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001. talking points	re: Talking Points for Use with John Hume [2 copies] (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Subject : THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@

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^THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@

FOX ``MORNING NEWS'' INTERVIEW WITH:

GERRY ADAMS, PRESIDENT, SINN FEIN

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1994

.STX

TRANSCRIPT BY: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE
620 NATIONAL PRESS

BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC

20045

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LARK MCCARTHY: The leader of the political arm of the
Irish Republican Army is in the United States. Gerry Adams,
president of Sinn Fein, is here to attend a conference aimed at
finding peace for Northern Ireland. He's here on a temporary
visa, just 48 hours. Eight previous attempts at obtaining a visa
to come to the U.S. were refused. What is different now? We'll
ask Gerry Adams, who joins us live now from New York.

Good morning, Mr. Adams.

MR. ADAMS: Good morning.

MS. MCCARTHY: How significant is it that you have been
granted this visa? Is it a breakthrough?

MR. ADAMS: Well, I think it shows clearly that President
Clinton is concerned to be informed of the peace process, and
concerned that I should have the opportunity to engage with
other opinion on how this is to be moved forward. And I think
the conference is a unique opportunity to do that.

And I want to commend President Clinton for giving me this
opportunity to come to your country.

.ETX

FOX MN/ADAMS PAGE 2 02/01/93

.STX

MS. MCCARTHY: What do you hope to achieve at the peace
conference today? What could realistically be achieved?

MR. ADAMS: Well, it's unfortunate the British government
won't be there. It's also unfortunate that two of the Unionist
parties have decided not to come. But apart from that, we have
had 20 years of disinformation to the U.S.A. about what's
happening in my country. All of the news coming here from
Ireland comes via London. So, we have at least the opportunity
to address the core issues.

MS. MCCARTHY: So, what --

MR. ADAMS: The U.S. opinion, progressive opinion in this
country, I think, can play a very positive role in trying to
encourage forward movement.

MS. MCCARTHY: Yes. So, with the exclusions that you have
cited -- meaning, no British government, some of the Union
parties -- what does that mean, that at best you could get some
sort of limited understanding that could be vetoed by anybody

else?

MR. ADAMS: Well, first of all, it (one remove?) -- that means that for the first time people will hear the nationalists' perspective. Secondly, that means that U.S. opinion can be informed of how it can play a positive, encouraging role. It is important -- we're at a very critical stage in this peace process. I can reiterate, and do reiterate, Sinn Fein's commitment to see the praise of peace realized. But that needs the cooperation of the British, and the British need encouraged. And U.S. opinion, without taking sides, can promote and assist and enhance the opportunities for peace.

MS. MCCARTHY: Let's take the view of Sinn Fein. What would you like to happen to achieve peace? What is your objective?

MR. ADAMS: Well, I think we need an Irish national democracy. We need a functioning democracy in Ireland. Ireland is partitioned. The Irish people are divided. The British government claimed jurisdiction over our affairs. And we need to see the British government agreeing with Dublin, with the Dublin government on a new policy objective. We need to see the London government, if you like, joining the persuaders. And then, in consultation with everyone involved, coming together on a process to move us out of the current situation.

And we in Sinn Fein were engaged for three years there, in discussions with the British government. We have engaged in a number of initiatives with a whole range of political opinion -- most significant, if I can say so, my discussions with Mr. John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labor Party. And all of that has focussed the issue. So, the core issues are now being addressed.

MS. MCCARTHY: Yes. Put it in --

.ETX

FOX MN/ADAMS PAGE 3 02/01/93

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MR. ADAMS: It is time to move it forward.

MS. MCCARTHY: In simpler terms, what territory do you want? What timetable do you want?

MR. ADAMS: Well, I want the shortest timetable consistent with leaving a peaceful and stable Ireland as the end product. In terms of territory, the Island of Ireland is the Island of Ireland. We have a partitioned area of 32 counties. It's a matter of all of the Irish people agree on how we should govern that Island, agreeing how we can have a whole process of national reconciliation --

MS. MCCARTHY: Would British Protestants be kicked out, for example?

MR. ADAMS: -- how we can have a healing process.

Sorry?

MS. MCCARTHY: Would British Protestants be kicked out?

MR. ADAMS: I'm sorry, I didn't hear your --

MS. MCCARTHY: Would British Protestants be kicked out? Is that what you're talking about?

MR. ADAMS: I didn't hear the question.

MS. MCCARTHY: Is that one of your goals, would British Protestants be forced to leave? That's not what you're talking about, is it?

MR. ADAMS: Oh, no, not at all. No, sorry, no. I mean, the Protestant people of Ireland are my brothers and sisters. The only British element that I want to see leaving is the British military presence, and, you know, (civil?) political interference in our affairs. But, I mean, the Protestant people have every right to full involvement. And, in fact, we wouldn't have an Ireland worthy of its people if we were excluding any section of our people from that Ireland.

MS. MCCARTHY: Talk just a moment about the terrorism question. It is that that got you blocked from the United States, even though Sinn Fein is a political party -- your ties to the IRA. Is terrorism against civilians ever justified?

MR. ADAMS: Never.

MS. MCCARTHY: And you have --

MR. ADAMS: And let me also say that a lot of this is an



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FAX

Date: 2-2-94TO: Jane HollOF: NSCPAGES (plus cover): 5FAX #: 395-1180

FROM: David F. Schafer
Desk Officer for Ireland and No. Ireland
EUR/NE-Northern European Affairs, Room 4513

FAX: (202) 647-3463 TEL: (202) 647-6585

SUBJECT: N. I. Conference Read out

Jane,

first page is a summary which includes
Adams presentation + Q & A's afterward.

Second through fifth page is actual text
of Adams 1/2 hour presentation (it was
handed out by Adams and read).

Detailed cable from USUN will follow
this morning.

USUN READOUT OF
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY
CONFERENCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND
FEBRUARY 1, 1994

The National Committee on Foreign Relations hosted a conference on Northern Ireland on February 1 at 1:30 P.M. featuring Alliance Party Chairman John Alderdice, Social Democratic and Labor Party Chairman John Hume and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams. Each spoke for a half hour followed by a half hour of questions taken from the audience. None of the speakers chose to remain in the room while the others spoke with the exception of John Hume who listened to Alderdice's presentation, therefore no give and take exchange between the speakers was possible.

Adams spoke last and paid eloquent tribute to the Irish roots of many Americans, describing their opportunities to succeed despite impoverished backgrounds in a way that could not be experienced in British-ruled Northern Ireland.

Adams asserted that the Irish nation had been partitioned creating an artificial majority of Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland. The overarching political goal of Sinn Fein and the Republican movement was the self-determination of the Irish people on the island as a whole. In that context, he described the Unionists as a minority with veto power over the nationalist aspirations of the majority on the Island. Therefore, an internal settlement among Unionists and Nationalists where partition remains in effect, is not a solution. He called on the British to become persuaders seeing in them the sole obstacle to the Nationalist aspirations by guaranteeing the position of the Unionists. The only route to achieving the opportunity for self-determination was through the commitment to the Irish and British governments.

Adams conceded that the Joint Declaration sought to address these needs. However, the abiding question was whether the Joint Declaration was a "first step" which envisaged self-determination of the Irish people as an outcome, or whether it was merely a political gesture made under pressure from the Irish government. For this reason, Adams continued to call for clarification from the British. He also insisted that his commitment to peace required the demilitarization of the Northern Ireland. He would ask the IRA to lay down their arms when the British presented a proposal to him which resulted in the demilitarization of Northern Ireland.

Feb 01, 94 19:41

governments were fully informed of these matters at every stage in our discussions.

The proposals were based on a number of basic principles:

- * That the Irish people as a whole have the right to national self-determination
- * That an internal settlement is not a solution
- * That the unionists cannot have a veto over British policy
- * That the consent and allegiance of unionists, expressed through an accommodation with the rest of the Irish people, are essential ingredients if a lasting peace is to be established.
- * That the British government must join the persuaders.
- * That the London and Dublin governments have the major responsibility to secure political progress.
- * A process to realise these principles was agreed, containing the political dynamic which could create the conditions for a lasting peace and a total demilitarisation of the situation.

THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION

The Downing Street Declaration is a response to all of this.

Republicans have to make fundamental assessments. Does the Downing Street Declaration represent a first step for the British government in the direction of a lasting peace? Or is it merely a political response by a British government under pressure from the Irish Peace Initiative, aimed at avoiding a political confrontation with the Dublin government, at fragmenting nationalist consensus and bringing political pressure to bear on Sinn Fein so as to damage us?

And even if our assessment is that it does not represent a first step for the British government Irish Republicans should not allow this to unduly influence our considerations on taking risks.

The consideration of any option available to us must be in the context of Sinn Fein's peace objectives and the strategy for their achievement.

- That is:
1. To eradicate the causes of conflict in Ireland.
 2. To bring about the exercise of the right to national self-determination of the Irish people as a whole.
 3. To establish a peace process to bring this about.

The issue of self-determination is central to the resolution of the conflict. That fact has now been identified and it is firmly on the political agenda.

Democracy demands that Britain recognises the right of the Irish people to determine our future in our own interests and on our own terms.

Any new agreement must respect the diversity of our different traditions and earn their allegiance. Present policies and political structures have prevented this from happening. Partition has deepened the divisions.

The Joint Declaration is described by its authors as 'the first step' towards a peace settlement. Sinn Fein is committed to such a settlement and I am concerned, I am indeed anxious to be persuaded that the Downing Street Declaration can provide the basis for this. And even if this is not the case,

Feb 01, 94 19:42

F.02

- * No - to any change in the unionist veto
- * No - to a Dublin say in the affairs of the north.

- a view which is at odds with the Irish governments understanding of the Joint Declaration.

There are three issues that need to be clarified. There are aspects of the Declaration itself. There are the statements made by the authors of the Declaration - Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Major - which contradict one another. Then there is the whole issue of processes, measures and steps envisaged.

In its first paragraph the declaration is described as the governments' "first step". What then is the second step? Or the third? What processes are envisioned -- what measures are these to move the situation forward?

These are reasonable questions from a party with an electoral mandate. Clarifications have been given to other parties. Why not Sinn Fein? And of course is all of this what kind of signal are the British seeking to send by their stalling and delaying tactics?

There is little evidence that they are willing to join the persuaders. Are they? The Dublin government raises the issue of political prisoners and says there should be an amnesty as part of a settlement. Downing Street says no.

Downing Street also dismisses Albert Reynolds' suggestion about demilitarising the situation.

What we have at the moment is a free-standing Joint Statement. Where does it lead to? We are told that the British government is going to facilitate and encourage. What programme do they envisage? And no matter about the validity of anyone else's interpretation of the Downing Street Declaration, the British government view of these matters is the crucial one.

Despite this, the potential for peace in Ireland has never been more realisable. If the British believe they have the basis of a settlement they must tell us what it is. I have already said that if there is a gap between what is on offer and what is required to move us out of conflict, then everyone involved has a responsibility to try to bridge that gap. This requires courage, imagination and flexibility. I have stated my willingness to assist in this process.

Sinn Fein has also initiated a series of peace forums in Ireland, which are open to everyone. We are actively engaging in our open and democratic way with citizens who wish to engage us on how peace can be established. It is our intention to publicise the oral and written submissions received by us. We have no hidden agenda. Peace needs people to build and sustain it and our consultative process is a way for securing this direct involvement.

THE UNITED STATES DIMENSION

It is clear that international interest and concern can also play an important and constructive part in the development of a viable peace process. There has been a consistent need for the international community to exercise its good will and influence to assist in the resolution of conflict worldwide. This is generally recognised and is at times acted upon. It has not, however, been a factor in the Anglo/Irish conflict. This situation needs to be rectified.

There is widespread interest in, and concern about, Ireland within North American public opinion. This stems from the historical links between the two countries and the large Irish American community in the US. The potential has, therefore, always existed for the US to play a part in the construction of an effective response to human rights abuses and this has been done, particularly, in the MacBride Campaign for Fair Employment. It is only proper that this

governments were fully informed of these matters at every stage in our discussions.

The proposals were based on a number of basic principles:

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 January 1994

Dear Tony,

SINN FEIN

Here is the correspondence which I mentioned to your secretary.

I am sending an explanatory message through the secure channel.

*yours ever,
Roderic*

RODERIC LYNE

Mr Tony Lake
The White House

NS
TR } have
SR } copies



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

TO: *Tony Lake*
White House, Washington

FROM: *Duty Clerk for Rod Lyne*

DATE: *22/1/94*

NUMBER OF PAGES
TO FOLLOW:



GERRY ADAMS

President of Sinn Féin

51/55 Bóthar na bhFál, Béal Feirste BT12 4PD

7/1/94.

Mr Major, a Chara,

I am taking the unusual step of writing to you directly regarding the potentially historic opportunity to achieve peace in Ireland which currently exists and, specifically to urge you to take the necessary steps to realise this opportunity.

In joint statements with the leader of the SDLP John Hume and in my own public statements I have repeatedly asserted my sincere belief that if all parties to the conflict, but most critically your government, are prepared to demonstrate courage and imagination, an effective peace process can be established at this point.

It is my belief that the position put to you in June by the Irish Government has the potential to move us out of conflict and towards a negotiated settlement based on the internationally recognised democratic principle of national self-determination.

The leadership of the Irish Republican Army has also made its position clear. In a statement on October 3rd they said,

"The leadership of Oglagh na hEireann welcomes this (the Hume/Adams) initiative.

We are informed of the broad principles involved which will be for consideration by the Dublin and London Governments.

It is unfortunate that the British Government reaction to this initiative so far, has been negative and has fuelled unionist reaction. Nonetheless, if the political will exists or can be created. It could provide the basis for peace".

Your public response to this was an absolute rejection. Additionally the text of the Declaration signed by you and the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, on December 15 is substantially different in key areas to the Irish position put to you in June. However, it has been asserted that these differences are no more than semantical and that the underlying politics of both documents are identical. Republicans are more than willing to examine, positively, the validity of such an assertion. However to do so effectively and accurately, full clarification on the key issues is essential.

The British Government has, from 1990, been involved in prolonged contact and dialogue with Sinn Féin. Only recently was this contact ended. Now, when you claim you have the basis of a settlement, you refuse to use these channels, an inconsistency which must increase republican doubts and suspicions. M

The opportunity for a real and lasting settlement has never been more realisable. Your government holds the key in all of this. It is crucial, therefore, that you clarify these issues, urgently and effectively through direct dialogue. If peace is a realistic prospect, as you have asserted, then the opportunity should not be lost because of confusion occasioned by the absence of open and honest dialogue.

Is this



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 January 1994

Dear Mr Adams,

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to the letter dated 7 January which, though unsigned, is on your headed notepaper.

As you know, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach made their Joint Declaration on 15 December. It is the responsibility of the two Governments and reflected intensive work between them in the preceding weeks.


Your letter seeks to reopen issues for renegotiation by pointing back to a position you say the Irish Government put forward in June last year. Both the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have made clear that there can be no question of renegotiation of their Joint Declaration. It provides a balanced framework for peace and democracy which recognises the interests and aspirations of both main traditions that exist in Ireland. That text, and only that text, is what is at issue.

You announced that you were writing to the Prime Minister. In the circumstances, the Prime Minister has decided to make this letter and that received from your office publicly available.

Yours sincerely,
Roderic Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

Mr Gerry Adams



Edward M. Kennedy

U.S. Senator for Massachusetts

315 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

202/224-4543

202/224-2417 FAX

FAX TRANSMISSION

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Nancy

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Trina

~~STEPHEN ROYCE 224-2411~~

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COMMENTS:

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the Dublin just. They see Dublin as a frontier god.

It is incredibly important that this
document not get out!

Tx Trina

436-2560

Sent to Neil O'Donnell

Urgent

Niall O'Donnell

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Not For Publication

21 January 1994

FOR THE ATTENTION OF

There has been a consistent need for the international community to exercise its goodwill and influence to assist in the resolution of conflict worldwide. This is generally recognised and acted upon. It has not, however, been a factor in the Anglo/Irish conflict. This situation needs rectified. The US government in particular, can play a very positive role especially at this critical phase in the peace process. There is an urgent need to break the current deadlock and to move the situation on towards a negotiated settlement and a lasting peace. This is the context in which I am seeking a waiver of the denial of a visa to me.

As President of Sinn Féin, the development and evolution of a peace strategy has been a personal and political priority for some time. It is now the central function of Sinn Féin as a political party. A series of initiatives taken by us over the last number of years culminated in the Irish peace initiative based on proposals by myself and SDLP leader John Hume - which directly led to the current opportunity for peace.

While I have never accepted the reasons advanced to deny me a visa to travel to the US, I accept that the decision was one taken by the US administration based upon its view of the political situation at that time. This situation has now changed dramatically. Sinn Féin has been involved in protracted dialogue and contact with the British government and has co-operated with the Dublin government and Mr Hume to advance the Irish peace initiative. Only this week Dublin's censorship laws were relaxed and as a consequence, hopefully, a more open and informed climate for debate will be created.

The creation of such a climate should be encouraged, not discouraged. The continued denial of a visa to me will not only perpetuate the denial to US citizens of their right to information but it will send a negative signal to those involved in the risky and difficult business of developing a genuine peace process. Of course, the US administration will be criticised if it takes this progressive step but the risk of such criticism is a small one compared to the risks being taken by people in Ireland.

The forum proposed by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy can assist the peace process in Ireland and I am very pleased to be invited to address this forum. I commend the committee. There is no risk involved in me going to the US, to any aspect of government policy. I am going to talk about peace in Ireland and between the people in Britain and Ireland.

The US government can promote peace here without taking sides. It can do this by facilitating the forum and the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

Committee on American Foreign Policy - by promoting the exchange of ideas and discussion and by thus actively seeking to encourage agreement.

Sinn Fein is not engaged in armed struggle. On the contrary, we seek an end to all armed actions and a demilitarisation of the conflict. The Sinn Fein leadership has been actively engaged in initiating and developing unarmed strategies for struggle. This should be encouraged not discouraged.

Gerry Adams

Below is the text of a press release Gerry Adams put out on January 24:

The Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams has said that international opinion can play an important and constructive role in the development of a peace strategy.

Referring, specifically, to the USA, Gerry Adams said,

"There has been a consistent need for the international community to exercise its goodwill and influence to assist in the resolution of conflict worldwide. This is generally recognized and is at times acted upon. It has not, however, been a factor in the Anglo/Irish conflict. This situation needs rectified.

"There is a widespread interest in, and concern about, Ireland within American public opinion. This stems from the historical links between the two countries and the large Irish American community in the USA. The potential has, therefore, always existed for the USA to play a part in the construction of an effective peace process. This potential has, in varying degrees, already been released in response to human rights abuses and, particularly, in the MacBride Campaign for Fair Employment. It is only proper that this potential is realized in the wider search for a lasting settlement.

Public opinion in the USA and the US government, in particular, could assist in the development of a peace process in Ireland. There is an urgent need to break the current deadlock and to move the situation on towards a negotiated settlement and a lasting peace.

It is in the context of the development of Sinn Fein's peace strategy and the overall development of a peace process that I have sought a waiver of the denial of a visa to me. The British, as in the past, are attempting to prevent this so as to stifle political debate, to inhibit free speech and to undermine the potential that exists for American involvement in a peace process.

The development of open debate and dialogue should always be encouraged. No situation is improved by misinformation and ignorance. The forum proposed by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy can assist the peace process in Ireland and I am very pleased to be invited to address this forum. I commend the committee. There is no risk involved in me going to the US, to any aspect of government policy. I am going to talk about peace in Ireland and between the people in Britain and Ireland.

Progressive opinion in the USA can help ensure the present opportunity for peace is not squandered by building support for the peaceful resolution of the conflict through inclusive dialogue. The US government can promote peace here without taking sides. It can do this by facilitating the forum and the National Committee on American Foreign Policy - by permitting the exchange of ideas and discussion and by thus actively seeking to encourage agreement.

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GERRY ADAMS

President of Sinn Féin

01/05 00thw na bhFáil, Dónal Póirtéa BT18 4PP

PRESS RELEASE

01/11/94.

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It is in the context of the development of Sinn Féin's peace strategy and the overall development of a peace process that I have sought a waiver of the denial of a visa to me. The British, as in the past, are attempting to prevent this so as to stifle political debate, to inhibit free speech and to undermine the potential that exists for American involvement in a peace process.

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22-JAN-94 SAT 17:10 BELFAST REPUBLICAN PRESS P.02

The development of open debate and dialogue should always be encouraged. No situation is improved by misinformation and ignorance. The forum proposed by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy can assist the peace process in Ireland and I am very pleased to be invited to address this forum. I commend the committee. There is no risk involved in me going to the US, to any aspect of government policy. I am going to talk about peace in Ireland and between the people in Britain and Ireland.

Progressive opinion in the USA can help ensure the present opportunity for peace is not squandered by building support for the peaceful resolution of the conflict through inclusive dialogue. The US government can promote peace here without taking sides. It can do this by facilitating the forum and the National Committee on American Foreign Policy - by permitting the exchange of ideas and discussion and by thus actively seeking to encourage agreement.

Sinn Féin is not engaged in armed struggle. On the contrary, we seek an end to all armed actions and a demilitarisation of the conflict. The Sinn Féin leadership has been actively engaged in initiating and developing unarmed strategies for struggle. This should be encouraged not discouraged.

excuse by the British to block the articulation by Sinn Fein of its views.

.ETX

FOX MN/ADAMS

PAGE 4 02/01/93

.STX

And previous administrations, because of foreign policy concerns, sided with the British administration. I think that President Clinton has taken a step in the right direction, because -- I mean, what are the British afraid of? That people want to agree with what I am saying, or disagree? They want to criticize what I'm saying? That's fair enough. I mean, people should have the right to information in which to make their own judgment.

What Sinn Fein is concerned to do is to move us all out of violence, to do so on a multilateral, in cooperation with the British, involving the Unionists, and in cooperation with all the other parties in Ireland.

MS. MCCARTHY: Gerry Adams, thank you so much, joining us live this morning from New York, the president of Sinn Fein. We appreciate it.

MR. ADAMS: Right. Good morning. Thank you.

####

END

.ETX

Reut09:13 02-01

28 JAN. '94 17:55

NBC NEWS LONDON

~~11812-0172~~

1021

lmuccini

Fri Jan 28 12:48 page 1

SLUG	SHOW	WRITER	MODIFIED	lmuccini	TIMING	LC
GERRY ADAMS S/BYTES		lmuccini	Fri Jan 28 12:47 1994	READY	0:45	20

OUR POSITION ON VIOLENCE IS QUITE CLEAR. I WANT TO SEE AN END TO THIS CONFLICT. I WANT TO SEE AN END TO VIOLENCE. I DONT ADVOCATE VIOLENCE

MY POSITION ON THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION IS CLEAR ALSO. ITS DESCRIBED AS A FIRST STEP AND WE ARE TOTALLY COMMITED TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT. SO IF ITS A STEP WE WISH TO EMBRACE IT

RE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION" I AM ANXIOUS TO EMBRACE IT IF IT HELPS THE PFACE PROCESS, IF IT MOVES THE PEACE PROCESS ON

I WANT TO SEE THE IRA ENDED I WANT THE IRA DISBANDED PERIOD I WANT THE LOYALIST DEATH SQUADS DISBANDED

I AM QUITE WILLING TO SEEK TO PERSUADE THE IRA ----- I HAVE SAID THAT I WANT TO BRING A PROPOSITION TO THE IRA WHICH ALLOWS IT TO END ITS CAMPAIGN

Eur/NR
PASS URGENTLY
TO DAVID SCHAFER

Aspin OK

R - returned

Shali OK

State OK - get guidance

Hamitt - asked him to renounce violence

hasn't gone as far as ~~the~~ we had hoped
but given us something to work with.

* Will support whatever our judgment is.
hasn't met the conditions.

Shali - BG passed authority for Nila + SB
Shali thinks should pass authority for all.

WC - & will talk to him (WC)

in light of San Diego - disclaimer resp.
for San Diego - say that is a bad thing.
Something @ Taking the loss of innocent life.

London bombings + San Diego.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	re: Talking Points for Use with John Hume [2 copies] (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-January 1994 [2]

2011-0533-F

rs1648

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Former Language on Visa Denial

Visa to Gerry Adams

- Q: During the campaign you called for granting a visa to Gerry Adams, yet your Administration just denied him one. How do you account for this contradiction?
- A: -- Mr. Adams was denied a visa in accordance with U.S. law, specifically, the Immigration and Nationality Act which bars those individuals involved in terrorist activity from entry into the United States.
- The decision to deny Mr. Adams a visa was recommended by the State Department with the full support of the Justice Department, including the FBI. I stand by that decision.
- During the campaign, I said I would consider granting a visa to Mr. Adams because he was a member of parliament and as such could be helpful to the process of bringing peace to the area.
- However, Mr. Adams is no longer a member of Parliament.

Points for Congress

→ NS

The Administration is reviewing Gerry Adams' January 14 application to attend the conference on Northern Ireland hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy on February 1, 1994, in light of events flowing from the December 15 Joint Declaration by Prime Minister Reynolds and Prime Minister Major.

In making a decision on whether to grant him a waiver of his ineligibility, it is important for us to have an understanding of his position on achieving peace in Northern Ireland.

After consulting with the Irish and British governments, we have instructed our Embassy in Dublin and Consulate in Belfast to approach Adams to determine whether he publicly will renounce violence and support the Joint Declaration.

Our decision on whether to provide him a visa will depend on his response.

Sandey has
attempted to
call Foley]

PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR ADAMS

. . . you personally renounce violence and will work to that end;
and that Sinn Fein and the IRA are committed to ending the
conflict on the basis of the Joint Declaration.

Points for Congress and Press:

The Administration is reviewing Gerry Adams' January 14 application to attend the conference on Northern Ireland hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy on February 1, 1994 in light of events flowing from the December 15 Joint Declaration by Prime Minister Reynolds and Prime Minister Major.

In making a decision on whether to grant him a waiver of his ineligibility, it is important for us to have an understanding of his position on achieving peace in Northern Ireland.

After consulting with the Irish and British governments, we have instructed our Embassy in Dublin to determine whether he will publicly renounce violence and support the Joint Declaration.

Our decision on whether to provide him a visa will depend on his response.

86 protest as not far enough:

Adams has been trying to obtain ^{la} visa for the past decade. His ten applications since 1984 have been denied because of his continued involvement in the command structure of the IRA. ~~His persistence in seeking to obtain a U.S. visa demonstrates the importance he places on coming to this country to make his case.~~ Longstanding U.S. government policy has been to avoid substantive contacts with him, Sinn Fein and the IRA.

Our move now represents ~~a shift in policy and~~ a reaching out to Adams: we have never had a substantive conversation with him before.

We have chosen to do this now because the Joint Declaration represents the first real opportunity in years for Sinn Fein to take a seat at the negotiating table. Our move is designed to demonstrate that we recognize that Adams has an important role to play in securing peace and we want him to move in the right direction.

Sandy:

calls beyond Kennedy

Dodd

*Authorizing your clearance of Additional
Points. THESE HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY ME +
Dan Russell (of Tarnoff's office). Nancy WANTED
THESE DONE BEFORE my more calls were made.
You should run by Peter if you approve.*

John

7:15

*Steve Friedman - 800-0404
Mark Matthews 416-6652*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 25, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY

FROM: BROOKE

SUBJECT: Arafat's Renunciation of Violence

Below, please find quotes by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on renouncing violence:

Text of letter to Prime Minister Rabin on Joint Recognition (September 9, 1993):

- "The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations."
- "The PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators."

Text of letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst (September 9, 1993):

- "The PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participation actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation."

Comments on the killing of an Israeli settler (November 13, 1993):

- "We are distressed by and condemn the killing of the Israeli settler Mizrachi. This individual operation was carried without the knowledge of the leadership. We demand that everyone comply with what was agreed on and stop violent acts to safeguard the peace process."

be appointed by PISGA. Legislation in force in areas of responsibility not assumed by PISGA will be reviewed as appropriate.

The two sides agree that one of the key goals of the interim period is the transfer of authority to Palestinians. Powers and responsibilities of the Israeli civilian administration and other relevant Israeli organs will be transferred to the Palestinians as agreed. This process will bring about a fundamental change in the existing situation on the ground and in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. An important outcome of this phase will be the empowerment of the Palestinian people through the establishment of interim self-government authority which will give the Palestinians real control over decisions that affect their lives and fate. It should also pave the way to put an end to the confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians and create a new relationship between them of mutual respect, tolerance, peace and reconciliation, in which both sides eschew violence.

Territorial Jurisdiction

The two sides agree that discussion of the issue of territorial jurisdiction as it relates to the interim period starts from the premise that issues relating to the exercise of sovereignty are outside the scope of the interim status negotiations.

Consequently, nothing agreed regarding the issue of jurisdiction in the interim status negotiations shall prejudice the outcome of the permanent status negotiations. Both negotiations, as provided for above, are designed to achieve the implementation of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, in all their aspects.

Thus, for the interim period, the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority will exercise its territorial jurisdiction on the occupied Palestinian territories which were not under Israeli control on June 4, 1967 including Jerusalem.

The two sides have agreed that these territories are viewed as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period, under one system of law.

General Security

The Israeli and Palestinian sides agree that the security of both sides must be respected and enhanced as a result of the negotiating process. The objective of security arrangements during the interim period is to respond to the needs of both sides, as well as to create the conditions for real peace. The agreement will include appropriate security arrangements for ensuring internal and external security and public order during the in-

terim phase, taking into account the security concerns of both sides. The PISGA will establish appropriate security organs to maintain internal security and public order including a strong police force. The interface between internal and external security, particularly as related to bridges, border crossings, etc., should be under the control of PISGA, unless otherwise stipulated by the agreement. The agreement will also take into account unilateral issues relating to border crossings and the movement of people and goods. Withdrawal of the Israeli forces shall begin during the interim phase according to an agreed timetable, with appropriate verification mechanisms. The Israeli army will withdraw from populated areas and redeploy in mutually agreed security locations.

Cooperation and Coordination

The two sides will conclude agreements and establish agreed arrangements for cooperation and coordination in specific areas of mutual and common concern. These areas of cooperation and coordination will take into account the mutual needs of both sides. The two sides will also establish a joint committee to consider and deal with matters of common concern and to resolve outstanding problems that may arise between them. Disputes which cannot be resolved or settled by agreement between the two sides will be submitted to international arbitration or an agreed standing committee.

Implementing Mechanisms

The Palestinian and Israeli sides seek early completion of the Declaration of Principles and a full agreement on interim self-government. Toward this end, the two sides will agree to a timetable and mechanisms for election of PISGA.

Gaza-Jericho First

"Gaza-Jericho first" as a form of disengagement and a first step toward a full agreement through both in negotiations and on the ground. This first step would provide tangible and viable expression of the true transfer of full authority to the Palestinians with a concrete territorial base integrally linked to the rest of the occupied territories which remain an integral whole.

F. PLO and Israeli Letters of Mutual Recognition, Tunis and Jerusalem, 9 September 1993.

[The mutual recognition letters were signed almost three weeks after the PLO-Israeli draft Declaration of Principles (DOP) was initiated in Oslo

on 20 August, and over a week after the draft was made public. Finalized in Paris by the same Israeli and PLO negotiators who had worked out the DOP filed on the Israeli side by Israeli Foreign Ministry Director-General Uri Savir and legal expert Yoel Singer, and on the Palestinian side by Ahmad Qumr, head of PLO economic department, and Hassan Asfour, the letters opened the way for the signing of the final agreement in Washington, D.C. on 13 September (see Special Document G). Chairman Arafat's letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Håvard Holst, who oversaw the negotiations for both the DOP and the mutual recognition, forms an integral part of the package by virtue of its implicit commitment to help end the intifada, an Israeli demand. The letters, on plain paper without letterheads (an Israeli requirement because of the two parties' unequal status), were all dated 9 September but were signed by Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin respectively on 9 and 10 September. The texts of the letters were published in the New York Times of 10 September 1993.]

1. PLO Chairman Yasar Arafat to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following P.L.O. commitments:

The P.L.O. recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.

The P.L.O. accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The P.L.O. commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

The P.L.O. considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic step, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the P.L.O. renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all P.L.O. elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the P.L.O. affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to

exist and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the P.L.O. undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,
YASIR ARAFAT
Chairman
Palestine Liberation Organization

2. PLO Chairman Yasar Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst

Dear Minister Holst,

I would like to confirm to you that upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles I will include the following positions in my public statements:

In light of the new era marked by the signing of the Declaration of Principles the P.L.O. encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.

Sincerely,
YASIR ARAFAT
Chairman
Palestine Liberation Organization

3. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to PLO Chairman Arafat

Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of Sept. 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that in light of the P.L.O. commitments included in your letter the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the P.L.O. within the Middle East peace process.

YITZHAK RABIN
Prime Minister of Israel

G. Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles, Washington, D.C., 13 September 1993.

[The text of the agreement, initiated in Oslo on 20 August, was signed at the White House following the Israeli-PLO mutual recognition (see Special Document F) by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO Executive Committee member Mahmud 'Abbas (Abu Mazen) in the

7TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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The Christian Science Monitor

December 9, 1993, Thursday

SECTION: THE WORLD; INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 8

LENGTH: 814 words

BYLINE: Peter Ford, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

DATELINE: JERUSALEM

HIGHLIGHT:

The intifadah changed forever the way Israelis and Palestinians viewed themselves and each other

BODY:

THE Israeli Army poured troops into the West Bank and Gaza Strip yesterday, in a bid to stave off trouble as Palestinians prepared to mark the sixth anniversary of their intifadah, or uprising, today.

The anniversary, always a volatile day marked by a general strike in the occupied territories, and stone-throwing at soldiers and settlers, falls at an especially delicate moment. A wave of violence is sweeping the West Bank four days before the Palestinians are due to take their first steps toward self-rule.

In the latest incident, an Israeli was seriously wounded by a Palestinian in Bethlehem yesterday morning. Israeli troops closed the town as they hunted the assailants.

As the death toll mounts, and as doubts spread that Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will meet the Dec. 13 target date to begin implementing their autonomy accord, observers on both sides of the conflict agree that without the intifadah there would probably not have been a peace treaty at all.

"The intifadah finally brought them together, and made Israelis and Palestinians realize that they had to negotiate," says Zeev Schiff, who co-wrote a book on the Palestinian uprising. "Without the intifadah, it would have been much more difficult for the Israelis to realize that they needed a strategic solution."

At the same time, says Freih abu-Middain, head of the Gaza Bar Association, the intifadah gave the Palestinians a sense of dignity "like the 1973 war for [then Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat: It gave us the confidence to make peace with Israel."

For opponents of the framework peace accord between Israel and the PLO, under which Palestinians will enjoy limited autonomy, starting in the West Bank city of Jericho and the Gaza Strip, the deal falls far short of the goal they have been fighting for over the past six years - an independent Palestinian state.

The Christian Science Monitor, December 9, 1993

Masked militants belonging to Hamas, the radical Islamist group, marched in the the Gaza Strip on Tuesday, pledging to continue their intifadah against Israel, even after Israeli troops withdraw from Gaza.

The uprising began on Dec. 9, 1987, the day after an Israeli truck ran into a Palestinian vehicle carrying laborers from the Gaza Strip, killing four of them. That incident, which rumor quickly transformed into a deliberate act of murder, triggered rioting that developed into the intifadah, an Arabic word that literally means "shaking off."

Small boys throwing stones at Israeli military patrols came to symbolize the Palestinian struggle, although this "David and Goliath" imagery has become less accurate in the last two years, as generalized resistance to the occupation has ebbed, replaced by individual acts of armed violence.

The intifadah, Mr. Middain says, "is the best thing that ever happened to us in the history of the Palestinians, the only struggle for our rights."

Many other factors conspired to bring the peace process to fruition, of course - the Gulf war, which prompted a new United States commitment to resolve the Palestinian problem, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, which forced Syria to reorient its foreign policy.

But the intifadah has been central to the relations between Israel and the Palestinians for the past six years.

Young men once on the run from the Army, for example, wanted for being leaders of the intifadah, are now in charge of the PLO headquarters in Gaza City, fitting out their offices with carpeting and telephones instead of hiding in secret safe houses. Indeed, they sat down with top Israeli military commanders two weeks ago to discuss ways of cooling the atmosphere after several days of unrest.

The fate of the 12,000 intifadah activists still in jail is proving one of the toughest problems in the Israeli-PLO negotiations over the details of autonomy, as the Palestinians demand pledges that they will be released over the next few months.

Officially, the intifadah ended Sept. 13, when Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, in a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, said that "the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence."

But Mr. Arafat has been unable to control Palestinians opposed to the peace accord, who have stepped up their attacks against Israeli targets in the occupied territories.

The Christian Science Monitor, December 9, 1993

Even Arafat's supporters, frustrated to see that the Israeli Army has not changed its ways, are back on the streets throwing stones in scenes reminiscent of the first days of the intifadah.

The difference, though, as Mr. Schiff worries, is that "unless we reach an agreement on Dec. 13. or very soon afterwards, the situation in the territories will deteriorate. But it will be an intifadah against both Rabin and Arafat, an intifadah against peace."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: ONCE A DEFIANT ACT: Palestinian youth waves a flag in the days when it was illegal to do so. On the sixth anniversary of the intifadah, violence threatens the peace accord., P.

BAZ/AFP/FILE

HD: Palestinians to Celebrate Six Years of Uprising

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: December 10, 1993, Friday

13TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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The Christian Science Monitor

November 16, 1993, Tuesday

SECTION: THE WORLD; INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 6

LENGTH: 864 words

HEADLINE: Israelis Shaken by Violence But Still Back Rabin's Deal

BYLINE: Peter Ford, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

DATELINE: JERUSALEM

HIGHLIGHT:

Worries over security heightened by Fatah members' role in killing

BODY:

AN Israeli settler killed an axe-wielding Palestinian who had attacked him yesterday in another of the violent incidents that are making a growing number of Israelis think again about their framework peace accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Two Jewish settlers have been killed in the past two weeks, victims of radical Palestinians opposed to the agreement on limited autonomy that Israel signed with the PLO two months ago.

In the wake of those killings, "the scope of support [for the peace process] has diminished," Israeli Economy Minister Shimon Shitreet acknowledged yesterday.

But Israelis' deepening doubts about their peace accord with the Palestinians do not yet add up to a serious threat to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who has insisted during his current trip to the United States that the two sides have gone beyond the point of no return in autonomy negotiations.

Beyond the killings themselves, what has enraged Israelis was the revelation Friday that members of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's own Fatah faction of the PLO were responsible for the death of settler Haim Mizrahi on Oct. 29.

The Israeli Army had initially blamed the attack on the radical Islamic Hamas organization, allowing Mr. Rabin to maintain his oft-repeated argument that mainstream PLO factions were abiding by Mr. Arafat's pledge to forswear violence against Israelis.

Under heavy pressure from Israel and the United States, Arafat Saturday condemned Mizrahi's killing, saying that the PLO leadership in Tunis had known nothing about it. But the incident raised troubling doubts here about the extent of Arafat's authority over his people.

The Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 1993

"Our strategic assumption was that Arafat had the power, that he was the partner," says Mr. Shitreet, one of the more hawkish members of Rabin's Cabinet. "People are beginning to wonder about this now, but we still hope that our assumption was correct," he says.

The only development that could derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement now, argues Yaron Ezrahi, a political scientist at Hebrew University, "is if the credibility of the PLO as a partner that can control security is seriously threatened. If the PLO doesn't demonstrate some form of control over the area ... this could have serious effects of delegitimizing the peace process for Israel," he warns.

"It is time for Arafat to start exerting his influence in the territories now," he argues.

Controlling political opponents in the territories from Tunia, before any sort of Palestinian police force is established, is clearly difficult for PLO leaders.

Only the mainstream Fatah faction, one wing of the Democratic Front, and the small People's Party support the agreement, and Fatah activists admit privately that as many as 30 percent of their members do not support Arafat's policies.

That leaves many opponents of the deal with Israel in the PLC, without counting Hamas, to which some dissident Fatah gunmen are beginning to shift their loyalties, according to Israeli intelligence officials.

Their policy of seeking to undermine the accord by attacking Israeli settlers is all the more effective given the supreme importance Rabin has attached to security.

"For Rabin, who has based the whole agreement on the security issue, and on putting an end to violence, these killings are a big blow," argues Danny Ben Simon, a commentator with the Labor Party-affiliated Davar daily.

Professor Ezrahi agrees: "Rabin made a mistake in tying the success of the peace process to extremely short-term improvements in security in the territories."

The Israeli public, however, appears more ready to accept that Palestinian violence will continue than even the government might have hoped.

A poll by the respected Guttman Institute just before the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was signed in Washington found that 75 percent of Israelis expected violence to increase as a result of the accord, even though most of them supported it.

And so far, the settlers do not appear to have succeeded in turning the deaths of their fellows to political advantage, as they

The Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 1993

try to force the government to abandon its negotiations with the Palestinians.

After every recent incident of violence by a Palestinian, settlers have gone on the rampage in retaliatory attacks on Palestinians and their homes and cars, which has not improved their image among ordinary Israelis.

"They appear more and more like a mob reacting with anger," says Ezerachi, "and the middle class in Tel Aviv and Haifa doesn't like that. The settlers are shooting themselves in the foot."

While the killings have clearly unnerved many Israelis in the political center, who are still unsure quite what to think about the peace process, "it's a question of testing their patience; rather than a serious challenge to Rabin," says Ezerachi.

"Since the opposition has not offered any proposals that would reduce the violence, if violence is the problem, the opposition is not the solution," he adds. "That makes Rabin's position much stronger than daily shifts in public opinion would suggest."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: RALLY AGAINST PEACE TALKS: Jewish settlers, angry over Arab violence against them, marched through Jerusalem on Nov. 10. Many Israelis have second thoughts about the accord. , DAVID SILVERMAN/AFP

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: November 16, 1993, Tuesday

14TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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The New York Times

November 14, 1993, Sunday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section 1; Page 7; Column 1; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 896 words

HEADLINE: ARAFAT CONDEMNS SETTLER'S SLAYING

BYLINE: By CLYDE HABERMAN, Special to The New York Times

DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Nov. 13

BODY:

Responding quickly to American and Israeli demands at the highest level that he speak out, Yasir Arafat today condemned the recent killing of an Israeli settler by allies in his Palestine Liberation Organization and called for an end to violence "to safeguard the peace process."

Mr. Arafat's statement, representing what is believed to be his first public denunciation of a lethal attack on an Israeli by Palestinian nationalists, was welcomed as "a very positive sign" by President Clinton.

At the White House on Friday, the President had joined Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel in insisting that the Palestinian leader was duty-bound to condemn Arab attacks on Israelis. Mr. Clinton said today as he left Washington for Memphis that Mr. Arafat's comments would help Israel and the P.L.O. to put into effect their mid-September agreement in principle on starting Palestinian self-rule in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Rabin Avoids Direct Comment

Mr. Rabin, who was in New York City today, did not comment directly on the Arafat announcement from P.L.O. headquarters in Tunis -- either to welcome it or to say, as other Israeli officials did, that the P.L.O. chairman had done what was minimally needed to keep a political problem for the Rabin Government from snowballing.

In a terse statement issued by aides, the Prime Minister noted that in September Mr. Arafat had renounced violence and promised to discipline anyone under his command who violated that commitment. The test of this pledge "will be in ceasing all terror and violent activities by this organization," Mr. Rabin said.

The Prime Minister added that he would not be sidetracked by terrorists from an agreement that is supposed to lead a month from today to the start of an Israeli troop withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank city of Jericho.

Negotiations on the details of that withdrawal and a companion Palestinian assumption of authority are expected to resume in Cairo on Monday.

Likely to Defuse Crisis

The New York Times, November 14, 1993

In the short run, the swift response from Tunis seemed likely to defuse a bubbling crisis that suddenly spilled over on Friday when the Israeli Army announced that it had captured five young Palestinians who were suspected of killing a West Bank settler on Oct. 29 and who identified themselves as members of Al Fatah, Mr. Arafat's P.L.O. faction.

The long run is not so clear, though. Israeli public support for the self-rule accord has plainly eroded after a recent burst of Palestinian attacks. It is far from certain that Mr. Arafat's condemnation of violence will be enough to persuade skeptical Israelis that the P.L.O. leader is sincere and that he can control events in the territories.

"Perhaps Arafat is also a minority on the ground," said Yoel Marcus, a columnist for the newspaper Haaretz. "Then the question arises as to whether we are mistaken in our intention to hand over the territories to him."

The army's disclosure that it was holding members of Al Fatah as suspects in the death of Haim Mizrachi was unquestionably embarrassing both to Fatah leaders and to Mr. Rabin.

Scrambling for Damage Control

When it suddenly turned out that Fatah militants had acted against Mr. Arafat's instructions all parties involved in the negotiations began scrambling to control the political damage.

The talks were at risk, Mr. Rabin said. Even though he insisted at the White House on Friday that Israel and the Palestinians had "passed the point of no return," Mr. Rabin cautioned on Israel's Army Radio that "there is no taste for coming to additional agreements" with someone who "doesn't stand by" his commitments.

So a blunt message was sent to Mr. Arafat by the American and Israeli leaders: He was "duty-bound at a minimum," in Mr. Clinton's words, to condemn the violence.

Oded Ben-Ami, a spokesman for Mr. Rabin, said that senior aides traveling with the Prime Minister in the United States had talked through the night with P.L.O. officials in Tunis, both directly and through intermediaries in Cairo, to make sure that the P.L.O. chairman would say something.

With a clear sense of urgency, Mr. Arafat responded today, although he confined himself to the stabbing murder of Mr. Mizrachi outside the Jewish settlement of Beit El and not to the half-dozen other killings of Israelis in the territories since mid-September.

"We are distressed by and condemn the killing of the Israeli settler Mizrachi," Mr. Arafat said in what was described in Tunis as a response to a question from the Palestinian news agency, Wafa. "This individual operation was carried without the knowledge of the leadership. We demand that everyone comply with what was agreed on and stop violent acts to safeguard the peace process."

Fatah officials in Gaza and the West Bank said today they had been called overnight by the Tunis leadership and told to send a message to members and supporters that they must abide by the renewed P.L.O. commitment.

The New York Times, November 14, 1993

• Troops Kill Palestinian

JERUSALEM, Nov. 13 (Reuters) -- Israeli troops shot and fatally wounded a Palestinian tonight after a car failed to stop at a military roadblock in the occupied West Bank, the army said.

An army spokeswoman said Iyad Mohammad Awad Awali was killed when the soldiers opened fire. Two others in the car were not hurt.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: November 14, 1993

21ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

The Associated Press

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October 15, 1993, Friday, AM cycle

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 316 words

HEADLINE: Sketches of Nelson Mandela, F.W. de Klerk

BYLINE: By The Associated Press

BODY:

Sketches of 1993 Nobel Peace Prize winners:

NELSON MANDELA - Son of Tembu tribal chief, had relatively privileged upbringing in Transkei, a Xhosa homeland. Was imprisoned at height of apartheid in 1962 and served 27 years for plotting to overthrow government by helping launch ANC's guerrilla campaign. After release Feb. 11, 1990, Mandela vowed to continue struggle against apartheid. But instead of seeking violent revenge, devoted efforts to negotiating settlement with government. Formally elected ANC president in 1991. Now 75, gait has slowed and hair gone white, but Mandela retains forceful personality that made him leader since first organizing student protests at black University of Fort Hare in 1938. While his country struggles with political and ethnic bloodshed in black townships, assassination of black leader Chris Hani, economic recession, Mandela never wavers from goal repeated like mantra - "a democratic, non-racial South Africa."

F.W. DE KLERK - Descended from generations of conservative Afrikaner stock, he changed course of South Africa by eliminating apartheid laws and offering blacks role in governing. Soon after replacing combative P.W. Botha as president in 1989, de Klerk shocked world by ending ban on African National Congress, freeing Nelson Mandela and engaging in talks with him on replacing apartheid with democracy. A former lawyer, de Klerk combines toughness with shrewd tactics to walk political tightrope and remain leading candidate to help run first post-apartheid government. When pro-apartheid whites challenged his authority last year, he called whites-only referendum on reforms and won convincingly. De Klerk, 57, often expresses admiration for world leaders who seized initiative at critical moments. Has been compared to Mikhail Gorbachev, but shrugs off such comparisons, saying only similarity is their baldness.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: October 15, 1993

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July 7, 1993, Wednesday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 3; Column 2; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 662 words

HEADLINE: Politics and Plunder Mix in South African Violence

BYLINE: By BILL KELLER, Special to The New York Times

DATELINE: KATLEHONG, South Africa, July 6

BODY:

Before they chased her away in the name of the African National Congress, the young warriors who invaded Sheila Hadebe's home in this battle-scorched black township did something strange.

They backed up a van, she said, and began demolishing the walls of her house, carting off the bricks for resale.

Such is the volatile mix of politics and opportunism that has set alight two black settlements east of Johannesburg in recent days, and raised anew the question of whether South Africa's streets are tuned in to the talk of peace and democracy.

49 Dead in Two Days

The fighting since Monday has left 49 bodies for the police to collect from the streets of Katlehong and the adjoining township of Tokoza, and pushed the nationwide death toll to 125 in four days of factional carnage.

Most of combatants are at least nominally aligned with either the African National Congress or the Inkatha Freedom Party, whose rivalry seems undiminished by the peace talks their leaders held just 13 days ago.

Although Nelson Mandela, the congress president, and Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi of Inkatha swore to join forces against violence, their regional lieutenants in the area surrounding Johannesburg failed to meet until they were pulled together for a crisis gathering today.

And even if the regional rivals agree to work together, it is not clear how much control they have.

Taxi Rivals' Feud

The most coherent explanation for the latest eruption pieced together from political leaders and local residents, was that it began Sunday as a feud between rival taxi moguls.

This soon evolved into a renewal of old hostilities between hostel-dwellers loyal to Inkatha and township youths claiming allegiance to the African National Congress.

The New York Times, July 7, 1993

They barricaded the streets with smoldering tires and chunks of paving stone large enough to impale a speeding car, and mounted ambushes with Molotov cocktails and guns.

By Monday the battle had been joined by opportunists looking to settle old scores or acquire new stereos. This afternoon looters pranced through the streets, around the husks of incinerated cars.

"It is political," said a Tokoza man who would only identify himself as Winter. "But if you go deeper it is not political. And then if you still go deeper, it is mainly political."

Link to Political Talks

Offering an alternative though unsubstantiated explanation, the African National Congress declared that the fighting was orchestrated by forces bent on halting progress toward majority rule. Congress official pointed out that the worst spasms of violence seem to follow signs of progress, like the confirmation last Friday of a date for the country's first universal election.

The congress did not name the forces at work, but here in Kattlehong congress sympathizers asserted that the violence was instigated by Mr. Buthelesi in league with white rightists, out to spoil the new order in which they will probably be pushed to the margins.

As it happened, Mr. Buthelesi met today in Natal Province with Afrikaner separatists, who share his unhappiness with the prospect of majority rule.

The fighting has sent a new wave of refugees scurrying from their homes. Some have moved in with friends or relatives. Several hundred, like Miss Hadebe, fled to the sanctuary of Natalspruit Hospital, which made a ward available for the dispossessed at night and let them camp on the parched quadrangle during the day.

Miss Hadebe, 19, said she had no idea where the fighting originated, but it reached her street when outsiders swooped down on a funeral at the house next door to her. The young men who invaded the house she rented two months ago told her they were evicting residents because the area had been a stronghold of pro-Inkatha Zulus.

Miss Hadebe, who claims no party allegiance but has the misfortune to be Zulu-speaking, grabbed her baby and fled as the men carted off furniture and began dismantling the house.

GRAPHIC: Maps show the locations of Tokoza and Kattlehong.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: July 7, 1993

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The Associated Press

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July 5, 1993, Monday, PM cycle

SECTION: Domestic News

LENGTH: 532 words

HEADLINE: Mandela, de Klerk Receive Liberty Medal

BYLINE: By A.J. HOSTETLER, Associated Press Writer

DATELINE: PHILADELPHIA

BODY:

Democracy made uneasy friends of South African leaders F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, and together they accepted honors for their struggle to bring that principle to the land of apartheid.

The former foes - one a vestige of white minority rule, the other a living symbol of an emerging nation - on Sunday received the Liberty Medal and praise from President Clinton in a ceremony outside Independence Hall.

De Klerk, president of South Africa, and Mandela, president of the African National Congress, which has fought the nation's apartheid system of racial separation, arrived in Philadelphia on Saturday and went their separate ways until the award ceremony Sunday afternoon.

Tension between the two arose Friday in Washington, when each met separately with Clinton over the future of their homeland. A photo opportunity for the three leaders was abruptly canceled.

At a morning church service in North Philadelphia on Sunday, Mandela referred to de Klerk as the nation's "so-called president."

But Sunday afternoon, they met at the birthplace of America's democracy to receive the Liberty Medal and some advice from Clinton.

Noting that the first multiracial elections have been scheduled in South Africa for next April, Clinton said, "they're going to bring freedom back and they're going to have to do it together."

De Klerk said he and Mandela represent "two political forces that have decided to break out of the cycle of conflict and to join hands in a quest for peace and democracy."

Mandela, in turn, asked the crowd to support the new South Africa.

"You, the peoples of the United States of America and of the world, stood with us as we fought for our political emancipation. We ask you to stay the course until freedom is won," he said.

The Associated Press, July 5, 1993

Protesters, including some from a newly formed group called the Philadelphia Freedom Committee, gathered two blocks away to demonstrate against the honor for de Klerk.

They said it was hypocritical to award a medal honoring moral courage to a man who represents the white-run system that preserved apartheid. Protesters jeered de Klerk from afar but otherwise did not disrupt the event.

Other community leaders shared the stage with the two, saying they took their cue from Mandela, who agreed to accept the medal alongside de Klerk.

One, the Rev. Leon Sullivan who drafted guidelines known as the "Sullivan Principles" that outlined ways to do business with South Africa without investing in apartheid, praised the men's efforts.

He added, however, that "unabashedly, we look to the day when Nelson Mandela is president of South Africa."

Mandela was imprisoned in 1962 for his activities with the ANC and his refusal to renounce violence. He was released in 1990 on de Klerk's orders.

The Liberty Medal and its \$ 100,000 cash award were established by local business and civic leaders in 1988, partly to bring attention to Philadelphia, where the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution were written.

Medal recipients have included Poland's Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, former President Jimmy Carter and retired Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. Mandela and de Klerk will split the money.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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July 1, 1990, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: STYLE; PAGE F4; COLMAN MCCARTHY

LENGTH: 787 words

HEADLINE: Mandela Deserves Our Respect, but on the Violence Question He's Plain Wrong

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: COLMAN MCCARTHY

BODY:

A political prisoner who survives unbroken 27 years in South African jails has legitimate claims on the world's moral respect. He has a right to its attention and adulation. He deserves its gratitude, for refusing to be dehumanized.

But Nelson Mandela, whatever severities he has endured, is due nothing when he calls for violence as a way to create a just society in South Africa. He is owed nothing when he labels such international gangsters as Yasser Arafat "comrades in arms."

Mandela's favoring of violence is not the bloodthirsty death-to-our-enemies yell that the world has heard from its Khomeinis and Pol Pots. He speaks with the sounds of reasonableness and in fact differs little from our conventional