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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Taoiseach to John Major (7 pages)	11/20/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002. report	re: Tarnoff/Trimble Meeting (4 pages)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1398

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Ireland/U.K. Trip-All Party Talks/International Body

2011-0355-F

rs1671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FAX COVER SHEET

FAX NO. —

DATE: 20 NOVEMBER 1995

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: MR ANTHONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: AMBASSADOR GALLAGHER

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVERING SHEET: 13
TRANSMITTED FROM FAX NUMBER: (202) 232 5993

As promised.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: nm Date: 1/4/14

2016 0358-F

DRAFT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS**ON****WASHINGTON THREE**

1. Is the Washington Three test within the remit of the International Body?
 "Yes". *NOT EXCLUDED*

2. What is your position on the Washington Three test after a satisfactory report from the International Body?
Our position has not changed. But
 "My Government will, as set down in the agreed communique, consider all aspects of the Body's recommendations on their merits".

3. Does this mean you will not necessarily insist on the Washington Three test?

"The underlying requirement is, and always has been, to underpin confidence that political progress will be achieved in an atmosphere free from violence or the threat of violence. That is the context in which the Washington Three test arose. A successful twin track process will generate momentum and increase confidence in a way which will make it easier to deal with this matter. As I have just said, my Government will, as set down in the agreed communique, consider all aspects of the Body's recommendations on their merits".

[Note: The British wording is shown in (). New Irish wording is underlined].

AMENDED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE (STATEMENT)

[NOTE: (Target) Dates proposed assume a launch before the end of November 1995.]

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach met today to review progress in the peace process. After intensive efforts by both Governments, and with the benefit of consultations with parties in Northern Ireland, the two Governments agreed to launch a 'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.

2. Both Governments reaffirmed their commitment to securing the early launch of all-party negotiations. By way of the twin tracks, the two Governments have the firm aim of achieving (target is to achieve) this by the end of January (February) 1996. It is the two Governments' considered view that, with cooperation from all the relevant parties in both tracks, that objective should prove achievable. Both Governments commit themselves to working, with others, to achieve it.

3. To this end, the two Governments have agreed jointly to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach a consensus on (agreement, acceptable to all, on what) the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda for substantive political negotiations in round table format aimed at

a political settlement based on consent. (subsequent all-party political negotiations should be.) These talks will have an open agenda, allowing any party to raise any relevant matters. These matters could include (matter, including) how best the structure and format of negotiations, involving both Governments and all the relevant Northern Ireland parties, directed to addressing in a comprehensive manner all the relevant relationships in a single three-stranded process, can properly take account of democratic mandates and principles, including whether and how an elected body could play a part at some point in the process.

4. In jointly managing the process of preparatory talks, the two Governments (each Government) will build on existing exchanges and bilateral contacts, treating each party on an equal basis, and will encourage other formats for meetings with the parties and among the parties which might further the objective of the preparatory talks. In particular, the two Governments propose to meet parties jointly, as far as the parties will agree, and to convene, as the Governments judge appropriate, meetings involving two or more of the parties by agreement with the parties concerned.

5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms (weapons) removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms now silenced (of those arms and other material silenced by the

✓
no✓
no

?

no

no

statements of 31 August, 1994 and 13 October, 1994 from the political equation).

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to a satisfactory process to achieve that in the appropriate context and manner.

yes

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of the issue of arms (the decommissioning issue) and, in reaching its conclusions, to consider such evidence on its merits.

9. (In establishing the Body,) The British Government reaffirms its willingness to continue to take responsive measures, on the advice of the security forces, as the threat reduces. (movement on such arms reduces the threat).

delete

10. The two Governments have invited Senator George Mitchell to chair the Body, and have invited [...] to serve as the other members of the Body.

11. The two Government have asked the Body to submit its report to the two Governments by mid-January 1996. (Neither Government, nor any other party

no

co-operating with the work of the Body, is bound in advance to accept its recommendations, which will be purely advisory and not operational). The two Governments will consider carefully any recommendations it makes and give them due weight on their merits.

no

12. To that (this) end, and to review progress in the preparatory talks (and towards the target date) for all-party negotiations, the two Governments plan to call a one day conference with all the parties before end January 1996. (to meet again by mid-February 1996).

no

Oifig an Taoiseach
Office of the Taoiseach

20 November, 1995.

The Right Honourable John Major, MP,
Prime Minister.

Dear John

Thank you for your letter. I appreciate the thought you have put into your response. Likewise I have examined your proposals very carefully with Dick Spring, Proinsias de Rossa and our officials. I do believe some limited changes and elaborations are necessary before we can go ahead. I enclose an amended communiqué and a draft answer to questions about Washington Three, which we can consider in our next phone conversation. They can provide the principal focus for our discussions.

I share your concern at the ominous signs of increasing polarisation evident in the situation since last August. There are disquieting signs within the nationalist community of serious disillusionment at the failure to build on the momentum of the peace, with obvious consequences for the authority of those who called and sustain their ceasefire. It is now more vital - and urgent - than

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

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ever to build political momentum so as to underpin the unique opportunity of this peace with a lasting political settlement.

I do not share your assessment of the impact of my speech last Saturday week.

You acknowledged in your earlier letter, and my public record abundantly confirms, that I have always taken extraordinary pains to take account of unionist concerns myself, and to encourage others to do so. Indeed the unprecedented emphasis I gave to this dimension gave rise to some misconception on the nationalist side that it was at the cost of neglect of their legitimate and equally important concerns.

I was at pains to make clear in my speech that I am fully concerned for both, and to set out in detail my views in that regard.

Both our Governments have formally and explicitly recognised, in the Joint Declaration and the Joint Framework Document, that a totally new dispensation is needed in relation to Northern Ireland. We affirm the principle of consent as the key protection of unionist rights, but we equally acknowledge the need for extensive change and totally new political structures if nationalists in Northern

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

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Ireland are also to have ownership of the institutions governing them - a requirement equally necessary for justice and stability.

Indeed I think it would be helpful on your side to make clear that the British Government, in the exercise of a wider responsibility which transcends the unionist agenda, remains committed to the balanced approach and the philosophy underlying these documents. It would in particular be helpful if you could find an early occasion to reassure nationalists that their political future and rights are not once again being decided, as they still fear, as a function of unionist requirements. We must both show clearly, as I did in my London speech, that our intergovernmental agenda remains resolutely dedicated to reconciling the rights of both communities.

I accept that, while unionists do not have a veto, there can be no settlement without them. Nor can there be a settlement without broad nationalist support.

As regards an elected body, I made clear in my last letter that David Trimble's proposals should be given a respectful and constructive hearing and I will work to ensure this. At the same time you will be aware of the very strong nationalist opposition to such an approach.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

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We must, therefore, ensure that David Trimble's proposals are treated in a way which does not prejudice the prospect of a constructive hearing but, equally, which does not weigh the scales against the general nationalist view. I might add that there will be a strong onus on David Trimble to allay nationalist fears that his proposal resiles from the position established in the 'Brooke Talks', particularly as regards the role of the two sovereign Governments, and to address the practical objections in terms of the potential for increased polarisation of such an election campaign, excess of negotiating numbers and so forth.

As to the remaining difficulties:

I consider the International Body will be of value in direct proportion to whether it offers to transcend the present impasse, as opposed to merely postponing it for a few weeks. That impasse centres mainly on "Washington Three". For that reason it must be agreed between us that the Body will deal with this aspect and that, at a minimum, there is an open mind on your side on the possibility of an alternative approach, and a readiness to consider such an alternative on its merits, and that this will be made clear in your public statements.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-5-

I agree that we are looking at a date that is a firm aim, rather than a fixed date, but there is an understandable scepticism across the nationalist spectrum about unionist intentions in this regard, and the ability of the Governments to reach that objective. For that reason, we should spell out more fully the proactive role that the two Governments will play in the preparatory talks to lend conviction to the objective. I believe we should also agree, to underline the seriousness of our resolve, to meet jointly with the parties to review the situation and to consider the way forward, when we have the mid-January report of the International Body and the results of our first round of political contacts.

On the question of arms, I believe there is a general acceptance that there should be no equivalence between paramilitary and security force weaponry; that it is accepted that Sinn Féin may put, and the Body take cognisance, as it sees fit, of Sinn Féin's views on this issue generally; and that a diminishing threat gives scope for constructive responsive measures on the British side.

I believe the formula "the removal of arms now silenced" might reflect this position without prejudice to the fundamental positions on either side.

Oifig an Taoisigh,
Office of the Taoiseach

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As to punishment beatings, I have condemned these publicly on several occasions and they have been frequently raised in our contacts with Sinn Féin, including most recently at a meeting which Dick Spring had on Thursday last with Martin McGuinness. They are an abomination by any civilised standards.

I believe, subject to our being able to reach agreement on the outstanding points identified in this letter and attachments, that our Summit meeting should be in Ireland and, if we can finalise agreement, I would be agreeable to either 24th or 25th November with a preference for the meeting to be on the 24th. I would be happy if our officials would meet on Wednesday afternoon. I suggest that the meeting should be in the Butler/Teahon format.

I agree with you that the process needs, at this stage, to be led by the two Governments, working as closely as possible together. I am sure you will appreciate that a decision to go ahead carries very significant political risks for my Government and me, given the public stance recently taken by the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Their public stance has been reinforced in even stronger terms in private meetings.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-7-

I agree completely with you on the crucial importance of the support of the United States for our common endeavour. I am, therefore, sending a copy of the amended communiqué on an equally private basis to the President.

I look forward to our phone conversation tomorrow afternoon.

With warmest personal regards

Yours sincerely,


Taoiseach



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

URGENT

TELEFAX MESSAGE

Date: 11-1TO: MARY ANN PETERSOF: NSCPAGES (plus cover): 5 FAX #: 456-9150

FROM: Paul B. van Son
Desk Officer for Ireland/Northern Ireland Affairs
Office of United Kingdom, Benelux, and Ireland Affairs
Room 4513
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520

FAX: (202) 647-3463 TEL: (202) 647-6585

SUBJECT: Draft Report of Tarnoff/Trimble mty

This will go out in a cable, but
you won't get it before VP/Trimble
mty. — Paul

3. summary. according to trimble, the twin track approach to the peace process advocated by hmg and the irish government is dead. unionist parties will not participate unless sinn fein begins decommissioning weapons. unionists do not believe this will happen. therefore, the unionist proposal for an elected assembly where elected representatives from all parties can talk and learn to cooperate is the way forward. a commission on decommissioning can proceed in parallel. reactions to

this proposal from other parties has been good. even sinn fein has not been negative. john hume, but not other sdlp members, gave a knee-jerk negative reaction to the proposal.

4. hume is now the problem to the peace process and his influence with the irish department of foreign affairs is excessive, especially over irish fm spring. irish pm bruton is more balanced. the president's visit will be a success regardless of any breakthrough in the peace process if it is a balanced program. so far, the president's schedule is discouraging to the uup.

end summary.

twin track approach to peace process

5. trimble told u/s tarnoff that the twin track approach had died in september when sinn fein issued an ultimatum to the government of ireland [goi]. the goi and hmg have been trying to revitalize this approach, but they are not going to get away with the fudge this time. the twin track had an element of fudge in it, but the public is now aware of it and will ask the hard questions. paisley's democratic unionist party [dup] will never participate and the uup most likely would not. so the uup doesn't believe this is the best way to proceed.

uup proposal for an elected assembly

6. in order to overcome the present stalemate, the uup has put forward its proposal for an elected assembly. the assembly will not negotiate a peace settlement, but it will make inquiries, conduct investigations, take testimony, etc., on the way forward. it will enable all of the parties to learn to work together and discover the possibilities for cooperation. the elections and the assembly can be set up using the powers under existing legislation [1982 government of northern ireland act].

7. trimble said that john hume of the social democratic and labor party [sdlp] has described the proposal as an internal solution, but this was a knee-jerk reaction. the uup has tried to get together with hume to meet and discuss the issues. the uup is encouraged by the reactions of the dup, the alliance party, the GOI, and HMG

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to these proposals. while sinn fein is suspicious of the the proposals, they are not as negative as the sdlp. when the sdlp starts to look closer at the proposals, they may revise the party position.

8. an elected assembly would give the parties a clear mandate and allow them to explain their programs. Sinn Fein would be forced to come up with an electoral program and stand for election on that program. trimble stated that he was not convinced that sinn was really committed to peace, much less wants to deal with decommissioning.

decommissioning on track with elected assembly

9. according to trimble, the decommissioning track of the twin track approach could still proceed. the assembly would not directly be tied to progress on the decommissioning track, although actual progress toward decommissioning, as well as actual decommissioning, would be reflected in the degree of cooperation and the atmosphere among the representatives elected to the assembly.

10. maginnis added that a commission on decommissioning would definitely fit in with the elected assembly proposal. the uup knows that sinn fein/ira will not give up the guns. ^{to hmg} that is why the uup came up with the idea of an international forum on decommissioning. the reason the ira called the ceasefire was because they found themselves out in the cold after the downing street declaration. with the goi and hmg cooperating, the u.s. nsc was enthusiastic that they could get adams into the political process and get him to decommission weapons. now the nsc has been deflated and admits they can't get anything from adams. they want to ask us, the unionists, to do something. the nsc has lost sight of the fact that you have to change the mind set of these people. until you do, they are not going to hand in guns, even to an international forum.

elected assembly as the only game left in town?

11. u/s tarnoff asked trimble what if sinn fein and the sdlp continue to resist an elected body or assembly. trimble said that would be a definite stalemate, but he is encouraged by signals coming from sinn fein that it will

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not come to that, especially if sinn fein is convinced that the twin track is not going to deliver the unionist parties to the table.

ceasefire will hold

12. responding to u/s tarnoff's query about the stability of the current ceasefire, trimble stated that there is no risk in the short term. sinn fein doesn't want to lose the political gains they have won vis-a-vis other parties in northern ireland, ireland, and the u.s. the ira has a discipline that is holding. adams had briefed his followers that real gains in the process could take several years. on the loyalist side there are rumblings, but that is because they do not have the political gains to point to that sinn fein does. maginnis added that the loyalists feel they have a "walk on, walk off" part in the process. they are brought out as needed to give balance.

13. smyth added that under the present situation of a ceasefire, what we are seeing is the threat of violence used as a political lever. adams uses the excuse that if the weapons are given up, the nationalist community will be attacked by the british army.

goi views on elected assembly and uup views on the goi

14. u/s tarnoff asked if there was a difference between the views of irish pm bruton and irish fm spring on an elected assembly. trimble responded that the real problem is sldp leader john hume personally. certain members of the irish department of foreign affairs [dfa] work closely with hume and then have too strong an influence over fm spring. hmg officials had raised the idea of an elected assembly in one of the recent meetings of hmg-goi civil servants. the dfa officials immediately dismissed the idea and have been attempting to influence spring to keep this line.

15. u/s tarnoff complimented trimble on his recent meeting with pm bruton and asked if the dialogue was important. trimble stated that the dialogue was a part of the peace process, but it was not real important. trimble did not seem to think the GOI had any fresh ideas.

16. trimble added that he didn't believe pm bruton had

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much influence over sinn fein. bruton had tried to form a relationship at the beginning, but sinn fein does not trust him--that is because bruton is basically a decent man who tries to be a fair and genuine arbiter. it is the dfa and the ira that have solid contacts. trimble believes a "wee bit of coolness" between dublin and sinn fein is not a bad thing at this time.

president's visit

17. trimble said it is probably too close to the president's visit to solve the decommissioning problem, but that is not critical to a successful visit to northern ireland. u/s tarnoff made the point that the occasion of a visit can sometimes push a process forward. trimble took the point, but said he was skeptical of any breakthrough.

18. smyth expressed concern that the present schedule for the president was too nationalistic. other events were scheduled for dup constituencies. u/s tarnoff responded that the president's schedule was a work in progress and the uup concerns would be taken into account. trimble admitted the schedule was probably not certain, but he was not encouraged by what he had seen to date. \\

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FAX COVER SHEET

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
42 ELGIN ROAD
BALLSBRIDGE
DUBLIN 4, IRELAND

Policy Management Office

PHONE: (353) (1) 668-8054

FAX: (353) (1) 667-0056

TO: *MARY ANN PETERS*
NSC STATE

FAX NUMBER: *202-456-9150*

FROM: *Dick Norland*

DATE:

11/21/95

Mary Ann - The Amb. received this from Gerry Adams today - his reactions to the latest British proposal contained in John Major's letter to John Birt. Adams - Birt has discussed the attached piece this evening, & SF still has concerns regarding the target date & Washington Three. Adams wanted the NSC to have this ("for Laker's attention"), & said the SF Rep. in Washington might also be in touch for a copy.

*Best regards,
Dick*

Number of Pages Including This Cover Sheet: 6

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21 November 1995

The British draft of a proposed joint communique is much longer than previous suggested drafts. This is important only in so far as all of the additional paragraphs deal with the arms issue so that in a 12 paragraph statement, 8 paragraphs deal in detail with the arms issue, while 4 deal in a general way with the political track. The British draft also subverts the original idea of a twin track. This was to allow for simultaneous or parallel movement on both tracks. The British draft makes movement on the political track totally qualified and conditional on the second track. Furthermore, the British have clearly put lots of negotiating fat into their draft, ie they have moved back from positions already agreed. For example, the period of time between the commencement of work of an International Body and the date for commencement of talks.

The British proposals fall far short of the proposals sent to them recently by the Irish government and in some ways step back from the British governments own position prior to 6 September.

Sinn Fein has already agreed propositions between Gerry Adams and John Hume but in this paper we analyse the British draft in the context of our understanding of the Irish government's position.

1. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach met today to review progress in the peace process. After intensive efforts by both governments and with the benefit of consultations with parties in Northern Ireland the two governments agreed to launch a 'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the (SF amendment replace the word 'decommissioning' with the word 'arms') arms issue and towards all party negotiations.

SF Commentary - with the one amendment of replacing the word "decommission" with the word "arms" this paragraph is acceptable.

The use of the word decommissioning is clearly sectional. The word itself has become highly politicised and carries the implication that the International Body will not accept submissions on of arms other than those which the British government wish to see decommissioned.

2. Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to securing the launch of all party negotiations. By way of the twin tracks, the two governments' target is to achieve this by the end of February 1996. It is the two governments considered view that, with co-operation from all the relevant parties in both tracks, that objective should prove achievable. Both governments commit themselves to working, with others, to achieve it.

SF Commentary - The target date is not acceptable so the entire paragraph would have to be reworked to incorporate a date which is not conditional. In addition the target date given is a full 12 weeks after the setting up of the International Body and 6 weeks after it reports. There is no logic for this delay and it runs counter to the 6 weeks mentioned in the draft Communique for the postponed 6 September Summit and referred to in the Taoiseach's letter to John Major which quotes the joint communique as

"The two government has agreed to work together to create the conditions so that all party talks in round table format aimed at reaching an agreed political settlement based on

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consent, could commence (refer to 6 weeks)."

.....
In the Irish Governments proposals to the British, it states,
"On a date for round table talks the Irish government's position has been, and remains, that a reasonable target date should be set with a clear commitment to make the utmost endeavours in good faith to reach it. The date should be six weeks from the international body commences work".

Our suggested alternative is;

2. Both governments reaffirm their commitment to all party negotiations and, in consequence, have set () as the date for the commencement of substantive political negotiations, in round table format, to reach an agreed political settlement.

3. To this end, the two governments have agreed to invite the parties to preparatory talks with a remit to achieve (SF amendment - seek) agreement, acceptable to all, on what the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda for subsequent all party political negotiations should be. These talks will have an open agenda, allowing any party to raise any relevant matter, including how best the structure and format of all party negotiations, directed to addressing in a comprehensive way all the relevant relationships in a single process, can properly take account of democratic mandates and principles (SF amendment delete -, including whether and how an elected body could play a part).

SF Commentary - This paragraph is in the main OK with above amendments.

A) The first amendment replaces the requirement to "achieve agreement" in the preparatory talks, which implies a further condition to the start of all-party negotiations, with the words "to seek agreement". The British have already agreed to this amendment and it is in line with the wording in the draft communique for the postponed 6 September summit, and is high-lighted in the Taoiseach's letter to the British Prime Minister;

" The two governments have agreed to work together to create the conditions so that all-party talks in round table format aimed at reaching an agreed political settlement based on consent, could commence [refer to six weeks]. A series of meetings will now be jointly convened by both Governments with all parties to lay the groundwork for these talks. Both governments share the aim of creating conditions in which all the relevant parties will attend these talks and will participate on the most constructive possible basis. "

B) SF's second amendment would remove the explicit reference to an elected body (the Unionist-proposed assembly). It is of course the right of any party to raise any matter or to make any proposal in the preparatory talks, but it is wrong to elevate any one proposal for mention in a joint communique. Full discussion of, and any decision on, this issue is, of course, a matter for the substantive political negotiations. We propose that this reference be deleted.

4. In managing the process of preparatory talks, each (SF amendment - both) governments will build on existing exchanges and bilateral contacts, treating each party on an equal basis, and will encourage other formats for meetings with the parties and among the parties which might further the objective of the preparatory talks.

SF Commentary - This paragraph is generally OK with the one amendment of replacing each with both. The idea of separating out the roles of the two governments is clearly aimed at

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*down-grading the role of the Irish government and runs counter to the wording in the draft communique for the postponed 6 September summit, ie;
"A series of meetings will now be jointly convened by both Governments with all parties to lay the groundwork for these [all-party] talks."*

5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning (SF amendment - arms) issue.

*SF Commentary - with the one amendment of replacing the word "decommission" with the word "arms" this paragraph is acceptable.
The use of the word decommissioning is clearly sectional. The word itself has become highly politicised and carries the implication that the International Body will not accept submissions on of arms other than those which the British government wish to see decommissioned.*

6. Recognising the widely held desire to see all weapons removed from Irish politics, the two governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal of - (SF amendment to delete - those arms and other material silenced by the statements of 31 of August 1994 and 13th October 1994 and replace it with - arms and other material of war) from the political equation. 

SF Commentary - this paragraph is acceptable also with the amendment above which replaces the reference to "those arms and other material silenced by the statements of 31 of August 1994 and 13th October 1994" which quite explicitly refers only to IRA and loyalist paramilitary weapons, with a more general reference - "arms and other material of war."

7. In particular, the two governments will ask the Body to:

Identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

report whether there is a clear commitment by or on behalf of those in possession of such arms to a satisfactory process to achieve that.

SF Commentary - this paragraph narrows the remit of the International Body quite explicitly to the modalities of decommissioning and to establishing that those in possession of weapons are committed to decommissioning them (Washington 1&2). This allows the British government absolute freedom to revisit their demand for a surrender of IRA weapons as a precondition to the commencement of all-party talks after the international body has reported.

The entire twin track approach was argued on the basis that it was a way around the unrealisable demand for a surrender of IRA weapons as a precondition to all-party talks. However this text anticipates SF's co-operation with an international body with the British quite explicitly retaining the option of Washington 3. This is obviously not a position we could sell.

The twin track approach is only viable if it removes all preconditions, deals with the arms issue to everyone's satisfaction and moves us into all-party talks.

In addition the second clause requires that the Body reports "whether there is a clear commitment by, or on behalf of, those in possession of such arms to a satisfactory process to achieve(decommissioning).

SF's position is that we are willing to address the issue of IRA arms in an authoritative manner. We would also address the issue of all other weapons involved in the conflict.

*The Irish government position is;
"On political parties and arms the formula of the political parties "speaking to the international body authoritatively on the position of IRA/Loyalist weapons and the issue of how the arms can be taken out of Irish politics" represents a reasonable basis for moving forward.*

We would therefore suggest that the two points in Paragraph 7 be reworked as follows;

SF Amendment.

7. In particular, the two governments will ask the Body to:

examine whether and in what context and manner the question of arms, now thankfully silenced, could be finally and satisfactorily settled; and

ascertain and advise the two governments on the commitment of the respective political parties to exclusively peaceful and democratic means of influencing the body politic and on their commitment to the removal of all weapons from Irish politics.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of the decommissioning (SF amendment to replace the word "decommissioning" with the word "arms") issue and, in reaching conclusions on its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits.

SF Commentary - with the one amendment of replacing the word "decommission" with the word "arms" this paragraph is acceptable.

The use of the word decommissioning is clearly sectional. The word itself has become highly politicised and carries the implication that the International Body will not accept submissions on of arms other than those which the British government wish to see decommissioned.

9. In establishing the Body, the British government reaffirms its willingness to continue to take responsive measures, on the advice of the security forces, as movement on such arms reduces the threat.

SF Commentary - this paragraph is a unilateral British position and has no place in joint communique. The simple way to deal with these problems is to remove this paragraph as it does nothing to enhance the proposal.

10. The two governments have invited Senator George Mitchell to chair the body and have invited [] to serve as the other members of the Body.

SF Commentary - we have no objection to this paragraph subject to agreement on the other

b- the changes given
or simply to show
the issue of decommissioning

sell Br or
wont beg

1. Oppr

content + manner

+ add consult ^{relevant} all p

+ advice 2 jobs

note 1, 2, + 3

Consult/advice

1. Consultation

2. Advice jobs
but app raise
methods

for advice of
govt to
dec.

the app
comms

on
advancing

2
members of the Body.

11. The two governments have asked the Body to submit its report to the two governments by mid-January 1996. Neither government, nor any other party cooperating with the work of the Body, is bound in advance to accept their recommendations (SF amendment to delete - , which will be purely advisory and not operational).

SF Commentary - this paragraph is acceptable with the one amendment to delete the last part of the last sentence. We believe this to be an unnecessary clause as the point is already covered and it smacks of options being kept open.

12. The two governments will consider carefully any recommendations it makes and give them due weight on their merits. (SF Amendment to delete - To this end, and to review progress in preparatory talks and towards the target date for all party negotiations, the two governments plan to meet again by mid-February 1996).

SF Commentary - this paragraph contains the new element of a meeting to consider the findings of an international body. This can only be regarded as a further device for stalling the start of all-party talks and should be removed. A meeting may be necessary, but that should be judged at the time and not written into a joint communique.

Spring

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