

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-Fundraising, 1995

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1397

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	1	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. ND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: USG Support for the Northern Ireland Peace Process (4 pages)	02/15/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002. cable	re: USG Support for the Northern Ireland Peace Process (4 pages)	02/15/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
003. cable	re: [Adams Fundraising] (1 page)	02/16/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
004. email	Kathleen Stephens to Wendy Gray et al. re: A Note from Nancy Soderberg (1 page)	02/08/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
005. email	Stephens to Ardenia Hawkins re: Northern Ireland Update (1 page)	02/07/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
006. cable	re: Follow Up with Mitchel McLaughlin on Fundraising... (2 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
007. cable	re: Northern Ireland Arms "Precondition" (2 pages)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
008. cable	re: Northern Ireland: Ambassador's Meeting with PM's Aide (4 pages)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
009. email	Stephens to Darby and Hawkins re: Northern Ireland Issues (1 page)	01/12/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
010a. cable	re: Northern Ireland: NIO Official on Exploratory Dialogue (4 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
010b. cable	re: NIO Official on Sinn Fein Strategy (4 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
010c. cable	re: Adams' Visit to Washington... (2 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-Fundraising, 1995

2011-0355-F
rs1646

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. cable	re: British Embassy Read-Out on Second HMG/Sinn Fein Meetings (2 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
012. cable	re: Adams' Visit to Washington... (3 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
013. cable	re: British Briefing on Northern Ireland (9 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)
014. cable	re: Fundraising by Gerry Adams (3 pages)	12/29/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
015. cable	re: Adams' Visit to Washington... (3 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
016. cable	re: Fundraising by Sin Fein (2 pages)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
017. email	Stephens to Darby and Hawkins re: Instructions on Gerry Adams Fundraising (1 page)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
018. cable	re: Adams on Fund Raising and Bilateral Talks with HMG (3 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
019. cable	re: Prime Minister Bruton on Sinn Fein Fund Raising (1 page)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
020. cable	re: Northern Ireland: British Readout on Third Round of Talks with Sinn Fein (6 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
021. cable	re: Assessment of Irish Terrorism in the United Kingdom During January 1995 (8 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)
022. notes	re: [Procurement] (1 page)	02/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

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023. cable	re: Under Secretary Tarnoffs Meeting with Ron Lync (3 pages)	02/17/1995	P1A(1) KBH 4/17/2023
024. memo	Attorney General Reno to Anthony Lake re: Gerry Adams Visa [2 copies] (4 pages)	02/17/1995	P1/b(1)
025. report	re: Northern Ireland" Peace Process Enters Crucial Phase (2 pages)	01/28/1995	P1A(1) KBH 4/17/2023
026. notes	re: [January 3rd Briefing] (1 page)	01/03/1995	P1/b(1)

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~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 151807Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4777

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2574

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 002495

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-038-F (1.06)
KBM 4/11/2023

EXDIS

DEPT FOR U/S TARNOFF, A/S HOLBROOKE AND A/S RYAN

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
PROCESS

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. WITH AGREEMENT ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD) LIKELY WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK, THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) THREATENING TO JOIN IAN PAISLEY'S DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) IN REJECTING THE JFD OUTRIGHT, UNREST AMONG PRO-UNION TORY BACKBENCHERS, AND BRITISH MINISTERS PROBABLY SOON TO ENTER TALKS WITH SINN FEIN, WE ARE ENTERING WHAT MAY BE THE SINGLE MOST TRYING PERIOD OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. WE CAN HELP THE PROCESS SUCCEED BY GIVING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRISH REPUBLICANS TO MAKE THE IRA CEASEFIRE IRREVOCABLE. THE MOST URGENT PRIORITY, HOWEVER, IS TO REASSURE UNIONISTS THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING SOLD OUT, WHILE WARNING THEM THAT A REFUSAL EVEN TO NEGOTIATE WOULD CARRY HEAVY COSTS.

3. BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE HMG-SINN FEIN ALKS, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH. BUT LIFTING IT AT A TIME WHEN THE PEACE PROCESS RESTS ON A KNIFE'S EDGE WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ENRAGE UNIONISTS, AND DIMINISH PROSPECTS FOR AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

PROCESS AT A CROSSROADS

4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS HAS HIT AN UNUSUALLY ROUGH PATCH, AND THE SITUATION MAY GET A GOOD DEAL MORE TURBULENT IN THE WEEKS TO COME. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS LATE NEXT WEEK. THE SELECTIVE AND INFLAMMATORY LEAK OF PORTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT HAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED MODERATE UNIONISTS, AND PROBABLY LOCKED THE UUP INTO AT LEAST PRO FORMA REJECTION OF THE DOCUMENT WHEN IT IS PUBLISHED. THAT DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN THE UNIONIST PARTIES WON'T EVENTUALLY ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT GETTING TO THAT POINT WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT. THEY (AND A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES) ARE IN A VERY SKITTISH MOOD. AND IF THE UUP WITHDRAWS ITS TACIT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, MAJOR WILL HAVE EVEN LESS NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY THAN BEFORE.

5. ON THE NATIONALIST SIDE, TALKS WITH SINN FEIN HAVE MADE INCREMENTAL PROGRESS AT BEST. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS WARMED A DEGREE OR SO, BUT ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT SINN FEIN HAS GIVEN NOTHING EXCEPT A WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO (BUT NOT ACCEPT) A BRITISH PROPOSAL, AND A VAGUE UNDERTAKING TO USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT MIGHT POSSESS IN A "POSITIVE" WAY AT A TIME OF ITS CHOOSING. AND IT HAS THREATENED TO END THE DIALOGUE UNLESS MINISTERS JOIN IT SOON. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO AUTHORIZE A JUNIOR MINISTER TO TAKE PART, ON THE NOMINAL GROUNDS THAT SINN FEIN HAS AT LEAST "ADDRESSED" THE ARMS QUESTION. BUT MOVING FROM DIALOGUE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS WILL REQUIRE MUCH MORE -- ALMOST CERTAINLY PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM IRA CONTROL.

6. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED, IT IS LIKELY TO DRAW FIRE FROM SEVERAL QUARTERS -- UNIONISTS, NATIONALISTS AND TORY EUROPHOBES. THIS IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND THE LONG HISTORY OF ANGLO-IRISH CONFLICT. ALL PARTIES WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

THE USG ROLE

7. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, THE USG CAN BEST SUPPORT THE PROCESS IN THREE WAYS:

- GIVING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OUR WHOLEHEARTED AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER TALKS AND THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY FORWARD;
- MAINTAINING MOMENTUM FOR PEACE BY OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS, WHILE WARNING THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE; AND
- AVOIDING ACTIONS THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE GENERAL PROCESS.

8. IN THE LATTER REGARD, THE NEW FACTOR IN THE EQUATION IS THE DANGER OF UNIONIST AND TORY BACKBENCH REJECTION OF THE JFD. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE NOT UPSET THE DELICATE PROCESSES NOW UNDERWAY BY MOVING TOO SOON TO LIFT THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING, A STEP WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE TENSIONS BY REINFORCING THE UNIONIST VIEW OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO DRIVE THEM ONTO A PATH THAT LEADS INEXORABLY TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND.

9. HMG'S HOPE IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL INDUCE THE IRA TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD DISARMING. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE TO BEGIN DECOMMISSIONINGSOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: JOHN HUME HAS CALLED FOR IT, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THEM UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IT AS A CONDITION FOR FUNDRAISING AUTHORIZATION. IF WE REMOVE ONE OF THESE SOURCES OF PRESSURE BEFORE THE IRA HAS TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE STEP, WE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IRA INTRANSIGENCE AND ENRAGE UNIONISTS.

10. MOST OBSERVERS HERE HAD PREDICTED SINCE THE CEASEFIRES THAT THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL AND DELICATE STAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WAS LIKELY TO COME BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND EASTER. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED LARGELY ON THE IDEA THAT RISING REPUBLICAN DISILLUSIONMENT WOULD INCLINE THE IRA TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THOSE FEARS HAVE

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

EASED SOMEWHAT. ADAMS CLAIMS, AND APPEARS, TO BE UNDER RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE FROM IRA HARDLINERS AT PRESENT. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE OVERALL PROCESS NOW COMES FROM THE FEARS -- SOME UNDERSTANDABLE, OTHERS DELIBERATELY INDUCED -- OF THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. IF MODERATE UUP LEADERS CANNOT CONVINCE THEIR PARTY TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE JFD, THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL SUFFER A SEVERE AND PROBABLY PROLONGED SETBACK, AND THE RISK OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE WILL RISE SHARPLY.

11. THE BRITISH, THE IRISH AND WE ALL NEED TO USE THE COMBINATION OF CARROTS AND STICKS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ENCOURAGE THE PARAMILITARIES AND PARTIES AFFILIATED WITH THEM TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE FOR GOOD, WHILE DISSUADING THE UNIONISTS FROM ABORTING THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMER BY MAINTAINING OUR REASONABLE AND DEFENSIBLE POSITION ON FUNDRAISING FOR A LITTLE LONGER, AND TO THE LATTER BY SENDING AN EQUALLY TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE UUP DELEGATION VISITING WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THAT THEY CAN EXPECT NO UNDERSTANDING FROM US IF THEY BLOCK PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. WHAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS IS PRECIPITATE UNILATERAL ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS AND INCREASE UNIONIST ALIENATION. CROWE

BT

#2495

NNNN

<MSGID> M1516954

~~SECRET~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ SSN: 2495 MSGID: M1516954

OAASZYUW RUEHLOA2495 0461807-SSSS--RHEHAAX.

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 151807Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE **4777**

INFO: RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2574

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.07)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 002495

EXDIS

DEPT FOR U/S TARNOFF, A/S HOLBROOKE AND A/S RYAN

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: **USG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
PROCESS**

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

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THE USG ROLE

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9. HMG'S HOPE IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL INDUCE THE IRA TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD DISARMING. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE — *from?* TO BEGIN DECOMMISSIONING SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: JOHN HUME HAS CALLED FOR IT, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THEM UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IT AS A CONDITION FOR FUNDRAISING AUTHORIZATION. IF WE REMOVE ONE OF THESE SOURCES OF PRESSURE BEFORE THE IRA HAS TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE STEP, WE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IRA INTRANSIGENCE AND ENRAGE UNIONISTS.

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BT

#2495

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 161458Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO ////

~~SECRET~~ 161458Z FEB 95 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH, DUBLIN 010

TO THE WHITE HOUSE/NSC, EYES ONLY FOR NANCY SODERBERG

NANCY: SEAN DONLON, PRIME MINISTER BRUTON'S SPECIAL ADVISOR, JUST TELEPHONED FROM LONDON. HE IS VERY DISTRESSED BECAUSE HE HAS TELEPHONED YOU REPEATEDLY LAST NIGHT AND TODAY AND YOU HAVE NOT RETURNED HIS CALLS. HE IS ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS FUND RAISING BY GERRY ADAMS WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I TRUST YOU HAVE SEEN DUBLIN 811 REPORTING ON MY CONVERSATION FEBRUARY 14 WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN AND EMBASSY LONDON'S RESPONSE IN LONDON 2495. GIVEN OUR CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, PERHAPS YOU COULD CLARIFY FOR ME WHAT THE EMBASSY MEANT IN PARAGRAPH THREE BY SAYING THEY "BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH.

I PRESUME THAT YOU HAVE SEEN THE LETTER OUTLINING CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS OVER BLOCKING FUND RAISING BY ADAMS. HOPEFULLY, THESE WILL BE FULLY WEIGHTED WHEN CONSIDERING ADAMS' APPLICATION FOR ANOTHER VISA, WHICH COULD COME AS EARLY AS TOMORROW. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN SEAN DONLON'S CALLS SOON AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU MYSELF.

~~SECRET~~

DECL OADR

#0170

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.08)

K8H 4/11/2023

NNNN

<MSGID> M1518930

~~SECRET~~

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Gray, Wendy E.; Hawkins, Ardenia R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: RE: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, February 08, 1995 4:14PM

Please pass to Nancy:

Following our telephone conversation earlier today, I made some calls around and learned the following:

-- Nobody agrees with O'Dowd's characterization of the ammo find as an IRA move of any kind. The Irish Embassy says it was routine police work that came upon them; the finding has no political significance. Peter Westmacott says Sinn Fein is not referring to or taking credit for the find publicly or privately. (I found this surprising given the timing of the find and the way it was initially reported in the press, but this is the Irish government/police view, as well as the British.)

-- Tuesday's HMG-Sinn Fein talks made "some progress," according to Westmacott. (I haven't connected with Oakley yet.) Some discussion of weapons decommissioning. IF Thursday's meeting goes similarly well, HMG may offer a meeting with ministers as the next step.

-- The emergency measures the Irish lifted were mostly symbolic, hadn't been used since the '70s. They RETAINED the ability to detain suspected terrorists incommunicado for 48 hours, the aspect of their (and the British) anti-terrorist approach which is most frequently criticized.

Given the fact that the ammunition discovery appears after all not to be a conscious Sinn Fein/IRA gesture (and that a bomb with semtex was defused today in Newry, although the IRA disclaimed responsibility), I suggest we wait to see whether the Brits do indeed offer ministers after tomorrow's meeting before revisiting the fundraising issue.

From: Gray, Wendy E.
To: Stephens, Kathleen D.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Marshall, Betty A.; Maxfield, Nancy H.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Subject: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, February 08, 1995 02:02 AM

Hi Kathy!

Neal O'Dowd called. The IRA gave up a large cache of weapons today, he says. 30,000 rounds of heavy ammo from the 1986 Libyan deal used for Soviet machine guns used to down helos. Neal thinks the IRA is in effect giving up its ability to shoot down helos. He thinks its in response to the Irish decision to lift the state of emergency in place in the south since 1976. Perhaps also due to release of Irish prisoners. Can you check out facts and check with State on whether this meets Peter's conditions. Also, perhaps coupled with expected positive statements next week re: the framework document?

Thanks!

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(1.09)
KSH 4/11/2023

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

Hawkins

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Hawkins, Ardenia R.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Kreczko, Alan J.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: Northern Ireland update [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Tuesday, February 07, 1995 5:37PM

Please pass to Nancy:

-- Nancy, there's press reporting today that the Irish police found an IRA arms cache consisting of 12,000 rounds of ammunition (no guns), some of it for Russian heavy machine guns believed to have been part of the stuff brought from Libya in the '80s.

-- HMG-Sinn Fein had another meeting today and will meet again on Thursday. No read-out yet.

-- State still takes the position that we shouldn't move on fundraising, but if the Brits say the meeting today and Thursday went well, I get the sense State will be prepared to revisit Adams fundraising. With the Unionists still very jumpy, we shouldn't rush, but the arms cache "discovery" is, a definite move in the direction we had indicated was necessary. We'll see if it's enough for the British to have a ministerial "drop-by" at the ongoing talks.

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PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (1.10)
KBM 4/11/2023

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 181705Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3448

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 2500

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 000842

EXDIS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC UK EI

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP WITH MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN ON
FUNDRAISING, SINN FEIN-HMG TALKS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.11)

KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN (PSF) NORTHERN CHAIRMAN MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN MET ITH THE CONSUL GENERAL JANUARY 17 TO FOLLOW UP THEIR JANUARY 13 MEETING ON FUNDRAISING AND OTHER ISSUES (SEPTTEL). MCLAUGHLIN GAVE THE CG A COPY OF SINN FEIN'S SUBMISSION TO ITS JANUARY 16 TALKS WITH HMG, NOTING PASSAGES THAT ADDRESSED USG CONCERNS. HE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF FUNDRAISING TO SINN FEIN AND HOW THAT ISSUE COULD AFFECT REPUBLICAN RANK-AND-FILE VIEWS OF "FAIRNESS" FOR PSF IN THE POLITICAL REALM. END SUMMARY.

3. MCLAUGHLIN VISITED THE CONSULATE JANUARY 17, AFTER PARTICIPATING IN A SINN FEIN STRATEGY SESSION, TO DEBRIEF THE CG ON THE JANUARY 16 SESSION OF THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND HMG. HE SAID THE JANUARY 16 MEETING WAS "MORE POSITIVE THAN PREVIOUS" SESSIONS, WITH BOTH SIDES CEDING SOME GROUND. SINN FEIN WAS PLEASED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HMG APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ARMS QUESTION NEED NOT BE COMPLETELY RESOLVED BEFORE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON OTHER ISSUES. FOR ITS PART, SINN FEIN ACKNOWLEDGED IN ITS WRITTEN SUBMISSION THAT CRITICAL REPUBLICAN CONCERNS PRISONERS AND BRITISH "DEMILITARIZATION") WOULD NOT BE COMPLETELY MET EITHER AS PRECONDITIONS TO INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

4. MCLAUGHLIN ALSO WISHED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE JANUARY 13 MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL ON SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING (SEPTEL). HE GAVE THE CG A COPY OF PSF'S JANUARY 16 "SUBMISSION" (FAXED TO EUR/UBI) AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH ON PAGE THREE, WHICH CONTAINS A COMMITMENT TO BRINGING ABOUT "DECOMMISSIONING" OF "WEAPONS OF WAR." ACCORDING TO MCLAUGHLIN, THAT PARAGRAPH REFLECTED SINN FEIN'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF USG (AND HMG) CONCERNS. THE SAME HELD FOR THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS ON PAGE FOUR, WHICH SAID SINN FEIN'S POSITION ON ARMS WAS "TRANSPARENT" AND THAT ITS "INFLUENCE" WITH THE IRA WOULD BE USED POSITIVELY.

5. MCLAUGHLIN REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF FUNDRAISING TO THE REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY, STRESSING THAT THE USG OUGHT NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE REAL FRAGILITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS -- THERE WAS STILL MUCH SKEPTICISM AMONG REPUBLICAN RANK-AND-FILE ABOUT WHETHER SINN FEIN WOULD BE TREATED "FAIRLY" IN THE POLITICAL REALM. MCLAUGHLIN SAID HE HOPED THIS MESSAGE WAS GETTING THROUGH AS SINN FEIN CONTINUED ITS DIALOGUE WITH U.S. DIPLOMATS IN BELFAST, LONDON AND DUBLIN. THE CONSUL GENERAL REPLIED THAT MCLAUGHLIN COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT SINN FEIN VIEWS WERE ACCURATELY REPORTED.

6. MCLAUGHLIN CONCLUDED BY ASKING THAT THE CG INFORM HIM, GERRY ADAMS OR MARTIN MCGUINNESS IF THE CG HEARD ANYTHING FROM WASHINGTON ON SINN FEIN'S REQUEST THAT THE USG TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE FUNDRAISING ISSUE. CROWE
BT

#0842

NNNN

<MSGID> M1464993

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 201310Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3535

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 000968

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2011-0355-F (1.12)

KSH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND ARMS "PRECONDITION"

REFS: (A) DUBLIN 289, (B) LONDON 917

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REF A REPORTED COMMENTS BY SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND DFA SECOND SECRETARY SEAN O'HUIGINN THAT HMG HAD DROPPED IRA ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRECONDITION FOR SINN FEIN PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. THIS IS NOT QUITE ACCURATE, REFLECTING EITHER AN UNDERSTANDABLE DEGREE OF CONFUSION OR A DELIBERATE SINN FEIN ATTEMPT TO MISREPRESENT THE SITUATION IN WAYS THAT CAN LATER BE USED AGAINST HMG.

3. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NEVER CHARACTERIZED ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AS A "PRECONDITION" FOR MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE OF TALKS; THIS IS SINN FEIN'S OWN RENDITION OF THE HMG POSITION. WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN SAYING -- AND CONTINUE TO SAY -- IS THAT UNLESS THERE WERE "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" (A PHRASE THE TAOISEACH CLAIMS TO HAVE COINED) TOWARD DECOMMISSIONING OF THE IRA'S MOST OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN DIALOGUE, THE UNIONIST PARTIES (AND HMG) WERE UNLIKELY TO BE WILLING TO JOIN SINN FEIN IN ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. ADAMS' ASSERTION THAT THE PRESENCE OF UNIONIST PARTIES IN SUCH TALKS WAS UNIMPORTANT IS, OF COURSE, NONSENSE, AS IS HIS CLAIM THAT HMG WAS USING THE ARMS ISSUE AS A RUSE TO EXCLUDE SINN FEIN FROM THE TALKS. CROWE

BT

#0968

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PRIORITY

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

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<MSGID> M1469033

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

PRIORITY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: SUM SUM2

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 201950Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3574
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2515

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 001011

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.13)
K8H 7/11/2023

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH
PM'S AIDE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ROD LYNE SAID THE UNIONISTS WERE INCREASINGLY TROUBLED BY SINN FEIN'S TACTICS ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL. LYNE ARGUED THAT IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS HAD NOT MARKEDLY WANED AND PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY WERE PLOYS TO PRESSURE HMG. THE AMBASSADOR UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR NOT BEING SURPRISED ON FUNDRAISING. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR MET JANUARY 20 WITH PM MAJOR'S FOREIGN POLICY AIDE, ROD LYNE, FOR A BROAD RANGING FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSION. THIS MESSAGE DEALS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND; SEPTELS FOLLOW ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA, KEDO AND PM MAJOR'S APRIL 4 VISIT TO THE U.S.

NERVOUSNESS IN THE UNIONIST CAMP

4. ASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY ON THE PEACE PROCESS, LYNE SAID IT WAS ENTERING A CRITICAL PERIOD. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW WAS SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC, LYNE'S VIEW WAS THAT SINN FEIN, SOOTHING RHETORIC ASIDE, HAD NOT BUDGED AN INCH ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. WORSE, RESPONSIBLE UNIONISTS (MOLYNEAUX, MCGUINNESS AND ROSS) WERE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT HMG WAS MAKING CONCESSIONS TO SINN FEIN E.G, CESSATION OF ARMY DAYTIME PATROLLING IN BELFAST, MEETINGS WITH MINISTERS, WITHOUT RECEIVING ANYTHING IN

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PRIORITY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

RETURN. THE UNIONISTS ARGUED THAT SINN FEIN WAS ESSENTIALLY SAYING "WE'RE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IRA BUT WE'LL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM ON TRACK SO NOW LET US INTO THE ALL-PARTY TALKS." THIS WAS A PIG IN A POKE AND THE UNIONISTS FEARED HMG WAS BUYING IT.

DECOMMISSIONING CRUCIAL

5. LYNE, WHO APPEARED TO HAVE SOME SYMPATHY WITH THE UNIONIST VIEW, STRESSED THAT HMG'S BOTTOM LINE ON DECOMMISSIONING I.E. "SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS" WAS DELIBERATELY SUBJECTIVE; LONDON DID NOT WANT TO BOX ITSELF IN BUT NEEDED SOME CLEAR MOVEMENT. SINN FEIN'S POSITION THAT DECOMMISSIONING OF ITS ARMS SHOULD BE PART OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BRITAIN TO HOLD FIRM ON ARMS SINCE A U-TURN WOULD CERTAINLY MEAN UNIONIST WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PEACE PROCESS. CABINET RESIGNATIONS AND A BRUISING FIGHT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WOULD ALSO BE IN THE OFFING.

6. CONTINUING, LYNE SAID THE IRA WAS MAINTAINING ITS TARGETTING AND TRAINING AND WAS STILL TRYING TO PROCURE WEAPONS OVERSEAS. IT MOST EMPHATICALLY HAD NOT STOOD DOWN AND HAD TAKEN NO OPERATIONAL STEPS TO PREPARE FOR PEACE. THE IRA HAD ABOUT TWO AND ONE-HALF TONS OF SEMTEX AND HMG HAD RELIABLE ESTIMATES ON THEIR INVENTORIES OF HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AND ROCKETS.

7. LOOKING AHEAD, LYNE THOUGHT HMG WOULD HAVE MORE FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE TRADE OFFS ONCE THE EXPLORATORY TALKS MOVED TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THE BRITISH WERE CURRENTLY LOOKING INTO THE AREA OF PRISONER RELEASES. THERE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE A GENERAL AMNESTY BUT SOME STEPS COULD BE TAKEN REGARDING PAROLE.

FUNDRAISING

8. LYNE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM U.S. STANCE ON FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS REMAINED A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN THE U.S., AND IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT HMG NOT SURPRISE US ON THIS ISSUE. LYNE AGREED FULLY.

NEW IRISH COALITION: BETTER NOW BUT POSSIBLE PROBLEMS

LATER

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

9. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE BRUTON GOVERNMENT'S IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS, LYNE SAID THE NEW IRISH PRIME MINISTER, ALONG WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET, CLEARLY HELD LESS NATIONALISTIC VIEWS THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS. THE PM'S PRE-CHRISTMAS MEETING WITH BRUTON HAD GONE VERY WELL. AT THE SAME TIME, HMG RECOGNIZED THAT BRUTON WOULD BE UNDER OPPOSITION PRESSURE AND WOULD OCCASIONALLY HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE HIS GREEN CREDENTIALS. PAR
ADOXICALLY, IT COULD WELL PROVE
DIFFICULT FOR BRUTON TO ENGAGE IN END-GAME TRADEOFFS WHICH REYNOLDS MIGHT HAVE DONE WITH THE CONFIDENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN CAMP.

ADAMS AND THE IRA

10. ASKED FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF CURRENT IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS, LYNE SAID THE SITUATION HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE. THE IRA HAS STILL NOT DECIDED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WILL LEAD TO REALIZATION OF ITS AGENDA AND ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE A FINITE AMOUNT OF TIME. BOTH MEN WILL PARTICIPATE WITH IRA REPS IN A WEEKEND MEETING OF A TACTICAL STEERING GROUP. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE A GREEN LIGHT TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS PENDING A FURTHER REIVIEW, PROBABLY AROUND EASTER. WHILE SOME IN THE IRA MAY ARGUE THAT A FEW WELL-TIMED BOMBINGS IN ENGLAND WOULD SPUR HMG TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS, ADAM AND MCGUINNESS WILL LIKELY PREVAIL WITH THE VIEW THAT THIS WOULD BE TOO DAMAGING TO THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT INTERNATIONALLY, PARTICULARLY IN THE U.S.

11. IN LYNE'S VIEW, SINN FEIN PROTESTATIONS THAT HMG "INTRANSIGENCE" IS ENDANGERING IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS ARE OVERDRAWN AND ESSENTIALLY TACTICAL PLOYS TO PUT PRESSURE ON LONDON. THOUGH ADAMS' POSITION REMAINS SOMEWHAT FRAGILE, HE IS BY NO MEANS UNDER SERIOUS THREAT AT THIS STAGE.

12. COMMENT: AS LYNE ACKNOWLEDGED, MAYHEW IS SOMEWHAT MORE UPBEAT ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY. SEPTTEL REPORTS ON THE AMBASSADOR'S DINNER DISCUSSION WITH SIR PATRICK AND LADY MAYHEW ON JAN 19.CROWE

BT

#1011

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

NNNN

<MSGID> M1469982

~~SECRET~~

Adm

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Northern Ireland issues ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Thursday, January 12, 1995 10:51AM

evidence

Please pass to Nancy:

1) Dave Goldwyn called from Peter Tarnoff's office to follow up on your request that Peter provide an idea of measurable criteria for lifting the fundraising restriction. Tarnoff's thinking is as follows:

- FBI should be prepared to say the arms network remains dormant,
- there should be a change in the Sinn Fein position that it can't talk about disarmament because it is not the IRA,
- Sinn Fein should take the paper and respond to it in a manner which demonstrates good faith, perhaps by an arms cache being quietly "discovered" by Irish authorities somewhere.

I told Dave our views here were about the same, and that the new Irish PM seemed to feel about the same too (see Dublin 6929). There'll be a Sinn Fein-British meeting Jan. 16 so we'll see what happens then. I'm checking again today but as far as I know Sinn Fein has basically taken our answer of no fundraising now with little/no comment or reaction.

2) Senator Mitchell has written Tony Lake asking for a plane for his February 13-18 trip to Dublin, Belfast, London and perhaps Brussels. They've asked me to go along, which I'd be happy to do, but I will defer to you if this is a trip you want to join.

3) My schedule has cleared and I would like to sit in on your meeting with the Irish church leaders at 5:30 if that's ok. I will fax you their bios. It should be interesting to hear their perceptions of the mood on the ground in both communities, and of what they think of the arms decommissioning issue, etc.

4) The British RUC chief announced today that British troops will stop patrolling Belfast's streets in daylight hours beginning Sunday.

5) Jay Footlik is working on an expanded list of possible invitees to a briefing by you and perhaps Tony on Northern Ireland. I await your instructions on whether and with whom I meet separately from Bruce Morrison's group.

TO TL-

I think Peter's points on fundraising are reasonable

ms

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.14)
KBH 4/11/2023

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 221624Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2594

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2462

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 019978

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: NIO OFFICIAL ON EXPLORATORY
DIALOGUE

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS, HMG'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, GAVE US A READOUT ON THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS. HIS ACCOUNT FLESHED OUT THAT IN REF A, ADDING USEFUL DETAILS AND ATMOSPHERICS. THOMAS SAID HE CAUGHT SINN FEIN LEADER MARTIN MCGUINNESS IN A KEY CONTRADICTION: HOW COULD THE PARTY CLAIM IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) ARMS, WHEN GERRY ADAMS HAD ALREADY AGREED TO DISCUSS THIS AT A LATER STAGE? HMG'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT SINN FEIN WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, BUT WANTED ONLY TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO ALL-PARTY TALKS, WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT MOVEMENT ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. END SUMMARY.

3. THOMAS INVITED US TO THE NIO DECEMBER 22 AFTER HEARING THAT WE HAD BEEN CASTING ABOUT FOR A READOUT ON THE DECEMBER 19 SECOND ROUND OF EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. HE LEADS THE BRITISH DELEGATION IN THE TALKS, AND WAS PREVIOUSLY THE CENTRAL OFFICIAL IN THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA.

SINN FEIN DISMISSIVE

4. THOMAS SAID THE SINN FEIN DELEGATION HAD COME TO THE SECOND MEETING WITH A MUCH CLEARER BRIEF THAN IN THE FIRST ROUND, AND WITH MUCH LESS APPARENT NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY. MCGUINNESS LED OFF BY DISMISSING HMG'S MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING AS USELESS AND REJECTING THE ANODYNE BRITISH PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS.

5. MCGUINNESS SAID SINN FEIN SAW NO POINT IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH "FACELESS OFFICIALS," THOMAS CONTINUED, AND INSISTED ON MOVING QUICKLY INTO POLITICAL TALKS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS AND THE OTHER PARTIES. HE CLAIMED THAT ONLY HMG AND THE UNIONIST PARTIES WERE OBSTRUCTING THE PATH TO INCLUSIVE TALKS, AND SAID IT WAS UP TO HMG TO PERSUADE THE UNIONISTS TO JOIN THEM. THOMAS SAID HE DREW ONE OF THE FEW LAUGHS OF THE SESSION BY NOTING MILDLY THAT CIVIL SERVANTS WERE USED TO BEING INSULTED AND WOULDN'T TAKE IT PERSONALLY, AND THAT SINN FEIN'S REACTION TO HIS PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS DEMONSTRATED THE LIMITS OF BRITISH PERSUASIVE POWERS.

ARMS AND PIRA

6. THOMAS SAID HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AGAIN, REITERATING HIS POINT IN THE FIRST MEETING THAT BOTH SINN FEIN AND HMG WANTED TO

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2011-0335-F (1.15)

KBH 4/11/2023

held for Nancy S

"TAKE THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS" AND DIFFERED ONLY ON MODALITIES AND TIMING. MCGUINNESS HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN THIS LINE IN THE FIRST MEETING, BUT IN THE SECOND HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT A BRITISH PAPER ON PHASED DEMILITARIZATION (EVEN ON THE BASIS THAT HE COULD CONVEY IT TO PIRA), AND INSISTED THAT THE ARMS QUESTION WAS "NOTHING TO DO WITH US." HE SAID THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH WAS BRITISH JURISDICTION ON IRISH TERRITORY. UNLESS THIS WAS RESOLVED, "CONFLICT WILL RESULT."

7. THOMAS SAID HE NOTED THAT SINN FEIN WAS NOT SIMPLY (AS MCGUINNESS HAD CLAIMED) ANOTHER POLITICAL PARTY, BUT WAS BACKED UP BY A FULLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED ARMED FORCE. WAS MCGUINNESS SUGGESTING THAT, SINCE MOST OTHER PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND WERE NOT ABOUT TO ACCEPT THE END OF BRITISH JURISDICTION, A RETURN TO CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE?

8. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND PIRA, THOMAS SAID HE REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT GERRY ADAMS' "PRESENTATION" TO PIRA IN LATE AUGUST HAD BEEN CITED AS LEADING DIRECTLY TO THE CEASEFIRE, AND THAT SINN FEIN HAD BEEN QUICK TO ISSUE STATEMENTS ABOUT PIRA INVOLVEMENT IN CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. HE TOLD MCGUINNESS: "YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND A PARROT IN PEKING, OR A POODLE IN PARIS, WHO BELIEVES YOU, BUT NOT A DOG IN THE STREETS OF NORTHERN IRELAND." HE SAID HMG WAS CONVINCED THAT "AN ASSESSMENT BY YOU" WOULD BE INFLUENTIAL IN PERSUADING PIRA TO DECOMMISSION ITS WEAPONS. NOTING THAT ADAMS HAD AGREED THAT DEMILITARIZATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND OTHERS, HE WONDERED HOW THIS COULD BE DONE IF SINN FEIN HAD NO INFLUENCE ON PIRA'S DECISIONS. MCGUINNESS, APPARENTLY TAKEN ABACK BY THIS LINE OF REASONING, HAD SAID ONLY THAT IT WAS SOMETHING HMG WOULD HAVE TO SORT OUT.

9. THOMAS SAID HE HAD STRESSED IN BOTH ROUNDS OF TALKS THAT RESOLVING THE ARMS ISSUE WAS NOT A PRECONDITION HMG HAD SET FOR PROGRESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. HE SAID HMG WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS (THOUGH NOT NEGOTIATE ON) A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING POLITICAL ONES, AND TRAILED THE NOTION THAT "REAL MOVEMENT" ON DECOMMISSIONING COULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL SINN FEIN COULD SEE A CLEAR PATH TO INVOLVEMENT IN THE WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS. HMG WAS PREPARED TO BE VERY FLEXIBLE ON TIMING AND MODALITIES. BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, SINN FEIN HAD TO REALIZE THAT TALKS WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS WOULD BE FUTILE, AND TALKS WITH THEM WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON ARMS.

OTHER ISSUES

10. APART FROM THE ARMS ISSUE, THOMAS SAID, SINN FEIN HAD ALSO RAISED THE RECENT BEATING OF A REPUBLICAN ACTIVIST, "EXCESSIVE" POLICE PATROLLING, D FUNDING FOR AN IRISH-LANGUAGE SECONDARY SCHOOL. THOMAS RESPONDED THAT HMG WAS HAPPY TO AIR THESE ISSUES, WOULD LOOK AT WHAT SINN FEIN SAID AND PROVIDE ANSWERS WHERE IT COULD. THE IDEA OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR THE IRISH SCHOOL HAD MERIT, BUT SINN FEIN'S DEMANDS WOULD ENTAIL GIVING THAT SCHOOL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OVER ALL OTHERS IN THE PROVINCE.

PACING DIFFERENCES

11. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT SINN FEIN'S SUGGESTION TO DELAY THE NEXT MEETING UNTIL JANUARY 16; IN THE FIRST ROUND, HMG HAD SUGGESTED JANUARY 5 OR 6. THE NIO HAD NO GREAT PROBLEM WITH THE DELAY -- IT WOULD ALLOW MORE TIME TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, AND HAVING THAT DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FOR DISCUSSION WITH SINN FEIN WOULD MAKE THE DIALOGUE MORE SUBSTANTIVE. BUT IT WAS HARD TO SQUARE SINN FEIN'S REQUEST FOR DELAY WITH ITS INSISTENCE THAT HMG WAS HOLDING UP PROGRESS.

12. AS FOR HMG, THOMAS SAID, "THE LAST THING WE WANT TO DO IS OBSTRUCT." THE NIO WAS READY TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES OVER THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AT AS FAST A PACE AS THE IRISH COULD ACCOMMODATE, AND ALSO WANTED TO SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF ITS TALKS WITH SINN FEIN. THERE WAS A RANGE OF OPTIONS INVOLVING STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS THAT PIRA COULD USE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTENT TO DISARM. BUT "AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND POLITICAL REALITY, WE NEED TO HAVE SOME PROGRESS IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE AND SOME MOVEMENT ON ARMS" IN ORDER TO GAIN THE NECESSARY ROOM FOR MANEUVER.

ATMOSPHERICS

13. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE TONE OF THE SECOND MEETING WAS NOTABLY LESS FRIENDLY THAN THE FIRST. THERE WERE FEWER SMILES, NO HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY, AND THE SINN FEIN GROUP SEEMED TO BE UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO STICK TO PREPARED POSITIONS. MCGUINNESS AGAIN DOMINATED HIS SIDE, WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL INTERJECTIONS FROM THE OTHERS.

14. APART FROM MCGUINNESS, THOMAS SAID, THE SINN FEIN GROUP SEEMED AN UNDISTINGUISHED LOT. KELLY, A CONVICTED IRA BOMBER WITH NO PREVIOUS POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, HAD SAID NOTHING THROUGHOUT THE TWO LONG MEETINGS, BUT SIMPLY SAT AND GLARED AT THOMAS. HE APPEARED TO BE THE PIRA "MINDER" FOR THE DELEGATION. BHREATHNACH, WHILE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY, DID NOT SEEM TO BE A SIGNIFICANT PLAYER. MCMANUS STRUCK THOMAS AS BASICALLY DECENT AND FRIENDLY, BUT PROBABLY INCLUDED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RELATIVES OF THE "MARTYRS" - HIS SON WAS KILLED ON A PIRA OPERATION. O'HANLON APPEARED TO FUNCTION AS THE SECRETARY TO THE DELGATION: SHE HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETINGS, BUT SAID NOTHING IN THEM. SHE WAS ALSO KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO ADAMS, AND MIGHT BE HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

15. HMG HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED, THOMAS SAID, THAT NONE OF THE SINN FEIN "BRAIN TRUST" AROUND ADAMS - TOM HARTLEY, RICHARD MCAULEY, MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN - HAD BEEN NAMED TO THE DELEGATION. THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP APPARENTLY HAD DECIDED TO CONTROL THE ACTION FROM OUTSIDE, RATHER THAN PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE STRONG PIRA PRESENCE IN THE GROUP (THREE OF THE FIVE HAVE TERRORIST CONVICTIONS) GAVE IT USEFUL "STREET CREDIBILITY." BUT THE ABSENCE OF THE STRATEGISTS, SINN FEIN'S UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK FRANKLY AT THIS STAGE, AND INCREASING THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IF ITS DEMANDS WERE NOT MET, RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS OVERALL APPROACH. CROWE
BT
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<^SSN>9978
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FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 231348Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2654

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2464

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 020032

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NIO OFFICIAL ON SINN FEIN STRATEGY

REFS: (A) LONDON 19978, (B) LONDON 16904,
(C) DUBLIN 6838

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS BELIEVES SINN FEIN LEADERS MUST HAVE DEVELOPED A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL STRATEGY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) CEASEFIRE, BUT HAS SEEN LITTLE EVIDENCE OF IT IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE. AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES:

- THEY BELIEVE (ERRONEOUSLY) THAT BRITISH MINISTERS ARE JUST LOOKING FOR A GOOD PRETEXT TO WITHDRAW;
- THEY ARE STILL TRYING TO FASHION A "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT" THAT COULD PLAY ON BRITISH WAR-WEARINESS AND BREAK THE GOVERNMENT'S WILL;
- THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT BRITISH RULE FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER GENERATION, BUT CANNOT REVEAL THIS TO THEIR GRASSROOTS SUPPORTERS; OR
- THEY BELIEVE A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IS INEVITABLE, BUT MUST GO THROUGH THE POLITICAL MOTIONS IN ORDER TO REGENERATE COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND BLAME THE BREAKDOWN ON THE BRITISH.

3. THOMAS SAID SINN FEIN DID NOT APPEAR TO TAKE THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE SERIOUSLY, AND WAS TRYING TO "BOUNCE" HMG INTO ALLOWING IT INTO MULTI-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT TAKING ANY OF THE STEPS NECESSARY TO MAKE THAT STEP FEASIBLE. WHATEVER THE REPUBLICANS HAD IN MIND, HMG WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO THE PRINCIPLES IN THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. END SUMMARY.

THERE MUST BE A STRATEGY

4. AFTER BRIEFING US DECEMBER 22 ON THE SECOND SESSION OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE (REF A), THOMAS AGREED TO A FREEWHEELING DISCUSSION OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT'S OVERALL STRATEGY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE. WE ASKED WHETHER HE AGREED WITH THOSE WHO SAID SINN FEIN HAD NO REAL STRATEGY BEYOND ITS MAXIMAL LONG-TERM DEMANDS AND TOOK INTERIM DECISIONS AS THEY CAME, OR WITH THOSE WHO ARGUED THAT SINN FEIN WAS THE ONLY PARTY IN IRELAND WITH A FULLY-DEVELOPED STRATEGY.

5. THOMAS, WHO HAS BEEN IN HIS PRESENT JOB AT LEAST FOUR YEARS AND CONDUCTED THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS WITH REPUBLICAN LEADERS, SAID IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE TO HIM THAT SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND THE "BRAIN TRUST" HE HAD ASSEMBLED IN THE 1970'S WOULD HAVE ENTERED THE POST-CEASEFIRE ERA WITHOUT A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THEY WANTED, WHAT THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD GET, AND HOW THEY COULD GET IT.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.16)

K8H 4/11/2023

hold for Nancy S.

6. THE GROUP AROUND ADAMS, THOMAS NOTED, HAD ALMOST 20 YEARS' EXPERIENCE AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY, AND HAD BEEN SHIFTING THE MOVEMENT'S FOCUS TOWARD ENHANCED POLITICAL ACTIVITY FOR NEARLY A DECADE. ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS HAD STAKED A LOT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE "POLITICAL STRUGGLE," AND IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THEY HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE PROBLEMS THEY WERE BOUND TO ENCOUNTER.

7. THOMAS STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES THAT FOR ADAMS, THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN WAS "MOVEMENT MANAGEMENT." HE WAS DETERMINED AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID THE KIND OF SPLITS THAT HAD LED TO HIS OWN RISE TO POWER. IN OUTMANEUVERING THE PREVIOUS GENERATION OF LEADERS, CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION AND ENGINEERING THE CEASEFIRE, ADAMS HAD SHOWN HIMSELF ADEPT AT THIS KIND OF MANAGEMENT, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO THINK HE WOULD CHANGE HIS STYLE.

BUT NO EVIDENCE YET

8. AT THE SAME TIME, THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED, HE HAD SEEN NO INDICATION IN THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS OF EXPLORATORY TALKS OF WHAT THE SINN FEIN STRATEGY MIGHT BE. AS NOTED REF A, HE SAID MARTIN MCGUINNESS HAD BEEN EVEN LESS FORTHCOMING IN THE SECOND SESSION THAN IN THE FIRST, STICKING RIGIDLY TO LONGSTANDING REPUBLICAN POSITIONS. IT APPEARED THAT, WHATEVER ELSE THEY MAY HAVE DECIDED, REPUBLICAN LEADERS HAD NOT THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT TO DO IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE.

9. THOMAS SAID THERE WAS REASON TO BELIEVE SINN FEIN HAD NO INTENTION OF TALKING SERIOUSLY IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, BUT RATHER WAS TRYING TO "BOUNCE" HMG THROUGH IT AND INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS (NOTE: REF C REPORTS ADAMS' LATEST EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD). THIS WAS A NON-STARTER. EVEN IF ADAMS COULD CONVINCE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY (SDLP) LEADER JOHN HUME AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS USELESS AND THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS SHOULD BEGIN AT ONCE, NEITHER OF THE UNIONIST PARTIES WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE. AND WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS, NO WORKABLE AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. THE REPUBLICANS "CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS": THEY WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR OWN SINCERITY -- PARTICULARLY ON THE ARMS QUESTION -- BEFORE OTHERS WOULD TREAT THEM AS A LEGITIMATE NEGOTIATING PARTNER.

BASED ON A DELUSION?

10. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY, THOMAS SAID, THAT SINN FEIN REALLY BELIEVED THAT BRITISH MINISTERS WANTED TO GET OUT OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND WERE ONLY LOOKING FOR A FIG-LEAF TO COVER THE EXIT. IF THE REPUBLICANS HARBORED THIS DELUSION, THOMAS SAID, THEY MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED LESS RESISTANCE TO THEIR DEMANDS THAN THEY WERE GOING TO ENCOUNTER. THIS MIGHT ALSO EXPLAIN WHY THEY WERE SO DISMISSIVE OF TALKS WITH OFFICIALS AND ANXIOUS TO MEET MINISTERS.

11. THOMAS NOTED MCGUINNESS' STATEMENT IN OCTOBER THAT DURING THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS, A BRITISH OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HIM THAT HMG'S ULTIMATE AIM WAS "THAT THE ISLAND WOULD BE AS ONE." THIS HAD COME UP AGAIN DURING THE SECOND EXPLORATORY MEETING, AND THOMAS HAD SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE IT CATEGORICALLY, STRESSING THAT THE CONTACT HAD BEEN UNAUTHORIZED, AND THAT WHAT HMG SAID PUBLICLY WAS ITS REAL POSITION. ANY STATEMENT THAT DEVIATED FROM THE PUBLIC LINE WAS SIMPLY NOT ACCURATE.

PAN-NATIONALIST PRESSURE?

12. IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE, THOMAS SAID, THAT ADAMS STILL THOUGHT HE COULD FORGE A MONOLITHIC "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT" INCLUDING SINN FEIN, THE SDLP, THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT AND THE USG (THROUGH IRISH-AMERICAN PRESSURE). THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT WITH CONCERTED U.S. AND IRISH PRESSURE, COUPLED WITH OPINION POLLS SHOWING

MOST BRITONS WANTED TO BE RID OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, THE WILL OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REMAIN ENGAGED WOULD COLLAPSE.

13. A STRATEGY BASED ON THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD ALSO MISREAD THE SITUATION, THOMAS SAID. JOHN HUME MIGHT BE CONVINCED BY ADAMS' ARGUMENTS (HE VACILLATED CONSTANTLY ON THE ARMS ISSUE), BUT HIS PARTY WAS NOT. THE NEW IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS MUCH LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO REPUBLICAN APPEALS THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. THE BRITISH OPINION POLLS REPRESENTED A LONGING FOR PEACE, NOT A PULLOUT. AND IN ANY EVENT, WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT OF THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE UNION VERSUS IRISH UNIFICATION, NO SERIOUS PLAYER IN BRITISH POLITICS WOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL IN THE FACE OF UNIONIST OPPOSITION.

COVERT ACCEPTANCE?

14. THIRD, THOMAS CONTINUED, THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT THE HARD POLITICAL REALITY THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REMAIN IN THE UK UNTIL A MAJORITY THERE AGREED TO UNIFICATION – AT LEAST A GENERATION IN THE FUTURE – BUT NEEDED MORE TIME TO BRING PIRA HARDLINERS AND GRASSROOTS REPUBLICANS AROUND TO THE IDEA. HMG HOPED THIS WAS THE CASE.

15. REPUBLICAN LEADERS, THOMAS NOTED, HAD TALKED INCREASINGLY OF AN "AGREED IRELAND" (BORROWING THE PHRASE FROM HUME); PERHAPS THE PASSAGE OF REFERENDA IN BOTH PARTS OF IRELAND ON A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO SAY THAT THE IRISH PEOPLE HAD EXERCISED THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. HMG WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THEY CHARACTERIZED THE RESULTING ARRANGEMENTS AS TRANSITIONAL, AND CONTINUED TO AGITATE FOR UNIFICATION; IT HAD ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF ASPIRATIONS TO UNITY. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE SO FAR TO SUPPORT THIS ASSESSMENT OF REPUBLICAN INTENTIONS.

PREPARING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE?

16. FINALLY, THOMAS SAID, THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS MERELY A TACTICAL MANEUVER, CALLED IN RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FLOWING FROM THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. IN THIS SCENARIO, SINN FEIN/PIRA LEADERS KNEW THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE THEIR AGENDA THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, AND BELIEVED A RETURN TO THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" WAS INEVITABLE, BUT NEEDED TO REGENERATE SUPPORT FOR IT IN THEIR COMMUNITIES BY GOING THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC MOTIONS WHILE PREPARING THE GROUNDWORK TO BLAME HMG FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE. THE LACK OF ANY MOVEMENT ON ARMS, CONTINUED PIRA TRAINING AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, AND MCGUINNESS' WARNING IN THE SECOND MEETING THAT "CONFLICT WILL RESULT" UNLESS BRITISH JURISDICTION ENDED ALL POINTED TO THIS CONCLUSION.

17. THOMAS NOTED THAT REPUBLICAN LEADERS (AS WELL AS SOME IN DUBLIN AND THE SDLP) HAD HARPED RELENTLESSLY ON THE THEME THAT HMG WAS DRAGGING ITS FEET AND PUTTING OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF RECONCILIATION. THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE: NO ONE WAS MORE ANXIOUS THAN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REACH AGREEMENT. IRISH CLAIMS THAT HMG HAD STALLED AGREEMENT ON THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WERE ESPECIALLY GALLING IN THIS REGARD, SINCE THE IRISH KNEW BETTER: THE NIO HAD GIVEN ITS DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT TO DFA COUNTERPARTS IN SEPTEMBER 1993, AND GOT NO RESPONSE (EXCEPT FOR THE LEAK OF A HIGHLY REPUBLICAN DRAFT TO IRISH MEDIA) UNTIL APRIL 1994. AND IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, SINN FEIN HAD SLOWED THE PACE OF MEETINGS AND DECLINED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING BUT ITS MAXIMAL DEMANDS.

BRITISH RESPONSE

~~SECRET~~

18. WHATEVER SINN FEIN PLANNED, THOMAS SAID, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO PRESS ON UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. IT WOULD NOT BE MOVED FROM THOSE PRINCIPLES UNDER ANY COMBINATION OF SINN FEIN PROPAGANDA, PIRA VIOLENCE OR EXTERNAL PRESSURE. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AND THE COMPLEMENTARY BRITISH PAPER ON INTERNAL DEVOLUTION WERE PUBLISHED, THEY WOULD PLEASE NEITHER UNIONISTS NOR NATIONALISTS. THEY WERE NOT, THOMAS STRESSED, INTENDED TO BE RIGID BLUEPRINTS FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT RATHER A STARTING POINT FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THEY REPRESENTED THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' BEST ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS LIKELY TO ATTRACT THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT ACROSS BOTH TRADITIONS IN THE NORTH. IDEALLY, THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT A PACKAGE DEAL WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS. BUT NEITHER IT NOR ANY OTHER PARTY HAD A RIGHT TO VETO ANY AGREEMENT THAT COULD WIN MAJORITY APPROVAL IN BOTH PARTS OF THE ISLAND. CROWE
BT

FROM:
SITREPT

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, FUERTH, ITOH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, NSC, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 231140Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011 - 0355 - F (1.17)

KBN 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK

SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON - POSITIVE BUT
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN FEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScored THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KEANE DESCRIBED THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" AS A DISTRACTION. SINN FEIN "FEELS THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH." THEIR GOAL IS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL-INCLUSIVE, ALL-PARTY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP AND TO SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE QUESTION OF FUND RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE KIND OF INCIDENTS WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN THE PAST. SMITH

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 230033Z DEC 94

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6592
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 0058
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST IMMEDIATE 7193

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 338910

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, EI, UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY READ-OUT ON SECOND HMG/SINN FEIN MEETING

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON 12/22, PETER WESTMACOTT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR AT THE UK EMBASSY, PROVIDED A READ-OUT ON SUBJECT TALKS TO EUR/UBI DIRECTOR LEKSON, IRELAND/N.I. DESK OFFICER VAN SON, INR ANALYST LIEBOWITZ, AND NSC EUROPEAN DIRECTOR STEPHENS.

3. WESTMACOTT'S PRESENTATION CLOSELY TRACKED REFTEL, WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS:

- MCGUINNESS HAD PROPOSED A "SMALLER" MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND HMG BEFORE THE NEXT SCHEDULED MEETING ON 1/16.

WESTMACOTT BELIEVES SINN FEIN WAS PROPOSING A SECRET MEETING BETWEEN HMG OFFICIALS AND MCGUINNESS AND SIOBHAN O'HANLON. HMG WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO A MEETING, AS LONG AS IT WAS MADE PUBLIC, EVEN IF AFTER THE FACT. WESTMACOTT WAS SKEPTICAL OF ANY SECRET MEETING SINCE IT WOULD NOT STAY SECRET AND THE FEAR THAT UNIONISTS WOULD BELIEVE A DEAL WAS BEING COOKED UP BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

4. WESTMACOTT STATED THAT SINN FEIN'S REFUSAL EVEN TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT (REFUSAL TO ACCEPT HMG'S PAPER ON SUBJECT) PRESENTS A SERIOUS RISK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP. CITING A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH PM MAJOR'S ADVISOR ROD LYNE, WESTMACOTT SAID IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF THOSE WHO HAD SINN FEIN'S EAR, INCLUDING AMERICANS, MADE CLEAR THAT THEY MUST ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT. HMG IS WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE AND IS PREPARED TO LISTEN TO ANY IDEAS OR PROCEDURES ABOUT DISARMAMENT OR DECOMMISSIONING, BUT SINN FEIN CANNOT REFUSE TO TALK ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR INSIST THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRA. THEY WILL NOT GET TO MINISTERIAL-LEVEL TALKS OR THE ALL-PARTY TALKS UNLESS SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS IS MADE ON THIS ISSUE.

5. ON LIFTING THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTION ON GERRY ADAMS' VISA, WESTMACOTT STATED THAT HMG WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FOLLOWING FIRST: TRANSPARENCY IN THE FUNDS COLLECTIONS AND EXPENDITURE PROCESS, SO THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY THAT FUNDS WOULD GO TO ILLICIT PURPOSES; PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE HMG/SF TALKS; AND A CLEAR END TO WEAPONS PROCUREMENT. ON THIS LAST POINT, WESTMACOTT ADMITTED THAT HE HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY ONGOING ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. USG OFFICIALS SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE SEEING ANY INFORMATION HMG MAY HAVE SUGGESTING ONGOING ORGANIZED ARMS PROCUREMENT BY THE IRA IN THE U.S. OR ANYWHERE ELSE. TALBOTT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.18)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc +
return

hold for Nancy S.

1/3

CC TOTL -

wanted to
be sure you had seen.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT HAS CLEARED THIS CABLE
(REF. B). BARTHOLOMEW

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231140Z DEC 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK

SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- POSITIVE BUT
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN PEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(1.19)

KBH 4/11/2023

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

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7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

FEIN LEADERSHIP AND T SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT
NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE
QUESTION OF FUD RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE
KIND OF INI-CRISES WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN
TE PAST. SMITH
BT
#6853

NNNN
<MSGID> M1431894

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: British Briefing on Northern Ireland (9 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-Fundraising, 1995

2011-0355-F
rs1646

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

015353

JAN -7 P12

Washfax Receipt

Department of State

B

S/S #

Message No. _____ Classification CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 3

From: Laurel Shea Gallivan S/S 647-8448 7224
 (Office name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

Message Description Cable to DUBLIN: FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS{9500250}

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	Nancy Soderberg	456-9461	WHSITRM
	XXXXXXXXXX		
	Andy Sens		
	Executive Secretariat		
	VERSHEDON		
	STEPHENS		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: January 9.

PERSONALLY APPROVED BY UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF

Thank you

9/8 Officer: Laurel Shea Gallivan

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: N Date: 11/14

201-0355-F

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to 9/8

AJT

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 5.21/7

AUTH SLY DRAFT PR
CLEAR 1 JK 2 DD
3 JML 4 RO 5 JR
6 DD 7 8
NSCS S/S S/S-0

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/UBI:PVANSON:PBV
12/29/94 X76585 SENEII 1526
P:PTARNOFF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(1.21)
KBH 4/11/2023

EUR:JCKORNBLUM
NSC:
CA:DDILLARD
EUR/UBI:JMLEKSON

S/P:RO'NEILL{SUBS}
DOJ:JREYNOLDS
S/S:
S/CT:DDOBSON

EUR/UBI, CA/V0, P, S/CT

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, LONDON IMMEDIATE

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST FOR ACTION ALSO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CVIS, PTER, PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS{9500250}

REF: A} DUBLIN 37 B} 94 DUBLIN 6853 C} 94 LONDON 19978
D} 94 STATE 33891 E} 94 LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. U.S. OFFICIALS MADE CLEAR TO GERRY ADAMS DURING THEIR MEETINGS ON 12/6/94 THAT IN ORDER FOR THE U.S. TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDRAISING BY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN LEADERS WHO REQUIRE WAIVERS OF THEIR VISA INELIGIBILITIES, THE ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO SEE MOVEMENT BY SINN FEIN IN TWO AREAS. NO REFERENCES TO TIME TABLES WERE MADE; RATHER, EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON THE FACT THAT IF THESE TWO AREAS WERE RESOLVED, THE FUNDRAISING ISSUE WOULD NO LONGER BE PROBLEMATIC.

3. FIRST, WE NEEDED AN END TO ARMS PROCUREMENT IN THE U.S. SECOND, THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO SEE SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION. ADAMS WAS TOLD THAT WE ASSUMED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ON DISARMAMENT WOULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF SINN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2

FEIN DISCUSSIONS WITH HMG. FURTHERMORE, MOVEMENT ON EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER ARMAMENTS SEEN AS OFFENSIVE (SEMTEX AND MISSILES WERE MENTIONED) WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR RESONANCE WITHIN THE USG. THE RETURN OF FUNDS FROM THE NEWRY ROBBERY/MURDER WAS ALSO MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE.

4. WHILE WE HAVE NO RECENT REPORTS OF PROCUREMENT EFFORTS BY THE IRA IN THE U.S., REPORTS FROM HMG (REFS C, D, AND E) ARE THAT SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT OR READ HMG PAPERS ON THE ISSUE. THE COMMITMENT OF SINN FEIN TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND ITS STATED INTENTION FOR THE USE OF FUNDS MR. ADAMS MAY RAISE IN THE U.S. APPEAR INCONSISTENT WITH THE REFUSAL OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES EVEN TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

4. DUBLIN AND BELFAST SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WITH ADAMS, MCGUINNESS, AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SINN FEIN OFFICIALS:

-- WE UNDERSTAND MR. ADAMS' DESIRE TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. TO SUPPORT LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITIES.

-- SINN FEIN PARTY OFFICIALS NOT NEEDING A VISA WAIVER PRESENTLY MAY RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. IN COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. LAWS, INCLUDING LAWS RESTRICTING SUCH FUNDS FROM BEING USED TO SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO MR. ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WHO REQUIRE A VISA WAIVER.

-- AS U.S. OFFICIALS TOLD MR. ADAMS AT MEETINGS ON 12/6, BEFORE THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTION CAN BE LIFTED, WE NEED TO SEE AN END TO IRA ARMS PROCUREMENT IN THE U.S. AND CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

-- ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY OUR INFORMATION OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO HAVE CONCERNS OVER CONTINUED IRA CONTACTS WITH WEAPON MERCHANTS.

-- WE ALSO WELCOME SINN FEIN PROPOSALS ON VOLUNTARY TRANSPARENT ACCOUNTING FOR ANY FUNDS RAISED IN THE U.S., AND ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY DETAILS YOU MAY HAVE TO OFFER.

-- MOVEMENT ON IRA DECOMMISSIONING OF PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SUCH AS SEMTEX AND MISSILES WOULD BE A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE THAT WOULD HELP TO ASSURE THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

USG OF SINN FEIN'S AND THE IRA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE
PROCESS, ~~AND AN END TO WEAPONS PROCUREMENT.~~

-- WE HAD ASSUMED THAT DISCUSSIONS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES OR OF A PROCESS FOR DEMOBILIZATION WOULD OCCUR IN
THE CONTEXT OF SINN FEIN MEETINGS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS.

-- IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE REFUSED TO DISCUSS OR EVEN ACCEPT COPIES OF BRITISH
PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

-- THEREFORE, AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE DO NOT FEEL
SUFFICIENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ALL OF THE AREAS
DISCUSSED WITH YOU TO WARRANT CHANGING THE CONDITIONS ON
MR. ADAMS' VISA WAIVER OR THE WAIVERS OF OTHER SINN FEIN
LEADERS. \\
YY

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231140Z DEC 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK
SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- POSITIVE BUT
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.22)

KBN 4/11/2023

NES
Kathy Stephens
NES will call you.
R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

FEIN LEADERSHIP AND T SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT
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#6853

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<MSGID> M1431894

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~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 091705Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3086
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 2475
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 000363

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.23)
K0H 7/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK
SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY SINN FEIN

REF: (A) 94 STATE 338910 (B) 94 DUBLIN 6853

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE FURTHER VISIT BY SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS TO THE U.S. LATE IN THE MONTH, WE QUESTIONED NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARY PETER BELL JANUARY 5 ON HMG'S LATEST VIEWS ON FUNDRAISING BY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BELL CONFIRMED THAT HMG REMAINED FIRMLY OPPOSED TO SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING AND URGED THAT THE USG CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE CONDITIONS (NO WEAPONS ACQUISITION IN THE U.S.; CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT FUNDS RAISED IN THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE USED FOR PURCHASE OF WEAPONS; AND PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMILITARIZATION) THAT IT HAD SPELLED OUT TO ADAMS DURING HIS MOST RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT HE AND NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS HAD CONSULTED WITH NIO SECRETARY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW ON THIS ISSUE JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS, AND THAT MAYHEW HAD STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN HAD MADE NO PROGRESS AT ALL ON THE KEY CONDITION OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS.

3. BELL WENT ON TO NOTE THAT HMG WAS BY NO MEANS SINGLING OUT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS AS THE ONLY ISSUE FOR ITS EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT AT THE FIRST ROUND OF EXPLORATORY TALKS, QUENTIN THOMAS HAD TAKEN GREAT PAINS TO POINT OUT THAT HMG WAS PREPARED TO PURSUE A WIDE AND FULL AGENDA -- ESSENTIALLY ANY ISSUE THAT SINN FEIN CARED TO RAISE. AT THE SAME TIME, BELL STRESSED THAT HMG COULD NOT ENVISAGE A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION OF THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, AND TRANSITION TO A SUBSEQUENT PHASE, WITHOUT

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IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SOMETHING HAVING BEEN ACHIEVED ON DECOMMISSIONING. HE SAID THAT THIS POSITION WAS, IN ESSENCE, SHARED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. BELL STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT THE EXPLORATORY TALKS WOULD NOT RUN OUT OF STEAM SOON BECAUSE OF SINN FEIN OBDURACY. HMG SINCERELY WANTED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE TALKS AND WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO MEET TO DISCUSS THE WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.

4. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF FUNDRAISING, BELL SAID THAT THE BRITISH BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT SINN FEIN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS, TO CONTINUE TO BE INFLEXIBLE IN THE TALKS WHILE HAVING THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING LIFTED. DROPPING THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTIONS WOULD HARDLY ENCOURAGE SINN FEIN TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE AT THE TABLE; QUITE THE REVERSE, IN FACT, WAS TO BE EXPECTED.

5. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: FROM ALL THE EVIDENCE I HEAR, SINN FEIN HAS TAKEN NO STEPS SINCE ADAMS' LAST VISIT TO THE U.S. TOWARDS MEETING AT LEAST THE THIRD OF OUR CONDITIONS FOR FUNDRAISING (PROGRESS ON DEMILITARIZATION). I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR CURRENT BAN ON FUNDRAISING PENDING PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. END COMMENT.

CROWE

BT

#0363

NNNN

<MSGID> M1450896

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

Adm

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Gardner, Anthony; Vershbow, Alexander R.; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: Instructions on Gerry Adams Fundraising ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Friday, January 06, 1995 5:26PM

Dee/Brooke: Please pass to Nancy:

Nancy, I incorporated your revisions into the draft cable on Gerry Adams' fundraising request. State is now getting DOJ/FBI clearances and will then send it over here as a formal cross-hatch with a COB Monday deadline for transmission. DOJ has accepted (though FBI has not yet cleared) the language you suggested for characterizing the state of play on procurement, but neither DOJ nor State is prepared to say categorically that the procurement condition has been met. But the emphasis of the message is on the need to see progress in disarmament. That means, I think, that if Sinn Fein takes a constructive approach on disarmament discussions with the British or otherwise takes steps that can be considered "concrete progress" toward disarmament, we should look at the fundraising issue again, again looking at both the conditions we've set: ending procurement and disarmament.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.24)
K8H 7/11/2023

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 191325Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6997

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2602

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000289

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, EI, UK

SUBJECT: ADAMS ON FUND RAISING AND BILATERAL TALKS WITH
HMG

REF: BELFAST 0022

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.25)
KSH 7/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GERRY ADAMS DISCUSSED THE THIRD MEETING OF SINN FEIN WITH THE HMG AND THE GENERAL QUESTIONS OF HIS PERCEPTION OF THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND OF FUND RAISING WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH JANUARY 16. ADAMS SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT THE BRITISH ARE USING THE ARMS ISSUE AS A RUSE TO KEEP SINN FEIN OUT OF INCLUSIVE ALL-PARTY TALKS. IF THIS CONTINUES AND SINN FEIN IS EXCLUDED FROM THE FRAMEWORK TALKS, GERRY ADAMS WILL BE DAMAGED, AND IN THE RESULTING HAVOC THERE WILL BE A REAL POSSIBILITY OF A SPLIT FROM TOP TO BOTTOM IN SINN FEIN/IRA.

3. ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS, ADAMS HAS TOLD THE TAOISEACH THAT "WE ARE PREPARED TO GO OVER IT, UNDER IT, AROUND IT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET A FORMULA THAT WILL WORK." ADAMS RETURNED TO THE LATTER POINT SEVERAL TIMES, "WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD A WORKABLE FORMULA," HE EMPHASIZED. HOWEVER, HE ALSO REITERATED THE NEED FOR PARITY OF ESTEEM AND FOR SINN FEIN TO BE TREATED AS ANY OTHER POLITICAL PARTY. INSTEAD THE BRITISH CONTINUE TO TRY AND ISOLATE SINN FEIN BY EXCLUDING THEM FROM, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BELFAST CONFERENCE AND THE MEETING OF LOCAL COUNCILORS TO BE HELD IN LONDON. THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE IS BEING USED BY THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

UNIONISTS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH, WHO ARE NOW USING IT TO STALL THE PEACE PROCESS. DISARMAMENT IS BEING USED THE WAY "PERMANENT" WAS EARLIER. JUST AS MAJOR EVENTUALLY WALKED AWAY FROM "PERMANENT", IT IS EXPECTED THAT EVENTUALLY HE WILL BACK AWAY FROM DISARMAMENT. ADAMS STRESSED AGAIN THAT THIS IS ONLY A STALLING TACTIC.

4. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE NIO JANUARY 16. SINN FEIN TABLED A PAPER WHICH EXPLICITLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DISARMAMENT WAS A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION BY SINN FEIN IN THE FRAME WORKS TALKS. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, "THE BRITISH WERE MOVED TO SAY THAT DECOMMISSIONING WAS NOT A PRECONDITION." THIS REPRESENTS A COMPROMISE BY THE BRITISH. AT THE SAME TIME SINN FEIN INTIMATED THAT IT MAY BE ABLE TO EXERT INFLUENCE OVER THE IRA.

5. (PARENTHETICALLY, THE NEWLY NAMED SECOND SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HEAD OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION SEAN O'HUIGINN CONFIRMED THAT THE JANUARY 16 MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND THAT PERCEPTIBLE, IF MODEST, PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. THE READ-OUTS HE RECEIVED FROM SINN FEIN AND THE NIO BASICALLY TRACKED IN THIS REGARD WITH SINN FEIN FOCUSING ON THE CAUTIOUS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE BRITISH THAT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS WAS NOT A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION IN ALL PARTY TALKS, WHILE THE BRITISH FOCUSED ON SINN FEIN REFERENCES TO POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OVER THE IRA. HOWEVER, SINN FEIN SAID THAT THE BRITISH HAD ARTIFICIALLY DRAWN OUT THE MEETING, AND THE BRITISH COMPLAINED THAT SINN FEIN SIMPLY PARROTED ITS STANDARD LINES IN SPITE OF THE SLIGHT SOFTENING. O'HUIGINN CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS A SCORELESS DRAW.)

6. ON THE ISSUE OF FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. BY GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES, ADAMS REITERATED THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE IRA TO SEEK FUNDS FOR ADDITIONAL ARMS PURCHASES. THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES ALREADY, PLUS THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES. BEYOND THAT THERE ARE ARMS ALL OVER THE PLACE, NOT JUST WITH THE IRA.

7. ADAMS BELIEVES THAT, AS THE BRITISH HAVE BACKED AWAY ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRECONDITION FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS, DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD NOT BE MADE A PRECONDITION AFFECTING SINN FEIN'S ABILITY TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. HE RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DEPENDS ON THE BRITISH IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD, WHICH IS WHY WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THE BRITISH THWART ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. NONETHELESS, HE IS SURPRISED THAT HIS LITTLE PARTY IS SO IMPORTANT TO THE WORLD POWERS.

8. ADAMS STRESSED AGAIN THAT SINN FEIN/IRA WERE ABLE TO BROKER A TOTAL CESSATION OF VIOLENCE BECAUSE THEY WERE TOLD THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW THEM INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THAT WAS THE DEAL THAT WAS STRUCK. NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS. NOW SINN FEIN WANTS WHAT THEY WERE PROMISED, I.E., TO BE TREATED WITH "PARITY OF ESTEEM" AND AS ANY OTHER LEGITIMATE, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTY. IN RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH ARGUMENT THAT THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN TALKS IF SINN FEIN IS PRESENT, ADAMS ARGUES THAT IT IS NOT IMPORTANT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000289

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EI, UK
SUBJECT: ADAMS ON FUND RAISING AND BILATERAL TALKS WITH HMG

WHETHER THE UNIONISTS ARE THERE. ONLY WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE TO SAY IS IMPORTANT. SMITH

BT
#0289

NNNN
<MSGID> M1466869

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, SODERBERG, NSC, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 201543Z JAN 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7003

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2609

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000310

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, UK, EI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BRUTON ON SINN FEIN FUND RAISING

REF: DUBLIN 121

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEAN DONLON, THE NEWLY APPOINTED SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH AND PROGRAM MANAGER COORDINATOR, DISCUSSED THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. BY SINN FEIN, AND SPECIFICALLY GERRY ADAMS, WITH US JANUARY 20. DONLON NOTED THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO CLARIFY HIS VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S INITIAL CALL ON HIM JANUARY 10. SINCE THEN HE HAS REFLECTED ON THE ISSUE AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THE CABINET SUB-COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. DONLON SAID THAT ANY RESERVATIONS BRUTON MAY HAVE HAD PHILOSOPHICALLY OVER SINN FEIN FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. HAVE BEEN LIFTED. (FINE GAEL HAS NEVER BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN ITS FUND RAISING EFFORTS OUTSIDE IRELAND AND HAS THUS NOT GENERALLY SUPPORTED FOREIGN FUND RAISING BY ANY PARTY.) HE STRESSED THAT THE DECISION ON ALLOWING FUND RAISING BY ADAMS IS OBVIOUSLY ONE FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE SO PRESUMPTUOUS AS TO ADVISE US ON WHAT WE SHOULD DO.

4. DONLON FURTHER NOTED THAT SINN FEIN AND GERRY ADAMS CAN AND DO RAISE FUNDS IN "OUR JURISDICTION". THUS IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO OPPOSE THEIR FUND RAISING ELSEWHERE.
SANDBERG

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(1.26)
KBH 7/11/2023

*Not a
ringing
endorsement,
but a
shift.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 191622Z JAN 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3503

RUEHDLAMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 2504

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000917

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH READOUT ON THIRD
ROUND OF TALKS WITH SINN FEIN

REFS: (A) 94 LONDON 19978, (B) STATE 5614,
(C) LONDON 842

SUMMARY

1. ~~(C)~~ QUENTIN THOMAS, HMG'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN ITS "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" WITH SINN FEIN, TOLD US THAT THE JANUARY 16 THIRD SESSION WAS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN THE SECOND, WITH SINN FEIN OFFERING TO USE ITS "INFLUENCE" WITH THE IRA "IN A POSITIVE WAY," WHILE STILL REJECTING THE NEED FOR EARLY DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA ARMS. HMG DANGLED THE POSSIBILITY OF MINISTERIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE TALKS BY EASTER IF PROGRESS WERE MADE BEFORE THEN, WHILE SINN FEIN ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT ANY ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO EITHER SIDE COULD BE ADDRESSED.

2. ~~(C)~~ THOMAS SAID THE BRITISH STRATEGY WAS TO ENGAGE SINN FEIN AS WIDELY AND FULLY AS POSSIBLE AND ROUTINIZE THE DIALOGUE. IT WANTED TO GET THROUGH THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT NEEDED SOME COMBINATION OF WORDS AND DEEDS ON WEAPONS TO MAKE THIS FEASIBLE. SINN FEIN, ON THE OTHER HAND, SEEMED LESS INTERESTED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION THAN IN SCORING POINTS. THOMAS HOPED THIS REFLECTED A TACTICAL EFFORT TO SQUEEZE AS MANY CONCESSIONS OUT OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE AS POSSIBLE, RATHER THAN A STRATEGIC INTENTION TO PREPARE FOR A RETURN TO VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY.

SKIRMISH ON BRIEFINGS

3. (LOU) AS HE HAD DONE AFTER THE SECOND ROUND OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE (REF A), NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS

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KBH 4/11/2023

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INVITED US JANUARY 18 TO A DEBRIEF ON THE THIRD ROUND, HELD IN BELFAST JANUARY 16.

4. (C) THOMAS SAID THE FIRST ISSUE TO ARISE IN THE MEETING HAD BEEN SINN FEIN CHIEF NEGOTIATOR MARTIN MCGUINNESS' COMPLAINT THAT THE NIO HAD BRIEFED THE USG ON THE TALKS (A CLEAR BUT IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO REF B TALKING POINT NOTING SINN FEIN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A BRITISH PAPER ON DEMILITARIZATION). IN RESPONSE, THOMAS HAD SIMPLY REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT IN THE FIRST ROUND, HMG HAD PROPOSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TALKS, WHILE SINN FEIN INSISTED ON TRANSPARENCY.

EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS

5. (LOU) AS IN THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS, THOMAS SAID, THE MEETING REVOLVED AROUND AN EXCHANGE OF POSITION PAPERS. THE BRITISH PAPER (FAXED TO EUR/UBI) CITED AREAS OF COMMON GROUND: THE DESIRABILITY OF INCLUSIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PREDETERMINED OUTCOME, AND THE NEED TO (IN JOHN HUME'S PHRASE) "TAKE THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS." BUT IT REFUTED SINN FEIN'S CHARGE THAT HMG WAS TRYING TO STALL OR ERECT BARRIERS TO PROGRESS, AND THE REPUBLICAN CLAIM THAT BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY WAS "SELF-EVIDENTLY" THE CAUSE OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT.

6. (LOU) NOTING THAT SINN FEIN'S DOCUMENT IN ROUND TWO SUGGESTED THAT FAILURE TO REACH AN "ACCEPTABLE" POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN CONFLICT, THE BRITISH PAPER ASKED: "ACCEPTABLE TO WHOM?" DID SINN FEIN INSIST ON REMOVING NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE UK "REGARDLESS OF THE WISHES OF A MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE?" WOULD IT ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF A REFERENDUM ON PROPOSALS DEVELOPED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS?

7. (LOU) THE DOCUMENT DEVOTED ONLY TWO PARAGRAPHS OUT OF 16 TO THE ARMS ISSUE. IT ACCEPTED THAT "SINN FEIN IS AN ORGANIZATION DISTINCT FROM THE IRA," BUT ASKED WHETHER SINN FEIN STILL ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF THE IRA'S ARMED STRUGGLE. IT DENIED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE DEPENDED ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING, BUT REITERATED THAT "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" MUST BE MADE DURING THE COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE.

8. (U) THE SINN FEIN DOCUMENT:

- INSISTED THAT "THE TALKS PROCESS CAN AND SHOULD NOW MOVE INTO ALL PARTY PEACE TALKS," AND THAT HMG HAD "A POLITICAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO MOVE US ALL INTO THE NEXT PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS;"
- ASSERTED THAT A "LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES ... REQUIRES THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT ENDS ITS INVOLVEMENT IN IRISH AFFAIRS";

- WELCOMED THE ENDING OF DAYLIGHT ARMY PATROLS IN BELFAST, BUT COMPLAINED THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH ARMAGH HAD INCREASED;
- CONFIRMED (AS NOTED REF C) THAT SINN FEIN WAS "TOTALLY COMMITTED TO BRINGING ABOUT THE COMPLETE AND PERMANENT REMOVAL OF ALL GUNS FROM IRISH POLITICS ... IN THE WORD (SIC) OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 'THE DECOMMISSIONING' OF ALL WEAPONS OF WAR";
- SAID (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARMS ISSUE) THAT SINN FEIN "WISH TO USE OUR INFLUENCE ON ALL MATTERS, IN A POSITIVE WAY AND WITH THE AIM OF ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS," BUT WITH THE CAVEAT THAT "HOW WE USE OUR INFLUENCE AND HOW MUCH INFLUENCE WE HAVE IS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT FOR US"; AND
- ASKED WHETHER DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA WEAPONS WAS "A PRECONDITION TO SINN FEIN'S INVOLVEMENT IN ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS." AND WHETHER FAILURE TO RESOLVE IT WOULD MEAN THAT "THE PEACE PROCESS IS AT AN END."

Is it?

9. ~~10~~ IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD GIVEN MCGUINNESS A PROPOSED "WORK PLAN" FOR THE NEXT FIVE ROUNDS OF TALKS. THE FIRST OF THESE SESSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO EXPLORING SINN FEIN'S IDEAS ON THE FORMAT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS, ANOTHER WOULD ADDRESS PRISONER CONCERNS, AND "PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE" (INCLUDING ARMS DECOMMISSIONING) WOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED UNTIL THE FOURTH ROUND (I.E. THE SEVENTH OVERALL). THOMAS SAID THE AGENDA'S STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE TALKS MORE EFFICIENT, REASSURE SINN FEIN THAT THE ARMS ISSUE WAS NOT A PRECONDITION, AND "MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR SINN FEIN TO WALK AWAY."

ORAL DISCUSSIONS

10. ~~10~~ IN DISCUSSING THE DOCUMENTS, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT SINN FEIN'S UNDERTAKING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE IRA IN A POSITIVE WAY. ESPECIALLY AS HMG BELIEVED THAT INFLUENCE TO BE GREATER THAN MCGUINNESS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED. THOMAS REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT THE IRA CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED CLOSE ON SINN FEIN PRESIDENT ADAMS' "APPEAL" TO IT, AND THAT IN THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS SINN FEIN CLAIMED IT HAD "SOUGHT AND OBTAINED" A TWO-WEEK IRA CEASEFIRE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT PARTIES OTHER THAN SINN FEIN ("LIKE THE ALLIANCE PARTY, WHICH HAS NO KNOWN PARAMILITARY WING") MIGHT ALSO WISH TO BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR, SO THERE WAS NOTHING ODD ABOUT HMG'S REQUEST TO SINN FEIN TO DO SO.

11. ~~10~~ WHEN MCGUINNESS AGAIN COMPLAINED ABOUT BEING

RESTRICTED TO DISCUSSIONS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS, THOMAS RECOUNTED, HE HAD READ OUT A NOTE REVEALING THAT THE PREVIOUS BAN ON MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN LOCAL COUNCILLORS HAD BEEN LIFTED. MINISTERS ALSO WANTED TO JOIN THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, BUT IN DECIDING WHEN TO DO SO WERE LIKELY TO CONSIDER WHETHER SINN FEIN ACCEPTED THAT "ALL NECESSARY ISSUES" (I.E. INCLUDING ARMS) WOULD BE ADDRESSED, AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE TOWARD "SERIOUS EXPLORATION" (NOT NECESSARILY RESOLUTION) ACROSS THE RANGE OF ISSUES. IF SOME PROGRESS WERE MADE IN TALKS WITH OFFICIALS, IT WAS LIKELY THAT MINISTERS WOULD BE ENGAGED BY EASTER.

12. ~~10~~ MCGUINNESS ASKED WHETHER HMG'S DECISION TO PUBLISH ITS PROPOSALS ON INTERNAL DEVOLUTION SEPARATELY FROM THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MEANT THAT IT WAS "WALKING AWAY" FROM THE THREE-STRAND PROCESS. RATHER THE REVERSE, THOMAS EXPLAINED: THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT COULD NOT ADDRESS STRAND ONE, SINCE DUBLIN WAS NOT A PARTY TO THOSE TALKS, AND SIMULTANEOUS PUBLICATION WAS MEANT TO REINFORCE THE LINKS AMONG THE STRANDS.

13. ~~10~~ THOMAS SAID SINN FEIN HAD RAISED ORALLY A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS:

- PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S MEETING WITH NORTHERN IRELAND'S MAYORS AND COUNCIL LEADERS, NONE OF WHOM WAS SINN FEIN (THOMAS DENIED THIS WAS DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE SINN FEIN, SINCE ALLIANCE HAD THE SAME PROBLEM);
- HMG'S REFUSAL TO FUND NORTHERN IRELAND'S ONLY IRISH-LANGUAGE SECONDARY SCHOOL (WE UNDERSTAND THIS IS LIKELY, THOUGH THE SCHOOL DOES NOT MEET NORMAL CRITERIA);
- 9 CURTAILMENT OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AN IRA PRISONER IN ENGLAND AND HIS WIFE WHEN THEY INSISTED ON SPEAKING IRISH;
- DELAYS IN TRANSFER OF IRA PRISONERS FROM ENGLAND TO NORTHERN IRELAND;
- SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF AT LEAST ONE IRA PRISONER IN ENGLAND; AND
- POLICE SEARCH OF A HOUSE IN BELFAST AFTER A MAN WAS SEEN ENTERING WITH A RIFLE (IT TURNED OUT TO BE LICENSED).

14. ~~10~~ IN TURN, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRA PUNISHMENT BEATINGS. MCGUINNESS WOULD NOT AGREE TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE BEATINGS, BUT

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SAID ADAMS AND OTHERS HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR DISAPPROVAL OF THE PRACTICE. SINN FEIN ALSO DECLINED AGAIN TO AGREE TO A JOINT PRESS RELEASE, BUT OFFERED NO OBJECTION TO THE BRITISH DRAFT, WHICH STRESSED AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY EITHER SIDE WOULD BE EXCLUDED.

15. ~~(S)~~ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WORK PLAN, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD PROPOSED STEPPING UP THE FREQUENCY OF THE MEETINGS TO ONE PER WEEK. MCGUINNESS DID NOT ADDRESS THE OVERALL FREQUENCY QUESTION, BUT SAID THE EARLIEST DATE FOR THE NEXT SESSION WOULD BE FEBRUARY 1, TO WHICH THOMAS AGREED. THOMAS NOTED IRONICALLY THAT SINN FEIN AS AGAIN SLOWING THE PACE, WHILE CONTINUING TO ACCUSE HMG OF FOOT-DRAGGING.

ATMOSPHERE AND STRATEGY

16. ~~(S)~~ THOMAS SAID THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE THIRD ROUND HAD BEEN MUCH LIGHTER AND MORE RELAXED THAN IN ROUND TWO. HE SENSED -- AND HOPED -- THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS BECOMING "ROUTINIZED." HMG WANTED TO LOCK SINN FEIN INTO LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY DEMONSTRATING THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE THROUGH DIALOGUE ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO ITS SUPPORTERS. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY THROUGH THE EXPLORATORY AND MINISTERIAL DIALOGUES INTO RENEWED ALL-PARTY TALKS, BUT NEEDED SOME PROGRESS ON ARMS IN ORDER TO DO SO. THIS COULD CONSIST OF ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF COMBINATIONS OF WORDS AND DEEDS.

17. ~~(S)~~ THOMAS STRESSED THAT HMG WAS NOT TRYING TO PUSH THE REPUBLICANS INTO A CORNER ON ARMS; IN FACT, BY USING THE DELIBERATELY VAGUE FORMULATION OF "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS," IT WAS TRYING TO LET THEM OFF THE HOOK. SINN FEIN (AND SOME IN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT) SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT HMG COULD "DELIVER" THE UNIONISTS REGARDLESS OF WHAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA DID; THIS WAS MANIFESTLY NOT THE CASE. THE UNIONISTS HAD NO VETO ON SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN AN INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE, BUT THEY DID HAVE A VETO ON THEIR OWN PARTICIPATION; AND WITHOUT THEM, THERE COULD BE NO GENUINELY INCLUSIVE TALKS.

18. ~~(S)~~ AS FOR SINN FEIN, THOMAS SAID, IT HAD BEGUN TO ADDRESS A WIDER RANGE OF ISSUES, BUT STILL SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN SCORING PROPAGANDA POINTS THAN IN TALKING SERIOUSLY. MCGUINNESS BRIEFED THE PRESS ON SINN FEIN'S COMPLAINTS BEFORE EACH SESSION, REPEATED THEM IN THE MEETING, AND REPEATED THEM AGAIN TO THE PRESS AFTERWARD AS IF THE BRITISH HAD SAID NOTHING IN RESPONSE. HE INSISTED IN EACH MEETING THAT "THE WHOLE WORLD" (PARTICULARLY DUBLIN AND WASHINGTON) SUPPORTED SINN FEIN'S POSITIONS. IN ROUND THREE, THOMAS HAD REBUTTED THIS BY QUOTING PRIME MINISTER BRUTON'S STATEMENT IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DOWNING STREET THAT "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING HAD TO BE MADE "IN THE PRESENT PHASE."

19. ~~let~~ HOWEVER, THOMAS CONCLUDED, HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT ADAMS AND THE GROUP AROUND HIM WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND THAT MOST OF THEIR HARDLINE RHETORIC WAS INTENDED FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION. THEY WERE, UNDERSTANDABLY, TRYING TO "GET THE BEST PRICE THEY CAN" FOR THE IRA CEASEFIRE, WRESTING MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS WHILE GIVING LITTLE AWAY AND TRYING TO KEEP THE MORAL HIGH GROUND. IN THE END, HE HOPED, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR FAR LESS THAN THEIR OFFICIAL DEMANDS -- IF THEY COULD GET ENOUGH OF THE IRA TO GO ALONG. THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY HAD CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A RETURN TO VIOLENCE, BUT THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE THEIR PREFERRED OPTION. CROWE

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UK were sent as planned.

but

"substantive progress"

of most defence —

or else no UN involvement

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
021. cable	re: Assessment of Irish Terrorism in the United Kingdom During January 1995 (8 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-Fundraising, 1995

2011-0355-F
rs1646

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Active

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Appel, Edward J.
To: Clarke, Richard A.; @INTEL - Intelligence Programs; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor;
Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED] PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) CONNECTED WITH
BRINKS ARMORED CAR ROBBERY IN SF, CA 2/27/95
Date: Wednesday, March 01, 1995 7:23PM

The FBI reports that evidence points to a Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) connection with the armed robbery of a Brinks truck in San Francisco (SF), CA, 2/27/95.

Two persons later identified as JAMES M. DELANEY and PHILIP ANDREW QUINN confronted a Brinks Armored Car guard as he exited a Lucky Grocery Store with the weekend receipts. One brandished a weapon and ordered the guard to the floor. In the ensuing struggle, the guard was shot with a semi-automatic handgun and pistol whipped. He survived due to the bullet striking his bulletproof vest. The guard's gun and about \$112,000 cash, \$100,000 in checks and \$16,000 in food stamps were taken. The subjects fled and were observed by a witness driving a getaway car.

The subjects' car was located at a motel in Millbrae, CA and police apprehended the two as they exited their room. A search (by consent) revealed the stolen money and two guns, including the guard's. The suspects were taken to SF Police Dept. and interviewed separately. DELANEY declined to admit any involvement. QUINN admitted his involvement but denied shooting the guard.

In subsequent interview by the FBI, QUINN advised that he is a Protestant from Northern Ireland who came to US at the direction of a splinter group of the PIRA to courier money back to Northern Ireland. He claimed the PIRA splinter is preparing to counter expected breaking of the peace by a Protestant group, and the money would be used for that purpose. QUINN, who claimed he is apolitical, decided to come to the US to erase a substantial debt.

QUINN claimed that the night before the robbery, he was directed by telephone from Northern Ireland to participate and he did so out of fear for his family. During the robbery, he did not have a gun, but took the guard's gun and exchanged shots with the driver and shot at the store guard. DELANEY directed QUINN in casing the Lucky Store and a second location, a Safeway Store. QUINN denied any personal political motivation in his actions, taken to erase his debt and protect his family.

DELANEY and QUINN are both citizens of Northern Ireland. DELANEY is a permanent resident alien in the US and QUINN is on a visitor's visa, both having arrived 2/15/95 on separate flights. QUINN believed he was chosen due to his wife BRENDA's employment with British Airways, facilitating travel at minimal expense and few security checks.

DELANEY and QUINN face CA State felony charges of two counts of attempted murder, one count of armed robbery, one count of burglary and one count of possession of stolen property. DELANEY had in his possession documents showing arrival in CA as early as 1981; that he used the address of a PIRA supporter previously convicted of sending weapons to Ireland; was associated with a prominent SF PIRA supporter; and may have other US-based PIRA associations.

While records checked to date fail to show prior QUINN association with PIRA activities in Northern Ireland (or anything political), DELANEY was arrested in 1976 and charged with possession of a weapon under suspicious circumstances. He was sentenced to two years suspended. He is suspected of involvement in armed robberies in Northern Ireland in 1980 and 1985.

FBI investigation continues to ascertain connections of these individuals and the nature of PIRA associations and activities indicated. There is also a suspicion that PIRA may have been involved in a series of armored car robberies in the US since 1986, and the FBI is investigating this possibility.

COMMENT: Clear, strong connections between at least DELANEY and PIRA have been shown by the preliminary FBI investigation. The individuals with whom DELANEY has already been connected by evidence at the scene are known, active PIRA supporters in SF. Preliminary review of the evidence indicates that QUINN's claim that the purpose of the robbery was to raise money for a PIRA splinter group appears to have merit. There is no further verification of the splinter group or its activities/purposes, as yet.

456:6235. Ann Stock.

To Nancy Soderberg

From Tim Phillips

Re March 17th Reception

Nancy:

Attached are my suggestions for the White House reception:

Timothy Phillips
Foundation for a Civil Society
2000 Commonwealth Avenue #1205
Boston, MA 02135
617/224-1125

Eric Nonacs
Foundation for a Civil Society
1270 Avenue of the Americas
Suite 609
New York, New York 10020
212/332-2890

Wendy Luers
Foundation for a Civil Society
1270 Avenue of the Americas
Suite 609
New York, New York 10020
212/332-2890

Paul Arthur
Chair, Department of Politics
University of Ulster
4 Carrisbrooke Terrace
Bangor, Co. Down BT20 5JA
Northern Ireland

Maurice Hayes
Chairman, Irish Advisory Board
American Ireland Fund
Former Ombudsman, Northern Ireland
~~Executive Director~~

To ADS
Kathy St.

Can we include
in Irish Reception?
they are organizing
a conference in June
& would be worth having
w.

5 Bullseye Park
Downpatrick
Co. Down BT30 6RX

FBI 2/93

Assessment of targets.

i in procurement cutmees. 140 investigations
are continuing procurement efforts, discussing costs.
Chicago to NY transported weapons, night vision equipment

fugitive investigations - major fugitives - pt of contact.

no weapons procurement in U.S.
talking to News

maintaining operational capability.

storing weapons in U.S.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 171806Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4892
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2589
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 002639

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.29)
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER UK EI

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF'S MEETING WITH RON LYNE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

THE PEACE PROCESS

2. PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S AIDE, ROD LYNE, TOLD VISITING UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF FEB. 17 THAT HMG WAS IN THE MIDST OF A MOST DIFFICULT PHASE OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. THERE WAS ANGER IN THE UNIONIST CAMP AND AMONG TORY SUPPORTERS OVER THE DRAFT JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD). AT THE SAME TIME, SINN FEIN/IRA HAD OFFERED NO REAL MOVEMENT ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF ARMS/EXPLOSIVES DECOMMISSIONING. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CABINET MEMBERS WHO BELIEVED THE JFD WAS "TOO GREEN" AND WOULD LEAD TO A CLEAVAGE WITH THE UNIONISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. THE CABINET SESSIONS ON FEB. 15 AND 16 HAD BEEN DIFFICULT -- A POINT FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD MADE TO THE AMBASSADOR ON FEB. 16 (REF A).

3. DESPITE PRONOUNCED DIFFERENCES AMONG MINISTERS, HMG HAD DECIDED TO AUTHORIZE MAYHEW TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS; HE WOULD MEET DICK SPRING ON SATURDAY, FEB. 18. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE JFD WOULD BE REACHED AT THIS MEETING. THE CABINET WOULD THEN MEET AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK TO GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE DOCUMENT. IT WAS POSSIBLE THE JFD WOULD BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS WEDNESDAY, FEB. 22. LYNE STRESSED THAT HMG WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY AS THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BEING INCREASINGLY POISONED BY UNIONIST CHARGES OF A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SELLOUT -- ASSERTIONS WHICH THOUGH INCORRECT WERE FINDING RESONANCE AMONG SOME TORIES.

4. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, LYNE THOUGHT THAT, ON BALANCE, THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD REMAIN ON TRACK THOUGH THE UNIONISTS MIGHT NOT COME TO THE TABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE JFD. AN ACTUAL AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, MIGHT TAKE YEARS.

THE UNIONISTS

5. LYNE SAID THEY HAD BEEN POORLY HANDLED BY DUBLIN HICH HAD REINFORCED THEIR FEARS VIA A SERIES OF LEAKS IN RECENT MONTHS. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR TO HMG WHERE THE "TIMES" LEAK HAD ORIGINATED. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS UUP MP DAVID TRIMBLE AND HIS ALLY DAVID BURNSIDE WHO WERE DRIVING THE UNIONIST REACTION. TRIMBLE WAS SEEKING TO CREATE A UNIONIST FRONT AND REPLACE MOLYNEAUX AS UUP LEADER. HE WAS PREPARED TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT AND, ALONG WITH UUP MPS JOHN TAYLOR AND WILLIAM ROSS (NOMINALLY A MOLYNEAUX SUPPORTER BUT ANXIOUS TO GUARD HIS FLANK IN THE STRUGGLE TO SUCCEED THE UUP LEADER) WAS "MADLY" BRIEFING TORY BACKBENCHERS AND MINISTERS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S ABANDONMENT OF UNIONIST PRINCIPLES. THEY WERE WRONGLY CLAIMING THAT THE JFD WAS A SLIPPERY SLOPE TO A UNITED IRELAND. THE SCENE HAD BEEN SET FOR A NASTY UNIONIST REACTION TO THE JFD THOUGH LYNE DID NOT EXPECT THE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES WHICH ACCOMPANIED SUNNINGDALE AND THE 1985 ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THERE WAS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT THE HARDLINE UNIONISTS WOULD SHORTLY INTRODUCE THEIR OWN PAPER TO PRE-EMPT LONDON AND DUBLIN.

SINN FEIN

6. SINN FEIN/IRA (LYNE POINTEDLY NOTED THAT SEVERAL F THE SINN FEIN NEGOTIATORS WERE KNOWN IRA MEMBERS) WAS STILL ENGAGED IN A MATING DANCE WITH HMG IN THEIR BILATERAL TALKS. THEY WERE PRESSURING THE BRITISH TO ALLOW THEM TO UPGRADE THE TALKS TO MINISTERIAL LEVEL EVEN WHILE THEY REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF ARMS

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

DECOMMISSIONING. THE BRITISH HAD MADE CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN MUST ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT ARMS MUST BE DEALT WITH AND ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW THEY WOULD DECOMMISSION. HMG COULD NOT MOVE TO A MINISTERIAL LEVEL IF, AS IS NOW THE CASE, SINN FEIN REFUSED EVEN TO ENGAGE ON THIS ISSUE. THE BRITISH RECOGNIZED THAT ADAMS WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURE FROM THE IRA BUT THEY COULD NOT ALLOW SINN FEIN TO LEVER BRITAIN WITH THIS ARGUMENT AT EVERY STEP IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, LYNE REITERATED THAT THE NEXT DAYS WOULD BE VERY ROCKY. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT A DECISION BY THE U.S. TO CHANGE ITS STANCE ON FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS NOW WOULD BE A "VERY BAD MISTAKE."

8. UNDR SECRETARY TARNOFF DID NOT CLEAR ON THIS CABLE. DEAL

BT

#2639

NNNN

<MSGID> M1523626

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 17, 1995

TO: NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: ALAN KRECZKO *AK*

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams

Although I told DOJ I didn't need immediate input from the AG, I guess they couldn't resist the opportunity. You certainly read the body language right.

cc: Kathy Stephens

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
024. memo	Attorney General Reno to Anthony Lake re: Gerry Adams Visa [2 copies] (4 pages)	02/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-Fundraising, 1995

2011-0355-F
rs1646

RESTRICTION CODES

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- Peace Process - Downing St. Decl. Decl 5

IRA cease Aug 31

PARAM. Oct.

- Series meetings with British SF.
- Positive comments on framework document.
- decommissioning talks.
- Our role supportive - Unionists.
 TZ - Molyneaux - Unionists Jeffrey
 Donaldson, Nicholson
- NOT agenda. → to get to talks.
- ON Basis of Adams, agreed to talk
 @ decommissioning.

urging for some time.

INR

Northern Ireland: Peace Process Enters Crucial Phase

Efforts to make the peace process irreversible are reaching a critical point. Exploratory talks with Sinn Fein have been blocked by its refusal to make significant moves on decommissioning weapons; the Unionists have threatened to bring down Prime Minister Major's government if it proposes north-south bodies with executive power. Whether the obduracy on both sides is tactical or represents a real threat to peace should be known soon.

No progress on arms

After three rounds of talks with Sinn Fein and four with political representatives of the Loyalist paramilitaries, Britain has made scant progress on decommissioning arms. Sinn Fein has abandoned the pretense that it has no influence on the IRA but continues to insist the subject can be considered only in the context of an overall settlement. The Loyalists have maintained much the same position, though — as in the case of the cease-fire — they are unlikely to prevent progress if the Republicans are prepared to move ahead.

The British have told us their position that "substantial progress" on arms must be made before inviting Sinn Fein to all-party political talks was meant to provide maximum flexibility. London is not demanding the surrender of all arms but does insist the paramilitaries make some gestures. If not, they say, subsequent talks will be useless, since the Unionists will boycott them.

Publicly and privately, Gerry Adams has bitterly criticized the British over this issue, alleging it is merely a British delaying tactic and that there is no precedent in Irish history for such a move. Instead, he has pressed for release of "political prisoners," participation of British ministers in talks with Sinn Fein, "demilitarization" of Northern Ireland (while scoffing at steps already taken to reduce British patrols), and permission to raise funds in the United States. If Sinn Fein does not receive "parity of esteem" with other Northern Irish parties, Adams predicts a crisis in the peace process by February 15.

Adams, a tough, shrewd negotiator, could well be taking this position for tactical reasons. North-

ern Ireland Secretary Mayhew seems to believe the issue can be resolved and is willing to make concessions in other areas, though others in the British government are less sanguine.

Talks move forward

Meanwhile the British and Irish governments have almost completed their discussions on the "framework document" they intend to present to the Northern Irish parties in renewed political talks. Mayhew and Irish Foreign Minister Spring made further progress in a January 26 meeting and still hope to have a document ready for publication in late February — possibly following a summit meeting between Major and Prime Minister Bruton.

The key outstanding items remain changes in the Irish constitution and in cross-border administrative bodies intended to improve north-south links by handling matters of common interest: at least at first, relatively non-controversial ones like trade and tourism.

Now that the Unionists' fears over the status of Northern Ireland have been allayed by assurances that any change would be subject to a referendum in the North, they have directed their anxieties toward the cross-border bodies. They insist that those entities not have executive power — that is, that any decisions taken be subject to approval by whatever local government is established in Northern Ireland.

The Unionists went so far as to threaten to defeat the Major government on a vote on EU fishing policy over this issue, winning an assurance that fisheries would not be included in any body with

INR

executive powers. Major has also pledged that the framework document would not give Dublin "joint authority over the affairs of Northern Ireland."

Though the survival of Major's cabinet hangs by a thread, Unionist threats are not entirely credible. If they forced an immediate election, in which — as polls now indicate — Labor would win a large majority, the Unionists' influence as holders of the balance of power in parliament would end. More-

over, a Labor government is more likely to be sympathetic to the Nationalists than is Major's.

The seriousness of threats to the peace process will be better measured after publication of the framework document — possibly in mid-February. Though criticism from all sides can be expected — and would be a sign of the document's impartiality — the parties' willingness then to continue with the process will indicate whether peace can last.

(CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

2/15

Sean Donlon - we don't like it. 6-8 weeks ago,
decided some things need to do. Balance SF +
Unionists. Joint framework document now completed
& launched very quickly. Good to get out in open,
will be seen as pro-Unionists. vs that background,
Want confidence building measures, fundraising.
Question then was today. Not be able to reach
agreement in London. Not realistic any prospect
to move as quickly as Brits want. Of
understanding

Not making progress on some issues; can't speed up
progress. Could try & help.

Slightly concerned that if goes thru St. Pats.

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: ROUTINE

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED

DTG:021100Z FEB 95

FM: AMCONSUL BELFAST

TO:

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8251

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7704

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5535

UNCLAS BELFAST 0053

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: SDLP LEADER CALLS FOR PARAMILITARIES TO SURRENDER
EXPLOSIVES

1. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) LEADER JOHN HUME CALLED ON BOTH THE PROVISIONAL IRA AND THE LOYALIST GROUPS TO SURRENDER THEIR STOCKS OF EXPLOSIVES. HUME, SPEAKING OVER THE WEEKEND OF FEBRUARY 4-5, NOTED THAT IF THE VIOLENCE WERE TRULY OVER -- AND HE SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS -- "THE EXPLOSIVES HAVE TO GO." HUME AGREED THAT IF THE IRA AND LOYALISTS DUMPED ALL OF THEIR EXPLOSIVES NOW, THEN THE ISSUES OF PRISONERS AND THE DECOMMISSIONING OF OTHER WEAPONS COULD MORE EASILY BE ADDRESSED AT A LATER DATE AND AS PART OF A BROADER PROCESS.

2. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) SPOKESMAN KEN MAGINNIS WELCOMED HUMES COMMENTS, SAYING THE SDLP LEADER HAD TAKEN A "POSITIVE STANCE." MAGINNIS SAID THAT EXPLOSIVES WERE AN OBVIOUS STARTING POINT FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND HE CALLED ON THE IRA AND THE LOYALISTS TO HEED HUMES WORDS.

MARTINEZ

BT

#0053

NNNN

<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN> 0053

<^TOR> 950206175025 M1499780

UNCLASSIFIED

To: Nancy Soderberg -
Did you see this?
Kathy

PM-White House-Adams, 3rd Ld-Writethru, a0555,390

Sinn Fein Leader to Meet With Clinton

EDS: RECASTS top 4 grafs

By TERENCE HUNT= AP White House Correspondent=

WASHINGTON (AP) Rewarding steps toward peace, the White House will invite Gerry Adams, leader of the Irish Republican Army-allied Sinn Fein party, to meet with President Clinton at a St. Patrick's Day reception next week.

Adams also will be allowed to engage in fund-raising on this visit, reversing a ban imposed during earlier trips, White House press secretary Mike McCurry said today.

McCurry said Sinn Fein had promised that the money would be used only for peaceful political purposes and not to buy weapons.

Adams' meeting with Clinton is symbolically important, the first ever between an American president and a leader Sinn Fein, the legal political party that supports the outlawed IRA. In December, Adams visited the White House, meeting with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Clinton and Vice President Al Gore pointedly did not drop in on the meeting.

Last Sept. 1, the IRA began a cease-fire, ending 24 years of bombings and assassinations aimed at ending British rule in Northern Ireland. Protestant gunmen declared their own cease-fire in mid-October.

Adams' visa will allow him to make repeated visits over three months, McCurry said.

He said Adams would be invited to a White House reception March 17, along with other people involved in the peace process in Northern Ireland.

McCurry said that Clinton, himself, decided to grant Adams a visa. He said the decision was influenced by Sinn Fein's statement to enter into discussions on disposing of the IRA's weapons.

Explaining the decision to allow Adams to engage in fund-raising, McCurry said, ``We've made it clear to him that we expect that any and all funds that are raised will be used for legitimate political party activities which serve to reinforce Sinn Fein's commitment to the peace process.''

Adams has been allowed to visit the United States twice before over British objections. He's said his party will open an office in Washington during his visit and that he plans to visit New York, Boston and possibly other East Coast cities.

McCurry refused to say whether the British government sanctioned Adams' visit. ``I don't speak for them. They have followed these developments very closely.''

**** filed by:APE(--) on 03/09/95 at 12:19EST ****

**** printed by:WHPR(JGER) on 03/09/95 at 12:23EST ****

INFORMATION TO BE USED WITH GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN
OFFICIALS CONCERNING LIST OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

-- THE LIST OF IRISH "POLITICAL PRISONERS" LEFT BY SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS ON 12/5 WAS FORWARDED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

-- THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS REVIEWED THE LISTS AND HAS MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

-- THE MAJORITY OF THE CASES ON THE LIST ARE EXTRADITION OR DEPORTATION/POLITICAL ASYLUM CASES PRESENTLY BEFORE A COURT OR ON APPEAL;

-- IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO COMMENT ON THE MERITS OF CASES BEFORE A COURT;

-- UNDER THE TERMS OF THE EXTRADITION TREATY IN FORCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST PURSUE AN EXTRADITION REQUEST FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH THE RELEVANT U.S. COURT;

-- CASES THAT INVOLVE THE VIOLATION OF U.S. LAWS WILL BE PROSECUTED;

-- PRISONERS SERVING A SENTENCE FOR A U.S. CONVICTION COULD ONLY BE TRANSFERRED TO IRELAND IF A TREATY EXISTED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRELAND PERMITTING THE RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OR IF IRELAND RATIFIED THE CONVENTION ON THE TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PRISONERS (STRASBOURG TREATY).



Sinn Féin

...news release...

For immediate release
16th January 1995

Sinn Féin's opening statement to British Officials at Stormont

In our opening statement to you, we outlined our view that democratic, political and practical imperatives require the open involvement and inclusion of all political views if a democratic resolution to the conflict is to be sought and achieved. Democratic reasons clearly determine that Sinn Féin's right to represent its electorate and to promote its analysis should be accepted and acted upon immediately and publicly. This is the basis upon which we entered into dialogue.

Sinn Féin has consistently stated, over a protracted period, that we seek a complete demilitarisation of the situation; that we seek the removal forever of all guns - British, unionist, loyalist and republican - from Irish politics.

Everyone has an influence over the present situation. The collective application of that influence can transform the political climate and put an end to the failures of the past.

Only a lasting peace settlement will achieve this and a peace settlement must include the permanent removal of all guns from Irish politics.

The evidence of our sad and tragic history wholly supports that. That is the logic of a peace process.

This is our third meeting with you. It is our opinion that the talks process can and should now move into all party peace talks, led by both governments, as the necessary next stage in the negotiation of a real and lasting political settlement in Ireland. We believe that this opinion is shared by an overwhelming majority of people on these islands and people of goodwill towards the Irish and British peoples in the international community.

The initiative taken by the IRA and the potential that initiative provides to transform Irish society has been universally recognised and welcomed. The Irish and US governments have already responded positively. The British government, however, has the central role in play in turning the potential for a lasting settlement into a reality. We believe that the British Government has a political and moral responsibility to move us all into the next phase of the peace process.

In attempting to progress towards that position republicans have consistently demonstrated a willingness to be reasonable and flexible. We are convinced that if the political will exists that we can finally remove the causes of conflict through the achievement of a democratic political settlement. We now have an unprecedented opportunity to build a lasting peace. The effective application for the first time of democratic principles, and the achievement of a political settlement on this basis, is the only way to permanently remove conflict. The potentially historic opportunity which currently exists cannot be lost.

We feel that the issues raised by us in this meeting and at our two previous meetings deserve direct and open responses. In the document which we presented to you at our second meeting on 19th December we asked you the following questions;

1. When do you intend to initiate, with the Dublin government, all party talks?
2. What format will these talks follow?
3. How will the various parties to the negotiations, including the British government, be represented?
4. Where will these talks take place?
5. What time-scale do you envisage for these talks?

We anticipate that you will provide us with answers to these questions at today's meeting.

We also wish to deal with your government's stance on the issue of IRA weapons.

Sinn Féin is totally committed to bringing about the complete and permanent removal of all guns from Irish politics. To bring about, in the word of the British government, 'the decommissioning' of all weapons of war. Without this commitment the peace process would not have been brought to its present position. The most important element in bringing the situation to this point, as is universally acknowledged, was the IRA's announcement of 31 August 1994. In our view the British government know this.

Attempts, therefore, to link the issue of the IRA's weapons to your continued refusal to recognise the rights of the Sinn Féin electorate are disingenuous. We are concerned, therefore, that the British government's position on the decommissioning of IRA weapons is, at best, a stalling tactic, at worst an attempt to create a situation of crisis in the peace process around the issue. This must be avoided. Our position on this matter is transparent. We wish to use our influence on all matters, in a positive way and with the aim of advancing the peace process. How we use our influence and how much influence we have is a matter of judgment for us.

Be assured of our commitment but be assured also that efforts by you to subvert the integrity of Sinn Féin's position on the rights of our electorate a pretext for stalling the peace process will serve only to undermine and subvert the peace process itself.

Sinn Féin wishes to see a lasting settlement based on democratic principles. In our view this requires that your government ends its involvement in Irish affairs (an involvement which has had destructive and painful consequences for both our peoples) and returns to the Irish people our right to national self-determination. These core political issues are the task of inclusive negotiations.

Inclusive dialogue and negotiations are, therefore, necessary and inevitable if this conflict is to be resolved on a democratic basis. Pre-conditions represent obstacles to peace. They are a distraction from and a barrier to the necessary negotiation.

Inclusive negotiations, without vetoes or preconditions should begin immediately. Sinn Féin, as a democratically mandated political party, must be involved fully in these negotiations.

It is, of course, essential, in this context, that Sinn Féin and our voters are immediately accorded equality of treatment.

In addition we are convinced that the political climate would be significantly improved if your government responded positively to the need for a demilitarisation of the situation. You need to show that you are committed to the peace process. The announcement on Thursday 12th January of a curtailment of British Army operations in Belfast is a welcome step in that direction. We are concerned, however, that British military operations, including the activities of the RUC, have continued unchanged in some areas. In fact, in some areas, most noticeably South Armagh, the actions of your military forces have been increased. A complete end to British military operations and the speedy release of all political prisoners, for example, would greatly assist the peace process. While such issues are not, and should not be preconditions to inclusive dialogue, we would again urge you to address them as a matter of urgency.

The most urgent task facing the people of Ireland and Britain is to advance the peace process setting democracy, equality, justice and political stability as its clear objectives. Dialogue and all-embracing negotiations in the context of democratic principles must be the means to that end.

Sinn Féin is fully committed to that position. This was underlined publicly by the Sinn Féin President, Gerry Adams, in a joint statement, issued with the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds and the SDLP leader John Hume on 6th September 1994, which stated:

"We are at the beginning of a new era in which we are totally committed to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving our political problems. We reiterate that our objective is an equitable and lasting agreement that can command the allegiance of all."

Furthermore, given the public statements made by British government ministers over the past weeks we would additionally ask you to answer the following questions;

6. Is it the British government's position that the decommissioning of IRA weapons is a precondition to Sinn Féin's involvement in all party negotiations?

7. Is it the British government's position that, unless this issue is dealt with to your satisfaction, that we cannot move to inclusive peace talks and that, consequently, the peace process is at an end?

The British government has said that other political parties will not agree to Sinn Féin's participation in the negotiation process until the decommissioning of IRA weapons has occurred. In real terms this means that the unionist parties are now being given a veto over Sinn Féin's participation in inclusive peace talks.

8. Is it, therefore, the British government's position that other political parties can exercise a veto over Sinn Féin's involvement in all party negotiations?

16 January 1995

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PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 251537Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7041
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2629
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3328
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
UNCLAS DUBLIN 000392

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: TAOISEACH'S DAIL COMMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 00335

1. DURING DAIL QUESTION TIME ON JANUARY 24, TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON SAID IN REGARD TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS THAT:

-- HE WAS NOT/NOT SEEKING JOINT AUTHORITY OVER NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT;

-- "GOOD PROGRESS" HAD BEEN MADE IN TALKS ON THE DOCUMENT SINCE HIS CHRISTMAS MEETING WITH JOHN MAJOR, AND HE WAS "HOPEFUL" THAT ALL REMAINING ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED "IN THE NEAR FUTURE";

-- THE TIMING OF HIS NEXT MEETING WITH MAJOR WOULD BE DETERMINED IN THAT CONTEXT;

-- THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WAS THAT THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS WAS NOT/NOT A PRE-CONDITION FOR SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS; "THE POSITION OF SOME OTHER PARTIES, HOWEVER, WOULD SUGGEST THAT PROGRESS ON THAT ISSUE IS REQUIRED IN ADVANCE OF SUCH TALKS;

-- "I WELCOME THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE TO DATE IN EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE QUESTION OF ARMS IS A REAL PROBLEM (WHICH) MUST BE WORKED AT STEADILY AND WITH PATIENCE";

-- IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT BE BALANCED AND THAT IT RECOGNIZE "THE BIRTHRIGHT OF BOTH

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PAGE 02 OF 02

COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTH";

-- THE DOCUMENT WOULD PROVIDE FOR CROSS-BORDER BODIES WITH EXECUTIVE POWERS ACCOUNTABLE TO A NORTHERN ASSEMBLY AND TO THE DAIL;

-- NO AREA IS EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE FROM THE JURISDICTION OF SUCH BODIES;

-- THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT/NOT PLANNING TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT; THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL CONSTITUTE AN UNDERSTANDING BY THE GOVERNMENTS ON THE OUTLINE OF A FAIR AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT AND FORM THE BASIS FOR A PROCESS OF DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THEM AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND;

-- THE OUTCOME WILL BE PUT TO REFERENDA BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH;

-- THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL SOON INTRODUCE A BILL TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY PREVAILING SINCE 1976;

-- HE DOES NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT A "VOTING PACT" EXISTS BETWEEN MAJOR AND THE UNIONISTS.

2. TANAISTE/FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING LATER TOLD THE DAIL THAT THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN REGARD TO THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WERE NORTH/SOUTH INSTITUTIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS AND THE EU DIMENSION. SANDBERG


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January 20, 1995 telcon w/Amb. Smith 9:23am

Prime Minister's Statement on Sinn Fein

The reservation discussed with me have been lifted. The decision is one for the US to make. Sinn Fein can and does raise funds in our jurisdictions in Ireland and therefore it would be inconsistent and inappropriate to oppose their fundraising elsewhere.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500869
RECEIVED: 08 FEB 95 10

TO: LAKE

FROM: ADAMS, GERRY

DOC DATE: 31 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRELAND

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM ADAMS OF SEIN FEIN RE ANGOL - IRISH PEACE PROCESS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 11 FEB 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: STEPHENS

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0869



GERRY ADAMS

President of Sinn Féin

51/55 Bóthar na bhFál, Béal Feirste BT12 4PD

Private and Confidential

Mr. Anthony Lake,
National Security Council,
The White House,
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20500,
U.S.A.

31 January, 1995.

Anthony a'chara,

Almost a year has passed since I was first granted a visa to visit the U.S.A.,. From then until the end of last year considerable progress was made in the creation of the peace process, not least because of the U.S.A. interest and engagement with this process.

In the last few months, and particularly since our very useful meeting at the White House on December 6th, this progress has been at a much reduced level. This is particularly so regarding the issue of visas for a number of named Sinn Féin representatives and on the issue of fundraising where there has been no movement.

PLEASE STAFF

URGENT

Soderberg
→ Stephens (for action)
cc Lake

During our meeting you will recall I asked not only for permission to fundraise; I also asked, if for whatever reason this could not be granted for the end of January, that I be given the timescale by which this could be granted. At our meeting and at an earlier meeting in the State Department this request was received very positively and I was told that I would be given such a timescale. This has not been forthcoming.)?

I was also asked to submit a list of Sinn Féin representatives requiring visa waivers so that these could be processed en bloc. I supplied this list in Washington. Two months later we are still awaiting a response.)

You will appreciate my concern at the lack of progress, especially in the context of the very real potential for a crisis in the process here in Ireland, as a result of the delaying tactics being employed by the British government. (Find enclosed a briefing paper which reviews these matters from the Sinn Féin perspective.)

My concern is aggravated at this time because it appears that the minimalist British stance is reflected also in the Whitehouse attitude to the above matters. Indeed the London government permits fundraising and has lifted exclusion orders. It is little wonder that Washington's attitude is seen to be at the behest of the British government. Certainly that is how this is being projected by the London media. All of this has a damaging effect at this very delicate phase of the process. I would be obliged therefore if you could give the visa waivers and my request for permission to fundraise, or a timescale on this, your urgent attention.

Is mise le meas.



G. Adams,

President of Sinn Féin

SINN FÉIN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION

25 JANUARY 1995

BY GERRY ADAMS

PRESIDENT OF SINN FÉIN

Attention John Taylor:

1995 will be a decisive year in Anglo-Irish relationships. The peace process which came to public prominence in 1993 and which moved the entire situation forward in 1994 must move forward even further in 1995; that much is at least obvious if we are to secure a peace settlement.

1994 was an amazing year. Great work was done. But we have not yet got peace. Justice remains absent from any of the institutions in the occupied area, British troops continue their military activities, the prisons remain full and the real peace talks have yet to begin. So there is a lot of work to be done.

Looking back on 1994 one gets some sense of the type of year it was by reflecting briefly on the week before Christmas. In that one week there were four meetings. These were between Sinn Féin and the British government representatives at Stormont; between Sinn Féin and Fianna Fail - now the main party of opposition in Dublin; between a delegation of Sinn Féin and the SDLP and between myself and the new Taoiseach John Bruton. These meetings are a sign of how much the parameters have been publicly shifted in the recent past. Most sceptics would have scoffed at the notion of such get-togethers. Now they are taken for granted. This is important. We have all come a long way and there is great hope and expectation.

But how far the situation can be moved along in this new year depends on whether the British government is willing to tackle the core issues which cause conflict in Ireland. There is widespread concern throughout nationalist Ireland about the seriousness of Mr Major and his commitment to the peace process.

Given the history of British strategy in Ireland there is always cause for republicans to be apprehensive about the British government's attitude but the present concern is much wider than the republican constituency. It affects all of nationalist Ireland and others who may not be nationalist but who are concerned to see a peaceful and functioning democracy on this island.

Their concern comes from the British governments refusal so far, and despite all of the great advances of last year, to pro-actively move the situation forward. The British immobility is reflected in its attitude to prisoners. This Christmas, for example, fewer prisoners received parole. It is reflected in the refusal by British forces to demilitarise the situation in a significant way. Complaints of harassment by the RUC and British Army continue to come from nationalist areas. It is also reflected in the refusal of the British to recognise the rights of Sinn Féin voters.

The rights of Sinn Féin voters

We do not seek preferential treatment. We simply want equality of treatment. Sinn Féin will not permit our voters to be treated as second class citizens. The British government must recognise our democratic mandate. This is one of the key points which has been put by the Sinn Féin delegation, led by Martin McGuinness, at the meetings with the British at Stormont.

The people we are meeting at Stormont are not policy makers and this phase of our discussions with them is from our point of view, dealing with the logistics of moving to all-party talks and of us receiving assurances that the British government recognises the rights of our voters.

Three meetings have taken place to date; December 9 and December 19, 1994 and January 16, 1995.

More than three months elapsed from the IRA cessation on September 1st until the commencement of talks. Five weeks have elapsed since then. Saturday, January 28, 1995 - marks the 150th day of the IRA ceasefire.

Sinn Féin's approach

Sinn Féin's agenda for the meetings with the British government to date has been straightforward and vital to positively progressing the situation.

That is:

The need to move to inclusive peace talks.

The need for London to recognise and accept Sinn Féin's democratic mandate;

and accord Sinn Féin and our electorate equality of treatment as an enabling element to move in that direction.

We have provided the British government with three written submissions outlining our basis for entry into dialogue and arguing the need for peace talks.

We have also raised such matters as the release of prisoners and the need for a comprehensive demilitarisation. We have spelt out in detail the nature and extent of political discrimination against Sinn Féin and the Sinn Féin electorate.

Our approach has been frank, positive and patient and takes its broad direction from the joint statement, of 6th September 1994, issued by the then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, SDLP leader John Hume and myself.

"We are at the beginning of a new era in which we are totally committed to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving our political problems. We reiterate that our objective is an equitable and lasting agreement that can command the allegiance of all."

The British Government Approach

After a three month delay to the commencement of talks and five weeks into them the British government has, as yet, failed to impact political representation into the delegation. Two written submissions have been provided by the British government to Sinn Féin. The first outlined the British government's basis for entry in dialogue. The second is a broad non-definitive response to a number of questions put to the British government by Sinn Féin in our written submissions of December 19, 1994 and January 16, 1995.

The British government delegation has been quite frank in putting the position that Sinn Féin is not to be accorded equality of treatment despite the acceptance of the delegation leader Quentin Thomas that Sinn Féin threatens no-one and that Sinn Féin is a 'main' political party with an electoral mandate.

I believe the British government is engaged in a strategy which involves at best - stalling the process through the deliberate erection of barriers to progress on a bogus pretext - at worst - attempting to create and sustain a crisis in the peace process around the issue of IRA arms. And attempting to accomplish this in a way which portrays Sinn Féin as being the unreasonable and inflexible party.

Sinn Féin's position on the weapons issue is transparent. The entire logic of a peace process is that through peace talks we arrive at a peace settlement which removes the causes of the conflict and removes forever the guns from the political equation in Ireland.

Peace talks are the vital issue involved here. The British governments refusal to recognise the right of Sinn Féin voters is the crux of this matter.

Sinn Féin is not the IRA. It does not have any guns. In our submission to the British government on January 16 we stated the reality of the situation;

"Sinn Féin is totally committed to bringing about the complete and permanent removal of all guns from Irish politics. To bring about, in the word of the British government "the decommissioning" of all weapons of war. Without this commitment the peace process would not have been brought to its present position. The most important element in bringing the situation to this point, as is universally acknowledged, was the IRA's announcement of 31 August 1994. In our view the British government know this.

"Attempts, therefore, to link the issue of the IRA's weapons to your continued refusal to recognise the rights of the Sinn Féin electorate are disingenuous. We are concerned, therefore, that the British government's position on the decommissioning of IRA weapons is, at best, a stalling tactic, at worst an attempt to create a situation of crisis in the peace process around the issue. This must be avoided. Our position on this matter is transparent. We wish to use our influence on all matters, in a positive way and with the aim of advancing the peace process. How we use our influence and how much influence we have is a matter of judgement for us.

"Be assured of our commitment but be assured also that efforts by you to subvert the integrity of Sinn Féin's position on the rights of our electorate as a pretext for stalling the peace process will serve only to undermine and subvert the peace process itself."

So where will London's stance leave the peace process? Is the British government telling us that unless there is a surrender by the IRA of their weapons, of "substantial progress" on this that the peace process is over? What other logic is there to this position?

Tory/Unionist alliance

London's attitude to negotiations with Dublin has also been marked by stalling and diversionary tactics. This weeks meeting between Patrick Mayhew and Dick Spring was therefore an important one.

In recent weeks there has been a lot of speculation about the framework document, when will it be published, what is in it, will it signal joint authority, what does 'executive powers' means and so on.

What is clear however is that there is a Tory/unionist alliance - pan unionism? - which is seeking to exploit the current uncertainty for party political advantage.

The recent revelation from former Taoiseach Albert Reynolds that the British government had accepted the principle that there should be cross border bodies with executive powers and an overall all-Ireland body is also my understanding of what was agreed at that time.

How this shapes up in the final draft or indeed if there will be a final draft - and remember there has been talk of a framework document for 2½ years - remains to be seen.

The Republican attitude

The Republican attitude to the framework document is straightforward. We seek an end to British interference in our country. We seek an end to partition, division and coercion. That is our goal and we will pursue it with determination. Sinn Féin will judge the framework document pragmatically and in the context of our objectives, policy and strategy.

The framework document will be an indicator of the British government's intentions. We will assess it or any other document as proposals that are to be discussed, agreed, rejected or changed in the context of all-party talks with everyone at the table and everything on the table.

In Sinn Féin's view this document should be published as soon as possible and if there are continued difficulties with this real peace talks should commence without the document.

In all of this the London governments attitude is crucial. We cannot make peace unless it wants to make peace also.

The Unionist Veto

Britain's provision of a veto to the unionists, the negative effect of that on the peace process and unionist resistance to even contemplating a change in the status quo, is a reflection of the politics of their position.

Major's repeated assurance to the unionists that they have a lock on political progress is a good example of the veto in operation - and an example of the British government's use of the unionists to excuse its own failure to effect political progress in regard to the peace process.

The British government cannot hide behind a unionist intransigence built on British guarantees and support. It is for Mr Major to provide clear leadership, to fulfill his obligations by facilitating consent and agreement and to stop the cynical manipulation of the unionists.

The unionists must be persuaded that there is no going back to the policies and structures which have been tried and failed.

The British government must remove the unionist veto and create the level playing pitch essential to meaningful negotiations. It must stop stalling the peace process and agree to move quickly to all party talks.

Nationalist expectations

It also important to note that there is an intense effort to lower nationalist expectations and to dilute nationalist aspirations as we face into the next phase of the peace process.

The last time this happened was in the build up to the Anglo-Irish agreement at Hillsborough almost 8 years ago and a year ago on the eve of the Downing Street Declaration. Then we were promised that the nationalist nightmare had ended. The sad history since then has shown the shallowness of these claims.

Much more is needed this time to move the situation on irreversibly towards a lasting peace. Everyone involved should be mindful that this is the best opportunity for peace in the last 75 years. Republicans have not struggled for all this time to see this opportunity squandered because of deals between unionism and John Major's government or for any other reason.

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[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry-Fundraising, 1995

2011-0355-F
rs1646

RESTRICTION CODES

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January 3, 1995

3pm meeting WHSR

Kathleen Stephens
Paul van Son
Richard Scruggs
BOB BRIANI
Jim Reynolds
ALAN KRECZKO

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