

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Cables

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1397

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49	1	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Summit Postponement Likely (4 pages)	09/05/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002. cable	re: Situation in Northern Ireland (3 pages)	11/21/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: On the Eve of the Presidential Visit Bruce Morrison Blames the British (2 pages)	11/28/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
004. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Ambassador Meeting with Mayhew (6 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005. cable	re: Bruton Letter to Major (6 pages)	11/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
006. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Initial HMG Reaction to Bruton Letter (2 pages)	11/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
007a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Message to Prime Minister Major (2 pages)	10/21/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
007b. cable	re: Message to Prime Minister Major (1 page)	10/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
007c. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (3 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Mayhew (3 pages)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
009. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (4 pages)	11/18/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Meeting with Prime Minister Major (5 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Cables

2011-0355-F
rs1672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Ambassador's Meeting with UUP Leader David Trimble (5 pages)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
012. cable	re: Aheram McGuinness Meeting October 20 (9 pages)	10/23/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
013. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Ambassador Meeting with Mayhew (6 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
014. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (3 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)
015. cable	Roderic Lyne to Anthony Lake (6 pages)	09/16/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
016. cable	re: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Trying to Move Toward Launch of the Twin Track Approach (4 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
017. cable	re: Northern Ireland Peace Process: The Latest from Adams and Hume (2 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 051628Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3361
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 3333
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 012355

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT LIKELY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.13)
KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION IS FLUID, AN NIO OFFICIAL TELLS US IT IS "INCREASINGLY IMPROBABLE" THAT THE MAJOR-BRUTON SUMMIT WILL TAKE PLACE SEPT 6 AS SCHEDULED. THE KEY PROBLEM IS DUBLIN, UNDER PRESSURE FROM SINN FEIN, "WOBBLING" ON THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING IN THE ABSENCE OF IRA AGREEMENT. IN LIGHT OF THIS, MAJOR WILL CONVENE AN IN-HOUSE MEETING THIS EVENING TO DISCUSS WHETHER TO GO FORWARD WITH THE MEETING AND, IF NOT, HOW TO PROCEED. END SUMMARY

3. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY PETER BELL TOLD US SEPT 5 THAT PATRICK MAYHEW AND IRISH FM DICK SPRING FAILED TO RESOLVE REMAINING DIFFERENCES AT THEIR "FULL AND CORDIAL" MEETING IN DUBLIN YESTERDAY. THE KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUE IS WHETHER TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING EVEN THOUGH THE IRA HAS INDICATED IT WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH THAT BODY. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS RELUCTANT TO LAUNCH THE COMMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF IRA ACQUIESCENCE, BELIEVING THERE IS SCANT CHANCE FOR ITS SUCCESS IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT SOME GESTURE ON DECOMMISSIONING MUST BE MADE SO THAT POLITICAL TALKS CAN PROCEED.

4. REFERRING TO A SINN FEIN "FULL COURT PRESS," BELL SAID HMG APPRECIATES THE INTENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE TAOISEACH. HE DESCRIBED BRUTON AS BEING BETWEEN THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

ROCK OF "THE INTRINSIC LOGIC OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH" AND THE HARD PLACE OF HAVING TO EXPOSE HIMSELF AND HIS PARTY TO CRITICISM FROM JOHN HUME AND OTHERS AS HAVING "SOLD OUT" TO THE BRITISH. BELL CONTRASTED MAYHEW'S "CIVIL" SEPT 4 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP, IN WHICH ADAMS, AND PARTICULARLY MCGUINNESS STRONGLY CRITICIZED BUT DID NOT REJECT OUTRIGHT THE NOTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, TO THAT BETWEEN SPRING AND ADAMS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "BRUTAL." IN THAT MEETING, ACCORDING TO HMG'S INFORMATION, SINN FEIN SAID "PEOPLE WILL DIE" IF THE COMMISSION IS ESTABLISHED AND ASSERTED THAT BRUTON WILL BE BLAMED FOR RUINING THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. BELL SAID THAT EVEN AFTER THE MAYHEW-SPRING MEETING FAILED TO "SET THE TABLE," MAJOR HAD CONSIDERED USING THE MEETING TO PERSUADE BRUTON OF THE VIRTUES OF THE COMPROMISE WHICH HAD BEEN HAMMERED OUT AT WORKING LEVEL LAST WEEK. HOWEVER, HMG HEARD FROM DUBLIN THIS MORNING THAT BRUTON MAY WISH TO POSTPONE THE MEETING.

6. AS IT APPEARS UNLIKELY TO HMG THAT BRUTON WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE THAT POLITICAL STEP TOMORROW, BELL TOLD US THAT IT IS "INCREASINGLY IMPROBABLE" THE SUMMIT WILL BE HELD AS SCHEDULED. DESCRIBING THE SITUATION IN THE LATE AFTERNOON AS FLUID, BELL SAID THE PRIME MINISTER WILL CONVENE AN IN-HOUSE MEETING THIS EVENING TO DISCUSS WHETHER TO GO FORWARD WITH THE SUMMIT AND, IF NOT, HOW TO PROCEED. HOLDING A WORKING LEVEL MEETING INSTEAD IS ONE OPTION.

7. BELL SAID HMG DOES NOT THINK DUBLIN'S "WOBBLE" INDICATES BRUTON WANTS TO ABANDON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. BELL SAID BRITISH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO POLITICAL TALKS BEFORE ANY WEAPONS WERE ACTUALLY DECOMMISSIONED WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION WHICH THE IRISH SIDE RECOGNIZES. WITHOUT THE COMMISSION EVEN BEING LAUNCHED, HE SAID, HMG HAS NO BASIS FOR ENTERING POLITICAL TALKS. NOTING THE INDICATIONS OF THIS POSSIBILITY ALL ALONG, BELL SAID HMG THINKS BRUTON SIMPLY NEEDS MORE TIME TO SELL THE IDEA.

8. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THIS AFTERNOON, NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS TOLD US HMG IS STUDYING THE TEXT OF A NEW PROPOSAL WHICH IT HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. IN IT, THE IRISH PROPOSED DOING AWAY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION IN FAVOR OF A SINGLE ARBITER, SPECIFICALLY SENATOR

IMMEDIATE

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MITCHELL. THOMAS SAID INITIAL BRITISH REACTION IS NOT POSITIVE AS THIS IN ESSENCE WOULD MEAN HANDING OVER THE PROBLEM AND BRITISH AUTHORITY TO A THIRD PARTY. THOMAS SAID HE ALSO EXPECTS THE SUMMIT TO BE POSTPONED, BUT DID NOT KNOW HOW THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE.

9. BELL SAID THAT ~~SCRUBBING THE SUMMIT AT LAST MINUTE WILL SEND A "WRONG SIGNAL."~~ HOWEVER, A SUMMIT MEETING THAT PULLS BACK FROM THE WIDELY EXPECTED DEAL MIGHT BE EVEN WORSE. HE WORRIED THAT THIS MIGHT STIFFEN UNIONIST RESISTANCE AND COULD STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF "NO-BRAINER HARDLINER" CANDIDATES IN THE UPCOMING UUP LEADERSHIP ELECTION. THOMAS, EVEN MORE THAN BELL, WAS CRITICAL OF DUBLIN'S INABILITY TO HOLD TO ITS EARLIER CHOEN COURSE UNDER PRESSURE FROM SINN FEIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 012355

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT LIKELY

10. COMMENT: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUMMIT TAKES PLACE TOMMOROW -- AND IT APPEARS IT WILL NOT -- A TWIN-TRACK APPROACH WHICH LAUNCHES POLITICAL TALKS IN PARALLEL WITH AN EFFORT ON DECOMMISSIONING OFFERS THE ONLY REAL CHANCE TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT PHASE. ALTHOUGH HMG, CITING PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, WILL NOT YET AGREE TO A SPECIFIC DATE FOR AN ALL-PARTY ROUNDTABLE, IT DOES AGREE THAT THIS IS THE NEXT STEP. IT IS A STEP WHICH COULD BE TAKEN WITHIN MONTHS. THIS APPARENTLY SATISFIES SINN FEIN'S NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SIMPLY CANNOT CONSIDER THAT SIDE OF THE EQUATION WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO POINT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WORKING ON THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. END COMMENT.

CROWE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NNNN

<MSGID> M1840115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

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[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Cables

2011-0355-F
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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: FETIG HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 281106Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6339
INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7733
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 015928

EXDIS

NSC FOR LAKE

STATE FOR U/S TARNOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/95

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: ON THE EVE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT BRUCE
MORRISON BLAMES THE BRITISH

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) I WANT TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO A SERIES OF TV
INTERVIEWS BROADCAST HERE YESTERDAY EVENING AND THIS
MORNING WITH BRUCE MORRISON. MORRISON, WHO IS VARIOUSLY
DESCRIBED AS "A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION WHO ADVISES ON IRISH AFFAIRS" OR "ONE OF
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S KEY AIDES," SQUARELY BLAMES THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE CURRENT IMPASSE BETWEEN
LONDON AND DUBLIN OVER THE PEACE PROCESS. WHILE I
UNDERSTAND THAT MORRISON HOLDS A POSITION IN THE
ADMINISTRATION, IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO ME THAT HE HAS
A FORMAL BRIEF ON NORTHERN IRELAND, LET ALONE THAT HE IS
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC SPOKESMAN ON THIS ISSUE.

4. (C) THE POINT HERE IS THAT MORRISON, ALLEGEDLY
SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION, HAS PUBLICLY
TAKEN SIDES WITH SINN FEIN AND DUBLIN AGAINST THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON AN ISSUE OF UTMOST SENSITIVITY.
IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT SUCH REMARKS (SEE BELOW)
HAVE NOT HELPED THE ATMOSPHERE HERE LESS THAN 24 HOURS
EFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

5. (C) I NEED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE

Put in my book

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.74)
KBH 4/11/2023

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORRISON'S REMARKS AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. IN THE MEANTIME, I AM INSTRUCTING MY SPOKESMAN TO RESPOND TO PRESS QUERIES BY STATING THAT WHILE MR. MORRISON IS A MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED WERE PERSONAL ONES THAT DO NOT REFLECT THE POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.

6. (C) AMONG THE ON-CAMERA COMMENTS MADE BY MORRISON INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: "QUITE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO FIND FAULT WITH EVERY MOVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE TO SHAPE THIS PROCESS SUCCESSFULLY"... "I THINK ALL PARTIES HAVE MOVED EXCEPT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH SEEMS TO BE ABOUT WHERE IT WAS FIVE MONTHS AGO"... "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CAN STAND ITS GROUND ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT DISARMAMENT IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE PEACE PROCESS BUT THEY HAVE BEEN OFFERED MECHANISMS TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD WHICH THEY HAVEN'T ACCEPTED. I THINK THEY SHOULD BE MORE OPEN MINDED"... "THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS WAS PUT FORWARD AS A WAY IN WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD MAINTAIN ITS PRINCIPLE ON DECOMMISSIONING BUT THEY HAVEN'T TAKEN UP ON THE VERY PROCESS WHICH WAS CREATED TO GET THEM OUT OF A BIND"... "THERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN NOT ONLY GERRY ADAMS BUT ALL THE POLITICAL LEADERS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE"... "THE TWIN TRACK PROCESS AS BEING OFFERED THROUGH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT CAME ABOUT THROUGH CONCESSIONS BY A NUMBER OF PARTIES INCLUDING SINN FEIN WHICH WENT FURTHER THAN IT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE GONE"... "THE SYMBOLIC TURNOVER OF WEAPONS IS NOT THE POINT HERE"....CROWE

BT

#5928

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<MSGID> M1970673

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: PETERS SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071740Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3460

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 012503

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.15)

KRM 4/11/2023

EXDIS

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS; PLS PASS OVP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH MAYHEW

REF: LONDON 12448 (NODIS)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PATRICK MAYHEW IS LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN NO. 10 ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, HMG DOES NOT HAVE A FOLLOW-ON PLAN AND IS WAITING FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SORT OUT ITS POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED SUMMIT. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN BRUTON'S POSITION. HE PRODUCED THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG HAD NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM ITS STANCE ON DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS AND THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THAT POSITION AT THE TIME THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WAS AGREED. WITH FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CERTAIN OVER THE COMING WEEKS, MAYHEW SAID THERE IS NO REASON NOW TO FACTOR THE ABORTED SUMMIT INTO PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW SEPT 7 FOR A 75-MINUTE MEETING TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT. MAYHEW OPENED BY NOTING THAT MICHAEL ANCRAM WOULD BE HEADING TO WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON FOR WHAT HMG HOPES WILL A USEFUL EXCHANGE WITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE ADMINISTRATION. THE AMBASSADOR WELCOMED THE VISIT AND SAID HE UNDERSTANDS HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS AT THE NSC AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE BEING ARRANGED.

THE POSTPONEMENT

4. MAYHEW SAID THAT SINN FEIN'S THREAT TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE HAD "DEEPLY SHAKEN" THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND HAD HAD A "DEVASTATING EFFECT" ON BRUTON. HE SPECULATED THAT THIS, IN PART, IS BECAUSE IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO DEALING DIRECTLY AND ADVERSELY WITH THIS ASPECT OF THE IRA. HE ALSO EXPRESSED SOME SYMPATHY FOR BRUTON WHO FOUND HIMSELF IN A POLITICAL VISE, UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE COMBINED PRESSURE OF ADAMS, HUME, REYNOLDS, ET AL. IN SHORT, MAYHEW SAID, BRUTON BACKED AWAY FROM PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS BECAUSE HE "HAD A GUN WAVED IN HIS FACE."

5. MAYHEW HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE TAOISEACH NOW APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE AND "BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL." FOLLOWING A COURTEOUS BUT POINTED EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS YESTERDAY, PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRUTON AND MAJOR REMAIN GOOD. BRUTON TOLD MAJOR THAT HIS COALITION COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE AND MAYHEW SAID HE HIMSELF HAD DETECTED NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRUTON AND DICK SPRING.

HMG STICKS TO THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION

6. TURNING TO THE CAUSE OF THE POSTPONEMENT, MAYHEW SAID HMG HAD BEEN TAKEN COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE BY THE LAST MINUTE IRISH CHANGES. HMG DID NOT FIND THE SUGGESTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION BE CHANGED TO A SINGLE ARBITER WITH INDEPENDENT POLITICAL AUTHORITY O BE A HELPFUL ONE. NOT ONLY WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE TROUBLE DELEGATING ITS AUTHORITY, BUT THE UNIONISTS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A SOLE ARBITER, PARTICULARLY ONE WITH A POLITICAL AND NOT A MILITARY BACKGROUND.

7. RESPONDING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ABOUT HMG'S POSITION ON DECOMMISSIONING, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED THAT HMG "HAS NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION" AND HAS NO POLITICAL ROOM TO DO SO EVEN IF IT WERE SO INCLINED. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SUMMIT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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COMMUNIQUE WOULD HAVE REFERRED ONLY TO THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS, I.E. ESTABLISHING A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND OUTLINING MODALITIES FOR ACCOMPLISHING IT. MAYHEW SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CONTENT TO DROP REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE NECESSITY OF SOME WEAPONS BEING DECOMMISSIONED AS A CONDITION FOR COMMENCEMENT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS. HOWEVER, THIS DID NOT INDICATE A RELAXATION OF ITS POSITION. HMG BELIEVES ADHERENCE TO THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION IS NECESSARY TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE REQUIRED SO THAT ALL PARTIES WILL COME TO THE TABLE. THE UNIONISTS SIMPLY WILL NOT ATTEND WITHOUT THAT CONDITION BEING MET.

8. MAYHEW SAID THAT HMG ALSO HAD AGREED TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION MAY GIVE. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ADVISE, AFTER IT CONFERS WITH THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARIES, THAT SOMETHING OTHER THAN BEGINNING THE ACTUAL PROCESS OF DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONS WOULD GENERATE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE TO ALLOW THE ROUNDTABLE TO BEGIN WITHOUT FEAR OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE, HMG WILL FAIRLY CONSIDER THAT ADVICE ON ITS MERITS. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, AT THIS POINT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN DECOMMISSIONING COULD PRODUCE SUCH CONFIDENCE.

9. MOREOVER, MAYHEW CONTINUED, BOTH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND SINN FEIN ALL ALONG HAVE BEEN WELL AWARE OF THE BRITISH POSITION. MAYHEW GAVE THE AMBASSADOR A COPY OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND OF THE CHILCOT-DALTON MINUTE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG'S POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. (TEXTS BELOW IN PARAS 12-13.) HE ALSO READ FROM THE MEMCON OF HIS MEETING WITH SINN FEIN LEADERS TO HOW THAT HE UNAMBIGUOUSLY HAD MADE THE POINT TO ADAMS. THE IDEA OF DECOMMISSIONING PREDATES THE CEASEFIRE, WAS AMPLY BRIEFED TO ALL PARTIES -- INCLUDING MSSRS. ADAMS AND REYNOLDS -- BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND IS NOT A SUDDEN OR WHIMSICAL DEMAND OF HMG, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED.

NEXT STEPS

10. MAYHEW SAID HE IS NOT AS PESSIMISTIC AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

COMMISSION (REFTEL). ALTHOUGH BOTH GOVERNMENTS REMAIN OPEN TO OTHER IDEAS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NOW NO SERVICEABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMMISSION. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, WE MUST "LET THE MUD SETTLE" BEFORE WE CAN SEE OUR WAY FORWARD. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO THE IRISH, AS THEY ARE THE ONES WHO WITHDREW. SO FOR NOW LONDON WILL WAIT, AS IT UNDERSTANDS BRUTON NEEDS SOME TIME TO GET "THE OTHERS" LINED UP. AT THIS MOMENT THERE ARE NO LIAISON GROUP OR OTHER CONTACTS SCHEDULED, ACCORDING TO MAYHEW. HE EXPECTS, HOWEVER, THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE PRIME MINISTERS WILL COMMISSION A GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS HOW TO PUT THE PIECES BACK TOGETHER.

11. SECONDING COMMENTS BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS, MAYHEW SAID THAT IF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS STAND FIRM, SINN FEIN WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. ANCRAM WILL BE MAKING THIS POINT FORCEFULLY IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID. ANCRAM ALSO WILL TAKE THE MESSAGE THAT THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. THERE ARE CERTAIN TO BE MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, MAYHEW POINTED OUT.

12. TEXT OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE PREPARED FOR SEPT 6 SUMMIT

BEGIN TEXT:

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS, AIMED AT EACHING IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD COMMENCE BEFORE THE END OF 1995. A SERIES OF MEETINGS WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION. THIS COMMISSION WILL HAVE THE INITIAL AND LIMITED REMIT OF

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

REPORTING TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS BY MID-NOVEMBER 1995, ON WHETHER IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A CLEAR COMMITMENT EXISTS ON THE PART OF THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARY ORGANISATIONS TO THE FULL AND VERIFIABLE DECOMMISSIONING OF ALL ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS IN THE APPROPRIATE CONTEXT AND MANNER. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AIM TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER 1995, TO AGREE THE APPROPRIATE WAY FORWARD.

END TEXT

13. CHILCOT-DALTON CONFIDENTIAL MINUTE

BEGIN TEXT:

TASK OF COMMISSION

(11) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY REFERRED TO, THE GROUP ENVISAGE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP A COMMISSION WOULD BE INVITED TO DEVELOP A SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING IN CONSULTATION WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES. ON THE BASIS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS, THE COMMISSION WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE MODALITIES FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS WHICH IN ITS VIEW WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DECOMMISSIONING. SUBSEQUENTLY THE COMMISSION COULD, IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SAW ADVANTAGE IN IT, BE REQUESTED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

(12) THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE GIVEN AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE IN TAKING FORWARD ITS WORK ON MODALITIES. THE GROUP THEREFORE SEES A NEED FOR TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH WILL ENABLE THE COMMISSION TO RESPOND TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROCESS ITSELF. IT RECOMMENDS TERMS OF REFERENCE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

-- TO CONSULT WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES, INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS ON THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS, ON THE TERMS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT APPLY FOR A SCHEME FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS; TO REPORT TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSULTATIONS, ON THE PROGRESS OF ITS WORK AND ON HOW THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS MIGHT BE TAKEN FORWARD, AND TO MAKE PROPOSALS OUTLINING THE MODALITIES FOR A SCHEME ON WHICH AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE;

-- TO CARRY OUT SUCH OTHER TASKS AS MAY BE ASSIGNED TO IT FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS JOINTLY AND, IN PARTICULAR, IF REQUESTED, TO:

O ASSIST THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO PUT IN PLACE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS; AND

O PARTICIPATE IN THE SUPERVISION AND VERIFICATION OF THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS ITSELF INCLUDING, IF APPROPRIATE, ACCEPTING WITHIN ITS CONTROL ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS.

CROWE

BT

#2503

NNNN

<MSGID> M1854982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 5430 MSGID: M1937597

OAACZYUW RUEHDLA5430 3101559-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 061559Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.76)
KBH 4/11/2023

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8962

INFO: RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST IMMEDIATE 3706
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3476

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE
NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

1. CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON:
1.5 (B) .

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

2. (X) TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON HAS WRITTEN TO UK PRIME
MINISTER MAJOR TODAY (NOVEMBER 6) SUGGESTING THAT THE TWO
OF THEM HOLD A SUMMIT IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER TO
LAUNCH THE LONG-DELAYED TWIN-TRACK PROCESS. IN THE LETTER,
A COPY OF WHICH WAS PASSED TO US BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FULL TEXT AT PARA 4), BRUTON OUTLINES WHAT
HE SEES AS THE SIX KEY ISSUES AND "THE SOLUTION WITHIN OUR
GRASP ON EACH OF THEM":

-- DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS: THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD SET
A "REASONABLE TARGET DATE WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE
THE UTMOST ENDEAVORS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT." THE DATE
SHOULD BE SIX WEEKS FROM THE TIME THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
BEGINS ITS WORK.

2-3 months

-- PROCEDURE FOR PREPARATORY TALKS: PROCEED AS PROVIDED FOR
IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE OF THE POSTPONED SEPTEMBER 6

SUMMIT.

-- BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS: A "REASONABLE" FORMULATION IS THAT THE RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LOYALISTS WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS."

*not
rec. pub. ltr.*

-- DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL ADDRESS: LEAVE THE REFERENCE TO ARMS AMBIGUOUS (I.E. NO ADJECTIVE SUCH AS ILLEGAL, PARAMILITARY, OR UNAUTHORIZED) AND "ALLOW ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH."

? tough

-- EXTENT OF INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT: THE INTERNATIONAL BODY SHOULD "TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW, NOT JUST WASHINGTON 1 AND 2."

-- POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY: THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE GIVEN "A RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING," BUT ANY MENTION OF IT IN A JOINT TEXT MUST REFLECT THE OPPOSITION OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS TO "ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND."

3. (C) COMMENT: BRENDAN SCANNELL, COUNSELLOR FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN DFA'S ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, TOLD US THAT THE LETTER HAD ALSO BEEN SHARED WITH OPPOSITION PARTY FIANNA FAIL, BUT WAS OTHERWISE BEING CLOSELY HELD. HE SAID THE PROPOSALS IN THE LETTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP ON NOVEMBER 8. WITH THE FAILURE OF SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS AT THEIR NOVEMBER 3 MEETING, DUBLIN FEELS IT MUST NOW RE-ENGAGE TO RESTORE FORWARD MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. BRUTON SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN TO HEART GERRY ADAMS'S ARGUMENT TO HIM LAST WEEK THAT THE UK AND SINN FEIN ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO WORK THIS OUT ON THEIR OWN. WHILE IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE IRISH WILL BE ABLE TO DO IN THIS REGARD, THEY NEVERTHELESS SEE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AS A VALUABLE SOURCE OF LEVERAGE TO PRESS SINN FEIN AND LONDON TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR LONG-HELD POSITIONS, AND DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY SLIP BY. END COMMENT.

4. (C) FULL TEXT OF BRUTON'S LETTER TO MAJOR:

6 NOVEMBER, 1995

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN MAJOR, MP,
PRIME MINISTER.

DEAR JOHN,

I AM WRITING TO YOU TO GIVE YOU MY VIEWS ON THE CURRENT POSITION IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND MY VIEWS ON HOW WE CAN NOW MOVE SPEEDILY FORWARD WITH A JOINT APPROACH, THAT WILL LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES.

OUR CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS SO FAR HAS BEEN BASED ON OUR ADOPTING A JOINT APPROACH, AND ON PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE THE TAKING OF

ANY IMPORTANT INITIATIVE. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND I REGRET TO HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT I WAS SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN THAT YOUR "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER, WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN THE LIAISON GROUP SPECIFICALLY AS AN AID TO YOUR ON-GOING DISCUSSION WITH SINN FEIN, WAS SENT TO ALL THE PARTIES, AND TO THE U.S., AND WAS MADE PUBLIC ON FRIDAY, ALL WITHOUT OUR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OR AGREEMENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

I NEED HARDLY ELABORATE ON THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CAN BE CAUSED BY A UNILATERAL DEFINITION, ON EITHER SIDE, OF WHAT PURPORTS TO BE - AND INDEED CAN ONLY BE - A BILATERAL AND AGREED PROCESS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

WE BOTH CAME TO THE TABLE AT CANNES WITH PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY. FOR MY PART I PUT IT FORWARD IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME THE PROLONGED AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS STALEMATE I FORESAW ARISING FROM YOUR UNILATERAL INSISTENCE ON "WASHINGTON THREE" AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND MY OWN CONCLUSION, WHICH I ARRIVED AT RELUCTANTLY AND ONLY AFTER SERIOUS EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE SITUATION, THAT THAT PRE-CONDITION WAS NOT ACHIEVABLE.

THE VALUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL BE DIRECTLY PROPORTIONATE TO THE PROSPECT THAT ITS WORK WILL TRANSCEND THIS IMPASSE, AND NOT MERELY POSTPONE IT. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW AT THE LAST ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE ENCOURAGINGLY INVOKED THIS POSSIBILITY, ADMITTEDLY WITH SOME PERSONAL SCEPTICISM. I HAVE DONE WHAT I CAN IN THE BACKGROUND TO PROMOTE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF SINN FEIN ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES ALSO.

AS I SEE IT THERE ARE SIX KEY ISSUES AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SOLUTIONS WITHIN OUR GRASP ON EACH OF THEM.

THESE SIX ISSUES ARE

A DATE FOR ALL PARTY, ROUND TABLE TALKS

THE PROCEDURE FOR HOLDING PREPATORY (SIC) TALKS

THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING
AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THE INTERNATIONAL
BODY WILL DEAL WITH

THE EXTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT IN
TERMS OF THE "WASHINGTON" CONDITIONS, AND

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY.

ON A DATE FOR ROUND TABLE TALKS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT A REASONABLE TARGET DATE SHOULD BE SET WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE UTMOST ENDEAVOURS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT. I BELIEVE THE DATE SHOULD BE SIX WEEKS FROM THE DATE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY COMMENCES WORK.

2-3

ON PREPARATORY TALKS I BELIEVE WE WOULD PROCEED AS IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR THE POSTPONED 6 SEPTEMBER SUMMIT, I.E.

no "THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT AIMED AT REACHING AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD COMMENCE (REFER TO SIX WEEKS). A SERIES OF MEETING (SIC) WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENT SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS."

THERE SHOULD BE A COMPLETELY OPEN AGENDA FOR THOSE TALKS.

ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND ARMS I BELIEVE THE FORMULA OF THE RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LOYALISTS WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS" REPRESENTS A REASONABLE BASIS FOR MOVING

no

FORWARD.

ON THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS/THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ISSUE, I BELIEVE THE OPTION ~~MICHAEL ANGRAM PUT TO~~ ??
MARTIN MCGUINNESS OF HAVING NO ADJECTIVE
(~~ILLEGAL/PARAMILITARY/UNAUTHORISED~~) IN THE COMMUNIQUE TEXT
AND ALLOWING ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH
REPRESENTS THE WAY FORWARD. I UNDERSTAND YOU, ON BEHALF OF
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL SAY THE ISSUE IS ONE OF
PARAMILITARY ARMS. WE WILL NOT DISAGREE WITH YOU ON THIS
BUT WILL UPHOLD SINN FEINN'S RIGHT TO PUT ITS OWN POSITION
ON THIS ISSUE TO THE
BODY AS IT SEES FIT.

ON 'WASHINGTON' 1, 2 AND 3 I BELIEVE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
SHOULD TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW,
AND NOT JUST 'WASHINGTON' 1 AND 2, AS YOUR "PRESS LINE" HAS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE
NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

IT IN THE "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER.

A POSSIBLE WAY OF DEALING, IN PRACTICE, WITH BOTH THE
'WASHINGTON' CONDITIONS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS, IS TO
DESCRIBE THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AS REPORTING ON
THE ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR OR OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL AIMS
AND ACTIVITIES.

ON THE POLITICAL TRACK, THE IRISH SIDE IN THE LIAISON GROUP

MADE CLEAR WE EXPECTED THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL
TRACK TO BE MORE PROACTIVE THAN IN YOUR PAPER. THE CHANGES
SUBSEQUENTLY MADE DID NOT REFLECT THIS, BUT INSTEAD FLAGGED
AN ELECTED BODY.

I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION, AND ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO ACCEPT,
THAT UNIONIST PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A BODY SHOULD BE GIVEN A
RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING.

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT OPPOSITION TO AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
IS A COMMON RALLYING POINT FOR NORTHERN NATIONALISTS
(COMPARABLE IN THIS RESPECT TO A UNITED IRELAND PROPOSAL

FOR UNIONISTS). CONSEQUENTLY, THEY ARE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND. IF AN ELECTED BODY IS TO BE FLAGGED THEN ANY JOINT TEXT MUST ALSO ADEQUATELY REFLECT THE CONSISTENT VIEW OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS I HAVE TOUCHED ON ABOVE.

I BELIEVE YOU AND I SHOULD NOW MOVE QUICKLY TO HOLDING A SUMMIT, SAY IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER, AND HAVING A REASONABLE JOINT POSITION TO PUT TO ALL SIDES.

I WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A TELEPHONE DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON THESE MATTERS BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. I WOULD PARTICULARLY WELCOME AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE UNIONIST POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS, IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR CONTACTS WITH THEM.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JOHN BRUTON
TAOISEACH

END TEXT OF BRUTON LETTER. SMITH
BT
#5430

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG

SIT: HARMON LAKEA SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071550Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5711

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 3607

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7622

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 015174

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355 - F (2.77)

KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/05

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL HMG REACTION TO
BRUTON LETTER

REF: DUBLIN 5430

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL J. HABIB, POLITICAL MINISTER
COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B).

2. (C) NIO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT HEAD CLARE
CHECKSFIELD TOLD US HMG VIEWS THE NOV 6 LETTER FROM
TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON TO PM JOHN MAJOR (REF) AS PART OF
THE ON-GOING EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND
NOT, AS THE BRITISH PRESS HAS PORTRAYED IT, A PROPOSAL
FOR A DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGH. SHE SAID HMG HAS YET TO
FORM A CONSIDERED REACTION TO THE LETTER BUT EXPECTS TO
DISCUSS THE VARIOUS IDEAS IN SOME DETAIL AT THE NOV 8
ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP MEETING.

3. (C) AS A PRELIMINARY REACTION, CHECKSFIELD SAID THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DISSENT FROM THE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE SIX KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED.
AND, SHE SAID, THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY PM BRUTON DO
NOT, IN THE MAIN, DEPART FROM IDEAS PREVIOUSLY
DISCUSSED. CHECKSFIELD OFFERED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
ON SOME OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS:

-- TARGET DATE: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OBJECT
TO SETTING A REASONABLE TARGET DATE FOR COMMENCEMENT OF
LL-PARTY TALKS IN THE NOT DISTANT FUTURE. WHILE HMG IS
WILLING TO DISCUSS THE IRISH PROPOSAL, IT IS "NOT
CONVINCED" THAT SIX WEEKS IS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

INTERNATIONAL BODY TO DO ITS WORK. CHECKSFIELD SAID HMG UNDERSTANDS THE PROPOSAL TO MEAN SIX WEEKS FROM THE TIME THE BODY ACTUALLY BECOMES OPERATIONL, NOT FROM THE TIME OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF IT MEMBERSHIP AND FORMATION.

-- REMIT: HMG CAN BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE JOINT DECLARATION REGARDING THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS, IF THE BASIC CONCEPT IS CLEAR TO THE PARTIES. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT HAS BEEN REACHED. AT THE NOV 3 MEETING IN BELFAST, MCGUINNESS TOLD ANCRAM THAT THE BODY'S REMIT MUST INCLUDE BRITISH ARMY WEAPONS, AND NOT ONLY "PARAMILITARY" WEAPONS, HOWEVER DESCRIBED. WHILE HMG DOES NOT OBJECT TO SINN FEIN PUTTING ITS OWN POSITION TO THE BODY AS IT SEES FIT, IT CANNOT ACCEPT A REMIT WHICH INCLUDES ARMS OF THE SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. HMG EXPECTS THAT SUCH A REMIT WOULD GIVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT PROBLEMS AS WELL.

-- WASHINGTON THREE: CHECKSFIELD SAID IT IS UNCLEAR HOW THE IRISH PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE BODY WOULD OPERATE IN PRACTICE. SHE SAID HMG WOULD SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION AT THE LIAISON GROUP MEETING.

4. (C) CHECKSFIELD CONFIRMED THAT MAJOR AND BRUTON DID EXCHANGE A FEW WORDS IN JERUSALEM. NIO SO FAR HAS HAD NO READ OUT FROM NO. 10 STAFF WHO JUST RETURNED AND ARE PREPARING TO DEPART MOMENTARILY FOR NEW ZEALAND. NIO IS OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT HAD THE BRIEF DISCUSSION CONTAINED NEW POINTS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY NOW.

CROWE

BT

#5174

NNNN

<MSGID> M1940103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT:

Message to Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.73)
KBM 4/11/2023Purpose

To reply to Major's message of October 19 on Northern Ireland.

Background

Major sent you a message immediately following my consultations with Rod Lyne and Northern Ireland Office officials in London (Tab B). His message says that I was "disappointed" by my latest conversation with Gerry Adams, which took place over the phone on October 17. Actually, I still believe Adams has accepted in principle the "twin-track" approach and the need to engage on the issue of decommissioning paramilitaries' weapons. The British Government and Sinn Fein now need to negotiate face-to-face on the remaining issues. Your reply to Major reviews where we think the process stands and cautions that Sinn Fein's agreement to participate in the twin track is not open-ended.

Major warns that the need to bring the unionist parties on board could slow the process down. We have urged the the British to consult closely with the unionists, especially new UUP party leader David Trimble, without giving them a veto over moving the process forward. Your draft reply to Major indicates that you will try to drop by the Vice President's meeting with Trimble next week. The drop-by is an option on your schedule that I strongly recommend you do.

Major also says that he still believes it should be possible to launch the twin track before your visit to Northern Ireland. This is what we are aiming for, in order to avoid pressure during the trip. Your reply, however, assures Major that we expect the trip to be successful in any event, which we do.

RECOMMENDATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Mary Ann Peters

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 1.6(b)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

That you approve the transmittal of the message at Tab A to Prime Minister Major.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to Major

Tab B Incoming message from Major

FROM: WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMB LONDON

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

FOR AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 19 ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. I'M GLAD YOU FOUND TONY'S VISIT HELPFUL. HE HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT HE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SINN FEIN'S CURRENT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH AND BELIEVES ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE VERY CLOSE TO SIGNING ON. IN FACT, ADAMS TOLD TONY OVER THE PHONE THAT HE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS IRA ARMS AUTHORITATIVELY WITH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, WHICH WE SEE AS THE KEY COMMITMENT SINN FEIN NEEDS TO MAKE. I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTY OF CLEARING THE REMAINING HURDLE OF FINDING WORDING FOR THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT SINN FEIN'S AGREEMENT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH IS CERTAINLY A STEP FORWARD.

AS TONY TOLD ROD LYNE AND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW, OUR SENSE IS THAT SETTING A TARGET DATE IS A VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SINN FEIN'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH AND THAT ADAMS WILL NEED TO SHOW PROGRESS TOWARD TALKS TO KEEP HIS CONSTITUENCY ON BOARD. THAT IS WHY WE ARE ENCOURAGING SINN FEIN TO ENGAGE FULLY WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT TO WORK OUT THE REMAINING PROBLEMS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AS LONG AS IT IS USEFUL TO YOU AND JOHN BRUTON.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING ALONG THE UNIONIST PARTIES, PARTICULARLY DAVID TRIMBLE AND THE UUP. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CERTAINLY DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO MAKE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON A SUCCESS. I WILL TRY TO FIND THE TIME TO DROB BY HIS MEETING WITH AL GORE TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO AGENDA FOR NORTHERN IRELAND BEYOND SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF ITS PEOPLE AND THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO REACH A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

FINALLY I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I TOO AM LOOKING FORWARD TO MY VISIT TO THE UK AND IRELAND IN LATE NOVEMBER-EARLY DECEMBER, AND HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE A SUCCESS. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN NEW YORK.

WARM REGARDS,

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (3 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Cables

2011-0355-F
rs1672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 151511Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5951
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3624
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 015469

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/05
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MAYHEW

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.81)
KRM 4/11/2023

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR..
REASON 1.5(B).
2. (C) SUMMARY: SIR PATRICK MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR NOV 14 THAT THE WAY FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS IS "NOT TERRIBLY CLEAR" AT THIS MOMENT. REAFFIRMING HMG'S COMMITMENT TO PRESS AHEAD, MAYHEW SAID HE BELIEVES THAT PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUALLY REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ARE GOOD, BUT NOTED THAT MANY LOOSE ENDS REMAIN TO BE TIED UP. THIS INCLUDES DOING SOME WORK WITH THE UUP TO ENSURE IT WILL NOT REJECT OUTRIGHT THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH. ACCORDING TO MAYHEW, BRUTON'S LONDON SPEECH HAS "DONE SOME DAMAGE" BY FEEDING UNIONIST DOUBTS ABOUT DUBLIN'S ROLE. ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTS PM MAJOR TO SPEAK BY PHONE WITH PM BRUTON "SHORTLY," MAYHEW DEMURRED WHEN ASKED FOR MORE SPECIFICS ON THE TIMING AND CONTENT OF THE CALL. END SUMMARY
3. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW ON NOV 14 TO REVIEW THE STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. MAYHEW WAS JOINED BY MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM, INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT HEAD CLARE CHECKSFIELD AND HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY. POLOFF ACCOMPANIED THE AMBASSADOR.
4. MAYHEW SAID HE WISHED HE COULD BE MORE OPTIMISTIC AS HE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT APPROACHES. HE SAID HE DOES NOT FEEL PESSIMISTIC, BUT THE WAY FORWARD AT THIS MOMENT IS "NOT TERRIBLY CLEAR" SO IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ENCOURAGING. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, HMG IS ANXIOUS TO PRESS AHEAD ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT "HASN'T COME THIS FAR JUST TO PRESS IT INTO THE SAND."

5. BRUTON'S SPEECH, MAYHEW SAID, WAS OBJECTIONABLE ON MANY GROUNDS, NOT LEAST THAT HE CHOSE LONDON AS THE VENUE FROM WHICH TO DELIVER HIS "EXTRAORDINARY" REMARKS. FOR EXAMPLE, MAYHEW CONTINUED, BRUTON HAD THE GALL TO COME TO LONDON TO COMPARE THE ABSENCE OF A BRITISH APOLOGY FOR ITS SECURITY FORCES' ACTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE LACK OF AN APOLOGY BY JAPAN FOR ITS ACTIONS IN BUILDING THE SIAM RAILROAD WITH POW LABOR. MAYHEW ADDED QUICKLY THAT WHAT IS PROBLEMATIC IS NOT THE HURT SENSIBILITIES, BUT THE FACT THAT IT HAS "DONE SOME DAMAGE" IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. MAYHEW SAID THAT IAN PAISLEY, WHO HAD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE AMBASSADOR IN A MEETING IN MAYHEW'S OFFICE, ASKED HIM "HOW CAN OUR PEOPLE BE EXPECTED TO UNDERSTAND EVEN PREPARATORY TALKS WITH AN IRISH GOVERNMENT LIKE THIS."

6. MAYHEW SAID THE "DISCOURAGING STANCE" HE ENCOUNTERED FROM PAISLEY IS NOT UNEXPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY EXPECT TO BRING THE DUP ALONG. BUT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT AFFORD TO GNORE THE OFFICIAL UNIOISTS. IT IS NOT A MATTR, HE EMPHASIZED, OF GIVING THE UNIONISTS A VETO. ANCRAM SAID THAT HMG IS NOT LOOKING FOR THE UUP TO SIGN UP TO THE TEXT OF A JOINT DECLARATION, BUT IT MUST HAVE SOME REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL NOT REJECT IT OUTRIGHT. HE SAID TRIMBLE REMAINS SOLD ON HIS ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL AND HAS NOT SIGNED ON TO THE TWIN TRACK. MAYHEW SAID HMG DOES NOT DISCOURAGE HIM FROM MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL, BUT HAS AND WILL ARGUE THAT ITS ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IS IF IT IS PROMOTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POLITICAL TRACK DISCUSSION. OTHERWISE, THERE CAN BE NO CHANCE AT ALL OF GAINING AY SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONALISTS. MORE WORK MUT BE DONE WITH TRIMBLE, HE SAID.

7. MAYHEW AND ANCRAM BOTH SAID THAT PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUALLY REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THE TWO REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE GOOD. THERE S ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT ON THE DESCRIPTION OF WEAPONS COVERED BY THE REMIT, AND THE SIDES ARE NOT SO FAR APART ON A "TARGET" DATE. BUT BOTH SAID THEY WERE CAUTIOUS ABOUT MAKING PROPOSALS BEFORE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE UP ITS MIND, WHICH THEY BELIEVE IT HAS NOT DONE YET. MAYHEW SAID THE NEXT STEP WILL BE A PHONE CALL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BETWEEN MAJOR AND BRUTON. HOWEVER, HE NOTED, THERE ARE MANY ISSUES FACING THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM NEW ZEALAND AND REPEATED THAT HMG MUST ALSO HAVE A BETTER SENSE OF WHERE THE UUP IS BEFORE IT CAN MOVE AHEAD. MAYHEW DID NOT OFFER ADDITIONAL SPECIFICS WHEN ASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR FOR DETAILS ON WHEN SUCH A CALL MIGHT BE PLACED OR WHAT THE PM MIGHT SAY.

CROWE

BT

#5469

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (4 pages)	11/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Cables

2011-0355-F
rs1672

RESTRICTION CODES

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SUBJECT: _____ PAGES: **7**

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UNCLAS 7E/UNITO IRELO 288 355 866

SERIAL: LD2811235495
PASS: ATTN WIRE SELECT

COUNTRY: UNITED KINGDOM
SUBJ: 'Full' Communique Issued by Prime Ministers Major, Bruton

SOURCE: London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 2339 GMT 28 Nov 95
TEXT:

['Communique in full' issued by British Prime Minister and Irish Prime Minister John Bruton following their meeting in London on 28 November]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] This is the communique issued by 10 Downing Street tonight:

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach met tonight. After intensive efforts by both governments, and with the benefit of consultations with parties in Northern Ireland, the two governments have agreed to launch a 'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.

2. Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to securing the early launch of all-party negotiations. By way of the twin tracks, the two governments have the firm aim of achieving this by the end of February 1996. It is the two governments' considered view that, with cooperation from all the relevant parties in both tracks, that objective should prove achievable. Both governments commit themselves to working, with others, to achieve it.

3. To this end, the two governments have agreed to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent. These talks will have an open agenda, allowing any party to raise any relevant matters. These matters would include how best the structure and format of all-party negotiations, involving in appropriate strands both governments and all the relevant Northern Ireland parties, directed to addressing in a comprehensive manner all the relevant relationships in an interlocking three-stranded process, can properly take account of democratic mandates and principles, including whether and how an elected body could play a part. These preparatory talks may also extend to all steps required to establish the necessary circumstances to bring the parties together at the negotiating table in accordance with paragraph 10 of the Downing Street Declaration.

4. In managing the process of preparatory talks, each government will build on existing exchanges and bilateral contacts, treating each party on an equal basis; they will encourage other formats for meetings with the parties and among the parties, including meetings between the two Governments together and one or more parties, with

their agreement, where these might further the objective of the preparatory talks.

5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by the virtue of the welcome decisions taken last summer and autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two governments will ask the Body to:

- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits.

9. In establishing the Body, the British and Irish governments reaffirm their willingness to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces.

10. The two governments have invited Senator George Mitchell to chair the Body, and will invite two other eminent persons to serve as the other members of the Body.

11. The two governments have asked the Body to submit its report to the two governments by mid-January 1996. Neither government, nor any other party cooperating with the work of the Body, is bound in advance to accept its recommendations, which will be advisory. The two governments will consider carefully any recommendations it makes and give them due weight on their merits.

12. To that end, and to review progress in preparatory talks for all-party negotiations, the two governments plan to meet again by mid-February 1996.

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PAGE 01 OF 05

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NODIS

OVP FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
MAJOR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (283)
KBH 4/11/2023

REF: LONDON 12431

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ROD LYNE ASKED ME IN LATE AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 6 FOR A DISCUSSION ON NORTHERN IRELAND. AFTER SOME TWENTY MINUTES WITH LYNE, WE JOINED THE PRIME MINISTER TO CONTINUE THE MEETING. BOTH MEN SPOKE PRIMARILY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT, ALONG LINES SIMILAR (BUT MORE EXPLICIT) TO THOSE BRIEFED BY MAYHEW SEVERAL HOURS EARLIER (REFTEL). BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND LYNE ASKED THAT WE HOLD THEIR REMARKS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

3. IN THE MEETING WITH LYNE, THE PM'S AIDE BEGAN BY STRESSING THAT LONDON AND DUBLIN HAD ESSENTIALLY SIGNED OFF ON THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH INCLUDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING, ON SEPTEMBER 1. SINN FEIN HAD, HOWEVER, CONCLUDED THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION. ADAMS, MCGUINNESS AND FATHER ALEX REED HAD VERBALLY "ROUGHED UP" IRISH OFFICIALS AT A BELFAST MEETING. THEY HAD THREATENED THAT PURSUING THE COMMISSION IDEA WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ENDING THE PEACE PROCESS. IT WOULD LEAD TO "BODIES IN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

THE STREETS," AND THE GOI WOULD BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM. AS HAD MAYHEW EARLIER, LYNE SAID JOHN HUME, IN SEPARATE TALKS WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND USING ADAMS' ARGUMENTS, HAD STRONGLY OPPOSED PROCEEDING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. HIS ROLE HAD BEEN CRUCIAL IN CAUSING DUBLIN TO BACK OFF FROM THE COMMISSION.

4. BY SEPTEMBER 5, DUBLIN'S SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION HAD UNRAVELED. AFTER PROPOSING A SERIES OF UNACCEPTABLE CHANGES TO THE COMMISSION, DUBLIN HAD FLOATED THE CONCEPT OF ONE COMMISSIONER, I.E., SENATOR MITCHELL. THIS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY HMG. LYNE SAID LONDON FELT STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO "EXPOSE" ONE INDIVIDUAL TO DEAL WITH THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE. MOREOVER, IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE COMMISSION HAVE MEMBERS (PROBABLY TWO) WITH A MILITARY BACKGROUND WHO COULD VIEW DECOMMISSIONING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERTS.

5. CONTINUING, LYNE SAID THE PROSPECTIVE COMMISSION WOULD LOOK AT THE DEGREE OF COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE IRA AND THE LOYALISTS TO PARTICIPATE IN DECOMMISSIONING AS WELL AS THE MODALITIES. IN A SECOND PHASE, THE COMMISSION MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN THE ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS. THE COMMISSION WOULD NOT, LYNE UNDERScoreD, TAKE POLITICAL DECISIONS. THESE WOULD BE RESERVED FOR LONDON AND DUBLIN. THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, HE NOTED, HAD CONTAINED NO REFERENCE TO THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION, I.E., A BEGINNING TO DECOMMISSIONING. IN RECOGNITION OF DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON AND ANXIOUS TO PREVENT A START TO DECOMMISSIONING FROM BEING AN OBSTACLE, LONDON HAD "PARKED OUR VIEW ON THIS DOWN THE ROAD."

6. LYNE SAID THAT JOHN BRUTON HAD TOLD MAJOR HE STILL HOPED TO HOLD THE SUMMIT NEXT WEEK AND WOULD SEEK TO REVIVE THE CONCEPT OF A COMMISSION. LYNE WAS SKEPTICAL. HE NOTED THAT MAJOR HAD EARLIER IN THE DAY WRITTEN BRUTON SUMMARIZING BRITISH VIEWS OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE. THE BRITISH EXPECTED BRUTON TO RESPOND WITH SOME IDEAS FOR MOVING THE PROCESS FORWARD. LYNE ADDED, WITHOUT ELABORATION, THAT DOWNING STREET HAD SOME IDEAS ON THIS SCORE AS WELL.

7. WE THEN WENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRIVATE CHAMBERS TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION. MAJOR OPENED BY SAYING THAT THE SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT HAD BEEN "BAD BUSINESS." JOHN BRUTON HAD BEEN SHAKEN OFF COURSE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRIMARILY BY THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE BY SINN FEIN. MAJOR ALSO EXPRESSED IRRITATION WITH THE ROLE PLAYED BY JOHN HUME, NOTING THAT THE SDLP LEADER HAD PROPOSED IDEAS ON THE PEACE PROCESS TO BRUTON WHICH MAJOR HAD EMPHATICALLY REJECTED IN A PREVIOUS MEETING WITH HUME.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. SINN FEIN HAD LITERALLY DESTROYED THE LONDON-DUBLIN AGREEMENT TO AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. THIS IDEA NOW WOULDN'T WORK. A PAUSE AND SOME QUIET CONTEMPLATION WERE NOW NECESSARY. MAJOR STRESSED THAT WHILE DISAPPOINTED THAT JOHN BRUTON HAD BACKED OFF THE COMMISSION, HE WAS FULLY UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS POLITICAL POSITION WHEN PRESENTED BY A UNITED FRONT OF SINN FEIN, JOHN HUME, AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 012448

NODIS

OVP FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

9. MAJOR THEN, AS HAD MAYHEW, LYNE AND SEVERAL NIO OFFICIALS, STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT SINN FEIN'S THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE HAD FULLY CONVINCED HIM OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S STANCE THAT SOME DECOMMISSIONING WAS NECESSARY. SINN FEIN COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO COME TO THE TABLE AND THREATEN A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IF IT DID NOT ACHIEVE ITS AGENDA IN NEGOTIATIONS. (MAJOR REFERRED TO SINN FEIN/IRA NOTING THAT BOTH ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS WERE MEMBERS OF THE IRA ARMY COUNCIL.) THE STORY OF THE LAST FEW DAYS WAS THAT SINN FEIN HAD USED THE THREAT OF AN END TO THE CEASE-FIRE TO DRIVE JOHN BRUTON OFF A POSITION, I.E., SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, THAT THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY FAVORED.

10. WHEN I ASKED MAJOR HOW LONDON AND DUBLIN MIGHT DEAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WITH SINN FEIN'S TACTICS, HE BLUNTLY REPLIED THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES COULD PREVENT ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS FROM REPEATING THIS SCENARIO. HE ASKED THAT WE MAKE CLEAR TO THEM THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR.

11. MAJOR SAID THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS SHOULD HAVE NO IMPLICATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. THE LATTER WAS STILL SEVERAL MONTHS OFF AND IT WAS VERY LIKELY THAT THE PICTURE WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT BY THE END OF NOVEMBER.

12. AS I WAS LEAVING, MAYHEW AND ANCRAM ARRIVED FOR A RAINSTORMING SESSION ON NEXT STEPS. I HOPE TO SEE MAYHEW LATER TODAY TO GET A READ-OUT ON THAT MEETING.

13. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION IN MY PRESENCE OF ANCRAM'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO ELABORATE ON BRITISH VIEWS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. I RECOMMEND THAT ANCRAM SEE THE VICE PRESIDENT, TONY LAKE, AND STROBE TALBOTT OR PETER TARNOFF.

14. ANCRAM IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MAJOR, SAID JOHN TAYLOR AND WILLY ROSS SEEMED TO HAVE THE INSIDE TRACK IN THE UUP LEADERSHIP ELECTION TO BE HELD SEPTEMBER 8. FROM THE BODY LANGUAGE, I SENSED THAT TAYLOR WAS DOWNING STREET'S FAVORITE SON.

15. COMMENT. THE MOOD AMONG THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS IS CLEARLY ONE OF DEEP IRRITATION THAT SINN FEIN WAS ABLE TO USE THREATS OF VIOLENCE TO MOVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT OFF A COURSE AGREED UPON WITH LONDON. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THEY ARE MIGHTY UNHAPPY WITH THE ROLE PLAYED BY JOHN HUME. I BELIEVE THEY PULLED SOME PUNCHES IN DESCRIBING HUME'S ACTIVITIES IN DEFERENCE TO THE HIGH ESTEEM IN WHICH HE IS HELD BY MANY IN THE US. I SENSED NO ANIMOSITY TOWARD JOHN BRUTON. ON THE CONTRARY, MAJOR APPEARS TO REGARD HIM AS A STRAIGHT SHOOTER WHO WAS CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL VISE -- A SITUATION HE IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH.

16. THOUGH THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT AND ADAMS' WILLINGNESS TO THREATEN A RETURN TO THE GUN ARE REASONS FOR SERIOUS CONCERN, I AM CONVINCED THAT MAJOR WITH HIS ENORMOUS STAKE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH DUBLIN TO MOVE IT FORWARD. MAJOR IS ALSO AWARE OF THE PRESSURE TO HAVE THE PROCESS BACK ON TRACK BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND WILL MAKE EVERY

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EFFORT TO DO SO. AT THE SAME TIME, I FULLY SHARE THE VIEW THAT ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS, WHO I GATHER ARE ABOUT TO VISIT THE US, MUST HEAR FROM ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS THAT WE WILL IN NO WAY COUNTENANCE THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THIS PEACE PROCESS WILL NOT SUCCEED IF SINN FEIN IS ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH THAT TACTIC.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON JENSEN LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 191728Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3880
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3437

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 012993

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH
UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.84)
KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE VISITED THE EMBASSY TO MEET THE AMBASSADOR ON SEPT 19. TRIMBLE SAID HE HOPES TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER AND LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A BRIEF PHOTO OP WITH THE PRESIDENT. TRIMBLE SAID SINN FEIN HAS YET TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS AND MANY UNIONISTS VIEW THE IRA CEASEFIRE AS MERELY A TACTICAL MOVE TO GAIN CONCESSIONS. ACCORDING TO TRIMBLE, SINN FEIN MUST MAKE "QUITE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES," OF WHICH DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONRY IS ONE PART, BEFORE UNIONISTS WILL HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE. WARNING OF "SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES" IF THE PEACE PROCESS IS RUSHED, TRIMBLE SAID WE SHOULD EXPECT IT TO TAKE TIME TO RESOLVE THE INTRACTABLE ISSUES INVOLVED. TRIMBLE WELCOMED THE LATE NOVEMBER VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT TO NORTHERN IRELAND AND OFFERED TO WORK WITH US ON IT. END SUMMARY.

TRIMBLE VISIT TO WASHINGTON

3. NEWLY ELECTED UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE VISITED THE EMBASSY SEPT 19 FOR AN INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR. TRIMBLE WAS UNACCOMPANIED. AFTER OFFERING CONGRATULATIONS ON HIS ELECTION AS NEW LEADER OF THE UUP, THE AMBASSADOR TOLD TRIMBLE THAT THE U.S. IS VERY

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INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE WITH HIM AND HIS FELLOW UNIONIST LEADERS. EMPHASIZING THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THE UNIONIST VIEWPOINT BE HEARD IN WASHINGTON, AND THAT U.S. POLICY BE PUT CLEARLY TO UNIONIST PARTY MEMBERS, THE AMBASSADOR URGED TRIMBLE TO VISIT WASHINGTON AS SOON AS HIS SCHEDULE PERMITS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE TRIMBLE.

4. TRIMBLE REPLIED THAT HE WELCOMES THE INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND LOOKS FORWARD TO A MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT, WHO HE HAD MET ON AN EARLIER OCCASION AND FOR WHOM HE EXPRESSED A HIGH REGARD. HE WAS AWARE THAT PROSPECTIVE DATES HAD BEEN PASSED TO HIS STAFF, BUT TRIMBLE DID NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE. CITING THE OPENING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION, THE UUP PARTY CONFERENCE AND OTHER COMMITMENTS, TRIMBLE SAID THAT LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER WOULD PROBABLY WORK BEST FOR HIS CALENDAR. HE REITERATED THAT HE IS EAGER TO GO AND WOULD BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE WHEN CONSIDERING DATES.

5. APOLOGIZING FOR RAISING A "BIT OF AWKWARDNESS," TRIMBLE SAID HE WOULD HAVE A PROBLEM WITH HIS ELECTORATE IF HE DOES NOT GET A HANDSHAKE OR PHOTO OP WITH THE PRESIDENT. TRIMBLE SAID THAT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, FAILURE TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS A SNUB BY COMPARISON TO THE RECEPTION ACCORDED GERRY ADAMS AND JOHN HUME. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD TRIMBLE'S SITUATION AND WOULD REPORT HIS COMMENT TO WASHINGTON WITH A FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION BUT COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT IN THAT REGARD.

PEACE PROCESS: PROGRESS WILL TAKE TIME

6 TURNING TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, TRIMBLE SAID THAT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HIS PARTY, SINN FEIN HAS YET TO DEMONSTRATE THE COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS AND TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WHICH IS REQUIRED BY THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. INDEED, HE DECLARED, THERE HAS BEEN A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SUCH COMMITMENT." TRIMBLE SAID UNIONISTS VIEW THE IRA CEASEFIRE AS A TACTICAL GAMBIT DESIGNED TO WRING CONCESSIONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM; IF IT DOES NOT GET THE CONCESSIONS IT WANTS, IT WILL REVERT TO VIOLENCE. RECENT REPORTS OF SINN FEIN THREATS

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TO IRISH OFFICIALS OF "BODIES IN THE STREETS" IF THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE WAS SIGNED REINFORCED HIS MEMBERS VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A COMMITMENT.

7. TO PERSUADE UNIONISTS THAT SINN FEIN IS COMMITTED TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, TRIMBLE SAID "QUITE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES" NEED TO BE MADE, OF WHICH DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONRY IS ONE PART. TRIMBLE ADMITTED HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE THE "CONFIDENCE GAP" IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HOWEVER, HE CONTINUED, IF THE IRA IS IN FACT COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL METHODS, HIS MEMBERS WOULD EXPECT TO BEGIN TO SEE EVIDENCE OF IT. STRUCTURES FOR PARAMILITARY RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING WOULD BE DISMANTLED; PUNISHMENT BEATINGS AND ENFORCEMENT OF IRA RULES BY INTIMIDATION IN CATHOLIC AREAS WOULD CEASE.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 012993

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH
UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE

7 true? BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THIS, SO UNIONISTS CONTINUE TO DOUBT SINN FEIN SINCERITY. HE NOTED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NO CRITICISM FROM WITHIN THE UUP FOR BRINGING IRISH MINISTER PROSINIAS DE ROSSA INTO PARTY HEADQUARTERS, EVEN THOUGH HE ONCE HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF THE IRA. HE SAID THAT IS BECAUSE UNIONISTS KNOW DE ROSSA BELIEVES IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

What did he do/say.

8. TRIMBLE WARNED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF AN IRA COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL METHODS, THERE WOULD BE "SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IF WE ARE RUSHED INTO TALKS WITH SINN FEIN." UNIONISTS, HE ASSERTED, ARE NOT SKEPTICAL FOR THE SAKE OF BEING SKEPTICAL. BUT NEITHER WILL HIS MEMBERS SIMPLY ACT ON BLIND FAITH. SAYING IT TAKES TIME FOR ATTITUDES -- IN ALL CAMPS -- TO CHANGE, TRIMBLE ARGUED THE PEACE PROCESS SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO TAKE TIME. THE LONGER IT TAKES, HE SAID, THE EASIER IT WILL BE. IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY AND INTRACTABLE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS, TRIMBLE SAID HE BELIEVES PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN A SERIES OF SMALL STEPS AND NOT IN MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS.

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PRESIDENT'S VISIT

9. AFTER SKETCHING OUT THE BROAD OUTLINES OF OUR PLANNING IN NON-SPECIFIC TERMS, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED TRIMBLE FOR SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT MIGHT BE ORGANIZED TO ENHANCE THE CLIMATE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO ENSURE PARTICIPATION BY ALL KEY PLAYERS. TRIMBLE AGREED THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MEET A GOOD MIX OF POLITICAL LEADERS, COMMUNITY ACTIVISTS, AND ORDINARY CITIZENS. HE SAID THAT PERSONS IN BOTH COMMUNITIES WILL BE INSPECTING THE PRESIDENT'S EVERY MOVE FOR INDICATIONS OF BIAS OR FAVORITISM. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE RECOMMENDED THAT ALL EVENTS BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED TO ENSURE BALANCE AND IMPARTIALITY.

10. TRIMBLE SAID THE PRESIDENT WILL RECEIVE A WARM WELCOME AND THAT HE DOUBTS THERE WILL BE ANY SERIOUS SECURITY THREAT. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, HOWEVER, HE SUGGESTED THAT SITES WHERE THE PRESIDENT MIGHT SHAKE HANDS OR GREET ORDINARY CITIZENS BE SELECTED WITH GREAT CARE. HE SAID IT IS BETTER TO DO ONE EVENT IN A CATHOLIC AREA AND ONE IN PROTESTANT NEIGHBORHOOD THAN TO HOLD ONE AT WHICH THE COMMUNITIES MIGHT MIX. THE COMPETITION AMONG THE CROWD FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION COULD LEAD TO PROBLEMS, HE SUGGESTED. TRIMBLE SAID HE PERSONALLY WELCOMES THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND OFFERED TO WORK WITH US TO MAKE THE VISIT A SUCCESS.

7

COMMENT

11. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, IN DISTINCT CONTRAST TO OUR ENCOUNTERS WITH HIS PREDECESSOR, TRIMBLE WAS RELAXED, CONFIDENT AND ELOQUENT. HE CLEARLY IS READY TO MAKE A TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND PREPARED TO PRESENT FORCEFULLY THE UNIONIST VIEW. WE WELCOME THE PROPOSED MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND, IF A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY CAN BE FOUND, RECOMMEND THE PRESIDENT DROP BY.

12. TRIMBLE IS LIKELY TO SET THE EVIDENTIARY BAR FAIRLY HIGH ON THE ISSUE OF IRA COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL METHODS, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR HE IS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN THE EFFORT TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. HE WAS FRANK IN SAYING HE DID NOT HAVE NEW IDEAS FOR MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS PAST THE CURRENT IMPASSE ON DECOMMISSIONING. IN FACT, ON HIS WAY OUT OF THE EMBASSY, TRIMBLE MENTIONED THIS HAD BEEN

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HE MAIN TOPIC OF HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER EARLIER IN THE DAY. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH MAJOR HAD NO NEW IDEAS EITHER AND NO PROPOSALS SURFACED DURING THE MEETING AT NO. 10, THE TWO AGREED TO CONTINUE TO CONSIDER OPTIONS.

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PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231724Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8862

INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3681

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3443

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.85)
KRM 7/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. CLASSIFIED BY DENNIS A. SANDBERG, DCM, 1.5 (D).

2. SUMMARY: SINN FEIN'S MARTIN MCGUINNESS PROVIDED US WITH THE FOLLOWING READOUT OF HIS MEETING WITH NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MICHAEL ANCRAM, OCTOBER 20, 1995. TEXT OF REPORT FOLLOWS.

3. BEGIN QUOTE: REPORT OF A MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, FRIDAY 20 OCTOBER, 1995.

THIS REPORT AIMS TO PROVIDE ACCURATE INFORMATION ON TODAY'S MEETING AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE. IT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS EITHER COMPREHENSIVE OR CONTAINING ALL OF THE RELEVANT DETAIL.

SINN FEIN WAS REPRESENTED BY MARTIN MCGUINNESS AND GERRY KELLY. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS REPRESENTED BY MICHAEL ANCRAM AND QUENTIN THOMAS. THE MEETING COMMENCED AT 4:00 P.M. AND CONCLUDED AT 5:25 P.M.

A. SINN FEIN'S PURPOSE IN THE MEETING WAS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING AGREEMENT ON A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE.

SINN FEIN BROUGHT FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE FOLLOWING

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IS THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCED BY SINN FEN:

1. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO LAUNCH THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH WILL, NOT LATER THAN 30 NOVEMBER, LEAD INTO SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT, TO REACH AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
2. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALSO AGREED TO ASK GEORGE MITCHELL TO HEAD UP AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, TO ASCERTAIN AND ADVISE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC METHODS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE REMOVAL OF ALL WEAPONS FROM IRISH POLITICS.

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL ALSO BE ASKED TO ASCERTAIN ADVISE ON HOW THE QUESTION OF ARMS, NOW (THANKFULLY) SILENCED, CAN BE FINALLY AND SATISFACTORILY SETTLED.

GEORGE MITCHELL WILL BE ASSISTED BY TWO OTHER FIGURES OF INTERNATIONAL STANDING LIKELY TO INSPIRE WIDESPREAD CONFIDENCE.

3. ACCORDINGLY, THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL HAVE THE REMIT OF REPORTING, BY (-----) ON WHETHER IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A CLEAR COMMITMENT EXISTS ON THE PART OF THE RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES TO AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, ACHIEVED THROUGH DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO THE SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION@L9 BHET9_XL REPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WHO WILL UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY RECOMMENDATIONS HE (SIC) MAKES AND TO GIVE THEM DUE WEIGHT. END OF SINN FEIN PROPOSAL.

END OF SINN FEIN PROPOSAL

B. THE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN A NUMBER OF AREAS INCLUDING:

1. ENSURING THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK WOULD BE A GENUINE PROCESS AIMED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS.
3. RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES TO A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, SHOULD ONE BE SET

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UP.

4. A DISCUSSION ON PRACTICAL MATTERS CONCERNING SUCH A BODY. THAT IS SUCH MATTERS AS HOW IT WOULD WORK, A TIMETABLE AND SO ON.

C. MARTIN MCGUINNESS MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS IN OPENING THE SINN FEIN END OF THE DISCUSSION.

1. THIS IS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT BY SINN FEIN TO EXPLORE A WAY THOUGH AN IMPASSE WHICH IS NOT OF SINN FEIN'S MAKING.

2. WE HAVE LISTENED CLOSELY, EXAMINED AND CONSIDERED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

CAREFULLY EVERYTHING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS SAID ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE IMPASSE.

3. HAVING DONE SO, IT REMAINS OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT THE IMPASSE ARISES OUT OF THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TURNED AN OBJECTIVE OF THE PEACE PROCESS - REMOVING THE GUN FOREVER FROM THE POLITICAL EQUATION IN IRELAND - INTO A PRECONDITION WHICH HAS BECOME A BARRIER TO PROGRESS.

4. IN STATING THIS IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO RECRIMINATE. RATHER IT IS TO DEAL WITH A REALITY AS WE KNOW IT. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SURRENDER OF WEAPONS BY ANY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT AT THIS TIME.

FURTHERMORE, OUR DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL MANDATE REQUIRES THAT WE CAN NOT AND WILL NOT ACCEPT A PRE-CONDITION ON OUR RIGHT TO REPRESENT SINN FEIN VOTERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE OF THE IRISH PEOPLE.

5. THAT SAID, OUR MEETING TODAY, AS IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS, IS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY AROUND THIS IMPASSE; AND IN SO DOING TO SPECIFICALLY FOCUS ON A TWIN TRACK APPROACH AS A POTENTIALLY VIABLE MEANS TO THAT END.

6. I MUST SAY, HOWEVER - AND AGAIN THERE IS NO RECRIMINATION IN WHAT I SAY - THAT THIS CONCEPT WHEN MOOTED

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EARLIER IN THE YEAR WAS - WHATEVER ITS MERITS - SCUPPERED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO TURN AN INTERNATIONAL BODY INTO A COLLECTION AGENCY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE COULD HAVE NO PART IN SUCH AN EXERCISE THEN. WE COULD HAVE NO PART IN SUCH AN EXERCISE NOW.

7. IN EXAMINING THE TWIN TRACK CONCEPT NOW WE DO SO ON A CLEAR BASIS:

(A) THE NEED FOR THE SETTING OF A DATE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS THE ESSENTIAL NEXT STEP.

(B) THE NEED TO HAVE THE PRE-CONDITION ON SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS REMOVED.

(C) THE NEED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ANY INTERNATIONAL BODY ARE SUCH THAT SINN FEIN CAN PROVIDE ITS FULL AND WHOLEHEARTED CO-OPERATION.

8. IN ANTICIPATION THAT THE JOINT LABORS, BY ALL INVOLVED IN THE EXAMINATION OF A TWIN TRACK APPROACH, PROVE FRUITFUL, WE HAVE COMMISSIONED A PAPER WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A SINN FEIN SUBMISSION TO SUCH A BODY.

WE HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE PAPER ADDRESS ALL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY AND INCLUDES A RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S MODALITIES PAPER. WE MUST, OF COURSE, BE FREE TO ADDRESS ALL OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES LIKEWISE. ✓

9. IN SO DOING ANYTHING STATED WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF OUR FIRMEST BELIEF AND CONVICTION.

10. AND, OF COURSE, SUBJECT TO REACHING A WORKABLE FORMULA ON ALL OF THIS INCLUDING A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOW ALL OF THIS WOULD WORK WE WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY ON ITS MERITS.

D. MARTIN MCGUINNESS STRESSED THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK NEEDED TO BE A GENUINE PROCESS AIMED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THIS REQUIRES THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK INVOLVES A SERIOUS AND GENUINE ENGAGEMENT BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THE END OF NOVEMBER. IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO BE USED AS A VETO BY ANY POLITICAL

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PARTY, OR AS A FURTHER DEVICE TO STALL THE COMMENCEMENT OF ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS.

SINN FEIN'S CO-OPERATION WITH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, IF AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA INVOLVING SUCH A BODY CAN BE FOUND, WILL CLEARLY BE ON THE BASIS THAT IT IS ONE OF TWO TRACKS DESIGNED TO BRING US ALL INTO ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. SO WHILE THE POLITICAL TRACK MUST BE A SERIOUS AND GENUINE POLITICAL PROCESS ITS PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT ALL-PARTY TALKS BY THE STATED DATE MUST ALSO BE SERIOUS AND GENUINE.

E. ON THE ISSUE OF A TIMETABLE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, MARTIN MCGUINNESS STATED: IT IS OUR VIEW THAT A PERIOD OF 2/3 WEEKS IS MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO ALLOW FOR SENSIBLE DISCUSSION AND DELIBERATION OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON ITS REMIT AND TERMS OF REFERENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI
SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

IT IS THEREFORE OUR VIEW THAT THE END OF NOVEMBER IS A REALISTIC DATE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF ALL PARTY TALKS.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ARGUED FOR A PROLONGED TIMETABLE ESTIMATING THAT IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST THREE MONTHS, BRINGING US WELL INTO 1996 AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DEFINITE DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. ALSO THAT THE THREE MONTHS PERIOD COULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY.

F. A WITHOUT PREJUDICE DISCUSSION ON HOW AN INTERNATIONAL BODY WOULD WORK TOOK PLACE. MARTIN MCGUINNESS POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO THIS.

1. WHO WOULD BE ON SUCH A BODY?
2. HOW LONG WOULD IT SIT?
3. WOULD IT'S HEARINGS BE PUBLIC/PRIVATE?
4. WHO WOULD IT INVITE TO MAKE SUBMISSIONS?

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5. WHERE WOULD IT SIT?

6. HOW WOULD IT TAKE SUBMISSIONS -
VERBALLY/WRITTEN/QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS/A COMBINATION?

7. TERMS OF REFERENCE:

ON THE BODY BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ONLY HAD ONE
NAME SO FAR - GEORGE MITCHELL.

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SUBMISSION ARE MATTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
BODY.

INVITES TO GIVE SUBMISSIONS WAS UP TO BODY BUT BRITISH
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED - AS NARROW AS
REPUBLICANS AND LOYALISTS. SINN FEIN MADE POINT THAT ALL
POLITICAL PARTIES AND TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE GIVEN
OPTION AS THEY HAVE OPINIONS.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARGUED TO NARROW THE REMIT OF THE
BODY DOWN TO DEALING WAS (SIC) QUOTE ILLEGAL END QUOTE
WEAPONS. BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SAID THEY
DIDN'T KNOW HOW LONG POLITICAL LEG OF TRACK WOULD TAKE.
BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT JOINT
COMMUNIQUE COULD BE IN DAYS.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY
WILL NOT EQUATE BEGIN QUOTE ILLEGAL AND LEGAL END QUOTE
ARMS. THEY STATED IN FACT THAT THE REMIT OF BODY WOULD BE
ARMS HELD BY PARAMILITARIES.

SINN FEIN EXPLAINED WHY IT WAS NECESSARY FROM NATIONALIST
PEOPLE POINT OF VIEW THAT BRITISH AND UNIONIST USE OF ARMS
AND DRACONIAN LAWS MUST BE ADDRESSED AS MANY HAVE LOST
THEIR LIVES.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES INSISTED ON NARROW
REMIT.

(BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES EVENTUALLY AGREED TO
LOOK AT WORDS TO SEE WHAT WAS POSSIBLE) .

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES INVOKED DUBLIN
GOVERNMENT ON BEGIN QUOTE LEGAL ARMS END QUOTE ARGUMENT.

MARTIN MCGUINNESS ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PRE-CONDITION TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY.

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THAT IS:

IS WASHINGTON 3 QUOTE OFF THE SCREEN END QUOTE WHERE AN INTERNATIONAL BODY WOULD BE CONCERNED?

WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ACCEPT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL BODY WHICH DISAGREE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S SETTING OF PRE-CONDITIONS IN THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS?

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES REITERATED THAT THEIR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POSITION REMAINS THAT W 3 IS THE ONLY WAY TO ALL-PARTY TALKS BUT CONCEDED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL BODY MAY PRODUCE A WAY AROUND WHICH NEITHER SIDE COULD SUGGEST TO EACH OTHER AT THIS TIME.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ASKED ABOUT AN ANSWER TO THE BEGIN QUOTE NON-DOCUMENT END QUOTE AND WERE TOLD THAT IT WAS CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT WE HANDED OVER AT THIS MEETING.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES MADE IT CLEAR THAT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WOULD NOT BE A COLLECTION AGENCY FOR ARMS. THAT IT SHOULD ONLY DEAL WITH THE WAY.

IN A STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA FOLLOWING THE MEETING, SINN FEIN SAID: BEGIN QUOTE AT THEIR LAST MEETING MARTIN MCGUINNESS AND MICHAEL ANCRAM AGREED TO A FURTHER MEETING. THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 4:00 P.M. AND LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF.

THEIR DISCUSSIONS ARE PART OF THE ONGOING EFFORTS TO END THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN THE PEACE PROCESS BY FINDING A FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO EVERYONE.

TO THIS END SINN FEIN MADE FIRM PROPOSALS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN END THE IMPASSE.

CLEARLY WHAT IS REQUIRED IS A DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS AND THE REMOVAL OF PRE-CONDITIONS TO INVOLVEMENT IN THOSE

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TALKS. END QUOTE.

THE FOLLOWING ARE INITIAL COMMENTS FROM THE MEETING WHICH AIM TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE MEETING IN AS TIMELY A WAY AS IS POSSIBLE.

FOR THAT REASON IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE COMPREHENSIVE. IN LIKE MANNER, AND FOR THE SAME REASON, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE LIMITED IN SCOPE.

THAT SAID, THERE ARE THREE ISSUES ARISING FROM THE MEETING WHICH CAUSE GREAT CONCERN AND DO NOT GIVE RISE TO OPTIMISM.

1. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT VIEW OF A TIMETABLE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, TO GET TO THE POINT OF BRINGING ITS REPORT FORWARD, IS THAT A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS COULD BE INVOLVED. THAT IS, AS THINGS ARE PROGRESSING AT PRESENT, FEBRUARY 96.

IN OUR VIEW THIS WOULD BE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS TO A PROCESS IN WHICH CONFIDENCE HAS ALREADY SERIOUSLY WANED AND WHICH ALREADY HAS A CREDIBILITY DEFICIT.

2. COMMENTS BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES TODAY WERE QUITE EXPLICIT ABOUT ONLY QUOTE RELEVANT END QUOTE PARTIES MAKING SUBMISSIONS TO OR CO-OPERATING WITH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY.

SINN FEIN COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFEND WITH OUR CONSTITUENCY SUBJECTING OURSELVES TO SUCH A BEGIN QUOTE TEST END QUOTE.

3. COMMENTS BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SUGGEST THAT WHATEVER AN INTERNATIONAL BODY MIGHT SAY ABOUT WASHINGTON 1 AND 2, THAT WASHINGTON 3 WILL REMAIN INTACT.

EVERYONE HAS TO TAKE RISKS IN THIS PROCESS. SINN FEIN HAS TAKEN ITS SHARE AND IS PREPARED TO TAKE FURTHER RISKS. BUT WE MUST BE SURE WE ARE DEALING WITH RISKS RATHER THAN PREDETERMINED CONCLUSIONS. END OF REPORT

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<MSGID> M1915303

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*POT in
Book
- CABLES
Also -
lets add
RAB -
US SMTS.
pls call
from Jan 93
n.*

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PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071740Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3460

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 012503

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.86)

KRH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS; PLS PASS OVP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH MAYHEW

REF: LONDON 12448 (NODIS)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PATRICK MAYHEW IS LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN NO. 10 ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, HMG DOES NOT HAVE A FOLLOW-ON PLAN AND IS WAITING FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SORT OUT ITS POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED SUMMIT. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN BRUTON'S POSITION. HE PRODUCED THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG HAD NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM ITS STANCE ON DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS AND THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THAT POSITION AT THE TIME THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WAS AGREED. WITH FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CERTAIN OVER THE COMING WEEKS, MAYHEW SAID THERE IS NO REASON NOW TO FACTOR THE ABORTED SUMMIT INTO PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW SEPT 7 FOR A 75-MINUTE MEETING TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT. MAYHEW OPENED BY NOTING THAT MICHAEL ANCRAM WOULD BE HEADING TO WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON FOR WHAT HMG HOPES WILL A USEFUL EXCHANGE WITH

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THE ADMINISTRATION. THE AMBASSADOR WELCOMED THE VISIT AND SAID HE UNDERSTANDS HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS AT THE NSC AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE BEING ARRANGED.

THE POSTPONEMENT

4. MAYHEW SAID THAT SINN FEIN'S THREAT TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE HAD "DEEPLY SHAKEN" THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND HAD HAD A "DEVASTATING EFFECT" ON BRUTON. HE SPECULATED THAT THIS, IN PART, IS BECAUSE IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO DEALING DIRECTLY AND ADVERSELY WITH THIS ASPECT OF THE IRA. HE ALSO EXPRESSED SOME SYMPATHY FOR BRUTON WHO FOUND HIMSELF IN A POLITICAL VISE, UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE COMBINED PRESSURE OF ADAMS, HUME, REYNOLDS, ET AL. IN SHORT, MAYHEW SAID, BRUTON BACKED AWAY FROM PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS BECAUSE HE "HAD A GUN WAVED IN HIS FACE."

5. MAYHEW HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE TAOISEACH NOW APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE AND "BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL." FOLLOWING A COURTEOUS BUT POINTED EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS YESTERDAY, PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRUTON AND MAJOR REMAIN GOOD. BRUTON TOLD MAJOR THAT HIS COALITION COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE AND MAYHEW SAID HE HIMSELF HAD DETECTED NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRUTON AND DICK SPRING.

HMG STICKS TO THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION

6. TURNING TO THE CAUSE OF THE POSTPONEMENT, MAYHEW SAID HMG HAD BEEN TAKEN COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE BY THE LAST MINUTE IRISH CHANGES. HMG DID NOT FIND THE SUGGESTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION BE CHANGED TO A SINGLE ARBITER WITH INDEPENDENT POLITICAL AUTHORITY O BE A HELPFUL ONE. NOT ONLY WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE TROUBLE DELEGATING ITS AUTHORITY, BUT THE UNIONISTS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A SOLE ARBITER, PARTICULARLY ONE WITH A POLITICAL AND NOT A MILITARY BACKGROUND.

7. RESPONDING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ABOUT HMG'S POSITION ON DECOMMISSIONING, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED THAT HMG "HAS NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION" AND HAS NO POLITICAL ROOM TO DO SO EVEN IF IT WERE SO INCLINED. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SUMMIT

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COMMUNIQUE WOULD HAVE REFERRED ONLY TO THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS, I.E. ESTABLISHING A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND OUTLINING MODALITIES FOR ACCOMPLISHING IT. MAYHEW SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CONTENT TO DROP REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE NECESSITY OF SOME WEAPONS BEING DECOMMISSIONED AS A CONDITION FOR COMMENCEMENT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS. HOWEVER, THIS DID NOT INDICATE A RELAXATION OF ITS POSITION. HMG BELIEVES ADHERENCE TO THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION IS NECESSARY TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE REQUIRED SO THAT ALL PARTIES WILL COME TO THE TABLE. THE UNIONISTS SIMPLY WILL NOT ATTEND WITHOUT THAT CONDITION BEING MET.

8. MAYHEW SAID THAT HMG ALSO HAD AGREED TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION MAY GIVE. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ADVISE, AFTER IT CONFERS WITH THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARIES, THAT SOMETHING OTHER THAN BEGINNING THE ACTUAL PROCESS OF DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONS WOULD GENERATE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE TO ALLOW THE ROUNDTABLE TO BEGIN WITHOUT FEAR OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE, HMG WILL FAIRLY CONSIDER THAT ADVICE ON ITS MERITS. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, AT THIS POINT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN DECOMMISSIONING COULD PRODUCE SUCH CONFIDENCE.

9. MOREOVER, MAYHEW CONTINUED, BOTH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND SINN FEIN ALL ALONG HAVE BEEN WELL AWARE OF THE BRITISH POSITION. MAYHEW GAVE THE AMBASSADOR A COPY OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND OF THE CHILCOT-DALTON MINUTE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG'S POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. (TEXTS BELOW IN PARAS 12-13.) HE ALSO READ FROM THE MEMCON OF HIS MEETING WITH SINN FEIN LEADERS TO HOW THAT HE UNAMBIGUOUSLY HAD MADE THE POINT TO ADAMS. THE IDEA OF DECOMMISSIONING PREDATES THE CEASEFIRE, WAS AMPLY BRIEFED TO ALL PARTIES -- INCLUDING MSSRS. ADAMS AND REYNOLDS -- BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND IS NOT A SUDDEN OR WHIMSICAL DEMAND OF HMG, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED.

NEXT STEPS

10. MAYHEW SAID HE IS NOT AS PESSIMISTIC AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

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COMMISSION (REFTEL). ALTHOUGH BOTH GOVERNMENTS REMAIN OPEN TO OTHER IDEAS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NOW NO SERVICEABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMMISSION. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, WE MUST "LET THE MUD SETTLE" BEFORE WE CAN SEE OUR WAY FORWARD. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO THE IRISH, AS THEY ARE THE ONES WHO WITHDREW. SO FOR NOW LONDON WILL WAIT, AS IT UNDERSTANDS BRUTON NEEDS SOME TIME TO GET "THE OTHERS" LINED UP. AT THIS MOMENT THERE ARE NO LIAISON GROUP OR OTHER CONTACTS SCHEDULED, ACCORDING TO MAYHEW. HE EXPECTS, HOWEVER, THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE PRIME MINISTERS WILL COMMISSION A GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS HOW TO PUT THE PIECES BACK TOGETHER.

11. SECONDING COMMENTS BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS, MAYHEW SAID THAT IF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS STAND FIRM, SINN FEIN WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. ANCRAM WILL BE MAKING THIS POINT FORCEFULLY IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID. ANCRAM ALSO WILL TAKE THE MESSAGE THAT THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. THERE ARE CERTAIN TO BE MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, MAYHEW POINTED OUT.

12. TEXT OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE PREPARED FOR SEPT 6 SUMMIT

BEGIN TEXT:

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS, AIMED AT EACHING IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD COMMENCE BEFORE THE END OF 1995. A SERIES OF MEETINGS WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION. THIS COMMISSION WILL HAVE THE INITIAL AND LIMITED REMIT OF

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REPORTING TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS BY MID-NOVEMBER 1995, ON WHETHER IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A CLEAR COMMITMENT EXISTS ON THE PART OF THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARY ORGANISATIONS TO THE FULL AND VERIFIABLE DECOMMISSIONING OF ALL ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS IN THE APPROPRIATE CONTEXT AND MANNER. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AIM TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER 1995, TO AGREE THE APPROPRIATE WAY FORWARD.

END TEXT

13. CHILCOT-DALTON CONFIDENTIAL MINUTE

BEGIN TEXT:

TASK OF COMMISSION

(11) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY REFERRED TO, THE GROUP ENVISAGE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP A COMMISSION WOULD BE INVITED TO DEVELOP A SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING IN CONSULTATION WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES. ON THE BASIS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS, THE COMMISSION WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE MODALITIES FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS WHICH IN ITS VIEW WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DECOMMISSIONING. SUBSEQUENTLY THE COMMISSION COULD, IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SAW ADVANTAGE IN IT, BE REQUESTED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

(12) THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE GIVEN AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE IN TAKING FORWARD ITS WORK ON MODALITIES. THE GROUP THEREFORE SEES A NEED FOR TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH WILL ENABLE THE COMMISSION TO RESPOND TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROCESS ITSELF. IT RECOMMENDS TERMS OF REFERENCE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

-- TO CONSULT WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES, INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS ON THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS, ON THE TERMS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT APPLY FOR A SCHEME FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS; TO REPORT TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS,

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IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSULTATIONS, ON THE PROGRESS OF ITS WORK AND ON HOW THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS MIGHT BE TAKEN FORWARD, AND TO MAKE PROPOSALS OUTLINING THE MODALITIES FOR A SCHEME ON WHICH AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE;

-- TO CARRY OUT SUCH OTHER TASKS AS MAY BE ASSIGNED TO IT FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS JOINTLY AND, IN PARTICULAR, IF REQUESTED, TO:

O ASSIST THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO PUT IN PLACE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS; AND

O PARTICIPATE IN THE SUPERVISION AND VERIFICATION OF THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS ITSELF INCLUDING, IF APPROPRIATE, ACCEPTING WITHIN ITS CONTROL ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS.

CROWE

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<MSGID> M1844011

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (3 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip Cables

2011-0355-F
rs1672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: BASS BERGER FUERTH LAKE SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HOTLINE_IN LAKEA SUM2

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161300Z SEP 95

FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(2.88)
KBH 4/11/2023

MESSAGE TO BE SENT VIA CABINET OFFICE/WHITE HOUSE DIRECT LINK TO
MR. ANTHONY LAKE FROM RODERIC LYNE ON SATURDAY 16 SEPTEMBER

DEAR TONY,

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE, WHICH WE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY EVENING.
YOU ASKED FOR A QUICK REACTION, AND THAT IS WHAT THIS IS. I HAVE
CONSULTED NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE MINISTERS, BUT IN THE TIME
AVAILABLE WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO PUT A FORMED POSITION TO THE
PRIME MINISTER. THE FOLLOWING IS OF COURSE SUBJECT TO HIS VIEWS.
PERHAPS I COULD FIRST SAY THAT EVERYONE HERE IS ENCOURAGED BY THE
PROGRESS YOU HAVE REPORTED. WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE TIME AND SKILL
YOU HAVE DEVOTED TO THIS, AND EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EFFORTS.
THERE SEEMS NOW TO BE A REAL HOPE OF GETTING THE TWIN TRACK
INITIATIVE UP AND RUNNING. THAT WOULD GIVE A TREMENDOUS BOOST TO
THE PEACE PROCESS AFTER THE RECENT SETBACK. SO ALL POWER TO YOUR
ELBOW?

THERE ARE NATURALLY A NUMBER OF POINTS OF DETAIL AND OF DRAFTING IN
YOUR TEXT WHICH WE MAY WISH TO EXPRESS DIFFERENTLY. WE ARE READY

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TO GO TO WORK ON THIS RAPIDLY NEXT WEEK, WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND IN CONSULTATION WITH JOHN HUME AND OTHERS, IF AS A RESULT OF YOUR WORK THERE IS NOW THE PROSPECT OF LAUNCHING THE TWIN-TRACK INITIATIVE. SO THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION FOR US, AND I ASSUME THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, IS TO KNOW WHETHER SINN FEIN WILL NOW AGREE TO THE KEY ELEMENTS IN THE INITIATIVE, AND WILL ACCORDINGLY SECURE FULL COOPERATION IN BOTH TRACKS. ANY ASSURANCE GIVEN TO YOU WILL OF COURSE CARRY WEIGHT WITH US.

THESE ELEMENTS ARE:

- LAUNCHING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A SERIES OF MEETINGS INVOLVING ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUBSTANTIVE ROUND-TABLE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. THESE INCLUSIVE PREPARATORY TALKS WOULD BE IN BILATERAL, TRILATERAL, OR MULTILATERAL FORMAT, ACCORDING TO THE WISHES OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND WOULD BE DESIGNED TO SECURE ALL-PARTY AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS, PARTICIPATION AND AGENDA FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU SAY, WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE PROSPECT OF MOVING TO A ROUND-TABLE FORMAT IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE IF THE PARTICIPANTS ASKED FOR IT.

- IN PARALLEL, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY OR COMMISSION OF THREE PEOPLE OF APPROPRIATE STANDING, AND LIKELY TO ENJOY WIDESPREAD CONFIDENCE, WHICH WE HOPE WOULD BE CHAIRED BY A DISTINGUISHED

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AMERICAN. (THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO MAKE A CAREFUL JUDGMENT ON THE SORT OF PEOPLE WHO WOULD COMMAND WIDE ACCEPTANCE, BUT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO GIVE THE PARTIES A VETO BY USING THE TERM 'ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES'. THAT WOULD MAKE IT ALL TOO EASY FOR A PARTY ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER TO BLOCK PROGRESS, AS WE HAVE LEARNED FROM PAST EXPERIENCE.) THE COMMISSION WOULD BE ASKED TO ADVISE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON WHETHER AND BY WHAT MEANS THE QUESTION OF ILLEGAL ARMS CAN BE 'SETTLED TO THE SATISFACTION OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS'. (THIS LAST PHRASE WAS SUGGESTED TO US BY JOHN HUME, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS AGREED IT WITH GERRY ADAMS.)

- WE WOULD ASK THE COMMISSION TO MAKE A REPORT BY A PARTICULAR DATE. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WE HAD SETTLED ON MID-NOVEMBER. IF, WITH THE TIME THAT HAS BEEN LOST, THIS IS NOW SETTING TOO TIGHT A DEADLINE, WE SHOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER A LATER DATE, PERHAPS ON THE LINES YOU HAVE INDICATED. MUCH WILL DEPEND, OF COURSE, ON THE COOPERATION OF THE PARAMILITARIES ON BOTH SIDES. SO WE HOPE YOU CAN SECURE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING FROM GERRY ADAMS THAT THE REPUBLICANS WILL COOPERATE. WE ARE CONFIDENT FROM CURRENT INDICATIONS THAT THE LOYALISTS WILL DO SO.

- AS WE HAVE ALREADY SAID, HMG WOULD CONSIDER THE

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RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE COMMISSIONS REPORT SERIOUSLY ON THEIR MERITS. (AS MICHAEL ANCRAM AGREED WITH YOU, IF WE ARE ASKED, WE SHALL OF COURSE STAND BY OUR EXISTING APPROACH TO DECOMMISSIONING. WE SHALL EXPLAIN, IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT, THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS AS WE HAVE DEFINED IT ON DECOMMISSIONING IS THE ONLY WAY THAT WE CAN AT PRESENT SEE TO GENERATE THE CONFIDENCE TO ENSURE PARTICIPATION BY ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES IN THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.)

- WE WOULD SET A TARGET DATE FOR THE BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS IN ROUND-TABLE FORMAT, ASSUMING THAT THROUGH THIS INITIATIVE WE HAD, WITH THE COOPERATION OF SINN FEIN AND OTHER PARTIES, BY THEN ACHIEVED THE APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES BY GENERATING THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES. WE HAD AGREED WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT WE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO CONVENE ROUND-TABLE TALKS BEFORE THE END OF 1995. HOWEVER, AS I INDICATED TO YOU, WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER BRINGING THIS FORWARD, PERHAPS TO MID-DECEMBER. THE CRUCIAL THING IS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY PROGRESS, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO DO THAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WOULD MEET WHEN THEY HAD RECEIVED THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, AND WOULD CONSIDER BOTH THAT REPORT AND THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. WE SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN AGREEING WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON A SUITABLE

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TIME FOR THAT MEETING.

THIS IS NOT DRAFTING LANGUAGE, BUT THESE, AS I SAY, ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS AND REFLECT WHAT WE PREVIOUSLY AGREED WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. THE TITLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OR BODY IS TO US A SECONDARY QUESTION, AND CERTAINLY A MATTER ON WHICH THERE IS SCOPE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. YOU TOLD ME THAT YOU HAD MADE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS WITH GERRY ADAMS, AND WERE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OBTAINING HIS AGREEMENT TO THE TWIN-TRACK INITIATIVE. IF YOU HAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT SINN FEIN ENVISAGE COOPERATING FULLY IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS AND THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY, THIS IS EXCELLENT NEWS. YOU SAID THAT GERRY ADAMS WANTED A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS POSITION. WE WOULD BE HAPPY FOR YOU TO EXPRESS OUR POSITION IN TERMS OF THE POINTS I HAVE SET OUT ABOVE, STRESSING THAT WE HAVE NOT AT THIS STAGE REFORMULATED THEM IN PRECISE DRAFTING LANGUAGE. WE THINK THIS WOULD BE A BETTER APPROACH THAN PUTTING A DRAFT TEXT TO HIM AT THIS STAGE, AS A TEXT WOULD INEVITABLY BE DELAYED WHILE I SECURED CABINET LEVEL APPROVAL AND THE AGREEMENT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.

AS SOON AS YOU TELL US THAT SINN FEIN ARE CONTENT TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS BASIS, WE SHALL PRODUCE A FULL DRAFT, DRAWING ON THE HELPFUL ADVICE WHICH JOHN HUME GAVE SIR PATRICK MAYHEW LAST WEEK.

(I UNDERSTAND THAT HUME WAS IN TURN LIAISING WITH ADAMS.) WE SHALL

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

FLASH

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

PUT THE TEXT TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, AND CAN THEN DISCUSS IT WITH SINN FEIN THROUGH THEM, THROUGH JOHN HUME, OR DIRECTLY. WE SHALL ALSO TAKE SOUNDINGS WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED, SINCE THE CONFIDENCE WHICH YOU HAVE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED WITH GERRY ADAMS IS A VITAL ASSET.

PLEASE LET US HAVE SINN FEINS CONFIRMED POSITION AS SOON AS YOU CAN, EITHER DIRECTLY TO ME OR THROUGH OUR EMBASSY. I SHALL SEND A COPY OF THIS TO JOHN KERR SO THAT HE IS FULLY IN THE PICTURE.

MANY THANKS, AS I SAY, FOR ALL THAT YOU ARE DOING. LETS HOPE THAT THIS WILL NOW GET US ONTO THE HOME STRAIGHT.

YOURS EVER

RODERIC

#0001

NNNN

<MSGID> M1858607

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG:131759Z OCT 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8818

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3675

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3430

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.89)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 005104

NSC FOXR/PaE.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EI, UK

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: TRYING TO MOVE
TOWARD LAUNCH OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH

REF: LONDON 14032

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

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2. DUBLIN EXPECTS MICHAEL ANCRAM AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS TO MEET EARLY NEXT WEEK IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES THAT STAND IN THE WAY OF LAUNCHING THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. A KEY ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED IS WHETHER SINN FEIN WOULD SPEAK FOR THE IRA IN PROVIDING ASSURANCES TO AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. LIKEWISE, FINDING CREATIVE LANGUAGE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND LONDON ON LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL WEAPONS REMAINS A PROBLEM. DUBLIN BELIEVES MCGUINNESS IS CURRENTLY RUNNING THE SHOW ON THIS ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

END SUMMARY

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3. I MET WITH DFA ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION CHIEF SEAN O'HUIGINN ON OCTOBER 13 TO REVIEW THE BIDDING ON THE PEACE

PROCESS. HE APPEARED WEARY AT THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND THE CONSTANT RETURN TO THE SAME ISSUES. "EVERYONE ACCEPTS THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH," HE SAID; THE KEY ISSUE NOW IS "HOW, NOT WHETHER," TO MOVE FORWARD. THE IRISH, FOR THEIR PART,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARE READY TO GET THINGS MOVING: "WE WANT TO GET THE DAMN SHOW ON THE ROAD," O'HUIGINN SAID.

FACE TO FACE

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4. FROM DUBLIN'S PERSPECTIVE, SINN FEIN AND HMG NOW NEED TO SIT DOWN FACE-TO-FACE TO WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE JOINT COMMUNIQUE LAUNCHING THE TWIN TRACK PROCESS. DUBLIN REMAINS PREPARED TO SERVE AS A BROKER, O'HUIGINN INDICATED, BUT THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY TO MOVE FORWARD AT THIS STAGE IS FOR THE TWO SIDES TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER DIRECTLY. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAN MICHAEL ANCRAM AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS MET LAST WEEK, AND ANOTHER MEETING IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THESE TWO, PERHAPS ON MONDAY (OCTOBER 16). JOHN HUME IS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN SOME OF THESE EXCHANGES.

THREE PROBLEM AREAS

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5. O'HUIGINN OUTLINED THREE AREAS THAT REMAIN PROBLEMATIC:

-- TARGET DATE: HMG IS STILL RELUCTANT TO SET A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE START OF ALL-PARTY TALKS, PREFERRING TO PUT FORWARD A TARGET DATE INSTEAD. SINN FEIN WOULD PREFER A DATE CERTAIN, BUT O'HUIGINN BELIEVES SINN FEIN IS LIKELY TO SETTLE FOR A TARGET DATE IN THE END.

-- AUTHORITATIVE ASSURANCES ON WEAPONS DECOMMISSIONING: DUBLIN IS CONCERNED BY INCREASING SIGNS THAT SINN FEIN IS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE IRA ON THE MATTER OF PROVIDING ASSURANCES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION REGARDING DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS. O'HUIGINN SAID THE IRISH HAVE MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR TO SINN FEIN THAT IT WOULD BE "COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC" TO EXPECT THE COMMISSION TO ISSUE A REPORT CONTAINING ASSURANCES ON ARMS, ONLY TO HAVE IT EMERGE THAT THE COMMISSION'S INTERLOCUTORS CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE ANY ARMS UNDER THEIR CONTROL OR BE SPEAKING FOR ANY OF THE PARAMILITARY GROUPS THAT DID. STILL, O'HUIGINN THINKS THERE ARE "TACTFUL WAYS" TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM. COMMITMENTS ALONG THE LINES MADE IN GERRY ADAMS' OCTOBER 9 "NO THREATS" SPEECH, OR ASSURANCES PROVIDED THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES SUCH AS FATHER REID, COULD HELP BRIDGE THE GAP. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE INTERLOCUTORS BE ABLE TO SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY, AND THAT SENATOR MITCHELL BE ABLE TO CHECK THE COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTIES TO REMOVE ARMS FROM IRISH POLITICS.

-- LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL ARMS: SINN FEIN REMAINS DETERMINED TO SEEK SOME FORM OF EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN PARAMILITARY WEAPONS AND BRITISH MILITARY/POLICE ARMS. THE BRITISH WILL NEVER ACCEPT THIS, O'HUIGINN OBSERVED. ARTFUL LANGUAGE HAS TO BE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOUND TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM OR PUSH IT DOWN THE ROAD.

MCGUINNESS IS KEY

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6. O'HUIGINN INDICATED THE IRISH BELIEVE GERRY ADAMS HAS GIVEN MARTIN MCGUINNESS THE LEAD ON DECISIONS RELATING TO ARMS ISSUES. IT IS MCGUINNESS, RATHER THAN ADAMS, WHO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 005104

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EI, UK

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: TRYING TO MOVE TOWARD LAUNCH OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH

RESISTS IRISH ARGUMENTS THAT THE COMMISSION'S INTERLOCUTORS MUST BE ABLE TO SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY ON WEAPONS DECOMMISSIONING. LIKEWISE, MCGUINNESS IS THE ONE WHO TENDS TO GET EMOTIONAL WHEN TALKING ABOUT THE MORAL EQUIVALENCE OF IRA AND BRITISH WEAPONS, CITING CONSTITUENTS WHO REMAIN VERY ANGRY BECAUSE THEIR RELATIVES WERE KILLED BY BRITISH GUNS. O'HUIGINN'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT MCGUINNESS HAS THE LEAD ON THESE MATTERS, AND WILL NOT TRUST ANYONE TO BROKER FOR HIM -- "CERTAINLY NOT DUBLIN, PERHAPS HUME, BUT MOST LIKELY ONLY HIMSELF." FROM DUBLIN'S VIEWPOINT, THAT IS FINE, JUST SO MCGUINNESS "GETS ON WITH IT." THUS, THE HOPE IS THAT MCGUINNESS AND ANCRAM WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS WHEN THEY MEET EARLY NEXT WEEK.

ASSEMBLY

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7. O'HUIGINN MADE CLEAR DUBLIN WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE DAVID TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY COURTEOUS CONSIDERATION, AT LEAST PUBLICLY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PROPOSAL IS CONSIDERED A NON-STARTER IN NATIONALIST CIRCLES. THE VERY DEFINITION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNIONISTS AND NATIONALISTS, HE EMPHASIZED, IS THAT NATIONALISTS REJECT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH SUCH ELECTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT, WHEREAS UNIONISTS ACCEPT IT. ANY EXERCISE WHICH REINFORCED THIS DIFFERENCE RISKED MOVING THINGS BACKWARD. TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL COULD PERHAPS BE USED "CREATIVELY" IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT IT REPRESENTED A "CLEVER, RATHER THAN STATESMANLIKE" APPROACH, AND WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY NATIONALISTS.

SHORT WINDOW

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8. REFERRING TO THE TORY PARTY CONFERENCE, O'HUIGINN EXPRESSED THE CONCERN THAT ONLY A SHORT WINDOW OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPPORTUNITY MAY REMAIN TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SIGNALS FROM THE PARTY CONFERENCE SUGGESTED THAT THE CONSERVATIVES WERE GETTING READY TO "GO BACK INTO ELECTION MODE" EARLY NEXT YEAR, AT WHICH POINT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN ELECTIONEERING. HE URGED THE U.S. TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES. SINN FEIN SHOULD BE PRESSED REGARDING THE NEED FOR "AUTHORITATIVE" STATEMENTS ON WEAPONS TO THE COMMISSION. LONDON SHOULD BE PRESSED NOT TO TRY TO DRAW THINGS OUT IN AN ATTEMPT TO "PLAY CHICKEN" WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT, AS THIS COULD PLACE THE ENTIRE PEACE PROCESS AT RISK.

SMITH
BT
#5104

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<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN> 5104
<^TOR> 951013141939 M1900847
<^SECT> SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN> 5104
<^TOR> 951013142209 M1900859

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:131658Z OCT 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8815

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3674
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3429

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.90)
K8H 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005100

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10-13-97
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EI, UK
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: THE LATEST
FROM ADAMS AND HUME

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GERRY ADAMS CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING, OCTOBER 13, TO EXPLAIN THAT HE HAD COME TO DUBLIN FOR A JOINT MEETING WITH JOHN HUME AND THE TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON. HOWEVER, BRUTON CANCELLED THE MEETING CITING UNIONISTS' SENSITIVITIES. HE PROPOSED INSTEAD TO MEET WITH ADAMS AND HUME SEPARATELY. ADAMS DECIDED, HOWEVER, TO RETURN TO BELFAST AND HUME WAS SICK.

3. DURING HIS BRIEF VISIT, ADAMS SEEMED VERY RELAXED AND CALM ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS. HE REITERATED THAT THERE WILL BE NO START TO DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRE-CONDITION, BUT UNDERLINED THAT HE SUPPORTS THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH AND ADDED THAT HE IS OPEN TO TALKING ABOUT THE NORTHERN ASSEMBLY IDEA FLOATED BY UUP PRESIDENT DAVID TRIMBLE. HE ALSO RAISED THE DOCUMENT DISCUSSED WITH NANCY SODERBERG, DURING HER RECENT VISIT. THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS HAVE BEEN DROPPED AND IT NOW JUST CONSISTS OF THE FIVE POINTS. THIS CURRENT VERSION HAS BEEN APPROVED BY JOHN HUME WHO MADE NO CHANGES TO IT. HE ASSUMES THAT THE DOCUMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED DURING THE MEETINGS TONY LAKE WILL HAVE IN LONDON ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 16.

4. JOHN HUME ALSO CALLED ME THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. ALTHOUGH SUFFERING FROM THE FLU, HUME HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH TONY LAKE AND PARTY ON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MONDAY, OCTOBER 16, IN LONDON. HE HAS ALSO REQUESTED A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19. HE IS CONFIDENT THAT MAJOR WILL BE AMENABLE TO MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

5. HUME NOTED THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF OCTOBER/EARLY NOVEMBER WITH A GROUP OF EURO-PARLIAMENTARIANS. THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO SOLIDIFY LINKS WITH DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND TO INVITE THE PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. WITH THIS GOAL IN MIND HE HOPES THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL BE ABLE TO CALL ON VICE PRESIDENT GORE. HE STRESSED THAT THEIR VISIT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD BE THRILLED TO BE ABLE TO MEET WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT.

SMITH

BT

#5100

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>5100

<^TOR>951013131740 M1900693

FROM:

SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: ROUTINE

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED

DTG:131413Z OCT 95

FM: AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO:

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8626

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8090

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5853

RUEHED/AMCONSUL EDINBURGH 3207

UNCLAS BELFAST 00403

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (CLINTON, BILL), PGOV, UK

SUBJECT: ULSTER UNIONIST DEPUTY LEADER WARNS
CLINTON OVER VISIT

1. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY DEPUTY LEADER JOHN TAYLOR
WARNED YESTERDAY THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT

TO NORTHERN IRELAND MUST BE EVEN-HANDED IF IT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL. SPEAKING TO A GROUP OF UNIONISTS IN COUNTY TYRONE ON OCTOBER 12, TAYLOR SAID HE HAD READ PRESS LEAKS WHICH INDICAED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ITINERARY WOULD INCLUDE ONLY NATIONALIST AREAS OF WEST BELFAST, DERRY AND DOWNPATRICK. HE WARNED THAT SUCH A RESTRICTED VISIT "IN WHICH THE GREATER NUMBER OF PEOPLE WOULD BE IGNORED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD BE DISASTROUS." HE CONTINUED, "IT WOULD EITHER DEMONSTRATE HIS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE REAL PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND OR A BIAS AMONG THOSE WHOM HE HAS AS HIS ADVISERS." THE UUP DEPUTY LEADER SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT CLINTON VISIT AREAS WHERE THE "MAJORITY PRO-BRITISH PEOPLE" LIVE, AND HE SUGGESTED PLACES LIKE THE SHANKILL ROAD, NEWTOWNARDS, BALLYMENA, CARRICKFERGUS AND LARNE AMONG OTHERS AS POSSIBILITIES. TAYLOR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD CLINTON'S WISH TO "BENEFIT ELECTORALLY BACK HOME" BUT REITERATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE VISIT MUST BE PERCEIVED AS BEING EVEN-HANDED. IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

2. TAYLOR ALSO WARNED AGAINST ANY PROTEST BY MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY AT THE VISIT. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN TERMS OF PUBLICITY, "THE ICING ON THE CAKE FOR CONSUMPTION BACK HOME IN THE USA WOULD BE A COUNTER DEMONSTRATION BY IAN PAISLEY.... "I HOPE NOONE WILL BE SO SILLY", HE SAID.

3. POST CONTINUES TO ADVISE ALL NORTHERN IRELAND AND OTHER MEDIA THAT A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS REGARDING THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT IS BEING CONSIDERED AND THAT NO DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IN RESPONSE TO DETAILED QUESTIONING, POST ADVISES THAT USG IS AWARE OF THE NEED FOR BALANCE IN THE VISIT AND IS CONTINUING TO EXPLORE ALL OPTIONS.

STEPHENS

BT

#0403

NNNN

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>0403

<^TOR>951013125335 M1900622

FROM:

SITREPT

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SODERBERG, NSC, PETERS, SUM2

PREC: ROUTINE

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED

DTG:131401Z OCT 95

FM: AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO:

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8625

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8- AMCONSUL EDINBURGH 3206

UNCLAS BELFAST 0402

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: SINN FEIN RESPONDS NEGATIVELY TO MAYHEW SPEECH

1. SINN FEIN'S NATIONAL CHAIRMAN MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN HAS

CRITICIZED AS A "NON-RUNNER" THE SPEECH MADE BY
SECRETARY OF STATE SIR PATRICK MAYHEW TO THE

CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 12. IN THE
SPEECH, SIR PATRICK SAID THAT HMG AND THE IRISH
GOVERNMENT WERE WILLING TO INVITE AN INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION TO ADVISE THEM ON THE QUESTION OF
DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS. HE ALSO PROPOSED "PRELIMINARY"
TALKS, IN WHICH ALL PARTIES COULD CONTRIBUTE, TO "PREPARE
THE GROUND FOR THE LATER ALL-PARTY POLITICAL
NEGOTIATIONS." MAYHEW REITERATED HMG'S INSISTENCE THAT
IT WOULD NOT CALL ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS AT THE MOMENT,
BECAUSE REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER PARTIES WOULD SIMPLY
NOT PARTICIPATE IN A SITUATION IF "THE SHADOW OF THE
GUNMAN OR THE BOMBER FALLS ACROSS THE TABLE." HE
INSISTED THAT THE IRA'S ARSENAL OF WEAPONS REMAINED A
"POWERFUL AND AN UNDIMINISHED THREAT." THE SECRETARY OF
STATE UNDERLINED WHAT HAVE BECOME KNOWN AS THE
"WASHINGTON REQUIREMENTS", AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ALL-
PARTY TALKS - A COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO DECOMMISSION
ARMS, AGREEMENT ON HOW DECOMMISSIONING MIGHT TAKE
PLACE, AND SOME DECOMMISSIONING AS AN ACT OF GOOD FAITH.
MAYHEW DESCRIBED HMG'S GUARANTEE TO THE PEOPLE OF
NORTHERN IRELAND TO REMAIN PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
FOR AS LONG AS THEY WISH AS 'CAST IRON.'

2. MCLAUGHLIN SAID THAT MAYHEW'S PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE
REGARDED AS A SERIOUS OR GENUINE ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE
PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, COMMENTING "THERE IS NOTHING

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NEW IN THESE SUGGESTIONS" INSTEAD, HE SAID, THE PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED TO "GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF MOVEMENT WHERE NONE EXISTS". SUCH AN APPROACH, MCLAUGHLIN INSISTED, WAS "CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT TO BREAK THE LOGJAM. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT KNOWS THIS." HE ACCUSED HMG OF HAVING "RENEGED ON ITS COMMITMENT TO ALL-PARTY PEACE TALKS BY DEMANDING THE SURRENDER OF IRA WEAPONS AS A NEW AND ABSOLUTE PRECONDITION."

STEPHENS

BT

#0402

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>0402

<^TOR>951013125332 M1900620

FROM:

SITREPT

UNCLASSIFIED