

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Adams Visit, September 1994

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1397

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	1	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Responding to Sinn Fein's Response to the Downing Street Declaration (3 pages)	07/21/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Further Clarification on Irish Concerns Over Timing (2 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
003. cable	Roderick Lyne to Anthony Lake re: Gerry Adams (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Visas for Gerry Adams and Other Sinn Fein Officials (3 pages)	09/17/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005. cable	re: Visas for Sinn Fein/IRA Members [Immigration and Nationality Act] (3 pages)	09/06/1994	P1/b(1) , P3/b(3) KBH 6/14/2023
006. cable	re: Vice President's Meeting with Irish Prime Minister: London Input (3 pages)	09/06/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams Visit, September 1994

2011-0355-F

rs1656

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: FILE KELLY SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 211139Z JUL 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5066

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 011437

NODIS

DEPT FOR UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: RESPONDING TO SINN FEIN'S
RESPONSE TO THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION

REF: DUBLIN 3967

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BASED ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND
POLITICAL LEADERS AND MEDIA REPORTS, IT IS NOW FAIRLY
CLEAR WHAT SINN FEIN'S RESPONSE TO THE DOWNING STREET
DECLARATION NEXT WEEK IS LIKELY TO CONTAIN. IN SOME
WAYS, IT WILL BE A MIRROR IMAGE OF THE DECLARATION
ITSELF: IN REPLY TO A DOCUMENT THAT WAS "ORANGE IN
SUBSTANCE, GREEN IN LANGUAGE," IT WILL BE POSITIVE IN
TONE, BUT NEGATIVE IN REJECTING THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF NORTHERN MAJORITY CONSENT TO ANY CHANGE IN
THE PROVINCE'S CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS AND BRITISH
NEUTRALITY OVER THE OUTCOME. IT MAY RPT MAY BE
ACCOMPANIED OR FOLLOWED BY A PROVISIONAL IRISH
REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) DECLARATION OF A CEASEFIRE.

3. IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT RUSH TO
JUDGMENT ON WHAT SINN FEIN MAY SAY. THE REPUBLICANS
WILL TRY HARD TO PUT DAYLIGHT BETWEEN US AND THE BRITISH
(AND PERHAPS ALSO THE IRISH) GOVERNMENT. WE MUST RPT
MUST RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO ASSUME THAT ANY FORM OF
ORDS WILL USHER IN THE MILLENNIUM. THIS IS A NASTY
CIVIL WAR THAT HAS RAGED SPORADICALLY FOR CENTURIES. WE
MAY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN ITS DENOUEMENT, BUT ONLY IN
COORDINATION WITH BOTH DUBLIN AND LONDON.

4. AFTER THE SINN FEIN PROCLAMATION (WHICH WE EXPECT
WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT JULY 25), WE
WILL NEED TO CONDUCT A QUICK BUT THOROUGH ROUND OF
CONSULTATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND MAJOR OPPOSITION
PARTIES, AS WELL AS LEADING FIGURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
BEFORE WE CAN ASSESS THE SINN FEIN REPLY. WHAT IS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.05)
KBH 4/11/2023

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PAGE 02 OF 03

ALREADY QUITE CLEAR, HOWEVER, IS THAT FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS THE SINN FEIN ANNOUNCEMENT IS OF FAR LESS IMPORTANCE THAN WHAT PIRA MAY DO AFTERWARD. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE IRISH HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE ADAMANT THAN THE BRITISH THAT SINN FEIN CAN ENTER THE POLITICAL PROCESS ONLY AFTER A PERMANENT END TO PIRA TERRORISM.

5. THERE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON TO GIVE SINN FEIN PRESIDENT ADAMS ANOTHER VISA TO EXPLAIN HIS PARTY'S (AND PIRA'S) STRATEGY TO ITS AMERICAN CONSTITUENCY. A SECOND VISA WAIVER WOULD ONLY BE WARRANTED IF THE IRA FOLLOWS THROUGH BY DECLARING -- AND IMPLEMENTING -- A CEASEFIRE OF SUBSTANTIAL DURATION. IF THE DECLARED LENGTH IS LESS THAN SEVERAL MONTHS, IT WILL BE MEANINGLESS; IF LONGER BUT NOT PERMANENT, OUR REACTION SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THAT OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MOST AFFECTED.

6. WITH REGARD TO PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS' SUGGESTION TO AMBASSADOR SMITH (REFTEL) THAT SENIOR AMERICAN POLITICIANS AND BUSINESSMEN SHOULD SEEK OUT ADAMS TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT HIS GOALS -- BUT NOT PIRA'S METHODS -- ENJOY IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORT, I AGREE FULLY THAT THE MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT, BUT HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE MODALITIES.

7. AS SO OFTEN HAPPENS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THERE IS ANOTHER DIMENSION THAT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED. MUCH AS WE ALL WANT TO BRING THE REPUBLICANS IN FROM THE COLD, IT SIMPLY WON'T WORK IF THE UNIONISTS CONCLUDE THEY ARE BEING SOLD OUT. LOYALIST VIOLENCE IS NOT ENTIRELY REACTIVE TO PIRA'S; IT IS DETERMINED EVEN MORE BY PROTESTANT INSECURITIES. AND IF LOYALIST TERRORISM SURGES DURING A PIRA CEASEFIRE, THE REPUBLICANS WILL COME UNDER ENORMOUS GRASSROOTS PRESSURE TO RESUME THEIR CAMPAIGN. AT THE MOMENT, AFTER UNIONIST LEADERS' SUCCESSFUL VISITS TO WASHINGTON, WE ENJOY THEIR TRUST AND APPRECIATION. SACRIFICING THAT BY APPEARING TO PANDER TO ADAMS WOULD NOT HELP ANYONE IN THE LONG RUN.

8. THE MESSAGE REYNOLDS OUTLINED IS A GOOD ONE, BUT IT CAN BE SENT JUST AS EFFECTIVELY BY LOWER-PROFILE MEANS. WE NEITHER CAN NOR SHOULD ATTEMPT TO BLOCK VISITS INITIATED BY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THEM AT THIS DELICATE AND AMBIGUOUS JUNCTURE; AND WE SHOULD, AS ALWAYS, URGE ANY VISITORS TO EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO THE FULL RANGE OF NORTHERN IRELAND OPINION.

9. S/S-O PLEASE REPEAT TO DUBLIN. CROWE

BT

#1437

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131624Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6172
INFO /////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 004973

Spring.

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE

STATE PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.06)
KBN 7/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON
IRISH CONCERNS OVER TIMING OF ADAMS' VISIT TO U.S.

REF: LONDON 14496

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. MARTIN MANSERGH, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, INFORMED THE CHARGE SEPTEMBER 13 THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING HAVE NOW CLARIFIED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS OVER THE TIMING OF GERRY ADAMS' PROPOSED VISIT TO THE U.S. FOLLOWING A DISCUSSION WITH THE SINN FEIN LEADER, IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT ADAMS WILL ADJUST HIS SCHEDULE IN THE U.S. TO ENSURE THAT HE DOES NOT VISIT WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK UNTIL AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN THERE AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. THIS WILL PROBABLY BE ABOUT OCTOBER 10 OR 11. ACCORDING TO MANSERGH, ADAMS WILL ENSURE THAT HE IS ON THE WEST COAST WHILE SPRING IS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

3. WHILE STRESSING THAT SUCH MATTERS WERE TOTALLY UP TO THE USG TO DECIDE, MANSERGH SAID THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN SOME THOUGHT TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL AT WHICH ADAMS COULD BE RECEIVED BY THE USG SHOULD THEY BE ASKED. MANSERGH SAID THAT THE IRISH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BELIEVE A MEETING AT THE NANCY SODERBERG LEVEL WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE. HE IS CONFIDENT ADAMS WILL BE MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH THAT.

4. MANSERGH ALSO SIGNALLED THAT WHEN THE ADAMS PARTY CALLS ON THE CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST TO APPLY FOR A VISA, THEY WILL EXPRESS THEIR HOPE THAT ANY RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR VISIT CAN BE MINIMAL. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHETHER THEY WILL BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN FUND-RAISING EVENTS. WHILE THE IRISH HAVE NOT YET FINALIZED THEIR POSITION ON THIS ASPECT OF ADAMS ACTIVITIES, THEIR INITIAL REACTION WOULD BE FAVORABLE IF ADAMS WOULD COMMIT HIMSELF THAT THE FUNDS WOULD ONLY BE RAISED FOR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES. MANSERGH POINTED OUT THAT LEGITIMATE FUND-RAISING WOULD HELP REMOVE THE SINN FEIN/IRA'S NEED FOR RAISING FUNDS BY MORE NEFARIOUS MEANS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SINN FEIN LEADERS CAN BE TRUSTED TO ADHERE TO THE LETTER OF ANY COMMITMENT THEY MAKE TO THE CONSUL GENERAL. SANDBERG
BT

#4973

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<MSGID> M1250693

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Roderick Lyne to Anthony Lake re: Gerry Adams (2 pages)	09/19/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams Visit, September 1994

2011-0355-F
rs1656

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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working*

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 171600Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6198
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO ////

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.08)
KRM 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005041

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

PASS TO BONN FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: VISAS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN
OFFICIALS

REF: A) DUBLIN 5039, B) DUBLIN 4973

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN REFTELS, WE REPORTED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON ALLOWING SINN FEIN TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. AND THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL AT WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD MEET WITH ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. ON THE FORMER, I AGREE TOTALLY WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT IT IS NOW IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE SINN FEIN TO RAISE THE FUNDS THEY NEED TO OPERATE AS AN OVERT, DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY IN THE TRADITIONAL WAYS CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES RAISE FUNDS AROUND THE WORLD. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE SINN FEIN ARE ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE FROM A MILITARY CULTURE TO A POLITICAL CULTURE. THIS CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT ADEQUATE FUNDING. LACK OF FUNDS WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO OPERATE. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT SINN FEIN'S DESIRE TO BE TREATED LIKE ANY OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY AND NOT TO BE TREATED LIKE SECON CLASS CITIZENS.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THE SINN FEIN IN THIS REGARD.

3. THUS, IF ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE INVITED BY WELL INTENTIONED PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS TO FUNCTIONS AT WHICH FUND RAISING WILL TAKE PLACE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE U.S.G. SHOULD STAND IN THEIR WAY. FOR TOO LONG, SINN FEIN HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO RAISE FUNDS FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL GOALS IN OFTEN NEFARIOUS WAYS. THIS SHOULD COME TO AN END NOW. SHOULD THERE BE GUIDELINES OR PARAMETERS TO WHICH OTHER FOREIGN POLITICAL PARTIES FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. MUST ADHERE, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SINN FEIN WILL ACCEPT THESE. WE ARE ALSO CONFIDENT THAT THE SINN FEIN LEADERS WILL KEEP THEIR WORD WHEN AGREEING TO ANY SUCH PARAMETERS.

4. I RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MAY BE SOME LEGAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE U.S. TO SUCH FUND RAISING. IF THERE ARE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ASAP BACKGROUND ON SUCH WHICH WE CAN SHARE WITH OUR IRISH GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS. THANKS.

5. AS FOR THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN THE ADMINISTRATION AT WHICH CONTACTS WITH ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES SHOULD BE HELD, I FEEL THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE AT LEVEL HIGHER THAN NANCY SODERBERG AT THE NSC OR SOMEONE AT ROUGHLY HER EQUIVALENT LEVEL IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. AS NOTED IN REF B, MARTIN MANSERGH, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR ON NORTHERN IRELAND, IS CONVINCED THAT ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD BE "MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH THAT." MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS SEAN O'HUIGINN, THE HEAD OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SAID YESTERDAY, THERE WILL BE OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIGHER LEVEL CONTACTS. WE NEED TO HOLD THESE IN RESERVE TO PRESSURE OVER TIME THE SINN FEIN/IRA TO MOVE FORWARD IN OTHER AREAS, SUCH AS TURNING IN THEIR ARMS, ETC. I ALSO SHARE THIS VIEW.

SMITH

BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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<MSGID> M1258280

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

NES

Gray, Wendy E.

From: Gray, Wendy E.
To: Kreczko, Alan J.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Hawkins, Ardenia R.; Darby, M. Brooke
Subject: A NOTE FROM NANCY -- ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Tuesday, September 06, 1994 10:09PM

Hi Alan!

I've sent you a copy of a cable regarding Irish visas. Let's discuss. Reno asks that we work it with Mark Richards.

Also, we are beginning to get asked about IRA prisoners in the U.S. Can you check into who they are and status of extradition requests?

Thanks!

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *W* NARA, Date *12/21/15*
2011-0355-F

cc + return

To Alank.

Reno called me to ask we
work this with Mark Richards
(1). We also need to discuss issue
of IRA prisoners here. Lets talk

M-S

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005. cable	re: Visas for Sinn Fein/IRA Members [Immigration and Nationality Act] (3 pages)	09/06/1994	P3/b(3)
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COLLECTION:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: BRANSCUM DARRAGH LEBOURGEOIS NSC SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 061600Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 1589
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7496
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1999
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 014126
CAIRO FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY
NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND OVP
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (GORE, ALBERT JR.) PREL PTER UK EI
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH IRISH PRIME
MINISTER: LONDON INPUT

REF: DUBLIN 4798

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS A SUPPLEMENT TO DUBLIN'S BACKGROUND CABLE ON THE GORE/REYNOLDS MEETING (REFTEL), WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A FEW PERSPECTIVES FROM LONDON.
3. THE DECEMBER 1993 DOWNING STREET DECLARATION WAS THE MOST DRAMATIC PRECURSOR TO THE RECENT IRA CEASEFIRE, BUT IT CAME AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF:
 - FIVE YEARS OF SPORADIC TALKS BETWEEN SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME AND SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS;
 - A 1991-92 SERIES OF TALKS AMONG LONDON, DUBLIN AND THE PROVINCE'S FOUR MAIN NONVIOLENT PARTIES THAT CAME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT, AND MAY RESUME SOON;
 - SECRET HMG/IRA CONTACTS THROUGHOUT 1993 IN WHICH INCLUSION OF SINN FEIN IN THE ALL-PARTY TALKS WAS OFFERED IN EXCHANGE FOR A PERMANENT END TO VIOLENCE;
 - GROWING REVULSION THROUGHOUT THE BRITISH ISLES AT TERRORISM BY BOTH THE IRA AND LOYALIST GUNMEN; AND
 - SECURITY FORCE SUCCESS IN EARNING COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND SQUEEZING THE TERRORISTS' REVENUE BASE.
3. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHY THE IRA CHOSE THIS MOMENT TO CALL A CEASEFIRE -- IT WAS CERTAINLY ENCOURAGED BY ADAMS' RECEPTION IN THE U.S. IN FEBRUARY, AND PROBABLY AFRAID THAT RENEWED DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE OTHER PARTIES WOULD REACH AGREEMENT WITHOUT IT -- OR WHAT IT HOPED TO GAIN THEREBY. SINN FEIN PLANS A MAJOR CAMPAIGN OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS DEMANDS, AND PROBABLY AN INTENSIVE PROPAGANDA PUSH (NOT LEAST IN THE U.S.) TO BRING DUBLIN AND THE USG INTO A "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT."
4. IT IS ALSO NOT QUITE CLEAR YET WHETHER THE

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2011-0355-F (2.10)
KBM 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CEASEFIRE IS INTENDED TO BE PERMANENT. ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS HAVE NOT, IN FACT, SAID SO PUBLICLY, AND OTHER SINN FEIN OFFICIALS HAVE COME CLOSER. HMG IS LEANING TOWARD ACCEPTANCE THAT THE IRA INTENDS THE CEASEFIRE TO BE PERMANENT, BUT, CONTRARY TO REFTTEL, JOHN MAJOR HAS NOT YET ACCEPTED THIS VIEW. THE PRIME MINISTER IS BEING UNDERSTANDABLY CAUTIOUS IN LIGHT OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF VIOLENCE AND MANY PREVIOUS FALSE DAWNS. THE BRITISH AND THE REPUBLICANS ARE EDGING TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE RECKLESS ABANDON OF COURTING SCORPIONS; WE SUSPECT THEY WILL GET THERE WITHIN A FEW DAYS, BUT BRITISH OFFICIALS COMPLAIN THAT REYNOLDS' ENTHUSIASTIC EMBRACE OF ADAMS IS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO REASSURE UNIONISTS THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SECRET DEAL.

5. IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ACCORDING TO THE POLL MENTIONED IN REFTTEL, ONLY 30 PERCENT EXPECTED THE CEASEFIRE TO BE PERMANENT, AND 56 PERCENT THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN A SECRET HMG/IRA AGREEMENT. MODERATE UNIONIST POLITICIANS ARE TRYING TO CALM NERVES, BUT TENSIONS ARE HIGH. IN ADDITION TO THE MURDER MENTIONED IN REFTTEL, A LOYALIST GROUP TRIED TO BOMB SINN FEIN HEADQUARTERS SEPTEMBER 4. ONE OF THE MAIN LOYALIST GROUPS REPORTEDLY FAVORS A CEASEFIRE, THE OTHER IS MORE HESITANT.

6. PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS IS REPORTEDLY IRRITATED BY HMG'S CAUTION, AND IS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (SEPTEMBER) WITH ADAMS AND HUME. IN HIS SEPTEMBER 5 DISCUSSION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW, IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING URGED FASTER PROGRESS, BUT ACCORDING TO BRITISH OFFICIALS ALSO EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR BRITISH CAUTION. POLICE AND ARMY CHIEFS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARE DISCUSSING STEPS THEY CAN TAKE TO MAKE THE SECURITY FORCES' PRESENCE LESS VISIBLE WHILE PROTECTING CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES FROM LOYALIST ATTACK.

7. AS NOTED REFTTEL, REYNOLDS' PEACE FORUM IS UNLIKELY TO ATTRACT EITHER OF THE MAIN UNIONIST PARTIES. HOWEVER, AN SDLP LEADER TOLD US HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONFRONT SINN FEIN WITH THE FACT THAT NONE OF IRELAND'S OTHER NATIONALIST PARTIES ACCEPTED ITS DEMANDS FOR EARLY BRITISH WITHDRAWAL OR UNIFICATION WITHOUT MAJORITY CONSENT IN THE NORTH. THE BRITISH WILL BE WATCHING SINN FEIN'S PERFORMANCE AT THE FORUM CLOSELY FOR EVIDENCE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO NONVIOLENCE.

8. WE HEARTILY ENDORSE DUBLIN'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE USG TO CONTINUE REACHING OUT TO UNIONISTS AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 014126
CAIRO FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY

IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND OVP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (GORE, ALBERT JR.) PREL PTER UK EI

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH IRISH PRIME
MINISTER: LONDON INPUT

ASSURING THEM OF OUR EVEN-HANDEDNESS. WE BELIEVE THE
DRAFT STATEMENT IN REFTTEL SHOULD PROVE USEFUL IN THAT
REGARD. CROWE

BT

#4126

NNNN

<MSGID> M1237439

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

Dec -

pls pull earlier press points on
all we've done for Ireland for my
call with Mary McHenry.

M.

The Sunday Tribune 11/9/94

①

The US role: more helper than fixer



Joe Joyce
spoke to Nancy
Soderberg,
one of the
key figures
in the US
Government's
involvement
in the peace
process, about
Washington's
talks role

The Sunday Tribune 11/9/94

(2)

How does President Clinton see his role in the Irish peace process?

From the beginning, during the campaign and from the day he took office, he's felt that the United States has a role to play as a catalyst moving all sides towards peace. The support and presence of the United States has helped. I think to build confidence on all sides for moving forward. That's helped bring the IRA along and we've tried to reach out towards the unionist community. We developed a very constructive close working relationship with Prime Ministers Reynolds and Major and the combination of being willing to weight in at appropriate moments and developing a very close working relationship with the two governments helped lead to the ceasefire announcement. We're going to continue that role and hope to encourage others to join the talks and move the process forward.

Do you see the US as being primarily an honest broker between Ireland and Britain?

It's not so much a brokering role. I've referred to it as a catalyst in that it's there to underscore to both governments and to the people on the ground—who are really the ones who ultimately have to make peace among themselves—that the United States supports and will reach out to those who will lay down their weapons and join the peace process through visits to the United States and involvement of the White House. We had Jim Molyneux come here to the White House and, obviously, the Gerry Adams visa. There is a variety of things which simply lending the prestige of the White House to can prod people forward.

With respect to the British and Irish Governments, what we have been trying to do is keep them fully informed of what our thinking is and before we move in one direction we walk through what our logic and thinking is so that they're not surprised at any of our decisions. They may disagree with some of the tactics but the goals are all the same. One of the important elements of this was the message that all three Governments sent to Gerry

Adams was exactly the same message, that there's got to be an end to the violence and you must join the political process and then a whole new world opens up to you.

The British Government has been more sceptical about the IRA announcement of a complete cessation of violence than the Irish Government or than Vice President Al Gore. Does the US have a role in persuading the British that it really is over?

Yes, I think that what will really convince the British that it's all over is when they

the court until we actually get a request.

If he does visit the US is there a possibility that he will meet somebody from the administration?

We haven't made any decisions on that. There's also the question of whether he's going to Congress, what cities he'll go to, whether he'll be received at the administration. Those are all issues that we need to make decisions on, which we're beginning to work through here.

Will you invite the Unionists to the White House



Clinton: constructive relationship with Major and Reynolds

notice the situation on the ground has changed dramatically, that the violence has stopped. I think they're beginning to see that and, as a little time passes, they'll get a sense that things are really moving forward. Our role is to give them our own views and impressions which is that this is a genie that's out of the bottle and can't be put back in. While it's not over—there's a lot of hard work to be done—it's a new chapter in history and I think we're encouraging Adams to be forthcoming on the issues of what he's agreed to do as well as trying to urge the British to help move the process forward by reaching out to the unionists and bringing them along.

There are reports that Gerry Adams is looking for another visa to visit the United States later this month.

We're hearing the same reports but we haven't got any request from him. We'll review one if and when we get one. We're not going to get into moving the ball down

again in the near future to give them your views on the state of affairs?

We've had a number of conversations with them since the ceasefire, with Jim Molyneux. We've made it clear that he or members of his entourage or party would be welcome here at any time and we're hopeful that there will be some coming over. There are no firm plans as yet.

Do you see any role for the US in arranging meetings between people like Mr Adams and Mr Molyneux?

We have not really addressed that issue. I think they're a bit away from that right now but if and when our assistance was requested we'd be willing to consider helping in any way we can. I think there's a misperception in much of the unionist community that the Americans are focused only on the nationalist community. There is nothing further from the truth: there are two communities, traditions involved in this conflict and there will be no peace with-

out both traditions. We're trying to reach out and underscore to the unionist community that we want to be helpful in any way we can. They're welcome to come and talk to us anytime. The US ambassador to Britain has also been having discussions with Mr Molyneux and I hope they feel we have a good dialogue with them.

From what you say, the US interest is obviously not simply in achieving an IRA cessation of violence but in pursuing the process into its next stages?

Absolutely. As you'll notice, no one has declared victory or an end to this. (The IRA ceasefire) was an historic, important step forward and now you need to build on that. It opens a number of doors which we want to keep open and push through. The next step is to try and get the parties to sit down and talk to each other. The Irish Government is playing a very crucial role in moving that forward in trying to get talks going. We're hopeful that the unionists and the British will

play a role in that at some point. As it becomes clear on the ground that the ceasefire is for real, is permanent, for good—whatever words anyone wants to choose—I think that will reduce the current scepticism in that community and encourage them to move forward.

What sort of role can the US play in the talks on the framework document being negotiated by the Irish and British Governments?

We are not the negotiators here. That's a role that's appropriately kept between the Governments and the parties involved. Our role is to try and encourage people to participate. The actual negotiations are for them to decide, not us.

What role do you see for the US in the next-stage of the process other than as a facilitator?

When you have the weight of the United States and the United States President, who takes a personal interest, it can have enormous beneficial consequences. I would

anticipate that we would continue to work closely with both governments, with the parties on the ground, continue to reach out to those who are willing to move forward towards peace. There's been a lot of speculation in the press about what type of aid package we're going to develop here and we are really just beginning to review that among ourselves. At this point it is too early to predict what we will be able to come up with. Hopefully, we will be able to demonstrate some form of assistance and increased trade and investment into the region that will help people see on the ground the increased benefits of peace.

There's also a misperception among both communities that it's a zero-sum game where if one side benefits the other stands to lose. What I think is important in the peace process is to demonstrate that both sides benefit from peace through increased investment and jobs.

Can you see any US role in perhaps helping to break

any logjams that develop in the talks process?

I would hope that people would understand that they can't expect the United States to come in and solve problems for them. The ultimate resolution of this issue has not been reached and no one knows how long it's going to take. That is only going to be resolved by the parties sitting down and working it out among themselves. The United States cannot do that for them. I don't get the impression either that the parties are looking for us to provide solutions. They're looking for us to help move the process forward by getting people to join the negotiations, put an end to the violence, and to demonstrate the benefits of peace which is where the resources of the United States, both private and public, can come into play. We certainly cannot sit down and negotiate a deal for those involved. That's what this process is all about, getting people to sit down and talk about how to resolve the conflict.

GERRY ADAMS' SCHEDULE

Saturday, September 24th - Arrive Boston

Saturday, September 24th Evening - Hartford, Connecticut
--Democratic Party Convention Dinner w/Dodd

Sunday, September 25 - travel to New York City

Monday, Sept. 26 thru Wednesday morning, Sept. 28 - New York
--Mtg w/Irish Community (3,000-4,000 people) Major Speech

Wednesday PM, Sept. 28 - Boston
--Mtg w/Irish Community (2,000 people) reprise of earlier speech

Thursday, Sept. 29 - Cleveland
--Mtg w/Irish Community (@1,000 people?) reprise of earlier speech

Friday, Sept. 30 - Detroit
--Mtg w/Irish Community (@1,000 people?) reprise of earlier speech

Saturday, Oct.1 - Philadelphia
--Mtg w/Irish Community (@1,000 people) reprise of earlier speech

Sunday, Oct.2 - Rest Day

Monday, Oct. 3 thru Tuesday, Oct. 4 - Washington
--Mtgs w/Black Caucus, Hispanic Caucus, the 2 Irish Caucus' as well as Senators Kennedy, Moynihan and Dodd

--Mtgs w/Administration officials tbd

--rest of Washington visit would be private

Wednesday PM, Oct.5 departure for San Francisco
--Mtg w/Irish Community (1,000-1,500 people)

Thursday, Oct.6 - Los Angeles
--Major speech to the World Affairs Council (200 people?)

Friday, Oct.7 - Return Home

Darby, M. Brooke

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: ban on contacts with Sinn Fein [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, October 03, 1994 3:27PM

Please pass to Nancy:

I had a phone message that you'd asked the history of the USG ban on substantive official contacts with Sinn Fein. The ban appears to have been in place since the very formation of Provisional Sinn Fein, which was formed as the political wing of the Provisional IRA sometime after PIRA was formed in January 1970 (in the aftermath of the split of the republican movement). Through the '70s, the ban on talking to Prov. Sinn Fein was not really an issue since PSF did not contest elections and was essentially indistinguishable from the Provisional IRA, which we didn't talk to because they were terrorists. The ban become more explicit and obvious (and controversial) beginning in the '80s, when Provisional Sinn Fein began to contest (and win some) elections, and when it became a more than theoretical proposition that someone might belong to Provisional Sinn Fein without belonging to Provisional IRA.

~~THOUGHT YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED.~~

-BR

Proposed Schedule Gerry Adams
(media not included)

Saturday 24 September
Arrive Boston 1.30 Aer Lingus
Meets Senator Kennedy
30 minute private meeting
Press Conference Airport
Depart Park Plaza for reception hosted by Kennedy backer John
Cullinane
2-30 -4-30 Reception

6-00 Depart Springfield, Mass
8-00 Address John Boyle O'Reilly Association

Sunday

Breakfast: Hartford Ct, meet with politicians, Return to Boston:
Meeting Senate President Billy Bulger
Possible meeting with Boston Globe, Herald
Private:

Monday:

Breakfast New England Business Circle
Depart Detroit 10-20 from Boston
No extensive details:
Address United Auto Workers
Address Irish Community

Tuesday

Cleveland:
Address Council on Foreign Affairs
Address: Irish Community

Wednesday

A.M Arrive New York
9-30 Ellis Island

11-00 Meet with Jewish Leaders:
12-00 City Hall 'Keys of City' reception
Media
5-00 Time Magazine Editorial Board

to Joe
reban

Note Community event either Wednesday or Thursday

Thursday

Morning Labor Breakfast

11-00 N.Y. Times Editorial Board

12-15 Bill Flynn, Foreign Affairs Group

2.30: Time Off

Friday:

Breakfast: Comptroller Hevesi

Lunch: Wall Street

Depart Boston 3.p.m.

6.p.m. Kennedy School of Government

8-30 Faneuil Hall Rally ——— **Boston**

Saturday; Depart Philadelphia

11.30 World Affairs Council

off:

Sunday

Irish Rally 2.p.m.

Monday/Tuesday

Washington D.C.

No Schedule available

Wednesday 2-15

Depart San Francisco

No Schedule Available

Thursday Los Angeles

World Affairs Council

No Schedule available

Friday: Depart:

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(21)

10-7

House

Nora

Grand

Office