

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-January 1994 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1397

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	1	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	re: [Gerry Adams Interview] (8 pages)	01/28/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002a. memcon	re: [Adams Interview] (2 pages)	01/28/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002b. cable	re: Gerry Adams Visa Request (2 pages)	01/28/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
003. report	[Duplicate of 001] (8 pages)	01/28/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
004. paper	re: Gerry Adams Approach (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005a. paper	re: Gerry Adams Visa Draft Options (2 pages)	01/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005b. paper	re: Gerry Adams Visa Issue (5 pages)	01/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
006. email	Michael Waguespack to Darby re: Today's Meeting re Gerry Adams [partial] (1 page)	01/14/1994	P3/b(3), P6/b(6), b(7)(C)
007. email	George Andricos to Nancy Soderberg et al. re: Mike O'Neil (1 page)	02/02/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
008. email	Julien LeBourgeois to Brooke Darby re: Note for Nancy (1 page)	01/13/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
009. email	Richard Clarke to George Tenet et al. re: IRA (1 page)	01/13/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
010. memo	Soderberg to Anthony Lake re: Gerry Adams Visa (6 pages)	12/15/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-January 1994 [1]

2011-0355-F
rs1647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. notes	re: Gerry Adams Briefing (3 pages)	01/14/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
012. email	LeBourgeois to Darby re: More on Gerry Adams (1 page)	01/10/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

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AMBASAID NA hEIREANN

(202) 462-3939



EMBASSY OF IRELAND
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

13 January 1994

Ms Nancy Soderberg
Special Assistant to the President
and NSC Staff Director
The White House
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Broadcasting Ban on Sinn Fein

Dear Nancy

I am attaching herewith the Irish Government statement on the lifting of the broadcasting ban on Provisional Sinn Fein, together with some Irish newspaper coverage on this issue which you may find interesting.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Michael Collins', written over a horizontal line.

Michael Collins
Charge d'affaires a.i.

Encls
a/s

MC/nc

AMBASAID NA hÉIREANN

(202) 462-3939



EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND
ON SECTION 31(1) OF THE BROADCASTING AUTHORITY ACT 1960

The Government at its meeting today decided to allow the current Order under Section 31(1) of the Broadcasting Authority Act 1960, as amended by Section 16 of the Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act 1976, the terms of which apply both to RTE and independent radio operators to lapse on the expiry of the current order on 19 January, 1994.

In these circumstances, Radio Telefis Éireann will have to observe Section 18(1A) of the 1960 Act, inserted by Section 3 of the 1976 Act, which prohibits the Authority from including in any of its broadcast anything which may reasonably be regarded as being likely to promote, incite to crime, or as tending to undermine the authority of the State. Independent radio operators would be required to observe a similar provisions by virtue of Section 9 of the Radio and Television Act, 1988.

The RTE Authority will operate guidelines, which have already been communicated to the Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht, Mr. Michael D. Higgins, T.D. The IRTC are preparing similar guidelines.

The operation of these guidelines will be kept under close review.

11 January 1994

LET IN THE LIGHT

The Cabinet has decided wisely to remove the prohibitions imposed under section 31 of the Broadcasting Act. Even if accusations of censorship had never been raised, the ban on Sinn Fein — and on proscribed organisations engaged in or supporting violence — was becoming increasingly counter-productive. It served in equal measure to frustrate broadcasters, embarrass the Government and provide Sinn Fein with a sense of grievance bordering on martyrdom.

It was imposed and maintained in response to a constitutional requirement obliging the Government to ensure that the broadcast media were not used to undermine the authority of the State. But while the requirement was clear, its implementation was complex. It depended on the political judgment of the Government of the day and the manner in which its intentions were interpreted by the broadcasting authorities — at RTE and the Independent Radio and Television Commission (IRTC) — and carried into effect by the broadcasters.

Now, it is the Government's judgment that the time is right for a more subtle approach. The sections of the Broadcasting Act on which it intends to rely, once section 31 has been allowed to lapse, will force managements and broadcasters into more active roles. RTE has already submitted operational guidelines under which, for instance, interviews with Sinn Fein spokesmen will be recorded and vetted, not transmitted directly. The IRTC has yet to frame its guidelines.

* * *

But the coalition is not only placing more responsibility on managements and broadcasters; its judgment, as Michael D Higgins pointed out last night, reflects the Government's view of the increasing maturity of the electorate since the 1970s, when one of the arguments for prohibition was that, if members of the republican movement were allowed to broadcast, their audiences would be gulled into support for violence. At least two other arguments probably influenced the Government's decision. One was that of the libertarian campaign of journalists and others opposed to censorship, who chose for their motto the Taoiseach's words on his arrival in office: Let in the Light. The other derived from a more pragmatic calculation: the impact which removing the ban might have on Sinn Fein's final response to the Downing Street Declaration.

It was the implicit appeal to Sinn Fein which provoked opposition from John Bruton, Michael McDowell, some Conservatives and the the Rev Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party. It aroused suspicions in the ranks of James Moyniaux's Ulster Unionist Party but was welcomed by the leader of Democratic Left: Proinsias De Rossa said it was time that some direct questions were put to Gerry Adams. Martin McGuinness and others in Sinn Fein. Mr Adams said the decision would allow informed debate and dialogue leading, he hoped, "to a just and lasting peace on this island."

The Government was obviously aware of the risk that it would be accused of siding with Sinn Fein or playing into the hands of Mr Adams and his colleagues. It has chosen to take the risk. For the journalistic opponents of censorship there is a distinct challenge, once Sinn Fein spokesmen begin to have the freedom of the airwaves. They have an opportunity to prove their claims about wishing to challenge the party's representatives. The most formidable challenge is to Sinn Fein itself. So far, its replies to the most straightforward questions have been anything but informative and anything but direct. The time for plain speaking — and for the putting of strong and straight questions — has arrived.

THE IRISH TIMES EDITORIAL

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1994

A very wrong decision

THE GOVERNMENT'S decision to lift the Section 31 ban on Sinn Fein is totally wrong, for a number of different but very important reasons. And that such a totally unwelcome turnabout should be made without a Dail debate is also disturbing.

Freedom to use the airwaves is being given to an organisation which supports murder and destruction. But the freedom of the Dail has been denied to those Parties which have voiced their opposition to removing Article 31 and wanted a Dail debate. No matter that, with the Government's majority, any opposition vote would have been crushed: the fact remains that the Opposition have not been allowed to put their views on the Dail record. This is almost Government by diktat.

The timing of the Government's bad decision is also inexplicable. It now seems quite likely that Sinn Fein and the IRA will refuse to talk on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration. Despite so much time and effort invested by both the Irish and British Governments it now seem clear that Sinn Fein hopes to enter negotiations without renouncing violence. That is not an option. The Taoiseach Mr Reynolds has said he is prepared to be patient and provide Sinn Fein with "continuing clarification" and in tandem with this he has removed the 23 year old ban on Sinn Fein broadcasting. The dangers of such carrots are obvious. There should be nothing more on offer until there is a concession on violence from the IRA. While Gerry Adams and Co are making demands, the Provisionals are still causing destruction and death. The signal that will go out to them from our Government's decision is a totally misleading one. They will believe they have won a round, and they will go looking for other victories.

IRISH INDEPENDENT EDITORIAL

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1994

If this endangers the Declaration, the consequences are on the Government's head.

The decision to remove the ban while the British are still enforcing theirs (and they were very late coming around to our position) means that Dublin and London are now out of step on a very important matter. Where else are we out of step?

Nor was the decision a friendly signal to the very Unionists whose views and interests we are supposed to be trying to understand and protect. No wonder they are already angry and bemused with a concession to Sinn Fein while that organisation is still dithering about the Declaration.

And all this for what? To enable Sinn Fein leaders to go on air and explain their viewpoints? Surely the Government is not serious when it asks us to believe that an organisation which has received so much coverage in the newspapers needs the additional outlet of a state-run radio and television service to promote its views.

If the Government expects Sinn Fein to be put on the spot when it is asked about its reasons for supporting this murder or that, this explosion or the other one then it has miscalculated. As John Bruton rightly pointed out, interviews with Sinn Fein leaders will now have to conform to another section which forbids incitement to hatred. This effectively rules out direct questions and answers about the reasons for specific murders.

Minister Michael D. Higgins has been named as the man who sought the removal of Section 31, and that may be true. If so, his judgment must be called into question. But, at the end of the day, it was a collective Cabinet decision which will effectively have Sinn Fein on our State airwaves. And it was a very wrong decision.

POLITICAL courage is a quality that is in short supply among Governments. It makes for an easier life all round to go along with conventional wisdom and accept the status quo. And after some 20 years, Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act had become part of that status quo, an official acceptance of State censorship of the airwaves that up until yesterday was renewed annually almost as a matter of routine.

The Fianna Fail-Labour Cabinet has taken a big gamble in deciding that this time the Section will not be renewed. Already the main Opposition parties, Unionist spokesmen and right-wing Tories in Britain, like Michael Mates, are in full cry, denouncing the decision as a sop to the Provisionals and a breach of the spirit of the Downing Street declaration. And if the IRA should now choose to launch another murderous blitz in Belfast or London — and who can say that they won't? — then the Government will be left looking very foolish indeed.

But despite the risks, the decision is the right one, and deserves to be applauded. The Cabinet's motivation may have less to do with a distaste for censorship than with encouraging the Provos to accept the Downing Street Declaration, but that does not detract from the courage and the correctness of the decision. In recent weeks Section 31 has been made to look absurd by excluding from TV and radio the very people who are central to the debate on the declaration.

It has also allowed the Provisionals to avoid the hard questions on the ambiguities of their approach that other parties have to answer. What, for instance, is the difference between the self-determination principle agreed by Gerry Adams with John Hume and that included in the declaration — and does the difference justify killing more people? Worst of all, the Section has provided the Provos with a powerful propaganda weapon, enabling them to claim that their lack of electoral support stems from censorship rather than abhorrence of their methods.

Lifting Section 31 will not mean an RTE takeover by paramilitary apologists. Instead, it will allow TV and radio licence holders to be treated as the adults they are. It will allow RTE journalists to do what they are paid to do — report the news fully and fairly while keeping within the law. Most important of all, it will expose the dangerous myth fostered by Sinn Fein — a minor party, whose influence comes out of the barrel of a gun — that, if allowed access to the airwaves, it would sweep the country.

IRISH PRESS EDITORIAL

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12 1994

RT interviews after Section 31 ban is lifted

By Maol Muire Tynan
and Andy Pollak

RTE will broadcast only pre-recorded and vetted interviews with members of Sinn Féin and other organisations previously banned under Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act when the controversial Order is allowed lapse after January 19th.

Stringent procedures governing interviews are expected to be put in place under new RTE guidelines. Decisions relating to how these should be conducted will be referred beforehand to senior management at the station. These pre-recorded interviews must also be vetted by the same managers.

Shortly after the Government announced yesterday its decision not to renew the Order, RTE's director of corporate affairs, Mr Bob Collins, said the content of what interviewees say, rather than whether they belong to particular organisations, will determine what is broadcast.

He did not "envisage" RTE conducting interviews with members of illegal organisations such as the IRA or the UDA.

However, the station's head of news, Mr Joe Mulholland, said that the Sinn Féin president, Mr Gerry Adams, might be interviewed "next week, the following week or in the not too distant future". An interview with Mr Adams will be dictated by the news of the day and ongoing developments and the matter of the peace process, he added.

Against an angry unionist reaction to the decision not to renew the broadcasting ban, the Government strongly rejected claims that it represented a "sop" to the IRA in the wake of the Downing Street Declaration. A Government spokesman insisted that the issue was "considered in the wider context, not in relation to the peace process at all; it was judged on its own merits".

Other Government sources suggested that the decision to drop the ban would not woo the IRA when it comes to rejecting or accepting the Declaration.

The move to lift the provision has been welcomed by many political and interest groups. Sinn Féin, which has not been allowed

Official denial that move is 'sop' to IRA

direct access to the airwaves for 20 years, was among the first to hail the decision. However, this positive view was not shared by the major opposition parties in Leinster House and by at least one Labour backbench TD, Mr Derek McDowell.

Speaking to journalists after the Cabinet decision to allow the Order to lapse, the Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht, Mr Higgins, said he had advocated the ending of the ban in the light of "broadcasting considerations", especially the right to freedom of information. He conceded that the present political situation contributed to the "context" in which the Government decision was made and he hoped it would assist the peace process.

It is understood that the British government was aware, in advance, of the Government's plan to allow the Order to fall and that unionists also knew of the plans. Government sources have been hinting heavily for some weeks that the Order would be allowed to lapse, and Labour and Fianna Fáil Ministers are understood to have been united in the decision.

Guidelines already communicated to Mr Higgins by the RTE Authority will be circulated among staff at the station; the IRTC is preparing similar directives.

Though the Parliamentary Labour Party issued a statement endorsing the lifting of the prohibition, the backbench TD for Dublin South Central, Mr Derek McDowell, expressed doubts. He was both "disturbed and concerned", adding that the party had not been consulted. The issue would be raised at today's PLP meeting and presumably the Minister would take the opportunity to discuss it then.

Mr McDowell's reservations were the only ones expressed in the Government party ranks but Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats — who have consistently called for the retention of the ban — declared themselves disappointed. The Fine Gael leader, Mr John Bruton, judged that to grant IRA spokespersons the right to appear on Irish television was "wrong".

"The Cabinet should not have done this without a democratic debate in the Dail. If this is part of some hidden agenda, that should have been openly explained," Mr Bruton said.

Describing the decision as "extremely regrettable", the former leader of the Progressive Democrats, Mr Des O'Malley, said the underlying reasons for having the ban in place for the past 20 years still remain. This State was "virtually unique" in the world to allow the freedom of the public airwaves to people who either support or carry on "a widespread and prolonged campaign of murder and who seek to overthrow the organs of State here".

The PD spokesman on Northern Ireland, Mr Michael McDowell, described the Government's decision as "an error". The Order was not a censorship order but a prohibition on the IRA "or its proxies, including Sinn Féin, using State-licensed broadcasting to propagate their murder campaign to gather support and to justify atrocities it has committed".

Reaction to the Government's announcement was generally positive, however. The leader of Democratic Left, Mr Proinsias De Rossa, welcomed the lifting of the ban but said the situation must be closely monitored.

Sinn Féin, inevitably, welcomed the move with the party president, Mr Gerry Adams, commending the Government for the "long overdue decision" to lift the censorship ban on television and radio.

"Over 20 years of political censorship has served to stunt any hopes of a resolution of the conflict... Good riddance", he said.

The Sinn Féin Ard Comhairle member, Mr Martin McGuinness, asked people to remember the truly undemocratic nature of the ban.

94 JAN 28 P8:35

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 111978 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 8
FROM: DAN RUSSELL P 447-4315 7240
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION COMPLETE TEXT OF BELFAST INTERVIEW WITH
GERRY ADAMS

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>NANCY SPOERBERG / KENNY</u>	<u>456-2224</u>	<u>1 PL WWH/WH</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>JANE HOLL / WALKER</u>	<u>395-4996</u>	<u>373 OEOB</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: Gavin 1/28

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: M Date: 12/13/0

2011-0355-F

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Provisional Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams Demurs on
Renunciation of Violence and Acceptance of Downing Street

REF: STATE 022569

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.32)

KBH 7/11/2023

1. ~~S~~ - Entire Text.

2. SUMMARY: The Consul General and Vice Consul met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on January 28. Adams stated that the PSF viewed the Downing Street Declaration as but a "first step" in a peace process, and that it was entirely reasonable to ask for "clarification" from London and Dublin. The PSF, Adams observed, had not rejected Downing Street, but it had not accepted it either. He said that he could not accept the USG's formulation on renouncing violence and committing to end the conflict on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration, for this action would destroy his credibility in republican circles and effectively end his career. Adams argued that the context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt. Adams would not be pinned down on the question of renouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to asserting that PIRA violence had to be understood in the context of HMG's "violence," as exemplified by the Army and the RUC. Adams opined that the USG was losing an opportunity for peace if it did not grant him a waiver; the political risk for the

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JAN 28 '94 09:40PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.2

USG, he averred, was far less than the risks he ran daily in Northern Ireland. Finally, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging elected PSF officials in substantive talks was ill-conceived and counter-productive. END SUMMARY.

3. The Consul General and Vice Consul met with PSF president Garry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. Adams was at first somewhat disconcerted that the press had had such a good handle on the nature and substance of the meeting. He had not involved the press at all in previous meetings on visa matters with USG officials, whether in Dublin or Belfast. He wondered whether he was being "set up" for a quick refusal on the waiver. The CG explained that Adams was not being manipulated; the USG had to have press guidance in place, and if this particular guidance was somewhat specific in nature, it was not out of malice or forejudgment. Adams accepted this and the meeting proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

4. The CG explained that this meeting was at USG request, and that it pertained entirely to Adams' visa application. He noted that the consulate would report Adams' views to Washington as they were expressed to us, and that Washington would render a final decision on the waiver. The CG then asked for (and later received) a contact number for Adams, explaining that when the Department made a decision it might well ask the CG to inform Adams. The CG also noted that the Department of course reserved the right to make its announcement in the manner that it saw fit, so it was at least possible that Adams might

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hear of the decision via the media instead of the consulate. In any case, the CG said, the consulate did not intend to brief the press on any aspect of the meeting, or even the fact of the meeting; we would wait for Washington guidance.

5. The CG opened the more substantive consular discussion by noting that the decision to seek a waiver would be made at a very high level in the USG and that we were interested in his views on the renouncement of violence and the PSF stance toward the Downing Street Declaration. The CG then followed reftel's talking points in bringing to bear USG interest in Adams' views on the peace process. The CG read the statement that we were interested in hearing, and gave Adams a copy on plain bond paper.

6. Adams began by saying that he personally wanted an end to violence. He stated that PSF had been involved in the peace process for at least the last eight years. He said this had led to a number of policy and discussion documents. Under his leadership, PSF had moved toward wanting a negotiated settlement, which was the PSF function as a political party. Adams opined that it was possible to argue that PSF was the only political party with a peace strategy. He said that it was a matter of public record that his party wanted an end to the violence and a demilitarization of the North of Ireland, (the latter phrase Adams attributed to Albert Reynolds). The PSF had engaged in a number of initiatives to engage a wide variety of the community, with the British government, and with the church leaders. Adams said that

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they had even had secret meetings with unionist but these had not come to light and might never do so. But the Hume-Adams Dialogue was the most significant.

7. Adams said that he and SDLP leader John Hume had developed the broad concepts that could create an agreement that would accommodate the people of all of Ireland. It was then put to London and Dublin, who had been briefed on the Hume-Adams dialogue all along. The two governments then produced a reply, which was the Downing Street Declaration. The CG interjected that the agreement came about not only because of the Hume-Adams dialogue but was also an answer to the increasing paramilitary violence. Adams conceded this but said the Hume-Adams dialogue was at the very least the context for the Declaration. Adams added that the PSF viewed the declaration as but a "first step"; he claimed that even the British government when pressed would see it so. The PSF wanted to embrace the Declaration and move on. They wanted to know what the second step was and what the mechanism would be to take the process forward and put into action the principles in the Declaration. PSF wanted to see the conflict ended. Matters were at a critical stage dating from December 15th or before. The PSF, Adams averred, was committed to peace and wanted to continue to develop unarmed strategies to replace armed ones.

8. The CG, noting very carefully that he did not intend to enter into a detailed discussion on this matter, or much less pretend to speak for HMG, observed that, to a layman on these matters, section four of the

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declaration seemed to have quite specific mechanisms. Adams allowed that this was so, but still stated that the PSF needed to know what "further steps" the declaration envisioned. Currently, Adams complained, HMG was stubbornly refusing to clarify matters and instead threatening to "throw down the gauntlet." This was hardly helpful to PSF's desire for peace.

9. Adams recognized that various HMG officials had made it clear that London had no strategic or selfish interests in Northern Ireland. HMG should now move, with Dublin, to ensure that this "no self-interest" clause was developed into a concerted effort to win "the consent of a greater number of people on the island." In this the PSF was willing to cooperate.

10. Adams said that the PSF had not rejected the Downing Street Declaration. Nevertheless, even if it had, it would not mean that the PSF therefore advocated violence. One did not follow from the other. The CG said that the USG had no quarrel with this logic; what it did find disturbing, however, was Adams' failure to renounce violence as a legitimate political weapon. Adams replied that Dr. John Alderdice (head of the Alliance party) viewed the presence and activities of the British Army in NI as legitimate; this was his opinion but Adams did not share it. Why should he be punished with a visa denial for not sharing with Alderdice what was and was not the legitimate use of force, Adams asked? The CG turned the topic back to the paper he had handed Adams, noting that a philosophical discussion on the legitimacy

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JAN 28 '94 09:51PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.4

of force in any society was an interesting topic, but that meanwhile, the USG remained interested in hearing whether he found the statement that was handed to him acceptable.

11. Adams replied that it was wrong to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, he said he did not speak for the IRA. After all, Adams claimed, the PSF and the PIRA were two separate organizations. Adams asserted that making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might indeed be able to travel to New York, but he would be "without influence" in republican circles when he returned. His people would repudiate him. All that then would be left to do, Adams said with a smile, would be to retire quietly to the mountains. The public statement that the USG was asking him to make was simply not worth it, Adams claimed; all it would do was end his career. The CG at this point carefully repeated Adams' words to him. Was this a fair and accurate characterization, the CG asked? It was, Adams acknowledged. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF's president's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

12. Adams asserted that he should get a visa regardless of his unwillingness to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. As it was, Adams said he saw much positive in the Clinton administration's statements on a possible peace envoy and its less

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one-sided view of the McBride Principles. Nevertheless, Adams mused, he expected now to be turned down and not to have another good discussion with the CG until the next time he applied for a visa and had to be interviewed.

13. Warming up to the subject, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging in substantive dialogue with the PSF was silly and counter-productive. The PSF, he noted, was the largest vote-getter in the city of Belfast and the USG continued to act as if the party did not exist. No wonder the people of West Belfast felt marginalized and left out; these feelings, in turn, only made it easier for paramilitaries to recruit in those neighborhoods.

14. Adams finished by saying that he had to take his own political course, that he had to adopt the political positions he thought most fitting under the circumstances. If this meant no visa, then so be it. He would not be particularly angry, but more disappointed that the visa refusal had allowed an opportunity to slip by. The risk the U.S. would take in granting him a waiver was small compared to the risks he was taking every day in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, visa or no, the PSF believed that violence would end; the only question was how long it would take and how many more lives would be lost. The Sinn Fein was actively working toward peace, Adams said, and this was the message the USG ought to understand. The context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt.

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15. The CG noted that he and Adams had just about come to the end of the line; Adams agreed. The CG repeated that he would contact Adams if and when he heard something from Washington. Adams repeated that it was a shame that the only time he had any contact with USG officials was during "visa interrogation" sessions. The meeting then ended.

16. OBSERVATION.

Adams was calm, discursive and self-possessed. As is his style, he was dressed in tweeds, with silk tie and scarf. Offered an ashtray, he noted that he had finally given up his pipe-smoking. Adams spoke well and clearly, but with no particular force or pace. He maintains eye contact, even when denying that the PSF has any links with the Provisional IRA.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Sun Jan 30 14:01 page 1

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BC-IRELAND-USA-ADAMS 01-30 0063

BC-IRELAND-USA-ADAMS URGENT

U.S. GIVES PERMISSION FOR VISIT BY IRISH ACTIVIST

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States has granted Irish activist Gerry Adams permission to attend a New York conference this week on Northern Ireland, a Clinton administration official said Sunday.

But the official, who asked not to be named, said strict ground rules have been laid down governing Adams' movements and activities while in the United States.

MORE

Loyalist activity

1/29

Two Catholics shot + killed in their homes
1/29 in N. Ireland.

Update on San Diego Bombs

The following is protected law enforcement information. The investigation is continuing, no suspects yet and the FBI is following all leads. Two buildings were evacuated in San Diego which was in the papers.

There were three inert grenades found at three sites -- The Shakespeare Inn (a pub), an English clothing store and a federal building in and around San Diego. None of the grenades were capable of exploding.

Taped to each of the grenades were the following notes:

Note 1: English out of Northeast Ireland now. Irish around the world unite against oppression. This is a warning. We mean business. Southern California IRA.

Note 2: We are the Oglahnah Erin. Gerry Adams must be granted a US visa so the Sinn Fein can be heard. We will fight oppression. We are beginning to organize our forces. This is a warning. The war of national liberation is about to begin. Southern California PIRA.

Note 3: Oglahnah Erin has struck. We mean business. If Clinton does not pressure Major to sign a joint peace accord or send a peace envoy to Northeast Ireland (like he promised) we will take matters into our own hands. Irish Unite. We will defeat the Limey imperialists. We have begun to organize our forces. We will stand our ground. We have not forgotten Bobby Sands, the Guilford Four, our brothers and sisters who are suffering in Northeast Ireland and the cause. Southern California IRA.

The FBI notes that Southern California is not a hot bed of IRA activity. Although in 1992 one of the IRA members wanted by the British was arrested there.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MEMCON

January 28, 1994
Consulate General, Belfast

Gerry Adams, President, Provisional Sinn Fein
Valentino E. Martinez, Consul General
Chris Bendsen, Vice-Consul

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.33)

K8H 7/11/2023

SUMMARY

The Consul General met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. The CG, following the guidance and talking points in State 22569 literally, outlined the USG's interest in ascertaining Adams' views on renouncing violence and committing the PSF and the IRA to end the conflict on the basis of the Joint Declaration. The CG handed Adams a plain sheet of paper with an extract from State 22569, the section that began "We therefore must know" and ended "on the basis of the Joint Declaration."

Adams read the extract and nodded, observing that the local and international press had seemed well aware of what was to be asked of him. "Was he being set up," he queried? The CG replied, "No," and briefly explained how USG press guidance worked. Adams accepted this at face value; the 90-minute conversation proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

Adams spent much time explaining previous public statements he had made on wanting violence to end and how they related to the PSF's "search for peace". He also explained in great detail his and the PSF's desire for "clarification" of the December 15 Downing Street Declaration.

He then came to the plain paper handed to him earlier by the CG. It was wrong, Adams said, to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might, indeed, be able to travel to NYC, but he would be "without influence" when he returned; the Republican community would repudiate him. All that would be left for him to do, Adams continued, would be a "quiet retirement in the mountains." The public statement of State 22569, Adams averred, was not worth making, as it would effectively end his career. The CG very carefully repeated Adams' words to him. "Was this a fair characterization," the CG inquired? "It was," Adams replied. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF President's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

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- 2 -

Adams stated that he thought he should get a visa regardless of his willingness or lack thereof to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel, irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. Adams, however, would not be pinned down on the question of denouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to ascertaining that PIRA violence had to be "understood" in the context of the violence engendered by the, for him, merely putative legitimate forces of order -- the police and the army.

Finally, the CG requested (and later received) a contact phone number for Adams, should the Department instruct the CG to pass on its final decision to Adams.

END EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 022569
LONDON - PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: CVIS. PREL, IR, UK
SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA REQUEST

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.34)
KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS ACTION MESSAGE FOR DUBLIN OR BELFAST.
3. CONSUL GENERAL AT EMBASSY DUBLIN SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS ASAP TO DISCUSS HIS VISA APPLICATION. IF ADAMS HAS RETURNED TO BELFAST, CONSUL GENERAL AT CG BELFAST SHOULD CONTACT ADAMS AND CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION.
4. THE CONSUL GENERAL AT THE ACTION POST SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO ADAMS:
 - THE ADMINISTRATION IS REVIEWING YOUR JANUARY 14 APPLICATION TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND HOSTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON FEBRUARY 1, 1994 IN LIGHT OF EVENTS FLOWING FROM THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION BY PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR.
 - IN MAKING A DECISION ON WHETHER TO GRANT YOU A WAIVER OF YOUR INELIGIBILITY, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR POSITION ON ACHIEVING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
 - WE THEREFORE MUST KNOW WHETHER YOU WILL STATE PUBLICLY THAT:

"YOU PERSONALLY RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND WILL WORK TO THAT END AND THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE COMMITTED TO END THE CONFLICT ON THE BASIS OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

JOINT DECLARATION."

-- WE BELIEVE AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND MUST RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND PURSUE PEACE THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. OUR DECISION ON WHETHER TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A VISA STRICTLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE FOR ONE DAY WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER YOU ARE WILLING TO TAKE THIS IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD PEACE.

5. POSTS SHOULD REPORT ADAMS' REACTION BY IMMEDIATE CABLE. POSTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENTS OR THE PRESS. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOI AND HMG ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY. CHRISTOPHER.

BT

#2569

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<MSGID> M0848282

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



GERRY ADAMS

President of Sinn Féin

51/55 Bóthar na bhFál, Béal Feirste BT12 4PD

PRESS RELEASE

FROM GERRY ADAMS

DATE 28 JANUARY 1994

Responding to media inquiries about his interview with a United States official today, on the issue of his visa application to visit the US, Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams said:

"As the New York Times editorial has stated today, at the core of all of this is the issue of freedom of speech and freedom of information and what part the Clinton administration wishes to play in the peace process. It is my view that the US government can play a significant and positive role in encouraging the peace process by helping to create a climate which moves the situation on.

Sinn Féin has played a central and pivotal role in moving the situation from an apparently intractable conflict to one where there is now a focus on resolving the issues involved and building a lasting peace. I welcome the substantial and significant support which has been generated on these matters in the past several weeks in the United States. This is a concrete contribution to the search for peace from concerned individuals and organisations there.

Whatever the outcome of the current request for a waiver of my visa, it is clear that this issue will be won sooner or later. It is also clear that the British government have used all their influence, as in the past, to impede any progress on this or in any matter which could influence or inform perceptions about the current situation in Ireland and the British government's responsibility for the present intolerable stand-off.

Notwithstanding this, let me reaffirm my commitment to move this situation on. The prize of peace for the Irish people, and the British people, is too important and the opportunity for peace cannot be squandered. Republicans will seek, therefore, to overcome any obstacles and to be resourceful and determined to have an encounter and develop the peace process.

for
IRA
consumption

As to the specific focus of my interview today, the Sinn Fein position and my personal position on these matters is well known.

I want to see an end to all violence and an end to this conflict. I don't advocate violence. It is my personal and political priority to see an end to the IRA and an end to all other organisations involved in armed actions. This means an end to the British army presence and the disbandment of the IRA. It means an end to the loyalist death squads. In other words, a demilitarisation of the situation.

I am willing to seek to persuade the IRA to make definitive decisions on the conduct of its campaign. I have stated on a number of occasions my willingness to go to the IRA with a proposition when such a proposition is forthcoming from the peace process.

Not only that, but Sinn Fein is actively engaged in developing unarmed strategies for republican struggle. This should be encouraged not discouraged. Indeed, despite all the difficulties Sinn Fein has now moved to a position where our main function as a political party is to build a peace process. The development of the peace process, including the Downing Street Declaration, is a response to the Sinn Fein peace strategy and to the peace initiative undertaken by myself and SDLP leader John Hume.

The Joint Declaration is described by the authors as "the first step" towards a peace settlement. Sinn Fein is committed to such a settlement and I am concerned, I am indeed anxious to be persuaded that the Downing Street Declaration can provide the basis for this. And even if this is not the case, if there is a gap between what is required and what is on offer, then we should all move to bridge that gap. I am prepared to go the extra mile.

My interview today was a useful and informative exchange and I appreciate the effort that has been made by the Clinton administration to deepen its knowledge of the situation. The US government now more clearly understands the importance of the visa issue, and how it can play a positive role in creating a better climate in which the resolution of our current difficulties can be agreed. My sole purpose in coming to the US is to advance the cause of peace and to move the process forward. The National Committee invitation presents a unique opportunity for this to be accomplished. It is not only an opportunity for me to advance my view on how peace can be created. It also, and just as importantly, presents an opportunity for others to engage with me on how best the peace process can be moved on."

CRIOSH

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NBC NEWS LONDON

1877 P.2/2

luccini

Fri Jan 28 12:48 page 1

JG	SHOW	WRITER	MODIFIED luccini	TIMING	LC
RRY ADAMS S/BYTES		luccini	Fri Jan 28 12:47 1994 READY	0:45	20

OUR POSITION ON VIOLENCE IS QUITE CLEAR. I WANT TO SEE AN END TO THIS
CONFLICT. I WANT TO SEE AN END TO VIOLENCE. I DONT ADVOCATE VIOLENCE

MY POSITION ON THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION IS CLEAR ALSO. ITS DESCRIBED AS A
FIRST STEP AND WE ARE TOTALLY COMMITED TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT. SO IF ITS A STEP
WE WISH TO EMBRACE IT

RE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION" I AM ANXIOUS TO EMBRACE IT IF IT HELPS THE
PEACE PROCESS, IF IT MOVES THE PEACE PROCESS ON

I WANT TO SEE THE IRA ENDED I WANT THE IRA DISBANDED PERIOD I WANT THE LOYALIST
DEATH SQUADS DISBANDED

I AM QUITE WILLING TO SEEK TO PERSUADE THE IRA ----- I HAVE SAID THAT I WANT
TO BRING A PROPOSITION TO THE IRA WHICH ALLOWS IT TO END ITS CAMPAIGN

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Subject: Provisional Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams Demurs on
Renunciation of Violence and Acceptance of Downing Street

REF: STATE 022569

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.35)
K8H 7/11/2023

1. ~~S~~ - Entire Text.

2. SUMMARY: The Consul General and Vice Consul met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on January 28. Adams stated that the PSF viewed the Downing Street Declaration as but a "first step" in a peace process, and that it was entirely reasonable to ask for "clarification" from London and Dublin. The PSF, Adams observed, had not rejected Downing Street, but it had not accepted it either. He said that he could not accept the USG's formulation on renouncing violence and committing to end the conflict on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration, for this action would destroy his credibility in republican circles and effectively end his career. Adams argued that the context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt. Adams would not be pinned down on the question of renouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to asserting that PIRA violence had to be understood in the context of HMG's "violence," as exemplified by the Army and the RUC. Adams opined that the USG was losing an opportunity for peace if it did not grant him a waiver; the political risk for the

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JAN 28 '94 09:42PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.2

USG, he averred, was far less than the risks he ran daily in Northern Ireland. Finally, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging elected PSF officials in substantive talks was ill-conceived and counter-productive. END SUMMARY.

3. The Consul General and Vice Consul met with PSF president Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. Adams was at first somewhat disconcerted that the press had had such a good handle on the nature and substance of the meeting. He had not involved the press at all in previous meetings on visa matters with USG officials, whether in Dublin or Belfast. He wondered whether he was being "set up" for a quick refusal on the waiver. The CG explained that Adams was not being manipulated; the USG had to have press guidance in place, and if this particular guidance was somewhat specific in nature, it was not out of malice or forejudgment. Adams accepted this and the meeting proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

4. The CG explained that this meeting was at USG request, and that it pertained entirely to Adams' visa application. He noted that the consulate would report Adams' views to Washington as they were expressed to us, and that Washington would render a final decision on the waiver. The CG then asked for (and later received) a contact number for Adams, explaining that when the Department made a decision it might well ask the CG to inform Adams. The CG also noted that the Department of course reserved the right to make its announcement in the manner that it saw fit, so it was at least possible that Adams might

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hear of the decision via the media instead of the consulate. In any case, the CG said, the consulate did not intend to brief the press on any aspect of the meeting, or even the fact of the meeting; we would wait for Washington guidance.

5. The CG opened the more substantive consular discussion by noting that the decision to seek a waiver would be made at a very high level in the USG and that we were interested in his views on the renouncement of violence and the PSF stance toward the Downing Street Declaration. The CG then followed reftel's talking points in bringing to bear USG interest in Adams' views on the peace process. The CG read the statement that we were interested in hearing, and gave Adams a copy on plain bond paper.

6. Adams began by saying that he personally wanted an end to violence. He stated that PSF had been involved in the peace process for at least the last eight years. He said this had led to a number of policy and discussion documents. Under his leadership, PSF had moved toward wanting a negotiated settlement, which was the PSF function as a political party. Adams opined that it was possible to argue that PSF was the only political party with a peace strategy. He said that it was a matter of public record that his party wanted an end to the violence and a demilitarization of the North of Ireland, (the latter phrase Adams attributed to Albert Reynolds). The PSF had engaged in a number of initiatives to engage a wide variety of the community, with the British government, and with the church leaders. Adams said that

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they had even had secret meetings with unionist but these had not come to light and might never do so. But the Hume-Adams Dialogue was the most significant.

7. Adams said that he and SDLP leader John Hume had developed the broad concepts that could create an agreement that would accommodate the people of all of Ireland. It was then put to London and Dublin, who had been briefed on the Hume-Adams dialogue all along. The two governments then produced a reply, which was the Downing Street Declaration. The CG interjected that the agreement came about not only because of the Hume-Adams dialogue but was also an answer to the increasing paramilitary violence. Adams conceded this but said the Hume-Adams dialogue was at the very least the context for the Declaration. Adams added that the PSF viewed the declaration as but a "first step"; he claimed that even the British government when pressed would see it so. The PSF wanted to embrace the Declaration and move on. They wanted to know what the second step was and what the mechanism would be to take the process forward and put into action the principles in the Declaration. PSF wanted to see the conflict ended. Matters were at a critical stage dating from December 15th or before. The PSF, Adams averred, was committed to peace and wanted to continue to develop unarmed strategies to replace armed ones.

8. The CG, noting very carefully that he did not intend to enter into a detailed discussion on this matter, or much less pretend to speak for HMG, observed that, to a layman on these matters, section four of the

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declaration seemed to have quite specific mechanisms. Adams allowed that this was so, but still stated that the PSF needed to know what "further steps" the declaration envisioned. Currently, Adams complained, HMG was stubbornly refusing to clarify matters and instead threatening to "throw down the gauntlet." This was hardly helpful to PSF's desire for peace.

9. Adams recognized that various HMG officials had made it clear that London had no strategic or selfish interests in Northern Ireland. HMG should now move, with Dublin, to ensure that this "no self-interest" clause was developed into a concerted effort to win "the consent of a greater number of people on the island." In this the PSF was willing to cooperate.

10. Adams said that the PSF had not rejected the Downing Street Declaration. Nevertheless, even if it had, it would not mean that the PSF therefore advocated violence. One did not follow from the other. The CG said that the USG had no quarrel with this logic; what it did find disturbing, however, was Adams' failure to renounce violence as a legitimate political weapon. Adams replied that Dr. John Alderdice (head of the Alliance party) viewed the presence and activities of the British Army in NI as legitimate; this was his opinion but Adams did not share it. Why should he be punished with a visa denial for not sharing with Alderdice what was and was not the legitimate use of force, Adams asked? The CG turned the topic back to the paper he had handed Adams, noting that a philosophical discussion on the legitimacy

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JAN 28 '94 09:51PM AMCONSULBELFAST

of force in any society was an interesting topic, but that meanwhile, the USG remained interested in hearing whether he found the statement that was handed to him acceptable.

11. Adams replied that it was wrong to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, he said he did not speak for the IRA. After all, Adams claimed, the PSF and the PIRA were two separate organizations. Adams asserted that making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might indeed be able to travel to New York, but he would be "without influence" in republican circles when he returned. His people would repudiate him. All that then would be left to do, Adams said with a smile, would be to retire quietly to the mountains. The public statement that the USG was asking him to make was simply not worth it, Adams claimed; all it would do was end his career. The CG at this point carefully repeated Adams' words to him. Was this a fair and accurate characterization, the CG asked? It was, Adams acknowledged. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF's president's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

12. Adams asserted that he should get a visa regardless of his unwillingness to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. As it was, Adams said he saw much positive in the Clinton administration's statements on a possible peace envoy and its less

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one-sided view of the McBride Principles. Nevertheless, Adams mused, he expected now to be turned down and not to have another good discussion with the CG until the next time he applied for a visa and had to be interviewed.

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Martinez

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Irish-American Labor Coalition
American Labor Committee For Human Rights
In Northern Ireland

Joe Jamison
Director
Bill Lenahan
Assistant Director

New York Chapter
200 Park Avenue South
Room 1109
New York, NY 10003
(212) 254-9271
(212) 254-9276 Fax

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO:

NAME: Nancy Soderberg

FROM: Bill Lenahan

DATE: Jan 31, 94

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES 2 INCLUDING COVER LETTER.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, PLEASE CALL THE TELEPHONE NUMBER
BELOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(212) 254-9271

PLEASE NOTE: OUR FAX NUMBER IS (212) 254-9276

☐ Handle	☐ As requested
☐ Comment	☐ For your information
☐ Recommendation	☐ Note and return
☐ Retry	☐ Per phone conversation

REMARKS:

As per my conversation with
Marilyn Di Giacobbe

Americans For a New Irish Agenda

**Bruce Morrison,
Chair**

**Press Release
For Immediate Release**

**For More Info Contact
Bill Lenahan (212) 254-9271 or
Niall O'Dowd (212) 684-3366**

ANIA To Sponsor Public Meeting with Gerry Adams

At 7:30 p.m. on Tuesday, February 1, 1994, Americans For a New Irish Agenda will sponsor a public meeting with Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams. The meeting will be held at the Sheraton New York Hotel and Towers, at 52nd Street and Seventh Avenue in the Exhibition Hall.

Former City Council President Paul O'Dwyer will introduce Gerry Adams. ANIA co-founder Bruce Morrison, will chair the meeting, which is expected to draw many leaders of the Irish-American community.

ANIA is an outgrowth of Irish-Americans For Clinton-Gore. It was formed in 1993 to press the Clinton Administration to honor its 1992 campaign pledges for a constructive new approach to US foreign policy on Ireland. The Clinton Administration's decision to grant Adams a visa is being warmly welcomed in the Irish-American community.

Mr Adams is visiting New York for a two-day period to attend a foreign policy conference and to discuss his party's perspective on the Irish peace process. Because of intense media interest, attendance is expected to be high.

Source: FBIS

Subject : Ireland: Prime Minister Comments on Adams Visa Issue

FBIS 077

UNCLAS 7F

Ireland: Prime Minister Comments on Adams Visa Issue

LD3101152994 Dublin RTE Radio One Network in English 1300 GMT 31 Jan 94

[Text] The taoiseach [prime minister], Albert Reynolds, was at a function in Dublin this morning. He gave reporters his reaction to the Adams visa [to visit the United states]:

[Begin recording] [Reynolds] Well, that was always a decision that the American authorities had to take. And if it brings the achievement of peace closer, in so far as it can contribute to that, we will (?welcome) it.

[Unidentified correspondent] Do you think that it could help if he were to go there and to make some declaration on the whole initiative?

[Reynolds] Well, I think everybody in the country, the vast majority of the people in the country, want to hear about a declaration of the cessation of violence so that we can get on with the process of establishing a just and a lasting peace in Ireland, and of course start to reap the benefits of what I believe will be a major peace dividend when that happens.

[Correspondent] Had the Irish Government got any role in this? Did you discuss it with President Clinton [words indistinct]

[Reynolds, interrupting] We have always said that this is a matter for the American Administration and we don't interfere in other governments' decisions.

[Correspondent] Taoiseach, a [Northern Ireland] Unionist politician described the decision as breaking faith with the declaration [words indistinct]

[Reynolds, interrupting] This is a decision, this is a decision taken by the American Administration. It is a matter for them. And they've made their own judgment based on their own information. We don't interfere in other people's decisions. As a, as a, contrib... [Reynolds pauses] If it turns out to be a good contribution towards achievement of peace and the start of a peace process I think everybody would welcome it. Thank you. [end recording]

[Announcer] And that was the taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, speaking in Dublin this morning.

31 JAN 1611z jd

NNNN

212-254-9271

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, DC

Bill Lenihan of
Irish-American Labor Coalition

- hosted by Americans for
a new Irish agenda
- public meeting
- tomorrow night
- 7:30 Sheraton

Memo to POTUS re:
Adams what's going on

Gallagher

Kend memo

→ Gary Christopherson
→ NSC spokesman

★ Mark Moran - foreign pol. advisor ★

→ to Senate & Rel. Comm.
→ Marc Ginsberg

↳ 703-549-9552 w/h 703-525-4129

Americans For a New Irish Agenda

Bruce Morrison,
Chair

Press Release
For Immediate Release

For More Info Contact
Bill Lenahan (212) 254-9271 or
Niall O'Dowd (212) 684-3366

ANIA To Sponsor Public Meeting with Gerry Adams

At 7:30 p.m. on Tuesday, February 1, 1994, Americans For a New Irish Agenda will sponsor a public meeting with Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams. The meeting will be held at the Sheraton New York Hotel and Towers, at 52nd Street and Seventh Avenue in the Exhibition Hall.

Former City Council President Paul O'Dwyer will introduce Gerry Adams. ANIA co-founder Bruce Morrison, will chair the meeting, which is expected to draw many leaders of the Irish-American community.

ANIA is an outgrowth of Irish-Americans For Clinton-Gore. It was formed in 1993 to press the Clinton Administration to honor its 1992 campaign pledges for a constructive new approach to US foreign policy on Ireland. The Clinton Administration's decision to grant Adams a visa is being warmly welcomed in the Irish-American community.

Mr Adams is visiting New York for a two-day period to attend a foreign policy conference and to discuss his party's perspective on the Irish peace process. Because of intense media interest, attendance is expected to be high.

***** -COMM. JOURNAL- ***** DATE JAN-31-1994 ***** TIME 17:16 ***** P.1

MODE = TRANSMISSION

START=JAN-31 17:15

END=JAN-31 17:16

NO.	COM	SPEED/NTWK	STATION NAME/ TELEPHONE NO.	PAGES	PRG.NO.	PROGRAM NAME
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-NSC EXEC SEC

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***** (FAX-310 V2.12)* - 202 456 2560- *****

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER

FAX TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET

DATE: 1-28-94	
TO: Nancy Soderberg	FROM: Alan Kreczko
PHONE NO.: 62224	PHONE NO.: 66538
FAX NO.: 82560	FAX NO.: 395-1039
COMMENTS:	
NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover page): 2	

8 § 1182

ALIENS AND NATIONALITY

ALIENS AND NATIONALITY

(2) lists the specific provision or provisions of law under which the alien is excludable or ineligible for entry or adjustment of status.

(c) Nonapplicability of subsection (a)

Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent resident who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3) and (3)(C)). Nothing contained in this subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to exercise the discretion vested in him under section 1181(b) of this title. The first sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.

(d) Temporary admission of nonimmigrants

(1), (2) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-649, Title VI, § 601(a)(2)(A), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5076.

(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible for such visa under subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3)(A)(i), (3)(A)(ii), (3)(A)(iii), (3)(C), and (3)(E) of such subsection), may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General, or (B) who is inadmissible under subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3)(A)(i), (3)(A)(ii), (3)(A)(iii), (3)(C), and (3)(E) of such subsection), but who is in possession of appropriate documents or is granted a waiver thereof and is seeking admission, may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall prescribe conditions, including exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the admission and return of excludable alien.

by regulations provide a method and procedure for the admission of the alien described in paragraph, who is excluded from admission by deported in the manner provided by law.

(8) Upon a basis of reciprocity, secret immediate families, attendants, servants, immediate and continuous transit through provisions of this section except paragraph subsection (a) of this section.

(9), (10) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-649, Title VI, § 601(a)(2)(A), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5076.

(11) The Attorney General may, in his discretion, admit an alien, or when it is otherwise of clause (3) of subsection (a)(5)(B) of this section, an alien who is admitted for permanent residence who is not under an order of deportation, and States as a returning resident under section 1158(a) of this title (or has encouraged, induced, assisted, sheltered, or daughter (and no other individual) law.

(a) Educational visitor status: foreign visitor

No person admitted under section 11 status after admission (3) whose purpose for the United States was financed in whole or in part by the Government of the United States of his nationality or his last residence, in

Nancy,

See underlined

phrase.

~~SECRET~~

Gerry Adams Approach

Objective: To encourage Sinn Fein and the IRA unequivocally to renounce violence, endorse the Joint Declaration and negotiate seriously for an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The President has repeatedly stated that the United States stands ready to contribute to peace in any appropriate way. He has also stated he will keep the issue of the Gerry Adams visa under review as the situation warrants, especially in light of events flowing from the December 15 Joint Declaration by Prime Minister Reynolds and Prime Minister Major. The goal is to use US influence over the parties to try to advance the cause of peace.

Proposal

On January 14, 1994, Gerry Adams applied for a visa to visit the United States January 31 to February 5 to attend a conference on Northern Ireland hosted in New York by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The application presents the US an opportunity to try to move Adams forward toward the goal stated above.

Over this weekend, the Administration would invite Adams into the US Consulate in Belfast or the Embassy in Dublin (Adams applied at the latter so the Embassy is the most logical choice) to discuss his application and press him on how far he is willing to go in renouncing violence and endorsing the Joint Declaration.

The IRA is currently engaged in an internal debate over whether to take such a step and a decision is not expected until mid-February. However, it may be possible to encourage Adams to move publicly in the right direction.

**If Adams is willing to state publicly that his goal is to end the IRA's role in violence, to move the IRA into the political process and to negotiate an end to the conflict the US would enable him to attend the conference in New York -- but only the conference. We would make it clear that he is not free to travel outside New York, fundraise or do public forums outside the context of the conference. Realistically, he will no doubt talk to the press but we would not permit him to remain in the country to attend the lunches and dinners he currently hopes to attend.

**We would also urge the British to respond to the IRA request for clarification of the Joint Declaration. The current stalemate risks providing the IRA an excuse to walk away from this opportunity. Since issuing the Joint Declaration, the British have maintained the position that the document stands on its own and any requests for clarification are simply veiled stalling techniques. Statements such as having "thrown down the gauntlet to the IRA" only make it more difficult for the IRA to respond. A willingness to discuss certain points in the Declaration would make it more difficult for the IRA to reject the Joint Declaration.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.36)
KBM 4/11/2023

~~SECRET~~

Gerry Adams Visa Draft Options
January 18, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.37)
KRM 7/11/2023

Issue for decision

Gerry Adams has requested a visa to attend a conference in New York on February 1st. His request comes in the midst of internal Sinn Fein/IRA deliberations on whether to endorse the December 15 Joint Declaration. It also follows a public statement by the President that he would "review" the issue of the Adams visa in light of recent developments. The issue is how we can use the "carrots" at our disposal to press Adams to renounce violence, endorse the Joint Declaration and enter seriously into peace negotiations.

Proposal

1. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his visa application in the context of his commitment to peace and the joint declaration. [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until it renounces the use of violence.]

While this step would not be a formal suspension of the current US ban on talking to Sinn Fein, it would be a step to reach out to Adams. We would need to flush out the terms of the discussion and its duration. The goal would be to get Adams to renounce violence (and/or accept the Joint Declaration) in which case we would issue him the visa. We would deny Adams the visa if he failed to renounce violence by the February 1 conference.

If Adams had not renounced violence by the time of the February 1 conference but had not yet rejected the Joint Declaration and those involved felt the talks were productive, the discussions would continue at least until the time Sinn Fein took a public position on the Joint Declaration, expected in mid-February. [NOTE: It is highly unlikely that Adams will be in a position to renounce violence before mid-February.]

This step is substantively a larger step than the symbolic issue of providing Adams a US visa. But it would allow us to make our own judgments on how serious Adams is about peace and enable us to reach out to him to encourage him to make peace. It would enable us to do so while not giving in to his politically charged request for a visa. American involvement would help provide the nationalist community a sense of security about the peace process and could contribute to moving the peace process forward. The step also follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts. (The Irish, however, still maintain its own ban on talking directly to Sinn Fein).

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, talks with Sinn Fein could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, might upset the British and perhaps some in Congress.

If Adams fails to renounce violence and the visa is rejected, it could further alienate the nationalist community. President might be criticized for missing an opportunity to press for peace and some in Congress would criticize him.

2. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration. The IRA has been pressing for a clarification by the British of the Joint Declaration. The British believe the IRA request is a delaying tactic, although the Irish have made a public attempt to clarify the document. If the British were to agree to clarify the document, it could help determine whether the IRA's action is a bluff or a serious attempt at clarification. Pushing for a clarification would help focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

3. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash against any reaching out to the nationalists. Possible steps include offering to open a dialogue with Ian Paisley (who has rejected the Joint Declaration) or with UUP leader James Molyneaux who has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

Consultations and Sequencing

Wednesday, January 19 Lake and Christopher discuss and agree on a course of action over lunch. President is briefed and accepts proposal.

Thursday and Friday, January 20-21 State consults with British, Irish, SDLP leader John Hume and Congress over proposal.

Saturday, January 22 Consulate in Belfast or Embassy in Dublin calls in Gerry Adams to brief him on proposal.

Monday, January 24 State or White House releases press release with outlines of proposal.

Adams would then have over a week to respond to our proposal and take the necessary steps to obtain a visa.

~~SECRET~~

BACKGROUND PAPER
GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.38)
KBH 4/11/2023

Decision

Gerry Adams requested a visa on Friday, January 14 to attend a peace conference hosted on February 1st in New York by a prominent Irish-American, William Flynn. He also indicated he hopes to do press interviews, attend a luncheon hosted by Bruce Morrison, dine with his book publishers and attend an AFL/CIO dinner honoring Tom Donahue. The FBI also has information that he intends to hold a \$150 a person fundraising dinner, although his people apparently claim he does not intend to do any fundraising in the country. The FBI also indicated to me that Adams could also easily be handed checks up to \$9,000 which would not have to be reported.

The decision we face is whether and how to use US influence to help induce Sinn Fein/IRA into accepting the Joint Declaration while at the same time maintaining our tough stance against terrorism. Since the Joint Declaration was reached December 15, Sinn Fein and the IRA have been debating the proposal but have not outright rejected it. A decision is likely within the next month. John Hume has continued his private talks with Adams and believes Adams is prepared to make peace if he has the political strength to bring the IRA along. He is pushing the US to provide Adams a visa as a way to enhance Adams' credibility.

The IRA has asked the British to clarify portions of the Joint Declaration. So far, the British have refused, claiming that the document stands for itself and the ball is in the IRA's court. The British believe that the IRA's request for clarifications is simply a means of stalling. In an attempt to reach out to the IRA's concerns, the Irish Prime Minister gave a speech clarifying the Joint Declaration but the IRA wants to hear clarification directly from the British. Earlier this week, the Irish lifted its 20 year ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts in Ireland. It maintains, however, its formal ban on talking to the IRA, although private, indirect discussions are most likely occurring. Last month, the British confirmed the leaks that it had talked to the IRA.

Since the Joint Declaration, the IRA has continued unabated its campaign of violence with almost daily attacks on British security forces. I was briefed by the FBI on Friday and it believes Adams remains in the command structure of the IRA's military campaign (one of the 7 man provisional army council that directs the more spectacular acts of violence and general IRA strategy). They do not have any direct knowledge of Adams' role in any specific act of recent violence but believe that given his position on the council he is involved in directing the actions. I've asked the FBI to check on any recent activity -- you might want to mention to Freeh in your meeting next week and/or ask the British for any information. It is very sensitive and the FBI may not be able to get information at the lower levels.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Others' positions

British -- as you know, the British oppose our giving Adams a visa until he has provided an "unequivocal and irrevocable" commitment to end violence. They believe that we should, however, hold out to him the prospect of the visa if he is willing to meet this condition. They believe that to give a visa to Adams before he has done so would "gravely undermine the joint declaration. The US would be seen to have diverged from the UK."

Irish -- it is unclear what the Irish will confirm publicly or in larger private circles but we have from several sources (John Hume, Ambassador Smith, Senator Kennedy and Ambassador Gallagher after he spoke directly to the Irish Prime Minister about the issue) that the Irish support us giving Adams a visa to attend the conference only. They would not want to see Adams doing high profile press or fundraising but believe that allowing him to attend the peace conference could encourage Adams to move toward peace and that prospect outweighs the negative.

John Hume -- Of all the players, Hume probably knows Adams the best, having engaged in lengthy discussions with him. In fact, the Joint Declaration in a way flowed from his talks with Adams over the last year. As far as I know, Hume is the only one who talks directly to Adams. Hume believes Adams is serious about wanting to move forward but is battling the splits among the IRA. He urges us not to miss this opportunity of using US influence to bring Adams into our fold. Some have made the point that Hume also has his own agenda and the most to gain by moving Adams along -- although as the one closest to the violence, he also has the most to gain from peace.

State -- we don't have anything formal from State, although my informal discussions indicate State will most likely come out in support of the British position.

Congress -- We received a letter today to the President from Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Moynihan and Dodd and Congressmen Manton, Fish and Coyne urging him to grant the visa to Adams. "The United States cannot afford to ignore this possibility and miss this rare opportunity for our country to contribute to peace in Northern Ireland." Senator Kennedy also called Sandy Berger and said that while this was a tough call, we should grant him the visa. He mentioned the strength of Reynolds' push for giving him the visa and the fact that the Irish intelligence believes Adams is talking peace. Senator Lautenberg's office also called me to add his name to the Kennedy letter.

Speaker Foley also called Sandy today to urge us not to give Adams the visa until he has taken steps toward peace. He felt very strongly that it would send the wrong signals.

OPTIONS

I believe most would agree that we ought to reach out to Adams and Sinn Fein/Adams in some fashion. Below are the options I can think of:

1. Publicly state that we will give Adams a visa once he unequivocally rejects violence (and perhaps joined peace process/accepted Joint Declaration)

Pros: Maintains our stance against terrorism, supports the British position, might encourage him in the right direction because it holds out the chance of coming to the US if he makes the right move. Would avoid alienating the Unionist community. Saves major carrot of visa.

Cons: Since the President has indicated he would review the visa in light of current events, a rejection that echoes the position of the British might increase the strength of the hard liners within the IRA. In addition, it might worsen Adams perceived need for something more than the Joint Declaration before he can make peace. A denial will anger the President's supporters from the campaign to whom he promised to give Adams a visa and disappoint those in Congress pushing for a visa. It might be difficult to define the term "unequivocally" or to know exactly when Adams had permanently given up on violence.

2. Provide a visa to Adams to attend the conference only, a one day visa that would limit his activities and exposure

Pros: Could help build up Adams within the IRA enough to enable him to renounce violence and negotiate seriously, would please campaign supporters and some in Congress.

Cons: Might provide Adams a forum to fundraise for the IRA and a platform to advance his cause without agreeing to renounce violence and join the peace process. Weakens stance against terrorism, might anger some in Congress and might provoke a Unionist backlash. Gives up major carrot of the U.S. for uncertain returns.

2a. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash. UUP leader James Molyneaux has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility (proposed by State) is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

3. Agree to initiate US-Sinn Fein talks within the framework of the Joint Declaration only [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until they renounce the use of violence.]

Pros: Would reach out to the IRA while not giving into the symbolic and charged issue of the visa, would enable the US to determine for itself how serious Adams and the IRA are about making peace, could help bring the IRA to the peace table. Follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts.

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, would upset the British and perhaps some in Congress. Inconsistent with Irish ban on direct Sinn Fein contacts.

3a. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his commitment to peace and the joint declaration, thus avoiding a formal suspension of talking to Sinn Fein

4. Offer to host peace talks if the IRA (and Unionists) accepts the Joint Declaration and renounces violence

Pros: By holding out the carrot of US sponsorship of a peace process, could enhance the confidence of the IRA and others in the process enough to bring them into the process.

Cons: Could commit the US to a lengthy negotiating process with uncertain ends, would annoy the British who resist any US role in the Northern Ireland issue, might not be enough to bring the IRA along.

4a. Offer to host the talks now, as a way to bring all parties on board

Cons: Prospects of success very difficult to predict.

5. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration and/or engage in direct talks with Sinn Fein

Pros: Would call the IRA's bluff on whether it really need clarification and thus whether it is serious about peace, would focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British who might reject our request, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

6. Send a U.S. special envoy to press for peace

Pros: Could help increase confidence of all parties involved, could advance peace, would please campaign supporters who called for envoy and would fulfill campaign pledge.

Cons: Will be opposed by the British and employ political resources of the US in a difficult problem with no clear end or definably prospects for peace.

7. Attempt to do more to address the root causes of violence by increasing aid ie., propose a US business/investment initiative working with OPIC and Commerce [State's idea]

Pros: Would enable the US to do something tangible in support of peace, especially if above steps were not taken.

Cons: We already have a robust \$20 million a year program of supporting the International Fund whose purpose is the same. Would raise real questions of absorption capacity.

8. Prayer Initiative (suggested by State and Ambassador Flynn) would involve working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, ie., through a prayer breakfast in Washington

Pros: Would encourage dialogue among the factions, could perhaps be used as cover for private US government talks with parties. Would demonstrate US interest in the conflict.

Cons: Might be a failure, might be difficult to control.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Jan-1994 06:06 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Nancy Soderberg
M. Brooke Darby

(SODERBERG)
(DARBY)

FROM: James W. Reed
(REED)

SUBJECT: URGENT: Answers from Tony Lake

Nancy/Brooke:

Greetings from sunny Moscow . . . (just joking -- it's cold as all get out, snowing and overcast outside) . . .

Tony read your E-mail notes from last night and asked that I provide the following responses to you:

- o Madeleine Albright's Aircraft Request: Tony said she should fly commercial; he won't support a military aircraft for her this time. *Talked to Jim - his impression is that TL wants you to make the call to Madeleine.*
- o Gerry Adams' Visa:

- Tony has no objection to providing appropriate people at State a copy of his message from Rod Lynne.
- He'd like to see the options paper "sooner rather than later." (Your note said you would have the paper ready for him on his return.) I interpret that to mean that he'd like to see the paper on the trip.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

↳ Jim says he just talked to Jane in Stockholm + passed this info - she's going out to do some media interviews but she indicated to Jim that she would call you when she returned

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *M* NARA, Date *12/23/15*
101-0355-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1994 18:46 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

(DARBY)

FROM:

Alan J. Kreczko
(KRECZKO)

SUBJECT:

RE: note from nancy re: Gerry Adams

Justice will definitely need to be involved in the decision, since ultimately it is the AG's waiver authority. I can check in with them if Nancy wants, but need to know to what end -- am I asking what position they will take? how strongly?

CC: Joan S. Hunerwadel

(HUNERWADEL)

To Alan - we
don't know yet. I'm
gathering options for Tony's consideration
next week. Eji, you might
join us at 100 on Friday
for briefing on Adams &
terrorism.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MA NARA, Date 12/23/15
2016 0355-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Michael Waguespack to Darby re: Today's Meeting re Gerry Adams [partial] (1 page)	01/14/1994	P3/b(3), P6/b(6), b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-January 1994 [1]

2011-0355-F
rs1647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Jan-1994 08:26 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

(DARBY)

FROM:

Michael J. Waguespack
(WAGUESPACK)

SUBJECT:

TODAY'S MEETING RE GERRY ADAMS

FYI: THE FBI PARTICIPANTS AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING WITH
NANCY WILL INCLUDE: BOB BRYANT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR --

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

REPRESENTING THE CIA/CTC WILL BE

(b)(3)

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By M NARA, Date 12/23/18

2011-0355-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Feb-1994 19:02 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George M. Andricos
(ANDRICOS)

SUBJECT: Mike O'Neil

Please pass to Nancy.

Subject: Mike O'Neil/Adams Cables

State is still considering the issue of whether to provide the Adams cables, or access thereto, to Mike O'Neil. State lawyers have raised an additional concern that the cable(s) includes, in part, material from the Visa interview which they apparently don't release. As soon as State decides what they want to recommend, I'll let you know. In the meantime, they have told O'Neil that they're still working this and will get back to him as soon as possible.

Mike

Distribution:

FOR: Nancy Soderberg
FOR: Wendy E. Gray
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard
FOR: Cathy Millison
FOR: M. Brooke Darby
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante
FOR: Allison M. Wright
CC: Jane E. Holl
CC: Jeremy D. Rosner
CC: William C. Danvers
CC: Eric Liu
CC: Christina L. Funches

(SODERBERG)
(GRAY)
(HILLIARD)
(MILLISON)
(DARBY)
(LAPLANTE)
(WRIGHT)
(HOLL)
(ROSNER)
(DANVERS)
(LIU)
(FUNCHES)

*Mike -
shall I call
Mike + let him
know generally
what's
Conversation?*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Feb-1994 02:10 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wendy E. Gray
(GRAY)

SUBJECT: RE: Gerry Adams Cable

Hi Mike!

The following is from Nancy in response to your Gerry Adams Cable e-mail of Tuesday evening.

Mike:

I recommend I talk to Mike and show him the cables and he can take notes. I know him pretty well -- let me know.

Nancy

Distribution:

FOR: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
CC: Jane E. Holl	(HOLL)
CC: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
CC: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
CC: Christina L. Funches	(FUNCHES)
CC: William C. Danvers	(DANVERS)
CC: Jeremy D. Rosner	(ROSNER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By NA NARA, Date 12/23/15

2011-0355-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-Feb-1994 21:53 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George M. Andricos
(ANDRICOS)

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams Cable

Brooke, would you please pass this to Nancy.

On behalf of Speaker Foley, Mike O'Neil has asked State for a copy of the cable reporting Gerry Adam's reaction to conditions we set for granting a waiver for a visa. State has asked for our views on whether this cable should be provided to Foley, but points out that Congress has been provided access to countless reporting cables. Usual procedure is to provide the cable and ask for its return. Often cables made available to Congress are redacted so as not to include deliberative material, privacy related information, third country references, intelligence sources or methods, names of drafters, etc. as appropriate. If classified, cables are also made available only under appropriate security conditions. In this case, State would propose sending it to the House Intelligence Committee where O'Neil would have access and presumably decide whether the Speaker would want to read it personally. Given past precedent of giving Congress access to cables, State H thinks it would be difficult to turn Foley down, especially since we have sent dozens to Jesse Helms over the years. Tarnoff has asked State H for a memo on this and wants to know what the White House position is before making a decision on whether to make it available to Foley.

All this assumes you have the cable. If not, please let me know and I'll get you a copy (I have not seen it).

If you let me know how this should be handled, I'll advise State.

Distribution:

FOR: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
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CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
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CC: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By M NARA, Date 11/23/15

201-0355-F

CC: Allison M. Wright
CC: Jane E. Holl

(WRIGHT)
(HOLL)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.40)
KBH 7/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1994 16:19 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

(DARBY)

FROM:

Julien D. LeBourgeois
(LEBOURGEOIS)

SUBJECT:

Note for Nancy

Nancy -- Update from our earlier conversation on N. Ireland.

1. Jane and I finally made contact. She has been swamped and unable to get time on the computer to make the changes to her memo you two discussed. She will try to send you tomorrow the original memo with marginal notes on changes to incorporate.

2. FBI will deal with Paisley as well at the 11:00 AM meeting 1/14, according to Gina Genton.

3. John Tefft, per his conversation with you, will seek more specifics on the invalidation of Paisley's 1980 visa. John is also getting guidance from Tarnoff for producing the options paper you requested.

4. You should have received by now copies of the two recent State cables on how to handle Adams when he applies (State 9969) and on how to respond to any press inquiries (State 11255).

Do you want any of this summarized for Sandy, or is he up to speed?

Julien

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

To Julien - you'll get a copy of a
memo to TZ+SB bringin them up
to speed. No need to inform them further at
this point

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.41)

KBH 4/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1994 17:58 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: IRA

The British embassy counter-intelligence types with whom we have liason on IRA terrorism issues informs us that there is an FBI briefing "at the NSC" tomorrow on IRA Terrorism.

Does anybody know anything about that?

Always nice to be told things about the NSC's doings by foreign embassies.

Distribution:

FOR: George J. Tenet
FOR: Jenonne R. Walker
FOR: M. Brooke Darby
FOR: Mary C. Emery
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FOR: Kristen K. Cicio
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(REED)
(ITOH)
(KENNEY)
(DARBY)
(MILLISON)
(RECORDS)
(CANAS)
(BEERS)
(DARRAGH)

To Richard.
I've asked fbi to
brief me on gerry Adams
re: his expected request
for a visa on
Friday.

✓ It never occurred
to me you
wanted to be
involved with
the gerry Adams
visa issue - If
you want to attend
you are welcome.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*WES
Can't we do
more to build on
our current position
without being as the
hard line as the
Brits?*
R
15-Jan-1994 19:45 EDT 1/16/94

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: M. Brooke Darby
FROM: M. Brooke Darby
(DARBY)
SUBJECT: gerry adams visa

(DARBY)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.42)
KRM 4/11/2023

December 15, 1993 ?

MEMO TO: Anthony Lake
FROM: Nancy Soderberg
RE: Gerry Adams Visa

I had hoped to have by today a paper from State outlining the options for a Gerry Adams visa. I have yet to receive it but given your request for materials before your returned, I have put together the options paper below. It is a rough draft that we will need to flush out and work through with State before forwarding.

Decision

Jan?
Gerry Adams requested a visa on Friday, December 14 to attend a peace conference hosted on February 1st in New York by a prominent Irish-American, William Flynn. He also indicated he hopes to do press interviews, attend a luncheon hosted by Bruce Morrison, dine with his book publishers and attend an AFL/CIO dinner honoring Tom Donahue. The FBI also has information that he intends to hold a \$150 a person fundraising dinner, although his people apparently claim he does not intend to do any fundraising in the country. The FBI also indicated to me that Adams could also easily be handed checks up to \$9,000 which would not have to be reported.

The decision we face is whether and how to use US influence to help induce Sinn Fein/IRA into accepting the Joint Declaration

~~SECRET~~

while at the same time maintaining our tough stance against terrorism. Since the Joint Declaration was reached December 15, Sinn Fein and the IRA have been debating the proposal but have not outright rejected it. A decision is likely within the next month. John Hume has continued his private talks with Adams and believes Adams is prepared to make peace if he has the political strength to bring the IRA along. He is pushing the US to provide Adams a visa as a way to enhance Adams' credibility.

The IRA has asked the British to clarify portions of the Joint Declaration. So far, the British have refused, claiming that the document stands for itself and the ball is in the IRA's court. The British believe that the IRA's request for clarifications is simply a means of stalling. In an attempt to reach out to the IRA's concerns, the Irish Prime Minister gave a speech clarifying the Joint Declaration but the IRA wants to hear clarification directly from the British. Earlier this week, the Irish lifted its 20 year ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts in Ireland. It maintains, however, its formal ban on talking to the IRA, although private, indirect discussions are most likely occurring. Last month, the British confirmed the leaks that it had talked to the IRA.

Since the Joint Declaration, the IRA has continued unabated its campaign of violence with almost daily attacks on British security forces. I was briefed by the FBI on Friday and it believes Adams remains in the command structure of the IRA's military campaign (one of the 7 man provisional army council that directs the more spectacular acts of violence and general IRA strategy). They do not have any direct knowledge of Adams' role in any specific act of recent violence but believe that given his position on the council he is involved in directing the actions. I've asked the FBI to check on any recent activity -- you might want to mention to Freeh in your meeting next week and/or ask the British for any information. It is very sensitive and the FBI may not be able to get information at the lower levels.

Others' positions

British -- as you know, the British oppose our giving Adams a visa until he has provided an "unequivocal and irrevocable" commitment to end violence. They believe that we should, however, hold out to him the prospect of the visa if he is willing to meet this condition. They believe that to give a visa to Adams before he has done so would "gravely undermine the joint declaration. The US would be seen to have diverged from the UK."

Irish -- it is unclear what the Irish will confirm publicly or in larger private circles but we have from several sources (John Hume, Ambassador Smith, Senator Kennedy and Ambassador Gallagher after he spoke directly to the Irish Prime Minister about the issue) that the Irish support us giving Adams a visa to attend the conference only. They would not want to see Adams doing high profile press or fundraising but believe that allowing

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him to attend the peace conference could encourage Adams to move toward peace and that prospect outweighs the negative.

John Hume -- Of all the players, Hume probably knows Adams the best, having engaged in lengthy discussions with him. In fact, the Joint Declaration in a way flowed from his talks with Adams over the last year. As far as I know, Hume is the only one who talks directly to Adams. Hume believes Adams is serious about wanting to move forward but is battling the splits among the IRA. He urges us not to miss this opportunity of using US influence to bring Adams into our fold. Some have made the point that Hume also has his own agenda and the most to gain by moving Adams along -- although as the one closest to the violence, he also has the most to gain from peace.

State -- we don't have anything formal from State, although my informal discussions indicate State will most likely come out in support of the British position.

Congress -- We received a letter today to the President from Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Moynihan and Dodd urging him to grant the visa to Adams. "The United States cannot afford to ignore this possibility and miss this rare opportunity for our country to contribute to peace in Northern Ireland." Senator Kennedy also called Sandy Berger and said that while this was a tough call, we should grant him the visa. He mentioned the strength of Reynolds' push for giving him the visa and the fact that the Irish intelligence believes Adams is talking peace. Senator Lautenberg's office also called me to add his name to the Kennedy letter.

Speaker Foley also called Sandy today to urge us not to give Adams the visa until he has taken steps toward peace. He felt very strongly that it would send the wrong signals.

OPTIONS

I believe most would agree that we ought to reach out to Adams and Sinn Fein/Adams in some fashion. Below are the options I can think of:

1. Publicly state that we will give Adams a visa once he unequivocally rejects violence (and perhaps joined peace process/accepted Joint Declaration)

Pros: Maintains our stance against terrorism, supports the British position, might encourage him in the right direction because it holds out the chance of coming to the US if he makes the right move. Would avoid alienating the Unionist community. Saves major carrot of visa.

Cons: Since the President has indicated he would review the visa in light of current events, a rejection that echoes the position of the British might increase the strength of the hard

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liners within the IRA. In addition, it might worsen Adams perceived need for something more than the Joint Declaration before he can make peace. A denial will anger the President's supporters from the campaign to whom he promised to give Adams a visa and disappoint those in Congress pushing for a visa. It might be difficult to define the term "unequivocally" or to know exactly when Adams had permanently given up on violence.

2. Provide a visa to Adams to attend the conference only, a one day visa that would limit his activities and exposure

Pros: Could help build up Adams within the IRA enough to enable him to renounce violence and negotiate seriously, would please campaign supporters and some in Congress.

Cons: Might provide Adams a forum to fundraise for the IRA and a platform to advance his cause without agreeing to renounce violence and join the peace process. Weakens stance against terrorism, might anger some in Congress and might provoke a Unionist backlash. Gives up major carrot of the U.S. for uncertain returns.

2a. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash. UUP leader James Molyneaux has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility (proposed by State) is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

Double jeopardy?

3. Agree to initiate US-Sinn Fein talks within the framework of the Joint Declaration only [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until they renounce the use of violence.]

Pros: Would reach out to the IRA while not giving into the symbolic and charged issue of the visa, would enable the US to determine for itself how serious Adams and the IRA are about making peace, could help bring the IRA to the peace table. Follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts.

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, would upset the British and perhaps some in Congress. Inconsistent with Irish ban on direct Sinn Fein contacts.

3a. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his commitment to peace and the joint declaration, thus avoiding a formal suspension of talking to Sinn Fein

4. Offer to host peace talks if the IRA (and Unionists) accepts the Joint Declaration and renounces violence

~~SECRET~~

Pros: By holding out the carrot of US sponsorship of a peace process, could enhance the confidence of the IRA and others in the process enough to bring them into the process.

Cons: Could commit the US to a lengthy negotiating process with uncertain ends, would annoy the British who resist any US role in the Northern Ireland issue, might not be enough to bring the IRA along.

4a. Offer to host the talks now, as a way to bring all parties on board

Cons: Prospects of success very difficult to predict.

5. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration and/or engage in direct talks with Sinn Fein

Pros: Would call the IRA's bluff on whether it really need clarification and thus whether it is serious about peace, would focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British who might reject our request, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

6. Send a U.S. special envoy to press for peace

Pros: Could help increase confidence of all parties involved, could advance peace, would please campaign supporters who called for envoy and would fulfill campaign pledge.

Cons: Will be opposed by the British and employ political resources of the US in a difficult problem with no clear end or definably prospects for peace.

7. Attempt to do more to address the root causes of violence by increasing aid ie., propose a US business/investment initiative working with OPIC and Commerce [State's idea]

Pros: Would enable the US to do something tangible in support of peace, especially if above steps were not taken.

Cons: We already have a robust \$20 million a year program of supporting the International Fund whose purpose is the same. Would raise real questions of absorption capacity.

8. Prayer Initiative (suggested by State and Ambassador Flynn) would involve working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, ie., through a prayer breakfast in Washington

~~SECRET~~

Pros: Would encourage dialogue among the factions, could perhaps be used as cover for private US government talks with parties. Would demonstrate US interest in the conflict.

Cons: Might be a failure, might be difficult to control.

cc: Sandy Berger, Jenonne Walker and Jane Holl

E

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Jan-1994 14:57 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

(DARBY)

FROM:

Alan J. Kreczko
(KRECZKO)

SUBJECT:

visa law

Nancy asked what legal standard applied to waiver of visa ineligibility for terrorists. She also asked whether the waiver is permanent or for a single entry.

1. The law does not establish a standard for waiver. It simply provides that the AG may waive ineligibility.

--as a matter of practice, State says waivers generally take into account whether the person's ineligibility results from personal involvement in terrorist actions (as opposed to association with a terrorist organization); whether the person has renounced terrorism; and the purpose of the trip (i.e. are they coming to attend peace negotiations sponsored by us.) On the basis of these criteria, the individual mentioned by Nancy is way off the charts in terms of State practice, but there would not be a legal bar to waiver.

2. The waiver can be for a single entry, limited duration, or multiple entry over a longer period of time.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

CC: Neal S. Wolin

(WOLIN)

FBI Brief 1/14/94

Geary Adams

1969 IRA - McGuinnis Adams etc. unhappy w/ pace of efforts. Orange parade turned violent. British sent in troops, Catholics welcomed at Re trie etc they needed protection. Couldn't agree - will meet in 6 months, provisionally - thus the name.

Adams throwing bombs etc. - sole source
'74 - internment policy - rounded up + put in MAZE. Tried to escape twice. 3 yrs in prison.

'77 release. Set up Northern Command group in N. Ireland respon. for carrying out Southern in S. + 7 man Council, Tom. Keill, Adam, McGuinnis. + General Army Convention / Council. 86 last convention in Dublin. Come meets at least

quarterly, supposedly monthly.
2 bombings recently, 8 mas blowing up subway, Warrington, Shankill (Tom Begley killed) since 12/15 seen numerous bombings shoots, RUC ambushed last week.

2nd command in S, technical training, procuring. My fundraising ^{for bullet proof} vest Conda, Arizona, obtaining thru 'drug deals', W. Coast radar jamming. 82 - \$42-1 million to IRA, now \$100,000 \$150 ahead - Adams plans dummies

Provis
Army Council Mainland + more spectacular,
all spectacular,

A. Command

Battalions (individual bombing/shooting)

Brigades

no info that G Adams spec approval London
bombing. But say Ray Co.

Libyans - by amounts of weaponry, plastics, weaponry.
250 tons of materials in South.

Arizona - McKinley Case. Late 89/90 - In Miami
Someone said wanted to buy Stingers. arrested in
Sting. bought 2900 bomb detectors.

PIRA uses radar gun to set off bombs.

Green Cross in Dublin - goes to Tom Cahill.

\$ goes to Kahill. $\frac{1}{2}$ - $\frac{1}{3}$ to war activities, bombs, operations.

Friends of Irish Freedom.

\$10 million smuggling, cigarette lighters, cattle harmer, extortion, organized annual crime activities, budget

Embargo shut off route to Libya → IRA.

Paisley - Dem. Unionist Party, extremist but not involved in violence.

never publicly associated w/ violence in same way Adams. Renounced violence.

What impact?

Have not yet responded to Joint Deal

If let in, undermine UK + Ireland, & support for IRA

might hurt our terrorist activities by shutting off sources if let Adams in since 1968

& substantial increase in fundraising.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(1.44)
KBH 7/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Jan-1994 17:58 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby
Betty A. Marshall

(DARBY)
(MARSHALL)

FROM: Julien D. LeBourgeois
(LEBOURGEOIS)

SUBJECT: More on Gerry Adams

For Brooke: Update on our earlier conversations today.
Please pass to Nancy.

For Betty: Please pass to Jane.

State Departement (Mike Parmly of EUR/NE) told me today that Christopher and Hurd had met, with the latter stating it would not be useful for Gerry Adams to get a visa to the U.S. State feels the same way, at least until he has renounced terrorism and made a commitment to peace. Up for discussion is how best to convey this message.

Embassy Dublin's indication that Adams might soon come to the Embassy to apply for a visa with the press in tow has yielded to the impression that he is -- more circumspectly -- taking soundings of what the U.S. reaction would be if/if he applies.

CC: Records
CC: Records

(RECORDS)
(RECORDS)

cc All officers

To: Head of Mission

From: DARACH HOLMES AI Division

Issued by the Government Information Services,
Government Buildings, Dublin, 2.
Tel. (01) 607555. Telex 93938. FAX 603281.

O Sheirbhíol Eolais an Rialtais.
Tithe An Rialtais, Baile Átha Cliath, 2.
Tel. (01) 607555. Telex 93938. FAX 603281.

Government Statement

cc PST
PSS
Counsellor,
Amb, London
Amb, W. for

The Government at its meeting today decided to allow the current Order under Section 31(1) of the Broadcasting Authority Act 1960, as amended by Section 16 of the Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act 1976, the terms of which apply both to RTE and independent radio operators to lapse on the expiry of the current order on 19 January, 1994.

In these circumstances, Radio Telefís Éireann will have to observe Section 18(1A) of the 1960 Act, inserted by Section 3 of the 1976 Act, which prohibits the Authority from including in any of its broadcast anything which may reasonably be regarded as being likely to promote, incite to crime, or as tending to undermine the authority of the State. Independent radio operators would be required to observe a similar provisions by virtue of Section 9 of the Radio and Television Act, 1988.

The RTE Authority will operate guidelines, which have already been communicated to the Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht, Mr. Michael D. Higgins, T.D. The IRTC are preparing similar guidelines.

The operation of these guidelines will be kept under close review.

11 January 1994