

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia, 1995

Staff Office-Individual:

Staff Director-Soderberg, Nancy

Original OA/ID Number:

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49	1	4	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Re: [Military Situation in Bosnia] [duplicate of vz2763_007, 2013-0687-F] (4 pages)	09/17/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Bosnian Serb Compliance with Ceasefire Agreement (2 pages)	09/17/1995	P1/b(1)
002. paper	A Framework for A Cessation of Hostilities (2 pages)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1)
003. list	Re: [Options] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	[UNPROFOR Withdrawal] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
005. notes	Minutes - Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (15 pages)	05/17/1993	P1/b(1)
006. note	Handwritten notes: [Reports from Situation Room] (2 pages)	05/31/1995	P1/b(1)
007. note	Handwritten notes, re: [Bosnian Serbs] (1 page)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
008. note	Notes regarding UNPROFOR (2 pages)	06/02/1995	P1/b(1)
009. map	Notional NSC Map for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)
010. map	Notional NSC Map #2 for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)
011. map	Notional NSC Map #3 for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F

ke5602

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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012. map	Notional NSC Map #4 for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)
013. map	Selected Economic Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)
014. map	Notional OSD Map (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)
015. map	Contact Group's Peace Plan and Selected Economic Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)
016a. email	Robert Mally to Nancy Soderberg, et al., re: Bosnia human rights [with handwritten annotations] (1 page)	08/09/1995	P1/b(1)
016b. draft	Draft Statement by the Press Secretary [with handwritten annotations] (2 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)
017. talking points	Talking Points on Bosnia for Consultations with Key Allies (7 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)
018. table	[Economic Damage] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
019. table	[Air Support] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
020a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: NATO Concept of Operations for Implementing a Peace Plan (1 page)	10/00/1995	P1/b(1)
020b. paper	SACEUR's Concept of Operations (2 pages)	10/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force



17 September 1995



NOTE FOR: See Attached List

SUBJECT: Bosnian-Serb Compliance with
Cease-Fire Agreement



Please find attached a summary of available
information on the status of Bosnian Serb
Compliance with the cease-fire agreement.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "A. Norman Schindler".

A. Norman Schindler
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force



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003. list	Re: [Options] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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Gray, Wendy E.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Fried, Daniel; Pifer, Steven K.; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: State Analysis of Geneva Agreement [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, September 08, 1995 6:28PM

Attached drafted by State, provides useful material for backgrounders. Treat as "official use only" -- should not be distributed in writing.

<<File Attachment: B-H.DOC>>

"AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES"
FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

AN ANALYSIS

The "Agreed Basic Principles" to be signed at the Geneva Meeting are based on the plan worked out by the five nation Contact Group in the spring of 1994 and elaborated after that. The principles are a compromise among the parties and thus do not reflect the maximum positions of any of the sides. However, they incorporate fully the principles of democracy and national sovereignty which are the essential basis for a lasting peace. They also reflect the continued determination of the international community to preserve the existence of a single Bosnian state with an internal order based on recognized standards of human rights. They are also an important breakthrough towards concrete negotiations on the questions which have led to violence and warfare in the region. Major points of the document include:

1. Confirmation of the continued existence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its present borders with continuing international recognition. This agreement underlines the continuity of the current state. This is a permanent entity which will continue to be recognized by the international community. There is no carve-up or partition of Bosnia.
2. Agreement on the eventual 51-49% territorial split which has been one of the major points of conflict for more than two years.
3. Agreement that there will be two entities within the state, which will continue their own internal organization, but stipulates also that there shall be full and free elections and adherence to international standards of human rights, and provides for binding arbitration of disputes. In other words, the foundations for internal cooperation have been agreed by all parties.
4. Allowance for "parallel special relationships" with other countries, but only those consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of B-H. This means that Bosnian Serbs can develop close links with Serbia, but not at the cost of the existence of B-H itself.
5. Establishment of a number of common institutions to handle matters such as displaced persons, human rights, public corporations and national monuments. It is expected

that other common institutions will be established during the negotiating process.

A Break on Sanctions: The agreement also is important because of what it does not say about sanctions relief for the "FRY." Milosevic backed off from his earlier position seeking up-front sanctions relief. We have made clear that further sanctions relief can only occur when there is a signed peace agreement in Bosnia.

Overall Assessment: The Geneva document is an important milestone on the road to peace. It provides an agreed foundation for detailed negotiations, accepted by the three parties and sanctioned by the Contact Group. As such it enjoys both regional support and broad international backing.

Relations between the opposing communities will be difficult and tense for a long time to come. Agreement on these principles allows each community to maintain its identity, while preserving the common state. While this is short of the truly integrated model that many would have preferred, it provides a dynamic basis for stopping the fighting and allowing the communities to begin to work together. American commitments to work through NATO and other international institutions to help implement an eventual settlement, and a readiness to contribute to the economic reconstruction of the region, will be critical to the achievement of a lasting peace in Bosnia and the other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

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004. paper	[UNPROFOR Withdrawal] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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540-7

Reviewed contingency planning, hostages
+
open to supply eq

Status of F-16 don't know status

Perry + Nato contingency planning

meetings This weekend at which there
will be a discussion of a
RDF.

Be prepared to discuss ^{providing} ~~the~~ Mift +
eq: but the US will not
da contribute ^{troops} ~~to~~ such a force.

SB → Koppel

McLain/Legan
Reulich
McKenzie-VN
Diana Pierce
202-7000

1130

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 2, 1995

① The President met this afternoon for more than an hour with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military briefing on Bosnia. The Vice President, the National Security Adviser and the Chief of Staff were also present.

② Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili reviewed the most recent developments in Bosnia, including the loss of our F-16 in Deny Flight operations and the status of the UN personnel held by the Bosnian Serbs. They are following the search for the missing pilot closely and hope he will be located and returned home soon. They agreed that all those held by the Bosnian Serbs should be released immediately and unharmed.

③ They also updated the President on the contingency military planning for our long-standing commitment help in a NATO-led operation to assist UNPROFOR in a withdrawal should that some day become necessary, after consultations with Congress. In addition, they discussed how these plans could be adopted in the event of a request to NATO to assist in a possible reconfiguration or strengthening of UNPROFOR. They reiterated our policy that the U.S. would not provide ground troops to serve under UNPROFOR command or become combatants in the conflict.

They also discussed the approach the Secretary and the Chairman will take in meetings with Allied Ministers of Defense this week in Paris and next week at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We want to work with our allies to develop a strategy that will permit UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia and carry out its mission more effectively. This may require changes in its configuration, rules of engagement and mandate in order to enable the UN to carry out its mission in the face of Bosnian-Serb opposition. Maintaining an effective UNPROFOR presence remains our best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster in the region should they leave. Our ultimate objectives -- negotiated peace and stability in the Balkans -- are more likely if the international presence remains strongly in place.

Draft Statement by the Press Secretary

In addition, they also discussed how these plans could be adapted to request to assist in a possible reconfiguration or strengthening of UNPROFOR

The President met this afternoon for an hour (ch) with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military briefing on Bosnia. The Vice President and the National Security Advisor (others?) were also present.

Secretary Perry and General Shali ^{Kashiki} reviewed the most recent developments in Bosnia, including the loss of our F-16 in Deny Flight operations and the status of the UN personnel held by the Bosnian Serbs. [They are following the search for the missing pilot closely and hope he ~~is~~ located and home soon.] They agreed that all those held by the Bosnian Serbs should be released immediately and unharmed. ^{will be returned}

They also ^{updated the President on} ~~reviewed~~ the contingency military planning for our long-standing commitment help in a NATO-led operation to assist UNPROFOR in a withdrawal, [~~reconfiguration or strengthening of its forces~~] should that some day become necessary, after consultations with Congress. They reiterated our policy that the U.S. would not provide ground troops to serve under UNPROFOR command or become combatants in the conflict. (OR: They also reviewed the contingency military planning for our long-standing commitment to aid UNPROFOR in any extraction effort, or reconfiguration or strengthening of its forces, while declining to provide ground troops for ongoing peacekeeping missions.)

They also ^{discussed} ~~outlined~~ the approach the Secretary and the Chairman will take in meetings with Allied Ministers of Defense this week in Paris and next week at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We want to work with our allies to develop a strategy that will permit UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia and carry out its mission more effectively. ^{discussed} This may require changes in its configuration, rules of engagement and mandate in order to enable the UN to carry out its mission in the face of Bosnian-Serb opposition. ~~That course~~ remains our best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster in the region should they leave. Our ultimate objectives -- negotiated peace and stability in the Balkans -- are more likely if the international presence remains strongly in place.

(??Mention plans in principle to participate in a NATO-led implementation of a peace plan once all the parties to the conflict have signed a peace accord calling for such implementation and demonstrated their willingness to abide by it.)

[Maintaining an effective UNPROFOR presence]

in a possible reconfiguration or strengthening of UNPROFOR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. note	Handwritten notes, re: [Bosnian Serbs] (1 page)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F

ke5602

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. note	Notes regarding UNPROFOR (2 pages)	06/02/1995	P1/b(1)

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Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
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June 2, 1995

FYI

NOTE FOR TONY LAKE/**SANDY BERGER**

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Talking Points

Attached is press guidance for the Monday POTUS Larry King Live event. Obviously, we'll have to update Monday but Podesta's office wants to forward this now.

If you approve, I'll send the Bosnia points to agencies. You can use a basis for conference call for Sunday shows.

Foreign Policy Talking Points

Resources and American Leadership

Bosnia

North Korea

China MFN

Middle East Peace Process and Jerusalem

Trade with Japan

RESOURCES AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

American leadership and engagement abroad benefits the American people at home.

- Through GATT, NAFTA and other trade agreements, we have opened new markets for American business and created hundreds of thousands of new jobs.
- By maintaining the finest fighting force in the world, we have preserved the stability of vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf. In turn, we have protected the flow of oil that heats millions of American homes.
- By ending the military regime's reign of terror in Haiti, we gave democracy a second chance and halted the flood of refugees to our borders. That means fewer taxpayer dollars to support refugee camps or care for new immigrants.
- By promoting reform in Russia, we have helped democracy take root and reduced the nuclear threat. Maintaining stability in Russia helps ensure security throughout Europe and can save American resources and lives.
- By assisting Mexico in its recent financial crisis, we worked to stabilize our second largest trading partner. If the political and economic situation in Mexico were to explode, Americans would pay the price in increased illegal immigration, shrinking exports and fewer jobs at home.

- These accomplishments were possible because we worked together on a bipartisan basis for America's future. They reflect Arthur Vandenberg's call to "unite our official voice at the waters' edge," and recognize the need for America's leadership.

- Yet some in Congress and elsewhere want America to retreat -- to choose isolationism over engagement. They would radically revise the fundamentals of American foreign policy that have guided both parties since World War II.

- We must have a sustained bipartisan effort to ensure that we have the resources we need to maintain American leadership. Those who argue for a strong America have a responsibility to commit the resources to keep America strong.

- Foreign aid is a critical element of our national security strategy. It is a lot less costly -- in terms of money and human lives -- to support foreign aid than it is to send in U.S. troops.

- The price of conducting our foreign policy is, after all, not very high. Today, it's slightly more than one percent of the budget. And it's only one-fifth of what Americans believe would be about the right amount to spend.
- The United States spends less of its gross domestic product on aid than any other major industrial country -- we rank just behind Ireland.
- That one percent helps to dismantle nuclear weapons, saves lives by preventing famines, immunizing children and combating terrorists and drug-traffickers. It is a good investment.

HR 1561

- I will veto the bill now before Congress if it comes to my desk in its current form. It threatens my ability to protect and promote American interests abroad.
- The bill slashes resources used to keep America in a strong international leadership position and attempts to micromanage the Administration's ability to conduct and to manage foreign policy.
- We are committed to work with Congress for a bipartisan foreign policy but not at the price of unilateral disarmament of Presidential prerogatives and critical resources.
- We cannot accept the current attack on Presidential prerogatives, the attempt to reorganize the Executive Branch's foreign affairs agencies and the slashing of resources.
- Spend very little on resources for international programs. If we turn inward and away from the world, it will be far more expensive and threatening to our national security interests than if we fund programs that protect and promote our overseas interests.

BOSNIA -- Current Situation

Key Points

- For the past two and one half years, the United States has sought to contain and end the conflict; to help preserve the Bosnian state as a multi-ethnic entity; to keep faith with our NATO allies; and to relieve human suffering. To these ends, we have led NATO military responses to calls by the United Nations for assistance in the protection of its forces and the safe areas for the people of Bosnia; led efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement; deployed peacekeeping troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history.
- We are appalled by the Bosnian Serb behavior over the past two weeks. After the expiration of the cease fire last month, the Bosnian Serbs unleashed a series of attacks on the UN-protected Safe Areas. This culminated with the firing of more than a thousand shells on the civilians of Sarajevo. The United Nations felt compelled to ask for a NATO air response, which we supported. The Bosnian Serb response -- taking hostages and killing innocent civilians in renewed artillery attacks on the Safe Areas -- was labeled by the U.N. as "a return to medieval barbarism."
- We have been meeting with our NATO allies to consider the next steps toward resolving this crisis. Secretary Perry led our delegation to meetings in Paris over the weekend, where our allies reaffirmed their readiness to strengthen UNPROFOR. We support that process. We will not rule out the continued use of air power and remain prepared to act with NATO in response to requests from the UN commander in the field.

F-16 Shootdown

A U.S. F-16 aircraft participating in NATO Deny Flight operations over Bosnia was hit and shot down on Friday by a possible SA-6 radar guided surface to air missile (SAM). These operations have been conducted for two and a half years.

Search and rescue aircraft have been deployed, and efforts to locate and recover the pilot are underway.

Any speculation at this time on further actions would be premature, and could jeopardize sensitive activities in the region.

This is a delicate moment, and we hope that comments on Bosnia today can be as limited as possible.

Why didn't we change our policy given the recent increase in threats from the Bosnian Serbs?

We have been aware of the SAM threat environment from the outset of the operation. The SA-6 is an effective but relatively older system, and Deny Flight aircraft have been routinely employing countermeasures designed to enhance their chances of avoiding an SA-6 attack.

What is the SA-6 threat in Bosnia?

The SA-6 is a highly mobile SAM system, and the Bosnian Serbs frequently redeploy them throughout the area under their control.

The Bosnian Serbs are known to have SA-2 and SA-6 radar guided SAMs in their possession, as well as a variety of IR/heat seeking SAMs.

Will we retaliate?

Not appropriate to speculate.

If our planes are now coming under attack, will we continue to enforce the no-fly zone?

Yes.

Friday Shali/Perry Meeting

-- I met on Friday with Secretary Perry and Chairman Shalikashvili to review NATO contingency planning, the efforts to recover the pilot from our downed F-16 and the status of those held by the Bosnian Serbs.

Rapid Reaction Force

-- We also discussed the meetings in Europe this weekend at which, among other issues, there will be a discussion of a Rapid Reaction Force to Bosnia.

-- Secretary Perry and Chairman Shalikashvili will be prepared to discuss our providing lift and equipment to such a Force but the U.S. will not commit troops to such a Force.

U.S. Use of Ground Forces

- U.S. policy remains that we will not provide ground forces to serve under UNPROFOR command in Bosnia, and that we will not become combatants in the conflict.
- However, in support of the ongoing efforts to find a solution to the crisis in the Balkans, the United States has stated that, in principle, it is prepared to consider the use of ground forces under certain limited conditions. These are contingencies which have not yet arisen.

Peace Plan Implementation

- The U.S. is committed in principle to participate in a NATO-led implementation of a peace plan once all the parties to the conflict have signed a peace accord calling for such implementation and demonstrated their willingness to abide by it, and after review and approval of NATO's plans and Congressional consultations,

Withdrawal/Relocation/Emergency Extraction of UNPROFOR

- We have a long-standing commitment to help our NATO allies, some of whom have troops in UNPROFOR, to take part in a NATO operation to assist UNPROFOR in a withdrawal should that some day become necessary. If necessary, and after consultation with the Congress, we should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet an UNPROFOR request for help in a withdrawal or in a reconfiguration and strengthening of its forces. This follows a long-standing U.S. policy to aid UNPROFOR in any extraction effort, while declining to provide ground troops for ongoing peacekeeping missions. We are planning for contingencies which might involve:
 - a pre-planned NATO-assisted withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia, should the UN decide to terminate the UNPROFOR mission and request help from NATO;
 - an emergency extraction of all or part of the UNPROFOR forces, should their situation become so dire as to require troop contributing nations to seek assistance in rescue operations; and
 - assistance, if necessary, to relocate UNPROFOR units whose situation has become untenable to positions from which the UN could apply more

robust means of fulfilling its humanitarian missions.

- We are developing, with our allies through NATO, contingency military plans to be used should it become necessary to carry out any of these operations. Any such operation would be under NATO command, with ROEs, equipment and forces sufficient, in the opinion of U.S. military commanders, to assure that the operation could be carried out effectively and successfully.
- Our aim is not UNPROFOR withdrawal, but to give our Allies in UNPROFOR the confidence that they will have the means to withdraw or redeploy if their situation becomes untenable, so that they will have the resolve to strengthen their capabilities and remain in place.
- As I have made clear, we will not commit our troops to this conflict in the heart of Europe, nor join UNPROFOR. As Commander-in-Chief, I will carefully review any request for an operation involving the temporary use of our ground forces and fully consult with Congress.
- These contingencies are highly conditional: if, and only if, UNPROFOR decided to withdraw or reconfigure its forces, and if NATO then agreed to help UNPROFOR do so, we would be prepared to participate, after Congressional consultation.
- The facts are that UNPROFOR has not made a decision to reconfigure or redeploy its troops, and our hope is that they can maintain their presence in the eastern enclaves. Indeed, UNPROFOR contributing nations are moving toward strengthening their capabilities, not withdrawing, even from the eastern enclaves. This remains, therefore, a hypothetical case, but it is one that we, in prudence, wanted to begin thinking about and anticipating.

(If asked) ARG Deployments

- As a precautionary measure, some of our forces are relocating to assist in an emergency evacuation if necessary. Our actions include the deployment of the three-ship Amphibious Ready Group to the Adriatic and positioning the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt off the coast of Italy. We have made no decision to deploy our troops further, nor has there been any request for us to do so.

(If asked) Airstrikes

- Despite the subsequent actions of the Serbs, the airstrikes were a necessary decision.
- We cannot forget that the airstrikes were a reaction to the Pale Serbs' deliberate violation of their agreements with the UN, and their initiation of heavy shelling of Sarajevo using weapons that were supposed to be under UN control. 800-1,000 shells were hitting Sarajevo every day.

Future U.S. Participation in Deny Flight:

- U.S. aircraft have been participating in Deny Flight since its inception nearly two and a half years ago.
- This NATO operation began in response to UN requests to ensure the safety of planes flying in the humanitarian airlift. While it cannot ensure the airlift will continue in the face of ground threats such as those closing the Sarajevo airport, it has proven effective in virtually eliminating the use of combat aircraft by the warring parties in Bosnia. This makes it one of the few real success stories in the Balkan crisis.
- The U.S. fully intends to continue participating in this operation.

Future of UNPROFOR

- Our policy continues to be that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia. It remains our best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster in the region should they leave.
- Let us not forget that, despite the turmoil in Bosnia, tens of thousands of lives have been saved by this humanitarian mission. Our ultimate objectives -- negotiated peace and stability in the Balkans -- are more likely if the international presence remains strongly in place.
- We are working with our Allies to agree on measures to keep UNPROFOR in place: this may require changes in its configuration, rules of engagement and mandate in order to enable the UN to carry out its mission in the face of Bosnian-Serb opposition.

- The Secretary of Defense met with his counterparts from NATO and the UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations in Paris over the weekend to consider these options, and will meet again with his NATO counterparts later this week in Brussels.

(If asked) Negotiations

- The ultimate resolution of the war must, of course, be achieved at the negotiating table.
- We are currently pursuing two tracks with our Contact Group partners:
 - strengthening the options available to the UNPROFOR commanders in the field; while
 - negotiating Serbian President Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders, in order to further isolate the Pale Serbs.
- Toward this end, our talks with Serb President Milosevic, in connection with Contact Group efforts, are aimed at securing his recognition of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders in return for sanctions relief.
- In this way, we hope to convince the Bosnian Serbs that there is no support left for them. Their only realistic option is to accept the Contact Group plan for a peaceful negotiated settlement.
- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

NORTH KOREA

[Background: While talks continue in Kuala Lumpur, the North continues to press for potential deal-breaking offsetting concessions on the light-water project and to threaten to break the nuclear freeze by moving its spent fuel. Meanwhile, the South Koreans have grown increasingly anxious and rigid, making it more difficult to close a deal in Kuala Lumpur. The North threatened on Friday to break off the talks, but we expect informal contacts with the negotiators to continue.]

Points

- Our negotiators have been meeting with the North Koreans in Kuala Lumpur for the purpose of reaching agreement on the specifics of the light-water reactor project.
- We want to move ahead with replacing North Korea's dangerous nuclear program with one that can supply their legitimate energy needs.

Progress in Kuala Lumpur (If pressed)

- I do not want to get into specifics while negotiations continue.

South Korean insistence on its central role in the LWR project (If pressed)

- We agree with our South Korean allies that the only feasible light-water reactor project is one in which South Korea plays a central role.

CHINA MFN

Points

- We announced on Friday my decision to extend the waiver that makes China eligible for Most-Favored-Nation trade status.
- Last year, I judged that it was appropriate to de-link MFN from judgments about China's human rights policies both to enhance our overall relationship and because I felt that other tools should be used to advance the cause of human rights.
- I believed then, as now, that the United States and China must have a sound relationship, based on mutual respect and understanding, as we approach the 21st century. That is fundamentally in the long-range interests of both countries.
- My bottom line is that we have to stay engaged -- as difficult as that sometimes may be -- and continue to work toward resolving our differences, including on human rights.

Human Rights

- At the same time, I am determined to continue pushing for continued progress on a variety of human rights issues.
- I regret that China's human rights record has not improved over the past year. I am deeply concerned about the state of human rights in China, especially following the arrests and detention of additional people over the past few weeks.
- We continue to press the issue of human rights directly through the bilateral dialogue with China, including such issues as: prisoner releases, prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross and talks on Tibet between Beijing and the Dalai Lama.
- We have expanded Voice of America broadcasts to China, including Tibet and look forward to working with Radio Free Asia on expanding international programming.
- We have also used multilateral diplomacy -- for example in the UN Human Rights Commission -- to draw attention to human rights problems in China.

- In March, we worked closely with the European Union on a UNHRC resolution on human rights in China. After a "no action" motion was defeated -- for the first time -- the resolution failed to pass by only one vote.

- We consult closely with non-government organizations on human rights in China and continue to work with U.S. business firms and investors on voluntary business principles.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND JERUSALEM

Points

- Israel and Syria have reached agreement on a conceptual understanding on the issue of security arrangements.
- This is a very significant achievement; the first time Israel and Syria have come to agreement since the Madrid process began. It is an important step, but we still have a long way to go.
- We have worked hard to make this possible. Most recently I met with Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Shaara in order to help facilitate the discussions.
- I am committed to achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East. I believe that goal is within our grasp, but it will require considerable effort -- and accelerated movement -- by all parties. We will continue to do all we can to support and facilitate such progress.

Jerusalem

- We are committed to protecting the peace process. I am determined to do everything possible to prevent action on the sensitive issue of Jerusalem being taken outside the understandings reached in the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. That includes the Security Council or the U.S. Congress.
- We will also continue our efforts to contain the enemies of peace, whether terrorist organizations or state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran. They will not be allowed to succeed.

U.S. TRADE WITH JAPAN

[Background: After announcing the Administration's decision to impose 100% tariffs on luxury autos imported from Japan and to initiate a case against Japan's auto practices in the WTO, Japan initiated its own WTO case and called for immediate consultations. We are now in the process of working with the Japanese on the appropriate timing and modalities of those consultations.]

Points

- My Administration is committed to opening Japan's market to competitive foreign autos and auto parts. That's good for Japanese consumers, Japanese firms and American workers.
- Unfortunately, we have not been able to resolve our differences despite 20 months of talks.
- We continue to seek a negotiated solution to this problem, and Ambassador Kantor is now talking with the Japanese about scheduling those negotiations.
- That being said, we are prepared to take further action if no negotiated solution can be reached.
- Japan is a close friend and ally. We cooperate in a number of areas, including on a range of economic issues, where we already have signed 14 market-opening agreements. Still, we cannot afford to let the disparity that exists in our auto and auto parts trade -- a sector which accounts for 5% of U.S. GDP -- to continue.

D-R-A-F-T

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 2, 1995

The President met this afternoon for more than an hour with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military briefing on Bosnia. The Vice President, the National Security Adviser and the Chief of Staff were also present.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili reviewed the most recent developments in Bosnia, including the loss of our F-16 in Deny Flight operations and the status of the UN personnel held by the Bosnian Serbs. They are following the search for the missing pilot closely and hope he will be located and returned home soon. They agreed that all those held by the Bosnian Serbs should be released immediately and unharmed.

They also updated the President on the contingency military planning for our long-standing commitment help in a NATO-led operation to assist UNPROFOR in a withdrawal should that some day become necessary, after consultations with Congress. In addition, they discussed how these plans could be adopted in the event of a request to NATO to assist in a possible reconfiguration or strengthening of UNPROFOR. They reiterated our policy that the U.S. would not provide ground troops to serve under UNPROFOR command or become combatants in the conflict.

They also discussed the approach the Secretary and the Chairman will take in meetings with Allied Ministers of Defense this week in Paris and next week at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We want to work with our allies to develop a strategy that will permit UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia and carry out its mission more effectively. This may require changes in its configuration, rules of engagement and mandate in order to enable the UN to carry out its mission in the face of Bosnian-Serb opposition. Maintaining an effective UNPROFOR presence remains our best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster in the region should they leave. Our ultimate objectives -- negotiated peace and stability in the Balkans -- are more likely if the international presence remains strongly in place.

September 2, 1995

Proposed NATO/UN Statement

Mladic letter is not acceptable as basis to end NATO air strikes.

NATO will continue pause in air strikes for further 24-36 hours, subject to following:

- No Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas. If such attacks occur, pause will end immediately
- Bosnian Serbs begin withdrawal of Heavy Weapons from 20km total exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Further procedures to complete and verify withdrawal to be worked out with UNPROFOR HQ in Sarajevo and promptly implemented.
- Complete freedom of movement for UN and NGOs, and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport (with no requirement to comply with Bosnian Serbs' "normal procedures").

NATO and UN will assess Bosnian Serb compliance with these conditions on September 3. If compliance is not fully satisfactory, air strikes will resume immediately. If compliance is initially satisfactory but there is non-compliance later, air strikes will resume. July 21 London Declaration will remain in effect.

During the pause and, assuming Bosnian Serb compliance thereafter, NATO and UN will expect Bosnian Government forces to show restraint and not take advantage of the situation in and around Sarajevo.

During the pause, NATO aircraft will continue air patrols over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO aircraft will react immediately to any attack or display of hostile intent by Bosnian Serbs.

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009. map	Notional NSC Map for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. map	Notional NSC Map #4 for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
ke5602

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. map	Selected Economic Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. map	Notional OSD Map (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F

ke5602

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015. map	Contact Group's Peace Plan and Selected Economic Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 page)	08/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

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Bosnia/Croatia Hill Calls

- Wanted to give you a brief update on the situation in the former Yugoslavia.
- We support the U.N.'s effort to broker a cease-fire in Croatia between Croatian government forces and the Krajina Serbs. We are urging the parties in the region to show some restraint.
- We regret that the cease-fire appears to have broken down after combined Krajianan Serb and Bosnian Serb forces launched attacks on Croatian towns from across the border in Bosnia.
- It remains our position that Serb-majority areas in Croatia should be reintegrated into Croatia proper through political dialogue.
- This is consistent with our long-standing policy that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be resolved through negotiations, not on the battlefield.
- We remain concerned over the fate of Serb refugees fleeing into Bosnia from Croatia, and have called for U.N. and ICRC involvement in managing the new, large-scale refugee flows and responding to the needs of civilians.
- Over the weekend we were in touch with the Croatian government several times to urge restraint in the course of military action in Krajina, particularly with regard to treatment of civilians, POWs and international personnel.
- We have also urged the utmost restraint on the part of the authorities in Belgrade. It is critically important that fighting in Croatia not spark a wider Balkan war, which will only lead to more suffering and displacement.
- The President called several Allied leaders yesterday to review developments there and explore initiatives to invigorate diplomatic efforts. (IF ASKED: Major, Kohl and Chirac)
- Our Allies agree that we need to move ~~rapidly~~ on the diplomatic front in order to take advantage of the current situation in the region.

- [National Security Adviser Tony Lake will be traveling to Europe this week for consultations.]

BASIC POINTS

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia. These include:
 - to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
 - to prevent the spread of the conflict;
 - to help limit the loss of life;
 - and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
 - led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
 - has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
 - has participated in enforcing the No-fly Zone;
 - has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
 - and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.
- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR through the Rapid Reaction Force.
- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo
 - the humanitarian crisis would worsen;
 - we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
 - and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.
- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.
- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF; support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions; support the decisions on decisive use of NATO air power taken in London; and work for a peaceful settlement.
- With regard to mounting evidence that the Bosnian Serbs committed atrocities in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica, we have given our full support to international efforts to investigate the whereabouts of the missing and prosecute those guilty of crimes.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Charlotte, North Carolina)

For Immediate Release

August 9, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

During his mission to Central and Northeastern Bosnia last week, Assistant Secretary John Shattuck was presented with evidence of egregious human rights violations committed by Bosnian-Serb forces in the aftermath of their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. The Assistant Secretary heard eyewitness accounts of mass executions, beatings, rape, and other flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. To date, thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for.

The United States calls on the Bosnian Serbs to provide international humanitarian organizations access to all persons still being detained. Bosnian-Serb forces also must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown and not harm those who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught. The United States will continue its efforts to collect information on what is happening on the ground. All information will be turned over to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Such criminal actions must not and will not remain unpunished.

Since Assistant Secretary Shattuck's return, events in the former Yugoslavia have provided additional cause for concern. Tens of thousands of persons have been forced to flee their homes as the lines of confrontation have shifted, most recently in the Krajina region of Croatia. This has led to a refugee crisis of massive proportions. It is imperative that all parties respect the rights of these refugees and displaced persons and, in particular, that access to this population be granted to international humanitarian organizations.

The United States has urged and will continue to urge all parties in the former Yugoslavia to show restraint and, most importantly, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. The United States is making these concerns

(more)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016a. email	Robert Mally to Nancy Soderberg, et al., re: Bosnia human rights [with handwritten annotations] (1 page)	08/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
ke5602

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016b. draft	Draft Statement by the Press Secretary [with handwritten annotations] (2 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F

ke5602

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Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Saunders, Richard M.
To: Berger, Samuel
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: Corrected version of draft talking points
Date: Wednesday, August 09, 1995 4:33PM

<<File Attachment: CROATIA.DOC>>

DRAFT

MEMO FROM: Mr. Leon Fuerth

MEMO FROM: Mr. Samuel Berger

SUBJECT: Draft Talking Points on Croatia

Allegations of Croatian Ethnic Cleansing

I feel strongly about this issue and want to make several points:

- The United States urges all sides to respect the human rights of civilians, prisoners of war, and international monitors.
- The Serb refugee flow from the Krajina is a tragedy, and we support the efforts of international relief agencies to assist needy refugees now in Bosnia.
- Croatia should encourage Serbs who remain, or those who want to return, that it is safe to do so and their rights will be protected.

With regard to allegations of Croat abuses of Serb civilians:

- In recent days, there have been reports that Croatian forces or their allies in Bosnia have shelled villages, bombed or shot Serb refugees, and looted and burned some villages.
- The available information regarding specific incidents is still incomplete.
- We are trying to confirm incidents, clarify details, and assign responsibility.
- As of now, I do not believe the Croatian Government has a policy of ethnic cleansing.
- By ethnic cleansing, I mean a grand strategy for expelling the indigenous population from their homes to "purify" the area.
- If it is verified that Croatian forces are involved in abuses, the United States will condemn these actions as we have in the case of Serbia.

We do not equate the incidents in Croatia in past days with Serb actions in Bosnia over the past several years:

- Many Bosnian Muslims who tried to remain in areas outside the Bosnian Government's control were killed or driven from their homes.
- Serbia waged an intentional and systematic campaign of purifying areas as their military advanced.
- International agencies experienced difficulty and delays in gaining access to Serb-captured areas in Bosnia while ethnic cleansing was occurring.

Evidence available to date on incidents in the Krajina does not indicate Croatia used a Serb-style campaign of ethnic cleansing:

- The Krajina Serb population immediately fled to Bosnia rather than remain in Croatia.
- Moreover, Croatia has promised the International Red Cross access to prisoners.

By no means do I want to:

- Minimize the suffering of those who have fled their homes.
- Turn a blind eye toward any violation of human rights or standards of warfare that may have occurred.

However, it is important to place recent events in Croatia in their proper perspective relative to Serb actions in Bosnia.

Bosnia/Croatia Hill Calls

- Wanted to give you a brief update on the situation in the former Yugoslavia.
- Although the Croatian offensive into the Krajina appears to have accomplished most of its objectives, it remains our position that Serb-majority areas in Croatia should be reintegrated into Croatia proper through political dialogue.
- We are continuing to urge the parties in the region to show restraint.
- This is consistent with our long-standing policy that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be resolved through negotiations, not on the battlefield.
- The Administration has been working over the past several weeks on a set of ideas designed to advance the peace process in the Balkans.
- These ideas have been discussed repeatedly among Deputies, Principals and with the President. All of the relevant national security departments and agencies were involved.
- The discussions have included consideration of the future of UNPROFOR, our long-term objectives in the region, and possible diplomatic initiatives.
- Based on these discussions, we have begun a process of consultation with our Allies and others involved in the Balkan crisis to seek renewed progress toward a settlement.
- As part of this process, the President has spoken with Prime Minister Major, President Chirac, and Chancellor Kohl.
- He has also asked National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to travel to Europe this week for further elaboration of our ideas. He will be accompanied by Under Secretary of State Tarnoff and other officials from State, OSD, and the NSC.

- (IF ASKED: Their itinerary will include follow-up to the President's conversations with stops in London, Bonn and Paris. Re: Additional Lake stops/Russia. No plans to do so.)
- We have been in touch with the Croatian government frequently to urge restraint in the course of military action in Krajina, particularly with regard to treatment of civilians, POWs and international personnel.
- We have also urged the utmost restraint on the part of the authorities in Belgrade. It is critically important that fighting in Croatia not spark a wider Balkan war, which will only lead to more suffering and displacement.
- We remain concerned over the fate of Serb refugees fleeing into Bosnia from Croatia, and have called for U.N. and ICRC involvement in managing the new, large-scale refugee flows and responding to the needs of civilians.

Croatia Update

- We support the UN's efforts to broker a cease-fire in Croatia between Croatian government forces and Krajina Serbs.
- We regret that the cease-fire appears to have broken down after combined Krajian Serb and Bosnian Serb forces launched attacks on Croatian towns from across the border in Bosnia.
- It remains our position that Serb-majority areas in Croatia should be reintegrated into Croatia proper through political dialogue.
- This is consistent with our long-standing policy that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be resolved through negotiations, not on the battlefield.
- We remain concerned over the fate of Serb refugees fleeing into Bosnia from Croatia, and have called for UN and ICRC involvement in managing the new, large-scale refugee flows and responding to the needs of civilians.
- Over the weekend we were in touch with the Croatian government several times to urge restraint in the course of the military action in Krajina, particularly with regard to treatment of civilians, POWs and international personnel.
- We have also urge the utmost restraint on the part of the authorities in Belgrade. It is critically important that fighting in Croatia not spark a wider Balkan war, which will only lead to more suffering and displacement .
- With regard to mounting evidence that the Bosnian Serbs committed atrocities in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica, we have given our full support to international efforts to investigate the whereabouts of the missing and prosecute those guilty of crimes.

BOSNIA

Key Points

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:
 - to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
 - to prevent the spread of the conflict;
 - to help limit the loss of life;
 - and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
 - led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
 - has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
 - has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
 - has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
 - and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.
- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.
- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo
 - the humanitarian crisis would worsen;
 - we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
 - and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.
- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.
- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions, support the decisions on decisive use of NATO air power taken in London. and work for a peaceful settlement.

Unilateral Lift Resolution

- **Unilateral lift of the arms embargo will force withdrawal of UNPROFOR requiring the United States to send ground troops to Bosnia. The inevitable debate over responsibility for this will hurt our nation.**
- **It will severely undermine NATO and lead to American responsibility for the outcome of the war in Bosnia.**
- **Unilateral lift will make it harder to defend Gorazde and increase the risk of a wider war.**
- **Supporting a strengthened United Nations Mission is our best course to a negotiated peace.**
- **We should test this course of action. If fails, UNPROFOR should withdraw.**

Current situation in Bosnia unacceptable

Three alternatives:

1. Massive NATO commitment, including U.S. ground forces.
2. Unilateral lift of arms embargo
3. Strengthen United Nations mission to protect Bosnian safe areas against Serbs.

Alternative 1: Massive NATO commitment, including U.S. ground forces.

- Hard to justify
- No public support

Alternative 2: Unilateral lift of arms embargo.

- Leads to introduction of U.S. ground forces as United Nations mission withdraws. We must meet our commitment to our NATO allies.
- Means unilateral responsibility because the U.S. will bear the burden after Allied troops withdraw.
- Increases chances for wider Balkan conflict, affecting heart of Europe and beyond.
- Increases chances of Serb victory. They will not rest as Moslems rearm.
- Sets back chances for a negotiated peace.
- Gives other nations excuse to ignore UN arms embargoes/resolutions they don't like.

Alternative 3: Strengthen United Nations mission, with serious commitment to NATO power.

- Has produced results, as peace in much of central Bosnia shows. Mladic statement on Gorazde.
- Allows stronger UN mission to protect safe area.
 - Rapid Reaction Force deployed.
 - Allies agreed to use NATO air power if Serbs attack Gorazde. Working on extension to other safe areas.
 - Allies can expand this formula to other safe areas.
 - “Dual key” system streamlined, in military hands.
- Keeps humanitarian aid flowing.
- Best creates conditions for limited war and negotiated peace.

House Action on Lift

Q: What next after House passage of the Dole resolution?

- I am disappointed in the House vote.
- Our current efforts to strengthen UN and NATO response to Serb aggressive behavior should be given chance to work.
- The resolution has been sent to the White House. I will veto it.
- I expect it will be sustained.

NAC Meeting/Follow-Up to London Conference

- We are very pleased by the decision by the NAC on August 1, which extended the threat of decisive air strikes previously adopted for Gorazde to the other safe areas -- Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla.
- This is a further demonstration of the NATO Alliance's resolve to halt Serb aggression, to help strengthen the effectiveness of the UN Mission in Bosnia, and to reestablish conditions that could lead to a political settlement.
- Under the NATO decisions, any Bosnian Serb attack on the safe areas will be met with a substantial and decisive response by NATO air power, going beyond the limited strikes conducted previously, if the Serbs defy our warning.
- These policies are working: Since July 21, 10 convoys have reached Sarajevo and five have reached Gorazde.

Dual Key

- Welcome decision by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to delegate his "key" to the UN force commander, General Janvier, who may in turn delegate authority to the appropriate subordinate commander on the ground. This is significant breakthrough.
- Allies took this decision fully aware of risks that the Bosnian Serbs would seek to respond as they have in the past by taking hostages, but agreed that our policy would not be held hostage to hostage-taking.
- The NATO decisions go hand in hand with the other decisions at last month's London conference, most importantly, the use the Rapid Reaction Force to take decisive action to ensure access to Sarajevo for delivery of humanitarian aid and resupply of UN forces.

UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: You have said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave. Do you expect UNPROFOR to leave?

- No. We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.
- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serb actions to interfere with its mission. No more business as usual.
- This view was fully supported by the London conference and by the subsequent decisions at NATO.

Contact Group/Sanctions Relief

Q: Is Contact Group going to endorse lifting additional sanctions on Belgrade? How can you even consider this after recent Serb offensives and ethnic cleansing?

- Contact Group met July 26 with EU negotiator Carl Bildt in London to discuss status of negotiations with Milosevic on recognition of Bosnia.
- We continue to believe mutual recognition and serious measures to seal Serbia's border with Bosnian Serb areas could be basis for suspension of some economic sanctions on Belgrade.

- Still many issues to be resolved, including mechanism for reimposing sanctions if Milosevic does not fulfill his commitments.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

- We have consulted with Congress on my intention to provide \$32 million of transportation and equipment support. I have signed three Determinations authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transpiration support to the allies and an initial package of \$3 million of equipment, as well as an additional \$17 million of goods and services -- primarily for equipment.

Bosnia Meetings

TL's Breakfast Meetings

July 17
July 19
July 27
August 2

POTUS meetings

August 2
August 7
August 8

Deputies Committee Meetings

July 11
July 12
July 22
July 24
July 25
July 26
July 27
July 28
August 2
August 3
August 4
August 5

Principals Meetings

June 6
July 14
August 1

Bosnia Meetings

TL's Breakfast Meetings

July 17
July 19
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August 2

POTUS meetings

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Deputies Committee Meetings

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Principals Meetings

June 6
July 14
August 1

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
017. talking points	Talking Points on Bosnia for Consultations with Key Allies (7 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
ke5602

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
018. table	[Economic Damage] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
ke5602

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
019. table	[Air Support] (2 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
ke5602

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

Statement by the President

I am announcing today my decision to veto legislation that would unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I know that members of Congress share my goals of reducing the violence in Bosnia and working to end the war. But their vote to unilaterally lift the arms embargo is the wrong step at the wrong time. The American people should understand the consequences of such action for our nation and for the people of Bosnia.

- First, our Allies have made clear that they will withdraw their troops from Bosnia if the United States unilaterally lifts the arms embargo. The United States, as the leader of the NATO Alliance, would be obliged to send thousands of American ground troops to assist in that difficult operation.
- Second, lifting the embargo now could cause the fighting in Bosnia to escalate. The Serbs will not delay their assaults while the Bosnian Government receives new arms and training. Getting humanitarian aid to civilians will only get harder.
- Third, unilaterally lifting the embargo will lead to unilateral American responsibility. If the Bosnian government suffered reverses on the battlefield, we -- and not the Europeans -- would be expected to fill the void with military and humanitarian aid.
- Fourth, intensified fighting in Bosnia would risk provoking a wider war in the heart of Europe.
- Fifth, for this bill to become law now would undercut the new diplomatic effort we are currently engaged in, and withdrawal of the United Nations mission would virtually eliminate chances for a peaceful, negotiated settlement in the foreseeable future.
- Finally, unilateral lift would create serious divisions between the United States and its key allies, with potential long-lasting damage to the NATO alliance.

This is an important moment in Bosnia. Events in the past few weeks have opened new possibilities for negotiations. We will test these new realities and we are now engaged with our allies and others in using these opportunities to settle this terrible war by agreement. This is not the time for the United States to pull the plug on the UN mission.

There is no question that we must take strong action in Bosnia. In recent weeks, the war has intensified. The Serbs have brutally assaulted three of the United Nations safe areas. Witnesses report widespread atrocities -- summary executions, systematic rape and renewed ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Tens of thousands of innocent women and children have fled their homes. And now the Croatian Army offensive has created new dangers and dramatically increased the need for humanitarian aid to deal with displaced citizens in the region. But these events also create opportunities.

Along with our allies we have taken a series of strong steps to strengthen the United Nations mission, to prevent further attacks on safe areas and to protect innocent civilians:

- NATO has decided it will counter an assault on the remaining safe areas with sustained and decisive use of air power. Our response will be broad, swift and severe, going far beyond the narrow attacks of the past.
- For the first time, military commanders on the ground in Bosnia have been given operational control over such actions, paving the way for fast and effective NATO response.
- And well-armed British and French troops are working to ensure access to Sarajevo for convoys carrying food, medicine and other vital supplies.

Despite these actions many in Congress are ready to close the books on the UN mission. But I am not -- not as long as that mission is willing and able to be a force for peace once again.

I recognize that there is no risk-free way ahead in Bosnia. But unilaterally lifting the arms embargo will have the opposite effects of what its supporters intend. It would intensify the fighting, jeopardize diplomacy and make the outcome of the war in Bosnia an American responsibility.

Instead, we must work with our allies to protect innocent civilians, to strengthen the United Nations mission, to bring NATO's military power to bear if our warnings are defied and to aggressively pursue the only path that will end the conflict -- one that leads to a negotiated peace.

FURTHER AGREED PRINCIPLES

4. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

4.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights that enhance and empower the democratic election process.

4.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree to which (a) displaced persons are being enabled to regain possession of their homes and other property, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

4.3 As soon as the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct simultaneous elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

5. Following the simultaneous elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be headed by a three-person Presidency representing the three principal constituent peoples, with each of the three members being elected by the appropriate newly-elected parliamentary body. The office of Chairman and Head of State will be rotated annually among the three members.

5.1 Among the responsibilities of the Presidency will be foreign relations, foreign trade, customs administration, monetary system administration, and such other activities as the parliamentary bodies of the two entities may agree upon as being mutually beneficial (such as, for example, immigration regulation, international criminal enforcement, establishment and operation of common transportation and communications facilities, utilization of energy resources, air traffic control, and cooperative economic projects). The Presidency may appoint a cabinet of appropriate ministers to assist the Presidency in executing its duties.

5.2 All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one member disagrees with a decision taken by the other two and declares that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from which the dissenting member was elected, the matter will be referred immediately to that entity's parliament, which may determine by a

two-thirds vote that the challenged decision will not be applicable to that entity.

6. As a result of the elections there will be created a new Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 36 members, 24 elected by the newly-elected legislature of the Federation and 12 elected by the newly-elected legislature of Republica Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority vote includes at least four votes from each entity.

6.1 The legislature will make such laws as it deems appropriate on subjects within the authority of the Presidency, as indicated in Paragraph 5.1.

7. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be financed by the Federation and the Republica Srpska.

SCHEDULE (9/19/95-Belgrade 17:15)
Travel of A/S Richard C. Holbrooke Delegation

Tuesday, September 12

2000 Depart Andrews AFB
2045 Arrive JFK to pick up Ambassador Holbrooke
2130 Depart JFK General Aviation Terminal
(718)244-3800 (POC Mr. Dalo)

Wednesday, September 13

0815 Arrive Shannon for refueling
0900 Depart Shannon
1305 Arrive Belgrade
1600 Meeting with President Milosevic
RON Belgrade - Hyatt Hotel

Thursday, September 14

0830 Depart Belgrade
0915 Arrive Zagreb
1000 Meeting with Gen. Janvier UNPROFOR
1130 Meeting with Pres. Tudjman
1345 Depart Zagreb
1430 Arrive Split
1500 Depart via Vehicle Convoy to Mostar
1830 Arrive Mostar
1845 Meet with BH Government
RON Mostar

Friday, September 15

0900 Meeting with BH Government cont.
1130 Depart for Split via UN Helicopter
1220 Arrive Split
1250 Depart Split
1430 Arrive Geneva
1730 Quad meeting at UK Mission
1830 Bi-lat with Ivanof -Russian Mission
1900-2230 Contact Group working dinner at Russian Mission
TBD Formal Press Conference at Russian Mission
RON Geneva - Inter Continental

Saturday, September 16

1230 Depart Geneva
1415 Arrive Belgrade
1600 Meet with Milosevic
TBD RON Belgrade - Hyatt

Sunday, September 17

0730 Depart Belgrade
0820 Arrive Zagreb
0900 Meeting with Tudjman (RCH)
0900 Meeting with Granic (Hill & Owen)
0900 Meeting with Susak (Pardew, Kerrick, & Clark)
1030 Meeting with Janvier (Delegation)
1130 Depart Zagreb
1240 Arrive Ancona
1340 Depart Ancona (US C-130)
1425 Arrive Sarajevo
1430 Meet with Carl Bildt at airport lounge
1500 Meeting with President, Prime Minister, Minister
Muratovic and FM at Presidency Building
Press Conference to follow
1600 Meeting with Gen. Smith and Chief UN Mission
Pedayue at Unprofor HQ
1700 Return to Presidency - Press
Conference/Announcement
1710 Depart for Sarajevo Airport
1730 Depart Sarajevo (YAK 40)
1900 Arrive Zagreb
1925 Depart Zagreb (C20)
2000 Arrive Belgrade
2200 Meeting with Pres. Milosovic at Villa
RON Belgrade Hyatt

Monday, September 18

0900 Meeting at US Embassy
1030 Meeting with Milosovic at Presidency
1300 Depart Belgrade
1350 Arrive Zagreb
1500 Meeting with General Janvier at UNPROFOR HQ (RCH)
1830 Meeting with Granic and Susak at Amb. Residence
2200 Meeting with Sacirbey, Delic and Amb. Tranka
at Interconti Hotel
RON Intercontinental Hotel

Tuesday, September 19

0930 Meeting with Bosnian and Croation Officials cont.
1330 Meeting with Pres. Izetbegovic and Pres. Tudjman
1600 Depart Zagreb
1650 Arrive Belgrade
1730-1830 Meeting with Milosovic
1900 Depart Belgrade (3+10 enroute)
2110L Arrive Shannon-Refuel
2155L Depart Shannon (6+40 enroute)
2335L Arrive NY drop off RCH

Wednesday, September 20

0020L Depart NY
0100L Arrive Andrews AFB

**STATEMENT ATTRIBUTABLE TO A SPOKESMAN FOR THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS**

Following an agreement signed in Belgrade today by Bosnian Serb military and political leaders, in which they committed themselves to withdraw their heavy weapons from the 20km exclusion zone around Sarajevo, NATO and United Nations military commanders have judged this to be an appropriate response to the demands by the United Nations. Consequently, they have announced a three-day suspension in NATO air operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the end of this three-day period, NATO and UN commanders will assess the level of Serb compliance with their undertakings. Failure to comply, or attacks on the other safe areas, will lead to the resumption of air operations.

During the suspension, and on the basis of a similar commitment by the Serbs, humanitarian convoys will travel to Sarajevo on two roads through Serb territory that hitherto have been closed.

It is also expected that Sarajevo airport will shortly be re-opened without restrictions.

New York
14 September 1995

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, OCTOBER 5, 1995

The undersigned agree as follows:

1. Commencing on the effective date defined in Paragraph 2 below, the parties will implement a cease-fire throughout all territory within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina by terminating all hostile military activities and by implementing the other provisions of this agreement.

2. The cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on October 10, 1995, provided that at that time full gas and electrical utility service shall have been restored in the city of Sarajevo; otherwise, the cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on the day following such restoration.

3. In order to allow for the negotiation and the commencement of the implementation of a Peace Agreement, this cease-fire will last for 60 days or until completion of Proximity Peace Talks and Peace Conference, whichever is later.

4. Pursuant to the cease-fire obligation, on the effective date all parties will immediately ensure that all military commanders issue and compel compliance with clear orders precluding (a) all offensive operations, (b) patrol and reconnaissance activities forward of friendly positions, (c) all offensive weapons' firings including sniper fire, (d) the laying of additional mines, and (e) the creation of additional barriers or obstacles.

5. Upon the effective date all parties will immediately ensure (a) that all civilians and prisoners will be treated humanely and (b) that all prisoners of war will be exchanged under UNPROFOR supervision.

6. Commencing on the effective date the parties will cooperate with the cease-fire monitoring activities of UNPROFOR and will immediately report violations to appropriate UNPROFOR authorities.

7. Commencing on the effective date all parties will provide free passage and unimpeded road access between Sarajevo and Gorazde along two primary routes (Sarajevo-Rogatica-Gorazde, Belgrade-Gorazde) for all non-military and UNPROFOR traffic.




8. During the period of the cease-fire, the undersigned will fully honor the obligations undertaken through the Geneva Agreed Basic Principles of September 8, 1995, the Framework Agreement of September 14, 1995, and the Further Agreed Principles of September 26, 1995, including (without limiting the generality of the foregoing) the obligation to afford all persons freedom of movement and all displaced persons the right to return home and repossess their property.

For the Republic of
Bosnia-Hercegovina:

pph

For Republika Srpska:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Radovan Karadzic', written over a horizontal line. The signature is highly stylized and cursive.

For the Federation of
Bosnia-Hercegovina:

Witness:

John Menzies
U.S. Ambassador

Witness:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Slobodan Milosevic', written over a horizontal line. The signature is highly stylized and cursive.

Slobodan Milosevic

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For the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina:

A. Felber
5. Oct. 1995

For the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina:

A. Felber
(za g. Zubra)
5. Oct. 1995.

Witness:

John Menzies

John Menzies
U.S. Ambassador

[Handwritten signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7507
NS-FYI re WJPD
WJPD 10/12

October 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: JOHN FEELEY *JF*
SUBJECT: NATO Concept of Operations for Implementing a
Peace Plan

The attached information memorandum to the President describes the NAC's approval of the NATO concept of operations for implementing a peace plan; describes the purpose of the concept; corrects erroneous press reports; and outlines next steps.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A DOD Summary of Concept of Operations

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *LOE* NARA, Date *1/20/03*
2008-0994-F-2

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

JF

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
020a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: NATO Concept of Operatiosn for Implementing a Peace Plan (1 page)	10/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
ke5602

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
020b. paper	SACEUR's Concept of Operations (2 pages)	10/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Staff Director (Soderberg, Nancy)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, 1995

2008-0994-F
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