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To: nancy soderberg

From: jill schuker

Re: Bosnia Fact Sheets

12:30 PM, THURSDAY

CC. Vershbow, Daalder

fyi, HERE IS THE FINAL DRAFT FROM STATE AND THE CIA. YOU HAVE MY EARLIER MEMO WITH THE QUESTION PENDING WITH STATE RE: USE OF THE CIA DOCUMENT. I ASSUME YOU WANT TO GET THIS TO TL DIRECTLY. PLEASE GET BACK TO ME URGENTLY. FUERTH, PER TL CONVERSATION WITH HIM, HAS COPY AS WELL.

11/9

TB R -

This will be part of a package that will include:

short memo + key questions (Jill/Blinken/ghw/mtw finishing)

key POWS/wc statements.

We'd like your OK on this so we can print before holiday tonight. would go to press + Hill

MS.

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #1

American Leadership: Key to Peace

- Thanks to President Clinton's leadership, we now have the best chance for peace in Bosnia since the war began four years ago. Continued American leadership is vital if we are to seize that chance and stand up for what's right—for the people of Bosnia, for Europe, and for the United States.

Securing the Peace in Bosnia Serves American Interests

- Stop the War from Spreading: Securing peace will prevent a war we have managed to contain from spreading into neighboring nations and igniting an even larger conflict. The former Yugoslavia borders key NATO allies and struggling new democracies—many of which have ethnic problems of their own. Today, violent exploitation of ethnic nationalism is the biggest threat to stability in Europe. Widespread conflict in Europe would threaten our security and require a far more costly American intervention.
- Help Create a Europe at Peace: The United States fought two world wars and a Cold War in Europe to defend freedom and advance the vision of an undivided, peaceful, democratic Europe. Securing peace will bring us one step closer to realizing that vision, with all the benefits it would bring for America's long-term security and prosperity.
- End the Suffering: Securing peace will end the terrible toll of this war—in innocent lives lost and futures destroyed. Over the past four years, the people of Bosnia have suffered the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II: ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, mass executions, systematic rape and terror, and terrible shortages of food, medicine, shelter, and heat. The best way—the only way—to stop these horrors for good is to secure peace.

Securing Peace in Bosnia Requires American Leadership

- American Leadership Is Key to Peace: The progress we have made toward peace has been the result of American leadership. NATO's bombing campaign—led by American pilots and their crews—stopped Bosnian Serb attacks against Sarajevo and other safe areas. The Contact Group's determined diplomacy—led by America's negotiating team—brought the parties to the peace table. If a peace agreement is signed, NATO must help secure it, and America, as NATO's leader, must take part in such an operation if it is to succeed..
- If America Doesn't Lead, the Job Won't Get Done: The burdens of American leadership are real—but its benefits are even greater: a reduced nuclear threat, democracy in Haiti, peace breaking out in the Middle East and Northern Ireland. In Bosnia, as elsewhere around the world, if America does not lead, the job will not get done. When President Clinton met with Pope John Paul II in September, the Pope ended their meeting by saying: "I have lived through most of this century. The 20th Century began with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let the 20th Century end with a war in Sarajevo."

November 1995

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #2

The Road to Dayton

- The international community is united in its desire to see the Balkan conflict resolved at the negotiating table. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and other nations, acting separately and in groups, have attempted to resolve the Balkan conflict through negotiations since it began in 1991.
- In October 1992, European Union mediator Lord David Owen and UN mediator and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposed a draft constitution organizing Bosnia into a decentralized federation. This became known as the "Vance-Owen" plan.
- In February 1993, President Clinton, at the beginning of his Administration, named the first U.S. special envoy to UN-EU joint negotiations, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew. In May 1993, U.S. efforts helped gain the parties' agreement to the Vance-Owen plan, but The Bosnian Serbs subsequently renounced the accord.
- In early 1994, with UN-EU efforts bogged down, the United States decided to undertake more active involvement, seeking to back diplomacy with the threat of NATO air power in protecting safe areas and UN peacekeepers.
- In March 1994, the new United States special envoy, Ambassador Charles Redman, and other U.S. officials led negotiations between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats which resulted in a cease-fire, the formation of a bi-communal Federation, and improved relations with neighboring Croatia.
- Later in the spring of 1994, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany established a five-nation Contact Group, with the goal of brokering a settlement between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group based its efforts on three principles:
 1. Bosnia would remain a single state;
 2. That state would consist of the Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity;
 3. These two entities would be linked via mutually-agreed constitutional principles, which would also spell out relationships with Serbia and Croatia proper.
- In July 1994, the Contact Group put forward a proposed map presenting a 51/49 percent territorial compromise between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian Governments all accepted the proposal. The Bosnian Serbs repeatedly rejected it. All of its key principles, however, have now been accepted as the basis for negotiations at the current proximity peace talks in Dayton.
- In the fall of 1994, Serbia announced it was withdrawing support for the Bosnian Serbs, would seal them off economically, and would allow a UN-EU team to monitor the border closure. The Security Council then offered a temporary suspension of some of the economic sanctions that had been in place against Serbia since 1992.
- In the summer of 1995, a series of events changed the situation on the ground:
 - In July, two UN-declared safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, were overrun by Bosnian Serb forces.

- In July and August, Croatia retook most of the territory held for three years by separatist Krajina Serbs, and thus presented itself as a counterweight to further Serb aggression in the region.
- In response to the fall of the safe areas, President Clinton insisted that NATO and the UN make good on their commitment to protect the remaining safe areas. The Allies agreed to U.S. insistence on NATO decisiveness at the London Conference on July 21, and threatened broad-based air strikes if the safe areas were attacked again.
- In late July, President Clinton decided that the changes on the ground and the new resolve displayed by NATO provided the basis for an all-out diplomatic effort to end the conflict. In early August, he sent his National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, to present a U.S. peace initiative to our NATO Allies and the Russians.
- In mid-August, U.S. negotiators, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, began intensive shuttle diplomacy with the parties to the conflict. The deaths of three members of our negotiating team—Ambassador Robert Frasure, Dr. Joseph Kruzal, and Colonel Nelson Drew—were an enormous tragedy, but our efforts for peace intensified.
- In late August, a Bosnian Serb shell killed 37 people in a Sarajevo market. NATO and the UN issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs:
 1. Stop shelling Sarajevo.
 2. Stop offensive action against the remaining safe areas.
 3. Withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.
 4. Allow road and air access to Sarajevo.
- On August 30, after the Bosnian Serbs refused, NATO began heavy and continuous air strikes against the Bosnian Serb military—with many missions flown by American pilots. The Bosnian Serbs then complied with the NATO demands.
- At meetings sponsored by the Contact Group in Geneva (September 8, 1995) and New York (September 26, 1995), the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (now also representing the Bosnian Serbs) agreed to basic principles for a settlement in Bosnia:
 - The preservation of Bosnia as a single state;
 - An equitable division of territory between the Muslim/Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity based on the Contact Group's 51/49 formula;
 - Constitutional structures;
 - Free and fair elections;
 - Respect for human rights.
- In early October, the United States helped broker a cease-fire, now holding throughout Bosnia.
- The United States and the other Contact Group countries convened the parties to Dayton, Ohio to begin "proximity peace talks" on November 1.

November 1995

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #3

The Dayton Process

- On November 1, the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia began participating in high-level political talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio. The purpose of the "proximity peace talks" is to encourage the parties to reach a comprehensive regional settlement.
- The sessions are building on principles reached in Geneva September 8 and in New York September 26. These include:
 1. The preservation of Bosnia as a single state containing the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity;
 2. The 51/49 percent formula as a basis for territorial arrangements;
 3. A constitutional structure establishing the institutions of a central government and specifying relations between the two territorial entities;
 4. The necessity of free and fair elections;
 5. Respect for human rights.
- The parties to the conflict are represented in the Dayton negotiations by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.
- Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and EU Negotiator Carl Bildt are co-chairing the talks. Other Contact Group countries (France, Germany and Britain) are represented at the political director level.
- There is no agreed date for the conclusion of the talks, but if the talks are successful, they will be followed by a conference on implementation of the settlement in London and an international peace conference in Paris.
- The substance of the current talks includes the range of territorial and constitutional matters. Among the outstanding issues are:
 - The location of the internal boundary between the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity;
 - The status of Sarajevo;
 - Practical steps for separating forces and establishing a permanent cessation of hostilities;
 - Procedures for free and fair elections under international supervision;
 - Procedures for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

November 1995

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #4

If a Peace Agreement Is Reached

- In October 1995, President Clinton stated the following: "If a peace agreement is reached, I will request an expression of support in Congress for committing United States troops to a NATO implementation force."
- If a peace agreement is reached, only NATO can effectively implement it. NATO will not deploy in Bosnia unless and until the parties reach a real agreement that demonstrates their commitment to peace.
- U.S. participation in any peace implementation force (IFOR) will depend on the details of the peace plan. President Clinton will not send our troops to enforce a plan that is not accepted by the sides, or to defend a paper settlement where there is no peace to keep.
- Ongoing NATO planning emphasizes the need to maintain a cease-fire and ensure that local forces withdraw to their respective territories as established at settlement. To accomplish these goals, Allies envision that the IFOR would report through a NATO chain of command to NATO's supreme political body, the North Atlantic Council. There will be no "dual key."
- The operation would be under the overall authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General George Joulwan, and under the direct command of NATO's Southern Commander, Admiral Leighton Smith. Both men are United States military officers.
- It is desirable for many reasons for the IFOR to contain units from non-NATO states as diverse as Russia, other Partnership for Peace members, and countries whose forces currently are part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Arrangements for coordination between non-NATO participants and the NATO command structure are now being finalized.
- Once the IFOR is deployed, UNPROFOR's mandate will terminate, although some forces in UNPROFOR would be "re-hatted" as part of IFOR. This would include "re-hatting" Allied units that now comprise the Rapid Reaction Force.
- In parallel with military implementation efforts, the United States and our Contact Group partners envision programs for economic reconstruction, civilian-led human rights and humanitarian activities, and the development of democratic institutions, including the conduct of free and fair elections.
- Planning has also begun for a European Union-led economic reconstruction effort to help the Balkans rebuild and to integrate into the broader economic community.
- A range of organizations and bilateral aid organizations, including the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, and the international financial institutions will be involved in implementation of the non-military aspects of the settlement.
- Discussions are under way among our Contact Group partners on the need for a senior coordinator to ensure that the work of the various organizations involved in implementing the non-military aspects of the settlement proceeds smoothly.

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #5**NATO Involvement in the Balkan Crisis**

- Throughout the Balkan crisis, NATO has undertaken a variety of activities in support of UN peacekeeping operations.
- In July 1992, NATO established a joint naval operation with the Western European Union to patrol the Adriatic to help enforce the UN's economic sanctions regime against Serbia.
- In the fall of 1992, the UN established a "no-fly" zone over Bosnia; in early 1993, NATO agreed to enforce it.
- In June 1993, NATO announced it would provide close air support to UN peacekeepers who came under attack. In August, NATO declared its readiness to respond with air strikes, in coordination with the UN, in the event that UN safe areas, including Sarajevo, came under siege. This decision temporarily ended the strangulation of Sarajevo.
- In February and April 1994, in response to renewed Bosnian Serb attacks on safe areas, including a brutal attack on a Sarajevo market, NATO established heavy-weapons-free zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Shelling of the Bihac safe area at the end of the year prompted NATO to expand its range of targets to include locations within Serb-held areas of Croatia.
- NATO fighters provided close air support and engaged in air strikes on several occasions in 1994 at the request of the UN. NATO and UN commanders both had to agree before air operations could be carried out. This arrangement, known as the "dual key," resulted in differences between the organizations over the threshold for military action and limited the effectiveness of air strikes.
- In 1993, when it appeared that a settlement proposal offered by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen might be accepted by the sides, NATO undertook planning for troop deployments to implement peace. NATO's plan, known as OPLAN 40103, was never finalized, as Bosnian Serb rejection of the peace plan, coupled with renewed fighting, rendered the chances for settlement remote.
- In mid-1994, in response to a request from the UN, NATO began contingency planning for withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops, should the situation on the ground prevent them from carrying out their mission. This plan was known as OPLAN 40104.
- On many occasions, President Clinton and other senior officials have expressed U.S. commitment to participation as appropriate in OPLAN 40103 and 40104. Emphasizing they would welcome Congressional support, Administration officials have long made clear that failure to take part in major Alliance efforts would weaken NATO cohesion and strain transatlantic relations.
- In July 1995, after the Bosnian Serbs overran the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, the United States, with some of our Allies, the Russians, and others, attended a Ministerial-level conference in London. The London Conference (together with subsequent NATO decisions) simplified the procedures for conducting air strikes, reduced the complications of the dual key mechanism, and greatly expanded the targets available for strikes.

- In August, when the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo safe area and rejected UN and NATO conditions for a heavy weapons withdrawal, NATO undertook its most intense air campaign to date, using the new authority and improved procedures agreed to in London. The month-long Allied campaign made clear to the Bosnian Serbs that the international community had no tolerance for violations of UN resolutions. Partly as a result of the strikes, Bosnian Serbs showed greater willingness to participate seriously in peace talks.
- By September, as a result of the air strikes, changes on the ground regionally, and progress made by the President's negotiating team, it appeared once again that a settlement might be possible. NATO renewed its planning for peace implementation. In October, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a concept of operations for deployment of an implementation force (IFOR) into Bosnia should a peace settlement be reached.
- NATO military authorities are now refining concepts for the IFOR, including its tasks, size, and cost. A final plan will depend on the details of the peace agreement. When military planning is finished, national governments will make decisions on troop numbers and financial contributions, and the NAC will give its final approval to the IFOR.

November 1995

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #6**Human Rights Issues in the Balkans****Human Rights Abuses**

- The war in the former Yugoslavia has involved widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including mass killings and murder, systematic rape, torture, and other crimes against humanity.
- The term “ethnic cleansing” has entered the world’s vocabulary to describe the horrifying range of human rights abuses—from forcible expulsion to murder—committed in parts of the former Yugoslavia in order to achieve “ethnic purity.”
- All parties to the present conflict in the Balkans have committed human rights violations, but the great majority have been perpetrated by Serb forces.
- Some of the worst incidents include the following:
 - In the fall of 1991, Serb forces shelled the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, an action without military justification.
 - Throughout the course of the conflict, Sarajevo and other cities have been subjected to indiscriminate shelling. Scores of civilians have been killed or wounded by snipers and cluster and napalm bombs used by Bosnian Serb forces. Six of these cities were designated safe areas by the United Nations in May 1993. This did not stop the shelling.
 - Beginning in the spring of 1992, entire enclaves, ranging in size from towns such as Prijedor, Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Jajce, to hamlets such as Foca and Cerska, were “cleansed” of their Muslim and Croat residents in a Bosnian Serb attempt to “purify” lands they controlled.
 - In November 1991, Krajina Serbs took several hundred wounded Croatian soldiers from a hospital in the eastern Slavonian town of Vukovar, shot them in a field, and buried them in a mass grave. Serb authorities continue to deny international forensic teams access to the site.
 - In 1992 the Bosnian Serbs set up a gulag of prison camps and detention facilities holding tens of thousands of Muslims and Croats. During the summer of 1992, international investigators were denied access to detainees, but those who escaped described repeated atrocities.
 - During the summer of 1995 Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica and Zepa, committing gross violations of human rights as they proceeded. As many as 6,000 male Muslim detainees were shot and buried in mass graves. The entire Muslim population of more than 42,000 people was “cleansed” from the region.
 - Evidence is mounting that human rights abuses were committed against Serb civilians in Croatia in mid-1995, when the Croatian military retook Serb-occupied western Slavonia and the Krajina region.

The Response of the International Community

- In August 1992, the UN Commission on Human Rights established a Special Rapporteur to conduct on-site investigations into human rights violations and report on his findings. The Special Rapporteur maintains human rights monitors in Sarajevo, Mostar, Skopje, and Zagreb and has submitted a series of reports on violations throughout the former Yugoslavia.

- In October 1992, the UN Security Council approved an impartial international investigation to identify persons responsible for human rights abuses and to discourage more ethnic-based violence. The resulting Commission of Experts documented thousands of crimes.
- In the spring of 1993, the Security Council concluded that the atrocities committed amounted to war crimes and that international prosecution of individuals responsible for atrocities was integral to the prospects for long-term peace. As a result, it established a War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal subsumed the Commission of Experts and took over the task of amassing data on abuses.
- The War Crimes Tribunal has issued indictments against 46 persons (42 Bosnian Serbs, one Bosnian Croat, and three Serbs (CHECK--TODAY'S NEWS)), including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. Proceedings have begun against the first defendant, a Bosnian Serb official accused of committing atrocities at a prison camp.
- Neither Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, nor any other indicted war criminal has been permitted to participate in the Dayton proximity peace talks or in any other international peace negotiations. The United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose amnesty for indicted war criminals. As warrants are issued, nations will be obliged to arrest indictees in their jurisdictions.

What the United States Has Done

- The United States led international efforts to establish the War Crimes Tribunal, and has contributed more to the Tribunal than any other nation—upwards of \$12 million. This includes financial contributions of nearly \$9 million and the services of more than 20 prosecutors, investigators, and other experts.
- The United States has offered full support for all international investigations of human rights abuses. We already have submitted large quantities of data to the Special Rapporteur, the Commission of Experts, and the Tribunal itself, and are committed to provide any additional evidence we receive of possible war crimes.
- Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck has traveled to the former Yugoslavia five times to investigate the massive violations of human rights that occurred around Srebrenica and Zepa this summer, as well as ongoing reports of Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing campaigns in Banja Luka and Sanski Most. Shattuck has personally interviewed scores of refugees and displaced persons who witnessed mass killings or were victims of forcible expulsions, rapes, or assaults.
- Under the U.S.-brokered cease-fire of October 1995, the parties agreed to treat civilians and prisoners humanely, to exchange prisoners of war under UN supervision, to afford all persons freedom of movement, and to guarantee the right of displaced persons to return home and reclaim their property.

November 1995

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #7**Humanitarian Issues in the Balkans**

- Approximately 2.7 million people have received some form of humanitarian aid since the conflict in the Balkans began. Nearly 50 percent of Bosnia's current 3.5 million inhabitants are internally displaced persons, and at least 900,000 others are refugees.
- The United States has led the world in responding to the humanitarian crisis in the region, donating \$965 million to humanitarian relief operations either bilaterally, through the UN, or through non-governmental organizations.
- Total humanitarian contributions through the UN system since November 1991 exceed 1.75 billion dollars, much of which was spent in Bosnia. An additional several hundred million dollars have been contributed via direct bilateral assistance mechanisms, the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations.
- In July 1992, the UN began a food airlift, using resources from the United States, U.K., France, Germany, and Canada. Later in the year, the UN undertook convoy deliveries of food and other essentials. Together, ground convoys and the airlift have delivered more than 700,000 metric tons of food to Bosnia, the largest airlift in history. The United States provided the largest quantity of food to the effort, and U.S. aircraft flew nearly 3,000 of the 8,200 Allied sorties. The airlift was suspended in Bosnia after the October 1995 cease-fire went into effect.
- The UN and other relief organizations have helped provide shelter and medical care for tens of thousands in the region. They have also helped secure admissions and accommodations for refugees fleeing abroad and have spearheaded family reunification efforts, missing persons and war crimes investigations, prisoner of war exchanges, and negotiations toward restoration of utilities.
- The large-scale international relief effort has not come without its price: twelve UN workers and a similar number of non-governmental relief staff have been killed while working to meet the needs of people in the region. International relief workers have faced intimidation and harassment and have endured the theft of relief supplies.
- Some aspects of the international humanitarian effort would need to continue post-settlement. Private relief agencies and the UN would participate in the international effort to help the region return to normal.

November 1995

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #8**Economic Sanctions Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)**

- In May 1992, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY; Serbia and Montenegro). These sanctions prohibit trade and financial transactions with the FRY. A humanitarian exception allows the FRY to import food, medicine, and other humanitarian items under license from the UN Sanctions Committee.
- In late 1992 and early 1993, the United States led efforts to establish Sanctions Assistance Monitoring Missions (SAMs), now under the auspices of the EU and OSCE, at border crossings in the states adjoining the FRY. International customs monitors assist local border officials in enforcing the sanctions on the FRY. The United States presently contributes approximately 60 customs monitors to this 240-person effort.
- In September 1994, the Security Council extended the economic sanctions already applied against the FRY to the territory controlled by Bosnian Serb forces.
- At the same time, the Security Council permitted a limited sanctions suspension for Serbia in return for a FRY commitment to cut off support to the Bosnian Serbs and to allow an international monitoring mission along the FRY/Bosnia border. The suspension allowed the opening of the Belgrade airport for international flights, the resumption of ferry service to Italy, and the resumption of sports and cultural exchanges with the FRY.
- The United States has contributed 50 civilian monitors to the 220-person international monitoring mission along the FRY/Bosnia border.
- Sanctions have contributed to a significant economic decline in the FRY. Industrial production and real incomes are down at least 50 percent since 1991. As a result, obtaining sanctions relief has become a priority for the FRY Government.

November 1995

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #9**Chronology of the Balkan Conflict**

- Strains within Yugoslavia's federated system emerged after Tito's death in 1980. Yugoslavia, an ethnically and religiously diverse federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces, operated under a collective government after his death.
- In the spring of 1990, democratic elections following the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe brought nationalist and independence-minded governments to power in the western-most republics of Slovenia and Croatia as well as in Serbia.
- In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. This set off a brief conflict between Slovenes and the Yugoslav Army and a protracted crisis in Croatia between the newly independent government in Croatia and the Serbian minority in Croatia ("Krajina Serbs"), supported by the Yugoslav military. By the end of 1991, the Krajina Serbs had gained control of nearly one-third of the country.
- In September 1991, in order to stem the fighting, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo against all of the former Yugoslavia. The Secretary General also launched a mediation effort under former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which led to a cease-fire agreement in Croatia in early 1992 and the deployment of the first UN peacekeepers during the winter of 1992.
- In January 1992, while the mediation efforts were ongoing, the European Community (now the European Union), after considerable internal debate, decided to recognize Croatia and Slovenia's independence. They deferred action on recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina pending a referendum to determine public support for independence.
- In March 1992, voters in Bosnia overwhelmingly approved independence in a vote boycotted by Bosnian Serbs. Almost immediately, the Bosnian Serbs, backed by the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav army, began forcible resistance to Bosnia's independence. By the end of spring 1992, Bosnian Serbs, who had significant military superiority, especially in heavy weapons, achieved control over more than 60 percent of Bosnia's territory.
- In April 1992, the EU recognized Bosnia. The United States, which had declined to recognize Croatia and Slovenia earlier, recognized Bosnia and the other two republics at the same time. All three were admitted to the UN in May. In response to continued Serb aggression, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Serbia at the end of May.
- During the summer of 1992, as the human rights and humanitarian crisis escalated, the Security Council voted to send UN peacekeepers to Bosnia to facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief. To help assure the safety of humanitarian operations, the UN imposed a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia in October 1992. In April 1993, NATO began to enforce the no-fly zone.
- In December 1992, the United States warned Serbia that the United States would respond in the event of Serb-inspired violence in Kosovo.
- In early 1993, UN peacekeepers deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The United States decided to participate in order to prevent a widening of the conflict. Five hundred fifty U.S. troops, as well as five hundred fifty troops from other nations, remain in the FYROM.

A Short History of the Bosnian Conflict

The Breakup of Yugoslavia

Strains within Yugoslavia's federated system emerged after Tito's death in 1980. Yugoslavia, an ethnically and religiously diverse federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces, operated under a collective government after his death.¹ Nationalist leanings--subdued under Tito's strong leadership--were brought to the forefront by politicians who attempted to bolster their own power base and resulting in a heavily decentralized governing structure. Serbian attempts, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, to recentralize the government alarmed the other republics and strengthened centrifugal forces. Democratic elections in the spring of 1990 following the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe brought nationalist and independence-minded governments to power in the western-most republics of Slovenia and Croatia. Both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence in June 1991, setting off a brief conflict between the Slovenes and the Yugoslav Army and a protracted crisis in Croatia between newly independent Zagreb and its 12 percent ethnic Serb population who were backed by Belgrade, the increasingly Serb-dominated Yugoslav Army. The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's declaration of independence in September 1991 was bloodless.

Bosnia: Warring Parties Vie for Territorial Control

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most ethnically mixed republic in the former Yugoslavia, held a referendum on independence in early 1992. Bosnian Serbs--approximately 30 percent of the republic's population--reacted violently to the largely Muslim and Croat vote for independence. Bosnian President Izetbegovic tried to reassure Bosnian Serbs by including them in his government and calling for a multi-ethnic independent Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs, however, moved almost immediately to partition the country in order to join with Serbia, beginning a violent struggle for control of territory that has been marked by massive population movements, "ethnic cleansing," and humanitarian hardship.²

International Efforts to Mediate in Bosnia

The European Union (EU), alarmed by growing tensions in the region, became engaged to mediate a peaceful resolution in the former Yugoslavia in the spring of 1991. Despite some early agreements by Serbian President Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman to negotiate a settlement for the former Yugoslavia, individual republics continued to reject peace plans offered by the

¹ The territory of the former Yugoslavia is a crossroads where Eastern and Western empires have clashed throughout history. Its varied ethnic composition mirrors differences in religion; with predominantly Roman Catholic Croatia and Slovenia to the west and Orthodox Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro to the east of the formerly Muslim-plurality Bosnia.

² Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" in late April and declared that it was the successor state to Yugoslavia.

international community, and the UN imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia in September 1991 in an effort to prevent widescale conflict. UN and EU efforts in Croatia resulted in the deployment of UN peacekeepers to implement a cease-fire agreement in Croatia.

The EU, which had recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, stepped up its efforts to negotiate a settlement in Bosnia after the outbreak of fighting that spring. It introduced the idea of a loosely federated Bosnia consisting of ethnic cantons which the Muslims eventually rejected as a plan to partition Bosnia. The UN also stepped up its efforts to limit the fighting in Bosnia and imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro in May in an effort to cut off Serbian assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. In July, the international community began its airlift into Sarajevo.

The EU and the UN unified their efforts to mediate an end to the conflict in Bosnia under the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) in September 1992. The ICFY--led by EU mediator Owen and UN mediator Vance--proposed a draft constitution organizing Bosnia into a decentralized federation of ten autonomous provinces in October 1992, the Vance-Owen plan. The plan, along with arrangements for a cease-fire and a military accord, was accepted by all the leaders of the parties in May 1993, but then was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs a few days later in a public referendum. Bosnian President Izetbegovic walked out of a discussion to modify the plan in June 1993, claiming he objected to the partition of Bosnia.

Other diplomatic efforts to prevent an escalation of the conflict and stop atrocities were initiated very early in the conflict. In September 1992, OSCE countries offered to provide personnel for sanctions assistance missions to Balkan states neighboring the former Yugoslavia. The UN Security Council established a no-fly zone over Bosnia and NATO began flights to enforce the zone in April 1993. The Security Council began to focus on war crimes issues in October 1992, leading to the formation of the International War Crimes Tribunal in February 1993. As fighting escalated and the Serbs began to threaten key Muslim population centers, the UN in May 1993 declared Sarajevo and five other Muslim enclaves in Bosnia "safe areas" under UN protection. NATO agreed in June to use air power to protect UN forces if attacked. In August, NATO agreed to authorize the use of air power to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo.

In the spring of 1993, the international community agreed to a Joint Action Plan focused on ensuring humanitarian aid, rigorous enforcement of sanctions and the no-fly zone, the use of airstrikes to protect UNPROFOR, and a renewed effort to mediate a political settlement. Progress in negotiations was slow, however, and in the fall the warring parties rejected the peace plan negotiated on the H.M.S. Invincible, based on a 49% Serb, 33% Muslim, and 17.5% Croat division of Bosnia that was introduced in September.³ Bosnian President Izetbegovic continued to reject perceived efforts to partition Bosnia.

UN troop contributors were beginning to express war weariness by the winter of 1993-1994, threatening to undermine diplomatic efforts. However, the market place massacre, in which a shell killed 68 civilians in the Sarajevo market on February 5, 1994, galvanized the international

³ The Bosnian Government conditioned its acceptance of the Invincible Plan on the return of all territory seized by force. That stipulation was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. The territorial percentages, however, became the basis for the Contact Group Plan of 1994.

community. On 6 February, NATO agreed to the US proposal to threaten airstrikes if the Bosnian Serbs did not pull back their weapons from the city, setting in motion the eventual creation of a 20-km heavy-weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Also in February, NATO planes shot down four Serb light-attack aircraft violating the no-fly zone over central Bosnia in NATO's first ever use of force. NATO also employed its first airstrikes against the Serbs in April to halt a Serb attack on the eastern enclave and UN safe area of Gorazde and France, Britain, Spain, Belgium, and Denmark agreed to send more troops to Bosnia.

The more intense international focus on Bosnia allowed the US to push forward with new diplomatic initiatives. The Bosnian Croats and Muslims signed a US-sponsored Federation agreement in Washington in March, ending the war between them. Mediators from Germany, France, Britain, Russia and the US met under US leadership to coordinate their negotiating efforts and established the Contact Group in April. The group created a plan for the territorial division of Bosnia based on a 51-percent Federation/49-percent Bosnian Serb division of Bosnia. The Federation accepted the plan but the Bosnian Serbs rejected it in an August referendum.

August 1994 also marked a turning point for Serbia's role in the conflict. In early August, Serbian President Milosevic announced that he had cut economic and political ties with the Bosnian Serbs in an effort to persuade them to accept the Contact Group plan. Milosevic agreed in September to accept the deployment of a border monitoring force to patrol the Serbian/Bosnian Serb border and in October, the UN agreed to suspend limited sanctions against Serbia--including opening the Belgrade airport and allowing cultural and sporting exchanges to resume.

Strains within the international community reemerged in the fall of 1994, however, as NATO continued its more activist role. Moscow threatened to withdraw its troops from Bosnia if NATO continued airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs or if the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were lifted. Although former US President Carter was able to mediate a four-month cease-fire between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs during shuttle diplomacy in December 1994, heavy fighting resumed in the spring. The temporary relief of the siege of Sarajevo was shattered and the Bosnian Government initiated offensive operations in northeastern Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs responded to NATO airstrikes in May by taking more than 350 UN peacekeepers hostage, and Belgrade intervened to help negotiate the release of UN hostages. The UK and France responded to the erosion of UN credibility by creating a Rapid Reaction Force, later joined by the Netherlands and Belgium.

Continued fighting in Bosnia has in recent months created increasing numbers of refugees and allegations of additional war crimes. Bosnian Serbs defied threats of NATO airstrikes and overran the Muslim enclaves and UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa in July, setting off a Muslim exodus and leading to some of the worst atrocities of the war. At a conference in London on July 21, US Allies agreed to an American proposal to threaten decisive air strikes if the Serbs threatened safe areas. In late August, a rocket attack on the Sarajevo market prompted a major NATO bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, which ended when the Serbs agreed to move their heavy weapons away from Sarajevo in mid-September. A Croatian offensive in the Krajina and a subsequent Muslim-Croat offensive in western Bosnia, which regained over 4,000 square km of land from the Bosnian Serbs, set off massive Serb refugee flows.

1.

The US-led efforts to rejuvenate flagging negotiations in August 1995, led by Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, are ongoing. In September, the warring parties negotiated a basic agreement on constitutional principles that provides for a union of two entities--the Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Croat-Muslim Federation--with a central government. Holbrooke secured agreement from the warring parties to implement a cease-fire in early October and attend peace talks in Dayton, Ohio beginning on November 1.

To Webster
Shucker Done

add
fact
sheet
on acronyms

Hyge

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #1

American Leadership: Key to Peace

President Clinton's

- Thanks to American leadership, we now have the best chance for peace in Bosnia since the war began four years ago. Continued American leadership is vital if we are to seize that chance and stand up for what's right—for the people of Bosnia, for Europe, and for the United States.

Sanctions

Securing the Peace in Bosnia Serves American Interests

- **Stop the War from Spreading:** Securing the peace will prevent a war we have managed to contain from spreading into neighboring nations and igniting an even larger conflict. The former Yugoslavia borders key NATO allies and struggling new democracies—many of which have ethnic problems of their own. Today, the violent exploitation of ethnic nationalism is the biggest threat to stability in Europe. Widespread conflict in Europe would threaten our security and require a far more costly American intervention.
- **Help Create a Europe at Peace:** The United States fought two world wars and a Cold War in Europe to defend freedom and advance the vision of an undivided, peaceful, democratic Europe. Securing peace will bring us one step closer to realizing that vision with all the benefits that would bring for America's long term security and prosperity.
- **End the Suffering:** Securing peace will end the terrible toll of this war—in innocent lives lost and futures destroyed. Over the past four years, the people of Bosnia have suffered the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II: ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, mass executions, systematic rape and terror, and terrible shortages of food, medicine, shelter, and heat. The best way—the only way—to stop these horrors for good is to secure peace.

Securing Peace in Bosnia Requires American Leadership

- **American Leadership Is Key to Peace:** The progress we have made toward peace has been the result of American leadership. NATO's bombing campaign—led by American pilots and their crew—stopped Serb attacks against Sarajevo and other safe areas. The Contact Group's determined diplomacy—led by America's negotiating team—brought the parties to the peace table. If a peace agreement is signed, NATO must help secure it, and America, as NATO's leader, must take part in such an operation.
- **If America Doesn't Lead, the Job Won't Get Done:** The burdens of American leadership are real—but its benefits are even greater. We see them all over the world: a reduced nuclear threat, democracy in Haiti, peace breaking out in the Middle East and Northern Ireland. In Bosnia, as elsewhere around the world, if America does not lead, the job will not get done. When President Clinton met with Pope John Paul II in September, the Pope ended their meeting by saying: "I have lived through most of this century: The 20th Century began with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let the 20th Century end with a war in Sarajevo."

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #2

The Road to Dayton

Sandy - add one paragraph on what we did before summer 95

Sandy - We have saved lives, contained the conflict while pursuing negotiations

- The search for peace in Bosnia has proven difficult. ^{But} in the Summer of 1995, the combination of American military muscle through NATO and diplomatic determination through the Contact Group began to pay off.
- After the tragic fall of Srebrenica and Zepa in July, the United States insisted that NATO and the UN make good on their commitment to protect the safe areas. The Allies agreed to the U.S. position at the London Conference on July 21.
- In August, a Serb shell slaughtered 38 people in a Sarajevo market. NATO issued an ultimatum to the Serbs:
 1. Stop shelling Sarajevo
 2. Stop offensive action around the remaining safe areas
 3. Withdraw your heavy weapons from around Sarajevo
 4. Allow road and air access to Sarajevo.

Can we say at request / urging of US?

After the Serbs refused, on August 30 NATO began heavy and continuous air strikes against the Bosnian Serb military—with many missions flown by American pilots. The Serbs then complied with the NATO demands.

- In mid-Summer, U.S. negotiators and our Contact Group partners stepped up efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. In Geneva (9/8/95) and New York (9/26/95), the Contact Group convinced the Serbs to agree to basic principles:
 - Preservation of Bosnia as a single state ~~we act~~ → can we get the US here?
 - 51/49 division of territory between the Muslim/Croat Federation and a Serb Republic as the basis for a territorial solution
 - Constitutional structures
 - Democratic elections.
- The United States helped broker a new cease-fire, now holding throughout Bosnia. ^{only?}
- The United States and other Contact Group countries (Britain, France, Germany, and Russia) convened the parties to Dayton, Ohio to begin peace negotiations on November 1. ^{not Croatia}

Can we say POTUS? Mention Klobuchar + Chris?

POTUS → TL → add paragraph about President instructing Tony to go out + Tony's trip. This effort.

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #3

Current Settlement Package

- ^{DAYTON} On November 1, the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia began participating in high-level political talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio. The purpose of the so-called proximity talks is to encourage the parties to reach a comprehensive regional settlement.
- The sessions are building on principles reached in Geneva September 8 and in New York September 26. These include a) the preservation of Bosnia as a single state containing the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb Republic; b) the 51/49 percent formula as a basis for territorial arrangements; c) a constitutional structure specifying relations between the two entities; d) the necessity of democratic elections.
- The parties to the conflict are being represented by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.
- Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivanov, and EU Negotiator Carl Bildt are co-chairing the talks. Other Contact Group countries (France, Germany and Britain) are represented at the political director level.

Who else there from Repw mention 3 presidents → There is no agreed date for the conclusion of the talks, but upon successful conclusion, we will move on to an international peace conference in Paris and a conference on implementation in London.

- NEW LANGUAGE COMING FROM NSC The substance of the current talks includes the range of territorial and constitutional matters. Among the many outstanding issues are a) the location of the internal boundary between the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic; b) the status of Sarajevo; c) practical steps for separating forces and ceasing hostilities; d) other matters related to a cease-fire; d) procedures for elections.

SANCTIONS The United States has long maintained that UN-imposed economic sanctions against Serbia will be suspended only when there is agreement to a comprehensive settlement.

Implementation of Peace If peace is reached, only NATO can effectively implement it. NATO will not deploy in Bosnia unless and until the parties reach a real agreement that demonstrates their commitment to peace. U.S. participation in the implementation force will depend on the details of the peace plan. The President will not ask our troops to enforce a plan that is not accepted by the sides, or to defend a paper settlement where there is no peace to keep.

- But if we do not deploy, our Allies will reconsider their own commitments in Bosnia, and we will undermine an Alliance that remains vital to our security. Moreover, the parties, including the Bosnia government, have said they will not sign a peace agreement unless they are confident the United States will help implement it.
- In parallel with military implementation efforts, we and our Contact Group partners envision that if peace is achieved, a civilian effort will be necessary to safeguard human rights, help refugees return, monitor elections, and deliver humanitarian aid.
- We are also planning for an EU-led economic reconstruction effort to help the Balkans rebuild and to help integrate the states in the region into the world economic community.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #4

International Negotiations and the Contact Group

*mention lift
+ strike
w/ trip*

- The international community is united in its desire to see that the Balkan conflict is resolved at the negotiating table. The UN, EU and various nations acting unilaterally and in groups have attempted to resolve the Balkan conflict through negotiations since its inception in 1991.
 - The United States named its first special diplomatic representative to UN-EU joint negotiations at the beginning of the Clinton Administration, in February 1993. At the end of that year, with UN-EU effort bogged down, the United States decided to undertake more active involvement.
 - *The first progress was made*
~~Our first success~~ was in March 1994, when U.S. officials including our special negotiator, Ambassador Charles Redman, convinced Bosnia's Muslims and Croats to accept a cease-fire, form a Federation, and establish productive relations with neighboring Croatia.
 - Later in the spring, the United States established a five-nation Contact Group consisting of representatives from the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany, with the goal of brokering a settlement between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs.
 - The Contact Group based its efforts on three principles: Bosnia would remain a single state; it would contain the Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity; the two entities would be linked via mutually agreed constitutional principles, which would also spell out relationships with Serbia and Croatia proper. These remain the basic principles of the current proximity talks in Dayton.
 - *Circumstances on the ground changed substantially during the 1995 Summer in two key areas*
~~International negotiating efforts received a double impetus~~ in the summer of 1995. First, Croatia retook most of the territory held for three years by separatist Krajina Serbs, and thus presented itself as a counterweight to further Serb aggression in the region. ~~Second,~~ NATO's most extensive air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs made clear that the international community wanted the conflict to end and would stand for no more violations of UN resolutions or international standards of behavior.
 - *seized this window of opportunity*
The United States sought to take advantage of the changed climate by launching a reinvigorated diplomatic effort toward settlement. The deaths in August of three members of our negotiating team—Ambassador Robert Frasure, Joseph Kruzal, and Nelson Drew—were an enormous tragedy, ~~but our efforts for peace redoubled.~~ **NO**
 - Representatives of each of the five Contact Group nations are mediating the current proximity talks in Dayton. U.S.-Russian-European efforts to resolve the ex-Yugoslav crisis through the Contact Group are premier examples of post-Cold War cooperation.
- Contact Group Members
- Each member of the Contact Group has brought particular strengths to the negotiating process.

The two events in 1995

①

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION
deaths
(3)

Russia

- Russia's cultural connections to the Slavs in the Balkans, and its historical political ties to Belgrade, have allowed it to play a useful role as mediator with the Serbs.
- Continuing conflict in the Balkans would strain U.S. relations with Russia, particularly if we were to lift the UN arms embargo unilaterally. Russia's developing relationship with NATO would also become more delicate should the conflict persist and NATO be asked to continue using air power in the region.
- A prominent Russian role in post-settlement implementation will add to the chances for regional stability. In late October, the United States and Russia agreed to form a special operations unit that would perform important tasks as part of the post-settlement implementation process.

Members of the European Union

- Britain and France are key Allies and EU members. ^{so?} Like Russia, they have had troops in UNPROFOR since the force was deployed. With the Dutch, they make up the UN's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which will be a critical element in the IFOR.
- German efforts to resolve the Balkan conflict have consisted of diplomacy and military support. If a settlement is achieved, Germany plans to deploy as part of the IFOR; this will be the first time troops from a democratic Germany have joined NATO forces in an out-of-area military operation. ^{? has committed to?}
- Germany has offered logistic support for Allied military operations and has played an important role in mediating with the Croatian Government in an effort to strengthen the Bosnian Federation between Muslims and Croats. The German Government has worked hard to foster peace and to avoid exacerbating existing regional tensions. This has required great diplomatic sensitivity, given the memories of Nazi atrocities in the Balkans half a century ago. ^{??}
- Italy (the staging area for many UN and NATO efforts in the Balkans) and countries holding the EU Presidency have taken part in Contact Group negotiations on an ad hoc basis.

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #5

Chronology of the Recent Balkan Conflict

- Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Belgrade was capital, in June 1991. The EC (now EU), which had opposed recognition of the break-away states, eventually accepted the German argument that an irrevocable split had occurred; European nations and the United States recognized Croatia and Slovenia in April 1992.
- Fighting that eventually killed at least 15,000^{Who?} began in Croatia in July 1991, when the Serbian minority (25%) rejected Croatia's bid for independence and sought military assistance from Belgrade. Human rights violations occurred on both sides as break-away Serbs established control over nearly a third of the country. In September, in order to stem the fighting, the UN declared an arms embargo against the whole of the former Yugoslavia.
- In early 1992, Cyrus Vance^{with Owen?} negotiated a cease-fire in Croatia and the UN deployed peacekeepers to Serb-held areas in Krajina and Eastern Slavonia.
- Bosnia declared its independence from the rump Yugoslavia in March 1992; almost immediately the Serbian minority (37%) launched a campaign against the Government with weapons and support from Belgrade. Over 100,000 people have died in the ensuing war between the Muslim-dominant Bosnian Government, Bosnian Serbs backed by Serbia, and (from May 1993 to March 1994) Bosnian Croats backed by Zagreb. *only 100,000? we've been using 130,000 alone in 9*
- Bosnia was recognized by the EC states, the United States and others in April 1992, soon after Croatia and Slovenia were recognized. The Bosnian Serbs, who had a large weapons superiority due to Belgrade's assistance, were able to establish control over more than 60% of Bosnia within several weeks of international recognition of the state. The EC undertook efforts to resolve the Bosnian crisis at its inception, but the Bosnian Serbs rejected cease-fires.[?]
- Perceiving Serbia to be the aggressor in the region, the UN declared economic sanctions against it in June 1992. Later in the summer, the UN sent peacekeepers (referred to as ^{the UN} UNPROFOR) to Government-held areas of Bosnia to prevent the Serbs from taking over more land. In August, the UN and the European Community held a joint conference in London; Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen were named mediators. A month later, the UN established a No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. *Force,*
- In late 1992 and early 1993, reports of Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing, instituted on a scale not seen in Europe since the Nazi era, captured the attention of the world. In the spring, when the Bosnian Serbs threatened remaining Muslim enclaves, the UN established six "safe areas" and forbade attacks on them. In June, NATO stated its readiness to provide air support to UN peacekeepers under attack. In August, NATO announced it would conduct air strikes in coordination with the UN to retaliate against assaults on safe areas.

- Throughout 1993, the UN-EU negotiating team (headed by Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who replaced Cyrus Vance early in the year) proposed various territorial settlement packages in the hope of brokering peace.
- By early 1994, with the UN-EU effort stalled over territorial issues, the United States began more intensive unilateral diplomacy to encourage settlement. *Admin in*
- In February of that year, in response to a Bosnian Serb attack on a Sarajevo marketplace, NATO issued an ultimatum that if Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were not withdrawn from UN-monitored exclusion zones around the capital, air strikes would commence. *As safe areas enforcement*
- In March, U.S. diplomatic intervention yielded an agreement between the Bosnian Government, Bosnian Croats and Government of Croatia to establish a Federation between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. Fighting between the two sides ceased and has not resumed.
- In May 1994, the United States established a Contact Group of mediators from five nations (United States, UK, France, Germany and Russia) who agreed to push for a settlement built on the existence of the Federation. In July, the Contact Group presented a peace proposal that the Bosnian Government accepted and the Bosnian Serbs rejected.
- In August, in response to the rejection of the peace plan, Belgrade announced it was breaking with the Bosnian Serbs. The UN suspended some economic sanctions against Belgrade after the latter established a sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs that permitted international monitors to verify the closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border.
- Late in the year, new fighting erupted between the Bosnian government, anti-Government Muslims in Bihac (support by Krajina Serbs) and Bosnian Serbs. NATO responded by expanding the range for air strikes into Serb-controlled Croatia.
- In January 1995, due to the efforts of former President Jimmy Carter, the sides agreed to a four-month cessation of hostilities. When the period expired, fighting resumed, and in May the Bosnian Serbs began threatening Srebrenica. By the end of July, they had overrun it and neighboring Zepa, committing some of the worst atrocities of the war.
- After a Ministerial-level conference of key Allies in London in late July, NATO issued an ultimatum warning the Bosnian Serbs that they would face decisive strikes if they continued to attack safe areas. When the Bosnian Serbs tested this ultimatum, NATO undertook an intensive month-long bombing campaign. *US role*
- In early August, the Croatian government launched military action against Krajina-Serb held areas of Croatia, regaining control of all but Eastern Slavonia. 190,000 Krajina Serb civilians fled into Serbia in advance of Croatian troops; those who attempted to return have described human rights abuses at the hands of Croatian soldiers.
- By the end of the month, in light of the changed situation on the ground and NATO's new demonstration of resolve, the United States began an intensive diplomatic effort to broker a regional settlement. *to take advantage of windows of opportunity* U.S.-led mediation led to an agreement by the parties to basic principles of a settlement, including terms of a cease-fire, which went into effect October 12. Proximity talks toward settlement began in Dayton, Ohio November 1. The aim of the talks is to finalize territorial and constitutional arrangements for a single Bosnian state, containing the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb republic.

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #6

Historical Information on the Balkans

- Religious and cultural differences in the former Yugoslavia date to the early Middle Ages, when the split between the Holy Roman and Byzantine Empires occurred. The fault-line between the two empires runs roughly along the current Serbian-Croatian border; present-day Serbs are overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox and Croats and Slovenes Roman Catholic.
- The entire region of the former Yugoslavia was governed by local princes until the 15th century, when much of the area that is now Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania was conquered by the Ottoman Turks. Turkish domination did not extend to Croatia or Slovenia, both of which eventually became part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serbia itself existed as a collection of principalities until the late 19th century. Montenegro managed to retain its independence.
- The ancestors of Bosnia's and Serbia's Muslims were Slavs who converted to the religion of their Turkish governors. The Turks ruled in a relatively tolerant manner, attempting to bring into their power structure local leaders who had previously been influential in their own right. Thus Muslim converts tended to be relatively wealthy and educated.
- That converts were politically influential explains why today many of Bosnia's Muslims are concentrated in cities. The Turkish practice of sending converts to colonize outlying areas, for example Bihac, resulted in modern Bosnia's religious-ethnic checkerboard. Jews expelled from Spain, who found refuge in Sarajevo, helped establish Bosnia's tradition of tolerance for cultural diversity.
- Pan-Slavic movements aimed at uniting the Slavs in the Balkans into a modern nation gained strength at the end of the 19th century, when control by the Turks and Austrians began to chafe at a people influenced by nationalism in Italy.
- The Pan-Slavic state of Yugoslavia that was formed after World War I contained the cantons including Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Vojvodina. It faltered even as it came into being because of Serb-Croat rivalries.
- During World War II, the Nazis aligned themselves with a Croatian fascist fringe group, the Ustashe, itself established to partly counter Serbian dominance in the new Yugoslav state, and installed a puppet headquarters in Zagreb.
- The Croatian puppet government and to a lesser extent Slovenes and Muslims carried out Nazi policies of terror against Serbs during the War, although resistance movements and anti-Nazi Communist cells were active throughout the region, including in Croatia.
- During the Tito years after World War II, powerful central control mechanisms forced underground pre-existing tensions between Serbs and Croats, and obscured class and cultural differences between urban Muslims and rural Christians.

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #7

Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues

TO BE PROVIDED MONDAY MORNING

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #8

NATO Involvement in the Balkan Crisis

- NATO's willingness to support peacekeeping dates to 1989, when the Alliance agreed its collective military assets could be used to further peacekeeping operations established by UN and OSCE (then CSCE) mandates. Throughout the Balkan crisis, the NATO membership has approved activities supportive of UN peacekeeping.
- In the fall of 1992, NATO agreed to enforce the UN's No-Fly zone over Bosnia. Late in the year, it established a joint naval operation with the WEU to patrol the Adriatic as part of the UN's economic sanctions regime against Serbia. # of flights?
- In 1993, NATO announced it would provide close air support to UN peacekeepers who came under attack. It also declared its readiness to respond with air strikes, in coordination with the UN, in the event UN safe areas including Sarajevo came under siege.
- Subsequent NATO decisions in February and April, 1994 established military exclusion zones around the UN safe areas of Sarajevo and Gorazde. In response to shelling in the Bihac safe area at the end of the year, NATO expanded its range of targets to include locations within Serb-held Croatia.
- NATO fighters engaged in several rounds of close air support and air strikes throughout 1994 at the request of the UN. The arrangement whereby NATO and UN commanders both had to agree before air operations could be carried out, known as the dual key, resulted in differences between the organizations over the threshold for strikes.
- In 1993, when it appeared the Vance-Owen settlement package might be accepted by the sides, NATO undertook planning for troop deployments to implement peace. NATO's plan, known as OPLAN 40103, was never finalized, as Bosnian Serb rejection of the peace plan, coupled with renewed fighting, rendered the chances for settlement remote.
- In mid-1994, in response to a request from the UN, NATO began planning to withdraw UNPROFOR troops, should the situation on the ground prevent them from carrying out their mission. This plan was known as OPLAN 40104.
- On many occasions, officials including the President expressed commitment to U.S. participation as appropriate in OPLAN 40103 and 40104. Emphasizing they would welcome Congressional support, Administration officials have long made clear that failure to take part in major Alliance efforts would weaken NATO cohesion and strain transatlantic relations.
- In July 1995, after the Bosnian Serbs overran the UN safe area of Srebrenica, the United States, close Allies and the Russians attended a Ministerial-level conference in London that (together with subsequent NATO decisions) simplified the procedures for calling air strikes, reduced the complications of the dual key mechanism, and greatly expanded targets available for strikes.
- In August, when the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo safe area and rejected UN and NATO conditions for a weapons withdrawal, NATO undertook its most intense air

Air Drops?
urgent humanitarian effort in
troops

important to remember NATO has done 24 UN asked Defense of NATO

TOTAL #s

campaign to date, using the improved procedures agreed to in London. The month-long Allied campaign made clear to the Bosnian Serbs that the international community had no tolerance for violations of UN resolutions or attacks on civilians. Partly as a result of the strikes, the negotiating climate improved and the Serbians and Bosnian Serbs showed greater willingness to participate seriously in peace talks.

- By September, as a result of the strikes and changes on the ground regionally, it appeared once again that a settlement might be possible, and NATO renewed planning for peace implementation.
- Ongoing NATO planning emphasizes the need to maintain a cease-fire and ensure that local forces withdraw to within lines established at settlement. To accomplish these goals, Allies envision that a force, called the implementation force or IFOR, would report through an exclusive NATO chain of command to NATO permanent representatives (i.e., no dual key) and operate under a UN Chapter VII mandate.
- It is desirable for many reasons for the IFOR to contain units from non-NATO states as diverse as Russia, Sweden, other Partnership for Peace members, and moderate Islamic countries. Arrangements for coordination between non-NATO participants and the NATO command structure are being finalized.
- Once the IFOR is deployed, UNPROFOR's mandate will terminate, although some forces in UNPROFOR would be rehattd as part of IFOR. Rehatting Allied units now forming the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF; see UN fact sheet) would be particularly desirable.
- NATO (including the United States) military authorities are now refining concepts for IFOR, including its tasks, size and cost. When they finish, the NAC will be asked to approve the plan and national governments will make decisions on troops numbers and financial contributions.
- Clearly, settlement implementation will involve more than military enforcement: the Administration and Allies envision economic reconstruction, civilian human rights and humanitarian activities, and political institution-building.
- A range of players, including the UN and its agencies, the OSCE, EU, international financial institutions, and bilateral actors, will be involved in implementation of the non-military aspects of settlement.
- We foresee a coordinating -- but not commanding -- role for the UN among these groups. Discussions are under way in New York on the shape of the UN political umbrella post-settlement, and on its relationship with NATO.

U.S. Reaching

are preparing?

U.S. Command etc.

Summary of sanctions, enforcements, flight-air drops,
No sense of magnitude

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #9

UN Involvement in the Balkan Crisis

- Of all the entities that have attempted to broker peace in the Balkans, prevent escalation of the conflict, relieve suffering, account for victims, and punish aggressors, the UN has played the earliest and broadest role.
- In September 1991, two months after fighting erupted in Croatia, and as the EC (now EU) attempted to convince break-away republics not to secede, the UN Security Council passed a resolution establishing an arms embargo against all of the former Yugoslavia. The embargo, which is now seen by many as hampering Bosnia's self-defense, aimed at preventing escalation and regionalization of the fighting.
- In early 1992, after some EC member states recognized Slovenia and Croatia, the UN deployed 14,000 peacekeepers, known as the UN Protective Force or UNPROFOR, to the latter state to monitor the cease-fire in Serb-occupied areas.
- In June, the Security Council responded to Serbia's involvement in the Bosnian Serb take-over of 60% of Bosnia by instituting a sweeping economic sanctions regime. Many subsequent resolutions tightened the regime with the aim of further ostracizing Serbia economically.
- In August 1992, the Security Council suspended Yugoslavia's UN membership (which Serbia claimed), while allowing Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia to become members. Virtually all other international organizations followed the UN's lead.
- The joint UN-EU London Conference the same month named Cyrus Vance the UN's special negotiator for the former Yugoslavia. Vance, his successors and their EU counterparts engaged in diplomatic negotiations on territorial issues for two years.
- As fighting continued in the late summer of 1992 and evidence mounted that Bosnia's Muslims were the targets of a campaign of atrocities, the UN deployed peacekeepers and commenced a large-scale humanitarian aid effort in Bosnia, with troops accompanying assistance convoys.
- Since the beginning of the conflict in the Balkans, the UN, through its various agencies, has distributed nearly \$2 billion in humanitarian aid. Over 2 million people, including 700,000 refugees and displaced persons, receive assistance from the UN. (U.S. humanitarian contributions total nearly \$1 billion, including contributions to UN agencies and direct assistance through USAID.
- UNPROFOR in Bosnia increased to its current 31,000 by UN resolutions late in 1992; the present overall regional troop strength is 40,000, from 37 nations. Operations in the former Yugoslavia account for 60% of the UN's peacekeeping budget.
- In October 1992, the UN instituted a No-Fly Zone over Bosnia to prevent Serbia from resupplying the Bosnian Serbs; the following year the UN called on NATO to use air power to enforce the regime.
- In early 1993 UN peacekeepers deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Because FYROM's proximity to Kosovo, Greece and Turkey meant a

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spillover of the conflict might have dangerous regional consequences, the United States decided to participate. 550 U.S. troops, as well as 550 from other nations, remain in the FYROM. U.S. troops are not deployed in Bosnia, and we have only one U.S. medical unit in Croatia.

- In the spring of 1993, when the Bosnian Serbs threatened remaining Muslim enclaves with extermination, the Security Council established safe areas in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla and Bihac, and deployed additional peacekeepers to the cities to try to deter further attacks.
- Shortly after creating the safe areas, the Security Council established a War Crimes Tribunal to investigate and bring to justice those accused of atrocities.
- In mid-1993, NATO offered to use air power, at the request of the UN, to protect peacekeepers and safe areas. In the following two years, the UN called in NATO aircraft on a number of occasions. Out of concern that UNPROFOR would suffer retaliation (including hostage taking), the UN adopted a conservative standard for ordering strikes, resulting in the public perception that the UN held NATO back from enforcing UN resolutions.
- In the fall of 1994, when Serbia announced it was withdrawing support for the Bosnian Serbs, would seal them off economically, and would allow a UN-EU team to monitor the border closure, the Security Council offered limited relief from the economic sanctions in place against Serbia since 1992. Full sanctions relief will not occur until after settlement, and Serbia's admittance to international organizations will only be possible when Belgrade makes clear it intends to comply with international democratic standards, including cooperation on war crimes investigations.
- In 1995, in response to changes on the ground and at the request of the Bosnian and FYROM governments, the UN established separate mandates for operations in Bosnia (where forces retained the name UNPROFOR), Croatia (now known as UNCRO) and Macedonia (known as UNPREDEP).
- In the wake of Croatia's successful move in August to regain control of the Krajina, UNCRO has been reduced by over half, with additional units set to leave later this year. UNCRO Forces remain in the eastern Slavonia area of Croatia, which still is contested between the Croatian Government and resident Serbs.
- If a settlement is reached, Allied UNPROFOR forces will be folded into the NATO-led implementation force. The UN's Rapid Reaction Force, a special unit potentially containing 12,500 UK, French and Dutch soldiers that was formed in June 1995 (and that possesses military capabilities beyond those of other peacekeepers) will play a key role and will be under NATO command. UNPREDEP and any remaining UNCRO will continue under UN command.
- Considering that military implementation is only one aspect of post-settlement reconstruction, we foresee a coordinating role for the UN among the various participants in the international effort to help the region return to normal.

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15 November, 1995 22:25

JOINT EU/U.S. ACTION PLAN

This Action Plan for expanding and deepening EU-U.S. relations reflects a framework with four shared goals:

- . Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world;
- . Responding to global challenges;
- . Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations;
- . Building bridges across the Atlantic.

I PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD

We attach the highest importance to perfecting a new transatlantic community reflecting our joint interest in promoting stability and prosperity throughout the whole continent of Europe, based on the principles of democracy and free markets. We will cooperate both jointly and multilaterally to resolve tensions, support civil societies, and promote market reforms.

Our partnership is also global. We accept our responsibility to act jointly to resolve conflicts in troubled areas, to engage in preventive diplomacy together, to coordinate our assistance efforts, to deal with humanitarian needs and to help build in developing nations the capacity for economic growth and self-sufficiency. In this global partnership we are guided by the firm belief that the strengthening of democratic institutions and respect for human rights are essential to stability, prosperity, and development.

1. Working together for a stable and prosperous Europe

a) Peace and reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia

(to be reviewed in the light of events).

We pledge to work together boldly and rapidly to implement the peace, assist recovery of the war ravaged regions of the former Yugoslavia, and support economic and political reform and new democratic institutions.

We will cooperate to ensure respect for human rights, for the rights of minorities and the rights of refugees and displaced persons, in particular the right of return; the establishment of a framework for free and fair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as conditions

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We will cooperate to ensure respect for human rights, for the rights of minorities and the rights of refugees and displaced persons, in particular the right of return; the establishment of a framework for free and fair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as conditions permit, and the beginning of a process for arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures.

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

While continuing to provide humanitarian assistance we will contribute to the task of reconstruction, subject to the implementation of the provisions of the peace settlement plan, in the context of the widest possible burden-sharing with other donors and taking advantage of the experience of international institutions and the European Commission, and all relevant bilateral donors in the coordination mechanism

We will continue to support the Bosnian-Croat Federation.

b) Central and Eastern European Countries

We will reinforce existing dialogue and cooperation on consolidating democracy, stability, and the transition to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe and, to this end, we will hold annual high-level consultations.

We will cooperate in support of the structural and micro-economic reforms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with a view to their integration into international political and economic institutions. We will continue to consult on ongoing technical assistance efforts to develop their financial systems and capital markets. We are fostering the creation of the legal and judicial infrastructure necessary in these countries to support expanded trade and investment.

We will pursue assistance cooperation on the spot in beneficiary countries via regular and intensified contacts between U.S. missions and Commission Delegations, including assistance coordination meetings in selected capitals.

We will cooperate in helping the countries of Central and Eastern Europe address their environmental problems by identifying joint projects consistent with the Lucerne Environmental Plan of Action, supporting the Budapest Regional Environmental Centre, and building on proposals from the October 1995 Sofia Ministerial.

We will work together to promote economic reform in the countries participating in the Partners in Transition (PIT) programme at the OECD, to facilitate their acceptance of OECD obligations and encourage their early accession to the OECD. We will support the OECD's outreach efforts to the other Central and Eastern European countries seeking a closer relationship with the OECD.

c) Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS

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We will also reinforce existing dialogue and cooperation on consolidating democracy, stability, and the transition to market economies in Russia, Ukraine, and the other NIS. To this end, we will hold annual high-level consultations.

We will coordinate activities in support of the integration of Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS in the global economy.

We will also reinforce the existing coordination relationship including technical assistance and enhanced on-the-spot coordination. We will:

- consider complementary initiatives such as: legal advice for reforms, tax reform, banking sector reform, human resource development, privatisation and post-privatisation activities, small and medium sized enterprise development and democracy building;
- intensify cooperation on projects aimed at protecting the environment in the fields endorsed by the Sofia Conference. In addition, we agree to take steps to establish an institution similar to the Regional Environmental Center within the NIS.

We will continue to improve coordination on food assistance, using the successful coordination in the Caucasus as a practical example to build on in future.

d) Turkey

We support the Turkish government's efforts to strengthen democracy and advance economic reforms. We will work to assist these efforts in order to further integrate Turkey into the transatlantic community.

e) Cyprus

We will work towards a resolution of the Cyprus question taking into account the prospective accession of Cyprus to the European Union, and we will support the UN Secretary General's Mission of Good Offices and encourage dialogue between [U.S. text: and with] the Cypriot communities.

2. Promoting the Middle East Peace Process

We will work together to make peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East become a reality.

To this end, we will

continue our support for Palestinian self-government and economic development;

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support the Palestinian elections which should contribute to the Palestinian democratic development;

play an active role in the Conference for Economic Assistance to the Palestinians;

work ambitiously to improve the access we both give to products from the West Bank and Gaza Strip;

encourage Jordanians, Palestinians, Israelis and Egyptians to establish comprehensive free trade agreements among themselves;

support the regional parties in their efforts to establish road links, electricity grids, gas pipelines and other joint infrastructure necessary to foster regional trade and investments;

encourage, and as appropriate, support, the regional parties in implementing the conclusions of the Amman Summit.

In addition we will:

continue our efforts to promote peace between Israel, Lebanon and Syria;

actively seek the dismantling of the Arab boycott of Israel.

3. Sharing responsibility in other regions of the world

We will strengthen our joint efforts in preventive diplomacy, attacking the root causes of crisis and conflict and facilitate the movement from relief to long-term development.

We will:

- jointly assess the regional dimensions of the conflicts in Rwanda and in Burundi, jointly identify and plan for transitional priorities and support African-led regional initiatives to deal with these conflicts;
- support and participate in the UN/OAU sponsored Conference on the Great Lakes region;
- foster peace and economic reconstruction in Angola and Mozambique;
- intensify consultations in the field and deepen our policy dialogue including support for the consolidation of democratic institutions in El Salvador and Nicaragua;
- support the peace process in Guatemala and the implementation of agreements among the parties;

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- help Haiti strengthen democracy and the rule of law by improving the effectiveness of its judicial system;
- promote democracy, economic reforms and human rights in Cuba;
- support smooth, successful transitions for Hong Kong and Macao in 1997 and 1999 respectively under the terms of the 1984 Sino-British and 1987 Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration;
- work together to reduce the risk of regional conflict over the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the South China Sea;
- reinforce our joint efforts to forward the process of democratic reform in Burma;
- continue jointly to support the development of human rights and democratic practices in Cambodia; and
- continue to offer our strong support to the UN Secretary General in his efforts to find a lasting and just solution to the question of East Timor.

4. Development co-operation and humanitarian assistance

We have agreed to coordinate, cooperate and act jointly in development and humanitarian assistance activities.

To this end, we will establish a High-Level Consultative Group on Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance to review progress of existing efforts, to assess policies and priorities, and to identify projects and regions for further strengthening of co-operation. This group will complement and reinforce existing coordination arrangements. The following areas have already been identified:

(a) Development cooperation

We will:

- coordinate policies on democracy and civil society; on health and population; on development cooperation within the framework of international institutions and organisations; and on food security;
- develop a joint food security strategy in a number of selected countries;

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- coordinate our support for sustainable development and economic reform in the context of political liberalisation in the Special Programme for Africa; co-operate in the Horn of Africa initiative and on approaches vis-à-vis Southern Africa (including discussions with the Southern Africa Development Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the exploration of opportunities for collaborative long term assessments);
- coordinate assistance policies to promote the participation of women at all levels.

(b) Humanitarian Assistance

We will:

- cooperate in improving the effectiveness of international humanitarian relief agencies, such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the World Food Programme and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and in our planning and implementation of relief and reconstruction activities;
- consider joint missions whenever possible, starting in Northern Iraq, Liberia and Angola and hold early consultations on security in refugee camps as well as on the use of military assets in humanitarian actions; and
- work towards greater complementarity by: extending operational co-ordination to include the planning phase; continuing and improving U.S./EC operational information-sharing on humanitarian assistance; appointing U.S./EC humanitarian focal points on both sides of the Atlantic; and improving staff relations by (1) exchange of staff (2) mutual training of officials administering humanitarian aid.

5. Human Rights and Democracy

We will:

- consult (bilaterally and within the framework of the relevant bodies of the UN, particularly the UN Commission on Human Rights) on countries where there is serious violation of human rights, in order to coordinate policies and, as appropriate, develop joint initiatives; [NIGERIA]
- support jointly UN human rights activities, reinforcing the office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights and the Center for Human Rights and following up UN conferences on human rights;
- ensure greater integration of the OSCE human dimension into conflict prevention and the daily activities of OSCE (both regular meetings/contacts and missions on the ground);

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- work to expand legal rights for women and increase women's equal participation in decision-making processes, building on commitments made at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing; and
- aim at strengthening civics education in order to nurture the culture of democracy. To that end, we will explore the possibility of EU participation in developing the coalition of public figures, educators, and private sector representatives established at the CIVITAS conference in Prague in June 1995.

6. Cooperation in international organisations

We will increase cooperation in developing a blueprint for UN economic and social reform including better coordination of UN activities, review and adjustment of agencies' mandates and adoption of more efficient management techniques with a more transparent and accountable Secretariat. We will cooperate to find urgently needed solutions to the financial crisis of the UN system. We are determined to keep our commitments, including our financial obligations. At the same time, the UN must direct its resources to the highest priorities and must reform in order to meet its fundamental goals.

We will cooperate to improve coherence in international economic organisations' activities, encouraging them to strengthen coordination between themselves and reduce overlap (e.g. between UN Economic Bodies, WTO, Bretton Woods Institutions, OECD).

We will strengthen coordination in the OSCE framework, including conflict prevention/crisis management, confidence- and security-building measures, and the economic dimension.

We will follow-up global fisheries issues, in particular on the results of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly-Migratory Fish Stocks.

7. Non-proliferation, international disarmament and arms transfers

We will work together to promote Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty adherence by non-parties to the Treaty. We will coordinate actions to encourage non-adherents to act in accord with the principle of non-proliferation.

We will combine our efforts to conclude in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, in 1996, an effective, verifiable and universally applicable comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We will set up joint efforts for immediate negotiations on a Treaty for the Ban of Production of Fissile Materials for Weapons Purposes (Cut-Off Treaty).

We will coordinate on prudent extension of the Missile Technology Control Regime to non-participating countries, in order to control the spread of missile technology.

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We will cooperate with a view to revising the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons in order to promote new measures to increase its effectiveness. We will work to counter the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

We will support international efforts to curtail the use and proliferation of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). We will cooperate for a successful outcome of the Conference on the Revision of the 1980 Convention on Inhuman Weapons, especially on the provisions related to landmines. We will cooperate on the possible establishment of controls on the production, stockpiling and transfer of APLs.

We will continue efforts to establish a new multilateral arrangement for export controls - the new forum - to respond to threats caused by the proliferation of arms and arms-related technologies as well as sensitive dual use items.

We will coordinate on preventing the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, with particular emphasis on regions and countries of concern [U.S. text: such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea].

We will [EU text: seek to] provide support to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation underscoring the shared desire to resolve important proliferation challenges throughout the world.

II. RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES

We share a common concern to address effectively new global challenges which, without respect for national boundaries, present a serious threat to quality of life and which neither of us can overcome alone. We pledge our actions and resources to meet together the challenges of international crime, terrorism and drug trafficking, mass migration, nuclear safety, disease, and the degradation of the environment. Together we can make a difference.

1. Fight against organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking

We will cooperate on the fight against illegal drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime, and illicit trade in nuclear materials.

We will enhance bilateral cooperation and institutional contacts. We will also enhance the capabilities of criminal justice and investigative systems and promote the Rule of Law through international training programmes at regional institutions such as the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, the Italian Judicial Training Center, the Middle and East European Police Academy, and a similar administration of justice institution for the Western Hemisphere.

We will take steps to establish an information exchange mechanism on cooperation between the U.S. and the EU and its member States in the law enforcement and criminal justice fields, especially regarding activities in providing training, technical assistance, and equipment to other nations.

We will foster the exchange of law enforcement and criminal justice expertise between the U.S. and the EU in three areas:

- scientific and technological developments;
- exchanges of experts and observers between appropriate institutes and agencies; and
- the sharing of information such as studies and analyses of emerging trends in international criminal activity.

When mutually agreed, we will jointly prepare reports to include recommended courses of action.

We will discuss the possibility of establishing interim cooperative measures between competent U.S. authorities and the European Drugs Unit and begin implementing the possibilities provided for in the convention on EUROPOL to facilitate relations between EUROPOL and the U.S. Government.

We will examine possibilities for cooperation in support of the UN Drug Control Programme marine interdiction initiatives.

We will coordinate alternative development programmes to counter drug production.

We will jointly support the establishment of cooperative links with appropriate EU institutions such as the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction and the Comision Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas .

We will coordinate our counter-narcotics assistance programmes and projects in the Caribbean.

We will take action to strengthen the Dublin Group by reinforcing and supporting its members' counter-narcotic measures.

We will work to conclude an agreement in order to exchange, *inter alia*, sensitive information for the pre-clearance of shipments of essential and precursor chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs and cooperate in joint training programmes in chemical diversion control.

We will cooperate on assessing and responding to terrorist threats.

2. Immigration and asylum

We will:

- strengthen information exchanges on illegal immigration and on asylum taking into account, *inter alia*, the work of the Geneva Intergovernmental Consultative Group;
- cooperate in fighting against the traffic in illegal immigrants;
- cooperate in fighting against the traffic in women;
- exchange information on asylum trends and on successful asylum system reform;
- establish common responses to refugee crisis situations, notably, early-warning mechanisms and coordination;
- develop a common stance in United Nations High Commission for Refugees on temporary protection;
- coordinate positions on the Conference on Refugees and Migrants in the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- improve existing arrangements and exchanges of intelligence in areas of mutual concern, for example, forged identity documents and transport carriers' liability; and
- convene seminars in 1996 and compare the results of our respective studies on migration flows both in the U.S. and in the EU.

3. Legal and Judicial Cooperation

We will:

identify means of strengthening international judicial assistance and cooperation in the obtaining of evidence and other relevant information.

cooperate on judicial seizure and forfeiture of assets.

identify means to strengthen and improve international mechanisms for extradition, deportation, mutual legal assistance, and other cooperative action to ensure that international fugitives have "nowhere to hide".

cooperate in promoting the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International Institute for Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT).

4. Preservation of the environment

To improve the effectiveness of multilateral efforts to protect the global environment, we will enhance our exchange of views and coordination of negotiating positions, on major global issues.

We will also strengthen the exchange of information and reporting on global environmental issues such as climate change, biodiversity, ozone layer depletion, persistent organic pollutants, desertification and erosion, water quality and quantity, land-based sources of marine pollution, hazardous wastes and contaminated soils, forest issues, and trade and the environment.

We will work together at the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and other relevant bodies, including the Global Environmental Facility, to encourage the world at large in the challenge of caring for the global environment. We will continue working on the successful conclusion of CSD work on the sustainable management of all types of forests.

We will enhance our bilateral dialogue on regulatory cooperation, including by:

- extending cooperation on chemicals issues, such as Prior Informed Consent for the trade in hazardous chemicals, harmonisation of classification and labelling, and reduction of risks from hazardous substances, in particular building on our joint call for actions in the OECD to reduce exposures to lead;
- continuing work on biotechnology issues, such as work on mutual acceptance of data for assessment and releases of genetically modified organisms; and
- enhancing work on air pollution, including efforts to decrease emissions from mobile sources and to assess the possibility of developing comparable emissions standards.

We will undertake coordinated initiatives for dissemination of environmental technologies, including in developing countries. Furthermore, we will utilise the Climate Technology Initiative and proposals for an international clearinghouse on environmental technologies and practices. Private sector involvement will be a key aspect of this process.

We will engage in a broad and substantive dialogue on ways and means to limit and reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases, including CO₂ emissions.

5. Population Issues

We will coordinate to implement the International Conference on Population and Development ("Cairo Conference") Programme of Action. We will work to sustain support

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for family planning and expand access to reproductive health programmes in the context of a comprehensive approach to population stabilisation and sustainable development.

We will work together to strengthen the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral population assistance programmes.

6. Nuclear safety

We will promote the ratification of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety.

We will coordinate positions on the negotiations in the International Convention on Radio-active Residues.

We will improve existing bilateral assistance coordination in the field of nuclear safety, extending to on-site and off-site nuclear emergency preparedness, including in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS, as well as special G-7 Chernobyl assistance. We will co-operate in the preparation of the Moscow Conference on Nuclear Safety.

7. Health

We will establish a U.S.-EU task force to develop and implement an effective global early warning system and response network for communicable diseases.

We are taking steps to provide for increased training opportunities and professional exchanges in the area of communicable diseases and encourage participation in U.S. and EU programmes by scientists from developing countries.

We will coordinate our requests to other nations and international organisations calling for action against emerging and re-emerging communicable diseases. We will encourage follow-up of recent WHO resolutions dealing with outbreak and reporting responsibilities and strengthened response centres.

We will cooperate bilaterally and within the framework of the WHO and other international organisations as appropriate on respective programmes on health-related matters (AIDS and other communicable diseases, cancer, drug addiction) and identify specific areas for cooperation, especially in the research field.

III. CONTRIBUTING TO THE EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS

We are each other's largest trading and investment partners. Our economic prosperity is inextricably linked. At the same time, our economic and trade relations affect third countries

and regions. It is our responsibility to contribute effectively to international economic stability and growth and to broaden our bilateral economic dialogue.

We have a special responsibility to strengthen the multilateral trading system, to support the World Trade Organisation, and to lead the way in opening markets for trade and investment.

We will create a [Transatlantic Marketplace] by progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital between us.

1. Strengthening the multilateral trading system

a) Consolidating the WTO

We will promote adherence to multilateral rules and commitments, including the effective functioning of the dispute settlement system, and secure the full implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements by all WTO Members.

We will work to ensure a successful and substantive outcome for the Singapore Ministerial meeting.

We will cooperate on the accession of new members, notably China and Russia.

We will promote the effective management and operation of the WTO.

b) Uruguay Round Unfinished Business

We will work for the completion of the unfinished business of Marrakech with regard to goods and services. We are committed to the successful conclusion of the current negotiations in all services sectors by the agreed timetables. The most immediate deadlines are 30 April 1996 for telecommunications and 30 June 1996 for maritime services.

c) Financial services

We agree to concert our efforts to promote liberalisation of financial services on a worldwide basis. In particular, we will seek to ensure that the interim agreement concluded in July 1995 is succeeded by a more substantial package of permanent liberalisation commitments from a critical mass of WTO members.

d) Procurement

We will promote the launching by Ministers in Singapore of negotiations within the WTO aimed at covering substantially all government procurement and WTO members.

e) IPR

We will cooperate to ensure the full implementation of the TRIPs Agreement and improve the level of IPR protection throughout the world. We will work to develop a comprehensive agenda for future TRIPs negotiations within the WTO.

f) New Issues

We will work together in the WTO and /or other appropriate fora. We will give priority to:

(i) **Environment:** The report to the Singapore Ministerial should set out clear recommendations for decisions and a process for further work to ensure that trade and environmental measures are mutually supportive.

(ii) **Investment:** We will work closely together in formulating our respective policies. This co-operation should, in particular, bear fruit in a successful conclusion, as called for in the 1995 OECD Ministerial Declaration, of the negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), espousing strong principles on international investment liberalisation and protection. Meanwhile, we will work to develop discussion of the issue with our partners in the WTO.

(iii) **Competition:** We will pursue work on the scope for multilateral action in the fields of trade and competition policy. We will promote a dialogue between competition authorities from the U.S. and the EU and other countries with a goal of developing ways to promote effective antitrust regimes throughout the world.

(iv) **Labour standards:** We will join our efforts in the WTO and other fora with a view to dissipating various misunderstandings and preoccupations of trading partners regarding the relationship between trade and internationally recognised labour standards.

g) Market Access: Creating Additional Trading Opportunities

We will cooperate in creating additional trading opportunities bilaterally and throughout the world in conformity with our WTO commitments. In view of the importance of the information society, we are launching a specific exercise in order to attempt to conclude an information technology agreement.

In the perspective of the WTO Singapore Ministerial Meeting, we will explore the possibility of agreeing on a mutually-satisfactory package of tariff reductions [EU text : on industrial products] and will consider which, if any, Uruguay Round obligations on tariffs can be implemented on an accelerated basis.

We will work ambitiously to improve the access we both give to products from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

[U.S. text : h) *International Customs Cooperation*

We will work together in the World Customs Organisation and the International Chamber of Commerce to develop a comprehensive model of norms and standards for customs procedures throughout the world which will promote *inter alia* increased transparency and harmonised approaches to classification, valuation and rules of origin.]

[U.S. text : i) *Illicit payments*

We will combat corruption and bribery by implementing the 1994 OECD Recommendation on Bribery in International Transactions.]

2. [Overall concept to be named later]

A [overall concept to be named later] will include the following actions, also taking into consideration the recommendations of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue:

a) *Joint study*

We will carry out a joint study on ways to facilitate trade in goods and services and further reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers.

b) *Confidence building*

As part of a confidence building process, we will reinforce our efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and disputes.

c) *Standards, certification and regulatory issues*

We will aim to conclude an agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment (which includes certification and testing procedures) for certain sectors as soon as possible. We will continue ongoing work in several sectors and identify others for further work [U.S. text : with special attention to the automotive sector].

We will cooperate closely in the international standard setting process [U.S. text : and will seek the maximum practical transparency, participation, and non-discrimination.]

We will strengthen regulatory cooperation, in particular, by encouraging regulatory agencies to give a high priority to cooperation with their respective transatlantic counterparts so as to address technical and other non-tariff barriers to trade resulting from divergent regulatory processes. We will, in particular, encourage a collaborative approach between the U.S. and the EU in testing and certification procedures by promoting greater compatibility of standards and health- and safety-related measures. To this end, we will seek to develop pilot cooperative projects.

d) Veterinary and Phytosanitary

We will conclude an agreement to establish a framework for determining equivalence of veterinary standards and procedures for all live animals and animal products.

We will enhance the established cooperation on plant health issues and in the area of pesticide residues regulation.

e) Procurement

We will aim to increase substantially in 1996 and beyond the coverage of EU/U.S. bilateral commitments on public procurement under the Government Procurement Agreement and to coordinate in developing proposals on information technology under the Agreement.

f) Intellectual Property Rights

With a view to reinvigorating our efforts to solve remaining IPR problems, we will hold a seminar during 1996 addressing current and future IPR issues.

g) Customs Cooperation

We will endeavour to conclude by the end of 1996 a customs cooperation and mutual assistance agreement between the U.S. and the EC. The Agreement should cover :

customs cooperation: simplification of customs procedures, computerisation (information, data exchange, common access to databases etc.), consultation within international organisations, methods of work;

mutual assistance: exchange of enforcement information, increase investigative co-operation in customs matters, protection of intellectual property rights, commercial fraud, illicit nuclear traffic, trade in severely restricted chemicals; and

programmes for the exchange of officials.

h) Information Society, Information Technology and Telecommunications

We will expand and develop the bilateral Information Society Dialogue, in order to further common understanding of global issues implying access to information services through public institutions, regulatory reforms, and technological cooperation, including the continuation of expert-level discussions in the following areas:

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- interconnection and interoperability, including standardisation issues (particularly for interfaces, network terminating equipment, mobile telephones, DVB/HDTV);
- universal service;
- procompetitive interconnection policies and principles;
- access to information and the protection of IPR;
- satellite policy,
- commercial communications;
- privacy and data protection; and
- the impact on society, including public services and employment.

This dialogue will also address those new legislative and regulatory developments which are proposed or are being prepared to achieve progress in these areas, including questions of regulatory transparency.

In the context of enhanced cooperation in science and technology we will work towards the reduction of obstacles to cooperation in research and development in the field of information and communications and jointly support the implementation of the G-7 global projects on the Information Society, aiming to spur innovation and ensure interconnection and interoperability. Furthermore, we will exchange information on on-going and future research programmes in the field of information communication technology to foster concrete bilateral cooperation actions in research and development.

We will also discuss regulatory issues relating to online interactive and international service provision, in order to maximise their development which is essential for the success of the transition towards an Information Society on both sides of the Atlantic.

We will cooperate on the integration of developing countries in the global information society, initially through our support for the Information Society Conference in South Africa in 1996 and through our participation in the ITU.

1) *Competition*

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We will pursue and build on bilateral cooperation in the immediate term based on the EC-U.S. Agreement of 1991. We will examine the options for deepening cooperation on competition matters including the possibility of a further agreement.

j) Data protection

We will discuss data protection issues with a view to facilitating information flows, while addressing the risks to privacy.

k) Transport

We will:

- establish a working group for consultations on design and implementation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS);
- improve EU-U.S. cooperation on air traffic management (ATM); and
- hold consultations on maritime transport safety and crew qualifications.

l) Energy

We will intensify contacts and cooperation on energy related issues - including through contacts in multilateral fora where appropriate - such as the environmental implications of energy policy, regulatory frameworks for the energy sector, on technical assistance activities to third countries and on energy technology.

m) Biotechnology

We will encourage regulatory cooperation, including with respect to genetically modified organisms and expand bilateral cooperation in the preparation of multilateral meetings/negotiations (UN and Biodiversity Convention, FAO, OECD, CODEX).

We will continue the activities of the EU-U.S. Biotechnology Task Force and in this context will promote joint research efforts in the fields of neuro-informatics and marine biotechnology.

n) Safety and Health

We will explore the scope for an agreement on exchanging information on issues affecting health and safety at work, such as occupational safety and health standards, the development of regulations, high risk activity, carcinogenic substances at the workplace, toxicology, testing programmes, education and information programmes, and collection of statistics and data.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

We will explore the establishment of improved mechanisms for the timely exchange of information related to the general safety of products including the withdrawal of products from the market.

3. **[EU: Macro-economic issues] [U.S.: Jobs and growth]**

[EU Text: *Macroeconomic cooperation*

We will develop exchanges on macroeconomic issues in the light of the importance of a sound macroeconomic framework for the development of an harmonious relationship, particularly in the context of the EU's progressive advance towards EMU.]

We will expand our ongoing dialogue on financial services to include discussion of the financial and economic aspects of our respective relations with third countries. (U.S. wants to move to III.2)

Employment

Given the overarching importance of job creation, we pledge to cooperate in the follow-up to the Detroit Jobs Conference and the G-7 Summit initiative. We look forward to further cooperation in the run-up to the G-7 Jobs Conference in France and at the next G-7 Summit in the Summer of 1996 and in other fora such as the OECD.

We will establish a joint working group on employment and labour-related issues. We will intensify the dialogue, in particular on: new forms of labour-management cooperation; increased investment in human resources, including education and skills training; smoothing the transition from school-to-work and job-to-job; active labour market policies and the relationship between work and welfare; employment and new technologies; and encouraging entrepreneurialism.

IV. BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

We recognise that the transatlantic relationship can only be truly secure in the coming century if future generations understand its importance as well as their parents and grandparents did. We are committed to fostering an active and vibrant transatlantic community by deepening and broadening the commercial, social, cultural, scientific, and educational ties that bind us.

1. **Transatlantic Business Dialogue**

We will support, and encourage the development of, the transatlantic business relationship, as an integral part of our wider efforts to strengthen our bilateral dialogue. The successful conference of EU and U.S. business leaders which took place in Seville on 10/11 November was an important step in this direction. We welcome the fact that the participants were able to agree on a series of joint recommendations to build an even stronger framework within which trade, investment, capital and technology can flow across the Atlantic. We commend them for encouraging both business communities to continue to devote attention to possible improvements in the transatlantic commercial relationship.

We have studied carefully the recommendations adopted at Seville, and have already incorporated a number of them into our present Action Plan. Our officials will work closely together with our business leaders on both sides in considering follow-up to the many other suggestions arising from the Seville meeting, and will report at the next EU-U.S. Summit.

2. Broadening science and technology cooperation

We will negotiate a new, comprehensive EU-U.S. S&T Cooperation Agreement by 1997, to address the following points: [EU text : access to research programmes, where possible]; defined areas of cooperation; modalities and methods of work; and protection, dissemination and exploitation of results.

We will work to conclude the agreement on Intelligent Manufacturing Systems (advanced technologies and robotics).

Recognising that scientific and technological advances underlie our ability to meet global challenges and foster economic growth, we will promote cooperative science and technology projects in support of topics identified in this document.

In addition, we will work to identify collaborative projects and exchange information to address cross-border issues such as transportation and health. Examples of specific projects include: intermodal transport and fast transshipment techniques; intelligent transportation systems; the study and forecasting of travel behaviour; development of a malaria vaccine; and the study of environmental health and the effects of radiation.

3. People to people links

We will:

encourage our citizens to increase their contacts in diverse fora - youth, professionals, think tanks etc. - with a view to deepening grassroots support for

the Transatlantic relationship and enriching the flow of ideas for the solution of common problems;

work for the early creation of the joint consortia, implementation of the Fulbright Awards, and other activities provided for in our Agreement on Cooperation in Higher Education and Vocational Training;

cooperate on the reform of higher education in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the NIS and Mongolia by identifying and assessing those projects of the EU's TEMPUS programme which already include U.S. partner universities and exploring possibilities of wider participation of U.S. universities in TEMPUS projects;

encourage the study of each other's systems of government as well as the histories, cultures and languages of our communities;

encourage voluntary cooperation and dissemination of information for the mutual recognition of university studies and degrees within the U.S. and EU member States;

examine ways to increase private support for educational exchanges to include scholarships and intern programmes;

exchange information and cooperate on innovations related to vocational training. We intend to convene a conference on vocational training in Spring 1996;

examine ways new technologies might be employed to link education and training establishments including schools in the U.S. with those in Europe; and

encourage "sister cities" to promote exchanges.

4. Information and Culture

We will study ways and means of:

- encouraging artistic and cultural cooperation projects, such as exchanges in the field of the visual arts, theatre, ballet, orchestras and musical groups, the co-production of films and TV programmes;
- spreading knowledge and dissemination of literary creativity, including exploring with the private sector the sponsorship of an EU-U.S. prize for literature; and

- spreading knowledge of cultural and artistic heritage programmes.

We will establish sites on the INTERNET to provide quick and easy access to the Transatlantic Initiative, information on EU and U.S. studies and descriptions of library holdings.

We will consult and cooperate on the preparation of a reciprocal medium-term communications strategy which will aim to increase public awareness on both sides of the Atlantic of the EU-U.S. dimension.