

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry and Visa Issues -1993

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1397

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	1	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Gerry Adams Wants Visa for December Visit... (7 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002a. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Denial of Visa to Gerry Adams... (2 pages)	05/03/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
002b. report	re: [Gerry Adams and PIRA] (2 pages)	05/03/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. report	re: The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Turning Up the Heat (2 pages)	04/30/1993	P1/b(1)
003. email	Barry Lowenkron to Brooke Darby re: Gerry Adams-Bruce Morrison (1 page)	07/19/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023
004. email	Lowenkron to Darby re: Adams: Morrison State Meeting (1 page)	07/20/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 6/14/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry and Visa Issues-1993

Rob Seibert
2011-0355-F
rs1645

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262011-0355-F (1.01)
K8H 4/11/2023ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AP*

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams Wants Visa for December Visit:
Fundraising and Other Issues for Decision

Purpose

To decide how to handle Gerry Adams' proposed December visit and fundraising request.

Background

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has applied for a visa to visit the U.S. December 7-13, stopping in several cities. Adams has asked that he be given a multiple-entry visa with no fundraising restrictions. (Adams' two earlier visas, in January and September this year, were both single-entry visas which prohibited him from raising funds in the U.S.)

There is no opposition within the Administration or from the British to granting Adams a three-month, multiple-entry visa subject to continued IRA observance of the cease-fire, a no fundraising restriction and advance notice of Adams' travel plans and itinerary for each trip.

I believe the appropriate way to handle the visit is for me to receive him in my office in the White House but with no photographs. This is consistent with the level of White House access accorded other Northern Ireland politicians representing political parties of similar size. State and the British can live with my seeing Adams, though they would rather it not be at the White House or include any photo opportunities.

Fundraising Conditions

There is a sharp division of views between Justice, State, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and the British on one side and the Irish, Ambassador Smith, and some important members of Congress on the other over whether to permit Adams to fundraise. The decision

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

comes at a delicate time in the Northern Ireland peace process and in our relations with the British over Bosnia.

As an individual with a terrorist background, Adams is ineligible for entry into the United States. In waiving that ineligibility, we have the right to impose conditions that we cannot impose on other Sinn Fein members. Justice, State, Ab Mikva and Ambassador Crowe in London strongly oppose allowing Adams to raise funds in the U.S., at least for the time being, primarily because of information that the IRA continues to procure handguns and explosives in the United States, the short time the cease-fire has been in place, the fact that the IRA maintains large stockpiles of weapons, and that it continues to maintain a high state of readiness, including training activities.

Ambassador Crowe also argues strongly that it is particularly important to take strongly-held British views on this issue into account at a time when the bilateral relationship is under severe strain over Bosnia. He feels it would be extremely unwise to cause another rift over Ireland and a time when we need them on the "much more important foreign policy issue" of Bosnia. British officials have said that the UK "would publicly denounce" the Administration if we allow fundraising.

British neuralgia on the fundraising issue, despite the fact that Sinn Fein is permitted to raise funds in Britain, relates to the historical fact that the IRA armed and sustained itself for many years in large part through support from U.S. sources. In practice, Sinn Fein has never demonstrated that the collections are segregated from IRA operational funds, and it has been proven in court that NORAID has used money collected for "widows and orphans" to fund arms purchases. In addition, Ab Mikva believes that as long as IRA weapons procurement activity continues in the U.S., permitting Adams to fundraise will expose us to charges of inconsistent and discriminatory policy if we crack down on Hamas fundraising (although there is a difference as the IRA has implemented a ceasefire).

The Attorney General, FBI and State (including Ambassador Crowe) strongly agree with the British line of argument. They underscore that although the cease-fire continues generally to hold, IRA extortion and other criminal activities continue, though apparently under instructions that firearms not be used. The IRA admitted November 20 that a recent armed robbery in which a postal worker was killed (and over \$200,000 stolen) was committed by IRA members ("volunteers") "acting on instruction" (presumably from local commanders) but "not sanctioned by the IRA leadership." Moreover, IRA extralegal "policing actions" (i.e. beatings of suspected collaborators or petty criminals in Catholic neighborhoods of Northern Ireland) continue, as do IRA

training operations. FBI is monitoring IRA arms procurement activity in the U.S. which has occurred since the cease-fire and is ongoing.

On the other side, the Irish Government (especially Albert Reynolds), Ambassador Smith in Dublin and some important figures on the Hill (including Dodd, Moynihan, Manton, Gilman and Ted Kennedy) argue with equal conviction that there is no practical or political benefit to be derived from continuing to insist that Adams cannot fundraise here and, indeed, that singling out Adams in this way will undermine him and perhaps the entire peace process. They point out that this is not a legal issue but rather a policy one, that other Sinn Fein leaders and supporters who do not need visa waivers can and do raise funds for Sinn Fein, and that Adams, given his positive and pivotal role in bringing IRA into the peace process, should not be "humiliated" in this way.

As Adams and others note, fundraising for Sinn Fein in the UK is legal (he held a fundraiser in London last week) and to deny him the same right in the United States would seriously undermine Adams at a delicate moment in the peace process. The loss of Albert Reynolds as Prime Minister of Ireland removes Adams' strongest supporter from the process and Adams needs to continue to show momentum in the process if he is to keep the hardliners in tow. Adams also argues that they are in urgent need of funds to organize a political party and argues passionately that denying him the right to do so will only make it more difficult for him to move on the important issues such as demobilization.

A denial of fundraising will make big headlines in Ireland of the US charging Adams with continued weapons procurement and calling into question the permanency of the ceasefire. He fears such action will seriously undermine him and encourage the hardliners to pull away from the path of peace.

Fundraising Options

Option I: Maintain Fundraising Prohibition

Option IA) That Adams' three-month multiple entry visa be annotated to indicate that he is not permitted to engage in direct or indirect fundraising, but that he may raise sufficient funds to pay for the costs of his U.S. trip (same conditions as his last visit). No commitments/indications given him as to what our future position might be. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government support; Irish and Ambassador Smith oppose.]

Pros: Even with the fundraising restriction still in place, Adams gets from this trip a substantial liberalization of the travel restrictions on him and the reward of being received at the White House (despite State and British discomfiture with the latter). Takes things a step at a time and keeps fundraising as leverage to encourage the IRA to address the weapons issue early on. Leaves no doubt where we stand on terrorism and expresses our concern about continued IRA criminal and procurement activities. Boosts confidence in London and Belfast that British and Unionist views matter and that Adams does not exercise undue influence on our Northern Ireland policy. Underscores that we are sensitive to the importance of working with them on Bosnia.

Cons: Could weaken Adams politically within the IRA, both by embarrassing him in his already-public request and by denying him the ability to raise funds he says he needs to operate Sinn Fein as a political party. To the extent Adams is weakened, the peace process could be damaged. There will be headlines in the Irish papers that we believe the IRA continues to procure weapons and perhaps that we doubt the permanency of the IRA ceasefire. You will face strong pressure from Ambassador Smith and some on the Hill to concede this issue. The Irish government will strongly urge you to reconsider. Adams may cancel his trip if not allowed to fundraise. Refusal will cause a rift with portions of the Irish-American community; some in the Irish-American community will begin to criticize what to date has been viewed as a successful foreign policy issue.

Option IB) Same as above, but we tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reconsidered, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress towards demobilizing and disarming. [State, Justice, Crowe and British can accept, while preference is IA. Justice prefers that the IRA be required to cease weapons procurement worldwide and permanently but that standard is not realistic as we cannot verify either. Irish, Smith oppose.]

Pros: Same as above, but makes more explicit why Adams can't fundraise now and what we expect from him before we will alter our position. Provides encouragement to Adams that we will not deny him fundraising access indefinitely. Could encourage an end to weapons procurement and progress on other issues.

Cons: Same as above. In addition, we will in all likelihood face another disagreement within the Administration and between the British and Irish when the time comes to decide if he has made enough progress on ending weapons procurement and on demobilization and disarmament.

Option II: Allow Adams to fundraise on this trip.

Option IIA) Impose no restrictions on Adams' ability to fundraise on this trip. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Pleases important Irish players on the Hill; strengthens Adams internally, could help advance the peace process.

Cons: Justice, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and State vehemently oppose, as do the British. The British (and Ambassador Crowe) still feel bruised from Adams' last visit and the Vice President's phone call to Adams; allowing Adams to fundraise will open another public U.S.-UK rift in a period of already-substantial strains over Bosnia. Could weaken pressure on Adams to deal with weapons issue and be interpreted in Northern Ireland as a sign that we take lightly the recent IRA murder/robbery incident; subjects us to criticism if there is another incident of violence involving IRA members or weapons. Funds could be directed to weapons purchase, especially if the cease-fire breaks down. Ab Mivka adds that it would be very difficult to permit Adams fundraising while at the same time cracking down on Hamas fundraising (while recognizing that the IRA has implemented a ceasefire and Hamas still engages in terrorism).

Option IIB) Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities. This could involve an extensive audit by a respected firm. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Boosts Adams and thus could help advance the peace process. Adams has already offered to provide such audits. Underscores the point that we expect Adams to move forward in bringing Sinn Fein/IRA fully away from terrorist and illegal activities. Makes diversion of funds more difficult.

Cons: Same as IIA. Also, money is fungible; even very elaborate safeguards will not stop it from going to support or offset criminal and terrorist activities. Largely symbolic, could be criticized as empty gesture. State and Justice strongly oppose on these grounds.

Option IIC) Allow Adams to fundraise if he agrees to place the funds in a U.S. account which he could not access without our permission. Establish that we will review the situation in early 1995 to decide if the funds can be accessed; factors affecting our decision will include whether the cease-fire still holds and whether Sinn Fein/IRA has ceased weapons procurement in the US and made concrete progress toward demobilization and disarmament. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government oppose; Irish and Ambassador Smith support.]

Pros: Lets Adams go ahead with his fundraising plans while still meeting some of the concerns of the British, State and Justice. Will boost Adams and thus help advance the peace process.

Cons: Neither side will like; either or both may reject. In requiring the US to make a decision on when to release funds, this option would put us under constant pressure on both sides to release or not release the funds and involve the US in the negotiating process in a way we have not been before.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve a three-month entry visa for Adams conditional on continuation of the ceasefire and that he advises us in advance of his travel plans and itinerary. That I meet with him in my office but with no photographs. And that you approve Option IB: Maintain fundraising restriction but tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reconsidered, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress towards demobilizing and disarming.

Of the difficult choices you face, I believe this option best promotes our goals of maintaining the peace process in Northern Ireland, sending a strong message against terrorism and maintains our strong relationship with the British. A meeting with Adams in the White House is a significant offering to him and a three-month multiple entry visa meets one of his key requests during his last visit. The prestige of entering the White House will lessen any criticism of him personally over denial of his fundraising request. While we have not yet heard back from the Vice President, Leon Fuerth and Jack Quinn agree. Leon Panetta also concurs.

In addition, by pointing out to him our knowledge of continuing procurement of weapons in the US, we might help achieve an end to such activities. We will also speak with the British to encourage them to reach out more positively to Adams to help offset any fallout from the decision. Adams recently wrote to the British and they expect to reply to his letter next week. We

will work with the British to encourage them to be as forthcoming as possible and perhaps hold announcement of our decision so it coincides with any positive response from the British.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Or alternatively,

That you approve Option IIB: Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities, most likely through an extensive audit by a respected firm.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

If you select Option IIB or any other option allowing fundraising, I recommend you telephone Prime Minister Major, Secretary Christopher, and perhaps Attorney General Reno to inform them of your decision.

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(1.02)

K8H 4/11/2023

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1993

03 MAY 3 P10:00

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: 

ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT:

Denial of Visa to Gerry Adams, Founder of PIRA

Purpose

To inform you that the State Department has denied a U.S. nonimmigrant visa to Gerard "Gerry" Adams, founder and high level member of the terrorist organization, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).

Background

During the campaign, you mentioned that you would consider the issuance of a visa to the PIRA's Gerry Adams because of his status as a member of the British Parliament. He has since lost his parliament seat in the 1992 election.

Adams has been twice refused a visa under the old Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) because of his advocacy of and involvement in terrorist violence. He appealed the first decision in 1988, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the denial. He was last denied a visa in March 1991, without legal challenge.

The Act was significantly amended effective June 1, 1991 to prevent discrimination against mere members of terrorist organizations. This is the first time since that change that Adams has applied for a visa. There is thus a chance he may try to challenge our action in court by arguing we are denying his visa request solely because of his membership in an organization rather than any specific action. However, we believe there is sufficient evidence of his involvement in terrorist activities to withstand a court challenge to his visa denial -- basically the same basis used for the 1991 First Circuit decision.

Adams is currently applying to visit the U.S. in May for three weeks, ostensibly to promote his two books, The Street and Cage Eleven. The State Department denied the visa contending that Adams is ineligible under section 212(a)(3)(b) of the Act because he has engaged in terrorist activity as defined in that section: "the preparation or planning of a terrorist activity" (Tab A). Although a founding member of PIRA, Adams denies his membership. (The organization is outlawed.) Because of his leadership status

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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in PIRA, it is difficult to link Adams directly to the scene of a specific terrorist activity, although, according to the FBI, he is a member of the Provisional Army Council which makes all decisions on terrorist operations. Thus, Adams would have been aware of -- if not a participant in -- PIRA's planning for the explosion at the London financial district, and the March 20 bombing which killed two children. Moreover, the FBI believes that Adams' affiliation with the "Provisional Third Battalion Army Command" makes clear his foreknowledge of the group's terrorist activities.

An FBI summary of Adams' involvement in terrorist activities is attached at Tab B. A CIA report on current PIRA terrorist activities is attached at Tab C.

While there is a waiver provision, we agree with State (and the FBI) that the Attorney General should not be requested to waive ineligibility. In addition to State and FBI objections based on the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Irish Government opposes PIRA and Sinn Fein (of which Adams is current President). Moreover, in the U.S., PIRA fund-raising has dwindled in the past few years; Adams' presence could reinvigorate this activity, including serving as a catalyst for procurement of arms. (A trial is underway in Arizona against IRA supporters accused of purchasing 2,000 detonators -- some of which have been used in the current bombing campaign -- and of attempting to purchase a stinger missile.)

State's decision does not conflict with your campaign statement since you offered to consider his eligibility based on Adams' status as a member of Parliament, a status which he no longer enjoys.

Adams may receive the letter denying the visa as early as Tuesday and we will be sure to inform your Irish supporters of the decision.

Attachments

Tab A	Section 212(a)(3) of Immigration and Nationality Act of June 1, 1991
Tab B	FBI Report on Adams
Tab C	CIA Report on PIRA Activity

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TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

(RESERVED)

RELATED STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INA 212(a)(3) Security and Related Grounds

(TL:VISA-60; 5-22-92)

(B) TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

(ii) IN GENERAL. Any alien who—

(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, or

(II) a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iii)), is excludable.

(iii) TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED. As used, in this Act, the term "terrorist activity" means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed, in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following:

(I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.

(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of any—

(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or

(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.

(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.

(iii) ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED. As used in this Act, the term "engage in terrorist activity" means to commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support to any individual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist activity at any time, including any of the following acts:

(I) The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity.

(II) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activity.

(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, false identification, weapons, explosives, or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity.

(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for any terrorist organization.

(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist organization, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.



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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. report	re: [Gerry Adams and PIRA] (2 pages)	05/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry and Visa Issues-1993

2011-0355-F
rs1645

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. report	re: The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Turning Up the Heat (2 pages)	04/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Nancy Soderberg)
OA/Box Number: 1397

FOLDER TITLE:

[Ireland]-Adams, Gerry and Visa Issues-1993

2011-0355-F
rs1645

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Jul-1993 11:39 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

(DARBY)

FROM:

Barry F. Lowenkron
(LOWENKRON)

SUBJECT:

Gerry Adams -- Bruce Morrison

Please pass to Nancy ASAP:

To review where we stand on arranging a briefing for Bruce Morrison on the Adams visa denial:

-- I spoke to FBI representatives who tell me that, because of the Privacy Act (let alone sources & methods) they cannot brief Morrison (or even provide him with the gist of the information) on Adams. (The only way a sitting Congressman can get the briefing is through an official request through a Congressional Committee.)

-- State/European Bureau can meet with Morrison today at 4:00 to run him through procedures/reasons why Adams was denied a visa. But, here too, what State can tell Morrison about Adams' activities is limited.

-- If Morrison is interested, he should call Elora Sayre at 648-8027 and give her the relevant info to get cleared into State. His briefer will be John Tefft, Director for Northern European Affairs. (Tefft briefed Mayor Flynn on the same issue.)

FYI, Adams is scheduled to see our number 2 person in the consulate in Belfast on August 4.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

CC: Jenonne R. Walker

(WALKER)

CC: Richard L. Canas

(CANAS)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.04)

KRM 4/11/2023

B- Tell Morrison what's going on let him decide whether he wants state briefing on balance, he might as well

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Jul-1993 13:57 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Barry F. Lowenkron

(LOWENKRON)

FROM:

M. Brooke Darby
(DARBY)

SUBJECT:

Bruce Morrison briefing

Morrison will be in town on Monday and Tuesday and is still pressing hard for a briefing on the Adams issue. Nancy has read your note of last month on this and wants to know how hard it would be to give him the gist of the FBI info. In her words, "He's more than just a private citizen - he's a former Member of Congress."

Please let me know what you think ASAP.

Many thanks.

CC: Betty A. Marshall

(MARSHALL)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By M NARA, Date 12/23/15

20160355-F

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Bruce A. Morrison

Member of Congress, 1983-91
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Refugees and
International Law 1989-91

Admitted in CT and NY

Telephone: (203) 498-0086
Fax: (203) 782-9181

July 15, 1993

Ms. Nancy Soderberg
Staff Director
National Security Council
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Nancy:

I have not heard from you in response to my letter of June 25, 1993. In that letter, I noted that I would be in Washington for a July 20 meeting of the Commission on Immigration Reform and would like to follow up on your suggestion of a briefing regarding the Adams visa denial. I will be arriving in the afternoon on July 19, which would be the more convenient time for any meeting or briefing.

Enclosed are several recent articles relating to the possibility of a special envoy to Northern Ireland. It appears that September would be a propitious time for such an appointment. It appears that the Irish government is preparing to welcome such an appointment and the British sound resigned. I would hope that the President would seize this opportunity to do substantial good in this process and to earn some immediate political points in the Irish-American community at home.

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. Thank you.

Sincerely,



Bruce A. Morrison
Attorney at Law

BAM/khh

P. 01

0691

JUL - 9 - 93 FRI 13:18 42526

TO: BRUCE MERRISON
FROM: NIALL O'DOWD

IS THE Taoiseach planning to ask President Bill Clinton to reactivate the idea of sending a "peace envoy" to Northern Ireland? Government sources have dismissed reports to this effect that appeared in British newspapers at the weekend. But London-based journalists who met Mr Reynolds last week in the course of a trip to Ireland hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs are unanimous that he did discuss the possibility with them.

Speaking on the record, the Taoiseach explained that when he met the American president in Washington on St Patrick's Day, it was agreed that all options on Northern Ireland should be kept open. "These options," Mr Reynolds said, "include sending a fact-finding mission to Ireland, or a stronger representative in the form of a peace envoy, as promised in the Democrats' presidential campaign last autumn."

At the time of the Taoiseach's meeting with the new US president last March, there was some surprise that Mr Clinton did not announce the appointment of either a fact-finding mission or a peace envoy. There had been considerable speculation about possible names, including Jimmy Carter, the former Democratic president, and Andrew Young, the civil rights leader and former ambassador to the United Nations, as well as figures more closely associated with Irish-American politics, like Mayor Raymond Flynn of Boston.

In the end, the idea was put on hold in the hope that it might still be possible to

get talks going again between the political parties in the North.

Mr Reynolds was careful to emphasise last week that this is still the Government's preferred option. But if, as seems increasingly likely, this doesn't happen, then, he said, "we have to sit down and seriously plan where we go in the future". The alternative is to sit back and do nothing, "and let people be killed and maimed, and destruction take place".

IT'S ONE sign of how touchy Anglo-Irish relations have become that it was thought politic to deny this statement of what most people would consider to be blindingly obvious. A couple of weeks ago Seamus Mallon told the House of Commons that he did not believe the talks would resume and that he doubted that either government thought otherwise. No Unionist voice was raised to disagree with him.

The poll on the findings of the Opsahl Report, which was published on Monday, bears out this prognosis. While a majority of those questioned in Britain, Northern

Now might be for the US 'r

MARY HOLLAND

Ireland and this State all concur, to varying degrees, with the proposition that the talks process is "very important", only a small percentage believe that it will succeed in delivering a settlement.

Dick Spring and Sir Patrick Mayhew both talk, honourably enough, of their hopes that the politicians will return to the conference table in the autumn, but without giving any idea of how the obstacles in the way of this can be overcome. The two governments seem virtually paralysed by the fear of another failed initiative and of the effect this is likely to have on both communities in Northern Ireland.

At the moment, understandably, the

President Robinson's visit to west Belfast and meeting with Gerry

The people of Northern Ireland, disenfranchised by direct rule, cannot leaders to refuse to compromise on all major issues, writes

Electorate in North cannot

none affect.

Those appointed by the Westminster administration to run the affairs of Northern Ireland are not answerable in any way to the people of the region. This state of affairs is not only undemocratic, it has led to diminished political responsibility on the part of the North's electorate and, more alarmingly, of their political leaders. Compromise, the bone mar-

the population of Northern land is now 41.4 per cent. total, a 7 percentage point increase in the last 20 years. the religious divide narrow

West of the Bann almost local authority area has a (lic majority; in the area whole, a Protestant minority. East of the Bann, Catholics continue to be in a minority they are for Northern Ireland

Just the time peace envoy'



main focus is on the Unionists, and the very real fear that the violence that erupted on to the streets last weekend will escalate over the summer. This in part accounts for the furious official reaction on both sides of the Irish Sea to the President Mary Robinson's visit to West Belfast and, at Westminster, to Kevin McNamara's discussion document for the British Labour Party, with its tentative proposals for some form of joint sovereignty which, it was thought, would inflame Unionist suspicions of a sellout to the Republic.

Chris McGimpsey has argued eloquently in these pages that the collapse of the most recent round of talks has been a

major factor fuelling alienation and support for violence in the Protestant community. He points out that the Loyalist paramilitaries called a ceasefire during the last talks, and believes that their failure has exacerbated his community's sense of betrayal and the feeling that nobody is addressing Unionist concerns. After last weekend's rioting he was quoted in an article by Mark Brennock as saying: "The failure of the talks had a greater effect on the Protestant community than even we realised."

IF ONE thing has emerged from the whole process leading to the Opsahl Report and from the recent opinion poll on its findings, it is the deep desire common to both communities in Northern Ireland for some return to local politics and to public accountability for the running of the province. They are sick of being governed by diktat from Westminster, which means that issues which affect thousands of people's lives are debated all too often in a virtually empty House of Commons and nodded through at midnight.

In the short term, the energy and commitment which was reflected in the enormous variety of submissions made to the Opsahl Commission has been channelled into community groups. But this is no substitute for an elected government answerable to the voters. To get this back, it does seem that very many people would now be prepared to compromise.

The most striking finding in the poll published last Monday was the widespread support in Northern Ireland itself for the recommendation in the Opsahl Report that any new administration should be based on the principle that each community would have an equal voice in making the laws, and an equal share in administrative authority. In the Catholic community there was 86 per cent support for the proposal. In the Protestant community this support dropped to 46 per cent but, given that 34 per cent of Protestants rejected the idea, this is still a figure which provides grounds for hope.

Torkel Opsahl and his colleagues have already rendered us a service by coming into an apparently frozen situation, listening to all kinds, creeds and conditions of people, and floating on to the agenda a wide variety of ideas for the future, many of them previously taboo. But what is desperately needed now is some person, or group of persons, who will carry sufficient political clout to shift, even slightly, the log-jam of fixed tribal attitudes. An eminent American, able to win the trust of both communities and backed by the authority of the US president, could be an idea whose time has come.



Jim McCullough, in the second of his articles on the Opsahl Report

Changes in

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areas of high unemployment and social deprivation. North and west Belfast account for 40 per cent of all conflict-related deaths. These areas contain some of Northern Ireland's worst social deprivation.

Recognising these factors in isolation does not solve the problems of Northern Ireland. In the words of Dr Brice Dickson, professor of law at the University of

By putting unacceptable preconditions on the involvement of elements such as Sinn Féin in settlement negotiations, constitutional political parties and establishment spin-doctors contribute to the continuation of conflict.

Those who call on Sinn Féin to renounce violence as a precondition for its involvement in future talks are in reality demanding that Sinn Féin cease to be Sin-

By putting unacceptable preconditions on the involvement of elements such as Sinn Féin in settlement negotiations, constitutional political parties and establishment spin-doctors contribute to the continuation of conflict.

The report's observation that

disposition into which the issue

To validate the work of Initiative '92 and the contents of the report, even those who feel responsible for the state of Northern Ireland are obliged to reconsider the problem; but using the worn-out models of familiar tradition — it is a

Protestants Set to March in an Uneasy Belfast

By JAMES F. CLARITY

Special to The New York Times

BELFAST, Northern Ireland, July 11 — Thousands of Protestants in this British province plan to march in the streets on Monday to celebrate the proudest day in their history, July 12, 1690, when Roman Catholics under King James II were routed in the Battle of the Boyne by James's son-in-law, the Protestant William of Orange.

That battle established in the Province of Ulster the Protestant domination that is the center of the civil strife that has killed 3,065 people since 1969.

As British troops patrol the streets to prevent clashes between an expected 100,000 Protestant marchers and Catholic bystanders, politicians of all sides have accelerated their own skirmishes, and the prospects for peace seem dimmer than they have for many years.

Politicians Are Uneasy

Catholic and Protestant politicians talk of approaching destabilization and even anarchy as violence by the Irish Republican Army and Protestant paramilitaries of the Ulster Defense Association increases. "In the months that lie ahead we are going to see a lot of violence in Northern Ireland," said Jeffrey Donaldson, an official of the moderate Ulster Unionist Party, who as an officer in the Orange Order will march on Monday, as the men in his family have done for generations.

Over the weekend there were several incidents of minor violence between Catholics and Protestants, and the police defused at least two bombs planted in Belfast. Today, police and army leaves were canceled and soldiers in armored cars combed the streets of the Belfast and other towns in unusual numbers, looking under cars for bombs and questioning drivers of cars passing checkpoints between Catholic and Protestant areas, especially those heading to the city center.

The peace talks sponsored by the

British Government seem to have collapsed beyond any chance of resumption this year. Officials of Britain and Ireland are squabbling about what to do next.

"Anarchy" was the word used by Cecil Walker, an Ulster Unionist Member of the British Parliament, to describe three nights of clashes this month between Protestant paramilitaries and the Protestant-dominated police force.

As those clashes subsided, the Irish Republican Army detonated a huge bomb in Newtownards, a town nine miles east of Belfast, that devastated its center, wounded 14 people and severely damaged 30 businesses and 87 homes. And the I.R.A. newspaper, Re-

Hopes of peace seem dim in Northern Ireland.

publican News, published a letter that it said the group had sent to foreign banks in London, warning that it would continue to bomb the financial district.

The Newtownards attack prompted another Protestant leader, a Unionist Member of Parliament, John Taylor, to say, "I have to say something which I thought I would never have to say, and that is that the I.R.A. are certainly winning in Northern Ireland."

The remark stung the chief British official for the province, Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Northern Ireland Secretary. Sir Patrick also found himself at odds with the Irish Foreign Minister, Dick Spring. In an interview with The Guardian, Mr. Spring added to the growing sense of alarm among politicians by saying:

"The path leading to the resumption of talks between the political parties in

Northern Ireland is narrowing and may be about to disappear. There is now a very real menace of a destabilizing vacuum. If it not possible to restart the talks, the British and Irish Governments must act."

He said the Governments should consider a new agreement, reached over the heads of the province's squabbling politicians if necessary, under which London and Dublin would have joint authority over the province. Such a proposition should go before voters in the North and in the Irish Republic to the south, Mr. Spring added.

Sir Patrick responded that if peace talks resumed, they would not bring an agreement on joint sovereignty. A majority of the voters in the North would reject such a proposal, he said. But he did not rule out the idea of a peace agreement that bypassed the local Catholic and Protestant politicians.

The idea of additional American involvement was revived by another senior British official in an interview here. This year Prime Minister John Major of Britain and Sir Patrick brushed aside a proposal by President Clinton to send a special United States envoy to try to help in Northern Ireland.

The White House said it would not interfere if that was not wanted by London and Dublin. But when Jean Kennedy Smith arrived in Dublin last month as Ambassador, she said that she intended to visit the North and that the appointment of a special envoy was still a possibility, whenever the Irish and the British were agreeable.

Last week, the senior British official, acknowledging that the earlier British attitude was that Northern Ireland needed additional jobs and not an American envoy, said: "We are noticeably more relaxed about the special envoy idea. It would be a terribly difficult job for any American. And it is still way down the road. The talks haven't been beaten to death yet."

Reynolds in threat to back envoy

THE IRISH POST, JULY 10, 1993

The Dublin government has threatened to back the call for a US peace envoy to Northern Ireland if all-party talks are not under way by the autumn, writes MARTIN COLLINS.

Briefing selected British journalists in Dublin last week, the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, said he shared President Clinton's belief that the best way forward now is through all-party talks. But, reflecting the prevailing mood of pessimism, he added: "If it becomes apparent in the autumn that talks are not going to restart, I have little doubt that President Clinton will be looking for our view at that stage".

Asked if this meant reviewing the plan to appoint a special presidential peace envoy, the Taoiseach replied: "If talks do not resume, we will have to sit down seriously and plan which way we would be going to look at the future. Otherwise we would just be saying 'sit back and do nothing' — let people be killed and maimed and let destruction take place".

Senior Irish government sources encouraged the view that Albert Reynolds was "turning the screw" on the British Prime Minister in a bid to save the talks process and would be prepared to court American support for a new initiative.

A spokesperson explained: "Unless there is a change of attitude from the unionists, and more pressure upon them from John Major, the talks have no hope at all."

Prior to his inauguration, Bill Clinton told the prominent Irish-American and former congressman Bruce Morrison that he was determined that the United States should take a more active part in the effort "to make a just and lasting settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland". He said a US special envoy could be a "catalyst" in that process.

The proposal to appoint a special envoy currently lies in limbo after intense British lobbying leading up to St. Patrick's Day, this year, persuaded the US president to postpone a decision.

When pressure against the appointment of an envoy was at its height, the Irish government was said to be "neutral" on the affair. Now it is suggested that Albert Reynolds played some part in blocking the proposal but retains the ear of the president should he wish to see it resurrected.

Both unionist parties and the British government remain opposed to any "outside interference" in the Northern Ireland conflict, especially from a president perceived to be vulnerable to pressure from a vocal Irish-American lobby.

If the British government were forced to recognise a US special

"secret" policy document has been known about for some time in Labour Party circles. Much of the thinking behind the proposals is outlined in Brendan O'Leary's book *The Politics of Antagonism*.

The recently published Labour Party Irish Society document *Time for Peace* is understood to be a pre-emptive response. It accepts Kevin McNamara's proposal for the entrenchment of a joint authority but argues this should be a 20-year stepping-stone toward British withdrawal and Irish reunification.

Using coded language during the parliamentary debate on renewal of direct rule, last month, Kevin McNamara revealed the drift of Labour Party thinking: "It is for the British and Irish governments, working within the Anglo-Irish Agreement, to recognise the responsibility that they share."

"The two governments should seek to make whatever progress is possible and seek ways to share responsibility and ensure that the needs of the peoples of Northern Ireland for security, equality and justice can be met."

"There is an increasing responsibility," he said, for the two governments "to resolve their differences and establish new institutions which will win the respect of the peoples of Northern Ireland and of the peoples of the whole of the island of Ireland".



Kevin McNamara: proposals triggered unionist outrage.

Popular support for the Mary Robinson-Gerry Adams handshake in West Belfast and a new round of talks between Sinn Féin and the SDLP have fuelled demands that republicans "be brought in from the cold".

The former Northern Ireland minister Michael Mates said at the weekend that, if the SDLP talked to Sinn Féin about ways to end the violence, the initiative "should be applauded".

This week, an opinion poll showed that most people now think

...can support for a new initiative.
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Both unionist parties and the British government remain opposed to any "outside interference" in the Northern Ireland conflict, especially from a president perceived to be vulnerable to pressure from a vocal Irish-American lobby.

If the British government were forced to recognise a US envoy, it would be in a difficult position to avoid entering negotiations. A deal which was brokered by the United States would be far more likely to assign Dublin a permanent role in the North.

While the public position of the SDLP and the Irish government is to counter any suggestion of an "internal solution" as unrealistic, the crucial discussion which is beginning behind the scenes is of what form an alternative type of government might take.

Publication of leaked extracts from Kevin McNamara's 14-month-old paper *Options* for a Labour Government arguing for a model of "durable shared responsibility" in Northern Ireland triggered such an outraged response because it was the first time a politician of any party could be identified with a given position.

The document touched a raw nerve. The two unionist parties responded instantly warning that Kevin McNamara's proposals are a "recipe for civil war worse than anything ever experienced in either the North or the South".

Prime Minister John Major called the paper "cynical and shameful" and "a betrayal of democracy and of the people of Northern Ireland". He said the union "has the democratic approval of the people of Northern Ireland and we in the Conservative and Unionist Party stand four-square behind it".

Despite its tightly controlled circulation list, the existence of a

means to resolve their differences and establish new institutions which will win the respect of the peoples of Northern Ireland and of the peoples of the whole of the island of Ireland".



Kevin McNamara: proposals triggered unionist outrage.

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This week, an opinion poll showed that most people now think the British government should talk to republicans and agreed that "informal channels of communication" should be opened. In the Irish Republic, 71 per cent agreed compared to 51 per cent agreeing in Britain and 39 per cent in Northern Ireland.

Proposals for a joint authority in Northern Ireland, with sovereignty shared between Ireland and Britain are not new, but never before have they been discussed so seriously.

David Alton MP, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson on Northern Ireland, has criticised the British government for over-reacting to the leaked Labour document. He said many would welcome honest intellectual discussion which moved away from the sterile debate of recent years. Joint sovereignty should be "on the table" as much as any other position.

Although the Labour Party leader, John Smith, is said to be "relaxed" about the row caused by the views of his Northern Ireland spokesperson, Kevin McNamara will not be hurried into releasing the document to a wider audience.

The document, originally drawn up by a team of academics, will be sent to a Labour Party think-tank — the Institute for Public Policy Research — before eventual publication in pamphlet form towards the end of the year.

The document will not be formally discussed at the Labour Party annual conference in October although at least two resolutions deal with its substance.

Darby -
Do we need to take another look at the special envoy issue?
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Jul-1993 10:13 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)

FROM: Barry F. Lowenkron (LOWENKRON)

SUBJECT: Adams: Morrison-State Meeting

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.05)
K8H 4/11/2023

Brooke, please pass to Nancy:

I got a read-out of the Morrison-State meeting. Morrison met for one hour & 40 minutes at State this morning with John Tefft in the European Bureau and Dick Scully, a State Dept. Lawyer. (Morrison knew Scully from Morrison's Congressional days and respects his knowledge of visa laws.) Points covered:

Gerry Adams Visa: State briefed Morrison on material presented in State's 1988 court deposition defending the decision to deny Adams a visa. Morrison countered that State seemed to be holding Adams to higher standards than Mandela or the PLO.

Special Envoy: Morrison pressed the idea of a special envoy, suggested Jimmy Carter. State asked what our negotiating strategy should be, and how do we protect the President's credibility. State also said that Reynolds is not enthusiastic about the idea of a special envoy at this time, but that the President would keep the option open.

Visa waiver. Morrison asked what Adams would have to do to get a visa. State answered that he would have to renounce terrorism.

The meeting ended well. Morrison said that he still had his views, but he found the meeting useful and would keep in touch with Tefft & Scully.

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Jenonne R. Walker (WALKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)

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Yes ☒ No ☐

DATE 6-25-93

TIME 4:15 pm

TO: Ms. Nancy Soderberg

FAX NUMBER: (202) 456-2560

FROM: Bruce A. Morrison

RE: _____

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover page): 4

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: _____

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June 25, 1993

Ms. Nancy Soderberg
Staff Director
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Nancy:

Enclosed is a recent article from the Irish Voice regarding the meeting held by President Mary Robinson of Ireland in West Belfast. It reflects the view, which I share, that President Robinson gained enormous credibility in the potential peace process in the North by her willingness to meet with all of the interested parties, from Queen Elizabeth II to Gerry Adams and his supporters.

This is the kind of credibility that should be sought for President Clinton and his representatives. It was, in my view, a mistake and a missed opportunity to deny Gerry Adams a visa. I hope that decision can be revisited in the future. Regardless of the outcome on that point, it is time to press forward in seeking the appointment of an envoy. If a fact-finding process is required initially, a broad-based group of varying viewpoints should be assembled at once to undertake that task. Meanwhile, I would hope that someone of the stature of former President Jimmy Carter would be recruited to undertake the envoy job itself.

When we spoke immediately following the Adams visa denial, you indicated you would ask whether I could receive a briefing on the underlying facts which the State Department relied upon for the denial. I remain extremely interested in such a briefing. I will be in Washington on July 20 for a Commission on Immigration

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Ms. Nancy Soderberg
June 25, 1993
Page Two

Reform meeting. It would be a convenient time for me to meet with you and to obtain whatever briefing might be offered.

I would appreciate hearing from you in the near future about these matters. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bruce".

Bruce A. Morrison
Attorney at Law

BAM/khh

Across the Great Divide

President Mary Robinson's meeting last week with Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams caused a major storm in political and media circles. ED MOLONEY reports from Belfast on the historic meeting, and the reaction of people North and South of the border.

THE scene was an emotional one as many in the room could remember.

Sean Maguire, one of Ireland's and the North's finest traditional fiddlers, led student musicians from all over West Belfast in a slow, moving lament. Facing them a few feet away sat President Mary Robinson, her husband Nick at one side and Eileen Howell of the Bait Community Council on the other.

Surrounding them in an eager semi-circle, struggling for a view over the heads of a horde of unruly journalists, stood some seventy community workers, political activists, clerics, language enthusiasts and sportspeople, the old, the young, the fit, the disabled of West Belfast. At the very back stood Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams with Emma Groves, the Andersonstown woman blinded by a British soldier's plastic bullet, at his side. A few feet away was his successor as MP for West Belfast, the SDLP's Dr. Joe Hendron.

What brought a cough to many a throat that afternoon as Sean Maguire's lovely music filled the Rucan Stanley community college on the Whitelock Road was the knowledge that the people Mary Robinson had come to spend an hour with were the pariahs of Ireland, the people who are normally shunned and ignored by many in the rest of the country.

At least half of them were Republicans of varying shades of activism, the rest either non-political or firmly SDLP. Most of them would normally find themselves censored off the airwaves, excluded from normal politics or abused in the media as the savages of West Belfast. But what made the group special was its ordinariness, the fact that it was about as representative a slice of Nationalist West Belfast as you could get.

Yet it was because the people in that room were the real West Belfast and that one of the hands she shook belonged to the undisputed Nationalist leader of the area that Mary Robinson now finds herself at the eye of a storm, criticized by former friends and the huns of Unionism and the British government.

For virtually a whole week much of the weight of Britain and of establishment Ireland, North and South, bore down on Mary Robinson and the community groups who had invited her to West Belfast, in an effort to get her trip called off.

In the North, Sir Patrick Mayhew

against her. He warned Dublin ministers, in a move regarded as a threat by all those at the receiving end, that there could be trouble between British troops and Nationalists from nearby Ballymurphy if the visit went ahead.

"The implication was clear," recalled one of those involved in the delicate negotiations. "If she went ahead he was going to send a heavy security force presence into the area, ostensibly to guard her, but really to goad people and if that provoked a clash with locals, then on her head be it."

Lies were told. The most fantastic one was a story relayed by the

Gerry Adams, he warned.

In Dublin, Taniste (Deputy Prime Minister) Dick Spring, worried about the adverse impact on Unionists and the talks, traveled twice to Robinson's residence at the Phoenix Park to get her to change her mind. The British Ambassador, David Blatherwick, delivered "the stiffest diplomatic note" to his opposite numbers, effectively asking Dublin to order her to stay at home.

Tanisteach (Prime Minister) Albert Reynolds played a more obnoxious game. While British newspapers, the BBC and RTE were



Gerry Adams

"Dick Spring, worried about the adverse impact on Unionists and the talks, traveled twice to Robinson's residence at the Phoenix Park to get her to change her mind."

Northern Ireland Office to Dublin that British Intelligence had uncovered a plot by the Invictos to lock out NIO officials accompanying the President as soon as she passed the college's threshold, thereby effectively kidnapping her.

Unionist politicians lobbied officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs to say that the talks process would be killed off and Mary Robinson's good standing with Unionists irreparably damaged.

The SDLP in West Belfast — though noticeably not elsewhere in the North — also lobbied hard against her coming (although that changed afterwards when it was clear the people of West Belfast liked the visit). On the day of the trip, Councillor Alastair McDonnell, the SDLP man who helped formulate Joe Hendron's successful electoral foray into Loyalist areas at the last election

briefed to the effect that the Irish government shared many of the British reservations and had told Mrs. Robinson so, other briefings from within the Reynolds camp sold a different message to the Irish papers. The Tanisteach, we were told, had stood up to British premier John Major at the London "summit" when the complaint was made again.

"The pressure on her was enormous," said Geraldine Holland of the West Belfast Anti-Poverty Network, one of the six community groups who had invited the President to West Belfast. "But she stood by her word. She said she was going to come and she did. Her office acted with enormous integrity throughout."

Concessions were made — the media were banned from witnessing or recording her handshake with Gerry Adams, the trip was trimmed by 45 minutes, contr-

Belfast. But the visit went ahead.

The reaction has been predictable. Right wing columnists — with ex-soccer star and Jack Charlton critic Eamon Dunphy leading the charge — have stated her venomously. "She has disgraced her office and tarnished her Presidency beyond redemption," he wrote in the *Sunday Independent*. Fine Gael Euro MP Paddy Conney said he was "outraged" by the Adams handshake and a later meeting she had with Sinn Fein councillors in Coalisland, claiming that she had given the IRA and Sinn Fein a new legitimacy. His party leader, John Bruton, called the trip "ill-advised." Unionists foamed at the mouth. Ian Paisley said her trip was a "Jesuitical trick."

The ferocity of the attacks on her were in direct proportion to the significance of what she had done. It wasn't just that she had shaken hands with Gerry Adams, although that was significant and symbolic enough. It was that she had also deliberately chosen to shake hands with Gerry Adams' people, knowing them to be Provos but recognizing them to be as Irish

commemoration at Bodens. In the clearest indication yet the IRA might be ready to accept its rigid conditions for a declaration of intent to withdraw — and thus the terms for an ceasefire — he hinted at a pragmatism.

Calling for a peace process to start, he said: "The initiation of such a process requires a clear and unambiguous indication from the British government that it accepts the right of the Irish people to self-determination and that it intends to make an enthusiastic contribution towards the unification of the Irish people. The adoption of such a scenario would create a dynamic which would undoubtedly transform the political situation throughout Ireland."

Translated, that means that the IRA would no longer have to see British shiploads of troops setting sail from Belfast harbor before agreeing to put away the armalites. A situation short of that, a declaration that Britain no longer has any political interest in staying in Ireland and would encourage Unionists to think so too, might be sufficient.



Mary Robinson

The wording this declaration might take is believed to be at the heart of the John Hume-Gerry Adams dialogue. And what John Hume is also saying by talking to Gerry Adams is that there can be no final settlement in the North until Sinn Fein is involved.

Bringing Sinn Fein in from the cold, allowing the IRA a way of honorably ending violence has become the name of the game. Mary Robinson played a part in that last week, signalling that Sinn Fein's isolation could end and would end if the conditions were right.

The real importance of her visit to West Belfast was

that she resisted the pressure to stay home in Dublin. For that, and the recognition she gave to Republican West Belfast, that it is Irish and should not be eternally shunned, the community groups, Provos and all, were enormously grateful.

Mary Robinson now has a credibility in West Belfast — and with Northern Republicans — few would ever have dreamed possible. And with that credibility has come an influence over Republicans no other Dublin politi-

as anyone on the island. She had done this too when she could just as easily have arranged a meeting with "safe" Catholic Church-controlled or SDLP-inclined groups in the area and avoided all the flack.

It is because she must have known precisely with whom she was rubbing shoulders and what the effect of meeting them would be that Mary Robinson's trip carried such an important political message, albeit one too subtle for some.

A clue as to what that message

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Yes _____ No X
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TO: Nancy Soder
FAX NUMBER: 1-202-456-2560
FROM: Bruce A. Morrison
RE: Attached documents
NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover page): 4

ADDITIONAL

INFORMATION: Item # 1 is the information we
discussed re an alien with IRA banking conviction
who has rec'd a visa and been admitted recently
Item # 2 is the Irish Echo account of
the Adams visa denial

I will be calling you shortly to discuss a related
matter. Thanks for your interest.

If there are any problems with this transmission, please call

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ATTN BRUCE MORRISON
FROM Niall O'Donnell


What is known is this, Dolores Price of the infamous Price sisters, was convicted of the Old Bailey bombings in the 1970s. It was a notorious case at the time, as the Price sisters went on hunger strike after the convictions and were force fed, drawing international attention to the case.... Eventually they were moved back to Ireland. She later married Oscar nominated actor Stephen Rea and has spent considerable time in America with him during his current run on Broadway. She was granted a visa at the Belfast Consulate in the recent past.

203-782-4181

Fears That New Immigrants
Won't Be Prepared, Page 3

Illinois MacBride Activists
Plan Tougher Bill, Page 20

IRISH ECHO



Around the
Town
With
Albert

Page 20

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Adams Visa Denied

By Jack Hallinan
BELFAST — U.S. authorities have again refused a visa for Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams, who has been banned from the U.S. to promote the American publication of two of his books, is believed to have received notification last weekend. On Sunday, he issued a statement saying that it was unlikely that he would be granted the visa.

Earlier, when questioned as to how he would react if the rejection was confirmed, he told the *Echo*: "The visa would've been the simplest concession to make. I hope it won't be an indication of

**Sir Patrick Mayhew
Makes North Pitch
in New York, Page 8**

broader policy."

President Clinton, when running for president, committed himself to a radical Irish agenda. Questioned at the Irish American Forum six months before the election, Clinton told reporters he would support a visa for Adams and would support a visa for "any other properly elected official." The then candidate said that he understood the position of the U.S. "with regard to Sinn Féin and the advocacy of violence as

opposed to non-violence." However, Clinton said he felt as Adams was an M.P., "it would be totally harmless to our national security and it might be enlightening to the political debate in this country about the issues."

Adams lost his seat at the last British general election, which was being held even as Clinton was speaking. While this might provide an "out" for the administration, it is unlikely to satisfy many Irish Americans who voted for Clinton on the strength of his Irish agenda.

Already he has delayed implementing a vital aspect of that agenda — the provision for a

special envoy. The failure to grant Adams a visa will be seen by many as further backsliding under pressure from Britain.

It is believed that the actual decision on the Adams visa application was taken by Attorney General Janet Reno. He was barred under Section 212 (a) (3) B of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (1950), which relates to "terrorist activity." Under the provisions of the act, which became law in 1991, "terrorist activity" is defined as to include lending "material support to any individual, organization, or government in conducting terrorist activity at any time." Material support includes



Gerry Adams

"the soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for any terrorist (Continued on Page 11)"

Adams Visa Denied

(Continued from Page 1)

organization."

A U.S. official said that the grounds for the continued ban on Adams was his support for the Provisional IRA. "Adams says, 'I support the IRA and what they do.' He claimed that the Rev. Ian Paisley had also been banned from entering the U.S. for several years because he too advocated violence. However, it is conceded that other factors were important in determining the decision on whether or not to grant the visa. Most important among them was the kind of message it would send."

This, commented the official, "overwhelmed all other considerations." Granting a visa to Adams at this time "would have put the British government in an awkward position."

Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, is currently on a tour of the U.S. in order to win support for a renewal of the peace talks initiative which broke down last November. He is also meeting with U.S. businessmen in an attempt to bring investment to Northern Ireland. An announcement in favor of Adams during Mayhew's visit would have been embarrassing for the Clinton administration, especially as it is currently trying to win British support for its policy on Bosnia.

Adams is the latest in a long line of Sinn Féin leaders whose applications for U.S. visas have been refused. Since 1971, no republican leader has been

allowed to legally enter the U.S. However, during that same period it is known that loyalist paramilitaries have been permitted entry. In 1979, the Congressional Judiciary Committee published a report on U.S. policy on issuing visas to Northern Ireland applicants. It listed those loyalists who were granted visas during the late 1970s. They included Billy Mitchell, Ken Gibson and Hugh Smyth of the outlawed Ulster Volunteer Force. Mitchell was later sentenced to life for his involvement in a double murder.

Leading members of the Ulster Defence Association have also gained admittance at various times. In early 1979, Andy Tyrre, then the UDA's chairman, and John McMichael were among a delegation of UDA men who visited the U.S. Though the UDA was still a legal organization, it was widely known to be responsible for hundreds of sectarian murders. At the time of his visit to the U.S., McMichael was in overall command of the UDA's so-called "military wing," the Ulster Freedom Fighters.

When questioned about these discrepancies, an official at the consular office in Belfast said that in the past loyalists had been given visas due to "poor intelligence."

The consul general would not confirm that Adams' application had been denied. "We can make no comment on that," he said.

A Place in the Sun For Shady People

(Continued from Page 6)

In this case, the two of them were soon plying me with champagne and doing their best to fill in the enormous gaps in my racing education. Damned civil.

Eventually, I headed back to Dublin with a fiddler

who had spent the three days of Punchestown playing for coins. "The best crowd of the year," he confided. "Even better than the hurling championships." I'm not surprised he had done well. There is an agreeable camaraderie among racegoers. I think I'll return to this place in the sun for shady people.

Armagh Gods Smile Kindly In Win Over St. Raymond's

(Continued from Page 48)

field blundering among their players was anything but helpful.

Trailing by one point at the break, St. Raymond's recommenced play with all guns blazing, with Sean Brosnan, Pat Huvane and Doug Queally tearing holes in the Armagh rearguard. A point from Raymond's Sean Brosnan eight minutes from time left them three clear, but Armagh then conjured up the equalizing goal from virtually nowhere when Martin Grant dispossessed a defender in the right corner, then flicked the ball along the endline to bustling full forward, Phil Hughes, and he sent a blistering shot rocketing into the roof of the net.

The sides exchanged late points and a share of the spoils would probably have satisfied both at this stage, but up stepped John Mageonia to fire over a magnificent point to give Armagh a winning start they hardly merited.

Disappointment for St. Raymond's, but this is a fine young team now will realize it is capable of matching the best the Junior Division has to offer, and will have to be taken as a serious contender in its group.

Stars for the winners were Anthony Cole (goals), Noel Major, John Caffney, Sean Smith, John Mageonia, Phil Hughes and Martin Grant. Best for St. Raymond's were Tom Conway, Denis McHugh, Kevin Huvane, Tom McHugh, Pat Huvane, Doug Queally and Sean Brosnan.

Armagh scorers: Phil Hughes 1-1, J. Mageonia 0-4, Sean Smith 0-2, Ollie Mone 0-2, Martin Grant 0-1. For St. Raymond's: Denis O'Connor 0-3, Doug Queally, Denis O'Connor, Tom McHugh and Sean Brosnan, all 0-2.

The referee was Tommy Fahay.

—Fergus Hanna

Sligo Wins in a Tale of 2 Penalties

Sligo began what promises for them to be an auspicious 1993 with a big Div. 2 win. But the scoreline does little justice to Monaghan, who were level with their opponents for three quarters of an hour. Then, after Phil Monahan's experience and wiliness resulted in a penalty award to the Ulstermen, Gene McGuigan bent the spot-kick well wide of the upright and an opportunity to stamp home a clean sheet was gone.

Just three minutes later, there was a similar award at the opposite end of the park, and Aidan Wiseman's effort was picture-perfect, with the ball tucked away just inside the right hand post.

A spectacular goal by Mike Gill-

Sligo 4-4 Monaghan 0-5

new manager, Boston Walsh. Monaghan, meanwhile, can point to that second-half penalty miss as the major cause for this setback.

Originally pencilled in as center-halfback, burly Martin Keeney justified his selection in the No. 14 jersey when he finished a center from James Gallagher to the net for the opening score of the game.

Declan Henry and Phil Monahan swapped minor scores, but by the half Monaghan were right back in it, thanks to well-taken points from Gene McGuigan and Paul

interchanging movement with Paul McGlynn.

For the winners, John Dowd, Brendan Harkin, Mike Hayes, Mike Gilligan, Paul Conterry, Aidan Wiseman and Martin Keeney were most impressive. Monaghan can take encouragement from the performances of Ken McVicker, Paul Curran, Donal Caseldy, Ricky Orogan, Cathal McBlaney, John Donoghue, Phil Monahan and Gary Flanagan.

Sligo marksmen, Martin Keeney 2-1, Mike Gilligan and Aidan Wiseman both 1-0, Declan Henry, John Dowd and Mike Hayes, all 0-1.

For Monaghan: Phil Monahan

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