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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake, re: U.S. Response to the Serbian Offensive [duplicate of kh1700_004, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (2 pages)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)
002. map	Provinces Proposed in UN Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, January 1993 [duplicate of kh1584_009, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003. map	Controlled Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Early February 1993 [duplicate of kh1598_001, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (1 page)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Military Developments, 19 March 1993 (1 page)	03/19/1993	P1/b(1)
005. map	Military Developments, 21 March 1993 [duplicate of kh1598_011, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (1 page)	03/21/1993	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake, re: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993 [duplicate of rs530_002, 2010-0533-M] (3 pages)	03/23/1993	P1/b(1)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)  
OA/Box Number: 1402

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia, 1993

2008-0994-F  
ke5603

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Office of the Secretary/Spokesman

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FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

February 10, 1993

BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL  
ON  
STATEMENT REGARDING FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

February 10, 1993

MR. RICHARD BOUCHER: As an introduction, the briefer today is a Senior Administration Official. This will be ON BACKGROUND from Senior Administration Officials. I know this is a large crowd, but let me emphasize that it's important to us that we stay ON BACKGROUND.

And, with that, I'll turn it over to our briefer.

OFFICIAL ONE: Let me begin by saying I've been talking all day. You can probably tell from my voice. I've been talking to foreign leaders and briefing people on Capitol Hill. But I'm going to try to give myself a minute or two rest and ask (Official Two) if he would start by giving you some perspective on how the President reached this series of decisions, which I thought might be of interest to you all.

OFFICIAL TWO: Well, I talked to a few of you about this before. You know this is a matter of great concern to the President and to all of us who worked with him in the campaign. And because we took the issue so seriously, we thought that rather than leap right into it on January 21, it deserved both urgent and very careful consideration and study.

And, therefore, immediately after the inauguration we ordered a study which asked all of the questions and asked for consideration of all the alternatives. We got the study back from the various departments some days later and then began a series of meetings with the Principal Committee, which was composed of the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Ambassador the United Nations, the Director of Central Intelligence and myself.

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We went over the information and worked through a series of three meetings of the Principals Committee over the past two weeks, two and a half weeks.

Worked through together what seemed to us, based on that information, the possible alternatives. Argued them through among ourselves, in between our meetings with the working group that helped develop the information we had asked for and to further refine the various alternatives. Kept the President engaged throughout this process. And he was, of course, interested in where we were going with it.

In the third meeting of the Principals Friday evening -- and this was a... , they were all very long meetings -- the President and the Vice President came and discussed the issues with us.

The recommendation then for the policy the Secretary just described was unanimous among all of his principal advisers. Over the weekend the President thought about the matter. Studied it further Monday morning, on the basis of written material he was given, and then reached a decision, I guess, late Monday.

And since then we have been proceeding to implement it through a lot of consultations with foreign leaders, with members of Congress today. The President today called both Yeltsin -- he called Boutros-Ghali; spoke to Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Major, and they were all very good conversations. We did this just before leaving for Detroit, and I guess he was going to arrive now.

So I think it was a very good process. We kind of short-circuited the usual system in which lower level committees work through the options and then they bubble up, but it was a process of the senior advisers all thinking this thing through together, and I think it went very well.

QUESTION: You seem to have expressed a certain amount of frustration at the beginning of your announcement that you didn't have more options. But the situation, as you said, had gotten to the stage where your options were limited. Is that an accurate reflection? Do you wish you could be taking more steps here?

OFFICIAL ONE: Mary, I was mainly emphasizing there the fact that we inherited a very difficult problem. It's a legacy of inaction by the prior Administration. If this problem could have been addressed at the time the Serbs began to come across the border into Bosnia, we'd have had much better options than we have now. We find the situation in which Serbia has

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occupied much of Bosnia. The Croats have occupied other aspects.

So it was really wanting you to understand and wanting the public to understand that we have a rather melancholy legacy here, a situation that could have been addressed much better at a prior time. On the other hand, our responsibility is to deal with it as we see it now. So there's no... We don't take much comfort in the fact that it might have been addressed in the past if you have this serious a situation.

So I was really reflecting that, Mary, when I commented at the early part of my statement that our options were much less than they would have been if you had been able to do it when the Serbs first started coming into Bosnia.

OFFICIAL TWO: Let me add one specific complaint here for this Administration, and that is that because we are now in the winter and because our allies also have their troops on the ground, you have to be very concerned in looking at a number of alternatives that we don't take actions which would either lead our allies to feel that their forces are in jeopardy, or could interfere with the humanitarian effort on which the people are barely surviving, but surviving. So we don't want to do things that interfere with the humanitarian relief effort. And that would not have been the case six or eight months ago.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- Vance and Lord Owen in -- as far as Vance and Lord Owen, what was their reaction? Also, could you tell us a little bit more about the role you envision for them and Reginald Bartholomew? I mean, are you pushing them aside?

OFFICIAL ONE: I talked to Mr. Vance this morning and foreshadowed to him what the announcement would be today. I talked to him earlier this week, telling him we would be announcing something. I went over the basis of our statement, and he had a positive reaction to it. He said that he looked forward to working with us on it; that he knows Ambassador Bartholomew well, of course, from prior service. He said he thought he was a good choice for the role.

At one point he did make, voice the thought that he hoped that Ambassador Bartholomew could be there as soon as possible. We told him that we were bringing him home on a very urgent basis; that the only delay that would ensue because he would be going through Moscow to talk with the Russians before coming home. But that I think will only involve a one-day delay, and we expect that Ambassador Bartholomew will be here back in the Department over the weekend or at least by Monday and going to work immediately.

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On the second half of your question, we are not pushing them aside at all. Our determination is to help make their effort more effective. We have worked tirelessly and have moved the problem along a great distance. I think Mr. Vance's work on this problem over the last year and a half is really of heroic proportions.

And one of the calls I made -- I made a number of calls to leaders of countries today -- and I will not betray the diplomatic confidence, but one of the leaders of another nation said that he thought that Cyrus Vance knew more about this problem than anybody else in the world.

QUESTION: (Multiple questions)

OFFICIAL TWO: I just want to point out they represent the United Nations and the European Community, and we would like to continue to operate within that framework.

QUESTION: Could I just follow up for one second. And that is that you said that you want to build on the Vance-Owen negotiations, and you said to ensure the survival of Bosnia as a state.

And yet I understood that their whole thesis was that Bosnia should be divided up into various areas. How can you find equity in that?

OFFICIAL ONE: Well, their constitutional provisions do preserve Bosnia as a state and set up something like -- along the lines of cantons or areas in which one of the groups or another might have a strong voice. But it does preserve the entity of Bosnia, and we think that quite desirable. We would not think it's desirable to break it into three separate countries.

Now, there may have to be areas of greater influence within Bosnia, but I think those concepts are quite harmonious. The first of their constitutional principles was that Bosnia should be preserved, and that was a part of the plan that was most agreeable to the Bosnians. Indeed, I think it's worthwhile that we all remember that on the three issues -- that is, the constitutional issue and the cease-fire and the map -- the Bosnians agreed to the first of those creations, the constitutional issue, which preserves Bosnia.

QUESTION: I don't quite understand. You said that you did not want to send a message that regimes can deal with ethnic

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minorities within their country by essentially driving them out or trying to create ethnically secure areas. And yet the basis of the Vance-Owen plan seems to be that you're going to have these ethnically, certainly concentrated, if not pure, areas.

Why doesn't that send that message that you don't want to send, if we endorse that approach?

OFFICIAL ONE: I think it does not send that message if the parties agree to it. With essential agreement by the parties, it would be that they felt this was a satisfactory solution to what is a very difficult problem.

On the other hand, to take the other side of that, that's the reason that we've been so strongly opposed to an agreement that would be imposed on the parties rather than consented to by them.

OFFICIAL TWO: Remember also that even in its current form it contemplates revision in the current status quo, which would change the territory held by the various parties. Now it would contemplate the return home of a number of the people who have been driven out of their areas through the process of ethnic cleansing.

So if you could agree -- if the parties agreed to something it would be at least a partial rectification of the horror of ethnic cleansing.

QUESTION: Could I just follow, please. Could each of you respond to the question whether in principle a map that divides Bosnia into ethnically dominated enclaves validates or ratifies the principle of ethnical cleansing?

OFFICIAL TWO: To the degree that it does, it is regrettable, and I think we all feel that. But what is needed here is to get an agreement that is the best possible that the parties themselves will agree to, and that is the unhappy situation that we are in now.

OFFICIAL ONE: On your question, of course, that's a problem that worries all of us. I think that after you've pondered over this for some time, that the thing that you can hope for most in this area is that peace will be brought to the area, and that the people could have an opportunity to return to their homes, and that some of the ethnic divisions could be at least tamped down and that there would be a chance to restore some tranquility in the area.

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Clearly, it's impossible to go back to the status quo the way it was, or at least it seems impossible, before the aggression took place. That really is part of my initial comments about the options being much less attractive than they might have been two years ago, the part of my statement that began: That our options were substantially narrowed.

I don't think we can ever completely reverse the steps that were taken over the course of the last two years.

QUESTION: On the face of it, what is in this package that in any way makes the Muslims happy? It seems that they got nothing after the promises of the campaign may have left another impression, that they didn't get the arms, they didn't get the targets bombed, and so forth.

OFFICIAL ONE: I think they've gotten very substantial steps being taken the United States.

First, the willingness of the United States to enter the negotiations with the full force of its diplomacy on the premise that the Bosnians would not be forced to agree and that no agreement should be imposed upon the parties. That's a very important step, or it should be from the standpoint of the Bosnians.

Second, our willingness to, along with others, help enforce the agreement answers an important point that had concerned the Bosnians. They had been asking, "Suppose we do agree. Then, will the agreement be enforced, or will this just be another step forward?"

Third, I think the fact that the United States will be pressing for the enforcement of a "no-fly" zone is something else that they have obtained from the agreement.

Overall, in addition to those three specific points, I think the engagement of the United States to ensure that there is a fair settlement, if possible, is something which the Bosnians are to take considerable reassurance from.

OFFICIAL TWO: And also don't forget that we believe there are a number of ways we'll be consulting with our allies about, and others, in which we can tighten the sanctions on the Serbs.

QUESTION: Nobody has succeeded so far. This is a subject that's everybody's looked at. Do you have any good ideas on how you actually can do this?

OFFICIAL TWO: We believe so, and we'll be consulting; yes.

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QUESTION: Any indication --

(Multiple questions)

QUESTION: Is there any indication there's some flexibility on the "no-fly" zone -- enforcing that?

OFFICIAL ONE: I think there may be timing issues with respect to that. But I think our overall involvement, our engagement will give reassurance to our allies and may be feasible to enforcing it in a way that it wasn't in the past.

Before I get too far away from it, let me say that we also think that the Vance-Owen plan is quite malleable, at least upon our discussions with them. They are quite willing to contemplate actions that might improve their plan from the standpoint of one or another of the parties. I think that's something that perhaps, with the energy and creativity that Reg Bartholomew -- and those of you who know him will understand what I mean when I talk about energy and ideas -- it may well be that we're in for some adjustments that will make the plan much more agreeable to the parties.

QUESTION: Could you tell us a little bit more in detail about the U.S. troops; under exactly what conditions they would be sent? If you could say even a range of troop levels that would go under NATO and under the U.N. peacekeeping forces?

OFFICIAL ONE: Another question for the National Security Advisor...

OFFICIAL TWO: That really depends on the nature of the agreement that is reached. One of the problems with the Vance-Owen plan has been that it has not addressed the question of enforcement provisions, implementation provisions.

We will, first of all, be consulting with NATO to develop contingency plans, and then we need to see what the nature of the agreement is and see what the circumstances are at the time and then decide.

I think it's premature to say now exactly what that would be, or even whether it necessarily is ground troops or air power.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) calls for 5,000 troops under the U.N. peacekeeping force -- would that be possible for you --

OFFICIAL TWO: I really don't want to -- the JCS is also looking at this.

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QUESTION: Further on this. Would these -- have you decided whether or not these troops would be part of a U.N. mission under U.N. command?

OFFICIAL TWO: Let me emphasize that very strongly. Certainly, it would be in the context of a NATO framework. It does not mean under NATO command -- excuse me, a U.N. framework -- and is part of a NATO operation.

QUESTION: But not under U.N. command, you started to say; right?

OFFICIAL TWO: Right.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you are coming to this new level of negotiation with no specifics, with no map drawn. What makes you think that when the same forces (inaudible) of the past few months that you're going to be able to get the Serbs to agree to a plan equitable to them given the fact that there are no pressures? And given the fact that this could take months, if not longer, to get them back to another point where all of the parties could? What happens in the interim to the people? What about the possibility of continued "ethnic cleansing?"

OFFICIAL ONE: On the first half of your question, I think the presence of the United States in the negotiations, and our working with countries like Germany who have influence with the Croats and the Russians who have influence with the Serbs, and Turkey which has influence in the situation as well, gives opportunities for reaching a settlement that weren't present before the United States became fully engaged.

Frankly, one of the consequences of our being the sole remaining superpower is that the world waits for us to become engaged in these matters. Until we are engaged, they seem to have a reason or an excuse or an explanation for not becoming engaged as fully as we think they should be. That reason or excuse, or explanation, no longer exists. I think it may change the character of the negotiation. I hope so.

With respect to the delay, I can only say, we regret deeply the problem can't be solved tomorrow morning. But I think it's important to get it solved or resolved. We're going to be taking some actions that we hope will minimize or cut down the killing -- the humanitarian actions that enhance sanctions that we hope will cut down on the mayhem that exists in that poor country. But this is part of the poor set of choices we have at the present time. There's no other option that seems more likely to produce less killing than the one we're following. (Inaudible)

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OFFICIAL TWO: Let me emphasize just one sort of central strategic point here, which is that the United States, by saying that it will participate in the implementation of an agreement, has significantly, we believe, increased the chances of having that agreement which means, in turn, that then the question of the use of American military power is in the context of keeping peace rather than going in and trying to make peace. That is a significant difference.

QUESTION: Wouldn't that be a stronger thing, though, if you did commit to ground troops? Why are you refraining from saying that, ultimately, you would put troops on the ground to enforce this course?

OFFICIAL TWO: We have not ruled it out. We think it's premature to say now whether that would be required or not.

QUESTION: Is that because of resistance from the Pentagon?

OFFICIAL TWO: No. Again, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs supported this policy. The President, in fact, discussed that with him, and the Chairman said that he recommended this course.

QUESTION: You emphasized your contacts with Moscow today. Can you say in what ways Moscow can be helpful in this rejuvenated process?

OFFICIAL ONE: We've not only talked to Moscow today, but I talked to Foreign Minister Kozyrev yesterday. I think they're quite prepared to be helpful. They have considerable influence with the Serbians. It's historic, of course. I think if they are anxious to be helpful, they can make it clear to the Serbs that there's worldwide pressure for them to be effective in trying to reach a settlement.

I also think the fact that the Russians are anxious to be helpful here prevents the Serbs from thinking that they have some sort of a supportive force on the other side that will welcome their stubbornness. So it's the things they can do positively that the Russians can bring to the table, but also I think the fact that the Serbs don't feel that they have got a shoulder to cry on in Moscow.

QUESTION: Will the Russians stop sending stuff in, whether it's oil or other things?

OFFICIAL ONE: Well, that would certainly be consistent with the commitment they've given us to support our endeavors here and to try to make sure that the Serbs are in a frame of mind to want to settle this matter.

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QUESTION: Will the Russians have an envoy also?

OFFICIAL ONE: We've not heard anything specific on that. But, of course, they have people at the U.N. that have been following this very closely, and we hope that they will stay close to the negotiations as well.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I believe you touched upon this, but it kind of slipped by me. Can you tell me, does the Clinton Administration stand by the Bush Administration's demarche to the Serbians regarding the possibility of the United States to take unilateral action to preserve Kosovo?

OFFICIAL ONE: Not much slips by you, Barrie. Yes. The answer to that question is, "yes."

QUESTION: And what specifically is the position vis-a-vis Macedonia? Is there any consideration of extending that warning also on Macedonia?

OFFICIAL ONE: If you look at my statement -- and I realize you didn't have a copy in front of you -- we indicated that we will work to increase the international presence in Macedonia out of the same concern.

OFFICIAL TWO: Barrie, recall that the Bush Administration consulted with the allies before issuing that --

QUESTION: I understood from talking, as a matter of fact, recently with Mr. Eagleburger about that. He said we advised the allies but we specifically indicated unilateral action, and you stand by it?

QUESTION: The surge of increased humanitarian aid. Are we talking about putting American logistic support, or any sort of American forces on the ground to ensure that they get more of that aid that they get right now? And, also, what pressure can we place on the Serbs to round up the big guns? That's where the Vance-Owen plan started, in the first place. We haven't heard much about that since then.

OFFICIAL TWO: The second part first. The best way to do that, I think, is to get to settlement and have that a part of the enforcement provisions. Otherwise, it's simply technically very difficult.

And on the first part, we are looking at ways to improve our ability to get through humanitarian relief. But it is very tricky because you don't want to take actions which could result in no relief getting through at all. So we'll be looking at this very carefully.

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QUESTION: Will the American troops be providing logistics or communications support or anything on the ground to improve the delivery of humanitarian relief?

(Inaudible)

QUESTION: (Inaudible) You asked them what the Bosnian Muslims would get from this. The first thing you said is the assurance that they will not be forced to accept it -- an unacceptable agreement. Yet, the situation on the ground, as Carla alludes to, is that time will be against them, obviously. The food isn't getting through in substantial quantities. They're getting bombarded in half. So that everyday that goes by, that does put pressure on them to accept an agreement.

How do you increase the food aid, the other steps, so that they are not forced by events on the ground to accept an agreement that is acceptable, of what you said part of the U.S. goal is?

OFFICIAL ONE: As I say, we're actively looking at ways to increase humanitarian conditions. That's a subject that's under very intense study, and also consultation with our allies.

The winter has not been as harsh, thankfully, as it might have been but there are still clear pockets of hunger and starvation and the need for medicines. It's in that context that we're looking at increased humanitarian aid.

I didn't mean to say that the settlement would not be, in an historic sense, inequitable to them. I just think we're not prepared to try to impose on them a settlement that they don't feel at the present time is the best they can get. That's about the best I can do under these circumstances.

QUESTION: But if I could just follow up. How is it possible for them not to be feeling they have a gun to their head as they negotiate?

OFFICIAL ONE: (Inaudible)

QUESTION: I know. But how can the Bosnians really feel that they are sitting at the table as equal partners here in this negotiation given the situation on the ground? I still don't -- whether accepting the fact that they won't feel that way.

OFFICIAL TWO: I think that when they see that we are actively engaged, that there will be a party there that is sympathetic to their plight, helping them.

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I think, again it is especially important that they will see that we are prepared to take part in enforcement which will encourage them to believe that this would not be a case of their agreeing to something that simply then leads to further Serbian aggression.

MR. BOUCHER: O.K. This is the last one.

QUESTION: How do you plan to ensure the release of detention camp prisoners? How does that fit into your plans? Does this Administration feel, as the previous one did, that Milosevic and Karadzic should be brought up promptly before this War Crimes Tribunal (inaudible).

OFFICIAL ONE: With respect to the detention camps, I think the best thing you can say about that is have peace come into the area -- and all of the attractiveness, all of the blessings of peace and tranquility -- is probably the best thing that can be done with respect to the detention camps, coupled with the international pressure against the Serbs to end their program of ethnic cleansing, to end their detention camps. Of course, there are detention camps on all sides of this picture, and clearly that's one of the travesties of the war.

The second half of your question was?

QUESTION: Does this Administration feel, as the previous one did, that Milosevic and Karadzic should be brought up and (inaudible) War Crimes Tribunal.

OFFICIAL ONE: Well, I think that the previous Administration thought that they were among the people who should be considered for possible war crimes trials. At least as I read their statements, they were not ready to bring an accusation, and I think our point of view would be the same about that; that there should be an assessment of the possible culpability of a wide range of people, including their possible subjects, but I don't think we're ready to bring any accusations or indictments at the present time.

And with respect to the War Crimes Tribunal, the United Nations is the obvious source of the principal likelihood of setting up such a tribunal. We'll also be working through the United Nations Human Rights Commission to see if that is not an appropriate place to help get a proper authorizing statute drawn. So I think we'll be working in the United Nations body for the establishment of a War Crimes Tribunal.

MR. BOUCHER: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

# # #

Comments of BC before leaving LR, 8/9/92

RE: Bosnia:

The President's statement yesterday was a statement in the right direction. There is reason to believe that concerted diplomatic efforts might not only put an end to it and open up the camps. That threat of concerted UN action against the Serbian positions might also lead to protecting the relief efforts. So I think we are going to have to watch it on a daily basis. Those are the two things I think the UN ought to consider -- the use of force to do, to open up the concentration camps and to open up the relief efforts.

RE: Political motives?

They cannot possibly be talking about me. [the only thing political was said by their press spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater.] I've been trying to take responsible positions. The Secretary of State said he must not have read it, [Secretary Cheney agreed with me and now it is the position of the United States Government. I don't want politics in the Yugoslav issue. Just want to do what we can to try to put an end to those camps and to protect the relief effort.

RE: Arms to Bosnia?

[?] concerned about that yesterday. [The President at the press briefing yesterday said] that at this time, France and Britain seem reluctant to go along with us. That is in part because it is a difficult military call and there are serious questions about what kind of air power might be effective there. I don't want to get into a slippery slope. I would note that the SFRC adopted a resolution which said the arms embargo against Bosnia and Croatia should be reconsidered and I think that's something that ought to be done. I'm not calling for an end to it. I do think it should be reconsidered. I was impressed with the arguments made by the Senate and that may be an alternative if we can't get our allies to go along.

RE: Bush said he was opposed to lifting embargo?

I'm not calling for lifting it now but I do think it is an issue that has to be debated and the urgency of the discussion will be all the greater if we can't get the UN to take concerted action on these two things.

RE: Not clear what your position on the humanitarian relief is?

Everything I have said to date, you know this is an unfolding situation. But I want to be very clear, the comments I have made about the use of force are confined to the two issues which the US is confronting today which is opening those camps and protecting the relief effort.

RE: Iraq? ① ②

We've got to see the ceasefire agreements are complied with. That's a daily thing and

the US has stiffened its resolve in the last few weeks and I hope that will be mirrored by our allies. I think we are going to have to watch that almost on a daily basis. Saddam Hussein is obviously playing some sort of game now for his own purposes. I think we just have to watch it. Mr. Bush said yesterday that they would comply and we'll take him at his word on that right now.



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  
AUGUST 4, 1992

CONTACT: AVIS LAVELLE  
(501)-399-3840

**Statement By Governor Bill Clinton on killings in Serbian camps**

I am outraged by the revelations of concentration camps in Bosnia and urge immediate action to stop this slaughter.

For months, unverified reports have circulated about atrocities, secret detention camps, torture and murder. Now, confirmed reports indicate that thousands of Croats and Slavic Muslims have been tortured and killed. Survivors report of brutal executions, as well as prisoners held in metal cages without sanitation or adequate food.

The United States and the international community must take action. If the horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralyzed in the face of genocide.

We must discover who is responsible for these actions and take steps to bring them to justice for these crimes against humanity.

The United States should take the lead in calling on the United Nations Security Council to convene immediately in emergency session. It should call for access by the International Committee of the Red Cross to all detention camps and to initiate a relief effort. The UN should demand the release of all non-combatants into the custody of the ICRC and the immediate closing of any detention centers. Military prisoners of war, if any, should be held under conditions defined by international law, including access for the ICRC.

*Call  
we  
keep  
some  
of  
this*

The United Nations demands should be backed up by collective action, including the use of force, if necessary. The United States should be prepared to lend appropriate support, including military, to such an operation.

The United States and the world community must come together in this crisis. All Americans must be united across party lines on this matter of simple human decency. I will strongly support urgent and appropriate action to stop the killing.

-30-30-30-



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  
JULY 26, 1992

CONTACT: DEE DEE MYERS  
(501)-399-3840

**Statement by Governor  
Bill Clinton On the Crisis in Bosnia**

The continuing bloodshed in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia demands urgent international action.

Tens of thousands of innocent civilians have been killed and countless cities have been destroyed. Over two million refugees have fled their homes, with vast numbers flooding into neighboring countries -- the largest displacement of people in Europe since World War II. This human tragedy is not merely a by-product of war; it is the result of a deliberate effort: the Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing," designed to drive whole peoples from the lands of their parents and move strangers into their vacant homes. It is not the Serbian people whom we oppose but rather the brutal actions of their government.

It is time for real leadership to stop the continuing tragedy in the former Yugoslav republics. I urge the Administration to work with the nations of Europe to bring new urgency to ending the bloodshed and ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Croatia, Hungary and other neighboring countries face severe burdens in absorbing the refugees fleeing the violence. These innocent victims must not be allowed to languish -- hungry, ill, impoverished and exposed to the elements. The international community, especially the nations of Europe, must assure them temporary safe-haven, with adequate food and shelter.

We must address not only the victims of war, but also the continuing war itself. Last week, yet another truce was agreed to and, yet again, the cease-fire was immediately breached. If this latest agreement can be preserved, it could be a turning point in the conflict as it takes the essential steps of requiring that heavy weapons be put under U.N. supervision and that refugees be allowed to return home. The Serbian leadership signed that agreement. It should be held accountable to it.

While there is time, our government should act to focus the international community on a series of new actions. They may not

succeed at this late stage, but at least we must do what we reasonably can.

We should make clear that the economic blockade against Serbia will be tightened, not only on weapons but also on oil and other supplies that sustain the renegade regime of Slobodan Milosevic. European and U.S. naval forces in the Adriatic should be given authority by the UN to stop and search ships that might be carrying contraband headed for Serbia and her ally, Montenegro. We should make a determined effort to convince neighboring states that it is not in their interest to violate the embargo.

Oil in sanctions  
Kopelov  
11

The international community should take steps to charge the Milosevic regime, and those responsible for the slaughter of innocent civilians, with crimes against humanity under international law -- as we should have done long ago in the case of Iraq.

The continuing attacks by Serbian elements in Bosnia threaten the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian aid, jeopardize the safety of U.N. personnel and put at risk the lives of thousands of citizens. If the Serbs persist in violating the terms of the current ceasefire agreement, the United States should take the lead in seeking U.N. Security Council authorization for air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort. The United States should be prepared to lend appropriate military support to that operation. Air and naval forces adequate to carry out these operations should be visibly in position.

I have emphasized the human agony of what has been taking place on the very steps of modern Europe. But we must also be clear about the meaning of these events for our national interests. In this crisis, the international community faces the first post-Cold War test in Europe of the fundamental principle that international borders will not be changed by violent means and that minority rights must be respected. Its outcome will set the standard for addressing other ethnic conflicts and the effectiveness of vital international institutions, including the European Community, the Atlantic Alliance and the United Nations itself.

I urge the Administration and the international community to move forward, to act with the greatest possible urgency before it is too late. The people of Bosnia and the world community -- the dream of a better, more stable world -- cannot afford further delay.

f6

Campaign Bosnia Positions

Basic principle

That international borders will not be changed by violent means and that minority rights must be respected.

Use of force

BC called for the use of force in two instances, opening the camps and protecting the relief effort.

"The United States should take the lead in seeking UNSC authorization for air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort...Air and naval forces adequate to carry out these operations should be visibly in position."

RE Camps: we called for an emergency session at the UN and access by the ICRC to all camps and to initiate a relief effort. The UN should demand release of noncombatants and immediate closing of detention centers. "The United Nations demands should be backed up by collective action, including the use of force, if necessary. The United States should be prepared to lend appropriate support, including military, to such an operation."

Refugees

We called on the international community to assure refugees temporary safe-haven, with adequate food and shelter.

Blockade

We called for a tightening of the economic blockage, "not only on weapons but also on oil and other supplies that sustain [Serbia]." Called for "stop and search" of ships and for a concerted effort to convince neighboring states that it is not in their interest to violate the embargo.

War crimes

We called on the international community to take steps to charge the Milosevic regime and those responsible for the slaughter with crimes against humanity.

Arms embargo

"I do think it is an issue that has to be debated." We said a lifting should be considered.

U.S. Department of State  
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

For Immediate Release

February 10, 1993

Statement By  
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher

Today I am announcing a series of new steps that President Clinton has decided to take with regard to the former Yugoslavia. The President believes it is time for the United States to become actively and directly engaged in the multilateral effort to reach a just and workable resolution to this dangerous conflict.

We inherit at this early point in our administration a tragic and dangerous situation. Over the past two years the states of the former Yugoslavia have descended into a dark period of terror and bloodshed. During that period, the west missed repeated opportunities to engage early and effectively in ways that might have prevented the conflict from deepening. As President Clinton stressed during the campaign, an early and forceful signal might well have deterred much of the aggression, bloodshed, and ethnic cleansing. Because those actions were not taken, we now face a much more intractable situation, with vastly more difficult options. Yet now we must address the circumstances as we find them, and we are resolved to do so.

Those circumstances have deep roots. The death of President Tito and the end of communist domination of the former Yugoslavia raised the lid on the cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds. This is a land where at least three religions and a half dozen ethnic groups have vied across the centuries. It was the birthplace of world war one. It has long been a cradle of European conflict. It remains so today.

Over the past year, Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen have tirelessly pursued a negotiated settlement. While they have made progress, their proposed settlement has not been accepted by the parties to the dispute, and the killing continues.

This conflict may be far from our shores, but it is not distant to our concerns. We cannot afford to ignore it. Let me explain why.

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We cannot ignore the human toll. Serbian "ethnic cleansing" has been pursued through mass murders, systematic beatings and rapes of Muslims and others, prolonged shelling of innocents in Sarajevo and elsewhere, forced displacement of entire villages, inhumane treatment of prisoners in detention camps, and the blockading of relief to sick and starving civilians. Atrocities have been committed by other parties as well. Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting such brutality.

Beyond these humanitarian interests, we have direct strategic concerns as well. The continuing destruction of a new U.N. member state challenges the principle that internationally recognized borders should not be altered by force. In addition, this conflict itself has no natural borders. It threatens to spill over into new regions, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. It could then become a greater Balkan war, like those that preceded World War I. Broader hostilities could touch additional nations, such as Greece, Albania, and Turkey. The river of fleeing refugees, which has already reached the hundreds of thousands, would swell. The political and economic vigor of Europe, already tested by the integration of former Communist states, would be further strained.

There is a broader imperative here. The world's response to the violence in the former Yugoslavia is an early and crucial test of how it will address the concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the post-cold war world. That question reaches throughout eastern Europe. It reaches to the states of the former Soviet Union, where the fall of communism has left some 25 million ethnic Russians living as minorities in other republics. And it reaches to other continents as well.

The events in the former Yugoslavia raise the question of whether a state may address the rights of its minorities by eradicating those minorities to achieve "ethnic purity." Bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether "ethnic cleansing" is a policy the world will tolerate. If we hope to promote the spread of freedom or if we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful multi-ethnic democracies, our answer must be a resounding no.

This is why President Clinton has decided to take the following six steps.

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First, the President has decided the United States will engage actively and directly in the Vance-Owen negotiations, bringing the weight of American diplomacy to bear. We know these negotiations will not be easy; we know the options have narrowed because of past inaction; we do not expect miracles. but we believe we can make a difference. We strongly support the efforts of the United Nations and the European Community, through the Vance-Owen negotiations, to arrive at any agreement that would bring peace to Bosnia. Now, in order to ensure the most effective possible communication between us, President Clinton has today named one of our top diplomats to be our government's envoy to those talks, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew. Mr. Bartholomew has served as our Ambassador to Lebanon and Spain and is currently the Ambassador to NATO. He is no stranger to crises. He is the right person for this task. Through Ambassador Bartholomew's efforts, working with Secretary Vance and Lord Owen, and through other means, the United States will help explore creative solutions to the conflict that we hope all parties can accept.

Second, the President is communicating to the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croations that the only way to end this conflict is through negotiation. No settlement can be imposed on the parties, both on grounds of principle and on grounds that an imposed settlement would be far more difficult to sustain than one the parties have voluntarily embraced. At the same time, we believe that each party must be prepared to accept a resolution that falls short of its goals. Therefore, we are taking steps to urge the parties not to hold back from earnest negotiation. The responsibility for crafting a workable solution is fundamentally on the parties involved, but we will lend our earnest support.

Third, the President will take actions to tighten the enforcement of economic sanctions, increase political pressure on Serbia, and deter Serbia from widening the war. We have informed the Serbians that we plan to raise the economic and political price for aggression. We will work with our allies, the Russians, and others, to achieve this result. We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. In addition we will work to strengthen the international presence in Macedonia.

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Fourth, the President is taking steps to reduce the suffering and bloodshed as these negotiations proceed. He is calling on all parties to stop the shelling and other violence. He has communicated to all concerned that the no-fly zone over Bosnia should be enforced under a U.N. resolution. He has urged that humanitarian aid be allowed to flow to those in need, and we are considering further actions to promote greater delivery of aid. Moreover, we are putting together a U.S. government team to assess further humanitarian needs on an urgent basis. The President is seeking the urgent creation of a war crimes tribunal at the United Nations to bring justice and deter further atrocities.

Fifth, the President has taken steps to make clear to all concerned that the United States is prepared to do its share to help implement and enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. If there is a viable agreement containing enforcement provisions, the United States would be prepared to join with the United Nations, NATO, and others in implementing and enforcing it, including possible U.S. military participation. This is a shared problem, and must be a shared burden.

Sixth and finally, the President has consulted widely with our friends and allies on these actions. He and I have communicated to dozens of world leaders regarding our intentions. In particular, earlier today the President spoke with President Yeltsin by phone to convey his personal request that both our nations work closely and cooperatively in this search for a peaceful resolution. He is also sending Ambassador Bartholomew to Moscow to discuss our approach before Ambassador Bartholomew returns to New York for the negotiations.

Let me make clear what we hope to achieve through these steps. We will attempt to help build on the Vance-Owen negotiations in a way that can move toward a just, workable, and durable solution. We will seek to preserve the survivability of Bosnia as a state. We hope that our direct involvement in the negotiations, as well as the other steps I have announced, will encourage the parties to move quickly to negotiate and embrace a solution that is mutually acceptable, and that, therefore, has a real chance to work. In particular, we expect that our willingness to participate in the enforcement of such an agreement will help allay concerns the Bosnian government and others have expressed about an agreement's workability.

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Let me also make clear what we do not intend by these steps. We do not intend to impose a solution on the parties. We believe the quickest, best, and most sustainable way to stop the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia is to help create an environment in which all parties see it in their own self-interest to negotiate a political settlement.

The United States is not the world's policeman. We cannot interpose our forces to stop every armed conflict in the world. Yet we are the United States of America. We have singular powers and influence. We are committed to Europe's stability. Our values and interests give us reason to help create an international standard for the fair treatment of minorities. Therefore, we have reasons to participate actively in this effort.

This is an important moment for our nation's post-cold war role in Europe and the world. It tests our ability to adopt new approaches to foreign policy in a world that has changed fundamentally. It tests our commitment to the nurturing of democracy and the support of environments in which democracy can take root and grow.

It tests our willingness, and that of our allies, to help our institutions of collective security, such as NATO, evolve in ways that meet the demands of this new age. and it tests what wisdom we have gathered from this bloody century, and measures our resolve to take early, concerted action against systematic ethnic persecution.

In the wake of the devastating struggles of the twentieth century, no great power today can take lightly the risks of involvement in a Balkan conflict. Yet no great power can dismiss the likely consequences of letting a Balkan conflict rage. Acting now, in close cooperation with our friends and allies, offers the best chance to contain these flames of conflict before they become an underground fire that could later erupt and become all-consuming. By acting now, we can demonstrate that not every crisis need become a choice between inaction and unilateral American intervention. In the face of great suffering and the imperative of our own interest, we cannot afford to miss any further opportunities to help pursue a resolution of this conflict.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Acting Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

For Immediate Release

February 10, 1993

## REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW

Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew was appointed as Special Envoy to the Vance negotiations on February 10, 1993. He has been serving as U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels, Belgium since July 20, 1992. He is a member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, class of Career Minister.

Ambassador Bartholomew served from April 1989 as Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs with responsibility for arms control, non-proliferation, security assistance and arms transfers, nuclear matters, technology transfer and controls, scientific and technological affairs, and other international security matters.

Ambassador Bartholomew previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Spain, 1986-89, and as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, 1983-86.

He served in 1982-83 as U.S. Special Negotiator, with the personal rank of Ambassador, for Defense and Economic Cooperation negotiations between the United States and Greece. In 1981-82 he served in the Department of State as the Special Cyprus Coordinator.

In 1979-81 Ambassador Bartholomew served as Director (Assistant Secretary of State) of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department.

He was assigned from the State Department to the National Security Council, 1977-79, as head of the East-West Relations and USSR and Eastern European cluster.

From 1974 until 1977 he served as Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and then of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

From 1968 to 1974 Ambassador Bartholomew served in the career Civil Service in the Department of Defense. His assignments included Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of International Security Affairs and Director of the DOD Task Force on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

His recent government service awards include Presidential Meritorious Service Awards in 1986 and 1988 and the Presidential Distinguished Service Award in 1990.

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Before entering government service, Ambassador Bartholomew taught social sciences at the University of Chicago, 1963-64, and was Lecturer in Government at Wesleyan University from 1964 to 1968.

Ambassador Bartholomew received his B.A. from Dartmouth College in 1958, did graduate study in Political Science at the University of Chicago from 1958 to 1961, and received his M.A. in International Relations in 1960. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ambassador Bartholomew holds Honorary Doctor of Laws degrees from Wesleyan University (1985) and Hobart and William Smith College (1987).

Ambassador Bartholomew was born in Portland, Maine, on February 17, 1936. He and his wife, the former Rose-Ann Dognin, reside in Washington, D.C., and have four children.

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## On My Mind

A. M. ROSENTHAL

# Clinton's Bosnia Choice

In its first real test, the new Clinton foreign policy team shows itself strong and flexible enough to pull back from a war that never could have been won politically, emotionally or historically.

For this, they are being denounced by much of the American foreign-commentary trade. But they deserve praise, not epithet.

The Clinton Administration had to make a clear choice about how to reach four goals in the Balkan war.

1. To save the lives of Bosnian Muslims.
2. To create a workable, independent Bosnia where none ever existed.
3. To give Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims the chance for honorable roles in their own land.
4. To demonstrate that Serbian atrocities had at least some price.

The choice was either to use American military power to try to settle the war in Bosnia or do it by negotiation followed by a strong international peacekeeping presence that would include the U.S.

Stepping back: As nationality there has never been a Bosnia or Bosnians. The population is divided between Christians and Muslims, but all are of Serbian or Croatian stock.

In 1992, during the breakup of Yugoslavia, Muslims, about 44 percent of the population, declared the first independent Bosnia. Orthodox Christian Serbs, more than a third of Bosnia's population, feared that they would wind up a minority in an Islamic state in what had been their homeland for centuries. So did some of the Catholic Croats.

They attacked the Muslims. The civil war became a Serbian pogrom against the Muslims. Muslims were driven from their towns, corralled in concentration camps. Muslim cities were shelled. Rape of Muslim women became planned terrorism.

Serbs had casualties and horror stories but the world was sickened by the far greater Serbian atrocities. Europe, however, was exquisitely polite when it came to helping Muslims militarily — after you, America.

But in the U.S. most foreign affairs specialists pressured President Bush and then President Clinton to bomb Serbian forces, and arm the Muslims with heavy weapons.

Before election, Mr. Clinton seemed to be leaning to that. But during the interim and after Inauguration Day, the Clinton team did what it is paid to do — take one more look.

They found two problems that

made it impossible for the United States to try to shoot its way to a Balkan settlement.

Problem one was that the U.S. would have to go in alone. The Europeans would not back a war against Serbia. Problem two: All the bombs in the American arsenal could not change the fact that if the war ever ended, Muslims in Bosnia would still have to live among and work with a Serbo-Croatian majority.

For months, Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State, and Lord Owen, once Britain's Foreign Secretary, had been on a U.N. assignment to come up with a peace plan. They did.

It calls for a cease-fire overseen by a substantial U.N. force, a war crimes tribunal, strong human rights provisions, the sharing of power by all three sides in a central government and Sarajevo, and nine districts in which the majority would be either

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## New team makes the right decision.

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Muslim, Serbian or Croatian.

Would the Serbs be rewarded?

As Muslims say bitterly, it is hard to see how Serbian leaders could be treated both as negotiators and war criminals. But Bosnian Serbs would get less territory than before the war, and no Bosnian industrial centers.

The Clinton team, headed by Secretary of State Christopher and Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, came up with a thoughtful approach. It is bringing down on them the fury of the bomb-Serbs crowd, once reserved for Vance-Owen.

Washington's approach rules out the hard-line military option or supplying arms to the Muslims and it does not explicitly endorse Vance-Owen. But by presenting no substitute, it makes the concept of power-sharing within a unified state not only the best idea but the only one.

To persuade the Muslims to go along, Washington promises that after the agreements are signed, U.S. troops will join a U.N. peacekeeping force. To help persuade the Serbs, Mr. Clinton is receiving the help of President Yeltsin of pro-Serbian Russia.

All told, a sensible plan. For the Clinton team a strong beginning and for Bosnia some hope. □

March 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER 

SUBJECT: Decisions of March 3 Principals Committee Meeting  
on Bosnia

Attached is a memo to your counterparts with the decisions from  
the March 3 Principals Committee Meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the Principals at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the Principals

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By KDC/NARA, Date 1/23/23  
2008-0994-F-2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0533-M(1.02)  
VZ 216120

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
USUN AMBASSADOR  
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decision of March 3 Principals Committee Meeting  
on Bosnia

1. The U.S. will support the draft statement prepared by the Security Council P-4, to be made by the Council President following today's meeting on the fighting in eastern Bosnia.
2. State will prepare instructions for consultations with European P-4 members including Russia about what we might do together if necessary to back up the words of the statement. Questions and ideas to be considered include:
  - clarification of what is meant by a ceasefire in Council President's statement
  - possible changes in UNPROFOR's mandate or Rules of Engagement
  - enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia
  - tightening enforcement of existing sanctions, e.g. including the possibility of a WEU or NATO/WEU operation to prevent violations via the Danube and
  - proposing new sanctions, especially to seize Serbian assets and impound vessels involved in sanctions violations
3. State also will prepare messages to all parties in the Bosnian conflict reinforcing the Security Council President's statement.
4. Publicly and in other diplomatic exchanges, we will say that the situation in Bosnia and the Security Council President's statement mark a serious moment, and that we continue to consult on how the statement should be followed up.

5. The air drops will continue as planned, including continuing to assess how long this phase should continue. In public and in diplomatic exchanges we will say that they are being effective and that we plan to continue the operation, without specifying when drops will be made or to what sites.
6. Since land convoys presently are able to reach Tuzla, we will not now actively explore the possibility of using the airport there to fly in relief supplies. We will reconsider that possibility if the situation changes.
7. The Principals agreed to revisit the question of what more the U.S. might do if the situation deteriorates in the next few days.

Anthony Lake  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

**MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS****No. 067-M  
March 4, 1993**

**Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued the following statement today:**

**"An assessment of the first four missions to airdrop food and medicine to cutoff areas in Eastern Bosnia indicates the operation has been successful so far. The first aim of these missions is to deliver emergency food and medicine to areas denied ground convoys of food and that is happening.**

**"We have some hard evidence and some anecdotal evidence indicating that a significant portion of the supplies have fallen within reach of the populations in need. We have no hard information and no anecdotal information to indicate that any of the supplies have fallen wide of their intended drop zones.**

**"Additionally, these missions are intended to reaffirm our position that the denial of food and medicine as a tool of ethnic cleansing is unacceptable and to provide a catalyst to a process that will result in more deliveries of food by land convoy. We believe that both purposes are being served."**

**-END-**

**DoD News Briefing****Thursday, March 4, 1993 - 1:00 p.m.****Mr. Bob Hall, DASD (Public Affairs)**

Mr. Hall: I'm sorry that I'm late. I'd like to welcome to the briefing Mr. Dabrovko Merlic of Croatia. He's editor of Croatia's most popular TV and news interview program in Zagreb and he's here as a guest today of ABC News.

I'd also like to welcome 14 foreign editors who are here on a multinational international visitor program hosted by the United States Information Agency. Their program is focusing on print journalism in the United States.

Last night, four U.S. Air Force C-130 cargo planes returned to the area of Konjevici and dropped 19.6 tons of military rations and medical supplies. The mission was completed without incident.

I have a statement here by the Secretary of Defense. It will be available for you after the briefing, but let me read it.

"An assessment of the first four missions to airdrop food and medicine to cut-off areas of eastern Bosnia indicates the operation has been successful so far. The first aim of these missions is to deliver emergency food and medicine to areas denied ground convoys of food, and that is happening. We have some hard evidence and some anecdotal evidence indicating that a significant portion of the supplies have fallen within reach of populations in need. We have no hard information and no anecdotal information to indicate that any of the supplies have fallen wide of their intended drop zones.

"Additionally, these missions are intended to reaffirm our position that the denial of food and medicine as a tool of ethnic cleansing is unacceptable, and to provide a catalyst to a process that will result in more deliveries of food by land convoy. We believe that both purposes are being served."

I know you have a lot of questions about the situation on the ground. We can't tell you exactly what is happening there for the same reasons that I mentioned to you on Tuesday. But as the Secretary points out, there is some hard evidence that we do have, and there's some anecdotal evidence. I know you're interested in what we do know, so we have somebody here from the Joint Staff to walk you through what we do know. He is Colonel James Pardew, U.S. Army. He is the Assistant Director for Intelligence on the Joint Staff. He'll summarize what's been happening over the last four days and what we know about the airdrops.

After he's finished and has taken some of your questions, I've got some things to talk about in terms of the team going to Russia and also on Somalia, so I'll come back.

Colonel Pardew: Thus far, we have conducted four airdrops in eastern Bosnia, a total of 78.4 metric tons. The first of these drops on the morning of the 1st of March was at a place called Cerska. Cerska is not really a town, but it's a series of hamlets in a mountainous area in eastern Bosnia. It's an area that's had considerable fighting recently, it's isolated, and was picked by the UNHCR as a place of need. As I mentioned before, it's a mountainous area, remote, and a series of hamlets. Each hamlet consisting of four or five houses.

We flew with three aircraft, each aircraft carrying a total of ten pallets, most by food -- nine food and one medical packet. We used high-velocity chutes in this operation. These parachutes come down faster than a normal parachute, and that allows us to get more accuracy in the drop.

We have practiced this technique in Germany at Hohenfels prior to the drop, and we're confident that it was successful. We have direct knowledge that at least half the bundles in the first drop landed in the designated drop zone, in or immediately close to the drop zone. We're confident that the others are in the same vicinity, but we do not have direct evidence to that effect.

The second operation was in the town of Zepa, or an enclave of Zepa -- all of these enclaves, a series of hamlets. That was on the 2nd of March, the next night. We used the same technique, and we're confident that we were successful there because of our success in the original drop.

In Zepa, we do not have direct, objective evidence on the success of the mission. We do, however, have some anecdotal information from radio operators and from press in the area. From one ham operator in Zepa, we have a report that at least 11 bundles so far have been recovered and distributed.

The third drop was, again, in an enclave known as Konjevici. In this case, we modified our technique slightly, used four aircraft instead of three, eight bundles each, which gave us a little more accuracy in some respects.

In that particular drop, again, we have only anecdotal information. That information from local radio operators indicates that at least two of the original bundles were recovered, and then local Bosnia officials have stated in the press that 18 bundles are located, but they cannot be recovered yet because of ongoing fighting in the area.

We returned last night to Konjevici, based on a UN recommendation. That recommendation was based on the UN's concern for the potential for refugees leaving Cerska and moving into the Konjevici area, so we dropped there, using the same techniques. We have no information because it was so recent. We have no feedback yet, even anecdotal, on the success of the Konjevici operation, although we are confident in all of these that we are achieving our mission.

We believe that the techniques that we're using here and the information that we have up to this point, preliminary as it is, that our techniques are delivering humanitarian materials to needy in eastern Bosnia. We can't guarantee at any point in time which side has a particular bundle. These are remote areas and there's lots of fighting going on. We have no U.S. observers or UN observers on the ground to tell us exactly what the situation is, so we can't guarantee at any point. But we are getting increasing evidence that the materials are reaching those in need in this area.

Turning briefly to humanitarian relief convoys on the ground, in the weeks prior to the announcement of U.S. airdrop operations, we have on our records a total of three humanitarian relief convoys going into this area in eastern Bosnia. One into Gorazde, one into Tuzla, and one into Zepa -- a total of 242 metric tons of humanitarian materials. Since the U.S. announcement on 25 February, we know of seven relief convoys that have gone into this area -- six into Tuzla and one into Gorazde.

Those are the points that I wished to cover with you. I'll open it up to questions.

Q: Just to back up a little bit, on your second and third drops, you said 11 bundles in Zepa had been recovered? How many total were dropped in Zepa?

A: We were dropping ten per aircraft, three aircraft. Thirty.

Q: You're talking about a bundle and a pallet being the same thing?

A: Yes.

Q: You dropped the same number on Konjevici night before last?

A: Konjevici, 28 bundles -- four C-130's.

Q: I thought you said eight bundles per plane.

A: I'm sorry. That's correct.

Q: And last night how many bundles?

A: The same. (Corrected later in briefing)

Q: Are you suggesting by comparing the weeks prior to when these drops started, using three convoys, and the fact that there have been seven convoys since the drops started, are you suggesting that that's achieving your mission of allowing more convoys into the area?

A: I just wanted to give you an update on the convoys. I'm not drawing any conclusions one way or the other.

Q: You know there's been a stated target here that part of the reason for these drops is that you all hoped it would spark the Serbs into allowing, assuming that since they're getting supplies anyway, they will allow the convoys.

A: We still hope that, but I'm not drawing that absolute conclusion.

Q: Are you saying seven convoys underway, seven convoys reached...

A: Arrived. Reached their destination.

Q: How many tons of supplies in those?

A: 750 metric tons.

Q: Colonel, have you encountered in any of the missions anything that might have brought a problem such as bad weather or ground fire? Any reason that the altitude couldn't be dropped to make sure that you have even more accuracy?

A: There are a number of safety considerations in this. We're confident that we can do it from these altitudes, and that is the safest altitude to operate. So we're concerned with aircraft and crew safety. At the same time, we think we can achieve our mission at that altitude.

Q: What's the military situation in Cerska and Zepa and the other places you've dropped? Can you be clear about what's going on as far as the military situation?

A: We don't have an absolutely clear picture there. There's fighting going on. We have conflicting reports of exactly who's in charge in Cerska. We know, factually, that there has been a considerable amount of fighting, that the Serbs are attempting to take the town. We believe that at least a good portion of the town of Cerska is in Serb hands, or the enclave of Cerska. But we don't know that the whole enclave has been overrun.

Q: I noticed in the list of whatever, enclaves, the convoys have gotten through to that there's not much of an overlap with where we've been dropping supplies. So I'm a little uncertain as to why you mentioned those particular towns since they weren't targeted by the UN in the first place, probably because food was getting through.

A: We're delivering to places in the greatest need, and the places that have not had the most ground convoys. So we're using the air to supplement the ground convoys. I'm simply giving you an overall picture of the humanitarian relief situation.

Q: Are these two towns very close to where we've been dropping?

A: Which two towns?

Q: Gorazde and Tuzla.

A: Gorazde is south of this area. Off the top of my head, I'm going to say 70 kilometers or so, but I wouldn't live on that figure. Tuzla is to the north. These are larger towns. Tuzla and Gorazde are, in fact, towns, as opposed to enclaves.

Q: I'd like to get a little better definition here of what we mean by success on these drops. The Secretary says that they're hitting their target; you say they're hitting their target. Can you give me an idea, as we got yesterday from Rhein-Main, the size of the target area? Does that size grow as your height or the altitude grows, that you're dropping from? The numbers seem to indicate that you're calling a success anything that lands within 500 yards of one square mile.

A: First of all, we're talking about an area of need, that's an area and not a point. It's not just a town with a main street intersection, it's an area. These areas can run four or five kilometers down a valley in a very mountainous area. Out of that, we pick some areas that...we again, have to be concerned about the people that we're dropping this material to, so we have to pick an area that's close to the enclave or in the edge of the enclave, that would accommodate stringing out 30 containers at fairly high velocity.

You might say a one by two or three kilometer area that we would be trying to hit. But this is an operational issue that I'm really not that familiar with. But it's an area we're looking for, not a point.

Q: Are there any plans to, in any way, change the way these airdrops are conducted based on the experience of the first four?

A: As I mentioned, we made a minor adjustment. We'll always assess the operation as it goes on, but I'm not aware of any...

Q: Other than changing from three planes to four planes?

A: I'm not aware of any.

Q: Two clarifying questions. First of all, just reviewing your figures, you've dropped a total of 125 pallets on four towns. Of that number, either through direct or anecdotal evidence, how many can you say is the total that have been recovered as opposed to being dropped in the target area?

A: I really can't give you a figure because all I have are some very limited reports on sketchy information that we have.

Q: Based on what you did say, you said that one said 11 bundles had been located in Zepa. That doesn't indicate recovered. The next one you said two bundles had been recovered and 18 located, but they couldn't get to them because of the fighting. So it seems to me that based on anecdotal evidence to date, two bundles out of 124 have been recovered by the people that they were intended to benefit.

A: We know that in Cerska 15 bundles were in the drop zone, and we have some evidence that...

Q: But there are Serbs in the drop zone.

A: ...that people have gone to those. But I can't tell you on the ground exactly who has what bundle. I know that 11 were reported, through anecdotal information, as being recovered in Zepa. Two were reported, again through anecdotal information, as recovered in Konjevici. And 18 were seen, observed, but could not be gotten to at that point.

Q: The other clarifying thing. In the week before the drops were announced, you said that three convoys were permitted to get through to Gorazde, Tuzla, and Zepa. How many were turned back that attempted to go to those locations?

A: I'm not sure of this, but I believe one was en route to Cerska and was turned around and ended up in Gorazde, but I'm not certain of that. I'm almost positive that at least one was heading for Cerska and was turned around.

Q: So there's no evidence that there was a change of heart on the part of the Serbs regarding convoys that were heading for Tuzla or Gorazde that were not being permitted through before the drops started and are being permitted through now. All you're saying is that there is a greater number of convoys.

A: That's correct. That's all I'm saying.

Q: The bundles you say have been recovered, are we to assume that your anecdotal evidence is that they have been recovered by Bosnian forces, or you don't know?

A: Some of the anecdotal information is from the Bosnians. But again, it's very hard for us to distinguish on the ground. We're delivering humanitarian aide to needy areas, but I can't tell you exactly on the ground who recovered it.

Q: So it could be recovered by both Bosnian and Serb forces?

A: It could be.

Hall: Well, the anecdotal evidence that he pointed to came from Bosnian sources. The Bosnian Muslims had recovered 11.

Q: So the figures were Bosnian recovered.

Pardew: That's correct.

Q: Has there been any reaction from Serbian military aircraft to the U.S. airdrops?

A: No.

Q: Is there any reason to add to the number in terms of doing more airdrops? Do you see any...

A: Any reason to add...

Q: Right. You say it's successful, and there are people that are hungry there. Why not do more of these rather than just four planes a night? Is there some logistical limit that you have?

A: I really can't answer that.

Q: In terms of the success that you're speaking of, you're rating it a success in terms of this material landing in target zones, not reaching people who need the food.

A: Yes, our mission was to air deliver humanitarian materials to needy areas. We have done that.

Q: Shouldn't the success be done on those people who are now being fed who needed relief supplies?

Hall: Let me answer that question.

Q: Any agreement with the Russians to have the Russians deliver...

Hall: I'm going to talk about that in a few minutes.

Thank you very much, Colonel.

Q: You said these are high velocity chutes. What's the rate of descent?

Pardew: I think they hit the ground at about 45 miles an hour.

Hall: Thank you very much, Colonel.

On the question of success, I think the colonel was trying to describe what is our confidence that we're delivering where we want to. As I say, we have a very high confidence in that. We're delivering on the targets that we picked.

Q: A lot of that's anecdotal.

A: A lot of it's anecdotal, but if you combine what we know and the anecdotal evidence, you get that we're delivering. We have no hard evidence and no anecdotal evidence to indicate that we're missing the target zones. That's a very important point.

**Q: How come you have only hard evidence from only one of the four drop areas?**

**A: That gets into an area of sources and methods that I can't get into, but that's the fact. So we only have hard evidence of our own, through our own processes, from the first night. The other is all anecdotal.**

**Q: You say on the first night's drop that you have evidence that at least half of the bundles landed in or near the drop zone, and you're confident -- where you get this confidence nobody knows -- but you're confident that the others landed near that area. How are you confident of that?**

**A: Because when you drop, the bundles all basically go out together. So they're all going to fall very close together. We know that from experience, obviously. Now I'm not saying you can't have a case of extreme wind shift that might take one or two of them off some distance, but basically they're falling at a high rate of speed, not quite as fast as if you just threw them out, the parachutes are slowing them up somewhat, but they're basically going to fall pretty directly down. So if you've got most or them or half of them in the area and you can confirm that, you can assume the others are nearby and you just can't see them. Don't forget, this is very, very rugged terrain.**

**Let me answer the question about success. That's one aspect of success.**

**The other aspect of success is, are we doing what we want in terms of meeting the UNHCR needs? That's a thing that, again, is largely anecdotal. We are trying to put the material, put the supplies, as close as we can to where the needy population is without, obviously, landing it on top of their heads. This is a very difficult process. But remember, the first site that we chose, Cerska, was chosen, with full knowledge, that it was under very intense military pressure; that it might be about to be overrun, and there's some anecdotal evidence that says that part of it has been overrun. We were aware of that. We went to the UNHCR and discussed that with them, and they asked us to go ahead anyway. We're not taking the easy targets here. We're taking the tough nuts because those are the people that need it the most. So you have to try to get it to them. And we have, as I say, some anecdotal evidence that we are succeeding, that some of the material is reaching the population that needs it.**

**Q: Secretary Aspin said the other day that we were going to reassess after the third mission, and then the subsequent announcement was made that the decision was made to continue. What was actually done in that reassessment or assessment process? What things were looked at, and on what basis was the decision made to continue?**

**A: The decision was made to continue in the sense that we didn't make a decision to stop. The Secretary asked for a reassessment by the morning. He got that. The UNHCR said no, there's a definite need, a desperate need, you need to keep doing this. EUCOM supported that assessment. The decision was made to continue, or a decision was made not to stop the operation.**

**Q: So the assessment mainly consisted of consulting with the UNHCR?**

**A: The UNHCR is the best authority we have in terms of the needs on the ground.**

**Q: The three areas that were spoken of here this morning, are they going to be continued targets for dropping? Is this an area that has been designated by UNHCR as, as you say, as most need? And if some is getting to them, but not all of it is, would you continue to repeat flights in that area?**

**A: We may well.**

Q: But do you...

A: There are other areas that we are discussing with UNHCR. Again, the UNHCR are the people that are giving us the best idea of what the need is on the ground, best estimate of what the need is on the ground. They've got their means of gathering the information based on the population studies, what they know about the population, what they know about the refugee flows in the area, and what they know, of course, about the amount of food that's been able to reach these particular locations.

Q: The impression I get after hearing all this, we certainly are going to continue the airdrops for an unspecified period. Are we going to expand this effort in combination with the Soviets?

A: The operation is continuing. The size of the operation is based on our discussions with UNHCR, in terms of what the needs are and where the best places are to go.

Q: Are they asking for an expansion of the program?

A: At this time, no, not that I'm aware of.

Q: But you do plan to expand them?

A: I haven't said yes or no. Right now we're doing...

Q: I know you haven't. That's why I keep asking.

A: If we expand it, we'll tell you.

Q: What are the plans for including other planes from other countries that have offered, the Turks, for instance?

A: As you know, we've discussed support and cooperation with nine countries. I'm not, at this point, at liberty to discuss them, but I can talk about the Russian offer.

U.S. European Command has identified members of a team who we expect will depart for Moscow within the next 24 hours. The team members include Rear Admiral John J. Mazach who is the Deputy Director of Plans and Policy at EUCOM. He's the team leader. Colonel Patrick Henry, who is the Vice Wing Commander of the 435th Air Wing at Rhein-Main. Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Walling who is a U.S. Air Force logistician. Chief Warrant Officer 3rd, Ken Studer, U.S. Army, who is a rigger expert. Lieutenant Colonel John O'Sullivan, U.S. Army, who is a staff officer and is supporting the team.

They plan to meet with officials from the International Cooperation Division of the Russian Committee for Civil Defense who will brief them on their operations and discuss their capability.

Specifically, they'll be talking about the aircraft, the cargo-carrying capacity of the designated aircraft, the range of operations for the aircraft, they'll talk about what kind of weather conditions the aircraft can operate in, the normal fuel consumption, the capacity, the specific type of fuel needs normal maintenance support that's required, the normal repair support that might be required, including the possibility of whether material needs to be transported from Russia, or whether repair and support aircraft capabilities exist out there. They'll talk about the cargo configurations, the type of pallet or bundle system that will be used by the aircraft, will be discussing whether this is compatible with our systems, talk about the limitation of the cargo capability based on the type of

cargo they might be dropping, can they drop certain kinds of cargo but not others, and the extent to which we can adapt our systems to work with theirs. They'll be talking to them about what kind of bundles they normally drop, what size pallets can they accommodate, what kind of delivery systems they use, what kind of rigging, what kind of parachutes, et cetera.

They'll also talk about the navigational methods used for pinpointing the drop locations. So there's a whole host of issues that we need to discuss with them.

Q: Number one, would they fly out of Rhein-Main? Is that the assumption now?

A: That is a possibility, but that's something that will be answered down the road.

Q: Will they drop their own equipment, or will they drop U.S. bundles?

A: That's the kind of thing we'll be discussing, but I think one of the assumptions is they'll be dropping international supplies. Maybe ours, maybe somebody else's. So we need to discuss what kind of systems they use.

Q: The basic coordination is their planes come in, their pilots fly from wherever, place undetermined, drop a load that might be ours, might be someone else's, and you just want to make sure that if there's this kind of interaction of the different components that it fits? In other words, if they use our bundles, their planes are capable of using our bundles? If they coordinate with UNHCR, that the drop points are as specified, and that they've got the same GPS system and so forth?

A: The same capability to find the drop site. That's a very good description of what we'll be discussing.

Q: Will these be in addition to the missions we're flying, or will they displace the American missions?

A: They may well be in addition. But again, UNHCR is kind of coordinating this whole effort in terms of where we drop, what kind of material we drop, what the needs are, what the size of the loads should be.

Q: Have you set any kind of target on when those drops might begin? Any kind of tentative...

A: We don't have a time frame. Obviously, soon hopefully. But...

Q: Are you discussing this with other countries also? You said other countries have also... The other eight countries...

A: We have discussions going on with other countries about various offers. Again, a lot of this is being done by UNHCR. They're really the coordinating agency.

Q: Is the key person in UNHCR who's being relied upon for...

A: They have a staff at Rhein-Main, who talk to their people in Sarajevo and other location and that's where the information flows from.

Q: But when you said that the assessment really involved talking to UNHCR, who are you talking about? Who did the U.S. talk to...

A: In terms of why we continued?

Q: ...don't quit.

A: The people in the former Yugoslavia. The UNHCR people on the ground are making the assessment that there are more supplies needed, more populations in need.

Q: Are there UNHCR people where we're dropping the food?

A: No. Not that I'm aware of. Otherwise we'd have better reporting I think at this point.

Q: Can the Pentagon offer any evidence that the airdrops are accomplishing the stated mission? You're hearing this cliché repeated often that the operation was a success, but the patient is dying. Are these efforts, on target or not, doing anything to bring about the goals stated about bringing the parties closer together for peace, getting the truck convoys moving, and having a political impact on the situation there?

A: Two parts to the question. One part is are we dropping where we want to drop? The answer is, we believe we are. We have no evidence, either hard or anecdotal, that we are missing our drop sites. The second part of it is, some of it is being recovered. At least we have anecdotal evidence that some of it is being recovered by the people who need it most. The next part of your question really is, is it having the other part of the effect that we want. I think it's in the mix of discussions that are going on, the mix of attitudes that are being formed about the peace process there in terms of convoys and allowing relief supplies to go, in terms of discussions they're having, but I can't really parse it out for you.

Q: Has this sort of veiled threat that was issued in this letter that was published by the Sert done anything to make you affect how you're handling this operation at all in terms of security or anything like that?

A: Not that I'm aware of. We, obviously, have security at Rhein-Main Air Base that we're operating out of.

Q: Is the Department of Defense involved in any way in the investigation of the bombing of the World Trade Center? Given the fact that Karadzic cited it as evidence of the dangers of involvement in Serbia?

A: U.S. military installations, as have other U.S. government installations, have taken the appropriate precautions that you have after any suspected terrorist incident.

Q: Where is this Mazach team, where are they going to fly from and where are they going to fly to? Where are these talks going to be taking place?

A: They'll be going to Moscow, and from Rhein-Main, I believe.

Q: When will they leave?

A: Within the next 24 hours, we expect.

Can I move to Somalia?

Q: Yes.

We're extremely pleased with the UN Secretary General's report to the United Nations Security Council on the operations in Somalia. The thrust of the report is consistent with what

we've been planning and discussing. The report talks about the plan for UNOSOM II and we hope that the resolution establishing UNOSOM II will be passed soon, perhaps as early as next week. That resolution will make possible the turnover of operations in Somalia from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

The Secretary General's report calls for a basic force of 20,000 troops with security responsibilities and with a mandate the same as the current UNITAF force. They'll be supported by some 8,000 troops performing support and logistical functions. The report also calls for as many as 2800 civilian personnel to perform nation building/refugee resettlement type activities.

To support UNOSOM II, the United States has promised to provide several thousand troops to perform logistical functions. They would be part of that 8,000 that I mentioned. We've also promised to provide a rapid reaction capability. That quick reaction force will remain under the command of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of Central Command.

The plans for the turnover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will, of course, depend upon the passage of, and the specific language in the resolution. However, I would note that the May 1st date cited in the press reports is more of an accounting date than a specific date for turnover.

General Montgomery, who is the Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II, will arrive in Somalia early next week. The new staff are arriving this weekend to beef up the UNOSOM staff that are already on the scene. Brigadier General Cox from Canada, who is the Chief of Staff of UNOSOM is already on the scene. Turkish Lieutenant General Bir, who will be the UNOSOM II commander, is expected to arrive shortly. They will all be working with General Johnston and his staff on the turnover.

The turnover is going to be done sector by sector. When General Bir and General Johnston agree that the security situation and the UNOSOM staffing meet their conditions for a smooth turnover. Some sectors will be turned over before May 1st, at least that's what we expect. Because those particular sectors are already under control of international troops who are staying to participate in UNOSOM II. Some other sectors that are still under U.S. control, or under the control of forces dedicated only to UNITAF, may not be turned over until after May 1st. In sum, there's not a magic date when the entire operation passes from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It's going to be a rolling process. The May 1st date is more, as I say, an accounting date. It has to do with the date that per diem is paid for troops that are dedicated to UNOSOM II. That's assuming that date is chosen in the resolution.

The U.S. commander of UNITAF will stay until the last UNITAF sector is turned over to UNOSOM II, and that should be in late May or June, we hope.

At some point during this process, the U.S. troops who are staying to provide logistical support to UNOSOM II will figuratively put on their blue hats, but frankly, I can't tell you a date when that's going to happen.

Q: So you look for the U.S. troops that are in there now, the preponderance of them, except for the few thousand who might stay, to be out by the end of May or perhaps early June, hopefully?

A: Sometime in May or June. But again, this is going to be an incremental drawdown of people as we turn over areas, turn over responsibilities.

Q: But the target to end it at some time in May or June hopefully is what you're saying.

A: June is probably the best, in terms of if you say ended by when General Johnston leaves or the UNITAF commander leaves.

Q: You went over it pretty fast, but did you say that the U.S. quick reaction force will remain under Central Command?

A: Yes.

Q: What's the purpose of that? Does that deprive the UN commander of any stinger in case of trouble?

A: The first point to make is that there are going to be 20,000 combat-ready troops there as part of the UNOSOM II plan. What we're saying is that we will leave a capable quick reaction force, sort of sized for the threat, that will stay and be available to UNOSOM if called upon.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: We're still working out those arrangements as well as the command arrangements.

Q: What was the approximate total number of U.S. forces that would remain past...

A: The figures 3,000 to 5,000 are pretty good ones.

Q: That would include quick reaction and the support?

A: Including quick reaction and support.

Q: You don't know what types of units will comprise...

A: Again, some of this is going to vary. One of the factors in the logistical contingent that we're leaving is we're still talking to countries about what they can supply. The UN is still negotiating with various countries who will be supplying forces to UNOSOM II. Some of those countries may want to contribute logistical troops. That will affect the number of people that we leave. That's why I give this broad range of 3,000 to 5,000.

Q: The quick reaction force, you weren't too concrete about whether it would be off shore or not. You don't mean in Somalia, right? You're talking about perhaps in a nearby country or off shore, but you're not talking about basing the quick reaction force in Somalia?

A: It's possible that it may stay in Somalia for some time, yes.

Q: This would be open-ended commitment? We have no end date of when...

A: That's something we're still discussing with the UN. Again, it depends a lot on the development of the security situation. Security is improving as we go along. We expect as the UN takes over, and as nation building begins, security will continue to improve.

Q: What would be the military mission of this quick reaction force, and what would its likely composition be?

A: They will be composed or equipped to deal with any kind of contingency we can foresee. They'll have attack helicopters as well as highly mobile ground troops.

Q: General Johnston, I was under the impression, was supposed to be coming home this week, and that our deadline for having a residual force there was mid-April, 5,000 troops. Has this been changed? I heard some objections from the Turkish government about taking control of the forces there.

A: As I say, General Bir will be going out shortly. There is no specific day when the whole country, all of a sudden, magically becomes UNOSOM II controlled. It's going to be sector by sector. The turnover will be sector by sector. So General Bir, at some point, will be, or UNOSOM II will be in charge of one sector, then two sectors, and so on and so forth until eventually UNITAF no longer has control of any sectors. It's just going to happen. But it's going to take place over a period of time, is the answer.

Q: That's an extended deadline, is it not? An extended planning deadline.

A: There has never been a specific timetable. It's the way we've always anticipated it happening.

Q: Is it the southern part now that remains the most troublesome? Is that the sector we continue to work in?

A: All of the sectors have their unique situations. I'm not sure I can point to any one particular sector.

Q: Kismayo and the south?

A: It's more a factor of Baidoa, we turned over to the Australians and they are staying, as far as I know. Kismayo, the Belgians are already there. We do have some U.S. troops who are there who are going to leave. They've been delayed because of disturbances in Kismayo, but I would imagine they would leave fairly soon, at which point the Belgians will have sole control of that area. So that's an area that's available to be turned over to UNOSOM II when the command stands up.

Q: In other words, you never did have a timetable for Johnston to leave the country and the Turkish general to take over? And it's going to extend now, more than likely, into May or June, is that right?

A: Yes, it's going to be a rolling turnover, sector by sector. The UNITAF commander's role will continue until UNITAF has said all the sectors which are under the command of UNOSOM II are under the command of General Bir.

Q: Johnston could be there, conceivably, then, as late as June?

A: Conceivably. I should say the UNITAF commander. It's always possible that might change. General Johnston is currently the commander.

Q: The U.S. quick reaction and U.S. logistical troops that will be left in Somalia, what logistical chores will the U.S. have? Will the U.S. be supplying transportation, MRE's? What kind of material...

A: There are certain unique capabilities that we have that a lot of countries don't have. A lot of countries aren't equipped, or don't normally deploy their forces overseas, so they don't have the kind of logistical capability inherent in their force that we do.

Q: Can you give us some idea?

A: Port handling, water purification, these kind of specialized functions. We also may well provide command and control and communications capabilities, intelligence capabilities. It's going to depend, frankly, on what the other countries offer when they offer of forces to the United Nations. Some are offering straight security forces, and some are offering logistical people. We're not sure what all those offers are yet. We're basically promising to fill the gaps.

Q: How many of the other countries is the U.S. supplying now?

A: Pardon?

Q: How many of the other countries that are there now in Somalia -- I think there are 22.

A: Something like that.

Q: How many of those countries are dependent on the U.S.?

A: I'm not sure that's relevant. The bulk of the troops come from a few of the countries. Is your question how many of the other troops of the 14,000-odd international troops that are there are self-sufficient?

Q: Right.

A: Why don't we try to take that question.

Q: A quick question about Bosnia just for a second. The Bosnian Muslims have requested that aid be flown into Tuzla, which they say is an airport in an area that they control. Is that under consideration at all?

A: I don't know the UNHCR's list, and I wouldn't want to speculate on future military operations.

Let me just mention one thing, though. I think we did the colonel a disservice when we were kibitzing from the peanut gallery here. Konjevici, the first night delivery was 28 bundles. The second night was 32. That makes a total of 120 bundles delivered -- 30, 30, 28, and 32.

Q: Can you give us a quick medical report on Secretary Aspin? Is he well, is he at home, is he...

A: He's here in the office. I talked to him a few minutes ago. He looks great to me.

Q: Is he conducting business on a regular schedule or a limited schedule?

A: He's got a pretty heavy schedule. I'm sure he's drawn it back slightly, and he's probably modifying it to a certain extent. I don't think he's playing any squash, for example.

Q: I understand an appearance on the Hill was canceled. Was that due to health reasons?

A: Today?

Q: Yes.

A: I'm not aware that he had an appearance scheduled.

Q: Wait a minute. He said four aircraft, eight bundles each. Eight times four is 32, right?

A: Thirty-two. He was right, though, the first flight was 28 bundles. The first night to Konjevici.

**Q: You mean the first night at Konjevici, and then the second night was 32.**

**A: Right.**

**Q: Because he said on the first night, four aircraft with eight bundles.**

**A: The first night was four planes times seven bundles. We can multiply, I just can't add.**

**Press: Thank you.**

**(END)**

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TEXT OF A U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENT APPROVED LATE WEDNESDAY ON THE RENEWED FIGHTING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA DURING A FORMAL MEETING CALLED BY THE UNITED STATES. THE STATEMENT WAS READ BY DON MCKINNON, NEW ZEALAND'S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOSE COUNTRY HOLDS THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY FOR MARCH

Released March 3, 1993

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The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric Beech, Melissa Bland, Will Dunham, Peter Ramjug and Paul Schomer also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For service problems call 1-800-435-0101.

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The Security Council, recalling all its relevant resolutions and statements, expresses its grave concern at and condemns the continuing unacceptable military attacks in eastern Bosnia and the resulting deterioration in the humanitarian situation in that region. It is appalled that even as peace talks are continuing, attacks by Serb paramilitary units, including, reportedly, the killing of innocent civilians, continue in eastern Bosnia.

In this connection the Security Council is particularly concerned about the fall of the town of Cerska and the imminent fall of neighboring villages. The Security Council demands that the killings and atrocities must stop and reaffirms that those guilty of crimes against international humanitarian law will be held individually responsible by the world community.

The Security Council demands that the leaders of all the parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina remain fully engaged in New York in a sustained effort with the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia to reach quickly a fair and workable settlement. In this connection, the Security Council also demands that all sides immediately cease all forms of military action throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, cease acts of violence against civilians, comply with their previous commitments including the ceasefire, and redouble their efforts to settle the conflict.

The Security Council further demands that the Bosnian Serb side, as well as all other parties refrain from taking action which might endanger the lives and well-being of the inhabitants of eastern Bosnia, particularly in the areas near the town of Cerska, and that all concerned allow the unimpeded access of humanitarian relief supplies through the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially humanitarian access to the besieged cities of eastern Bosnia, and permit the evacuation of the wounded.

Having determined in the relevant resolutions that this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council insists that these steps must be taken immediately.

The Security Council also requests the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to increase the U.N. Protection Force's presence in eastern Bosnia.

The Security Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to meet at any moment to consider further action.

END TEXT

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake, re: U.S. Response to the Serbian Offensive [duplicate of kh1700_004, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (2 pages)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)  
OA/Box Number: 1402

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1993

2008-0994-F  
ke5603

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# DRAFT

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued the following statement today:

"I said yesterday that we would have an assessment today on whether we should continue the current phase of airdrops in Bosnia. Based on this morning's assessment, the U.S. European Command, after consulting with the staff of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has recommended that the current phase of operation should continue for at least a while. I have concurred with this recommendation. The President's policy will be to continue to assess the situation in consultation with UNHCR and our allies. This will likely result in various phases -- some phases of airdrops and some phases of assessment. We will continue this policy while we press all the parties to live up to their commitments made in the London Conference to let ground convoys of food and medicine pass freely.

"Airdrops can never fully substitute for ground convoys, but they can make an unequivocal statement to the world of the international resolve to thwart the effort of some to use the denial of food and medicine as a tool of aggression. In that context, the willingness of the government of Russia to join the operations is particularly welcome and reflects a changed world in which old adversaries stand united in the effort to bring reason and human dignity to a volatile situation."

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. map	Provinces Proposed in UN Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, January 1993 [duplicate of kh1584_009, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)  
OA/Box Number: 1402

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1993

2008-0994-F  
ke5603

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. map	Controlled Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Early February 1993 [duplicate of kh1598_001, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (1 page)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)  
OA/Box Number: 1402

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1993

2008-0994-F  
ke5603

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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## Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina



## Ethnic Plurality in Bosnia and Herzegovina



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Military Developments, 19 March 1993 (1 page)	03/19/1993	P1/b(1)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)  
OA/Box Number: 1402

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia, 1993

2008-0994-F  
ke5603

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**RESTRICTION CODES****Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. map	Military Developments, 21 March 1993 [duplicate of kh1598_011, 2008-0994-F Segment 1] (1 page)	03/21/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)  
OA/Box Number: 1402

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1993

2008-0994-F  
ke5603

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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
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# Military Terrain of Former Yugoslavia



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake, re: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993 [duplicate of rs530_002, 2010-0533-M] (3 pages)	03/23/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)  
OA/Box Number: 1402

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1993

2008-0994-F

ke5603

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