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United States Leadership On Bosnia



**The White House
Office of Public Liaison
December, 1995**

United States Leadership On Bosnia



United States Department of State

November 1995

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**Letter From President Clinton to All Members
of Congress (Nov. 2, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 2, 1995

Dear Members of Congress and Senators:

The negotiations beginning in Dayton, Ohio, offer the best chance for peace in Bosnia since the war began nearly four years ago. Continued American leadership is vital if we are to seize that chance and do what is right for Bosnia, for Europe and for the United States. I want to take this opportunity to update you on our Balkan peace initiative and to urge your support for American leadership as the peace process moves forward.

Peace in Bosnia serves America's values and interests.

The American people are rightly outraged by the atrocities suffered by the Bosnian people -- mass executions, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, rape and terror, disease and starvation. Every day, we learn more about the slaughter of innocent civilians in Srebrenica. Making peace is the only way to end the terrible human toll of this war.

Making peace also will prevent a war we have managed to contain from spreading. The Balkans border some of our key NATO allies and many of the new and fragile European democracies that America already has done so much to promote and defend. If the war in Bosnia re-ignites -- as it almost certainly will if a settlement is not achieved -- it could spread to these countries and spark a much greater conflagration. To prevent that possibility, we must do everything we can to end the war in Bosnia now.

Finally, making peace in Bosnia will promote our goal of a peaceful, democratic and undivided Europe -- the same goal America's sons and daughters fought two world wars and a Cold War to achieve. A Europe at peace will make America more secure and more prosperous. It will give us strong partners to take on common problems like terrorism, international crime and drug smuggling, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It will mean more stable and secure trading partners to create growth and good jobs for the future on both sides of the Atlantic. This century teaches us that our own well-being and that of Europe are inextricably tied together.

Each of these interests -- ending the suffering, stopping the war from spreading, building a Europe at peace -- can only be met if America continues to lead.

The progress we already have made in Bosnia is a product of our leadership. NATO's bombing campaign -- led by American pilots and their crews -- stopped Serb attacks against Sarajevo and the other safe areas. Our negotiating team brought the parties to the peace table in Dayton. If an agreement is signed, America -- through NATO -- must help secure it.

Right now, our focus must be on the peace process in Dayton. Only the parties to the war can end it -- we cannot impose a settlement on them. But our negotiators can help them along the way. American mediation efforts have already secured a Bosnia-wide cease fire. The parties have also agreed to the basic principles of a settlement: Bosnia will remain a single state; there will be an equitable distribution of territory; and there will be free elections and democratic institutions of government at the regional and national levels.

But many difficult obstacles remain to a comprehensive settlement that will end the fighting once and for all and lay the foundation for a lasting peace. These include territorial arrangements; the status of Sarajevo; the separation of forces; and procedures for free elections. In the days and weeks ahead, our negotiating team will be working with the parties to resolve these and other issues in Dayton. I urge Congress to be as supportive as possible of our sustained effort to bring the parties together.

If the parties reach a comprehensive settlement, I believe, as I have said many times over the past two and half years, that NATO must help secure it -- and the United States, as NATO's leader, must participate in the implementation effort.

After four years of war, a credible international military presence will be needed to give the parties confidence to live up to their agreement and breathing room to begin reconciliation and rebuilding. NATO -- proven, strong, effective -- is that force. And the United States is the heart of NATO. If we fail to do our part in implementation, we would undermine our leadership of NATO. We would weaken the alliance itself. And we would undercut the chance for peace in Bosnia to the detriment of our own interests. Indeed, the parties to the war -- including the Bosnian government -- have said they will not sign a peace agreement unless they believe the United States will help implement it.

Let me state once again that our troops would only be deployed if the parties reach and are committed to a strong peace agreement. American soldiers would make up roughly a third of the NATO force. They would operate under NATO command, with strong rules of engagement, a defined mission and a clear exit strategy. They would not be asked to keep a peace that cannot be kept. They would be asked to do our part in helping peace take hold.

My Administration is committed to consulting closely with you and every member of Congress as the negotiations for peace continue. If an agreement is reached, I will request an expression of support from Congress for American participation in a NATO implementation force. But we are not there yet. Unless the parties reach a settlement in Dayton, there will be nothing to secure.

At this defining moment for Bosnia -- and for our own values and interests -- it is vital that America speak with one voice. We must continue to work together to fulfill our common objective for peace in a part of the world that has known too much war. If we do -- and if America continues to lead -- I am convinced we can succeed. It is in that spirit that I urge your support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline.

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**Newsweek Op-Ed by President Clinton
(Nov. 6, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

Why Bosnia Matters to America

Our values, interests and security are all at stake

BY PRESIDENT CLINTON

OVER THE LAST FOUR years, the world has witnessed images we thought had been banished from Europe forever: sunken-eyed prisoners; defenseless men shot down into mass graves. Bosnia-Herzegovina, once a symbol of multi-ethnic tolerance, has been Europe's bloodiest battleground since World War II.

But now, in Dayton, Ohio—where the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia are beginning negotiations aimed at ending the brutality—horror is giving way to hope. America has led the way to the best chance for peace since the war began. American pilots and their NATO colleagues waged a bombing campaign that halted Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas. America's determined diplomacy brought the parties to the peace table. And in Dayton, America's negotiating team—together with our European and Russian partners—is working with them to make a lasting peace.

Peace in Bosnia matters to America—to our values and our interests. We have an urgent stake in stopping the slaughter, preventing the war from spreading, and building a Europe at peace.

The war in Bosnia has been waged chiefly against innocent civilians, who have suffered mass executions, ethnic cleansing, terror, and systematic rape. Murder in the markets and the playgrounds of Sarajevo has outraged our nation and our conscience—for the violence done to the Bosnian people does violence to the principles on which America stands. The only way to stop the killing for good is to make peace.

Peace would also prevent the war from spreading. Bosnia lies amidst some of America's NATO allies and many of Europe's fragile new democracies. If war reignites in Bosnia, it could spark a much wider conflagration. In 1914, a gunshot in Sarajevo launched the first of two world wars. We must not let the century

remain a single state, with an equitable distribution of territory, free elections and democratic government. But many difficult obstacles remain to be overcome in Dayton before a comprehensive settlement is reached. There is no guarantee the parties will succeed.

If peace is achieved, NATO must help secure it—and

putting American soldiers in harm's way. I will not deploy U.S. troops to Bosnia unless the parties commit to a solid peace agreement. I will insist on NATO command and control that protects our troops and ensures the effectiveness of the operation. Our troops will take their orders from the American general who commands NATO forces—no one else. They will have clear rules of engagement, a carefully defined mission, and an exit strategy. As the peace process moves forward, I will continue to consult closely with Congress. If an agreement is reached, I will request an expression of Congressional support for American participation in a NATO implementation force.

I was proud to see that when the Balkan leaders arrived in Dayton, they were welcomed by hundreds of Americans of diverse faiths and backgrounds, demonstrating how deeply our nation hopes for peace. Standing together, they reflected the foundation of America's strength: *E Pluribus Unum*—from many, we are one. The war of ethnic and religious hatred in Bosnia strikes at the heart of the American ideal. But there was a time when Bosnia, too, found unity in its diversity. Now is the time for Bosnia to find that unity in peace—for the orphans of Sarajevo; for the untold victims of Srebrenica; for the countless men and women from every ethnic community, driven from their homes and divided from their families. And now is the time for the United States to stand by our principles and stand up for our interests. We must be leaders for peace. That is our responsibility as Americans.



Seizing the chance: The United States has taken the lead in working to end the slaughter

close with gunfire in Sarajevo.

Making peace in Bosnia will help build a peaceful, undivided Europe. A united Europe will be America's best partner in security and trade. But Europe will not come together with a brutal conflict raging at its heart. Europe will not come together if the forces of intolerance triumph.

To seize this opportunity for peace, America must continue to lead. Already, American mediators have helped the parties agree to a cease-fire and to the basic principles of a settlement. Bosnia will re-

main a single state, with an equitable distribution of territory, free elections and democratic government. But many difficult obstacles remain to be overcome in Dayton before a comprehensive settlement is reached. There is no guarantee the parties will succeed. If peace is achieved, NATO must help secure it—and

as NATO's leader, America must take part. Only NATO—proven, strong, effective—can give the Bosnian people the breathing space they need to begin to reconcile and rebuild. If the U.S. does not do its part in a NATO mission, our partners may turn their backs on Bosnia as well. The hard-won peace could be lost. We would also weaken NATO—the anchor of America's and Europe's common security—and jeopardize U.S. leadership in Europe.

As President, I have no responsibility more grave than

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**Remarks by President Clinton to the American
Negotiating Team (Oct. 31, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 31, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Roosevelt Room

11:35 A.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. I have just met with Secretary Christopher and our Bosnia negotiating team, led by Ambassador Holbrooke. As you know, they are preparing to leave for Dayton, Ohio, in just a few moments. There, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia will start direct negotiations which we hope will lead to a peaceful, lasting settlement in Bosnia.

I want to repeat today what I told President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic when we met in New York last week. We have come to a defining moment in Bosnia. This is the best chance we've had for peace since the war began. It may be the last chance we have for a very long time. Only the parties to this terrible conflict can end it. The world now looks to them to turn the horror of war to the promise of peace.

The United States and our partners -- Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom -- must do everything in our power to support them. That is what I have just instructed Secretary Christopher and our team to do in the days ahead in Dayton. We will succeed only if America continues to lead.

Already our military strength through NATO and our diplomatic determination have advanced the possibility of peace in Bosnia. We can't stop now. The responsibilities of leadership are real, but the benefits are greater. We see them all around the world -- a reduced nuclear threat, democracy in Haiti, peace breaking out in the Middle East and in Northern Ireland. In Bosnia, as elsewhere, when the United States leads we can make progress. And if we don't, progress will be much more problematic.

Making peace in Bosnia is important to America. Making peace will end the terrible toll of this war -- the

innocent lives lost, the futures destroyed. For four years the people of Bosnia have suffered the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II -- mass executions, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, rape and terror, starvation and disease. We continue to learn more and more even in the present days about the slaughters in Srebrenica.

The best way -- the only way -- to stop these horrors is to make peace. Making peace will prevent the war from spreading. So far, we have been able to contain this conflict to the former Yugoslavia. But the Balkans lie at the heart of Europe, next door to several of our key NATO allies and to some of the new, fragile European democracies. If the war there reignites, it could spread and spark a much larger conflict, the kind of conflict that has drawn Americans into two European wars in this century. We have to end the war in Bosnia and do it now.

Making peace will advance our goal of a peaceful, democratic and undivided Europe, a Europe at peace with extraordinary benefits to our long-term security and prosperity, a Europe at peace with partners to meet the challenges of the new century -- challenges that affect us here at home like terrorism and drug trafficking, organized crime and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. A peaceful, democratic, undivided Europe will be that kind of partner.

In Dayton, our diplomats face a tremendous challenge. There is no guarantee they will succeed. America can help the parties negotiate a settlement, but we cannot impose a peace. In recent weeks, thanks to our mediation efforts, the parties to the war have made real progress. The parties have put into effect a Bosnia-wide cease-fire. They have agreed to the basic principles of a settlement. Bosnia will remain a single state comprised of two entities -- but, I repeat, a single state. There must be free elections and democratic institutions of government at the national and regional levels.

Now, beyond this, many difficult issues remain to be resolved. These include the internal boundary between the Bosnia-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic, the status of Sarajevo, the practical steps that need to be taken to separate hostile forces, and the procedures for free elections. That's just a few of the difficult issues this team will have to confront beginning today.

I urge the parties to negotiate seriously for the good of their own people. So much is riding on the success in Dayton, and the whole world is watching. If the parties do reach a

settlement, NATO must help to secure it; and the United States, as NATO's leader, must participate in such an effort.

Again I say, there is no substitute for American leadership. After so many years of violence and bloodshed, a credible international military presence in Bosnia is needed to give the parties confidence to live up to their own agreements and to give them time to begin the long, hard work of rebuilding and living together again. NATO is the one organization with the track record and the strength to implement a settlement.

And as I've said many times, the United States, the source of NATO's military strength, must participate. If we don't participate in the implementation force our NATO partners, understandably, would reconsider their own commitments. We would undermine American leadership of the Alliance. We would weaken the Alliance itself. And the hard-won peace in Bosnia could be lost.

American troops would not be deployed -- I say this again -- would not be deployed unless and until the parties reach a peace agreement. We must first have a peace agreement. And that is what I would urge the American people and the members of Congress to focus on over the next few days. They would, if going into Bosnia, operate under NATO command, with clear rules of engagement and a clearly defined mission. They would not be asked to keep a peace that cannot be kept. But they would make sure we do our part in helping peace to hold.

As the peace process moves forward I will continue to consult closely with the Congress. If a peace agreement is reached I will request an expression of support in Congress for committing United States troops to a NATO implementation force. Our foreign policy works best when we work together. I want the widest possible support for peace.

But now it would be premature to request an expression of support because we can't decide many of the details of implementation until an agreement is clearly shaped and defined. Let me stress again, we aren't there yet; there are still difficult obstacles ahead. The focus on Dayton must be on securing the peace. Without peace there will be nothing for us to secure.

Earlier this month in New Jersey, I had the privilege of spending time with His Holiness Pope Paul -- Pope John Paul II. At the end of our meeting, the Pope said something to me I would like to repeat. He said, you know, I am not a young man. I have lived through most of this century. This century began

with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let it end with a war in Sarajevo.

All of us must do our part to hear the Pope's plea. Our conscience as a nation devoted to freedom and tolerance demands it. Our conscience as a nation that wants to end this mindless slaughter demands it. Our enduring interest in the security and stability of Europe demand it. This is our challenge. And I'm determined to do everything I can to see that America meets that challenge.

Thank you.

Q Mr. President, what is the effect of the House resolution on these talks? And do you feel hemmed in by them?

THE PRESIDENT: No. No, I wouldn't expect it to have any effect on the talks. I think we have to get the peace agreement first. I expect to consult intensively with the leaders of Congress, beginning -- I believe tomorrow the congressional leadership is coming in and I expect to talk to them about Bosnia in detail, and then to keep working with the congressional leadership and with members of Congress who are interested in this right along, all the way through the process. And I expect them to say that they want to ask questions and to have them answered before they would agree to the policy that I will embark on.

Q Mr. President, looking back at the advice that General Colin Powell gave you on Bosnia when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that bad advice, his reluctance to use air power to force the parties into negotiations?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me tell you, today we're starting a peace process. And we have done things that have brought us to this point. I believe we have done the right things. But I think the American people should be focused on peace and on the process and the work before us.

Q Mr. President, are you going to make peace with the Republicans tomorrow and strike some sort of debt extension agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I look forward to having the opportunity to discuss that with them. I know Senator Dole and Leon Panetta have had a brief conversation about it. I know that a lot of others are contacting the Congress about it. So we'll have a chance to talk about that tomorrow as well.

Q Are you willing to accept a short-term, through November 29th, as has been suggested, extension?

THE PRESIDENT: I think any responsible extension is a move forward. I think the main thing is we want to send a message to the world and to our own financial markets and to our own people that America honors its commitments; that we are not going to see the first example in the history of the republic where we don't pay our bills.

Thank you very much.

Q Mr. President, have you been briefed on the Aldrich Ames damage assessment?

Q Are you happy about Canada?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

END

11:45 A.M. EST

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**Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher
Opening the Dayton Proximity Peace Talks
(Nov. 1, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

(Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio)

For Immediate Release

November 1, 1995

STATEMENT BY
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
OPENING THE BALKAN PROXIMITY PEACE TALKS

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
November 1, 1995

Good afternoon. President Izetbegovic, President Tudjman, President Milosevic, Prime Minister Bildt, Deputy Minister Ivanov, honored colleagues: on behalf of President Clinton and the American people, I welcome you to the United States for the start of these historic proximity peace talks. My special thanks go to the people of Dayton, Ohio and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base for their magnificent support.

We have an urgent and important purpose today. We are here to give Bosnia-Herzegovina a chance to be a country at peace, not a killing field -- a place where people can sleep in their homes, walk to work, and worship in their churches, mosques, and synagogues without fear of violence or death. We are here to prevent a wider war that would undermine the security of Europe at a time when the whole continent should finally be at peace.

The talks that begin here today offer the best chance to achieve peace since this war began four years ago. If we fail, the war will resume, and future generations will surely hold us accountable for the consequences that would follow. The lights so recently lit in Sarajevo would once again be extinguished. Death and starvation would once again spread across the Balkans, threatening to engulf the region and possibly Europe itself.

To the three Presidents, I say that it is within your power to chart a better future for the people of the former Yugoslavia. The United States, the European Union, Russia, and others in the international community will help you succeed. But while the world can and will help you make peace, only you can ensure that this process will succeed. And you must begin today.

As President Clinton said yesterday, the "whole world is watching." We must persevere until an agreement is reached and the promise of this hopeful moment is fulfilled.

There are some who say these talks can only end in failure. They have written off the Balkans as a region cursed by its past to a future of endless hatred and retribution. I have heard those arguments before -- in the Middle East, where Arabs and Israelis are now ending an armed conflict that has lasted ten times as long as the one in the former Yugoslavia. I have heard the same arguments applied to Northern Ireland, where a centuries-old conflict may be nearing resolution. I have heard them applied to South Africa, where former enemies have abandoned

apartheid to build a multi-ethnic democracy. I know that negotiations can work when people have the courage and patience to make them work.

We have reached this moment because the international community took firm measures to enforce its mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and because for the first time, all sides have agreed to a cease-fire, to constitutional principles, and to a common set of institutions for a single Bosnian state. We must all resolve to stay on the path that brought us here. For each of us, the stakes are enormous.

For the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whatever their heritage, the success of our efforts can mean an end to the killing and the beginning of hope for a normal life. The people of Bosnia deserve a chance to live as they once did -- in harmony with their neighbors in a country at peace.

For the nations at war, the stakes are clear as well. They have a choice between two futures -- a future of peace and integration, or a future of violence, poverty and isolation from Europe and the world. We must always remember: as this region is engulfed in flames and violence, a new Europe is being built around it. Some of the fastest growing economies in Europe today are found in this region. The new democracies of Central Europe are resolving disputes with their neighbors and earning the right to be considered for membership in NATO and the European Union.

When the Cold War ended, nobody imagined that once vibrant cities like Sarajevo, Mostar, and Vukovar would be set so tragically apart from Europe by the sight of tanks and the sound of gunfire. The door to Europe and the West is still open to the nations of the region, if you end this war peacefully and respect the human rights of your people. You alone can choose your destiny.

The United States and the international community also have a vital stake in sustaining progress toward peace. If war in the Balkans is reignited, it could spark a wider conflict, like those that drew American soldiers in huge numbers into two European wars in this century.

If this conflict continues, and certainly if it spreads, it would jeopardize our efforts to promote stability and security in Europe as a whole. It would threaten the viability of NATO, which has been the bedrock of European security for 50 years.

If the conflict continues, so would the worst atrocities Europe has seen since World War II. As President Clinton has said, the "only way to stop these horrors is to make peace." We must and we will stay engaged to advance our interests and to uphold our values.

The United States and its Contact Group partners will make every effort to help you reach an agreement that will settle outstanding questions over territory, constitutional arrangements, elections and the return of refugees. We have worked hard to create the right atmosphere for progress at this site. And I know that Ambassador Holbrooke, Prime Minister Bildt, and Deputy Minister Ivanov will continue to provide the most effective and evenhanded mediation that is possible.

If peace is to endure, we must do more than separate the military forces. For peace to last, several key conditions must be met.

First, Bosnia-Herzegovina must continue as a single state within its internationally recognized borders, and with a single international personality. The principles to which the parties have agreed provide a firm foundation for achieving that goal.

Second, the settlement must take into account the special history and significance of Sarajevo and its environs. Sarajevo was the city where the first of this century's two bloody world wars began. But ten years ago, it was also the city where the world came together to celebrate the Olympics -- a city of many communities, living, working, and prospering together in peace. It must have a chance to become that wonderful city again. It deserves that chance.

Third, any agreement must guarantee that the human rights of all the citizens of the region are respected. This terrible war has uprooted people from every ethnic community. All must be able to return home or to receive just compensation. And it is vital that all those who have committed atrocities are held accountable. Full investigation of all such charges, regardless of where they occurred, must be undertaken swiftly and firmly. And responsibility must be assigned.

Finally, we also believe that these talks must establish a process of normalizing the status of Eastern Slavonia, as a part of Croatia and in a peaceful manner.

If and when a formal agreement is reached-- but only then-- the United States and its partners, including Russia, will provide military personnel to help implement the peace. NATO is the only organization with the resources and capacity to perform this task. It has already begun planning for a robust peace implementation force.

For each nation participating in the implementation force, deploying soldiers is a difficult and solemn choice. The American people and the United States Congress are asking serious and appropriate questions about U.S. participation in the Implementation Force. They will watch very closely for signs that the parties are finally ready to lay down their arms and to begin a lasting, stable peace.

The United States will not send troops where there is no peace to keep. Before we deploy, the parties must reach a peace agreement. They must be prepared to stick to it. They must use the time when our troops are on the ground to consolidate it. And the Implementation Force must have a clear exit strategy.

The international community is also determined to help the people of the region rebuild their institutions, their economies, and their lives. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will help to organize and supervise elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which ought to come at the earliest possible date, to ensure that they are free and fair. Under the leadership of the EU, a major effort to support the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be launched. Lasting security will depend on bringing the region's economy back to life.

In other words, once an agreement is signed, a multi-dimensional effort will begin to help ensure its success. It will be backed by soldiers, diplomats, bankers and engineers, by governments and by private organizations from countries around the world.

We know that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not easily recover from four years of ethnic cleansing and destruction. Nothing we do will erase our memory of the violence or bring back its victims.

But if we succeed, we can make it possible for the sons and daughters of those who have died to live without fear. If we succeed, we can ensure that the sons and daughters of America and Europe do not have to fight again in a larger, more terrible war. If we succeed, we may yet realize our vision of a Europe at peace, united, prosperous and free. We must rise to the challenge.

This will be a long journey. But it all starts here. Let us get to work, and let us reaffirm our pledge to make it work.

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**USA Today Op-Ed by Secretary Christopher
(Oct. 18, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

Send troops to Bosnia

After a peace settlement, U.S. troops would serve no more than about a year, says secretary of State.

After four years of brutal fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. leadership has produced important progress toward peace. If and when a peace settlement is signed, something that is by no means certain, the NATO alliance has agreed to send troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina to help implement it. As the leader of NATO, and as a nation with profound security interests in a stable Europe, it is essential that the United States participate in this force.

The United States has an important interest in seeing peace brought to this historically volatile region. Twice this century we have had to send our soldiers to fight in wars that began in central Europe. Today, after a century of hot and cold war, we finally have a chance to build an undivided Europe in which major wars that require our troops to fight do not happen. But we must remember Sarajevo was once the spark that ignited an entire continent. We can help prevent that from happening again. We can help stop the spread of this conflict beyond its borders, threatening progress toward peace and stability across Europe.



COMMENTARY

By Warren Christopher

Thanks to President Clinton's leadership, the situation has fundamentally changed in recent months. First, NATO promised to use decisive air power to protect the remaining safe areas, and it did. Today, a semblance of normal life is returning to Sarajevo. Second, the president launched a new diplomatic initiative. After weeks of shuttle diplomacy, and despite the loss of three courageous U.S. negotiators, we've taken dramatic steps on the path the president laid out.


We've come a long way since July, when Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica and Zepa, two U.N.-declared safe areas. Had we not acted, we might still be facing the need to send troops to Bosnia, not to support peace but to extract peacekeepers from a failed mission.

In September, the parties to the conflict agreed to preserve Bosnia within its present borders and with a single international personality. On Oct. 5, U.S. negotiators convinced the parties to agree to a Bosnia-wide cease-fire. On Oct. 31, we will convene peace talks in the United States with the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. Our team, led by Assistant Secretary of State Dick Holbrooke, will do all it can to help resolve the hard issues, which include differences over territory, constitutional arrangements, elections and the return of refugees.

Much work remains before a settlement is achieved, and success is not assured. Before we are ready to help implement a settlement, before we know precisely what that will require from us, we must get the parties to agree, in their words and in their deeds, to peace.

Nevertheless, this remains our best chance to achieve peace since the war began four years ago. If we want the killing to stop, if we want to end the worst conflict in Europe since World War II, then we must follow through with the strategy that brought us to this point.

There will not be a peace settlement in Bosnia unless



By Peter Andrews, Reuters

SARAJEVO: French peacekeeper overseeing cease-fire.

NATO, and the United States in particular, takes the lead. The Bosnian government has said it will not sign a peace agreement without a commitment by NATO and the United States to help implement it. Only NATO can provide the robust forces and the effective command and control needed to deter or to prevent the parties from breaking their commitments. If we ask NATO to act in Bosnia, we cannot fail to contribute troops to the mission. The United States is the bedrock of NATO's strength and resolve. We cannot say to our allies, "We have come this far in Bosnia, but now you are on your own." That would mean abdicating our leadership of the alliance. It would imperil the future of NATO and the stability of Europe.

Some still believe that the best way to implement a lasting peace in Bosnia would be to have the international community lift the arms embargo and walk away. Such a course would jeopardize all the progress we have made in pursuit of peace at a moment when peace is finally within reach. It would make it impossible to put into place the instruments of a single Bosnian state, inevitably consigning Bosnia to an ethnic partition. It would be inconsistent with what the government of Bosnia itself wants. It would subject the Bosnian people to another winter of hiding in cellars and mourning in cemeteries.

When a final settlement is reached, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia will end. At that point, and only at that point, a NATO-led force will move in to implement the agreement. This will under any circumstances be a complicated mission. It will not be risk-free. But the president will not put our troops in a situation where there is no peace to keep. The president will consult fully with Congress before deploying any U.S. troops. The force would have a limited mission and remain for a limited period of time — approximately one year.

The costs and risks of our participation in a NATO mission will be shared with our allies. Indeed, our allies, especially France and Britain, have already borne the bulk of the casualties among international forces in Bosnia. But this is not a purely European problem. It has profound implications for U.S. interests. And in the last few weeks in Bosnia, we have seen again that if the United States does not lead, no nation or group of nations has the strength or vision to replace us. There should be no doubt that our leadership remains vital to peace in that long-troubled country and to the broader security of Europe.

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**Cease-Fire Agreement Signed in
New York (Oct. 5, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release

October 5, 1995

STATEMENT BY NICHOLAS BURNS, SPOKESMAN

BOSNIAN CEASE-FIRE

The parties to the Balkan conflict today agreed to a Bosnia-wide cease-fire, terminating all hostile activities. This agreement is to take effect on October 10 subject to certain conditions. In addition, the parties agreed to take part in proximity talks in the United States beginning on or about October 25. Following the successful conclusion of proximity talks, a peace conference will take place in Paris.

This agreement is a significant step forward in the search for peace in the Balkans. We note, however, that much still remains to be done. The parties must continue to demonstrate that they are willing to make the hard decisions necessary for peace.

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, OCTOBER 5, 1995

The undersigned agree as follows:

1. Commencing on the effective date defined in Paragraph 2 below, the parties will implement a cease-fire throughout all territory within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina by terminating all hostile military activities and by implementing the other provisions of this agreement.
2. The cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on October 10, 1995, provided that at that time full gas and electrical utility service shall have been restored in the city of Sarajevo; otherwise the cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on the day following such restoration.
3. In order to allow for the negotiation and the commencement of the implementation of a Peace Agreement, this cease-fire will last for 60 days or until completion of Proximity Peace Talks and Peace Conference, whichever is later.
4. Pursuant to the cease-fire obligation, on the effective date all parties will immediately ensure that all military commanders issue and compel compliance with clear orders precluding (a) all offensive operations, (b) patrol and reconnaissance activities forward of friendly positions, (c) all offensive weapons' firings including sniper fire, (d) the laying of additional mines, and (e) the creation of additional barriers or obstacles.
5. Upon the effective date all parties will immediately ensure (a) that all civilians and prisoners will be treated humanely and (b) that all prisoners of war will be exchanged under UNPROFOR supervision.
6. Commencing on the effective date the parties will cooperate with the cease-fire monitoring activities of UNPROFOR and will immediately report violations to appropriate UNPROFOR authorities.
7. Commencing on the effective date all parties will provide free passage and unimpeded road access between Sarajevo and Gorazde along two primary routes (Sarajevo-Rogatica-Gorazde, Belgrade-Gorazde) for all non-military and UNPROFOR traffic.

8. During the period of the cease-fire, the undersigned will fully honor the obligations undertaken through the Geneva Agreed Basic Principles of September 8, 1995, the Framework Agreement of September 14, 1995, and the Further Agreed Principles of September 26, 1995, including (without limiting the generality of the foregoing) the obligation to afford all persons freedom of movement and all displaced persons the right to return home and repossess their property.

For the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina
and the Federation of
Bosnia-Hezegovina:

Alija Izetbegovic

Witness:

John Menzies

For Republika Srpska:

Radovan Karadzic
Momcilo Krajisnik
Ratko Mladic

Witness:

Slobodan Milosevic

For Republika Srpska:

Popisna Komisija
S. Muzijević

For the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina:

A. Felber
5. okt. 1995

For the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina:

A. Felber
(za g. Zubra)
5. okt. 1995.

Witness:

Slobodan Milosevic
Slobodan Milosevic

Witness:

John Menzies
John Menzies
U.S. Ambassador

[Handwritten signature]

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**Further Agreed Basic Principles Signed in New York
(Sept. 26, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

SEPT 26, 1995

BOSNIA/CROATIA/SERBIA

JOINT STATEMENT

For the second time in three weeks, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have met under the auspices of the Contact Group. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and co-chaired by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke and EU Special Negotiator Carl Bildt.

The Contact Group and EU Special Negotiator announce today that the three Foreign Ministers, speaking for their governments -- the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which also represents the Bosnian Serbs in a joint delegation -- have authorized us to issue the attached Further Agreed Basic Principles. All three governments -- and their Presidents -- agree that these principles will govern additional negotiations. Moreover, the Co-Chairmen reiterated that the issues of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem will be a top priority in an overall peace settlement.

The principles issued today take us one more important step on the road to peace. As important as this step is, we remain a long way from peace.

Although we still have a long and difficult path ahead of us, today's agreement does mark another important step forward for several reasons.

First and foremost, it establishes clearly that both sides agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a Parliament or national assembly, a Presidency, a Constitutional Court, and makes provisions for free and democratic elections under international supervision. In our view this means direct, free and democratic elections would be held as soon as possible when the necessary conditions exist.

These are obviously significant, if incomplete, achievements, which must be fleshed out in much greater detail in the next round of negotiations. For example, what are the "other matters" referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 6.6? Although this must be negotiated, in our view they should include such important matters as foreign trade, customs administration, international financial affairs, currency administration, citizenship and passports, protection of borders, and other matters. These issues must be solved before we can achieve the settlement we seek.

There are many other important issues not resolved, or even addressed, in today's document. Above all, the territorial issues are still unresolved, and will be the subject of very tough negotiations. In this connection, the Contact Group reiterates its strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states of the region.

We are also committed to insuring that, at the end of the negotiating process, the above institutions and their manner of operations and decision-making will be fully consistent with democratic principles. We shall continue to avoid mechanisms that could make the governmental institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina un-democratic or non-functioning in their operations.

We also must address the presence of several different military forces on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a manner as to ensure that their presence and activities are consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The American negotiating team will return to the region, starting in Sarajevo, on Thursday. The EU Special Negotiator, Carl Bildt, will continue work also on the constitutional and reconstruction efforts which will be addressed by the EU Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg October 2 before he proceeds to the region. Russian negotiator, First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, will return to the region next week.

The attached Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by H.E. Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), H.E. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia (Croatia); and H.E. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.

New York
September 26, 1995

SEPT 26, 1995

BOSNIA/CROATIA/SERBIA

FURTHER AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES

(additional to those issued September 8, 1995, in Geneva)

4. Each of the two entities will honor the international obligations of Bosnia Herzegovina, so long as the obligation is not a financial obligation incurred by one entity without the consent of the other.

5. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

5.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property or receive just compensation, (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights in order to enhance and empower the democratic election process.

5.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout the Federation and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree which (a) the obligations listed in all of the Agreed Basic Principles have been fulfilled, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

5.3 Within 30 days after the OSCE delegations have concluded that free and democratic elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct free and democratic elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

6. Following the elections, the affairs and prerogatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be vested in the following institutions, in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

6.1 A parliament or assembly, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes from each entity.

6.2 A Presidency, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All Presidency decisions

will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one-third or more of the members disagree with a decision taken by the other members and declare that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity or entities from which the dissenting members were elected, the matter will be referred immediately to the appropriate entity's/entities' parliament. If any such parliament confirms the dissenting position by a two-thirds vote, then the challenged decision will not take effect.

6.3 A cabinet of such ministers as may be appropriate.

6.4 A Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to decide all questions arising under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it will be revised in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

6.5 The parties will negotiate in the immediate future as to further aspects of the management and operation of these institutions.

6.6 The foregoing institutions will have responsibility for the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties will negotiate further to determine the extent to which these institutions will also have responsibility for other matters consistent with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

New York, September 26, 1995

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**Basic Principals Agreement Signed
in Geneva (Sept. 8, 1995)**

Divider Title: _____

SEPT 8, 1995

BOSNIA/CROATIA/SERBIA

AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and the Republica Srpska (RS).

2.1 The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

2.2 Each entity will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic principles).

2.3 Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.4 The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere to normal international human rights standards and obligations, including the obligation to allow freedom of movement and enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; (c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.

3. The entities have agreed in principle to the following:

3.1 The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation.

3.2 The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two entities will abide by the Commission's decisions.

3.3 The establishment of joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations, financed by the two entities, to own and operate transportation and other facilities for the benefit of both entities.

3.4 The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.

3.5 The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the solution of disputes between the two entities.

Geneva, September 8, 1995

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**Bosnia Fact Sheet 1: American Leadership:
Key to Peace**

Divider Title: _____

American Leadership: Key to Peace

- Thanks to President Clinton's leadership, we now have the best chance for peace in Bosnia since the war began four years ago. Continued American leadership is vital if we are to seize that chance and stand up for what's right—for the people of Bosnia, for Europe, and for the United States.

Securing the Peace in Bosnia Serves America's Values and Interests

- **End the Suffering:** Securing peace will end the terrible toll of this war—in innocent lives lost and futures destroyed. Over the past four years, the people of Bosnia have suffered the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II: ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, mass executions, systematic rape and terror, and terrible shortages of food, medicine, shelter, and heat. The best way—the only way—to stop these horrors for good is to secure peace.
- **Stop the War from Spreading:** Securing peace will prevent a war we have managed to contain from spreading into neighboring nations and igniting an even larger conflict. The former Yugoslavia borders key NATO allies and struggling new democracies—many of which have ethnic problems of their own. Today, violent exploitation of ethnic nationalism is the biggest threat to stability in Europe. Widespread conflict in Europe would threaten our security and require a far more costly American intervention.
- **Help Create a Europe at Peace:** The United States fought two world wars and a Cold War in Europe to defend freedom and advance the vision of an undivided, peaceful, democratic Europe. Securing peace will bring us one step closer to realizing that vision, with all the benefits it would bring for America's long-term security and prosperity.

Securing Peace in Bosnia Requires American Leadership

- **American Leadership Is Key to Peace:** The progress we have made toward peace has been the result of American leadership. NATO's bombing campaign—led by American pilots and their crews—stopped Bosnian Serb attacks against Sarajevo and other safe areas. The Contact Group's determined diplomacy—led by America's negotiating team—brought the parties to the peace table. If a peace agreement is signed, NATO must help secure it, and America, as NATO's leader, must take part in such an operation if it is to succeed..
- **If America Doesn't Lead, the Job Won't Get Done:** The burdens of American leadership are real—but its benefits are even greater: a reduced nuclear threat, democracy in Haiti, peace breaking out in the Middle East and Northern Ireland. In Bosnia, as elsewhere around the world, if America does not lead, the job will not get done. When President Clinton met with Pope John Paul II in September, the Pope ended their meeting by saying: "I have lived through most of this century. The 20th Century began with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let the 20th Century end with a war in Sarajevo."

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Bosnia Fact Sheet 2: The Road to Dayton

Divider Title: _____

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #2

The Road to Dayton

- The international community is united in its desire to see the Balkan conflict resolved at the negotiating table. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and other nations, acting separately and in groups, have attempted to resolve the Balkan conflict through negotiations since it began in 1991.
- In October 1992, European Union mediator Lord David Owen and UN mediator and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposed a draft constitution organizing Bosnia into a decentralized federation. This became known as the "Vance-Owen" plan.
- In February 1993, President Clinton, at the beginning of his Administration, named the first U.S. special envoy to UN-EU joint negotiations, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew. In May 1993, U.S. efforts helped gain the parties' agreement to the Vance-Owen plan, but the Bosnian Serbs subsequently renounced the accord.
- In early 1994, with UN-EU efforts bogged down, the United States decided to undertake more active involvement, seeking to back diplomacy with the threat of NATO air power in protecting safe areas and UN peacekeepers.
- In March 1994, the new United States special envoy, Ambassador Charles Redman, and other U.S. officials led negotiations between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats which resulted in a cease-fire, the formation of a bi-communal Federation, and improved relations with neighboring Croatia.
- Later in the spring of 1994, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany established a five-nation Contact Group, with the goal of brokering a settlement between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group based its efforts on three principles:
 1. Bosnia would remain a single state;
 2. That state would consist of the Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity;
 3. These two entities would be linked via mutually-agreed constitutional principles, which would also spell out relationships with Serbia and Croatia proper.
- In July 1994, the Contact Group put forward a proposed map presenting a 51/49 percent territorial compromise between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian Governments all accepted the proposal. The Bosnian Serbs repeatedly rejected it. All of its key principles, however, have now been accepted as the basis for negotiations at the current proximity peace talks in Dayton.
- In the fall of 1994, Serbia announced it was withdrawing support for the Bosnian Serbs, would seal them off economically, and would allow a UN-EU team to monitor the border closure. The Security Council then offered a temporary suspension of some of the economic sanctions that had been in place against Serbia since 1992.
- In the summer of 1995, a series of events changed the situation on the ground:
 - In July, two UN-declared safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, were overrun by Bosnian Serb forces.

- In July and August, Croatia retook most of the territory held for three years by separatist Krajina Serbs, and thus presented itself as a counterweight to further Serb aggression in the region.
- In response to the fall of the safe areas, President Clinton insisted that NATO and the UN make good on their commitment to protect the remaining safe areas. The Allies agreed to U.S. insistence on NATO decisiveness at the London Conference on July 21, and threatened broad-based air strikes if the safe areas were attacked again.
- In late July, President Clinton decided that the changes on the ground and the new resolve displayed by NATO provided the basis for an all-out diplomatic effort to end the conflict. In early August, he sent his National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, to present a U.S. peace initiative to our NATO Allies and the Russians.
- In mid-August, U.S. negotiators, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, began intensive shuttle diplomacy with the parties to the conflict. The deaths of three members of our negotiating team—Ambassador Robert Frasure, Dr. Joseph Kruzal, and Colonel Nelson Drew—were an enormous tragedy, but our efforts for peace intensified.
- In late August, a Bosnian Serb shell killed 37 people in a Sarajevo market. NATO and the UN issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs:
 1. Stop shelling Sarajevo.
 2. Stop offensive action against the remaining safe areas.
 3. Withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.
 4. Allow road and air access to Sarajevo.
- On August 30, after the Bosnian Serbs refused, NATO began heavy and continuous air strikes against the Bosnian Serb military—with many missions flown by American pilots. The Bosnian Serbs then complied with the NATO demands.
- At meetings sponsored by the Contact Group in Geneva (September 8, 1995) and New York (September 26, 1995), the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (now also representing the Bosnian Serbs) agreed to basic principles for a settlement in Bosnia:
 - The preservation of Bosnia as a single state;
 - An equitable division of territory between the Muslim/Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity based on the Contact Group's 51/49 formula;
 - Constitutional structures;
 - Free and fair elections;
 - Respect for human rights.
- In early October, the United States helped broker a cease-fire, now holding throughout Bosnia.
- The United States and the other Contact Group countries convened the parties to Dayton, Ohio to begin "proximity peace talks" on November 1.

November 1995

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Bosnia Fact Sheet 3: The Dayton Process

Divider Title: _____

The Dayton Process

- On November 1, the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia began participating in high-level political talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio. The purpose of the “proximity peace talks” is to encourage the parties to reach a comprehensive regional settlement.
- The sessions are building on principles reached in Geneva September 8 and in New York September 26. These include:
 1. The preservation of Bosnia as a single state containing the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity;
 2. The 51/49 percent formula as a basis for territorial arrangements;
 3. A constitutional structure establishing the institutions of a central government and specifying relations between the two territorial entities;
 4. The necessity of free and fair elections;
 5. Respect for human rights.
- The parties to the conflict are represented in the Dayton negotiations by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.
- Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and EU Negotiator Carl Bildt are co-chairing the talks. Other Contact Group countries (France, Germany and Britain) are represented at the political director level.
- There is no agreed date for the conclusion of the talks, but if the talks are successful, they will be followed by a conference on implementation of the settlement in London and an international peace conference in Paris.
- The substance of the current talks includes the range of territorial and constitutional matters. Among the outstanding issues are:
 - The location of the internal boundary between the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity;
 - The status of Sarajevo;
 - Practical steps for separating forces and establishing a permanent cessation of hostilities;
 - Procedures for free and fair elections under international supervision;
 - Procedures for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

November 1995

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**Bosnia Fact Sheet 4: If a Peace Agreement
Is Reached**

Divider Title: _____

If a Peace Agreement Is Reached

- In October 1995, President Clinton stated the following: "If a peace agreement is reached, I will request an expression of support in Congress for committing United States troops to a NATO implementation force."
- If a peace agreement is reached, only NATO can effectively implement it. NATO will not deploy in Bosnia unless and until the parties reach a real agreement that demonstrates their commitment to peace.
- U.S. participation in any peace implementation force (IFOR) will depend on the details of the peace plan. President Clinton will not send our troops to enforce a plan that is not accepted by the sides, or to defend a paper settlement where there is no peace to keep.
- Ongoing NATO planning emphasizes the need to maintain a cease-fire and ensure that local forces withdraw to their respective territories as established at settlement. To accomplish these goals, Allies envision that the IFOR would report through a NATO chain of command to NATO's supreme political body, the North Atlantic Council. There will be no "dual key."
- The operation would be under the overall authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General George Joulwan, and under the direct command of NATO's Southern Commander, Admiral Leighton Smith. Both men are United States military officers.
- It is desirable for many reasons for the IFOR to contain units from non-NATO states as diverse as Russia, other Partnership for Peace members, and countries whose forces currently are part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Arrangements for coordination between non-NATO participants and the NATO command structure are now being finalized.
- Once the IFOR is deployed, UNPROFOR's mandate will terminate, although some forces in UNPROFOR would be "re-hatted" as part of IFOR. This would include "re-hatting" Allied units that now comprise the Rapid Reaction Force.
- In parallel with military implementation efforts, the United States and our Contact Group partners envision programs for economic reconstruction, civilian-led human rights and humanitarian activities, and the development of democratic institutions, including the conduct of free and fair elections.
- Planning has also begun for a European Union-led economic reconstruction effort to help the Balkans rebuild and to integrate into the broader economic community.
- A range of organizations and bilateral aid organizations, including the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, and the international financial institutions will be involved in implementation of the non-military aspects of the settlement.
- Discussions are under way among our Contact Group partners on the need for a senior coordinator to ensure that the work of the various organizations involved in implementing the non-military aspects of the settlement proceeds smoothly.

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**Bosnia Fact Sheet 5: NATO Involvement
In the Balkan Crisis**

Divider Title: _____

NATO Involvement in the Balkan Crisis

- Throughout the Balkan crisis, NATO has undertaken a variety of activities in support of UN peacekeeping operations.
- In July 1992, NATO established a joint naval operation with the Western European Union to patrol the Adriatic to help enforce the UN's economic sanctions regime against Serbia.
- In the fall of 1992, the UN established a "no-fly" zone over Bosnia; in early 1993, NATO agreed to enforce it.
- In June 1993, NATO announced it would provide close air support to UN peacekeepers who came under attack. In August, NATO declared its readiness to respond with air strikes, in coordination with the UN, in the event that UN safe areas, including Sarajevo, came under siege. This decision temporarily ended the strangulation of Sarajevo.
- In February and April 1994, in response to renewed Bosnian Serb attacks on safe areas, including a brutal attack on a Sarajevo market, NATO established heavy-weapons-free zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Shelling of the Bihac safe area at the end of the year prompted NATO to expand its range of targets to include locations within Serb-held areas of Croatia.
- NATO fighters provided close air support and engaged in air strikes on several occasions in 1994 at the request of the UN. NATO and UN commanders both had to agree before air operations could be carried out. This arrangement, known as the "dual key," resulted in differences between the organizations over the threshold for military action and limited the effectiveness of air strikes.
- In 1993, when it appeared that a settlement proposal offered by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen might be accepted by the sides, NATO undertook planning for troop deployments to implement peace. NATO's plan, known as OPLAN 40103, was never finalized, as Bosnian Serb rejection of the peace plan, coupled with renewed fighting, rendered the chances for settlement remote.
- In mid-1994, in response to a request from the UN, NATO began contingency planning for withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops, should the situation on the ground prevent them from carrying out their mission. This plan was known as OPLAN 40104.
- On many occasions, President Clinton and other senior officials have expressed U.S. commitment to participation as appropriate in OPLAN 40103 and 40104. Emphasizing they would welcome Congressional support, Administration officials have long made clear that failure to take part in major Alliance efforts would weaken NATO cohesion and strain transatlantic relations.
- In July 1995, after the Bosnian Serbs overran the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, the United States, with some of our Allies, the Russians, and others, attended a Ministerial-level conference in London. The London Conference (together with subsequent NATO decisions) simplified the procedures for conducting air strikes, reduced the complications of the dual key mechanism, and greatly expanded the targets available for strikes.

- In August, when the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo safe area and rejected UN and NATO conditions for a heavy weapons withdrawal, NATO undertook its most intense air campaign to date, using the new authority and improved procedures agreed to in London. The month-long Allied campaign made clear to the Bosnian Serbs that the international community had no tolerance for violations of UN resolutions. Partly as a result of the strikes, Bosnian Serbs showed greater willingness to participate seriously in peace talks.
- By September, as a result of the air strikes, changes on the ground regionally, and progress made by the President's negotiating team, it appeared once again that a settlement might be possible. NATO renewed its planning for peace implementation. In October, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a concept of operations for deployment of an implementation force (IFOR) into Bosnia should a peace settlement be reached.
- NATO military authorities are now refining concepts for the IFOR, including its tasks, size, and cost. A final plan will depend on the details of the peace agreement. When military planning is finished, national governments will make decisions on troop numbers and financial contributions, and the NAC will give its final approval to the IFOR.

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**Bosnia Fact Sheet 6: Human Rights
Issue in the Balkans**

Divider Title: _____

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #6

Human Rights Issues in the Balkans

Human Rights Abuses

- The war in the former Yugoslavia has involved widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including mass killings and murder, systematic rape, torture, and other crimes against humanity.
- The term “ethnic cleansing” has entered the world’s vocabulary to describe the horrifying range of human rights abuses—from forcible expulsion to murder—committed in parts of the former Yugoslavia in order to achieve “ethnic purity.”
- All parties to the present conflict in the Balkans have committed human rights violations, but the great majority have been perpetrated by Serb forces.
- Some of the worst incidents include the following:
 - In the fall of 1991, Serb forces shelled the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, an action without military justification.
 - Throughout the course of the conflict, Sarajevo and other cities have been subjected to indiscriminate shelling. Scores of civilians have been killed or wounded by snipers and cluster and napalm bombs used by Bosnian Serb forces. Six of these cities were designated safe areas by the United Nations in May 1993. This did not stop the shelling.
 - Beginning in the spring of 1992, entire enclaves, ranging in size from towns such as Prijedor, Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Jajce, to hamlets such as Foca and Cerska, were “cleansed” of their Muslim and Croat residents in a Bosnian Serb attempt to “purify” lands they controlled.
 - In November 1991, Krajina Serbs took several hundred wounded Croatian soldiers from a hospital in the eastern Slavonian town of Vukovar, shot them in a field, and buried them in a mass grave. Serb authorities continue to deny international forensic teams access to the site.
 - In 1992 the Bosnian Serbs set up a gulag of prison camps and detention facilities holding tens of thousands of Muslims and Croats. During the summer of 1992, international investigators were denied access to detainees, but those who escaped described repeated atrocities.
 - During the summer of 1995 Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica and Zepa, committing gross violations of human rights as they proceeded. As many as 6,000 male Muslim detainees were shot and buried in mass graves. The entire Muslim population of more than 42,000 people was “cleansed” from the region.
 - Evidence is mounting that human rights abuses were committed against Serb civilians in Croatia in mid-1995, when the Croatian military retook Serb-occupied western Slavonia and the Krajina region.

The Response of the International Community

- In August 1992, the UN Commission on Human Rights established a Special Rapporteur to conduct on-site investigations into human rights violations and report on his findings. The Special Rapporteur maintains human rights monitors in Sarajevo, Mostar, Skopje, and Zagreb and has submitted a series of reports on violations throughout the former Yugoslavia.

- In October 1992, the UN Security Council approved an impartial international investigation to identify persons responsible for human rights abuses and to discourage more ethnic-based violence. The resulting Commission of Experts documented thousands of crimes.
- In the spring of 1993, the Security Council concluded that the atrocities committed amounted to war crimes and that international prosecution of individuals responsible for atrocities was integral to the prospects for long-term peace. As a result, it established a War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal subsumed the Commission of Experts and took over the task of amassing data on abuses.
- The War Crimes Tribunal has issued indictments against 46 persons (42 Bosnian Serbs, one Bosnian Croat, and three Serbs), including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. Proceedings have begun against the first defendant, a Bosnian Serb official accused of committing atrocities at a prison camp.
- Neither Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, nor any other indicted war criminal has been permitted to participate in the Dayton proximity peace talks or in any other international peace negotiations. The United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose amnesty for indicted war criminals. As warrants are issued, nations will be obliged to arrest indictees in their jurisdictions.

What the United States Has Done

- The United States led international efforts to establish the War Crimes Tribunal, and has contributed more to the Tribunal than any other nation—upwards of \$12 million. This includes financial contributions of nearly \$9 million and the services of more than 20 prosecutors, investigators, and other experts.
- The United States has offered full support for all international investigations of human rights abuses. We already have submitted large quantities of data to the Special Rapporteur, the Commission of Experts, and the Tribunal itself, and are committed to provide any additional evidence we receive of possible war crimes.
- Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck has traveled to the former Yugoslavia five times to investigate the massive violations of human rights that occurred around Srebrenica and Zepa this summer, as well as ongoing reports of Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing campaigns in Banja Luka and Sanski Most. Shattuck has personally interviewed scores of refugees and displaced persons who witnessed mass killings or were victims of forcible expulsions, rapes, or assaults.
- Under the U.S.-brokered cease-fire of October 1995, the parties agreed to treat civilians and prisoners humanely, to exchange prisoners of war under UN supervision, to afford all persons freedom of movement, and to guarantee the right of displaced persons to return home and reclaim their property.

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**Bosnia Fact Sheet 7: Humanitarian
Issues in the Balkans**

Divider Title: _____

Humanitarian Issues in the Balkans

- Approximately 2.7 million people have received some form of humanitarian aid since the conflict in the Balkans began. Nearly 50 percent of Bosnia's current 3.5 million inhabitants are internally displaced persons, and at least 900,000 others are refugees.
- The United States has led the world in responding to the humanitarian crisis in the region, donating \$965 million to humanitarian relief operations either bilaterally, through the UN, or through non-governmental organizations.
- Total humanitarian contributions through the UN system since November 1991 exceed 1.75 billion dollars, much of which was spent in Bosnia. An additional several hundred million dollars have been contributed via direct bilateral assistance mechanisms, the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations.
- In July 1992, the UN began a food airlift, using resources from the United States, U.K., France, Germany, and Canada. Later in the year, the UN undertook convoy deliveries of food and other essentials. Together, ground convoys and the airlift have delivered more than 700,000 metric tons of food to Bosnia, the largest airlift in history. The United States provided the largest quantity of food to the effort, and U.S. aircraft flew nearly 3,000 of the 8,200 Allied sorties. The airlift was suspended in Bosnia after the October 1995 cease-fire went into effect.
- The UN and other relief organizations have helped provide shelter and medical care for tens of thousands in the region. They have also helped secure admissions and accommodations for refugees fleeing abroad and have spearheaded family reunification efforts, missing persons and war crimes investigations, prisoner of war exchanges, and negotiations toward restoration of utilities.
- The large-scale international relief effort has not come without its price: twelve UN workers and a similar number of non-governmental relief staff have been killed while working to meet the needs of people in the region. International relief workers have faced intimidation and harassment and have endured the theft of relief supplies.
- Some aspects of the international humanitarian effort would need to continue post-settlement. Private relief agencies and the UN would participate in the international effort to help the region return to normal.

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**Bosnia Fact Sheet 8: Economic Sanctions Against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**

Divider Title: _____

BOSNIA FACT SHEET #8

Economic Sanctions Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

- In May 1992, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY; Serbia and Montenegro). These sanctions prohibit trade and financial transactions with the FRY. A humanitarian exception allows the FRY to import food, medicine, and other humanitarian items under license from the UN Sanctions Committee.
- In late 1992 and early 1993, the United States led efforts to establish Sanctions Assistance Monitoring Missions (SAMs), now under the auspices of the EU and OSCE, at border crossings in the states adjoining the FRY. International customs monitors assist local border officials in enforcing the sanctions on the FRY. The United States presently contributes approximately 60 customs monitors to this 240-person effort.
- In September 1994, the Security Council extended the economic sanctions already applied against the FRY to the territory controlled by Bosnian Serb forces.
- At the same time, the Security Council permitted a limited sanctions suspension for Serbia in return for a FRY commitment to cut off support to the Bosnian Serbs and to allow an international monitoring mission along the FRY/Bosnia border. The suspension allowed the opening of the Belgrade airport for international flights, the resumption of ferry service to Italy, and the resumption of sports and cultural exchanges with the FRY.
- The United States has contributed 50 civilian monitors to the 220-person international monitoring mission along the FRY/Bosnia border.
- Sanctions have contributed to a significant economic decline in the FRY. Industrial production and real incomes are down at least 50 percent since 1991. As a result, obtaining sanctions relief has become a priority for the FRY Government.

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**Bosnia Fact Sheet 9: Chronology
Of the Balkan Conflict**

Divider Title: _____

Chronology of the Balkan Conflict

- Strains within Yugoslavia's federated system emerged after Tito's death in 1980. Yugoslavia, an ethnically and religiously diverse federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces, operated under a collective government after his death.
- In the spring of 1990, democratic elections following the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe brought nationalist and independence-minded governments to power in the western-most republics of Slovenia and Croatia as well as in Serbia.
- In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. This set off a brief conflict between Slovenes and the Yugoslav Army and a protracted crisis in Croatia between the newly independent government in Croatia and the Serbian minority in Croatia ("Krajina Serbs"), supported by the Yugoslav military. By the end of 1991, the Krajina Serbs had gained control of nearly one-third of the country.
- In September 1991, in order to stem the fighting, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo against all of the former Yugoslavia. The Secretary General also launched a mediation effort under former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which led to a cease-fire agreement in Croatia in early 1992 and the deployment of the first UN peacekeepers during the winter of 1992.
- In January 1992, while the mediation efforts were ongoing, the European Community (now the European Union), after considerable internal debate, decided to recognize Croatia and Slovenia's independence. They deferred action on recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina pending a referendum to determine public support for independence.
- In March 1992, voters in Bosnia overwhelmingly approved independence in a vote boycotted by Bosnian Serbs. Almost immediately, the Bosnian Serbs, backed by the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav army, began forcible resistance to Bosnia's independence. By the end of spring 1992, Bosnian Serbs, who had significant military superiority, especially in heavy weapons, achieved control over more than 60 percent of Bosnia's territory.
- In April 1992, the EU recognized Bosnia. The United States, which had declined to recognize Croatia and Slovenia earlier, recognized Bosnia and the other two republics at the same time. All three were admitted to the UN in May. In response to continued Serb aggression, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Serbia at the end of May.
- During the summer of 1992, as the human rights and humanitarian crisis escalated, the Security Council voted to send UN peacekeepers to Bosnia to facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief. To help assure the safety of humanitarian operations, the UN imposed a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia in October 1992. In April 1993, NATO began to enforce the no-fly zone.
- In December 1992, the United States warned Serbia that the United States would respond in the event of Serb-inspired violence in Kosovo.
- In early 1993, UN peacekeepers deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The United States decided to participate in order to prevent a widening of the conflict. Five hundred fifty U.S. troops, as well as five hundred fifty troops from other nations, remain in the FYROM.

- In May 1993, the UN declared Sarajevo and five other Muslim enclaves “safe areas” under UN protection. NATO agreed in June to use air power to protect UN forces if attacked.
- In August 1993, NATO declared its readiness to respond with air strikes, in coordination with the UN, in the event that UN safe areas, including Sarajevo, came under siege. This decision temporarily ended the strangulation of Sarajevo.
- In February 1994, in response to a Bosnian Serb attack killing 68 civilians in a Sarajevo marketplace, NATO issued an ultimatum that if Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were not withdrawn from UN-monitored exclusion zones around the capital, Bosnian Serb forces would be subject to air strikes.
- In early 1994, with UN-EU diplomatic efforts stalled over territorial issues, the United States began more active efforts to encourage a settlement.
- In March 1994, U.S. mediation produced an agreement between the Bosnian Government, Bosnian Croats, and the Government of Croatia to establish a Federation between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. Fighting between the two sides ceased and has not resumed.
- In April 1994, NATO employed its first air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces to halt a Serb attack on the eastern enclave and UN safe area of Gorazde.
- In the spring of 1994, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany established a five-nation Contact Group, with the goal of brokering a settlement between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs.
- In late 1994, new fighting erupted between the Bosnian Government, anti-government Muslims in Bihac (support by Krajina Serbs), and Bosnian Serbs. NATO responded by expanding the range for air strikes into Serb-controlled Croatia.
- In December 1994, with the help of former President Jimmy Carter, the sides agreed to a four-month cessation of hostilities. When the period expired, fighting resumed, and in May, the Bosnian Serb forces began renewed attacks on Sarajevo and began threatening Srebrenica.
- In the spring of 1995, Bosnian Serb forces responded to NATO air strikes by taking more than 350 UN peacekeepers hostage. Serbia intervened to help negotiate the release of hostages. On June 8, United States and Allied forces rescued a U.S. pilot, Captain Scott O’Grady, who had been shot down over Bosnia on June 2.
- In July 1995, In response to the fall of the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, President Clinton insisted that NATO and the UN make good on their commitment to protect the remaining safe areas. The Allies agreed to U.S. insistence on NATO decisiveness at the London Conference on July 21 and threatened broad-based air strikes if the safe areas were attacked again. When the Bosnian Serbs tested this ultimatum, NATO undertook an intensive month-long bombing campaign.
- In late July, President Clinton decided that the changes on the ground and the new resolve displayed by NATO provided the basis for an all-out diplomatic effort to end the conflict. In early August, he sent his National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, to present a U.S. peace initiative to our NATO Allies and the Russians.
- U.S.-led mediation produced an agreement by the parties to basic principles of a settlement as well as a cease-fire which went into effect in October. Proximity peace talks toward settlement began in Dayton, Ohio on November 1.