

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia/Iran Arms-Background, April 1996 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

1402

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
49	1	4	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	[Chronology] [duplicate of ke5440_001] (28 pages)	00/00/1996	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Memorandum to the File re: [Croatia] [duplicate of ke5440_026] (2 pages)	05/06/1994	P1/b(1)
003. paper	[Preliminary Staff Assessment] [duplicate of ke5436_004] (13 pages)	05/14/1996	P1/b(1)
004. report	Interagency Balkan Task Force Report re: [Foreign Forces] (5 pages)	04/22/1996	P1/b(1)
005a. cable	Re: [Croatia to Seek U.S. Views] [duplicate of eh511_006, 2006-0996-F] (3 pages)	04/27/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	Re: [Tudjman] [duplicate of eh521_015, 2006-0996-F] (5 pages)	04/29/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: Iran Arms (2 pages)	04/22/1996	P1/b(1)
007a. cable	Re: Ambassador Reaction to Chronology [duplicate of ke5443_017] (2 pages)	04/23/1996	P1/b(1)
007b. cable	Re: 24 April Meeting with Ambassador [duplicate of ke5443_018] (2 pages)	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)
007c. cable	Re: [Missile] (3 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)
008. report	Interagency Balkan Task Force Report, re: [Background] [duplicate of eh520_007, 2006-0996-F] (8 pages)	04/29/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	[Chronology] [duplicate of ke5440_001] (28 pages)	00/00/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F
ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Memorandum to the File re: [Croatia] [duplicate of ke5440_026] (2 pages)	05/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F
ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	[Preliminary Staff Assessment] [duplicate of ke5436_004] (13 pages)	05/14/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN

ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA, VICE CHAIRMAN

RICHARD J. LICHT, INDIANA
 RICHARD C. SHROPSHIRE, ALABAMA
 WYCKE DEWINE, OHIO
 JON KYL, ARIZONA
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 GAY SHELLEY HUTCHISON, TEXAS
 DONNIE MACK, FLORIDA
 WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE

JOHN GLENN, OHIO
 RICHARD M. BRYAN, NEVADA
 BOB GRAHAM, FLORIDA
 JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
 MAX BAUCUS, MONTANA
 J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LOUISIANA
 CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA, EX OFFICIO

CHARLES BATTAGLIA, STAFF DIRECTOR
 CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUB, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
 KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

May 13, 1996

The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
 Secretary of State
 U.S. Department of State
 Washington, DC 20520

The Honorable John M. Deutch
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, DC 20505

Dear Secretary Christopher and Director Deutch:

On April 5, 1996, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that "President Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations arms embargo that the United States was pledged to uphold and the administration's own policy of isolating Tehran globally as a supporter of terrorism." On April 8, at the request of the Senate Majority Leader, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence began an inquiry into alleged U.S. support for Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia.

In furtherance of its inquiry, the committee has scheduled three public hearings for the week of May 20, to hear testimony from the Honorable Richard Holbrooke, the Honorable R. James Woolsey and the Honorable Strobe Talbott. To prepare for public hearings, we request that you review two attached documents for declassification: a draft preliminary staff assessment of what the committee has learned to date; and the transcript of the committee's closed hearing of May 10 with former Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey. The former document is intended for release on Wednesday, May 15, if the committee's members approve. The latter document is intended to serve as a rough script for the open hearing with former Director Woolsey, so that he and the committee will not have to make off-the-cuff judgments of what may safely be said in public.

The committee would appreciate these tasks being accomplished as soon as possible. We would anticipate your personnel discussing with our staff on late Tuesday afternoon how to cover in a declassifiable form those subjects in the attached documents that are too sensitive to be declassified as written. Any questions regarding the committee's inquiry may be addressed to the committee's Staff Directors, its General Counsel or Mr. Edward Levine of the committee staff, who is leading the staff group handling this inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

Arlen Specter
 Chairman

J. Robert Kerrey
 Vice Chairman

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Interagency Balkan Task Force Report re: [Foreign Forces] (5 pages)	04/22/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'96 APR 19 P4 13

B

S/S #

'96 APR 19 PM 4 18

MESSAGE NO. 034742 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 9
FROM: J. ZORSTIN S/CO4 x 78905 7246F
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>WHouse/NSC</u>	<u>Jack Quinn, WH Counsel</u>	_____	<u>2d Floor, West Wing</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: Jack, As promised, Job

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 1/24/23
2008-0994-F-2

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. cable	Re: [Croatia to Seek U.S. Views] [duplicate of eh511_006, 2006-0996-F] (3 pages)	04/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F
ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	Re: [Tudjman] [duplicate of eh521_015, 2006-0996-F] (5 pages)	04/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	Re: Iran Arms (2 pages)	04/22/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. cable	Re: Ambassador Reaction to Chronology [duplicate of ke5443_017] (2 pages)	04/23/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. cable	Re: 24 April Meeting with Ambassador [duplicate of ke5443_018] (2 pages)	04/26/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. cable	Re: [Missile] (3 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F

ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Kessinger, Jodi

Wfo Iran/Bosnia
ADM STMTS

From: Cullin, Brian P.
To: Danvers, William C.; Feeley, John F.; Vershbow, Alexander R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: @PRESS - Public Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: Iranian Arms to Bosnia - LA Times [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, April 26, 1996 5:43PM
Priority: High

Jim Risen/Doyle McMannus's next piece will involve an April-May '94 written response to John Warner by Talbott on arms embargo questions that included an answer which stated this Administration frowned upon Iranian arms to Bosnia. Also he says that Nunn was upset that Redmen when he appeared before his non-enforcement hearings in the summer of '94 did not mention the lack of instructions with regard to Croatia (as you remember Redmen was negotiating during this period). I believe Jim is writing for Monday. I have asked State for the Talbott responses and on how they responded to Risen's query. Should we contact Nunn? Brian

To Danvers

Can we get the letter?

Who should call nunn

CC Danvers

To Bar
Did he ever call
Kenney Nunn at Gingrich

Attached

ORIGINAL LETTER AND ANSWERS
GIVEN DIRECTLY TO H FOR DELIVERY
TO THE HILL, 5/4.

S/S 9410445

ORIG ACTMEM TO OIS
COPIES TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S
DONILON
D-2

94-10445

May 4, 1994

P
E
T
M
C
S/P
S/S-2
S/S-S

Dear Senator Warner:

EUR
H
RF/CWA

Thank you for your letter of April 29 to Secretary Christopher regarding the United Nations imposed arms embargo as it applies to Bosnia. I hope the attached information, which the State and Defense Departments have prepared in response to your questions, will be useful to you.

As you know, the Administration believes that maintaining the arms embargo against Bosnia punishes the victim in the conflict. But it is also our view that if the embargo were to be lifted at this time, and particularly if it were lifted unilaterally, a number of serious practical problems would ensue. Most importantly, we would jeopardize the chances of addressing the Bosnian crisis in concert with our Allies and undermine the authority of other U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Thank you for sharing your concerns with us. We look forward to working with you on this important issue.

Sincerely,



Strobe Talbott
Acting Secretary

PS - Thanks for the chance to work with you directly on this. Your support has been crucial.

Enclosure:
Responses to your questions

The Honorable
John W. Warner,
United States Senate.

Drafted: H:RTatge ~~BA~~ for
05/04/94 HEUR 3224 x78722

Cleared: H:RBradtke Y

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON THE
ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA
POSED BY SENATOR WARNER

Question: If the arms embargo against the Bosnian government were unilaterally lifted by the United States, what impact would such a move have on the compliance of other nations with the broad range of UN Security Council-imposed embargoes, such as economic sanctions against Serbia and sanctions against Iraq?

Answer: There is a clear danger that other nations would use the U.S. precedent as a pretext to unilaterally "lift" sanctions regimes that they found inconvenient or opposed for political or economic reasons. This could lead to a total breakdown in the ability of the UN to enforce sanctions against Serbia, Iraq, Libya and Haiti, and over time could limit the power of the UN to affect international behavior through binding resolutions.

Question: Some have argued that the arms embargo against Bosnia is not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed against the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia is not a successor state; and because the embargo violates Bosnia's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. What is the Administration's legal opinion on this issue?

Answer: The arms embargo was imposed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia by UN Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) and reaffirmed in later resolutions (e.g., Resolutions 724, 727, 740, 743, and 787). Resolution 713 is a mandatory decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and expressly provides that the embargo will remain in effect "until the Security Council decides otherwise." The Council has also made clear that the embargo applies throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia, notwithstanding its breakup into separate states (see Resolution 727 (1992)). Thus it applies to Bosnia.

The embargo does not violate Bosnia's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Any self-defense right that may exist to receive arms from other states under Article 51 is subject to the authority of the Security Council, which may take action affecting it. Thus, under Article 51, measures taken in self-defense "shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the [UN] Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The Security Council may take various actions -- imposition of cease-fires, limits on armaments, and establishment of protected or demilitarized zones -- that affect a state's right of self-defense. For example, the Council may impose a cease-fire even though its immediate effect may leave an aggressor in temporary occupation of part of the defender's territory. Article 51 takes as its premise the principle that the Security Council may impose such sanctions when it judges them to be necessary, and this is an essential part of the Council's authorities to maintain and restore peace.

Question: How would a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo affect our relations with our NATO Allies and the Russian Federation?

Answer: Our Allies and the Russians are extremely concerned at the prospect of unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo. They would argue that our behavior encouraged an erosion of the UN sanctions regime as an instrument of international policy. If they came to believe that unilateral U.S. lifting of the embargo had more than a symbolic effect, they might decide to pull some or all of their forces out of UNPROFOR, leading to the collapse of the humanitarian relief effort. Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, which are surrounded by Serb forces, would be cut off from most relief supplies. Should the Bosnian Serbs attack any remaining European forces or take them hostage, the Europeans would hold us accountable. Nations like Iran, who have standing offers to provide troops to the Bosnian government, might elect to do so, arguing that the U.S. had set a precedent for ignoring a UN resolution.

Question: If the arms embargo were lifted, what types of weapons would the Bosnian government forces need to achieve a degree of weapon equivalence with the Bosnian Serb forces? Which nations would train the Bosnian forces with these new weapons?

Answer: We presume that the Bosnian government would require large-caliber heavy weapons to match the capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs. This could include medium and heavy artillery, medium tanks, and long-range anti-tank weapons such as the Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Anti-Tank Weapons (TOW) System. Personnel familiar with weapons provided, usually the supplier (government or industry), generally train recipients in the use, tactical employment, and maintenance of systems procured. Potential suppliers/trainers span the globe.

Question: How long would it take for heavy weapons to be transported to the Bosnian government forces? What are the various access routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable are these routes to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? How large a military force would it take to guard and maintain these logistical routes?

Answer: If the arms embargo were lifted by UN action and Croatia cooperated, heavy weapons could be brought into Bosnia through Croatian Adriatic ports. It would be difficult to deliver substantial amounts of equipment by air since all major Bosnian government airstrips are within Serb artillery range, and aircraft would be subject to SAM fire. Shipment by sea would require weeks and perhaps months, depending on how long it took the Bosnian government to purchase or otherwise procure the weapons. If the U.S. unilaterally lifted the arms embargo, heavy weapons could not be shipped to Bosnia without a willingness on the part of other nations to violate the UN arms embargo. If Croatia were to cooperate with the U.S. in violating the UN arms embargo, and the Bosnian government were able to purchase or otherwise obtain weapons, arms could begin reaching Bosnia in some weeks or months. It is quite possible that most, if not all, UNPROFOR forces would probably have departed by then, perhaps having had to fight its way out, and would not be available to secure routes for arms imports. The Serbs would naturally take advantage of any lag-time between international lifting of the arms embargo and provision of weapons to the Bosnian government. The incentive for the Serbs to launch an all-out final offensive before their forces were put at a disadvantage would be great. Thus the U.S. might have to undertake air strikes -- in this case, without the participation of our NATO Allies -- to help repel new Bosnian Serb aggression.

Question: How long would it take to effectively train the Bosnian government forces to use heavy weapons? Would this training require the presence of U.S. military personnel in Bosnia, or are other nations capable of training Bosnians on the U.S. military equipment that may be provided if the embargo is lifted? Should this training take place in Bosnia or out of country?

Answer: Estimating the time required to train a force to use, tactically employ and maintain sophisticated weapons is difficult without exact knowledge of the capabilities of the force to be trained. As a rough estimate, DoD notes that training time of one to six months is required to train soldiers to survive on the battlefield and properly use rudimentary weapons. Until there is a definitive plan to train a particular force, it is not possible to estimate where the training might take place.

Question: What is required in terms of logistics and maintenance to service the heavy weapons that the Bosnians would receive? Are the Bosnian government forces capable of maintaining this equipment without outside assistance?

Answer: The more sophisticated the weapon system, the more lengthy and complicated the maintenance and supply system. The following factors, inter alia, would have a direct impact on both sustenance and tempo of operations: the complexity of the weapons system, number of units to be operated, skill of the operators, the level of training, the equipment's exposure to hostilities and weather, and logistics (ammunition, parts, transportation) and infrastructure (lines of communication, facilities) capacities. If the Bosnian government acquired weapons and equipment compatible with its existing indigenous armaments production capabilities (e.g., former Soviet Union sourced), it could possibly maintain them without outside assistance.

Question: How would the Serbs (or other belligerents) react in that interim period between announcement of lifting and adequate training?

Answer: Any formal lifting of the arms embargo by the UN prior to a peace settlement would give the Serbs an obvious incentive to exploit their current military superiority before foreign arms began to be used effectively by Bosnian forces. Assuming that UNPROFOR stayed in place, its soldiers could face attack by Bosnian Serb forces. The Serbs could also be expected to halt the humanitarian relief effort. While relief could still flow into central Bosnia from the Adriatic coast through Croatia, the Serbs are currently capable of cutting off all land routes into Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica. They could also close Sarajevo and Tuzla airports. The only possibility of supply to these areas would be through air drops. While these might sustain some of the outlying enclaves, they would be insufficient for a city the size of Sarajevo, which has at most a three-week supply of food on hand. In addition, air drop aircraft would be susceptible to anti-aircraft fire. The eastern enclaves and other isolated areas like Maglaj and Bihac would probably fall and Sarajevo would be at serious risk even if the population did not face starvation.

Question: If there is an increase in fighting, should air power be used against the Serbs during this period? What are the military risks associated with air delivery of the new weapons? Is it likely the airfields in the government-controlled areas can be kept open for such deliveries? Should Allied aircraft be expected to participate in such a air operation if we unilaterally lift the embargo? If not, would U.S. air controllers have to be put on the ground to control air strikes?

Answer: The only possible way to discourage large-scale Serb attacks on the Bosnian government or on UNPROFOR forces, or to prevent the Serbs from halting the continued supply of Sarajevo via the airport, would be through the threat of military invasion or a massive bombing campaign aimed at Bosnian Serb military and strategic infrastructure targets. Unless we were prepared to undertake such actions, the destruction of Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, and other isolated Bosnian government positions before the arrival of weaponry would become a distinct possibility. This is why the U.S. has always linked the lifting of the arms embargo to a bombing campaign, as exemplified in the "lift and strike" proposal of May, 1993.

Question: Would UNPROFOR troops have to be withdrawn prior to the lifting of the arms embargo? How long would such a withdrawal take and what are the risks involved? Would the Serbs intercept the withdrawal and endeavor to take hostages?

Answer: Our understanding is that the key UNPROFOR contributors, most of whom are NATO Allies, would not be prepared to stay in Bosnia if the arms embargo were lifted. If UNPROFOR's departure were unopposed by the Bosnian Serbs, all UNPROFOR forces could probably leave within several weeks. The primary impediments would be logistical. If the Bosnian Serbs retaliated for a formal or unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by targeting UNPROFOR, the departure of the troops might be difficult or impossible. UNPROFOR troops, civil affairs officers and military observers are deployed widely and could not defend themselves against concerted attack. Allies might call on the U.S. to join them in sending ground forces in to rescue their troops or to launch a massive bombing campaign aimed at getting the Serbs to stop impeding UNPROFOR's departure.

Question: What impact would an UNPROFOR withdrawal have on the people now receiving their assistance?

Answer: If UNPROFOR were to leave before the Bosnian government was in a position to take the offensive on the battlefield, Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, which are already surrounded, would be cut off from resupply via land routes. The Serbs could also cut resupply to Sarajevo by closing down the airport. Any assistance deliveries to either Sarajevo or the eastern enclaves would have to be by air drops. Sarajevo could not survive on air drops alone, and with only a three-week supply of food.

Question: If the arms embargo were lifted against Bosnia, would it also have to be lifted against Croatia since Croatian cooperation is essential for transporting weapons to the Bosnians? What impact would lifting the arms embargo against Croatia have on the situation in Krajina? What is the likely Serb reaction?

Answer: The only reliable way to deliver heavy weapons to Bosnia in large quantities is through Croatia. If the UN Security Council lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia alone, Croatia might be permitted (by resolution) to have arms transit its territory. Thanks to the Federation agreement signed in March, relations between the Croatian and Bosnian governments are relatively good. Still, it is likely that weapons bound for Bosnia through Croatia would only reach their final destination if Croatia also received arms either openly or covertly. If the arms embargo were also lifted against Croatia, and the Croats used these weapons against the Krajina Serbs (who currently control almost one third of Croatian territory) it is possible, and perhaps likely, that Serbia proper would intervene, leading to an outbreak of war between Croatia and Serbia. Lifting the embargo against Croatia would also raise questions on whether the embargo should remain in effect against Slovenia and FYROM.

Question: What is the likely reaction of Russia and Serbia to a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo? Is it reasonable to assume that they would come to the assistance of the Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian government began to recapture territory in the wake of the lifting of the embargo?

Answer: The Russian reaction would be similar to that of our NATO Allies. A Russian withdrawal from UNPROFOR would be likely. A U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would certainly play into the hands of pro-Serbian extremists in Russia, who could make political decisions even more difficult for the Yeltsin government. The Belgrade reaction would depend on how seriously the threat were perceived. If a humanitarian disaster in Sarajevo could be avoided and the Bosnian government survived long enough for the situation on the battlefield to change, the Serbian government could be prompted to intervene on behalf of their Bosnian Serb brethren. Milosevic would certainly be under tremendous domestic pressure to do so. The threat or use of NATO military actions, either on the ground or from the air, might be needed to deter him.

Question: Would the lifting of the arms embargo help or hinder efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict? Is it an option for future consideration? Under what circumstances?

Answer: Unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo would probably have a chilling effect on the negotiating process. The Bosnian government might feel less inclined to seek a negotiated solution in the hope that it could achieve a better solution on the battlefield. The Bosnian Serbs, for their part, would be less inclined than ever to accept a U.S. mediating role in the conflict, depriving us of the ability to serve as an honest broker for a settlement. If the Serbs perceived an immediate physical threat to themselves as a result of the U.S. decision, they could attack the Bosnian government or UNPROFOR forces or close down the humanitarian relief supply to Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves, thus making a negotiated settlement even more remote.

Question: If the lifting of the arms embargo does not give the Bosnian government forces a degree of military equivalence with Bosnian Serb forces, what would be our next step?

Answer: Assuming that UNPROFOR has departed, or needs to be rescued, and that Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves are at grave risk, the U.S. might have no choice but to intervene massively in the conflict or acquiesce in a humanitarian and political disaster.

Drafted:EUR/EE:JSchmidt/SBremner
SEEEYYUG 8512 6-7479 5/3/94

Cleared:EUR:AVershbow
PM/ISP:DBolton
IO/PHO:WBartlett
H/EUR:RTatge
L/EUR:TBuchwald
DoD:JKiley

Handwritten initials or signature, possibly "LS" or similar, located to the right of the cleared list.



United States Department of State


Washington, D. C. 20520

RECD S/S - NEW/MS

MAY -4 P 12 25

9410445

May 4 1994



ACTION MEMORANDUM
UNCLASSIFIED S/S 5/4

TO: The Acting Secretary
FROM: H - Wendy R. Sherman
SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Warner

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to sign the attached letter to Senator Warner communicating the Department's views on the UN-imposed arms embargo as it applies to Bosnia.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Senator Warner, who has been a leading opponent of Senator Dole's resolution mandating the unilateral lifting of the Bosnia arms embargo, wrote the Secretary April 29 to express his concern that the Senate is not adequately informed of the various implications of unilaterally lifting the embargo (Tab 1). He solicited the Department's responses to a number of specific questions, which he believes are critical to consideration of this legislation.

H expects that the Dole resolution will be debated on the Senate floor tomorrow. Warner plans to draw on our reply when speaking on the floor. Our reply to Warner should be signed by you, in order to underscore the fact that the views expressed on this important issue are held by Department officials at the highest levels.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter (Tab 2) to Senator Warner at your earliest convenience today.

Agree 5/4/94 ST Disagree _____

MAY - 4 1994

Attachments:

- Tab 1: Letter from Senator Warner
- Tab 2: Proposed response letter
- Tab 3: Answers to Senator Warner's questions

JOHN WARNER
VIRGINIA

COMMITTEE
ARMED SERVICES
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

225 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4471
(202) 224-2023

CONSTITUENT SERVICE OFFICES:

490 WORLD TRADE CENTER
HARRISBURG, VA 22516-1624
(804) 641-3073

MAIN STREET CENTER
800 EAST MAIN STREET
RICHMOND, VA 22216-3838

235 FEDERAL BUILDING
180 WEST MAIN STREET
ABINGDON, VA 24210-0887
(703) 828-4188

DOMINION BANK BUILDING
215 S. JEFFERSON ST. SUITE 1002
ROANOKE, VA 24011-1714
(703) 982-4978

April 29, 1994

The Honorable Warren Christopher
Department of State
2201 C Street
7th Floor
Washington, DC 20520

Handwritten note:
JFK to
draft response
get answers
as needed; H
by COS SF

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you are aware, the Senate is scheduled to resume consideration of a bill introduced by the Republican Leader and a very significant list of co-sponsors, which lifts the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government. I commend Senator Dole and the co-sponsors for raising this issue and insuring a Senate debate.

During the first debate, last week, there were representations by co-sponsors that their objective was to legislate a unilateral lifting by the United States. At this point, I am opposed to this proposed legislation because I do not believe that the United States should take such an action without coordination and cooperation (participation) of our allies.

Since last week's Senate debate on the bill, I have asked for and received a series of briefings on the implications of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government. I have had the opportunity to meet with members of CIA's Balkan Task Force, the Department of Defense's Bosnia Task Force, and the State Department's Balkan Conflict Group. It is evident that there is a depth of knowledge among these fine professionals and basic concurrence within the Administration against, at this time, supporting the objectives of the bill in its' present form.

I have also discussed this issue with a group of highly respected former government officials, particularly Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Ambassador Kampelman, Secretary Wolfowitz, and Secretary Richard Perle. They had views quite opposite to those of the Administration.


I am concerned that the Senate is not adequately informed of the various implications of unilaterally lifting this arms embargo. Therefore, I am enclosing a set of questions which I believe are critical to consideration of this legislation. I ask that you provide your response, which I will speak to and place, just as written, in the Congressional Record.

The Honorable Warren Christopher
April 29, 1994
Attachment Page 1

I shall continue to urge the Leadership, Committee Chairmen
and Ranking members to hold hearings.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Warner".

John Warner

Attachment

The Honorable Warren Christopher
 April 29, 1994
 Senator Warner's questions
 to Secretary Christopher
 Attachment Page 2

QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIFTING OF ARMS EMBARGO

- * If the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were unilaterally lifted by the United States, what impact would such a move have on the compliance of other nations with the broad range of U.N. Security Council-imposed embargoes, such as economic sanctions against Serbia and sanctions against Iraq?
- * Some have argued that the arms embargo against Bosnia is not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed against the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia is not a successor state; and because the embargo violates Bosnia's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. What is the Administration's legal opinion on this issue?
- * How would a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo affect our relations with our NATO allies and the Russian Federation?
- * If the arms embargo were lifted, what types of weapons would the Bosnian Government forces need to achieve a degree of weapon equivalence with the Bosnian Serb forces. Which nations would train the Bosnian forces with these new weapons?
- * How long would it take for heavy weapons to be transported to the Bosnian Government forces? What are the various access routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable are these routes to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? How large a military force would it take to guard and maintain these logistical routes?
- * How long would it take to effectively train the Bosnian Government forces to use heavy weapons? Would this training require the presence of U.S. military personnel in Bosnia, or are other nations capable of training Bosnians on the U.S. military equipment that may be provided if the embargo is lifted? Should this training take place in Bosnia or out of country?
- * What is required in terms of logistics and maintenance to service the heavy weapons that the Bosnians would receive? Are the Bosnian Government forces capable of maintaining this equipment without outside assistance?
- * How would the Serbs (or other belligerents) react in that interim period between announcement of lifting and adequate training?

L
 SPW
 RM

SPW
 RM

SPW
 RM

The Honorable Warren Christopher
April 29, 1994
Senator Warner's questions to
Secretary Christopher
Attachment page 3

- * If there is an increase in fighting, should air power be used against the Serbs during this period? What are the military risks associated with air delivery of the new weapons? Is it likely the airfield in the Muslim controlled areas can be kept open for such deliveries? Should allied aircraft be expected to participate in such an air operation if we unilaterally lift the embargo? If not, would U.S. air controllers have to be put on the ground to control air strikes?
- * Would UNPROFOR troops have to be withdrawn prior to the lifting of the arms embargo? How long would such a withdrawal take and what are the risks involved? Would the Serbs intercept the withdrawal and endeavor to take hostages?
- * What impact would an UNPROFOR withdrawal have on the people now receiving their assistance?
- * If the arms embargo were lifted against Bosnia, would it also have to be lifted against Croatia since Croatian cooperation is essential for transporting weapons to the Bosnians? What impact would lifting of the arms embargo against Croatia have on the situation in the Krajina? What is the likely Serb reaction?
- * What is the likely reaction of Russia and Serbia to a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo? Is it reasonable to assume that they would come to the assistance of the Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian Government begins to recapture territory in the wake of the lifting of the embargo?
- * Would the lifting of the arms embargo help now or hinder efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict? Is it an option for future consideration? Under what circumstances?
- * If the lifting of the arms embargo does not give the Bosnian Government forces a degree of a military equivalence with Bosnian Serbs forces, what would be our next step?

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Interagency Balkan Task Force Report, re: [Background] [duplicate of eh520_007, 2006-0996-F] (8 pages)	04/29/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia/Iran Arms - Background, April 1996 [1]

2008-0994-F
ke5609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]