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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: President Clinton's Oval Office Address on Somalia and White House Briefing with SEDEF, SECSTATE, and CJCS (7 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Next Steps on Somalia (6 pages)	10/15/1993	P1/b(1)
003. email	Richard Clarke to Brooke Darby, re: Somalia: TP for Lake-Howe Telcon (3 pages)	10/17/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Re: [Conversation with General Powell] (1 page)	06/09/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Somalia Options (7 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1)
006. email	Richard Clarke to Brooke Darby, re: Memo to POTUS-Somalia (2 pages)	10/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993

2012-0659-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

-w/ up
7877

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 13, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALAN KRECZKO/^{Ak}DONALD GROSS^{dg}

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Shalikashvili and Senator Nunn

This memorandum offers some observations about the pending congressional resolution on Somalia.

Attached at Tab II is the draft of the resolution that was circulated by Senator Mitchell's staff early Tuesday. A summary of the draft is at Tab I. You should be aware there may be changes to this draft by the time you, Howard Paster and General Shali meet with senators today.

As a general observation, the draft is positive in many respects: it neither sets a binding time-limit on the deployment of U.S. troops to Somalia, nor contains a funding cut-off. It is therefore far preferable to the Byrd resolution, which reportedly contains a December 31, 1993 cut-off of funds. By contrast to the resolution Mitchell's staff drafted, Congress' resolution authorizing our peacekeeping mission in Lebanon in 1983 (which was adopted prior to the Beirut barracks bombing) contained limitations on the duration of our deployment, the size of our force and its mandate. (Tab 3).

To moot the argument with Congress over whether U.S. activities in Somalia are subject to the War Powers Resolution, it will be very helpful to obtain an authorization.

MAJOR ISSUES

A significant portion of the attached draft -- especially section 4(b) -- responded to concerns expressed by Senator Nunn. This section presents the most significant problems for the Administration.

Section 4(b)

Nunn may argue that Congress does not want U.S. forces to engage in any of the activities specified in Section 4(b), including "urban police functions," seeking to arrest General Aideed, disarming the clans and conducting nation-building. He may also argue such limitations are necessary to secure support for the broad authorization in 4(a).

This would be our response: it is one thing for Congress to define the mission of U.S. forces in an overall way. But Congress should not dictate how the military carries out its operation. Our forces must have the maximum flexibility on the ground to respond to attacks and provocations. The tactics they use in pursuit of their mission should be decided by military commanders who are most familiar with local conditions. Attempts to legislate restrictions could actually put our servicemen and women at risk by hampering their use of necessary operations. We have constitutional as well as precedential concerns about giving the President a mission and then telling him there are some operations he cannot conduct, even if he concludes they are essential to the mission.

As a secondary argument, even if we could agree today on how the President should limit military operations in Somalia, we do not know how the situation will evolve. Writing restrictions on military operations into law fails to take this time factor into account. It could severely hamper U.S. commanders on the ground who need to have maximum flexibility over time in designing effective tactics.

Finally, even if we agreed on dropping the effort to arrest General Aideed, this prohibition should not be written into law. It will only give Aideed comfort, encourage him to wait us out and be less forthcoming in negotiations of a possible settlement.

Based on these arguments, we would urge deletion of Section 4(b) of his draft resolution. You would argue that 4(a) accomplishes Nunn's core objective of authorizing a defined mandate.

FALL-BACK #1: If he is unwilling to make this change, we should ask him to replace the phrase "shall not" in the introductory sentence with "should not." This would put Congress' views on record without constraining the President in exigent circumstances.

FALL-BACK #2: We should ask Nunn to delete the phrase "In performing this mission . . ." at the beginning of the introductory sentence and substitute "It shall not be the mission of . . ." The purpose of this change would be to permit Congress to exclude the items in 4(b) from the Statement of Mission, without putting those items off-limits if necessary to the achievement of the mission authorized in 4(a).

FALL-BACK #3: Accept 4(b), but note that we may need to have a signing statement that upholds the President's constitutional authorities.

Section 3

We need to delete the word "tactical" in section 3. According to JCS, when the QRF responds to requests for assistance from a foreign contingent, it takes direction from the sector's foreign commander. JCS says this is necessary to ensure deconfliction. (JCS was still evaluating Tuesday night whether we should seek to

delete the word "command" for similar reasons.) Also, for constitutional and precedential reasons it would be preferable to change "shall" to "should."

Ideally this provision would then read:

"United States forces....should at all times remain under the operational command and control of United States commanders."

Section 4

We also need to replace the word "shall" in Section 4(a) with the phrase "are authorized to." This is both to get us a clear authorization and to make clear the President is not required to take these actions if he decides otherwise. Thus, the introductory paragraph would read:

"United States Armed Forces are authorized to conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia in support of and as an emergency backup to United Nations forces. In performing this mission, United States forces are authorized to:
. . . ."

End Point of Mission

Finally, you should be aware that Senator Dole and others may be pushing to delete any reference to a March 31 end-point for our mission.

Concurrences by:  Jeremy Rosner,  Richard Clarke

Attachments

Tab I Summary of Resolution
Tab II Draft Resolution on Somalia
Tab III Congressional Resolution on Lebanon (1983)

SUMMARY OF RESOLUTION

This resolution initially cites the circumstances and history of U.S. involvement in Somalia. It notes that the mission of the United Nations has "apparently evolved" to "one of internal security and nation building" -- and that U.S. servicemen have been killed in support of this broader U.N. mission.

Section 2 of the resolution contains a "Statement of Congressional Policy," including an endorsement of the planned, orderly withdrawal of all American troops from Somalia no later than March 31, 1994."

Section 3 deals with "Command and Control Arrangements." It specifies that all U.S. forces -- other than the support personnel assigned to UNOSOM -- "shall at all times remain under the operational and tactical command and control of United States commanders." This statement is problematic.

Section 4(a) of the resolution is a positive authorization for the U.S. armed forces to carry out their mission in Somalia. The elements of that mission are consistent with the purposes outlined by the President in his recent remarks: 1) to protect U.S. troops and facilities in Somalia; 2) secure key ports and lines of communication to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief; 3) provide an "emergency backup force" for U.N. forces; and 4) prevent a return of anarchy and famine.

Section 4(b) is the most problematic provision and should be the focus of your discussions today. It sets forth specific prohibitions on the operations of U.S. forces in Somalia. Under Section 5, U.S. forces "shall not": 1) conduct urban police functions; 2) carry out search and seizure operations in an attempt to arrest General Aideed or his compatriots; 3) conduct disarmament of Somali clans "except as incident" to carrying out their positive mission described in the previous section; and 4) carry out "nation-building."

Section 5 requires periodic reports on the mission and function of U.S. forces in Somalia. Section 6 requires periodic reports on the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Somalia.

Draft Joint Resolution Regarding United States Policy Towards Somalia

Mitchell, Dole, Nunn, Warner

Whereas an estimated 300,000 Somalis have died as a result of hunger and widespread violence since January 1991.

Whereas on December 3, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 794 in which the Security Council determined that the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance constituted a threat to international peace and security.

Whereas up to 28,000 United States Armed Forces personnel entered Somalia on December 9, 1992 under Operation Restore Hope in response to Security Council Resolution 794.

Whereas on March 26, 1993, the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolution 814 providing for the establishment of a 20,000 man United Nations force in Somalia.

Whereas after May 1, 1993, about 3,100 United States Armed Forces personnel remained in Somalia to provide logistical, communication and intelligence support to the United Nations-led humanitarian relief operation, and about 1,400 combat troops remained as a United States-commanded Quick Reaction Force.

Whereas the mission of United States forces supporting the United Nations force in Somalia has apparently evolved from assisting in the establishment of "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" as set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, to one of internal security and nation building.

Whereas in support of this broadened United Nations mission of internal security and nation building, rather than humanitarian relief operations, sixteen American servicemen have been killed, three are missing and one is a known prisoner: Now therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Statement of Congressional Authorization Regarding the Presence of United States Armed Forces in Somalia".

SECTION 2. Statement of Congressional Policy.

(a) United States Armed Forces should remain deployed in and around Somalia until such time as all American service personnel missing in action have been accounted for; and all American service personnel held prisoner have been released.

(b) The Congress endorses the planned, orderly withdrawal of all American troops from Somalia no later than March 31, 1994.

(c) The President should intensify efforts to have other United Nation member countries immediately deploy additional troops to Somalia to assume the security missions of United States Armed Forces.

(d) The President should vigorously urge the United Nations to accelerate its diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement among all internal parties and factions to the crisis in Somalia.

(e) The President should strongly encourage and assist, the leaders of the neighboring African countries most directly affected by the crisis in Somalia, to intensify their efforts to build a political settlement among the Somali people.

SECTION 3. Command And Control Arrangements.

United States Forces, other than the support personnel presently assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), shall at all times remain under the operational and tactical command and control of United States commanders.

SECTION 4. Mission of United States Forces In Somalia.

(a) United States Armed Forces shall conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia in support of and as an emergency backup to United Nations forces. In performing this mission, United States forces shall;

- (1) protect United States troops and facilities in Somalia;
- (2) assist in securing and maintaining security of airports, seaports, and lines of communication whose use is essential to the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies throughout Somalia; and

- (3) provide an emergency backup force for United Nations forces and respond, as deemed appropriate by the on-scene United States commander, to requests for assistance when such forces are under actual or threatened attack;
- (4) to assist within the performance of assigned mission in preventing a return of anarchy and famine.

(b) In performing this mission, United States Armed Forces shall not:

- (1) conduct urban police functions;
- (2) conduct search and seize operations in an attempt to arrest and detain personnel pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 837 of June 6, 1993;
- (3) conduct disarmament of the various Somali clans, except as incident to the conduct of operations carried out pursuant to paragraphs (a) (1), (2) and (3) above; nor
- (4) conduct nation-building or other activities that are more properly performed by civilian personnel.

SECTION 5. Reports Regarding The Presence Of United States Forces In Somalia.

(a) Periodic Reports.--

(1) Information To Be Provided. The President shall submit periodic reports to the Congress with respect to United States Armed Forces participation in and support for the United Nations force in Somalia. Each report shall --

(A) specify the number and location of the United States Armed Forces participating in the United Nations force in Somalia or operating in support of that force;

(B) specify the mission and functions being performed by United States Armed Forces support personnel participating in the United Nations force in Somalia;

(C) specify the mission and functions of all the United States Armed Forces operating in and around Somalia;

(D) specify the command and control arrangements applicable with respect to United States Armed Forces participating in the United Nations force in Somalia or operating in support of that force; and

(E) specify the anticipated duration of the deployment of United States Armed Forces in and around Somalia.

(2) Reporting Dates And Period Covered By Each Report-- A report pursuant to this subsection shall be submitted --

(A) not later than January 1, 1994, covering the period since the enactment of this legislation; and

(B) not later than March 1, 1994, covering the period since the preceding report pursuant to this subsection.

SECTION 6. Reports On Costs Of United Nations-Authorized Operations In Somalia.

(a) Requirement For Periodic Reports.--The President shall submit to the Congress periodic reports regarding the costs of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia.

(b) Information On Costs And Other Contributions. --Each report pursuant to this section shall specify (to the extent such information is available to the United States) --

(1) the amount of the incremental costs incurred by the United States as the result of its participation in or military operations in support of the United Nations force in Somalia;

(2) the amount of other in-kind or financial contributions pledged, and the amount of such contributions made, by each participating country toward the costs associated with the United Nations force in Somalia, including contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia and excluding amounts reported pursuant to paragraph (3);

(3) the amount assessed by the United Nations to the United States and each other country for its contributions to the costs associated with the United Nations force in Somalia;

(4) the amount received by the United States and each other country as reimbursement from the United Nations, including reimbursements from the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia, as the result of its participation in the United Nations force in Somalia; and

(5) the amount received by the United States and each other country as credit against an assessment described in paragraph (3) from the United Nations for costs that it incurred as the result of its participation in or military operations in support of the United Nations force in Somalia.

(c) Reimbursement of Costs Incurred By The United States in Somalia.-- It is the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to ensure that incremental costs incurred by the United States in connection with the United States Armed forces presence in Somalia are reimbursed to the maximum extent possible by the United Nations and other members of the international community. Each report pursuant to this section shall review all actions taken by the United States to achieve this objective.

(d) Reporting Dates And Period Covered By Each Report.-- A report pursuant to this section shall be submitted--

(1) not later than January 1, 1994, covering the period since enactment of this legislation; and

(2) not later than March 1, 1994, covering the period since the preceding report pursuant to this subsection.

SECTION 7. Definitions.

As used in this joint resolution--

(1) the term "United Nations force in Somalia" means the expanded force (referred to as UNOSOM II) authorized by paragraph 5 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (1993);

(2) the term "United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia" means the trust fund established and maintained pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 794 and 814.

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II

Ninety-eighth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

*Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the third day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three*

Joint Resolution

Providing statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution for continued United States participation in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon in order to obtain withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution".

FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

SEC. 2. (a) The Congress finds that—

(1) the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is an essential United States foreign policy objective in the Middle East;

(2) in order to restore full control by the Government of Lebanon over its own territory, the United States is currently participating in the multinational peacekeeping force (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the "Multinational Force in Lebanon") which was established in accordance with the exchange of letters between the Governments of the United States and Lebanon dated September 25, 1982;

(3) the Multinational Force in Lebanon better enables the Government of Lebanon to establish its unity, independence, and territorial integrity;

(4) progress toward national political reconciliation in Lebanon is necessary; and

(5) United States Armed Forces participating in the Multinational Force in Lebanon are now in hostilities requiring authorization of their continued presence under the War Powers Resolution.

(b) The Congress determines that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983. Consistent with section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, the purpose of this joint resolution is to authorize the continued participation of United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

(c) The Congress intends this joint resolution to constitute the necessary specific statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution for continued participation by United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

S. J. Res. 159—2

AUTHORIZATION FOR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON

SEC. 3. The President is authorized, for purposes of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, to continue participation by United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon, subject to the provisions of section 6 of this joint resolution. Such participation shall be limited to performance of the functions, and shall be subject to the limitations, specified in the agreement establishing the Multinational Force in Lebanon as set forth in the exchange of letters between the Governments of the United States and Lebanon dated September 25, 1982, except that this shall not preclude such protective measures as may be necessary to ensure the safety of the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS

SEC. 4. As required by section 4(c) of the War Powers Resolution, the President shall report periodically to the Congress with respect to the situation in Lebanon, but in no event shall he report less often than once every three months. In addition to providing the information required by that section on the status, scope, and duration of hostilities involving United States Armed Forces, such reports shall describe in detail—

- (1) the activities being performed by the Multinational Force in Lebanon;
- (2) the present composition of the Multinational Force in Lebanon, including a description of the responsibilities and deployment of the armed forces of each participating country;
- (3) the results of efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the Multinational Force in Lebanon;
- (4) how continued United States participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon is advancing United States foreign policy interests in the Middle East; and
- (5) what progress has occurred toward national political reconciliation among all Lebanese groups.

STATEMENTS OF POLICY

SEC. 5. (a) The Congress declares that the participation of the armed forces of other countries in the Multinational Force in Lebanon is essential to maintain the international character of the peacekeeping function in Lebanon.

(b) The Congress believes that it should continue to be the policy of the United States to promote continuing discussions with Israel, Syria, and Lebanon with the objective of bringing about the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and establishing an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area.

(c) It is the sense of the Congress that, not later than one year after the date of enactment of this joint resolution and at least once a year thereafter, the United States should discuss with the other members of the Security Council of the United Nations the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force to assume the responsibilities of the Multinational Force in Lebanon. An analysis of the implications of the response to such discussions for the continuation of the Multinational Force in Lebanon shall be

included in the reports required under paragraph (3) of section 4 of this resolution.

DURATION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON

SEC. 6. The participation of United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon shall be authorized for purposes of the War Powers Resolution until the end of the eighteen-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this resolution unless the Congress extends such authorization, except that such authorization shall terminate sooner upon the occurrence of any one of the following:

- (1) the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the President determines and certifies to the Congress that continued United States Armed Forces participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon is required after such withdrawal in order to accomplish the purposes specified in the September 25, 1982, exchange of letters providing for the establishment of the Multinational Force in Lebanon; or
- (2) the assumption by the United Nations or the Government of Lebanon of the responsibilities of the Multinational Force in Lebanon; or
- (3) the implementation of other effective security arrangements in the area; or
- (4) the withdrawal of all other countries from participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

INTERPRETATION OF THIS RESOLUTION

SEC. 7. (a) Nothing in this joint resolution shall preclude the President from withdrawing United States Armed Forces participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon if circumstances warrant, and nothing in this joint resolution shall preclude the Congress by joint resolution from directing such a withdrawal.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution modifies, limits, or supersedes any provision of the War Powers Resolution or the requirement of section 4(a) of the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, relating to congressional authorization for any substantial expansion in the number or role of United States Armed Forces in Lebanon.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR AMENDMENTS

SEC. 8. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced to amend or repeal this Act shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be. Such joint resolution or bill shall be considered by such committee within fifteen calendar days and may be reported out, together with its recommendations, unless such House shall otherwise determine pursuant to its rules.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days

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thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such joint resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within forty-eight hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

*Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.*

Whereas at that time as many as one million additional Somalis were at risk of dying

Whereas nearly one million Somalis remain dependent on humanitarian relief supplies or services

Draft Joint Resolution Regarding United States Policy Towards Somalia

Mitchell, Dole, Nunn, Warner

Whereas an estimated 300,000 Somalis have died as a result of hunger and widespread violence since January 1991

Whereas on December 3, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 794 in which the Security Council determined that the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance constituted a threat to international peace and security.

Whereas up to ^{25,000} 28,000 United States Armed Forces personnel entered Somalia on December 9, 1992 under Operation Restore Hope in response to Security Council Resolution 794.

Whereas on March 26, 1993, the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolution 814 providing for the establishment of a ~~20,000 man~~ ^{28,000} United Nations force in Somalia.

Whereas after May 1, 1993, about 3,100 United States Armed Forces personnel remained in Somalia to provide logistical, communication and intelligence support to the United Nations-led humanitarian relief operation, and about 1,400 combat troops remained as a United States-commanded Quick Reaction Force.

Whereas the mission of United States forces supporting the United Nations force in Somalia has apparently evolved from assisting in the establishment of "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" as set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, to one of internal security and nation building.

Whereas in support of this broadened United Nations mission of internal security and nation building, rather than humanitarian relief operations, sixteen American servicemen have been killed, three are missing and one is a known prisoner: Now therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Statement of Congressional Authorization Regarding the Presence of United States Armed Forces in Somalia".

SECTION 2. Statement of Congressional Policy.

(a) ~~United States Armed Forces should remain deployed in and around Somalia until such time as all American service personnel missing in action have been accounted for; and all American service personnel held prisoner have been released.~~

(b) ~~The Congress endorses the planned, orderly withdrawal of all American troops from Somalia no later than March 31, 1994.~~

(c) ~~The President should intensify efforts to have other United Nation member countries immediately deploy additional troops to Somalia to assume the security missions of United States Armed Forces.~~

(d) ~~The President should vigorously urge the United Nations to accelerate its diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement among all internal parties and factions to the crisis in Somalia.~~

(e) ~~The President should strongly encourage and assist, the leaders of the neighboring African countries most directly affected by the crisis in Somalia, to intensify their efforts to build a political settlement among the Somali people.~~

SECTION 3. Command And Control Arrangements.

~~United States Forces, other than the support personnel presently assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), shall at all times remain under the operational and tactical command and control of United States commanders.~~

SECTION 4. Mission of United States Forces In Somalia.

The President is authorized to insert
 (a) ~~United States Armed Forces shall conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia in support of and as an emergency backup to United Nations forces. In performing this mission, United States forces shall~~ *are authorized to:*

- (1) protect United States troops and facilities in Somalia;
- (2) assist in securing and maintaining security of airports, seaports, and lines of communication whose use is essential to the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies throughout Somalia; and

(3) provide an emergency backup force for United Nations forces and respond, as deemed appropriate by the on-scene United States commander, to requests for assistance when such forces are under actual or threatened attack;

(4) to assist within the performance of assigned mission in ~~preventing a return of anarchy and famine.~~ *providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief.*

(b) In performing this mission, United States Armed Forces shall not:

should not (1) conduct urban police functions; *regular* (2) conduct search and seize operations in an attempt to arrest and detain personnel pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 837 of June 6, 1993; *under*

no (3) conduct disarmament of the various Somali clans, except as incident to the conduct of operations carried out pursuant to paragraphs (a) (1), (2) and (3) above; nor

(4) conduct nation-building or other activities that are more properly performed by civilian personnel.

SECTION 5. Reports Regarding The Presence Of United States Forces In Somalia.

(a) Periodic Reports.--

(1) Information To Be Provided. The President shall submit periodic reports to the Congress with respect to United States Armed Forces participation in and support for the United Nations force in Somalia. Each report shall --

(A) specify the number and location of the United States Armed Forces participating in the United Nations force in Somalia or operating in support of that force;

(B) specify the mission and functions being performed by United States Armed Forces support personnel participating in the United Nations force in Somalia;

(C) specify the mission and functions of all the United States Armed Forces operating in and around Somalia;

(D) specify the command and control arrangements applicable with respect to United States Armed Forces participating in the United Nations force in Somalia or operating in support of that force; and

(E) specify the anticipated duration of the deployment of United States Armed Forces in and around Somalia.

(2) Reporting Dates And Period Covered By Each Report--
A report pursuant to this subsection shall be submitted--

(A) not later than January ¹⁵, 1994, covering the period ~~since~~ ^{between} the enactment of this legislation, and

(B) not later than March 1, 1994, covering the period since the preceding report pursuant to this subsection. ^{on December 31, 1993}

SECTION 6. Reports On Costs Of United Nations-Authorized Operations In Somalia.

(a) Requirement For Periodic Reports.--The President shall submit to the Congress periodic reports regarding the costs of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia.

(b) Information On Costs And Other Contributions. --Each report pursuant to this section shall specify (to the extent such information is available to the United States) --

(1) the amount of the incremental costs incurred by the United States as the result of its participation in or military operations in support of the United Nations force in Somalia;

(2) the amount of other in-kind or financial contributions pledged, and the amount of such contributions made, by each participating country toward the costs associated with the United Nations force in Somalia, including contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia and excluding amounts reported pursuant to paragraph (3);

(3) the amount assessed by the United Nations to the United States and each other country for its contributions to the costs associated with the United Nations force in Somalia;

(4) the amount received by the United States ~~and each other country~~ as reimbursement from the United Nations, including reimbursements from the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia, as the result of its participation in the United Nations force in Somalia; and

(5) the amount received by the United States ~~and each other country~~ as credit against an assessment described in paragraph (3) from the United Nations for costs that it incurred as the result of its participation in or military operations in support of the United Nations force in Somalia.

info may
not
be available

(c) Reimbursement of Costs Incurred By The United States in Somalia.--It is the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to ensure that incremental costs incurred by the United States in connection with the United States Armed forces presence in Somalia are reimbursed to the maximum extent possible by the United Nations and other members of the international community. Each report pursuant to this section shall review all actions taken by the United States to achieve this objective.

(d) Reporting Dates And Period Covered By Each Report.--
A report pursuant to this section shall be submitted--

- (1) not later than January ¹⁵ 1994, covering the period ~~since enactment of this legislation; and~~ *between* ^{and Dec 31, 1993}
- (2) not later than March 1, 1994, covering the period since the preceding report pursuant to this subsection.

SECTION 7. Definitions.--

As used in this joint resolution--

(1) the term "United Nations force in Somalia" means the expanded force (referred to as UNOSOM II) authorized by paragraph 5 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (1993);

(2) the term "United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia" means the trust fund established and maintained pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 794 and 814.

REMARKS OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON
On U.S. Policy in Somalia
October 7, 1993

My fellow Americans, today I want to talk with you about our nation's military involvement in Somalia.

One year ago, we watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the thousands -- dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country.

This past weekend, we all reacted with anger and disgust as an armed Somali gang brutalized our people. We watched with outrage as they desecrated the bodies of American GIs and mistreated a captured American pilot -- all of them soldiers of mercy who were taking part in a brave international effort to end Somalia's starvation.

But I want to assure you: I will not let these outrages shake our resolve, and I will not let these outlaws erase what our brave young Americans accomplished.

These tragic events raise hard questions about our effort in Somalia: Why are we there? What are we trying to accomplish? How did a humanitarian mission turn violent? And when will our people come home? These questions deserve straight answers.

Let's start by remembering why our troops went into Somalia. We went because only the United States could help stop one of the greatest human tragedies of our time. A third of a million

people had died of starvation and disease. Twice that many were at risk. Meanwhile tons of relief supplies piled up in the capital of Mogadishu because a small number of ruthless Somalis were determined to stop food from reaching their countrymen.

Our consciences said: enough. In the best tradition of our generous country, we took action. With bi-partisan support, President Bush sent in 28,000 American troops as part of a United Nations humanitarian mission. Our troops created a secure environment so food and medicine could get through. We saved close to a million lives. And throughout most of Somalia -- everywhere but in Mogadishu -- life began returning to normal; crops are growing and markets are reopening. Nearly a million Somalis still depend completely on relief supplies, but the starvation is gone. And this would not have happened without American leadership and American troops.

But then, back in June, the gang that caused most of the problems in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani and other troops who were there to keep the peace. They want to return Somalia to the anarchy that existed before we came. And make no mistake, if we left Somalia tomorrow, the multi-national peacekeeping force ^{of nearly two dozen nations} would collapse, chaos would resume, the relief effort would stop, and mass starvation would return.

It is not America's job to rebuild Somalia's society. The Somalis must do that themselves. The UN and many African states are helping. But we must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance.

In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We have nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave now, those embers will reignite into flames and people will die once again. If we stay a short while longer, we have a reasonable chance of cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place.

So now we face a choice. Do we leave when the job gets tough or when the job is well done? Do we invite a return of mass suffering or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a decent chance to survive?

General Colin Powell recently said this about our choices in Somalia: "because things get a bit difficult, you don't cut and run. You work the problem and try to find a correct solution."

I want to bring our troops home from Somalia. Before the events of this week, we already had reduced the number of our troops there from 28,000 to less than 5,000. We must complete that withdrawal soon -- and I will. But we also must leave on our terms. We must do it right. And here is what I intend to do.

The past week's events make it clear that, even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need a stronger force there to ensure our people are safe. Today I have ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and complete our mission. I also have ordered an aircraft carrier and two amphibious groups with 3,600 combat Marines to be stationed offshore. These forces, like all our

others, will be under the command of US Army Major General Thomas Montgomery.

Their mission -- what I am asking these young Americans to do -- is the following.

First, they are there to protect our troops and our logistics bases, and to ensure that anyone who attacks our soldiers pays a heavy price.

Second, they are there to keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communication that are essential for the UN and relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely through the country.

Third, they are there to keep the pressure on those that cut off relief supplies and attacked our people -- not to personalize the conflict, but to prevent a return to anarchy.

Fourth, through that pressure and that presence, our troops will help make it possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so they can solve their problems and survive.

That is our mission.

I am proposing this plan *how diff?* because it will let us finish leaving Somalia on our own terms, and without destroying all that two

Administrations have accomplished. It is a plan for an orderly withdrawal rather than a forced retreat.

For if we were to leave today, we know what would happen. Within months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets. Our credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in global affairs would be undermined.

And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.

That is why I am committed to getting our job done in Somalia not only quickly but also effectively. To do that, I am taking steps to ensure troops from other nations are ready to take the place of our soldiers. We have already withdrawn some 20,000 US troops and more than that number have replaced them from over two dozen nations. Now we will intensify efforts to have other countries deploy more troops to Somalia to assure that security will remain when we are gone. And we will complete the replacement of U.S. military logistics personnel with civilian contractors who can provide the same support to the UN. We cannot keep our troops in Somalia forever; but America does not leave its friends in the lurch.

While we are taking military steps to protect our own people and help the UN maintain a secure environment, we also must accelerate diplomatic efforts to help the Somalis find a political solution -- the only kind that can endure. Leaders of

neighboring African states such as Ethiopia and Eritrea have offered to take the lead, in efforts to build a settlement among the Somalia people that can preserve order and security. I have directed my representatives to pursue such efforts vigorously, and I have asked Ambassador Bob Oakley, who effectively served two Administrations as US representative in Somalia, to travel to the region immediately to advance this process.

Obviously, even then, there is no guarantee Somalia will rid itself of violence or suffering. But we will have given Somalia a reasonable chance. This week some 15,000 Somalis took to the streets to express sympathy for our losses and to thank us for our effort. Most Somalis are not hostile us, but grateful, and they are ready to use this opportunity to rebuild their country.

~~Finally, and this is very important,~~ I am determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or held captive. Anyone holding an American right now should understand that we will hold them strictly responsible. We expect our people to be well-treated. And we expect them to be released.

It is my judgment and that of my military advisors that we need six months to complete these steps and conduct an orderly withdrawal. All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March 31, except for a few hundred support personnel in non-combat roles.

If we take these steps, if we take the time to do the job right, I am convinced we will have lived up to the responsibilities of

American leadership in the world, and we will have proven that we are committed to addressing the new problems of a new era.

When our troops in Somalia came under fire this weekend, we witnessed a dramatic example of the heroic ethic of the American military. That ethic is expressed in the creed of the Army Rangers, many of whom were involved in the operation. That creed reads: "Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country."

When the first Black Hawk helicopter was downed this weekend, the other American troops didn't retreat, although they could have. Instead, they fought through heavy resistance and converged on the crash site to look for survivors and to retrieve their fallen comrades. Some ninety of them formed a perimeter around the helicopter, and they held that ground under heavy fire.

Those young Americans lived up to the highest ideals of our armed forces. They didn't run in the face of danger. They finished their job. They honored their country.

Now it is up to each of us to follow their example. Let us stand together as a nation at this moment of adversity. Let us finish the work we set out to do. And let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they ~~do the job right.~~

must it.

Thank you, and God bless America.

TALKING POINTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL MEETING ON SOMALIA

- Thank you for joining me this morning.
- Like all of you, I was angered and disgusted by the scenes from Mogadishu on Sunday and by the attack on our men yesterday.
- I intend to do a number of things in the wake of those events, which I will detail here for you.
- But let me say at the outset: one thing I am not going to do is to cut and run. We have people all over the world doing important tasks in dangerous places.
- I am not going to do anything that will convince our potential enemies that they can get us to change our policies by killing our people. If they think that, it will be open season on Americans, not just for now but in the future.
- And I am not going to act in a way that irresponsibly endangers the great humanitarian success our forces achieved in Somalia over the past year.
- I know the American people are concerned. I know many want us out tomorrow. But I am going to ask for your support so that we can end our involvement in Somalia in a way that reflects our responsibilities and our leadership role in the world.

THE U.S. MISSION IN SOMALIA

- I will get back to that thought in a minute. First, let me lay out what our policy has been and is in Somalia.
- Let me be very clear. The United States went to Somalia to help establish a secure environment in which the UN and relief workers could alleviate famine and anarchy. That remains our mission today.
- Remember how bad it was when President Bush went in ten months ago. Over 350,000 people had died. More than twice that number were on the verge of dying.
- We can be very proud that we stopped that. And we should do all that we reasonably can to insure it does not happen again when we leave.
- It is also true that we cannot stay forever; and I am committed to having our forces leave by a date certain, which I will explain.
- The U.S. mission in Somalia is not nation-building or creating a Jeffersonian democracy there. Our initial mission was security, our mission has remained one of security, and our mission will continue to be one of security.

- In most of the country, we have achieved that mission and turned over vast areas to other nations' troops. In most of the country, people are no longer hungry; there is peace; crops have been harvested; local governments are functioning again; and life is returning to normal.
- In one area of Mogadishu, where the U.S. and UN headquarters are, where the port and airport are, where the TV cameras have been, one critical faction is engaged in a violent attempt to prevent us from creating that secure environment.
- It is the same faction that was responsible for much of last year's problems, including not allowing relief supplies to leave the port when people were dying all around the country. It is the same faction that broke the cease-fire last June when they killed two dozen Pakistanis in one incident.
- Our mission has remained the same. But their breaking the cease-fire in June did change things. Because we were then operating in a hostile environment.
- Clearly, that environment has become more hostile in recent weeks.

MILITARY STEPS

- But we must and will not run away. We must do what we said we would do. We must do our best to finish our mission of security. When we leave, we must leave the UN and the Somalis a reasonable chance to prevent a return of the chaos and starvation we came to help eliminate.
- And while we finish that job, we must assure that we have the right forces there to accomplish it with the least risk to our own people.
- Therefore, I am taking steps to ensure that our people there are well protected as long as they are there.
- In addition to the steps Secretary Aspin announced earlier this week, I have ordered 1700 additional combat personnel with 84 additional armored vehicles to be dispatched to protect our people.
- I have also ordered a helicopter carrier task force and amphibious ready group of 3400 Marine personnel to sail and stand by off shore to provide additional protection.
- Secretary Aspin will brief you later on the elements of that enhancement.

THE MISSING PERSONNEL

- We also have sent messages through a variety of channels to those who may be holding American soldiers making clear that I hold them personally accountable for the well being of any Americans they are holding.

- If the opportunity arises -- and I will ask you not to repeat this outside of this room -- we will get them back through other means. We have our best military assets and our intelligence people hard at work on this.
- But we must also not send a signal in what we say that our missing are hostages, which would make their release less likely.

POLITICAL STEPS

- Now let me return to our mission in Somalia. While we are taking military steps to help the UN create a secure environment, and to protect our own people, ultimately this is not a military problem.
- Our purpose is humanitarian. And restoring a secure environment requires political steps by the Somali people.
- The UN, frankly, has been slow to do some of the political work necessary. They are now energized, dispatching their senior people to the region to accelerate a political solution.
- We also are in touch with the leaders of the nations of the region and they have offered to lead an effort to achieve a political solution.
- Today, I am sending Ambassador Bob Oakley, who served the last two administrations in Somalia, to return to the region to further this process.
- We are not going to dictate how the Africans and the Somalis achieve this political solution and we are not going to stand in the way of any solution they achieve.

TIMETABLE

- I said earlier that we will not stay there forever and that we will leave by a date certain.
- Some want that date certain to be tomorrow. But that simply cannot be. It should not be.
- If we were to leave tomorrow, it is a virtual certainty that the UN effort would collapse. Chaos almost certainly would return; the relief effort would end; starvation would return, and we would be leaving live Americans behind. We would be casting doubt on the value of America's commitments and the strength of America's leadership, and we would be endangering American troops and civilians all over the world.
- I am determined that we do our reasonable best to meet our commitments to the UN, to the thirty nations that we asked to join us there and who have done so, to the vast majority of the Somali people who have worked with us, and to the

thousands of Americans who have worked so hard to do that humanitarian mission there.

- But our commitment cannot be unlimited. My military and diplomatic advisers have concluded that by March 31, 1994, all of our forces, with the possible exception of a few hundred support personnel will be out of Somalia. We can and will have given others working with the UN, and the Somali people, a full chance.
- This is the reasonable but finite period that maximizes the chance that Somalia does not return to chaos when we leave: time to maintain the logistical support the UN needs as we transfer those functions to civilian contractors and others; to turn our security role over to other capable troops; to get the political process back on track.
- And understand: the vast majority of Somalis support the UN mission. Although you did not see it on TV, some fifteen thousand of them rallied two days ago to express their condolences for the deaths of our troops. The leaders of all of the clans except Aideed's spoke and asked us to stay. Many of the people in that rally wouldn't be alive today if it hadn't been for our leadership.
- We can remain true to them -- more importantly, we can preserve the heroic mission we accomplished there -- if we leave Somalia having made our best effort to prevent a return of the anarchy and starvation we went there to prevent.

A NEW CHALLENGE; AN OLD REQUIREMENT OF LEADERSHIP

- All of us understand that this mission in Somalia broke new ground. It is a different kind of military operation. We have all learned from it. But even in a new era and in a new kind of operation, we cannot forget some old truths about our role in the world.
- We are the most powerful nation on earth. We are the leader and the hope of freedom. We simply do not cut and run once we make a commitment. We do not act in a way that virtually guarantees a humanitarian disaster. We do not act in a way that invites attacks on Americans in every corner of the world.
- We have huge responsibilities around the world. And let me tell you, the whole world is watching. Believe me, we will live to regret it if they see us run.
- I understand how angry the public is at what they saw, as we are. I understand they want someone to explain what is happening in Somalia and why we still are there. I plan on talking about this later this morning. I will make the case to the American public.

-- But I also need your help. This is not a time for Americans to divide or run. This is a time for us to stand together. I have heard the call for us to get out of Somalia. I hope you will heed my call for us to do it the right way.

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

October 5, 1993

MEMO TO: Tony

FROM: Nancy *W*


RE: Somalia

Attached is a scheduling idea that was forwarded to Roy Neel suggesting the President go out to Andrews to meet the bodies returning from Somalia. Bob Bell checked and they are already back or on their way back this afternoon. They come into Dover.

I thought this might come up on the margins of your meeting this afternoon. We could think about having the President go to Dover if the four who are still missing are found dead and returned.

cc SB

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



October 5, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ROY NEEL

FROM: Josh King

RE: Somalia

On April 23, 1983, Ronald Reagan, accompanied by his wife, traveled to Andrews Air Force Base to welcome home the bodies 16 of the Americans who were killed in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut.

Reagan's brief remarks, which were delivered at 6:44 pm on a Saturday, were among the most powerful of his presidency. I have attached a copy of them, as well as the radio address he taped that morning, and a photo of the event.

On President Clinton's return from New Haven, would it not be appropriate for him to express similar condolences and sympathy to the families of the fallen servicemen? In the course of his brief remarks, the President could also restate the administration's continuing resolve to bring peace to Somalia and bring to justice those responsible for the murder and inhumane treatment of American troops.

Message on the Observance of Army Reserve Day April 23, 1983

Established on April 23 seventy-five years ago, the United States Army Reserve traces its roots to the proud tradition of the citizen-soldier of the American Revolution. Created as the Medical Reserve Corps, the Army Reserve has become the largest Federal Reserve component in the Armed Forces of the United States. It now is composed of Army Reserve Troop Units, the Individual Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

Since 1908, Army Reservists have been called to active duty in emergencies. Almost 170,000 Reservists served in World War I. In World War II, an estimated 217,250 soldiers were mobilized from the Army Reserve to fight in the European and Pacific Theaters of war. Army Reservists

also served with pride and distinction during the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis in 1961, and the Vietnam conflict.

Today, the Army Reserve is an integral element of the Army, providing over 30 percent of its tactical support unit requirements and over 25 percent of its general support units. Army Reservists, like the citizen-soldiers of earlier time, stand ready to respond to their country's call and their nation's need. Let us answer their sacrifices and their dedication with our support and gratitude.

I am very proud to congratulate the United States Army Reserve on its Diamond Anniversary.

RONALD REAGAN

Remarks at a Ceremony Honoring the Victims of the Bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon

April 23, 1983

There can be no sadder duty for one who holds the office I hold than to pay tribute to Americans who have given their lives in the service of their country. I extend also the condolences of ourselves and our people, through Ambassador Turk, to the families of our loyal Lebanese employees who perished in this tragic event along with their American colleagues.

You here today, the families of these honored dead, I want you to know I speak for all Americans when I say that we share your sorrow and offer you our heartfelt sympathy. We are in your debt and theirs. Your loved ones served their country with talent and energy, courage and commitment. With your sorrow you must feel at the same time a pride—pride in their dedication. And we, your fellow citizens, share in that, also.

These gallant Americans understood the danger they faced, and yet they went willingly to Beirut. And the dastardly deed, the

act of unparalleled cowardice that took their lives, was an attack on all of us, on our way of life and on the values we hold dear. We would indeed fail them if we let that act deter us from carrying on their mission of brotherhood and peace.

It is written, "Blessed be the peacemakers." And they truly were peacemakers. They knew the road they traveled was hard and fraught with peril. They walked that road with cool professionalism and a deep sense of purpose. They knew at firsthand how an afflicted mankind looks to us for help—with faith in our strength, our sense of justice, and our decency. And that is the America that your loved ones exemplified. Let our monument to their memory be a preservation of that America.

Let us here in their presence serve notice to the cowardly, skulking barbarians in the world that they will not have their way. Let us dedicate ourselves to the cause of those loved ones, the cause they served so nobly

and for which they sacrificed their lives, the cause of peace on Earth and justice for all mankind.

We thank God for them. And God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 6:44 p.m. at Andrews Air Force Base, Md. The ceremony followed the return to the United States of the bodies of the 16 Americans who were killed in the bombing.

Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Enrico Fermi Awards at the Department of Energy

April 25, 1983

The President, Secretary Hodel, Dr. Anderson, Dr. Neddermeyer, Dr. Trivelpiece, and ladies and gentlemen:

You know, from long years out on the mashed-potato circuit, you always tried to think of some reason that you could sort of express at the beginning of your remarks as to why you were qualified or what you had in common with the occasion that could bring you there. And the only thing that I could think of for this morning goes back some years to when I was doing a television show called "The General Electric Theater." [Laughter]

And I remember that I was up at that great installation in the State of Washington where so much was being done with nuclear power. And in one particular building where they were showing me through, why, we put on felt boots and we put on some gowns and then we went through. But then we had to peel all of this off. And there was a slot machine there in which you put your hands and your feet—[laughter]—and there were four dials that started ticking away as to the amount of radioactivity that you might have acquired in your extremities. And mine all—on three of them, stopped. But on my left hand, that dial kept on ticking, and it was getting up there toward where the numbers were red. And I was getting a little concerned. And the manager of the plant looked over my shoulder, and he says, "Oh, your left hand." He says, "That always happens." He said, "That's the radium dial on your wrist-watch." [Laughter] I was very relieved.

I was 200 miles away from there when I realized—I don't have a radium dial. [Laughter] Every once in a while, I still put

my head under the covers and look to see if my hand's lighting up. [Laughter]

But on December 2d, 1942, James Conant, the Science Adviser to the President of the United States, received a coded message during a phone call from Arthur Holly Compton, "The Italian navigator has landed in the New World," Compton said. Conant inquired, "How were the natives?" And Compton answered, "Very friendly."

Well, ladies and gentlemen, that coded message signaled to President Roosevelt that the first demonstration of a sustained nuclear reaction had taken place. The Italian navigator referred to was Enrico Fermi. And on that day, the whole of mankind landed in a new world.

The two individuals that we honor today played significant roles in the early exploration of the atom. I understand Dr. Anderson was present in Chicago at the time of the first sustained reaction. Dr. Neddermeyer was also involved, conducting his research in another part of the country.

Wartime necessity focused that early research on the production of a weapon—a weapon that, once brought to bear on the enemy, effectively ended the conflict that then engulfed the world. This development 40 years ago forever changed the world and our perceptions of the consequences of conflict, which is why 40 years later, we continue to search for surer ways to control and reduce nuclear weapons and, eventually, better ways to defend against them.

While we might speculate on what the world would be like had nuclear weapons never been developed, we can't wish them away. And that's why I have challenged

these negotiations will be conducted by the U.S. Trade Representative in close coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of State.

Proclamation 5055—National Farm Safety Week, 1983

April 22, 1983

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Many of the world's people depend on American agriculture to fill their food and fiber needs. Yet, the efficiency of American agriculture and the quality of life for those who work on the land are impaired by a high accident rate. Many farm and ranch families, both owners and workers, suffer great personal sorrow and economic loss each year because of serious injuries or fatal accidents. It is particularly unfortunate that farm children and teenagers often are the victims of these accidents.

Although great progress has been made in improving safety on farms, much work remains to be done. It is important that community leaders and public officials continue to contribute their time and effort to promoting accident prevention programs. But real progress in safety must start with the individual. Most farm accidents can be prevented if safe work methods are followed and appropriate protective equipment used. If our farmers and ranchers develop strong safety habits while at work, in the home, in recreational pursuits, and while driving on the road, our safety record

will improve further.

Now, therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week of September 18 through September 24, 1983, as National Farm Safety Week. I urge all persons who live and work on the Nation's farms and ranches to make safety a daily part of activities on the job, at home or on the highway. I also urge those who work with and service America's farms and ranches to support safety efforts in every way possible. I call upon parents especially to teach their children good safety practices and instill in them a positive attitude toward safety which will serve them well throughout their lives.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 22nd day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and seventh.

RONALD REAGAN

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 10:27 a.m., April 25, 1983]

Note: The text of the proclamation was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on April 23.

Radio Address to the Nation on the Death of Federal Diplomatic and Military Personnel in Beirut, Lebanon

April 23, 1983

My fellow Americans:

In a few hours I'll undertake one of the saddest journeys of my Presidency. I'll be going to Andrews Air Force Base to meet one of our Air Force planes bringing home

16 Americans who died this week in the terrorist attack on the United States Embassy in Beirut.

I undertake this task in great sadness, but also with a tremendous sense of pride in

those who sacrificed their lives in our country's efforts to bring peace to the Middle East and spare others the agony of war. Greater love hath no man. The courage and the dedication of these men and women reflect the best tradition of our Foreign Service, our Armed Forces, and the other departments and agencies whose personnel serve our nation overseas, often in situations of great personal danger.

We don't know yet who bears responsibility for this terrible deed. What we do know is that the terrorists who planned and carried out this cynical and cowardly attack have failed in their purpose. They mistakenly believe that if they're cruel enough and violent enough, they will weaken American resolve and deter us from our effort to help build a lasting and secure peace in the Middle East. Well, if they think that, they don't know too much about America. As a free people, we've never allowed intimidation to stop us from doing what we know to be right. The best way for us to show our love and respect for our fellow countrymen who died in Beirut this week is to carry on with their task, to press harder than ever with our peacemaking efforts, and that's exactly what we're doing.

More than ever, we're committed to giving the people of Lebanon the chance they deserve to lead normal lives, free from violence and free from the presence of all unwanted foreign forces on their soil. And we remain committed to the Lebanese Government's recovery of full sovereignty throughout all its territory.

When I spoke after the bombing to Lebanon's President Gemayel, he expressed his people's deepest regret and revulsion over this wanton act of terrorism. I in turn assured him that the tragic events of this week had only served to strengthen America's steadfastness as a force for peace in his country and the Middle East. To this end, I've asked Secretary of State George Shultz to leave tomorrow night for the Middle East. Secretary Shultz will now add his personal efforts to continue the magnificent

work begun by Ambassadors Phil Habib and Morris Draper, bringing about the earliest possible withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon in a way that will promote peace and security in this troubled region.

The scenes of senseless tragedy in Beirut this week will remain etched in our memories forever. But along with the tragedy, there were inspiring moments of heroism. We will not forget the pictures of Ambassador Dillon and his staff, Lebanese as well as Americans, many of them swathed in bandages, bravely searching the devastated embassy for their colleagues and for other innocent victims.

We will not forget the image of young marines gently draping our nation's flag over the broken body of one of their fallen comrades. We will not forget their courage and compassion, and we will not forget their willingness to sacrifice even their lives for the service of their country and the cause of peace.

Yes, we Americans can be proud of these fine men and women. And we can be even prouder that our country has been playing such a unique and indispensable role in the Middle East, a role no other single nation could play. When the countries of the region want help in bringing peace, we're the ones they've turned to. That's because they trust us, because they know that America is both strong and just, both decent and dedicated. Even in the shadow of this terrible tragedy in Beirut, that is something to remember and draw heart from. It is also something to be true to.

I know I speak for all Americans when I reaffirm our unshakeable commitment to our country's most precious heritage—serving the cause of peace and freedom in the world. What better monument than that could we build for those who gave their all that others might live in peace.

Until next week, thank you, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 12:06 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House.



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September 11, 2006

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NARA, Date

8/24/17

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Talking Points for Congress

--As you know I have spent a lot of time on our policy toward Somalia, including several meetings these last two days with our senior diplomatic and military officials.

--I was horrified and disgusted by the scenes from Mogadishu on Sunday and I intend to do a number of things in the wake of those events, which I will detail here for you.

--But one thing I am not going to do is to cut and run. We have people all over the world doing important tasks in dangerous places.

--I am not going to do anything that will convince our potential enemies that they can get us to change our policies by killing our people. If they think that, it will be open season on Americans.

THE US MISSION IN SOMALIA

--I will get back to that thought in a minute. First, let me lay out what our policy has been and is in Somalia.

--There has been a lot of talk about a lack of clarity. I think we have been perfectly clear. The American mission, not the UN's, the American mission in Somalia has been and is to assist in establishing a secure environment in which the UN can then alleviate famine and anarchy.

--Remember how bad it was when President Bush went in ten months ago. Almost all of you supported that decision. Over 350,000 people had died and more than twice that number were at risk.

--We can be very proud that we stopped that. We should do all that we reasonably can to insure it does not happen again when we leave. But we also have to leave, and we will by a date certain, which I will explain.

--Our mission is not nation-building or creating a Jeffersonian democracy. Those are intentional distortions. Our mission is creating a secure environment for the UN to alleviate famine and anarchy.

--In most of the country, we have done that and turned over vast areas to other nations' troops.

--In one area of Mogadishu, where the US and UN headquarters are, the port and airport are, the TV cameras are, one faction is engaged in a violent attempt to prevent us from creating that secure environment.

--That faction was responsible for much of last year's problems. That faction broke the cease-fire last June when they killed two dozen Pakistani peace-makers in one incident.

--They changed the mission. Because then we were operating in a hostile environment.

MILITARY STEPS

--And it has become more hostile in recent weeks.

--Therefore I have taken steps and will now take further steps to insure that our people there are very well protected as long as they are there.

--In addition to the steps Secretary Aspin announced earlier this week, I have ordered ---- additional Army personnel with additional armored vehicles to be dispatched to protect our people. #15

--I have also ordered a Marine helicopter carrier task force and amphibious ready group to sail and stand by off shore to provide additional protection.

THE MISSING PERSONNEL

--I have sent messages through a variety of channels to those who may be holding American soldiers that I hold them personally accountable for their well being.

--If the opportunity arises -- ~~and I do not want to hear this repeated outside of this room~~ -- we will get them back through direct military means.

--We have our best military assets and our intelligence people hard at work on this.

--I do not want to send the wrong message to those who may hold them, but I will get those men back politically or militarily if it is at all possible.

POLITICAL STEPS

--But let me be clear about our mission in Somalia. While we are taking military steps, it is not fundamentally a military problem.

--Our purpose is humanitarian. We want to restore conditions of peace and order.

--That can best be done politically.

--The UN, frankly, has been slow to do some of the political work necessary. They are now energized, dispatching their senior people to the region to accelerate a political solution.

--I have also been in touch with the leaders of the nations of the region and they have offered to lead an effort to achieve a political solution.

--Today, I am sending Amb. Bob Oakley who served the last two administrations in Somalia, to the region to further this process.

--We are not going to dictate how the Africans and the Somalis achieve this political solution and we are not going to stand in the way of any solution they achieve. We are going to depersonalize the issue.

TIMETABLE

when
--I said earlier that we will not stay there forever to achieve the political solution and that we will leave by a date certain.

--Some of you want that date certain to be tomorrow. Its not going to be. It cannot be.

--We are going to meet our commitments to the UN, to the thirty nations that we asked to join us there and who have done so, to the vast majority of the Somalis people who have worked with us, and to the thousands of Americans who have worked so hard to do that humanitarian mission there.

--The vast majority of Somalis do support the UN mission. Although you did not see it on TV, thousands of them rallied two days ago to express their condolences for the deaths of our troops. The leader of all of the clans except Aideed's spoke and asked us to stay.

--We will not run away. We will do what we said we would do.

--We will provide the logistical support for the UN.

--We will also continue the reduction of US forces. I have already withdrawn 25,000 US troops. Despite the need for a slight increase to protect ourselves in the newly intense environment, we will stay on the planned downward slope of transitioning our roles to others.

--We will transition our logistical units to civilian contract support.

--Other countries will assume the role of our Quick Reaction Force that is there to assist other countries' units that get in trouble.

--And we will finish those transitions ahead of schedule. (As we have briefed the Congress, we had planned to keep some logistical forces there throughout next year.)

--Those transitions will be completed by 31 March, after which there will be no US military unit in Somalia.

--By then we will either have a political outcome in Somalia that has created a benign environment that the other UN forces can handle, or we can rightly say that there is unlikely to be one.

--Either the Somali people, with our help and the UN's and the African leaders assistance, can solve their problem by then or it is beyond the reasonable capability of us all to solve. We would have done our best and met our commitments.

REQUIREMENTS OF LEADERSHIP

--I said at the outset that I am not going to cut and run because we have been bloodied by some armed gang.

--Nor am I going to persist beyond reason.

--If we were to leave precipitously, not only would it become open season on Americans around the world as I said earlier, but we would be insuring that all that we have achieved in Somalia would collapse.

--The UN cannot now do the logistics role without us. We had said we would do it.

--Other nations cannot immediately assume the Quick Reaction Force role. In fact, if we cut and run, a score of other nations will beat us to the door.

--Either we create by March a political and military situation that the other troop contributing nations can handle without us, or the UN should and will reduce its goals and forces there.

--But not in a panic. Not without having done what we said we would do, trying through reasonable political and military efforts to create a secure environment.

--We have huge responsibilities around the world and let me tell you, as they said at the Chicago Convention in 1968, the whole world is watching. And believe me we will live to regret it if they see us run.

--We have responsibilities and we are going to ask flexibly, but responsibly.

--I ask for your support on this, but as the person ultimately responsible for our foreign policy and as commander in chief of our forces, I intend to do this the right way.

(1) the United States entered into Operation Restore Hope in December of 1992 for the purpose of relieving mass starvation in Somalia;

(2) the original mission in Somalia, to secure the environment for humanitarian relief, had the unanimous support of the Senate, expressed in Senate Joint Resolution 45, passed on February 4, 1993, and was endorsed by the House when it amended S.J. Res. 45 on May 25, 1993;

(3) Operation Restore Hope was being successfully accomplished by United States forces, working with forces of other nations, when it was replaced by the UNOSOM II mission, assumed by the United Nations on May 4, 1993, pursuant to United Nations Resolution 814 of March 26, 1993;

(4) neither the expanded United Nations mission of national reconciliation, nor the broad mission of disarming the clans, nor any other mission not essential to the performance of the humanitarian mission has been endorsed or approved by the Senate;

(5) the expanded mission of the United Nations was, subsequent to an attack upon United Nations forces, diverted into a mission aimed primarily at capturing certain persons, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 837, of June 6, 1993;

(6) the actions of hostile elements in Mogadishu, and the United Nations mission to subdue those elements, have resulted in open conflict in the city of Mogadishu and the deaths of 29 Americans, at least 159 wounded, and the capture of American personnel; and

(7) during fiscal years 1992 and 1993, the United States incurred expenses in excess of \$1,100,000,000 to support operations in Somalia.

(b) The Congress approves the use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia for the following purposes:

(1) The protection of United States personnel and bases; and

(2) The provision of assistance in securing open lines of communication for the free flow of supplies and relief operations through the provision of—

(A) United States military logistical support services to United Nations forces; and

(B) United States combat forces in a security role and as an interim force protection supplement to United Nations units: *Provided*, That funds appropriated, or otherwise made available, in this or any other Act to the Department of Defense may be obligated for expenses incurred only through March 31, 1994, for the operations of United States Armed Forces in Somalia: *Provided further*, That such date may be extended if so requested by the President and authorized by the Congress: *Provided further*, That funds may be obligated beyond March 31, 1994 to support a limited number of United States military personnel sufficient only to protect American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, and noncombat personnel to advise the United Nations commander in Somalia: *Provided further*, That United States combat forces in Somalia shall be under the command and control of United States commanders under the ultimate direction of the President of the United

States: *Provided further*, That the President should intensify efforts to have United Nations member countries immediately deploy additional troops to Somalia to fulfill previous force commitments made to the United Nations and to deploy additional forces to assume the security missions of United States Armed Forces: *Provided further*, That—

(i) captured United States personnel in Somalia should be treated humanely and fairly; and

(ii) the United States and the United Nations should make all appropriate efforts to ensure the immediate and safe return of any future captured United States personnel: *Provided further*, That the President should ensure that, at all times, United States military personnel in Somalia have the capacity to defend themselves, and American citizens: *Provided further*, That the United States Armed Forces should remain deployed in or around Somalia until such time as all American service personnel missing in action in Somalia are accounted for, and all American service personnel held prisoner in Somalia are released: *Provided further*, That nothing herein shall be deemed to restrict in any way the authority of the President under the Constitution to protect the lives of Americans.

SEC. 8152. Funds appropriated by this Act for intelligence or intelligence-related activities are deemed to be specifically authorized by the Congress for purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) during fiscal year 1994 until the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994.

SEC. 8153. (1) Except as provided in subsection (c) below, it is the sense of the Congress that none of the funds appropriated by this Act should be obligated or expended for costs incurred by the United States Armed Forces units serving in any international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations under the authority of Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and under the authority of a United Nations Security Council Resolution, or for costs incurred by United States Armed Forces serving in any significant international humanitarian, peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations, unless—

(a) the President initiates consultations with the bipartisan leadership of Congress, including the leadership of the relevant committees, regarding such operations; these consultations should be initiated at least fifteen days prior to the initial deployment of United States Armed Forces units to participate in such an operation, whenever possible, but in no case later than forty-eight hours after such a deployment; and these consultations should continue on a periodic basis throughout the period of the deployment;

(b) such consultation should include discussion of—

(1) the goals of the operation and the mission of any United States Armed Forces units involved in the operation;

(2) the United States' interests that will be served by the operation;

(3) the estimated cost of the operation;

the Interior will facilitate improvement in the quality of biological research. Better science will result in improved decision-making in the management of the Nation's federally managed lands and will enable Federal land managers to avoid future contentious actions under the Endangered Species Act.

The Act provides funding for a number of my investment proposals for energy conservation and fossil energy research and development. These investments are important for our Nation's energy future.

William J. Clinton

The White House,
November 11, 1993.

NOTE: H.R. 2520, approved November 11, was assigned Public Law No. 103-138.

**Statement on Signing the
Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1994**
November 11, 1993

Today I have signed into law, H.R. 3116, the "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994." H.R. 3116 supports the Administration's major defense priorities and reflects a spirit of cooperation between the Administration and the Congress to provide for a strong national defense. I am very pleased that the Congress has addressed budget issues in such a way that provides balanced support for my number one priority, the readiness of our forces. I also appreciate the support that the Congress has given to key investment and modernization proposals, especially my efforts to create a strong defense reinvestment program.

However, I do have serious reservations about a provision in section 8151 of this Act. I construe section 8151(b)(2)(ii) as not restricting my constitutional responsibility and authority as Commander In Chief, including my ability to place U.S. combat forces under the temporary tactical control of a foreign commander where to do otherwise would jeopardize the safety of U.S. combat forces

in support of UNOSOM II. Such U.S. combat forces shall, however, remain under the operational command and control of U.S. commanders at all times.

William J. Clinton

The White House,
November 11, 1993.

NOTE: H.R. 3116, approved November 11, was assigned Public Law No. 103-139.

**Remarks in a Telephone
Conversation With Congressman Ed
Pastor on NAFTA**

November 12, 1993

Congressman Ed Pastor. Good morning.

The President. Hello, Ed.

Congressman Pastor. Yes, good morning, Mr. President.

The President. How are you?

Congressman Pastor. I'm doing well, sir, beautiful weather here in Arizona.

The President. It's beautiful here, too.

Congressman Pastor. The reason I called you was to let you know that November 17, we'll be supporting you on the free-trade agreement.

The President. Thank you very much. We need your help.

Congressman Pastor. And I give a lot of credit to this to Congressman Esteban Torres. As you know, he worked very hard to get that nat. bank. And I know that with it we can do some things along the border.

I had a conversation yesterday with the EPA Administrator, and we talked about the resources that will be available. That was one of my concerns. So I look forward to working with her and with you to help the border communities along our Mexican-U.S. border.

The President. Thank you very much, Ed. As you well know, these environmental difficulties are going to get a lot better if NAFTA passes now that we've got the development bank there. And it also means more jobs along the border on both sides working

ANNEX VI: REMARKS OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON
 ON U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA OCTOBER 7, 1993

Today I want to talk with you about our nation's military involvement in Somalia.

A year ago, we watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands -- dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country.

This past weekend, we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot -- all of these soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people themselves.

These tragic events raise hard questions about our effort in Somalia. Why are we still there? What are we trying to accomplish? How did a humanitarian mission turn violent? And when will our people come home? These questions deserve straight answers.

Let's start by remembering why our troops went into Somalia in the first place. We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time. A third of a million people had died of starvation and disease. Twice that many more were at risk of dying. Meanwhile, tons of relief supplies piled up in the capital of Mogadishu because a small number of Somalis stopped food from reaching their own countrymen.

Our consciences said: enough. In our country's best tradition, we took action with bi-partisan support. President Bush sent in 28,000 American troops as part of a United Nations humanitarian mission. Our troops created a secure environment so food and medicine could get through. We saved close to one million lives. And throughout most of Somalia -- everywhere but in Mogadishu -- life began returning to normal. Crops are growing. Markets are reopening. So are schools and hospitals. Nearly a million Somalis still depend completely on relief supplies, but at least the starvation is gone. And none of this would have happened without American leadership and America's troops.

Until June, things went well with little violence. The United States reduced our troop presence from 28,000 down to less than 5,000, with other nations picking up where we left off.

But then in June, the people who caused much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani and other troops who were there just to keep the peace. Rather than participate in building the peace with others, these people

sought to fight and to disrupt, even if it means returning Somalia to anarchy and famine. And make no mistake about it: if we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The relief effort would stop. And starvation would soon return. That knowledge has led us to continue our mission.

It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society, or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help. But we -- we in the United States -- must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance.

We started this for the right reasons. And we're going to finish it in the right way.

In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We have nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave now, those embers will reignite into flames and people will die again. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place.

We also have to recognize that we cannot leave now and still have all our troops present and accounted for. And I want you to know that I am determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or held captive. Anyone holding an American right now should understand, above all else, that we will hold them strictly responsible for our soldiers' well-being. We expect them to be well-treated. And we expect them to be released.

So now we face a choice. Do we leave when the job gets tough or when the job is well done? Do we invite a return of mass suffering, or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a decent chance to survive?

Recently, General Colin Powell said this about our choices in Somalia: "because things get difficult, you don't cut and run. You work the problem and try to find a correct solution."

I want to bring our troops home from Somalia. Before the events of this week, we already had reduced the number of our troops there from 28,000 to less than 5,000. We must complete that withdrawal soon -- and I will. But we also must leave on our terms. We must do it right. And here is what I intend to do.

The past week's events make it clear that, even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there. We need more armor, more air power, to ensure our people are safe and that we can do our job. Today, I have ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and complete our mission. I also have ordered an aircraft carrier and two amphibious groups with 3,600 combat Marines to be stationed offshore. These forces will be under American command.

Their mission -- what I am asking these young Americans to do -- is the following.

First, they are there to protect our troops and our bases. We did not go to Somalia with a military purpose. But those who attack our soldiers will pay a very heavy price.

Second, they are there to keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communication that are essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely through the country, so that starvation and anarchy do not return.

Third, they are there to keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people -- not to personalize the conflict, but to prevent a return to anarchy.

Fourth, through their pressure and their presence, our troops will help make it possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so they can solve their problems and survive when we leave.

That is our mission.

I am proposing this plan because it will let us finish leaving Somalia on our own terms and without destroying all that two Administrations have accomplished there.

For, if we were to leave today, we know what would happen. Within months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets. Our credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world.

And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.

That is why I am committed to getting our job done in Somalia not only quickly but also effectively. To do that, I am taking steps to ensure troops from other nations are ready to take the place of our soldiers. We have already withdrawn some 20,000 U.S. troops, and more than that number have replaced them from over two dozen other nations. Now we will intensify efforts to have other countries deploy more troops to Somalia to assure that security will remain when we are gone. And we will complete the replacement of U.S. military logistics personnel with civilian contractors who can provide the same support to the UN.

While we are taking military steps to protect our own people and help the UN maintain a secure environment, we must pursue new diplomatic efforts to help the Somalis find a political solution to their problems. That is the only kind of outcome that can endure. For, fundamentally, the solution to Somalia's problems is not a military one. It is political. Leaders of neighboring African states such as Ethiopia and Eritrea have offered to take the lead, in efforts to build a settlement among the Somali

people that can preserve order and security. I have directed my representatives to pursue such efforts vigorously. And I have asked Ambassador Bob Oakley, who served effectively in two Administrations as U.S. representative in Somalia, to travel to the region immediately to advance this process.

Obviously, even then, there is no guarantee Somalia will rid itself of violence or suffering. But we will have given Somalia a reasonable chance. This week some 15,000 Somalis took to the streets to express sympathy for our losses and to thank us for our effort. Most Somalis are not hostile to us, but grateful, and they want to use this opportunity to rebuild their country.

It is my judgment and that of my military advisors that we may need up to six months to complete these steps and conduct an orderly withdrawal. We will do what we can do to complete the mission before then. All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31th, except for a few hundred support personnel in non-combat roles.

If we take these steps, if we take the time to do the job right, I am convinced we will have lived up to the responsibilities of American leadership in the world, and we will have proven that we are committed to addressing the new problems of a new era.

When our troops in Somalia came under fire this last weekend, we witnessed a dramatic example of the heroic ethic of the American military. When the first Black Hawk helicopter was downed this weekend, the other American troops didn't retreat, although they could have. Some ninety of them formed a perimeter around the helicopter, and they held that ground under intensely heavy fire. They stayed with their comrades. That is the kind of soldiers they are. That is the kind of people we are.

So let us finish the work we set out to do. And let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right.

Let me express my thanks and my gratitude and my profound sympathy to the families of the young Americans who were killed in Somalia. My message to you is, your country is grateful, and so is the rest of the world, and so are the vast majority of the Somali people. Our mission from this day forward is to increase our strength, do our job, bring our soldiers out, and bring them home. Thank you, and God bless America.

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U.S. Interests and the Risks of Precipitous Withdrawal

The U.S. does not have strategic or vital interests at stake in Somalia. Our diplomatic and military efforts in Somalia have been based instead on humanitarian concerns over one of the most devastating humanitarian catastrophes in recent history. Such humanitarian efforts have long played an important role in U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. does, however, have important interests at stake in how we complete our mission in Somalia.

U.S. forces will leave Somalia in the shortest time possible, but that cannot be at any cost. All U.S. troops, except for a few hundred non-combat support personnel, will be withdrawn no later than March 31, 1994. The U.S. should leave Somalia in a manner that does not increase the danger to Americans all over the world or undermine the substantial accomplishments of U.S. forces in Somalia.

We should complete our mission effectively and on our own terms. This is best achieved through a deliberate, phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over a six month period. Most importantly, withdrawing in such a manner is vital to the U.S. national interest because it reduces the many and unacceptable risks of withdrawing in the face of recent attacks. The risks of leaving Somalia precipitously include the following:

- The U.S. would be forced to leave behind and unaccounted for missing or detained U.S. servicemen and thereby reduce our ability to recover them safely or swiftly. This is not necessary and therefore not in keeping with the implicit covenant between the American people and the servicemen and women who risk and sometimes give their lives in our national defense. The U.S. will make every effort to return those who are missing.
- To leave Somalia abruptly in response to recent attacks would invite adversaries, terrorists and thugs all over the world to attack U.S. citizens and property to change U.S. policy. It would be open-season on Americans. In a world where there are many who may wish us ill and do not hesitate to use violence, this is a message we cannot send.
- A sudden U.S. withdrawal would damage our relations with the close to thirty other countries that are serving in Somalia at the direct request of the U.S. Many of these countries have also suffered serious losses in pursuit of this humanitarian mission. Having seen the U.S. break its commitments in Somalia, these and other nations would be reluctant to join the U.S. in future coalition efforts because they perceive our resolve as weak, and our commitments unreliable.
- U.S. logisticians are in Somalia providing indispensable material support for more than 20,000 other troops from all over the world. The U.S. QRF is the only force in the country capable of coming to the

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swift aid of other forces under attack. An abrupt American withdrawal would make it impossible for these contingents to stay in Somalia and finish the job.

- The departure of the U.S. and other contingents would cause the UN mission to fold. Since there has not yet been adequate progress on political reconciliation, this in turn would almost certainly result in renewed civil war, and with it, renewed anarchy and famine. The conditions that led to the original intervention would return, but this time there would be no one able or willing to alleviate the suffering. The accomplishments of the many U.S. and international forces that have served in Somalia would be lost, and their sacrifices would be largely in vain.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. cable	Re: President Clinton's Oval Office Address on Somalia and White House Briefing with SEDEF, SECSTATE, and CJCS (7 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1408

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993

2012-0659-F
ke4179

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NS-
Final
(R)

File

Byrd, Mitchell, Dole, Nunn, et al

Sense of Congress regarding United States Policy towards Somalia.

Whereas United States Armed Forces made significant contributions under Operation Restore Hope towards the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and restoration of peace in the region to end the humanitarian disaster that had claimed more than 300,000 lives.

Whereas the mission of United States forces in support of the United Nations appears to be evolving from the establishment of "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations," as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992, to one of internal security and nation building.

Statement of Congressional Policy:

a) Consultation with the Congress. - The President should consult closely with the Congress regarding U.S. policy with respect to Somalia, including in particular the deployment of U.S. armed forces in that country, whether under United Nations or United States command.

b) Planning. - The United States shall facilitate the assumption of the functions of U.S. forces by the United Nations.

c) Reporting Requirement. -

(i) The President shall ensure that the goals and objectives supporting deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia and a description of the mission, command arrangements, size, functions, location, and anticipated duration in Somalia of those forces are clearly articulated and provided in a detailed report to the Congress by October 15, 1993.

(ii) Such report shall include the status of planning to transfer the functions contained in paragraph (b).

d) Congressional Approval. - Upon reporting under the requirements of paragraph (c) Congress believes the President should by November 15, 1993, seek and receive Congressional authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia.

Somalia
PC with
Ombler.
10/16/93

Pete Datto

- > arms flows across Kenya, Ethiopian border.
- > coordination here.
- > break down attitude of enemy.
- > pol. support for Hwey // USLO. ^{state}
- > ⁸ Candidates, Res. to UN.
- > Engate for UNOSOM work of Africans.
- > Get African conference by Nov. 8
- > c-lire elements. Formelize for whole city, not just SNA. Have C-L, etc. conference do it. Take me at a time.

Will need
copying notes

Grounde

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Re: Next Steps on Somalia (6 pages)	10/15/1993	P1/b(1)

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Richard Clarke to Brooke Darby, re: Somalia: TP for Lake-Howe Telcon (3 pages)	10/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1408

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993

2012-0659-F
ke4179

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	Re: [Conversation with General Powell] (1 page)	06/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1408

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993

2012-0659-F
ke4179

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Somalia Options (7 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1408

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993

2012-0659-F
ke4179

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006. email	Richard Clarke to Brooke Darby, re: Memo to POTUS-Somalia (2 pages)	10/17/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1408

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993

2012-0659-F
ke4179

RESTRICTION CODES

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