND NEEDED TO GET OUTSIDE OF BELFAST TO VISIT PROTESTANT TOWNS. SODERBERG SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A VISIT TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CARRICKFERGUS WHICH WOULD EMPHASIZE THE ULSTER-SCOTS LINK AND THE WARTIME COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE U.S. THROUGH THE ANDREW JACKSON HOMESTEAD AND THE U.S. RANGERS CENTER. WHILE EXPRESSING SOME ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS PROPOSAL, TRIMBLE NOTED THAT CARRICKFERGUS HAD AN ALLIANCE MAYOR AND SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD VISIT A DISTRICT WITH A UUP MAYOR.

19. MAGINNIS SAID THAT ONE ESPECIALLY BAD IDEA FLOATING AROUND WAS THE SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD VISIT ROSSLEA (IN MAGINNIS' PARLIAMENTARY DISTRICT). AGINNIS AND TRIMBLE BOTH EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE GENEALOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE TOWN WAS WHOLLY SPURIOUS AND THAT A VISIT THERE WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS "CLOWNING UP" THE VISIT. (MAGINNIS SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED CONGEN OCTOBER 9 TO SAT THAT, AS A RESULT OF SUMMERTIME MARCHING DISPUTES, LOCAL PROTESTANTS WERE BOYCOTTING ROSSLEA SHOPS.)

20. THE UUP OFFICIALS WERE ALSO CHARY OF THE NOTION THAT THE PRESIDENT WALK ALONG THE WEST BELFAST PEACE LINE, CALLING IT "GHOULISH" AND AS PROJECTING A NEGATIVE IMAGE AND EMPHASIZING DIVISION. THEY SUGGESTED A WALKABOUT TAKE PLACE IN THE ROYAL AVENUE - DONEGAL PLACE SHOPPING DISTRICT IN BELFAST CITY CENTER. AS A PLACE WHICH WOULD SYMBOLIZE THE COMMERCIAL VIBRANCY OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND BE A PLACE WHERE THE COMMUNITIES CAME TOGETHER RATHER THAN ONE WHERE THEY HAD TO BE KEPT APART.

21. IN THE UUP'S OPINION, MACKIES WOULD BE A PROBLEMATIC VENUE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MAIN SPEECH. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE COMPANY WAS THOUGHT OF AS BEING IN A NATIONALIST AREA AND AS HAVING DIFFICULT ACCESS FOR PROTESTANT WORKERS. (NOTE. IN A LUNCH OCTOBER 5 (SEPTTEL), WEST BELFAST COMMUNITY WORKERS TOLD DNSA THAT NATIONALISTS AND UNIONISTS IN WEST BELFAST EACH SAW MACKIES AS BEING AN ENCLAVE OF THE OTHER COMMUNITY BUT THAT NATIONALIST SENSITIVITIES ON THE SUBJECT WERE PROBABLY GREATER THAN UNIONIST. END NOTE.) THEY SUGGESTED THE ULSTER HALL OR KING'S HALL AS ALTERNATIVE VENUES, WHILE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE ULSTER HALL WAS ASSOCIATED WITH MANY IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF UNIONISM AND MIGHT BE OBJECTIONABLE TO NATIONALISTS.

22. TRIMBLE SAID THAT IT WAS PREFERABLE IF THE PRESIDENT CAME TO BELFAST BEFORE LONDONDERRY, BUT THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT HE SPEND AT LEAST AS MUCH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TIME IN BELFAST AND PARTICIPATE IN EVENTS OF AT LEAST AS MUCH SUBSTANCE AND IMPORTANCE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT LOGISTICS AND TIMING MIGHT MAKE IT DESIRABLE TO GO TO LONDONDERRY FIRST BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT MAKE A FIRST STOP AT LANGFORD LODGE NEAR THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BEFORE HEADING OFF FOR LONDONDERRY. LANGFORD LODGE IS THE SITE OF A WORLD WAR II AIRBASE USED EXTENSIVELY BY U.S. FORCES. IT NOW HOUSES A SMALL WARTIME HERITAGE CENTER.

23. COMMENT. TRIMBLE'S PUBLIC POSITION ON THE "TWIN-TRACK" IS SLIGHTLY MORE FLEXIBLE THAN THE ONE HE STAKED OUT FOR US PRIVATELY IN THE LUNCH. TRIMBLE GAVE A PRESS INTERVIEW OCTOBER 6 IN WHICH HE SAID HE KEPT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SINN FEIN PROVING ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE WITHOUT WEAPONS BEING DECOMMISSIONED, BUT ADDED HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS POSSIBLE. TRIMBLE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION "UNDERSTOOD" THE UUP'S POSITION, LEAVING IT TO HIS DEPUTY, JOHN TAYLOR, TO ISSUE A WARNING TO THE U.S.: IN AN OCTOBER 7 SPEECH, TAYLOR SAID THAT THE UUP WOULD NOT BE "FORCED" INTO TALKS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IN ORDER TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT A "PROPAGANDA COUP." WHILE GERRY ADAMS' "NO VIOLENCE PLEDGE" OF OCTOBER 9 MAY GO SOME WAY IN REASSURING THE BROADER COMMUNITY HERE, THE UUP, WHILE WELCOMING THE FORMATION OF A DECOMMISSIONING PANEL, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT FOR MORE BEFORE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTY

AGREEING TO TALK ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH SINN FEIN. END
COMMENT.

24. DNSA SODERBERG DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR
THIS CABLE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: LAKE

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FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 004983

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.05)
KBH 4/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S
OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH PD LEADER MARY HARNEY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH IRISH OFFICIALS IN DUBLIN
OCTOBER 5-7. THE FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
OF HER MEETING WITH PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER MARY
HARNEY.

3. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: OCTOBER 6, 1995 TIME: 12:45-1 P.M.

LOCATION: ON THE MARGINS OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND
RECONCILIATION AT DUBLIN CASTLE

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

NANCY SODERBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND

WILLIAM MOELLER, POLITICAL OFFICER, AMERICAN EMBASSY DUBLIN
(NOTETAKER)

IRELAND

MARY HARNEY, LEADER, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS
DES O'MALLEY, NORTHERN IRELAND SPOKESMAN, PROGRESSIVE
DEMOCRATS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ISSUES FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT

AFTER BRIEFLY DISCUSSING EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THE PRESIDENT'S IRISH LINEAGE, SODERBERG ASKED HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WHAT THEMES WOULD RESONATE HERE IN THE REPUBLIC DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HARNEY MENTIONED THE ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY UNEMPLOYMENT. O'MALLEY STRESSED THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION AS WELL, NOTING THAT IRELAND TAKES OVER THE EU PRESIDENCY DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1996, WHEN THE EU IS EXPECTED TO BE DEEP INTO ITS MAASTRICHT REVIEW CONFERENCE. AS THE EU STRENGTHENS ITS COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, IRELAND WILL COME UNDER PRESSURE TO MOVE AWAY FROM ITS STRICT ADHERENCE TO NEUTRALITY, WHICH COULD PROVE QUITE CONTROVERSIAL.

PRAISE FOR U.S. ROLE

O'MALLEY PRAISED THE PRESIDENT FOR TAKING SUCH AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED THUS FAR.

TRIMBLE

BOTH HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WERE VERY COMPLIMENTARY OF NEW UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE. HARNEY SAID HE WAS A CHARISMATIC LEADER WHO COULD CARRY UNIONISTS, AND WAS SOMEBODY WITH WHOM OUTSIDERS COULD DO BUSINESS. O'MALLEY THOUGHT IT WAS VERY POSITIVE THAT TRIMBLE WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE PARTIES FROM THE SOUTH IN DIALOGUE. THAT WAS A BIG CHANGE FROM HIS PREDECESSOR, WHO HAD BEEN A "POLITICAL HERMIT." IT WAS ALSO GOOD THAT TRIMBLE WAS GOING TO THE U.S., WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN VIEWED AS A "NATIONALIST ALLY." THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. TO DISPEL NOTIONS THAT IT IS A PART OF THE "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT."

ALL-PARTY TALKS COULD TAKE YEARS

HARNEY SAID THAT EVEN IF ALL-PARTY TALKS CAN BE STARTED SOON, A LASTING PEACE AGREEMENT IS PROBABLY YEARS AWAY. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO "SQUARE THE CIRCLE," GIVEN THAT NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST VIEWPOINTS AND ASPIRATIONS WERE SO DIFFERENT. SHE THOUGHT IT COULD TAKE 3 TO 5 YEARS TO

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COMPLETE TALKS.

ELECTED ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL

O'MALLEY SAID HE HAD MIXED VIEWS ON TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. ON ONE HAND, IT WAS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE WHY PEOPLE WANTED TO HAVE AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. BUT WITHOUT EXECUTIVE POWERS, THE PROPOSED 85-MEMBER ASSEMBLY WAS UNLIKELY TO AMOUNT TO VERY MUCH. EACH REPRESENTATIVE WOULD, OF COURSE, WANT TO HAVE HIS OR HER SAY ON ANY PARTICULAR ISSUE, MAKING THE BODY EXTREMELY UNWIELDY AS A NEGOTIATING FORUM. O'MALLEY SAID THE IDEA OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS TO GIVE PEOPLE ELECTORAL "MANDATES," BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY PROVE TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, THE CANDIDATES FROM EACH TRADITION
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 004983

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH PD LEADER MARY HARNEY

WOULD

ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FORCED INTO ADOPTING EXTREME POSITIONS IN ORDER TO WIN VOTES. THAT WOULD NOT AUGUR WELL FOR A COOPERATIVE, POST-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE. HARNEY SAID THAT NO MATTER HOW IT WAS "DRESSED UP," THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE SEEN AS "OLD STORMONT."

4. SODERBERG DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS MESSAGE BEFORE DEPARTING DUBLIN. SMITH

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PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA RICE SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 031652Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4434
INFO RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3289
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 3113
RUEHOSB/USLO ABUJA PRIORITY 0097
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 8429
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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.06)
KBH 4/11/2023

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W - JOYCE LEADER
PARIS FOR ROGER MORAN - PASS TO AF/DAS BUSHNELL
NSC FOR SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL NI UK
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH SENIOR FCO OFFICIAL ON
REACTION TO ABACHA'S OCTOBER 1 STATEMENT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. ON OCTOBER 3 VISITING NSC STAFF DIRECTOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY FOR AFRICA ANTHONY GOODENOUGH AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA DEPARTMENT HEAD DAVID MACLENNAN FOR AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO ABACHA'S OCTOBER 1 SPEECH. EMBASSY POLOFF ACCOMPANIED AS NOTETAKER.
3. PREFACING HIS REMARKS WITH A CAVEAT THAT MINISTERIAL INPUT WOULD BE NEEDED TO FINALIZE HMG'S REACTION BEFORE THE QUADRILATERAL MEETING (UK, US, FRANCE, AND GERMANY) TO BE HELD OCTOBER 4 IN LONDON, GOODENOUGH SAID THE FCO SAW GOOD AND BAD ELEMENTS IN ABACHA'S SPEECH. ON THE PLUS SIDE THERE WOULD BE NO EXECUTIONS AND THERE WAS NOW A TIMETABLE FOR A TRANSITION. ON THE DOWN SIDE, THE TRANSITION WAS CLEARLY TOO LONG, CENTRAL AUTHORITY WAS NOT TRANSFERRED UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT, AND THERE WAS SOME BACKSLIDING IN ABACHA'S COMMENTS ON ABIOLA. FOR THE MOMENT, THE FCO WANTED TO STUDY THE TEXT THOROUGHLY, CONSULT WITH ALLIES, AND GAUGE REACTIONS WITHIN NIGERIA AND FROM NIGERIA'S NEIGHBORS.

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4. GOODENOUGH SAID THERE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A MESSAGE FROM JOHN MAJOR TO ABACHA REACTING TO THE TRANSITION AND DECISION ON THE COUP PLOTTERS (A PHONE CALL OR WRITTEN MESSAGE, WITH GOODENOUGH MAKING CLEAR HE PREFERRED A WRITTEN MESSAGE). HE WOULD BE TRAVELING TO NIGERIA ON OCTOBER 15 AND MIGHT CARRY A PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE TO DELIVER PERSONALLY TO ABACHA.

5. GOODENOUGH SHARED IN CONFIDENCE THE STATE OF THOUGHT WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATION ON HOW TO HANDLE NIGERIA AT THE NOVEMBER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NEW ZEALAND (CHOGM). WHILE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO ENDORSE THE DECISION, IT APPEARED THAT COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL ANYAOKU WOULD ANNOUNCE AN AGREEMENT THAT MEMBERS UNDER MILITARY RULE WOULD HAVE A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS (TILL THE NEXT CHOGM) TO HOLD ELECTIONS. DURING THAT TWO YEAR PERIOD, THOSE STATES WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND WORKING LEVEL COMMONWEALTH MEETINGS. IF AT THE END OF THE TWO YEAR PERIOD THERE HAD BEEN NO ELECTIONS, MEMBERS UNDER MILITARY RULE WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM HAVING MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL LEVEL CONTACTS WITH OTHER COMMONWEALTH STATES. IN RESPONSE TO SODERBERG'S QUESTION, GOODENOUGH SAID IT WOULD BE VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE COMMONWEALTH WOULD AGREE TO OTHER FORMS OF SANCTION AGAINST NIGERIA (VISA, ARMS SALES) BECAUSE OF THE POSITIONS OF AFRICAN MEMBER STATES.

6. SODERBERG ASKED GOODENOUGH WHAT HMG HOPED TO ACHIEVE AT THE QUAD MEETING ON OCTOBER 4. GOODENOUGH SAID HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT TO KEEP CURRENT MEASURES AGAINST NIGERIA IN PLACE AS A SIGN OF DISPLEASURE OVER THE TIMETABLE, AGREEMENT THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT TAKE ADDITIONAL MEASURES IMMEDIATELY AGAINST ABACHA UNTIL WE HAD A BETTER SENSE OF WHAT WE MIGHT ACHIEVE VIA FURTHER PRESSURE AND DIALOGUE, AND A CONSENSUS THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE ABACHA THROUGH EVERY AVAILABLE CHANNEL THAT HE NEEDED TO SHORTEN THE TRANSITION TIMETABLE.

7. THIS MESSAGE NOT CLEARED BY SODERBERG BEFORE TRANSMISSION.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: LAKE SIT

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 004985

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.07)
KSH 4/11/2023

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S
OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY
ADAMS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH IRISH OFFICIALS AND
POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS IN DUBLIN OCTOBER 5-7. THE
FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF HER MEETING
WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS.

3. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: OCTOBER 7, 1995 TIME: 10-12 A.M.

LOCATION: AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, DUBLIN, IRELAND

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

NANCY SODERBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND
WILLIAM MOELLER, POLITICAL OFFICER, AMERICAN EMBASSY DUBLIN
(NOTETAKER)
SINN FEIN

GERRY ADAMS, PRESIDENT
RITA O'HARE, PRESS OFFICER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: DISCUSSION OF
BRITISH NON-PAPER AND PLANS FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

ADAMS BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE BRITISH, IN RECENT DAYS, HAVE SEEMED RELUCTANT TO MEET HIM. ADAMS SPECIFICALLY CITED A MEETING THAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE ON OCTOBER 9 WITH NIO MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM. ONE MINUTE THE MEETING WAS ON, ANOTHER MINUTE IT WAS OFF, AND STILL LATER, IT HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A PHONE CALL. ADAMS SAID THAT EVEN NOW, HE WASN'T SURE WHAT THE STATUS OF THE MEETING WAS. SODERBERG SUGGESTED THAT THE CURRENT BRITISH AMBIVALENCE ON MEETINGS WAS PROBABLY RELATED TO NEXT WEEK'S TORY CONFERENCE. SHE SAID THAT ANCRAM HAD TOLD HER THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DO ANYTHING BEFORE THAT CONFERENCE. SODERBERG ASSURED ADAMS, HOWEVER, THAT THE BRITISH WERE VERY INTERESTED IN TALKING TO SINN FEIN. ANCRAM, IN FACT, HAD ARGUED TO HER THAT SINN FEIN -- NOT LONDON -- WAS THE RELUCTANT INTERLOCUTOR.

BRITISH NON-PAPER

ADAMS ASKED IF SODERBERG KNEW THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH NON-PAPER ON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. SODERBERG REPLIED THAT HER UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE NON-PAPER HAD BEEN A COLLECTIVE EFFORT BY ANCRAM AND ROD LYNE. ITS PURPOSE WAS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION AND ESTABLISH THE PARAMETERS OF AN EVENTUAL JOINT LONDON-DUBLIN COMMUNIQUE ON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT WHAT SINN FEIN AND THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT "COULD LIVE WITH."

ADAMS WORRIED THAT BECAUSE THIS "ANGEL" PAPER HAD NO OFFICIAL STATUS, THE UK COULD, DOWN THE ROAD, WALK AWAY FROM IT AND LEAVE SINN FEIN HANGING. HE CITED CASES WHERE THIS HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST. SODERBERG SAID SHE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO HAVE THE BRITISH FORMALLY TABLE THE NON-PAPER. IT WOULD LOCK-IN THE BRITISH POSITION AND MAKE THEM MORE RELUCTANT TO NEGOTIATE CHANGES TO THE TEXT. SODERBERG ASSURED ADAMS THAT WITH THE U.S. WATCHING, THE UK WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SIMPLY WALK AWAY FROM THE NON-PAPER.

BRITISH CLARIFICATIONS

REFERRING TO THE NON-PAPER, SODERBERG NOTED THAT DURING HER RECENT MEETING WITH ANCRAM, SHE HAD ASKED HIM TO FLESH OUT WHAT THE BRITISH MEANT BY THE TERM "PARTICIPATION" IN THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. ANCRAM INDICATED THAT THE UK DID NOT EXPECT SINN FEIN TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF WEAPONS OR ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION. BUT SINN FEIN DID HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK "AUTHORITATIVELY" ON THE DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA ARMS AND TO BE "FAIRLY SPECIFIC" ON THE MODALITIES. ANCRAM SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AS A GOOD STARTING POINT THE PAPER ON DECOMMISSIONING WHICH HE HAD GIVEN MARTIN MCGUINNESS DURING EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE TALKS IN MARCH. SODERBERG

G SUGGESTED THAT SINN FEIN SIT DOWN WITH ANCRAM AND GO THROUGH THAT PAPER "PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH" TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS.

SODERBERG ALSO SAID SHE HAD TOLD ANCRAM ABOUT SINN FEIN'S OBJECTION TO THE WORD "CONDITIONS" IN THE NON-PAPER, WHICH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 004985

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S
OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY
ADAMS

THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT TRANSLATED AS MEANING "PRECONDITIONS." SHE SAID THAT ANCRAM WAS OPEN TO COMING UP WITH A NEW FORM OF WORDS THAT WAS LESS OBJECTIONABLE. SHE SAID THAT A RECENT LETTER FROM MAYHEW TO HUME CONTAINED SOME GOOD LANGUAGE IN THAT REGARD.

ADAMS'S NOTE TO HUME

ASKED TO GIVE HIS VIEWS ON THE NON-PAPER, ADAMS RESPONDED BY PULLING OUT A 1-1/2 PAGE NOTE THAT HE JUST WRITTEN TO JOHN HUME, WHICH PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PLANNED TO SEND SODERBERG A COPY OF THE NOTE EARLY NEXT WEEK, AFTER HUME HAD HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW AND COMMENT ON IT. HE SAID THE ADVANTAGE OF WORKING THROUGH HUME WAS THAT IT GAVE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT "COVER" FOR ACCEPTING SINN FEIN LANGUAGE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE BRITISH TO SIGN UP TO A JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT HE HAD WRITTEN.

REDEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ADAMS POINTED OUT, FIRST OF ALL, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION MUST BE SET IN THE CONTEXT OF A "FIRM DATE" FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. SODERBERG INTERJECTED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE SATISFIED WITH A "TARGET DATE" INSTEAD. ADAMS SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS REPLYING "FAIR ENOUGH." ADAMS THEN SHOWED SODERBERG A COPY OF HIS NOTE, WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE ANY EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO "ILLEGAL WEAPONS" IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION.

SODERBERG FLAGGED THIS DEMAND AS A POTENTIAL SHOW-STOPPER. SHE SAID SHE WAS VERY WORRIED THAT "THIS WHOLE THING WILL FALL APART" UNLESS ADAMS IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH ILLEGAL PARAMILITARY WEAPONS. SHE SAID SHE UNDERSTOOD SINN FEIN'S DESIRE TO ADDRESS THE "DEMILITARIZATION" ISSUE, BUT THIS COULD BE COVERED IN ALL-PARTY TALKS.

ADAMS CLAIMS HE HAS NO FLEXIBILITY

ADAMS ARGUED THAT IT HAD BEEN A "MASSIVE ACHIEVEMENT" JUST TO GET THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT ONBOARD WITH THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. HE WAS NOW AT HIS LIMIT. BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING DEADLOCK, THERE WAS A LOT OF DISAFFECTION IN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. IF LAST MONTH'S SINN FEIN CONFERENCE HAD BEEN AN IRA CONFERENCE INSTEAD, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A "TOTALLY DIFFERENT OUTCOME." ADAMS CLAIMED THAT THE BASIS OF LAST YEAR'S CEASEFIRE "NO LONGER EXISTS." HE SAID THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT HAD BEEN PROMISED THREE THINGS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE: (1) A SPEEDY MOVE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS, (2) EQUALITY OF TREATMENT, AND (3) HELP IN BRINGING THE UNIONISTS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ADAMS SAID NONE OF THOSE PROMISES HAD BEEN KEPT. HE SAID THE ONLY REASON THE CEASEFIRE CONTINUED WAS BECAUSE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT.

DESIRE FOR AMBIGUITY

AS A RESULT, ADAMS SAID HE COULD NOT SIGN UP TO A COMMISSION THAT WAS EXPLICITLY MANDATED TO ADDRESS ONLY ILLEGAL WEAPONS. IN ITS PUBLIC PRESENTATION, THE COMMISSION HAD TO BE BROADER THAN THAT. OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THE COMMISSION'S SCOPE HAD TO BE AMBIGUOUS ENOUGH TO LEAVE IT OPEN TO INTERPRETATION. THE IRA WAS JUST ONE OF SIX ARMED GROUPS IN NORTHERN IRELAND; IT WAS "UNFAIR" TO IGNORE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

THE 120,000 PRIVATELY-OWNED WEAPONS, OR THOSE ARMS HELD BY THE RUC AND BRITISH ARMY.

ADAMS SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO EXPLICITLY MANDATE THE COMMISSION TO ADDRESS ALL ARMS LOCATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, LEGAL AND ILLEGAL. HE SAID HE ACCEPTED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NEVER ALLOW THE LEGAL WEAPONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES TO BE EQUATED TO THOSE HELD ILLEGALLY BY THE PARAMILITARIES. THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE AMBIGUOUS ENOUGH SO THAT SINN FEIN WOULD BE FREE, IN ITS SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION, TO ADDRESS LEGAL AS WELL AS ILLEGAL ARMS.

PLEA FOR SINN FEIN TO RE-CONSIDER

SODERBERG REITERATED HER VIEW THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NOT ACCEPT WHAT SINN FEIN WAS PROPOSING. SHE FELT THAT LONDON WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN DROPPING COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE THAT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION'S MANDATE WAS TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 004985

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S
OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY
ADAMS

ILLEGAL WEAPONS. SODERBERG SAID THAT IT WAS IN SINN FEIN'S OWN INTEREST TO MOVE ON THIS ISSUE. CONTINUING OBJECT TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE WOULD DELAY THE START-UP OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, AND PUSH ALL-PARTY TALKS INTO NEXT YEAR.

SODERBERG REMINDED ADAMS THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE COMING FROM THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, NOT SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN DID NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BUY OFF ON EVERY ELEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT SINN FEIN BE WILLING TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING IRA WEAPONS. IF IT WANTED TO DO THAT IN A BROADER CONTEXT -- BY ALSO ADDRESSING WEAPONS HELD BY THE RUC AND BRITISH ARMY -- THAT WOULD BE OKAY. SINN FEIN COULD SIMPLY REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH BOTH LONDON AND DUBLIN AHEAD OF TIME THAT THIS WAS THE WAY IT PLANNED, BUT PROMISED TO CONSIDER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

SODERBERG'S SUGGESTION.

4. SODERBERG DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS
MESSAGE BEFORE DEPARTING DUBLIN. SMITH

BT


#4985

NNNN

<MSGID> M1892405

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

American Embassy London

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

OCTOBER 4, 1995

(DATE)

FROM:BLAIR HALL**TEL:**

FAX [44] 71 629-2295
FAX FTS 8/492-2794

ADDRESS:

U.S. Embassy London
PSC 801 BOX _____
FPO AE 09498-4000

TO:NANCY SODERBERG**FAX:****SUBJECT:****COMMENTS:**I WILL BE ON LEAVE IN THE AFTERNOON. YOU MAYCONTACT MIKE HABIB WITH ANY CHANGES YOU MAY HAVE.

Number of pages (including this sheet)

7

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: M Date: 1/5/16

2011-0355-F

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STA 10/03/95
THE AMBASSADOR
POL:BPHALL
POL:MHABIB DCM:TDEAL NSC:NSODERBERG
POLX TWI

AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMCONSUL BELFAST

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/03/00
TAGS: PGOV PREL UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SODERBERG MEETING WITH ANCRAM

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: The ~~decommissioning~~ *twin track approach* issue, David Trimble's leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party, and the President's visit to Northern Ireland were the key topics discussed at the Oct 3 meeting between NSC ~~Staff~~ *the Ambassador* Deputy NSC Director Nancy Soderberg and Northern Ireland Minister Michael Ancram. Soderberg said she had the sense that differences between Sinn Fein and HMG on decommissioning are bridgeable. Ancram agreed it may be possible to craft language acceptable to both sides, but warned that it must be defined sufficiently so that the process does not proceed on the basis of a misunderstanding. Ancram said UUP actions under Trimble suggest the party is approaching the point of engagement, even if it has not reached that point yet. Although Trimble remains skeptical of the ~~two-track~~ *two-track* approach, Ancram said HMG will continue to ~~try~~ to persuade him because it would be difficult to construct an effective process without the unionists involved. He suggested that it would be helpful for the President to greet Trimble when he visits Washington later this month. Soderberg noted that we are mindful of the need for balance in the program for the President's visit to Northern Ireland. She said we would welcome HMG's suggestions for using the visit to advance the peace process. End Summary.

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^{DNSA}
3. NSC Staff Director Nancy Soderberg met with Michael Ancram for a one-hour session at the Northern Ireland Office on October 3. Ancram was joined by Roderick Lyne, PM's foreign policy adviser, Paul Lever of the Cabinet Office Secretariat, NIO A/US Quentin Thomas and NIO officer Clare Checksfield. Soderberg was accompanied by the Ambassador, POLMINCOUNS and embassy notetaker.

peace process

4. in the course of a detailed discussion of the peace process, ancram said hmg stands by the third washington condition requiring a start to decommissioning. he said he made this clear in recent discussions with martin mcguinness, but also indicated to mcguinness that he recognizes sinn fein cannot accept that condition at this time. that being the case, he said, hmg is willing to keep the focus of the decommissioning commission on the first two conditions, i.e., a willingness to decommission and the modalities of doing so. washington III would be a point of judgement later in the process. ancram said there is no need for the commission at this stage to get into details of the types and numbers of arms that would be decommissioned. it could instead engage in a more general discussion on the details of decommissioning. lever commented that describing the commission as a "political project" rather than a military one does not cause hmg any particular problem, as long as sinn fein will be able to engage authoritatively with the commission. that is, it cannot subsequently talk only in generalities about "getting the gun out of politics" while disclaiming any responsibility for discussing practical modalities. ancram agreed that the commission's remit can include a political dimension but it also must deal with the process of decommissioning. thomas said hmg remains uncertain whether sinn fein can commit to this.

5. ancram asked for soderberg's assessment of the twin-track approach. she said the differences between sinn fein and hmg appear to be bridgeable even though the wording of any understanding necessarily will have

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to be somewhat fuzzy. both sides will have to accept some risk and, although neither now can show any give on the third washington condition. both should agree to publicly state their position on the third washington condition and consider the commission's recommendations on their merits. angram said this coincided with hmg's view of the commission. his impression, too, was that progress is achievable. however, he cautioned, hmg does not want the language to be so fuzzy that the end result is something unintended. he said we must not proceed on the basis of a misunderstanding of the other side's intentions.

6. angram then described several key points which guide british thinking on the peace process: first, it must be inclusive -- all parties must participate. secondly, it cannot be concerned with only an internal settlement. the process must also cover the other two strands: relations between northern ireland and the republic and relations between the uk and ireland. finally, it must move forward by broad consensus among all parties. complete agreement is unlikely, but no progress is possible unless steps receive broad support across the political spectrum.

unionism under trimble

7. soderberg asked angram how the election of david trimble would affect the unionist participation in the process. angram said that since Trimble assumed leadership of the ulster unionist party last month he has been a constructive force, not an obstructive one. in angram's view, the unionists under trimble are trying in their own way to engage. he cited the uup's implicit acceptance of the downing street declaration as a legitimate document and trimble's relatively measured statements on decommissioning as evidence that they have moved. this suggests, he said, that the unionists may get to a point at which they will begin to engage fully in the peace process -- although they are not there yet and it is not clear when they might get there.

8. angram recognized that trimble has doubts about the twin-track approach. he said unionist reluctance to

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participate in political talks stems from worries about a "slippery slope." mirroring sinn fein's concerns about the decommissioning commission, unionists worry that they will be drawn into a process over which they exercise little control. lever pointed out that although the uup already talks to hmg and the irish government, dealing with issues as agenda items in a political process in which sinn fein is a participant would change the context of discussion. having just assumed the leadership, ancram said, trimble is mindful that unionist opinion does not change rapidly and that earlier uup leaders such as O'Neill and Faulkner who moved too far ahead of it quickly found themselves out of a job. the more confidence trimble has in his position, the easier it will be for him to move forward. ancram suggested that a greeting by the president during trimble's late october visit to washington be helpful in this regard. such a drop-by would have great symbolic impact, he said, and could go a long way toward knocking down a "unionist prejudice" which holds that the administration favors the nationalist side.

the unionists and the twin track

9. when asked by the ambassador whether hmg would move forward on the two-track approach even without unionist acquiescence, ancram replied obliquely that he hopes to persuade them to come on board. he said hmg seeks to avoid having to make such a decision but noted, in the event, that it would be "difficult to envisage an effective two-track approach without trimble's participation." it would, ancram also pointed out, not be possible to move to all party talks without the unionists. he admitted that hmg has been focusing on defining the outlines of the approach and so has not yet explored with unionists to what degree they might become involved. thomas offered his view that the third washington condition remains key. should the unionists perceive that hmg is abandoning that condition, they would likely fall back to an absolutist position of rejection of the process.

presidential visit

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10. soderberg said the president is looking forward to his trip to northern ireland at the end of november. Responding to a comment from ancram, she noted that we are mindful of the need for balance and will work to ensure that all reasonable observers perceive the President's role as impartial and even-handed. In this light, she said, the White House is considering starting the program with a speech and other public events in Belfast and then going to Londonderry rather than the other way around as had been suggested by HMG. Ancram, who said he has not been involved in planning for the visit, offered his impression that logistical and transportation considerations weighed into HMG's recommendation and re-emphasized that programmatic balance is the key, whatever the order of the day's events might be.

11. soderberg confirmed that a presidential overnight in belfast remains under consideration. thomas, saying the symbolism of such a stay would be quite positive, welcomed the prospect of an overnight. he noted, however, that accommodating the large delegation, which might include business leaders and membes of congress, would be challenging. in closing, soderberg reiterated that the objective of the president's visit is to further the peace process. she said we welcome suggestions from HMG for structuring the president's program to achieve that goal.

CROWE##

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