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President's Trip to Camp David, Maryland for the Camp David Summit on the Middle East Peace Process (July 11-19, 2000) [4]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Camp David, Maryland)

For Immediate Release

July 24, 2000

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
JOE LOCKHART

Thurmont Elementary School
Thurmont, Maryland

11:53 A.M. EDT

MR. LOCKHART: Good afternoon, everyone. Let me give you a recap of the President's activities since we returned here to Camp David last evening.

Around 7:00 p.m. last night the President had a meeting with his team, who brought him up to date on the weekend's activities, since he was Okinawa at the G-8 summit. Following that meeting, the President had a bilateral with Prime Minister Barak. Following that was a bilateral with Chairman Arafat.

After that meeting, the delegations and the leaders had dinner together. It was probably about 30 or so people in one room at the cabin where they've been eating for the last two weeks. The President sat between the two leaders and engaged in discussion over the dinner.

The dinner broke; by agreement that he had worked through during his bilaterals, the President then proceeded to begin a meeting with a small group of negotiators from each side to work through the issues that are before them. That meeting lasted, with the President hosting it, until just after 5:00 a.m. this morning. Those meetings were intensive and substantive and, as the time indicates, went quite long into the night.

The President got up this morning just after 10:00 a.m., met with his team. And I think it was about 10:30 a.m. or so began another meeting along the same lines with a small group of negotiators, and I expect that to go for some time.

Q Are the principals in that meeting?

MR. LOCKHART: No, this is the President -- he has negotiators from each side, and then someone from the U.S. team trying to work through the issues.

That's the schedule for the day. I don't have an absolute sense of how long this will go on, but I expect the meeting to go on for several hours.

Q Joe, when the President came back, we were told that he was going to make an assessment of where the talks were. What was that -- what is that assessment?

MR. LOCKHART: I think in the most general sense, the President, in his mind, is working on what I'll call a rolling assessment of whether the substance and atmosphere at these talks are one that potentially could lead to an agreement. While that is the case, and while the President believes that discussions are substantive and have the potential of leading to an agreement, he will remain here, and he will keep the parties here, to keep working.

Should he come to the conclusion that the substance of the discussions and the atmosphere of the discussions do not have the potential to lead to an agreement, then he will act accordingly and bring these discussions to an end. I think the fact that he was up until 5:00 a.m., working through the issues in a very personal, hands on way, and that he was back at it again early this morning should lead you to believe that he thinks staying here for the time being is worthwhile.

Q Joe -- that was the same group of negotiators that he met with until 5:00 a.m.?

MR. LOCKHART: I think there may be some variation, but certainly -- obviously, the President will continue to host it, but I think there's some changes on our side, and within the teams.

Q -- tell us one of the specific working groups?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think there have been various permutations of who is working on what and how. So I wouldn't -- it has moved around over the last six or seven days, so I wouldn't try to tie it to the groups that were established, what, seven or eight days ago.

Q Is there a specific topic?

MR. LOCKHART: They are discussing specific topics, yes.

Q Where, Joe. Where?

MR. LOCKHART: In the President's cabin.

Q Is it fair to say that they are now in the process of putting down understandings that have been reached on various issues on paper?

MR. LOCKHART: I think that would get to the substance of what they're discussing so I will refrain from commenting on that.

Q Joe, have the groups divided up into committees, like they did at Sheppardstown? And, also, what was the sense of urgency that caused the President to be working until 5:00 a.m.? Is there a deadline now or some --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, the deadline is as I described it. Based on the President's assessment of the realistic chance that we can reach an agreement here. It is not a calendar-driven deadline. But, having said that, I think that all the parties know that there is a balance here between taking the time to work through the issues and taking too much time that will never lead to an agreement. So I cannot give you a precise formula, except to say that the President has got this very issue foremost in his mind and he will remain here as long as he believes we have some prospect of success.

Q Has the President cleared his schedule for this week, to stay up here?

MR. LOCKHART: I think we're taking this day by day. Today we have nothing else on the schedule. I think those of you who cover the White House know that the President has a personal event tomorrow that he would like to attend in Arkansas; but we're taking this day by day.

Q Joe, when the President left on Wednesday, as you know better than most, he literally went from one hour to the next where you thought the summit was ending in failure. You got both leaders to agree to stay. They've been talking now for the last several days. Do you feel any more hopeful that perhaps they did make some progress over the weekend? Are you able to kind of characterize what happened over the weekend and where you think things stand for the next day or so?

MR. LOCKHART: I hesitate to use a phrase like "hopeful," because these issues are so difficult and I don't know that I'd be able to back that up with any substance. I think the fact -- obviously, the last time I stood here it was an hour or so removed from the collapse of these discussions. The fact that these discussions are continuing is a positive thing. The fact that the President is using his time to sit down and work through each and every issue is a decision that he and his team do not take lightly, as far as devoting the time to this.

And as long as we're here and discussing things, there is a prospect for reaching agreement, but it's impossible to predict the likelihood of that.

Q What do you think -- he had his fingers crossed and is now --

MR. LOCKHART: I think he was -- you know, it was a long flight back, he had a lot of time to mull over the issues. He was anxious once we got on the plane to get back here and get back to work. And that's exactly what he did. This morning he only got a few hours of sleep, but he was anxious to go. In fact, we were sitting around the table in his cabin in the briefing and he cut us off and said, you know, let's get going. Let's get the groups in here. Let's get back to work. So I think that's some indication of where he is.

Q Two questions. Can you give us a sense of what Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat are doing today? Will they be meeting with the President? And can you give us maybe a little clearer sense when the President -- do you expect him to make this decision about whether or not to go forward?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think that decision is -- the best word I can use for it is, it's kind of a rolling decision. There is no time frame on it. It's just a judgment that the President will have to make.

As far as the leaders -- I will let you know if they schedule a meeting today. There is nothing at this point. But they are working very intensively within their teams and with their negotiators, as far as working through the issues. I mean, obviously, the negotiators are working with the President, but also have a good deal of contact with their leaders on the specific issues that are on the table.

Q Is it several hours until the President decides, or is it going to take days or even weeks?

MR. LOCKHART: I think it is impossible to speculate at this point on a judgment that hasn't been made.

Q Can you tell me if Arafat was on the phone with either President Mubarak or -- in the last few hours?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know the answer to that.

Q Can you tell us, Joe, about the input of the rest of the world? How is it that -- I mean, does Arafat have to check things out at periodic junctures with the Saudis, who control the money and with the Egyptians, who control the prestige?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know to what extent the consultations are going on, between the leaders of either delegations, with the

rest of the Arab world. As far as -- I mean, we had a good sense of the international community's focus on this, with the President's meetings in G-8. They were all very interested in the process, in any progress we made.

It was a brief discussion, which never got into the numbers or how it would all work, but on the international community's responsibility to help, at the Friday night session, among the G-8 leaders. And I think, you know, it's not just the Arab world, it's the rest of the international community that's watching this very closely.

Q Joe, we understand the President made several phone calls to regional leaders last week. Can you tell us the purpose of those phone calls? Is he trying to rally support?

MR. LOCKHART: You know, in the most general sense, the President has said all along that it's important for everyone involved here, whether they're here at the talks, whether they're outside the talks, whether they are regional leaders, whether they are international leaders, to try to work toward creating an atmosphere that's conducive to reaching an agreement here.

For his part, he has done some work on that, with both calls to the regions, with his discussions in Okinawa with the G-8 leaders, and that will continue.

Q European diplomatic sources say that --

MR. LOCKHART: I think I know what your question is. Go ahead. (Laughter.)

Q -- the European Union proposed to the United States a solution regarding Jerusalem that could be close in substance, or close to the Pope's statement yesterday. How do you comment on this?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I know that there -- a lot of people have made a lot of statements, but as far as what's being discussed within the confines of Camp David, on this and some other difficult issues, I'm not going to comment on that.

Q Joe, can you -- now I think you already know what my question is -- comment on the fact that CIA officials have confirmed that George Tenet has been here and visited the talks a few times? Can you explain what role the American intelligence agency may play in both these talks and any --

MR. LOCKHART: Sure. I think those of you followed the previous talks understand the role that Mr. Tenet has played. I would describe it as similar to the last talks. He was here for a day or two. He is now gone. And beyond that, I'm going to leave it to the CIA to say, no comment.

Q What about the Jonathan Pollard issue, which has been raised by several media -- George Tenet -- Jonathan Pollard the last time around. Did that come up again, and has he changed his view?

MR. LOCKHART: There is no change in the President's view, or the U.S. government's position. It has not come up that I know of, but I know that it frequently comes up when the President talks to the Prime Minister of Israel, and the Prime Minister of Israel raises it on a regular basis. We're certainly aware of what the government of Israel's view on this subject is.

Q Joe, could we just stay on this for just a minute and get some clarification in terms of, were the two leaders looking for some assurances, in terms of what American intelligence agency could offer in the event of a settlement? Is he meeting with both sides? Tell us a little bit more, because the CIA is going to refer it back to you.

MR. LOCKHART: Well, then -- let me make a joint White House/State Department, with Richard's blessing and CIA's, statement, which is: I'm not going there. (Laughter.)

Q Let me follow up with a different question which is: The Palestinians made it clear over the weekend that there can be no final agreement without an agreement on Jerusalem. But have there been agreements reached on the other core issues so that they can get closer to that once they resolve Jerusalem?

MR. LOCKHART: Again, I'm not going to get into the substance of the discussions. I think that goes to the core. There are -- I think the issues are well known. And I think, obviously, to reach an agreement they've got to work through each of these issues.

Q Would you at least say that they're making progress?

MR. LOCKHART: I would say that the conversations continue in a substantive and constructive way.

Q The Israelis are saying that they did discuss Jerusalem over the weekend -- the Palestinians are saying that they did and the Israelis are saying that did. Was Jerusalem discussed over the weekend? And in 1991 the United States sent a letter to the Palestinians saying they do not recognize Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. Has there been anything in this summit that will cause the United States to change that position?

MR. LOCKHART: I think the substance of your question goes directly to the substance of the talks. And we've managed to get through 13 days, or 14 days now without discussing that. And we're going to continue that.

Q Jerusalem is obviously coming up in these talks. We're not asking as to whether or not there has been progress. We're just asking as to whether or not when President Clinton left it came up in conversation?

MR. LOCKHART: No, you're asking was there a specific discussion of a specific issue. And I'm not going to answer the question.

Q Joe, the 5:00 a.m. meeting, when did it start? Can you give us any sense of who was there, who was the U.S. aide to the President who was participating?

MR. LOCKHART: I'm not going to go into who represented each side. The conversation began, I think, just around midnight, went through about 5:00 a.m., and included a break of 45 minutes to an hour.

Q And no substance was -- can you tell us anything about the moods of both Barak and Arafat?

MR. LOCKHART: You know, they're both still here and they're both still working and the delegation is working. And I think that dwarfs any questions about how they're feeling. I mean, I know that it's -- in the 21st century how you feel is often more important than what you do, but not here.

Q When was the last time the President or anyone from the U.S. team talked to the Vatican concerning Jerusalem?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know the answer to that.

Q -- to keep Middle Eastern leaders updated on what is taking place here? There have been calls both by American leadership and by Palestinian leadership for the leaders in that region. And a lot of them have voiced their support for the Palestinian stand on Jerusalem. Do you think their opinions should be considered when reaching an agreement?

MR. LOCKHART: Listen, I think there is a lot of people in the international community that have a view. Those views are weighed as appropriate by the delegations and by the U.S.. But, ultimately, it's going to be up to the parties, with the assistance of the United States, to reach an agreement that both parties believe is in their best interests.

Q A question about the position of the United States, the official position of the United States on East Jerusalem. Has that changed?

MR. LOCKHART: The United States believes that Jerusalem is a final status issue, to be worked through by the parties -- and guess what, it's happening right now, and that's why we're here,

and that's why we've spent 14 days together in very close quarters.

Q Joe, I'm not going to ask about Barak or Arafat, but I would like to ask, what is President Clinton's reaction to that spiritual quote, to the spiritual leader of all Christian world, about Jerusalem becoming an international city. Can you tell me what his reaction -- and it's not the talk, really.

MR. LOCKHART: Obviously, if the President had a reaction, and I were to report it to you, it would give something away about the discussions that are ongoing, and I don't intend to do that.

Q Can you confirm that Mr. Reisner, the legal advisor who helped draft the Wye agreement is coming to be at Camp David?

MR. LOCKHART: Who, please?

Q Daniel Reisner, the military advisor, Daniel Reisner.

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know that.

Q Joe, is the purpose of today's session to decide if it's worth going on or not?

MR. LOCKHART: No, I think the purpose of last night and today is to work through the issues, and then having worked through the issues, one by one, make a judgement of whether it makes sense to continue on, or it makes sense to call a break for this.

Q Joe, can you characterize, or just give us a little bit more about the dinner and the conversation last night between the President and the two leaders?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't have too much on it.

Q What were they talking about? Were they talking about this, were they talking about the G-8? Did they talk about the weather? What did they --

MR. LOCKHART: You know, I think it was some combination. I didn't talk to the President in particular about the dinner, but what was reported to me was some combination of kind of all of the above. And it was the -- it was sort of an intermittent conversation with -- I think Arafat was on the President's right, and Barak was on his left. And on Barak's left was Chelsea. So there was a sort of rolling conversation, that involved both substance and non-substance.

Q Joe, was it the first group dinner in how many days now, because --

MR. LOCKHART: It was the first group dinner involving the President -- with the exception of the one that the Secretary had -- probably in four or five days.

Q Has Chelsea always been going to the dinners?

MR. LOCKHART: Yes, she's been at the dinners.

Q Is Albright still here and did she participate in the five day absence?

MR. LOCKHART: She is still here. She's been involved at a number of levels with the leaders, with the negotiators and within our team. But as far as the overnight discussion, she was not in the room for the actual discussions, but talked to the President, I believe, during the break and then afterwards.

Q -- those talks?

MR. LOCKHART: I will leave it as a very small group.

Q Joe, on Sunday the Pope weighed in reviewing his suggestion that Jerusalem be --

Q They did it yesterday.

MR. LOCKHART: We did it today, that's right.

Q Do you know if the President placed any telephone calls to leaders in the region the last day or two?

MR. LOCKHART: No, not that I know of.

Q Joe, -- question. Senator Hollings -- in a conversation of the spending bill, which would effectively prohibit the FTC from considering proposed acquisitions like Georgia Telecom's \$50 billion bid for Voicestream Wireless in the next fiscal year. Does the administration see this as one that would force the President to veto the bill?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I don't know that we've actually seen the bill yet. I think our position on these sort of acquisitions is pretty clear. We favor acquisitions that provide consumers with more choice and more products, and oppose those mergers or acquisitions that stifle competition.

There's obviously a regulatory process here, which we need to honor, but I don't even know that we've seen the actual legislation, so I don't know if we've made up our mind on what we will do when we see it, if we ever see it.

Q -- concessions, and no bilateral meeting yet? I want to confirm this.

MR. LOCKHART: Except for the dinner last night, that is correct.

Q My second questions is, has the President made any comments or reactions to that plan -- statement issued at the weekend by -- calling for -- in East Jerusalem was part of the package? Was he enthusiastic --

MR. LOCKHART: Not in my presence, no.

Q Does the President have anything to say about the rumors that Dick Cheney is the Vice-Presidential choice for George Bush? Does he think that will make it a more difficult race for Vice President Gore?

MR. LOCKHART: I think the President has been focused on other things, but he thought Mr. Podesta's wisdom on a Sunday morning talk show had a lot of merit to it.

Q Does the President think he could be Al Gore's Vice President? (Laughter.) Come on Joe, it's late. Come on Joe. (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: I'm still on Tokyo time, Bill. I'm afraid of what will happen if I answer that. (Laughter.)

Q Joe -- and you said, not in your presence. But the fact that the truce was actually mentioned, did the President say that even if you weren't in there -- react to it, in any way?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, if I wasn't there, no one reported it to me. Like the tree falling in the proverbial forest, I don't know. (Laughter.)

Q Thank you, Joe.

END

12:15 P.M. EDT

July 27, 2000

CHARLIE ROSE, Host: Welcome to the broadcast.

A consideration tonight of what happened at the Camp David summit and the implications for peace in the Middle East. Joining me, the national security adviser to the president, Sandy Berger.

SAMUEL BERGER, National Security Adviser: If we did not force these issues now, they're not going to-- it's not going to get easier as it gets closer. And so I think the fact that we-- we brought them together, we forced them to confront these issues, we actually broke open a number of them-- I think the timing was probably right.

CHARLIE ROSE: The deputy defense minister of Israel, EPHRAIM SNEH. EPHRAIM SNEH, Deputy Defense Minister, Israel: Arafat is committed to the peace process. If he fails, the entire concept inside the Palestinian society of dealing with Israel through a negotiation would collapse, and the next Palestinian leader would be somebody from the very fanatic fringe of the Palestinian society, somebody from the Hamas or the Jihad, of those organizations.

So actually, that's true. If we fail, maybe no one will try again.

CHARLIE ROSE: And the foreign affairs columnist of the New York Times, Tom Friedman.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN, "New York Times": Arafat put some real stuff on the table. Arafat's people put some real stuff on the table, as well. But on the most emotive issue, the central issue of Jerusalem, Arafat basically, as I said, kind of absorbed the Barak offers, did not come up with a serious or any form of counter offer at all. And that's what I think was reflected in the president's remarks.

CHARLIE ROSE: A program note. We continue our consideration of the Middle East tomorrow night with interviews with Dr. Edward Said and Mort Zuckerman.

Tonight, Berger, Sneh and Friedman -- next.

Sandy Berger Says it's Time for Palestinian Creativity

CHARLIE ROSE: The Middle East peace summit at Camp David broke up on Tuesday without an agreement after 15 days of very hard negotiations. The summit was a high-stakes gamble intended to end 52 years of bloody conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. After the leaders of both sides left on Tuesday, there are now some hard questions.

Tonight we consider some of those questions, and we begin with the national security adviser to the president of the United States, Sandy Berger. I am pleased to have him here to give us an overview of this very important summit and how he analyzes the results.

Tell me what happened. Why did it fail?

SAMUEL BERGER, National Security Adviser: We-- we dealt in this summit with the issues in the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis that have never been dealt with before at the highest level, not since the 52 years of the conflict, not since the '67 war, not since the seven years of the Oslo People's Republic of China.

What is the future of Jerusalem, and how do these two peoples live side by side there? What is the nature of a new Palestinian state, and what are its borders? What about the refugees that were displaced in '48 and their-- their progeny? What are their rights? And what kind of security is there for Israel if it pulls back from the West Bank?

These are-- these were issues that were called "final status" issues in Oslo because they were the hardest issues. And we opened the box on these issues for the first time. The parties had to grapple with them, wrestle with them for the first time, both themselves and between the two. And while we made a good deal of progress on those issues, we were not able to come to closure on some of the most difficult ones. But I think the gap was narrowed.

CHARLIE ROSE: Now, those who will say that notwithstanding the assumption by Barak that any concessions made during the negotiations are no longer on the table, that-- with a failure to reach an agreement, meant that every concession in pursuit of agreement was no longer operative, that, in fact, it is operative--

SAMUEL BERGER: No--

CHARLIE ROSE: --that once you have gone to make a certain direction that you can no longer remove that presence of that kind of progress.

SAMUEL BERGER: I don't think that's true. The understanding from day one-- the president set down some rules of the road on day one. We wouldn't talk to the press. We'd have a complete press blackout, which essentially worked. Number two, nothing was decided till everything was decided. And that was very clearly understood by the parties.

And during the negotiations, one party would put something forward at one point, and it would pull it back at another point. So I believe that Israel or the Palestinians-- neither Israel nor the Palestinians are bound in any way, legally or morally, to any positions that it took in Camp David.

I do believe that Camp David demonstrated that on these issues there is the capacity to define some solutions if both sides are prepared to make very tough choices.

CHARLIE ROSE: But surely you're not saying that once-- what was significant about this summit was that Jerusalem was on the table. For the first time ever, the two leaders were really talking about what to do. They were getting their hands around it and saying, "What about this, and what about this, and what about this? And would you do this?" Most of the time, Arafat said no, but surely you can't eliminate that from the consciousness of the leadership.

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, some of the ideas were our ideas. Some of the ideas were ideas that were derived from conversations between the parties, from the negotiators. I don't believe this is a problem. I think that if--if there is a will for the parties to get back together again, we will take a fresh crack at this.

It depends upon, on the one hand, the Palestinians deciding that they have

a clear choice here. Down one path is confrontation. Down the other path is agreement. The only way to get to agreement is to compromise, and that means leaving behind some of the traditional baggage that has been part of their ethos and their ideology for decades. But if they're not prepared to do that, they're not going to give their children a better future, a different future than they've had. And I believe that there are a number of people, many people in the Palestinian leadership, who understand that choice very clearly.

CHARLIE ROSE: It has been said by some that there was a kind of division in the Palestinian camp and that the younger members of the negotiating team were more responsive to change and compromise and more supple in what they thought might work.

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, there was a range of views in both delegations, in the Israeli delegation, in the Palestinian delegation. These are enormously tough issues-- not just Jerusalem, borders, security, refugees. I think each of those-- I suspect that everybody there changed their minds on some of those issues during the course of the two weeks. So there were-- there were differences.

But ultimately, obviously, the Palestinian authority and the Israeli government have to come to a particular decision. I think the Israelis were prepared on some of these issues to be at least more creative in thinking about solutions. But I think-- I think that it's incumbent now on the Palestinians to-- to show the same kind of creativity.

CHARLIE ROSE: Was it more a case of the past hadn't produced the kinds of results you needed and only a summit with these kinds of marathon negotiations in the privacy of Camp David might make it happen, or because you wanted to see what you could do before September 13th and all that might come out of some dramatic announcement of a state without an agreement beforehand?

SAMUEL BERGER: I think the conclusion that we reached -- certainly, the conclusion that Barak had reached -- was that there would be no more progress at the negotiator level. The negotiators actually in Stockholm had made good progress. They had achieved a great deal. But as you got closer to the tough core issues, only the leaders could make them. They believed that they could make them best with President Clinton's help. They believed they could make them best as a whole and in an environment which was not intensely scrutinized every day by the press.

So I think-- don't forget, we called this summit nine weeks away from September 13th. We're now seven weeks away from September 13th. If we did not force these issues now, they're not going to-- it's not going to get easier as it gets closer. And so I think the fact that we-- we brought them together, we forced them to confront these issues, we actually broke open a number of them-- I think the timing was probably right.

CHARLIE ROSE: Which one did you break open?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, I think there was progress on all of the issues, actually. Actually, even some progress on Jerusalem, although that was the hardest issue. But--

CHARLIE ROSE: What progress would you say you made on Jerusalem?

SAMUEL BERGER: But just to answer your first question, I think that on—on borders, on security, on refugees, while there was not agreement on those issues, I think that one could see the contours of an agreement. Neither party was prepared to make final-- take final positions until they saw how the Jerusalem issue came together. So I think there was progress across the board.

One of the negotiators, after this thing-- as this thing was ending, said this was really revolutionary. This had broken the taboos and had forced these two parties to come together and talk about the issues that they had never talked about before.

CHARLIE ROSE: Are you convinced in your mind that you-- that that is a point that you-- that you-- because of that, you've gained something that's dramatic and it's not like the fact that you failed, it's no longer operative?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, let's-- let's be clear. We did not reach an agreement. That was our goal, and therefore I don't want to try to sweep that fact under the rug. We wanted to get an agreement. We didn't get an agreement. But I do believe that-- that we've, in a sense, broken the iceberg. The pieces are now floating around. The two parties will have to decide whether they want to drift now towards confrontation, which I think is not in either's interest, or whether they want to look again at some of the positions they took and see whether there is, particularly on the Palestinian side, some more movement.

CHARLIE ROSE: How disappointed are you in the Egyptians and the Saudis and others that might have given Arafat cover to make a decision that would have been closer to or helped reach an agreement?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, let me put it this way. I hope that over the next several weeks that the other Arab countries will work with Chairman Arafat and recognize that the choice here is confrontation or agreement and support him in reaching an agreement that involves compromise based on principle.

No one is suggesting that either side-- certainly, the Israelis never compromised on their vital interests, never compromised on fundamental principles. And we wouldn't expect the Palestinians to, either. But we would hope that the other Arab countries would-- would express very clearly to Arafat their support for an honorable agreement.

CHARLIE ROSE: Why didn't they do that?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, I don't know what transpired between-- between them. I know King Abdullah of Jordan, I think, played quite a constructive role.

CHARLIE ROSE: Yeah, but the person who has the most influence on Arafat is not King Abdullah of Jordan, it is President Mubarak of Egypt and Foreign Minister Moussa.

SAMUEL BERGER: Yeah. Well, again, I don't know what-- what transpired between Mubarak and Arafat or Moussa and Arafat. I think that all of the Arab countries, including our friends, the Egyptians, have to face reality here. This problem is not going away. One possibility is not simply continuing along the status quo. There is no status quo in the Middle East.

CHARLIE ROSE: Let-- let me ask you this, though. I mean, I'm trying to get at this notion-- I mean, this was, as you have just said, an important moment. I mean, you've got the September 14th. You had the parties together. The president was giving-- staying up all night, giving the best he had, and you were, and I assume all the negotiators were. Shouldn't all of you have expected the Saudis and the Egyptians to do more, to lend more of an assistance to get you over the hump?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, again, I don't want to characterize what they did or did not do. I-- I want to look to the future here and express my hope and expectation that they will look at this reality sharply and starkly in the eye and realize that there is either conflict or there's agreement. There's no middle ground. They've got to choose.

CHARLIE ROSE: Do you think they grasp that?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, you know, I think that this was new territory for everybody. I'm not sure that the parties-- I'm not sure that the-- that the region believed that we would actually-- although they were hopeful there would be an agreement, in one sense, I'm not sure they would-- they actually had come to grips with the kinds of choices that are inherent in making an agreement. And I think now those issues are on the table, and I think that we have to just talk with them over the next several weeks and make it clear that there are-- there are choices to be made.

CHARLIE ROSE: Let me-- let me come--

SAMUEL BERGER: And they're part of this process.

CHARLIE ROSE: Let me-- let me come to-- you're the only person I'm talking to who was inside the room, which makes you my favorite guest, obviously.

SAMUEL BERGER: Makes me tired.

CHARLIE ROSE: Makes you tired? Exactly.

Do you think that at the end of the day, when this-- when the president realized that Arafat's final "no" at 3:00a.m., or whenever it came, meant that it was time to close shop, that there was trust between the parties, that somehow being there had made them come to a new level of understanding of each other and trust in each other?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, that's a very good question, Charlie. I mean, one of the things that was striking, having been around this problem for a long time and-- is the degree of familiarity, respect and even affection among the Israeli negotiators and the Palestinian negotiators.

They were constantly back and forth. We ate together. The president purposely had us every night, except a few, dine together at-- up at Camp David. They were off in the corner

grappling with these things. So I think that-- and that would not have been the case five years ago. In many ways, it is a result of Oslo that there is this kind of organic connection between Palestinians and Israelis.

Now, I think that is-- that at the leadership level, I think that there is less trust, and I think that is something that has accumulated over some time, and I think it-- I don't know that it was decisive here, but I think it certainly is a reality.

CHARLIE ROSE: Anything the president, who-- who pushed that ball up that hill and almost got it there, with the help of all the people, the parties-- Palestinians, Israelis, his own staff-- is there anything that he feels tonight that he might have done differently that might have made a difference?

SAMUEL BERGER: Well, I'll tell you, you know, on the first day that we got there, Charlie, the president said to us, "We're either going to succeed, or if we fail, we're going to know we tried everything we could think of."

And when we called this off on-- before the president went to Okinawa -- because he had made clear from the beginning he was going to the G-8 meeting -- I think there was a little feeling on-- on-- we called it off, and then, of course, the parties came back to us and said, "Let's stay."

But during that period, I think there was a little feeling on the part of all of us that we weren't really positive that-- that we couldn't get there. While we were gone, there-- under Secretary Albright, there was a good deal of very constructive work done at the negotiating level. When the president got back, he moved most of these issues pretty far down the field.

But I think by the end, not only-- we were absolutely convinced that we could not reach an agreement here and now. And I think that while we were quite disappointed by that, I think all of us, including the president, felt that we had done everything we could.

And the president, in particular-- I've never seen an effort as-- as heroic as he made over 14 days.

CHARLIE ROSE: Sandy Berger, national security adviser to the president, thank you.

SAMUEL BERGER: Thank you, Charlie.

CHARLIE ROSE: A pleasure to have you on the broadcast. We'll be right back. Stay with us.

Deputy Defense Minister Says Jerusalem Needs Creativity

CHARLIE ROSE: We continue our consideration of what happened at Camp David and the future for peace in the Middle East with EPHRAIM SNEH. General Sneh is the deputy defense minister of Israel.

General Sneh, thank you for coming in. I know it's late in Israel, and I thank you for doing this.

EPHRAIM SNEH, Deputy Defense Minister, Israel: My pleasure.

CHARLIE ROSE: With the perspective of at least a day or two, how do you see Camp David, failure, success or laying the groundwork for something new?

EPHRAIM SNEH: Well, it was not a success, unfortunately, but it was not a failure, either. Even from a perspective of two days, we can learn -- and it's quite evident -- that Camp David was a necessary step in our way to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

And it was an inevitable, indispensable step because we have to remember that in the first time in history, the two leaders, Barak and Arafat, were together in one venue, sitting for two weeks and discussing those issues that no leader before them ever dared to touch-- Jerusalem, refugees, final borders. Neither Rabin, the late, or Shimon Peres discussed it with Arafat. And now this was a higher step of negotiation.

I think it was very important, and I hope that quite soon we will learn that it's going to be continued.

CHARLIE ROSE: Some say that Prime Minister Barak put too many concessions out early, leaving nothing to close the deal.

EPHRAIM SNEH: No, I-- he made a long way towards Mr. Arafat. He made concessions, but he went as far as he could, according to the mandate that the Israeli people, that his constituency, gave him, and he stopped there. The fact that he came home empty-handed means that he went as far as he could, and in this point he stopped and say "That's it. No more."

I believe that now, in the next turn, it's the time of the Palestinians to make the steps forward. That's the true analysis of the situation.

CHARLIE ROSE: So your best hope would be that the Palestinians will see that Prime Minister Barak has made some concessions, has stepped forward in the search for peace, and that they, on further thinking, will accept some kind of joint sovereignty over portions of Jerusalem in order to reach an agreement?

EPHRAIM SNEH: And that-- yes. And that's a lot. No one dared to speak about it in the past. There were many Israelis who thought, "Well, some neighborhood suburbs, Arab suburbs, of Jerusalem are not so important. Actually, we can-- we can relinquish them." But nobody dared to say so.

Now, in a broader framework, what actually we offered is a sort of a trade-off. We want to annex to Jerusalem major, large Jewish neighborhoods, and in return to allow a certain extent of sovereignty to the Palestinians in suburbs which are at the periphery of Jerusalem.

A creative differential solution is the only solution that we can have to Jerusalem. It's so complicated a problem that we must build a very, very unusual way of solution to this extremely complicated problem. And we went in this direction.

This was the core of the suggestions, unless we decided to put Jerusalem aside and try to wrap up a deal without Jerusalem, and this is almost impossible.

CHARLIE ROSE: Some say Prime Minister Barak went further than he promised he would go in his election campaign.

EPHRAIM SNEH: Well, he says that we are going to keep Jerusalem united and

that we keep the defense border of Israel along the Jordan River and that we will not allow an influx, a massive influx of refugees to the borders of Israel. I think that he lived up to his promises. He stretched the flexibility as far as he could, but as I said, he didn't cross those red lines because the description of future Jerusalem would be an expanded, not divided, city where we may have our capital and another part of it, in the eastern periphery of it, the Palestinians could have their own capital. And this is, I think, the-- it is consistent with our red lines that we did promise to the Israeli voters--

CHARLIE ROSE: No question in your mind it's consistent with--

EPHRAIM SNEH: --just a year and a half ago.

CHARLIE ROSE: --the red lines?

EPHRAIM SNEH: In the framework of a certain necessary flexibility, which is necessary in negotiation, I think we kept it. If we succeeded to complete the agreement, then everybody could see that we adhere to our red lines. We didn't make Jerusalem, the Jewish Jerusalem, weaker. We didn't allow another Arab army to be deployed in the West Bank or in Gaza strip. We kept the Jordan River as the defense border of Israel. And we didn't accept the moral and the judicial responsibility for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. So I think this is our policy, and we kept it. And at the point that Barak understood that any farther step toward the Palestinians is unacceptable, he went home.

CHARLIE ROSE: Characterize how you perceive Barak's relationship with Arafat, the respect they have for each other, the trust that they have in each other, the sense that-- they-are-in-this-together notion?

EPHRAIM SNEH: It seems to me that to describe it honestly both leaders understand that their counterpart is the only leader that can strike a deal. Only Arafat can make it on the Palestinian side, and only Barak can do it on the Israeli side. While knowing this, each one has a great extent of respect and a sense of responsibility not-- not to bring about total collapse of the negotiations because after us maybe no one will try again.

CHARLIE ROSE: There were reports--

EPHRAIM SNEH: I think this is the true description of the relationship.

CHARLIE ROSE: That's why the moment is so important.

EPHRAIM SNEH: That's the point. The current-- the current leadership of Israel is consistent with the most-- the strongest supporters of the peace process.

Who is in Barak's cabinet? People like Peres, Beilin, Banami [sp], Surel [sp], until recently and I hope he will be back soon. These are the staunchest supporters of the peace process.

If this government cannot bring about peace with the Palestinians,

reconciliation with the Palestinians, which other government can do it? And in a different way, it applies to Arafat.

Arafat is committed to the peace process. If he fails the entire concept inside the Palestinian society of dealing with Israel through negotiation would collapse. And the next Palestinian leader would be somebody from the very fanatic fringe of the Palestinian society; somebody from the Hamas or the Jihad or those organizations.

So actually that's true. If we fail, maybe no one will try again.

CHARLIE ROSE: Can you tell me if there were credible threats made against Prime Minister Barak's life while he was at Camp David?

EPHRAIM SNEH: There are rumors, assessments. You know, I'm sure that there was hidden somewhere a person in our country who is ready to carry out again the same political assassination as put an end to the life of our beloved leader Yitzhak Rabin.

I believe that the killer is waiting somewhere and we have to be aware of it.

The tone of the instigation, the vocabulary that is used in the last couple of weeks against Barak reminds me of the days of October '95, just before the decimation of Rabin. And it's very sad that people in our country didn't learn this terrible lesson.

CHARLIE ROSE: Do you-- do you worry about the life of your friend?

EPHRAIM SNEH: Yes. I am concerned about it. You know, the security measures, the precautions that are taken today are very-- very, very thorough and strong, but you can never know.

CHARLIE ROSE: Apart from an extremist, how is--

EPHRAIM SNEH: He's well-guarded. He's well-guarded.

CHARLIE ROSE: Apart from some extremist like the young man who killed, assassinated, murdered Yitzhak Rabin, how is this going down with the Israeli public, what took place at Camp David? Because Prime Minister Barak was reading the polls that said 60, 70 percent of the people were opposed to some of the concessions he was prepared to make on Jerusalem.

EPHRAIM SNEH: I don't think that these are the right figures. There is a high sensitivity in Israel about Jerusalem. And when-- allow me to explain what is the difference.

When you ask somebody, "Are you in favor of dividing Jerusalem, of concessions in Jerusalem?" most of the Israelis, including very, very strong Barak supporters, will say "No. We are against it."

But when you ask specifically about a certain neighborhood, "Do you mind that in Shu'fat the Palestinians would have municipal autonomy?" Everybody

says, "I couldn't care less. Why not?"

So when you go to specific details about those "concessions," in Jerusalem and people discover that the names of those suburbs, those neighborhoods where we're supposed to make concessions, these are place that he never visited, that is never included in the old prayer of the Jewish people. Those people say, "Ah, is this what you mean? OK. I don't mind."

So when it comes to specific details, then you discover that if it ends up in a real peace and reconciliation with the Palestinians, there are some-- there are some concessions in Jerusalem that most of the Israelis are ready to make. It doesn't apply to the holy places with us, to those places which, for us symbolize Jerusalem, which are the subject of the real prayer of the previous generations, of our generation. Because we pray to Jerusalem -- not to Abadiz [sp] and not to Shu'fat and not Benhanina [sp]. And these are the places where we were ready to share sovereignty with the Palestinians. That's the big difference.

CHARLIE ROSE: Arik Sharon, the head of the Likud Party, probably looks forward to a new vote of confidence. There is talk of wanting new elections. What will Prime Minister Barak do now to build up his support in the Knesset? Will he make a new deal with Shas or something else?

EPHRAIM SNEH: To reach peace with the Palestinians, to put an end to the century-long conflict remains the strategic objective of our government and of Ehud Barak. In order to attain this objective, we need a coalition of parties which are ready to go in this direction. Of course, Meretz has to return to the coalition and we hope to convince Shas to go together with us. And then we'll build a reasonable coalition.

CHARLIE ROSE: Last question--

EPHRAIM SNEH: I'm afraid that the Lakhud is not a partner for this-- for obtaining these objectives.

CHARLIE ROSE: And there will be no national--

EPHRAIM SNEH: And if there will be no other choice-- There is no real national unity now. The Israeli people, a slight majority is in favor of a peace agreement and a minority is against it. Even if it is not a small minority at all, but we have to decide. We can't wait with the decision till we have broader consensus. We have to decide now in order to prevent deterioration down the road.

And there is some moments in the history of the nation when a decision is necessary and not a consensus. And that's exactly the historic moment where we are now. We have a majority for a national decision. It may be a referendum, it may be new elections, but this decision must be taken. We

are now at a crossroad and we have to decide which way we take.

CHARLIE ROSE: Now that there is no agreement coming out of Camp David and the likelihood of something happening in the near future is not certain, if the Palestinians go forward with announcing a Palestinian state, what will be the consequences for Israel? And what will Israel do?

EPHRAIM SNEH: We strongly advise them not to do that because when you start with unilateral measures, it never stops on the other side a unilateral decision. It may be followed by unilateral mirrors of the other side -- in this case, Israel.

And tactics or a ping-pong of unilateral measures, this is not a prescription for a real peace agreement. So it may-- and it even may put an end to the others. Because if you do things without considering your partner or, if you want, your rival, you don't reach an agreement.

So unilateral declarations of a Palestinian state is highly unadvisable. And we say to the Palestinians, it's better to wait to make another effort, to think in a more creative way and to reach an agreement -- an agreed upon arrangement, formula -- than to start with unilateral measures which can start a new circle of violence. And you never know where it ends. So--

CHARLIE ROSE: So the implicit threat is--

EPHRAIM SNEH: It is strongly recommended to the Palestinians not to do it.

CHARLIE ROSE: So the implicit threat is that if the Palestinians declare a new Palestinian state on September 13th, there is the possibility that there will be no more bargaining from the Israeli side. And secondly, there may be violence.

EPHRAIM SNEH: That's true. That's the danger. That's why I think to take such a measure unilaterally it's not a clever thing to do. There are some practical implications to this declaration. You have to define a territory which is your own. And this is a prescription for a series of clashes. I hope that Arafat will be clever and cautious enough not to do that.

We can reach a good agreement during this year. The 13th of September is not a sacred date. And we can reach an agreement without it. No doubt.

CHARLIE ROSE: General Sneh, thank you so much. I know it's late, as I said, in Tel Aviv. I thank you for joining me at this table, on this program, on this day.

EPHRAIM SNEH: Thank you, Charlie.

CHARLIE ROSE: We'll be right back. Stay with us.

Tom Friedman Says Barak Was More Prepared Than Arafat

CHARLIE ROSE: Also tonight from Washington, a journalistic perspective; that of Tom Friedman, the foreign affairs columnist from the New York Times and the author of *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*.

Tom, welcome.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN, "The New York Times": Hi, Charlie.

CHARLIE ROSE: Tell me what you think, where we are now. Is this-- is this the absence of success at this summit a complete failure?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Not in the least, Charlie. I think that Camp David 2000 was, in fact, the most important Israeli-Palestinian negotiation in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

CHARLIE ROSE: Why?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Um, it is because for the first time issues that had been wrapped up, Charlie, in sealed boxes and which each side carried around under their arm never to be opened, were opened in Camp David. The issues in those boxes were put on the table and actual compromises were discussed for the first time. I'm talking about Jerusalem. I'm talking about territorial compromise. I'm talking about refugees. I'm talking about an end to the conflict.

And that was a huge, huge achievement because to begin to settle them, they had to be unwrapped and put on the table. And that is a big deal.

CHARLIE ROSE: But if you listen to the president and others, it seems like-- that Prime Minister Barak made some concessions, but it's hard to appreciate the concessions made by Yasir Arafat. Tell me where they were because if you read the accounts of what happened, it ended up with him saying "No, no, no. I can't. I can't. I can't. I can't."

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: I think what happened here basically was that-- remember, Barak wanted this summit, Arafat was reluctant. He was reluctant for a lot of reasons -- one, because he felt that Barak had actually welched on a lot of promises and not delivered beforehand.

But Barak came far more prepared here to do business. And he laid down specific compromises for how to deal with the Palestinian refugee issue; a pragmatic solution involving both the return of some people to Israel, some to the West Bank and money. He laid down basically a territorial offer to Arafat by which the Palestinians would basically end up with something like 94 percent of the West Bank and Gaza under their control after this is over. And he laid down a proposal for Jerusalem that really involved a kind of

mosaic of control where Palestinians would get some neighborhoods outright, some they would have administrative control of, some religious control.

Arafat basically took a kind of rope-a-dope strategy there. He absorbed all of the Barak proposals, but he actually stuck very much to his own mantra, his own line on Jerusalem.

On the question of the West Bank and territorial compromise, though, Arafat's deputies made very clear that they were ready to accept a change of the 1967 border by which Israeli settlements would be incorporated into Israel. They also signalled very importantly they were ready to let Israel have a security presence in the Jordan valley for a set period of time; that Israelis were, I think, quite encouraged by.

So Arafat put some real stuff on the-- Arafat's people put some real stuff on the table as well. But on the most emotive issue, the central issue of Jerusalem, Arafat basically, as I said, kind of absorbed the Barak offers, did not come up with a serious or any form of counter-offer at all. And that's what I think was reflected in the President's remarks.

CHARLIE ROSE: Well, do you think that Arafat can come forward, certainly between now and, say, September 13th, one possible deadline, and take a different position on Jerusalem than he has taken before?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Well, you have two interpretations really in the U.S. government today on this issue, you know. The question is, is he Nelson Mandela or is he Willie Nelson? Is he a man who's ready for a great compromise or does he really just want to go down singing his old song?

And that's really a question on which there is a lot of division today. Some people will tell you this man and this movement don't know what they want to be when they grow up and they simply weren't ready for a final deal. Other people will tell you -- and I would put myself in this camp, basically -- that I think Arafat, if he is serious, had to be seen to be saying "no" now in order to make his "yes" more credible later on, number one.

Number two, I feel he did not feel in any way empowered by the Arab-Muslim world to be making any concessions on Jerusalem, which after all involves a billion Muslims and not just five or seven million Palestinians.

Clinton, from Camp David, as you know, Charlie, called Mubarak and on the Saudis, to the president of Egypt and the president of Saudi-- the leader of Saudi Arabia to help, basically, Arafat forge a compromise on Jerusalem. Unfortunately they headed for the hills. "Sorry, that phone call is fading out, Mr. President." And they were nowhere to be seen at the time.

CHARLIE ROSE: Is that because they didn't want to take the political risk to themselves for being-- for reaching out beyond what had been the mantra of the Arab world or the Muslim world?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: It would certainly seem so. Now, Arafat has gone back.

He's on a tour of the Arab world, or he's about to commence--

CHARLIE ROSE: His first stop was Cairo.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Yeah, his first stop is Cairo. And really, to me, Charlie, the question is, you know, who is Yasir Arafat now? What is he going to put on the table?

He is perfectly in his right to say that Barak's compromise offer on Jerusalem is insufficient; it does not meet his bottom line in a variety of respects. But is he ready, able and willing to put his own compromise on the table, one that would involve Palestinian sovereignty in part of east Jerusalem? Shared control maybe of the Temple Mount? Access to and from the Palestinian area in east Jerusalem, to and from the West Bank, unimpeded by Israeli checkpoints?

I can think of a lot of serious counter-offers that would still be short of what Barak may be demanding right now, but where Israelis would say, "Hmm, you know what, that's a serious offer. We can build on that."

We're not there yet, Charlie. And to me, the big question is Arafat's move now and is he going to put on the table something that Israelis say "I don't like it. I hate it. It falls short of what I wanted. But you know what? Let's talk about that."

CHARLIE ROSE: The most important thing that has happened now, I think you are saying, is that at least the Israeli people are thinking in a new way about Jerusalem and what might be acceptable.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Oh, you know, Charlie, one of the points you and I have discussed often on other issues is sometimes the news is in the noise, and sometimes the news is in the silence.

Sometimes the news is in what everyone is yelling. And sometimes it's in what isn't being said. And I urge you, do not pay attention to all the flapping of lips and all the rapping, the yapping of the right wing politicians in Israel. What is going on in Israel today is a very silent and very important re-drawing of mental maps in people's heads, as the celestial Jerusalem gives way to the real Jerusalem.

I don't know how far it will go. I can't say it's going to achieve, you know, the conclusion that everyone hopes for. But something really important is happening.

CHARLIE ROSE: And that's why the ball is in Yasir Arafat's court right now?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Absolutely.

CHARLIE ROSE: And what can he-- what-- what flexibility does he have? How much maneuverability does he have to make a counter-offer about Jerusalem that would be acceptable by Barak?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: I think it's really hard. There's no question because, you know, like Barak no preparation has gone into preparing the public for any such compromise. As I've said before, it's like he and Barak were two guys trying to get a divorce and they met with the lawyer and they agreed on some of the terms but nobody told the kids. And nobody has still told the kids, basically.

Barak hasn't had a frank conversation with the Israeli public. It's all leaked out in the press. Arafat has not had a frank conversation with the Palestinian people, let alone with the Muslim world.

So this is going to take time. And what might actually prove to be flexibility in the wake of that conversation, we can't predict. It's hard to know what kind of wiggle room he has when he has yet to even make the case of why a compromise is not only the best they can get, but is actually something they can build on and would be in the long term interest of the Palestinian people.

CHARLIE ROSE: What do you think would best-- what could most help Arafat come to the conclusion that he ought to reach out now; that this is an opportune moment?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: He needs-- Absolutely. He needs Arab/Muslim cover. I mean, if you were waving a magic wand, you'd want an Arab summit that basically empowered him to strike a final deal, you know, on this issue; one that did not cede any religious control over Muslim holy places; one that involved Palestinian sovereignty in the eastern half of the city, but one that still left room for a compromise on the key issues with Israel.

That would be the ideal thing. Short of that, you really need the leaders of Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco, basically to provide some kind of cover. And unfortunately here you're dealing with weak, frail and often illegitimate Arab regimes that are terrified of the street. They live by the motto, "There they go. I must catch up for I am their leader."

And these are not people, boy-- you know, Arafat could really get out on a limb and look over his shoulder and ain't nobody going to be there. So I have a certain sympathy for him here.

CHARLIE ROSE: So-- but are you convinced that he is willing to take the initiative to say to Barak and-- I mean, to say to Mubarak and to say to the young Assad and to say to King Abdullah in Jordan and to say to other Arab leaders, "Let's get together. This is a time I need your help. Come on. Let's do something."

Or is he simply saying, "Look, I've been muddling through for a long time, I'll just continue to muddle and maybe circumstances will change and I'll be better off."

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: It's the question, Charlie, and it's really impossible to know, you know, what's going through his mind. He was quite Delphic, as I understand, at Camp David.

CHARLIE ROSE: What does that mean, "Delphic?"

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: I don't think he signalled either way which way he's going to go.

CHARLIE ROSE: Oh, I see.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: And-- but either way, he knows now this is the choice, OK. Basically the PLO and Arafat and the Palestinian National Movement have survived to these many years, survived Arab regimes that wanted to control it around the throat and Israeli governments that wanted to destroy it.

He has survived all these years by bobbing and weaving and never irrevocably giving anything away. Well, that play is over. We are at the end game now. And he cannot survive the end game.

CHARLIE ROSE: Why is that play over?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Because there's simply no way to get a final deal here, OK, by bobbing, weaving and refusing to irrevocably give anything away. If he wants to be the mayor of Ramala, that's fine. If he wants to be the mayor of Gaza, he's got that. No problem. He can muddle through. But if he wants to be the president of a real state, then he's going to have to make a decision.

CHARLIE ROSE: Do you think he will go forward and announce a Palestinian state on the 13th of September?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: I think everything depends on where the negotiations are then. It would be a futile gesture, Charlie. One that would trigger a unilateral Israeli response and unravel potentially everything that Arafat has achieved.

So I think it's something that they will think hard and long about. I think it's-- you know, I'm struck -- both guys went back, but look what has been going on in the ground. Both Barak and Arafat gave orders -- "Keep things quiet." Saeb Erakat, the Palestinian negotiator, met today, or spoke today, with his Israeli counterpart. They've agreed to meet again on Sunday.

I am just struck at the degree to which nobody wants this to go over a cliff.

CHARLIE ROSE: Everybody is saying something special happened there. I know we didn't reach an agreement, but there is something there that gives us an incentive to go forward.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: Exactly. Both Barak and Arafat came away and they could not but have come away saying, "Hmm, he didn't give me what I wanted, not even close, but, man, he was there yesterday. And now they did tell me they would be ready to go here." And so, for you then to walk away and say, "I didn't get what I wanted. Let's go to war. Let's man the barricades." That's not an easy thing to do. They're caught there and they're caught in the best way, I think.

So this is going to take time.

CHARLIE ROSE: What could bring the Arab leaders to come around and give cover to Arafat?

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: That's a good question, Charlie. I've been thinking about that all day. You know, one would like to think that they could be shamed into it; that people who have so cynically exploited the Palestinian cause all these years might actually do something to help the Palestinian people.

But color me, you know, this Minnesota optimist comes out, I'm sorry, every once in a while on your show, Charlie. One, you know, could only hope that, you know, one of them will actually rise above himself in his own politics and actually sit down and say we have an

historic opportunity in Barak, in this moment, with Arafat, to actually bring this conflict to a close.

It's not going to be peace. It's not going to make everybody happy. But to create a foundation out of which co-existence might actually grow, people can live their lives.

You know, that's all you can appeal to. There's not going to be some pressure on them to do, although one would like to see that sometimes. But I don't see it happening.

CHARLIE ROSE: Tom, thank you so much.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN: My pleasure. Thanks, Charlie.

CHARLIE ROSE: Tom Friedman from Washington.

A program note -- two other interviews on this subject will be aired tomorrow night. They are with Edward Said, Professor Said, long-known for his consideration of Palestinian issues, and Mort Zuckerman, the editor-in-chief of U.S. News and World Report.

Also tomorrow, the secretary general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.

Thank you for joining us. See you then.

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The James S. Brady Briefing Room

12:30 P.M. EDT

MR. LOCKHART: I don't have anything for you, so why don't you start with questions. Terry, what's on your mind? I can go to the Week Ahead.

Q I'm going to defer.

Q Joe, does the administration have a position on the Treasury, Postal and Legislative Branch approps bill that this House Conference Report is likely to pass today?

MR. LOCKHART: We'd love to see it. Our understanding was there was some Republican-only negotiations that ended at 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. this morning, and leading Democratic members in the House have been forced to try to get details off the Internet as opposed to from their colleagues. When we see it, we'll make a judgment on it.

Q Joe, I searched on the Internet for this and couldn't find it. Do you guys have a position yet on the legislation that Congressman Lazio has endorsed, and also the First Lady?

MR. LOCKHART: Congressman Adler, I know, is considering legislation on post-September 13th. I don't know that that's been introduced; we certainly haven't seen it yet. As far as our position, we have indicated very clearly to all the parties that we oppose any unilateral actions, which declaring a state would be one.

Q But does that mean you would support withdrawing aid from --

MR. LOCKHART: Again, I'm not going to go down the hypothetical road, but on this legislation, I mean, once it's done and available, I can probably give you a more fuller comment.

Q But you wouldn't need legislation to do that if that was a goal you supported, right?

MR. LOCKHART: Pardon?

Q Any aid to unilateral declaration? That wouldn't require legislation for the administration to do that.

MR. CROWLEY: All of these issues need to be resolved within the peace process.

MR. LOCKHART: I'm not aware that it would -- yes. I'm not aware that would require any legislation, but it's been our view, and it's been our view throughout the Oslo process that all of these issues are done in the context of the peace process, and are done with an eye towards what's best for the peace process.

Q Joe, there was a meeting last night at the Erez Crossing. Israeli-Palestinian meeting; there is going to be another one Sunday. Is this leading up to another summit?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I don't know what it will lead up to. But I think it's encouraging that both parties are anxious to get back to the negotiating table. We know that time is short. It's the end of July now; September 13th is the deadline on this. My understanding from the State Department is Assistant Secretary Walker will be traveling to some Arab capitals next week. We stand ready to play our role in this. But the comments that have been coming from the leaders seem to indicate that they want to get right back to work.

Q Joe, a follow-up. If the parties decide they want a Palestinian state, will the United States accept it and recognize it?

MR. LOCKHART: I think if they're -- the final status issues are final status issues. Our position is that they shouldn't be decided unilaterally, they should be decided in the context of the peace process, and we will make our decisions, obviously, based on their ability to reach an agreement.

Q Joe, do you have any schedule for travels of Ambassador Ross to the region?

MR. LOCKHART: No. I checked on that before coming out. There are no travel plans at this point for Ambassador Ross.

Q Joe, should we expect a very rapid veto from the President when the marriage penalty elimination bill comes down this afternoon? We understand the Republicans are going to dress up a couple of staffers as a bride and groom and tie tin cans to their car and send it down here?

MR. LOCKHART: Let me say this: It's not surprising that Republican tax plans would come down in a limousine.

Q It won't be a limousine they say.

MR. LOCKHART: Well, obviously we've gotten to them, but let me say this: that this is the worst contrived marriage since our friends Darva Conger and Rick Rockwell got together. (Laughter.) Except this one should be called, under the Republican plan, "Who wants to help a millionaire?"

THE PRESS: Oooohhhhh. (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: Next? Otherwise, on the plans we'll -- when it gets here, the President, in due time, will send it back. (Laughter.)

Q Can the President --

Q Is that your line, or did you get help with it?

Q I got what I needed. (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: I didn't. Next? Yes.

Q Joe, back on the First Lady's statement -- does her statement in any way complicate the administration's efforts to make policy at a delicate time in the peace process?

MR. LOCKHART: No. The First Lady's running for the Senate seat in New York; the President's running America's foreign policy.

Q Joe, given what you said this morning, though, about marriage penalty, is it safe to assume that the President will not veto this until Congress leaves town and definitely doesn't link it with the prescription drugs?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, listen, we -- the President has a lot on his plate over the next couple of days because we did have to move a lot of things in the schedule because of the Camp David Summit talks. So I don't think we feel like we need to toss our schedule up in the air because the Republicans have come up with a stunt that they think is clever.

Q That wasn't the question, though.

MR. LOCKHART: Well, what was the question, then?

Q He had said something about, well, he was likely to veto this unless they come up with a --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, sure, if they decide this afternoon to get an 11th-hour conversion, and do the right thing, and do

something on prescription drugs, then we'd be in a different position. But that doesn't look likely.

Q So there -- my question, though, is he won't act on this until they leave town?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't expect any action on that today. Yes.

Q Joe, can you give us a rundown on the meeting between President Estrada and President Clinton?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, they're actually still going on. I think I previewed this morning some of the things they'd be talking about as far as our bilateral relationship deepening the cooperation between the two countries, trade and investment, some of the military assistance that is provided. My understanding is, once they break from lunch, President Estrada will go to the stakeout, give you his readout, and if anybody needs anything further on that, I'll make Mr. Crowley available to you all.

Q Why does the marriage tax penalty bill become more acceptable if there is a prescription drug benefit that's talked about? Because the objection that I've heard from here about the marriage tax penalty is fiscally irresponsible and rewards the wealthy. Does that change if there's a prescription drug benefit?

MR. LOCKHART: No, I think the point that the President made was, we would be willing to accept poor targeting within the marriage penalty if the Republicans were willing to accept a real prescription drug benefit, and that's sometimes how you get to a deal and you make compromises. So it's a compromise the President has offered. The Republicans haven't seemed too interested in compromising on this.

Q I mean, taking your comments about the millionaires, seriously, Joe, I mean --

MR. LOCKHART: I wouldn't. (Laughter.) I take it about as seriously as two staffers getting dressed up as a bride and groom.

Q Joe, the tax bill isn't -- as I understand, the administration's number one objection is that there are basically 25 million Americans who pay this marriage tax penalty. Their bill would affect 42 million, mainly who are upper middle class, not necessarily super wealthy.

MR. LOCKHART: Right.

Q That's really the objection. It's not about millionaires.

MR. LOCKHART: The objection is you can fix the marriage tax penalty with the President's proposal by going after and changing the tax code so that the people who pay a penalty no longer are penalized.

What's going on here is the Republicans want to change the tax code in a way that affects those who are most well off. And the way they are doing it is through all of these bills. So, you can't look at one of these bills, you have to look at all of them.

And in this particular one -- and in fact, they've done their own sort of internal bidding war on this. In one statement, they said they wanted to make it more acceptable. And what they did between the House and the Senate, and going back to the House, was they made it even more expensive. So, if they want to attack the marriage penalty -- we want to work with them -- but if they want to do something else like they want to do with this bill, then we can't work with them.

Q So, the statement about favoring the wealthy disproportionately is applied to all of the tax cuts, not this one in particular?

MR. LOCKHART: It applies to all of them, but it also applies in a sense to this one because of the way they've taken the marriage penalty -- and there are actually people who get a marriage bonus who are now going to be getting an extra bonus. And if you look at them, they are, as you move up, disproportionately to the advantage of people at the higher income levels.

Q What about the increase of the size of the 15 percent tax bracket? Is the administration generally supportive of that and sympathetic to that thrust?

MR. LOCKHART: To -- sorry?

Q They would enlarge the income barrier -- or the extent of the 15 percent tax bracket --

MR. LOCKHART: That's just one element.

Q -- earn more, you wouldn't go into the 28 percent tax bracket?

MR. LOCKHART: Right, but I think what we believe is the best way to do this, and the best way to target tax relief is the way we've put forward. In the marriage penalty this is one way the President has a proposal -- there are a number of other ones. That is what we think is the best way to make policy.

Q Who gets the marriage bonus? Can you explain that?

MR. LOCKHART: Almost the same number of people who, through quirks in the tax code, who have to pay a marriage penalty. It's just the way the system works.

Q Joe, how does the Social Security benefits bill fit into this given it would just revert it back to the original law where they still would be taxed 50 percent over certain income thresholds?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think the biggest problem with that is the five years it takes off of the life of the Medicare Trust Fund. Now, they say they have some sort of mechanism to replace that, but it's hard to believe that if they can get anything else they want on their tax agenda. Because the money just won't be there. Yes.

Q Joe, as head of the Democratic Party, does President Clinton approve of the DCCC fundraiser at the Playboy mansion?

MR. LOCKHART: I'm not aware that he knows about it. What are the details of that, besides at the Playboy --

Q Vice President Gore has expressed his strong disapproval. DCCC is going to be holding a fundraiser at the Playboy mansion in the middle of the Democratic Convention in Los Angeles. Some Democrats have said it's inappropriate as a venue.

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know that he has any awareness of it. If the subject of the Playboy mansion happens to come up in conversation, I'll ask about that. (Laughter.)

Q Joe, does the White House find a different way to solve the problem with the Cuban relatives of the pilots that were shot down with the Cubans a few years ago. They -- the proposal by the White House of \$50 million.

MR. LOCKHART: I'd have to check on that. I haven't seen anything on that recently. But we'll check. Yes.

Q On the Philippines, is the U.S. helping with the hostage situation at all? I think it's still ongoing.

MR. LOCKHART: Not that I'm aware of.

Q The President's going to veto that bill?

MR. LOCKHART: The process isn't complete yet, and they still have time to change what they're doing, but I can tell you this, the President will not sign a bill that takes five years off of the life of the Medicare Trust Fund.

Q What do they need to do, then, to change this so that it will be acceptable specifically? I mean, could you be satisfied that the money would be transferred out at general

revenues to Medicare, or if there were an alternate funding mechanism, would that be good enough?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, one of the things they'd have to do is reexamine their entire approach to taxes. If they didn't have these exploding things like the estate tax, there might be funds available to do that. But they are going to continue to pursue those, so --

Q Yes, but you're not going to sign those bills.

MR. LOCKHART: Well, we're not going to -- we have no intention of signing the estate tax bill, but on each of these things, they need to work with us to find a mechanism that would work. And right now they haven't.

Q But then the money will be there if you don't sign those bills. So why would you oppose the current tax cut --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, we -- I mean, you're now asking kind of a circular question, so I think that question is best put to them on why they would put forward legislation that would seek to take five years off the Medicare trust fund.

Q All right, but without going into the semantics, though, just to be sure I understand, then with these other tax bills on the table -- with them proposing these other tax cuts -- you're not going to accept this Social Security tax cut; is that correct?

MR. LOCKHART: Not unless they can come up with a way of doing this that does not threaten the Medicare Trust Fund.

Q Joe, continuing that line of questioning for a second, let's just work out a sequence here. Let's say marriage penalty, estate, come up, the President vetoes those. And they can't override, and they're essentially dead. Then, this Social Security tax comes up. It's clear that those other tax cuts have been vetoed, they're not going to come back. They're not going to go into law. There is this money available. Under those circumstances, would the White House entertain signing that type of legislation?

MR. LOCKHART: We are willing to work on all of these subjects in good faith with members of Congress to work out a way where we can provide targeted tax relief to the American public. And I'm not going to engage in a hypothetical conversation. Because what's clear in this process is the Republican Congress is not willing to work with us. What they're trying to do is set up an agenda and a campaign for the fall. And this, in many ways, is not a serious effort.

Q So, Joe, in principle you don't have a problem going back to 50 percent from 85 percent in terms of taxing?

MR. LOCKHART: I think -- any discussion like this has to be done in the overall context of fiscal discipline and how things are paid for. Up until now, the Republicans have refused to engage in that conversation. The appropriations process has gone nowhere on the spending side. On the tax side, they just keep loading up bill after bill after bill that spends all the surplus. If they want to engage in that conversation the door is always open here.

Q But it doesn't fit in your definition, though, of something that weighs heavily for the wealthy?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think that --

Q The ceiling is only like --

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know that is as egregious, or is like the estate tax repeal. But again, all of this has to be done in the context of an overall plan, which is, you know, not what they've been after.

Q Joe, on the topic of working together, specifically on appropriations, some Republicans say they have asked the White House in what they described as a good-faith effort for specific numbers, targets on these appropriations bills as they move toward conference report and say they haven't gotten any word back from the White House; they can't get a fixed target of what the White House really believes is acceptable and workable.

MR. LOCKHART: We have worked very well at times with the appropriators. OMB Director Lew is always ready to discuss issues with them. They've gone, recently, into closed doors excluding Democrats from Congress and people from the Administration to try to cut their own deals. We'll see how well they do.

Q Joe, what is the minimum you're willing to accept to cut a deal -- to reach a deal with the Republicans this fall on, for instance, additional spending or tax cuts?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think we've put out a budget. So, they know what our priorities are. They have done their own work. Now it's a question of getting together and making sure that we continue a policy of fiscal discipline, but continue a policy of investing in our priorities.

Q Do you think you're heading for a big budget battle like we've had in the past with the GOP this autumn?

MR. LOCKHART: It's becoming a ritual of September and October. And the fact that they're leaving town tonight without having made significant progress indicates that we'll have a lot

of appropriations work to do. Whether it's a battle or not is something that's in the hands of the majority party in Congress.

Q What is the opinion of the President about the proposal of some members of the Congress to create a new amnesty for illegal workers in the United States?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know that I've seen any specific proposal on that. I know that there is a lot of work being done at the INS on a number of different fronts, including illegal aliens that are here in the U.S. But I haven't seen a specific proposal recently.

Week ahead because we're not here tomorrow. Friday, July 28th the President will travel to Barrington, Rhode Island for lunch with Representative Patrick Kennedy. That will be pool press. The President will also travel to Boston later that day for a DCCC reception and a DCCC dinner. He will return to Washington tomorrow evening.

Saturday, July 29th the President's Weekly Radio Address is broadcast at 10:06 a.m. Eastern Time. The President will also travel to New York to make remarks at the New York Senate 2000 Lunch. He'll remain overnight in Chappaqua.

Sunday, July 30th, the President will travel to Chicago to give a speech at a DNC lunch and will also speak to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America 2000 Annual Convention, returning to D.C. that night.

Monday, the President will travel to Tampa, Florida for an event promoting his plan for prescription drugs, and a DSCC lunch. He'll then travel to West Palm Beach, Florida for a DSCC reception and dinner, returning to Washington that evening.

On Tuesday, the President has no public schedule, as he has none for Wednesday or Thursday. On Friday, the President will attend a Hillary 2000 dinner in Nantucket, Massachusetts. The President will remain overnight in Martha's Vineyard.

Saturday, in addition to his weekly radio address, the President will make remarks at a dinner for Kathleen Kennedy Townsend in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. The President will remain again overnight in Martha's Vineyard.

On Sunday, the President will attend a New York Senate 2000 reception and a New York Senate 2000 dinner on Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. The President is expected to remain overnight in the Vineyard and return to Washington, D.C. the next day.

Q Do you think that he might go up to the Vineyard early, maybe -- is there any indication of that; you've got a couple of open days there.

MR. LOCKHART: He's got a couple open days, but as of now, I think the plan is to go up Thursday or Friday. We'll let you know.

Q One other thing. Does the White House have a position on whether it's appropriate to wear an open-toed sandal to a formal event after Labor Day? (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: Terry, that kind of fashion question obviously shouldn't be put to me. I don't really have an answer for you. Any others before we go?

Q Joe, one more for next week. The President's going to be around. What other plans does he have; how closely will he pay attention to the convention?

MR. LOCKHART: You're ruining my gag here, Bob. (Laughter.) Mark, do you have a question?

Q That I do. There's a considerable interest with the First Lady away. When the President whips up some salad dressing for himself, does he use virgin olive oil or extra virgin olive oil? (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: Cooking question. Fashion and cooking. I'm getting close to who might want to answer these questions. (Laughter.) John?

Q Joe, is the President concerned about the deterioration of Courtney Love's music, and does he directly associate it with the death of Kurt Cobain? (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: Okay, I think I know where you're all going. Is there anyone else who wants to jump in here before I try to answer those?

Q Joe, the Clinton administration has had, I think, two Italian-American chiefs of staff. (Laughter.) Does the President have an opinion about which one of those has been a more effective Chief of Staff, and also which one has been a better contributor to the Italian American community?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, having only been able to work myself with the esteemed and capable John Podesta, I might have a personal view. But Ms. Palmieri, who is now about to walk up here and answer these few questions -- (laughter) -- might have another view. So, given this is her last day as a briefing here, I thought she would come up and take on a few of those tough questions. (Laughter and applause.)

MS. PALMIERI: This isn't so bad. Oh, no. (Laughter.) Look, it's my favorite Italian Greek Chief of Staff. (Laughter.) Okay, Terry. You know, this is one of the greatest fashion travails of our time, and it is considered okay at this point in

the year 2000, it's a new fashion rule for the 21st century, yes, you can wear open-toed shoes. Beyond Labor Day, however, they must not be white. (Laughter.)

Okay, Knoller?

Q Virgin olive oil, or extra virgin?

MS. PALMIERI: Extra virgin. King, what was that?

Q Courtney Love in the tank. (Laughter.)

MS. PALMIERI: You know, well, Courtney, she's a renaissance woman, John. She can't focus solely on her music career; she must also focus on her film career. And like Courtney, I just want to be the girl with the most cake.

And Harris?

Q Panetta or Podesta?

MS. PALMIERI: Oh, well, again, John is my favorite Italian Greek Chief of Staff.

MR. LOCKHART: Why don't we let John speak for himself? (Laughter.)

MR. PODESTA: I just want to say that it was the ability to answer questions like the last one -- (laughter) -- which endeared Jennifer to us so much over the years, I want to thank her for the seven-and-a-half years of service to the country, to the President and to the administration. I want to thank her for kicking the butt of two Italian American Chiefs of Staff, along with everyone else around here, and I want to say that I think in a few more days, we're going to have an Italian American deficit disorder in the White House. We'll try to fix that.

MS. PALMIERI: Thanks, John.

MR. LOCKHART: I've got to get the last word here.

MS. PALMIERI: Oh, you do?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I hope some of you will be able to stay behind, as I think we have something like cake and champagne to celebrate this day, or to commiserate this day; it's my personal view. But I think those of you who have been around a while realize the contribution Jennifer's made over the last seven and a half years, first with Leon for a long stint, then in the scheduling office, or scheduling hell, as we like to refer to it.

MS. PALMIERI: Rescued me from scheduling hell.

MR. LOCKHART: Yes. And then finally, for the last two years, in the Press Office. I think what many of you know, some of you may not know, those of you who know are the ones involved with the Correspondents Association and other groups is that Jennifer has been an incredible advocate for the press over the last two years as far as making our events accessible to you, making sure that things get done, your needs are met, this room stays open and all of our work can get done.

I think from my point of view, we have now what I think is the best White House press staff we've ever had, at least certainly in my memory, and it's because of the people she recruited and managed. And I like to take credit for -- I think finally, we are all going to miss her deeply. I think you don't know how much you will. I already do. And I just, from the President, from John, from me and everyone in the press staff, we just want to thank you for everything you've done, and we will miss you greatly. (Applause.)

MS. PALMIERI: All right, that wasn't so bad.

Q Is there any truth to the rumor that Rene Russo is going to replace her? (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: Well, Bob, as you've mentioned to me several times, you've never seen the two of them in the same room at the same time, so I'll leave it there. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

12:53 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Camp David, Maryland)

For Immediate Release

July 24, 2000

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
JOE LOCKHART

Thurmont Elementary School
Thurmont, Maryland

4:40 P.M. EDT

MR. LOCKHART: Okay, let me bring you up to date since we spoke last, a few hours ago.

As I indicated this morning, the President, just before 11:00 a.m., went into the first meeting with the small group of negotiators. He had a series of meetings that lasted between 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. The President took a break at 3:00 p.m. I expect him to meet with the team within the next half hour and resume the negotiating at roughly 6:00 p.m. tonight.

Our team, for their part, spent the break time together working through a number of issues. I talked to several of those on our side who are involved in negotiating, in addition to the intensive and substantive, they added that it was both exhaustive and exhausting. I think everyone is feeling the effect of some late nights, but they're still hard at it.

Other than that, the evening will be open. There obviously is a possibility for a number of meetings of different types, we'll let you know before we let you go tonight.

Q Joe, can you fill in a couple of small --

MR. LOCKHART: Yes.

Q Those series of meetings would mean with a mixed team of negotiators?

MR. LOCKHART: Yes. They did things in a variety of formats, both separately and together, between 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.

Q And you said this morning they're working their way through all issues. Is that still the case?

MR. LOCKHART: That is still the case.

Q As the summit spokesman, you tell us habitually that the President met with his people. But what have Arafat and Barak been doing? Have they been getting reports?

MR. LOCKHART: They've been getting reports from their team and they've been meeting in a variety of formats with their own teams.

Q Joe, what is the latest in the rolling assessment?

MR. LOCKHART: It's still rolling. (Laughter.)

Q It's still rolling, but, I mean, has he decided -- has he come to a point where he would make another -- in this rolling series of assessments or are we still operating on the one front that --

MR. LOCKHART: I think we're still operating from where we were this morning, that it's still constructive to continue these sessions. I think they had almost four hours' worth this morning; they'll go back at it this evening and we'll just have to see where they go.

Q Joe, these are extremely complicated issues. Would it be fair to say that the negotiators are not keeping all the details in their head, and that -- pieces of paper --

MR. LOCKHART: Certainly, people are taking notes.

Q Joe, what's the significance of the President's meeting with teams of negotiators and -- without the presence of Arafat and Barak?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think the significance is there are a number of issues, all of which have significant sub-issues and they're trying to work through to find areas of agreement.

Q Who do you think the President is going to meet with assuming -- is that the U.S. team?

MR. LOCKHART: U.S. team, yes.

Q -- evening? How close are they to getting any --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, they're in proximity very close. When we call and ask for a meeting we generally get one, it's a question of what's the most useful thing to do. Right now we think working with the negotiating teams is the most constructive

way to move forward, but I would -- certainly wouldn't rule out that he'd sit and talk to the leaders tonight.

Q Is the President trying to find areas of agreement? You said they're trying to find areas of agreement.

MR. LOCKHART: Yes.

Q They must have found an area or two by now, no?

MR. LOCKHART: They've probably found some areas, they've probably found some issues. But this is as -- as the question indicated, these are very difficult issues, and do have some very complicated parts to them.

Q Has the President been in touch with any foreign leaders in the last --

MR. LOCKHART: Not that I'm aware of.

Q Is it still the case that the President hasn't discussed any calendar deadlines of the summit --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, should I let him in our little secret? I mean, there's sort of an informal deadline that we've all been working off. All parties want to be available to see Kathy Lee's last show, on Friday -- (laughter) -- so I would expect we'll be done by then. But besides that, no.

Q Let me try for clarity on a couple. One is, without asking for the substance of the proposal, the proposal that is being discussed on Jerusalem continues to be described as an American proposal. Can you at least help clarify whether it is, indeed, an American proposal that is being discussed?

MR. LOCKHART: No, I'm not going to try to help on if there's a proposal, who's it is, or what the details are. I've read a lot in the last few days, and as the question indicated today, the batting average hasn't improved very much.

Q Can I get clarity on one more thing that you were asked about earlier today with this Jonathan Pollard? There are continuing reports on that, as well, that the Israelis are asking for an agreement on Jonathan Pollard. You said earlier today that Pollard has not been a topic of discussion, is that correct?

MR. LOCKHART: I'm not aware that it's come up in the context of the discussions. But what I did say, and what is the reality is, I don't know of any time the President has met with Barak in any format or extended session where at some point it's not raised.

Q -- on that, there is a lot of speculation that the President may at least keep the -- at least part of the -- peace

negotiations, how it might affect his wife's Senate race. And, certainly, the issue of Jonathan Pollard is one that is watched closely by a lot of New York voters. Has he been in discussions with the First Lady at all during his time at Camp David about what a --

MR. LOCKHART: I certainly know he's talked to her, but I'd be very surprised to learn that they were talking about Jonathan Pollard.

Q Is he going to Arkansas tomorrow?

MR. LOCKHART: The President is still scheduled to go. We're supposed to leave at about lunchtime and return sometime after midnight.

Q Joe, can you say anything about the talks going on at Emmitsburg? I understood it's something of a problem, separated the issues -- two of the major issues, water and the economy. It seems to me that they've made some progress there that might alleviate tensions, it might create other possibilities of getting agreement elsewhere. Has there been anything done on that and have you experienced a separation of these issues --

MR. LOCKHART: I don't have anything beyond what Richard discussed yesterday, so I'd refer you to his transcript.

Q Last week, the -- last week you characterized the objective -- agreement --

MR. LOCKHART: No, still an agreement.

Q Agreement?

MR. LOCKHART: Agreement.

Q Is there an issue among the final set of issues that are being discussed only by the leaders, without the negotiators? Something like Jerusalem?

MR. LOCKHART: No, my understanding is that all issues have been discussed both at the leader level and among the negotiators.

Q Joe, when you say, agreement, are you talking final status agreement or framework agreement, or any kind of agreements?

MR. LOCKHART: I'm talking about an agreement between the two sides.

Q (Inaudible.)

MR. LOCKHART: We didn't put a name to it, but -- (laughter) -- I think that would be probably correct. I mean, the Secretary of State, should the President leave the talks, will take over for the President and keep the discussions going.

Q Is that certain? You're planning on the talks continuing through tomorrow noon?

MR. LOCKHART: I probably broke my rule about speculating a day ahead. We are taking this through today, which is Monday. We'll worry about tomorrow, tomorrow.

Q -- given the fact that people are getting tired, leading you to believe that these situations might --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I guess there is a breaking point at some point, but it remains to be seen whether exhaustion will help the process or hurt the process. You know, I think you could find examples from other negotiations where exhaustion worked to their advantage and some others where it didn't.

Q This is my first summit, so forgive me if this is a terribly naive question. But I thought that the point of these things were to bring together leaders face-to-face, and in two weeks there hasn't been a trilateral meeting, in my understanding, except for a couple things at dinner. Could you explain to people like me why that's okay, why that's not a sign that things aren't --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I would disagree only with what the point is. The point is to get an agreement, and we make an assessment on what is the most constructive way to get from a position now where we don't have agreement to a point where the parties do agree. There is a variety of ways to do that and we will employ the ones that, in our judgment, we believe have the best chance of bringing about an agreement.

Q In your judgment. But does this approach have the consent of the two leaders?

MR. LOCKHART: I'm not aware of any dissention at all on this issue.

Q I mean, they could take a break.

MR. LOCKHART: Oh, absolutely, there's nothing -- there is absolutely nothing that prevents any other kind of discussion or format.

Q Joe, without going into details, would you say that in the past couple of weeks red lines have been crossed, a kind of sufficient creativity has been shown that taboos have been broken on both sides?

MR. LOCKHART: I wouldn't say.

Q -- either last night or today at Camp David?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, there have been a variety of people involved, depending on the issue they were discussing. So in a sense, yes, because there are some people who are more expert on some issues than others. But there has been, obviously, a pool of negotiators they've drawn on that have been used in different combinations and different groupings.

Q Last night and today?

MR. LOCKHART: Last night and today.

Q Is there a total number of -- or is that -- whether it should never have left or --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I'm actually only referring to what's going on at Camp David.

Q It's been about 24 hours since the President returned from Okinawa. Is he more or less hopeful about the --

MR. LOCKHART: I think he's right where he was when he left Japan and spoke to you all last.

Q Joe, the negotiators that are meeting with the President, you say different people at different times. What are the ones that aren't meeting with the President doing? Are they also meeting on other issues or --

MR. LOCKHART: I think there are a series of other informal discussions that are going on. There is a set group of issues, and I think there are some discussions going on informally on other issues when the President is focused on one with a set of negotiators.

Q Why is it advantageous at this point for the President to be meeting just with the negotiators? Is it because of certain technical details that they can handle that the leaders don't need to be --

MR. LOCKHART: I think there's -- they are using a number of different tools to try to reach an agreement, one of which is to sit and go through, with all the substantive detail necessary, through a number of issues, the work that needs to be done to get there. It's our judgement at this point that the President, working intensively with the negotiators, is the most productive use of time in order to get to the agreement.

Q It's been said -- often been said that the leaders have to make a hard decision. Is that still -- I don't mean checking a box, I mean, you know, a made in America plan of -- is usually

thought of as not necessarily the best way to go, that the leaders have to come to terms. If they don't meet, they don't see each other, they're not part of the talks -- the President is involved in the details --

MR. LOCKHART: The President has been back for about 18 hours. He's already met with the leaders once each, and I think the fact that there are negotiators working through hard issues should not indicate in any way shape or form that the leaders are not making the decisions and making the calls.

Q That's still the basic bedrock?

MR. LOCKHART: Yes.

Q We're still talking about a framework agreement, aren't we?

MR. LOCKHART: We're talking about an agreement.

Q Could it go on again until 5:00 a.m. in the morning? Is that thinkable, in terms of the exhaustion that's --

MR. LOCKHART: It's certainly possible.

Q Joe, you're unclear as to whether the President today met with both sets of negotiators at the same time?

MR. LOCKHART: No, I'm not -- let me be clear. He's done both. He's met with both of them at the same time, he's met with them separately, and throughout the afternoon.

Q So do we have a set up for a 9:30 p.m. or so, or is it just open ended, so far as the next fill in?

MR. LOCKHART: We'll probably do something, try to give you some sense at 8:00 p.m. or so, and if we need to keep it open ended we will.

Q Joe, can I ask you about a different topic?

MR. LOCKHART: Sure.

Q Since you've been here, the Senate has run into some problems with passage of normalized trade relations with China. Does the President feel confident of its passage? Does he see the potential for a delay, does he think a delay will be in the best interests of --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I don't think there's anyone on our side, from the President on down, who thinks delay is in the best interest of the PNTR, normalized trade with China. I know that there has been a lot of work done on trying to get this scheduled. It's something that I think the President believes is

a high priority, and it's certainly our hope that the Senate will bring it up as quickly as I can.

Q Is he making any phone calls on this issue --

MR. LOCKHART: He's talked to Senator Lott about this.

Q Joe, in case we're on other subjects, has the President come to any conclusion as to whether the North Koreans can be persuaded or, in fact, are inclined to convert their missile program into a civilian satellite program?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know that we have reached any conclusion different than when he was asked this in Japan. As he said in Japan, it is an idea that certainly warrants more attention, to try to understand exactly what the North Koreans may have been saying. I think as the President said, President Putin also, in their discussion indicated some lack of clarity on what they were suggesting.

Q Joe, regarding the tax cuts passed by the Republicans. The President put off action on that -- vetoes, until the after the talks here have concluded so as not to --

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know. First off we have to get the bills, which I don't think we have. My understanding is the bills were passed, and will be sent to us, timed to the Republican Convention, rather than desire to have tax cuts for the American people.

I understand it's going to be done in a way that they don't have to deal with estate tax during their convention. I can understand that. When you give an \$800,000 tax cut to the top one percent of Americans and leave everyone else paying for it, it's not the kind of thing you want to put on national television during prime time.

The others, you know, when they come down, we'll have to make a decision.

Q Do you have any view, or the President have an assessment of Dick Cheney as the Vice Presidential candidate?

MR. LOCKHART: I think Governor Bush promised that our eyes would light up when he made his decision, so my eyes are ready, we'll just have to see.

Q Would you come out and light up for us? (Laughter.) I mean, how would we know? (Laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: I may just have to leak that to you, Barry. (Laughter.)

Q Joe, speaking of the Republican Convention, what if the President were to get an agreement out of this summit, and it happened to be during the week of the convention? Would that be ill-mannered? Would that be -- (laughter.)

MR. LOCKHART: Let me say that, you know, there's no way to predict how long this will go. I don't think there's a sense that those two things are going to collide. But I will say that when asked on the subject, Governor Bush has been properly supportive of the President and his efforts. So I don't think on either side there's any attempt to play politics with this, and I hope it stays that way.

Thank you.

Q Thanks very much.

END

5:00 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

July 25, 2000

TRILATERAL STATEMENT

Between July 11 and 24, under the auspices of President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat met at Camp David in an effort to reach an agreement on permanent status. While they were not able to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement, their negotiations were unprecedented in both scope and detail. Building on the progress achieved at Camp David, the two leaders agreed on the following principles to guide their negotiations:

- 1) The two sides agreed that the aim of their negotiations is to put an end to decades of conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace.
- 2) The two sides commit themselves to continue their efforts to conclude an agreement on all permanent status issues as soon as possible.
- 3) Both sides agree that negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only way to achieve such an agreement and they undertake to create an environment for negotiations free from pressure, intimidation and threats of violence.
- 4) The two sides understand the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that prejudice the outcome of negotiations and that their differences will be resolved only by good faith negotiations.
- 5) Both sides agree that the United States remains a vital partner in the search for peace and will continue to consult closely with President Clinton and Secretary Albright in the period ahead.

30-30-30

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

July 25, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS AT CAMP DAVID

The James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

12:07 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, let me say, like all of you I just heard the news of the crash of the Concorde outside Paris, and I wanted to extend the deepest condolences of the American people to the families of those who were lost.

After 14 days of intensive negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, I have concluded with regret that they will not be able to reach an agreement at this time. As I explained on the eve of the summit, success was far from guaranteed -- given the historical, religious, political and emotional dimensions of the conflict.

Still, because the parties were not making progress on their own and the September deadline they set for themselves was fast approaching, I thought we had no choice. We can't afford to leave a single stone unturned in the search for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.

Now, at Camp David, both sides engaged in comprehensive discussions that were really unprecedented because they dealt with the most sensitive issues dividing them; profound and complex questions that long had been considered off limits.

Under the operating rules that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, they are, of course, not bound by any proposal discussed at the summit. However, while we did not get an agreement here, significant progress was made on the core issues. I want to express my appreciation to Prime Minister Barak, Chairman Arafat and their delegations for the efforts they undertook to reach an agreement.

Prime Minister Barak showed particular courage vision, and an understanding of the historical importance of this moment. Chairman Arafat made it clear that he, too, remains committed to the path of peace. The trilateral statement we issued affirms

both leaders' commitment to avoid violence or unilateral actions which will make peace more difficult and to keep the peace process going until it reaches a successful conclusion.

At the end of this summit, I am fully aware of the deep disappointment that will be felt on both sides. But it was essential for Israelis and Palestinians, finally, to begin to deal with the toughest decisions in the peace process. Only they can make those decisions, and they both pledged to make them, I say again, by mid-September.

Now, it's essential that they not lose hope, that they keep working for peace, they avoid any unilateral actions that would only make the hard task ahead more difficult. The statement the leaders have made today is encouraging in that regard.

Israelis and Palestinians are destined to live side by side, destined to have a common future. They have to decide what kind of future it will be. Though the differences that remain are deep, they have come a long way in the last seven years, and, notwithstanding the failure to reach an agreement, they made real headway in the last two weeks.

Now, the two parties must go home and reflect, both on what happened at Camp David and on what did not happen. For the sake of their children, they must rededicate themselves to the path of peace and find a way to resume their negotiations in the next few weeks. They've asked us to continue to help, and as always, we'll do our best. But the parties themselves, both of them, must be prepared to resolve profound questions of history, identity and national faith -- as well as the future of sites that are holy to religious people all over the world who are part of the Islamic, Christian and Judaic traditions.

The children of Abraham, the descendants of Isaac and Ishmael can only be reconciled through courageous compromise. In the spirit of those who have already given their lives for peace and all Israelis, Palestinians, friends of peace in the Middle East and across the world, we long for peace and deserve a Holy Land that lives for the values of Judaism, Islam and Christianity.

Thank you.

Q Was Jerusalem -- Mr. President, was Jerusalem the main stumbling block? And where do you go from here?

THE PRESIDENT: It was the most difficult problem. And I must tell you that we tried a lot of different approaches to it, and we have not yet found a solution. But the good news is that there is not a great deal of disagreement -- and I want to emphasize this -- it seemed to me, anyway, there was not a great deal of disagreement in many of these areas about what the facts

on the ground would be after an agreement were made -- that is, how people would live.

For example, everyone conceded that Jerusalem is a place that required everyone to have access to the holy sites and the kinds of things you've heard, and lot of other things in terms of how, operationally, the Israelis and the Palestinians have worked together; there was actually more agreement than I had thought there would be.

But obviously, the questions around Jerusalem go to the core identity of both the Palestinians and the Israelis. There were some very, as I said -- it has been reported Prime Minister Barak took some very bold decisions, but we were in the end unable to bridge the gaps. I think there will be a bridge, because I think the alternative is unthinkable.

Q There is a striking contrast between the way you described Prime Minister Barak's courageous and visionary approach to this, and Mr. Arafat seemed to be still committed to the path of peace. It sounds like that at the end of the day, Prime Minister Barak was ready to really step up to something that President Arafat wasn't yet ready to step up to.

THE PRESIDENT: Let me be more explicit. I will say again: We made progress on all of the core issues. We made really significant progress on many of them. The Palestinian teams worked hard on a lot of these areas. But I think it is fair to say that at this moment in time, maybe because they had been preparing for it longer, maybe because they had thought through it more, that the Prime Minister moved forward more from his initial position than Chairman Arafat, on -- particularly surrounding the questions of Jerusalem.

Now, these are hard questions. And as I said to both of them, none of us, no outsider can judge for another person what is at the core of his being, at the core of his sense of national essence. But we cannot make an agreement here without a continuing effort of both sides to compromise.

I do believe that -- let me say this -- and you will appreciate this, Tom, because you've been covering this a long time -- but I want to give credit to both sides in the sense that they were really coming to grips with things they had never seriously come to grips with before.

Oh, yes, there were always side papers -- even going back to 1993 -- about how these final issues would be solved. There were always speculation, there were always the odd conversation between Palestinians and Israelis who were friends and part of the various -- the different government operations. But these folks really never had to come together before, and in an official setting put themselves on the line. And it is profoundly difficult.

So I said what I said, and my remarks should stand for themselves, because not so much as a criticism of Chairman Arafat, because this is really hard and never been done before, but in praise of Barak. He came there knowing that he was going to have to take bold steps, and he did it. And I think you should look at it more as a positive toward him than as a condemnation of the Palestinian side.

This is agonizing for them -- both of them. And unless you have lived there and lived with them and talked to them, or lived with this problem a long time, it is hard to appreciate it. But I do think -- I stand by the statement as written. I think they both remain committed to peace, I think they will both find a way to get there if they don't let time run away with them so that external events rob them of their options. And that's why I decided to call the summit in the first place.

I got worried that -- this is like going to the dentist without having your gums deadened, you know. I mean, this is not easy. And I got worried that if we didn't do the summit and we didn't force a process to begin, which would require people to come to grips with this in a disciplined, organized way, as well as to face -- look themselves in the mirror and look into the abyss and think: What can I do and what can't I do, that we would never get there. Now, I believe because of the work that was done within both teams and what they did with each other, we can still do it. Let me just make one other observation and then I'll answer your question.

You know, when we worked, I remember when we went to Dayton over Bosnia; when we went to Paris over Bosnia. After the Kosovo conflict -- and I went there and met with all the people who were going to have to work on Kosovo's future -- even when we first started the Irish peace talks, we were dealing with people who would hardly speak to each other. We were dealing with people who still often wouldn't shake hands. We were dealing with people who thought they were from another planet from one another, whose wounds were open.

Let me give you some good news. Of all the peace groups I ever worked with, these people know each other, they know the names of each other's children, they know how many grandchildren the grandparents have, they know their life stories, they have a genuine respect and understanding for each other. It is truly extraordinary and unique in my experience in almost eight years of dealing with it.

So I'm not trying to put a funny gloss on this; they couldn't get there. That's the truth. They couldn't get there. But this was the first time in an organized, disciplined way they had to work through, both for themselves and then with each other how they were going to come to grips with issues that go to the core of their identity.

And I think on balance, it was very much the right thing to do, and it increases the chance of a successful agreement, and it increases the chances of avoiding a disaster.

Now, I promised you, you could ask now.

Q What is your assessment of whether Arafat's going to go through with the threat to declare statehood unilaterally? Did you get any sort of sense on whether he's going to go through with that? Did you have any --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me say this. One of the reasons that I wanted to have this summit is that they're both under -- will be under conflicting pressures as we go forward. One of the things that often happens in a very difficult peace process is that people, if they're not careful, will gravitate to the intense position rather than the position that will make peace. And it's very often that people know that a superficially safe position is to say no, that you won't get in trouble with whoever is dominating the debate back home wherever your home is, as long as you say no.

One of the reasons I called this summit is so that we could set in motion a process that would give the Palestinians the confidence that all of us -- and most of all, the Israelis -- really didn't want to make peace, so that it would offset the pressure that will be increasingly on Chairman Arafat as we approach the September 13th deadline.

Q Are you implying that he should give up his claim to East Jerusalem -- the Palestinians should?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I didn't say that.

Q Or any kind of a foothold?

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't say that. I didn't say that. I didn't say that. And let me say, I presume, I am bound -- I'm going to honor my promise not to leak about what they talked about, but I presume it will come out. No, I didn't say that. I said only this: I said -- I will say again -- the Palestinians changed their position; they moved forward. The Israelis moved more from the position they had. I said what I said; I will say again: I was not condemning Arafat, I was praising Barak. But I would be making a mistake not to praise Barak because I think he took a big risk. And I think it sparked, already, in Israel a real debate, which is moving Israeli public opinion toward the conditions that will make peace. So I thought that was important, and I think it deserves to be acknowledged.

But the overriding thing you need to know is that progress was made on all fronts, that significant progress was made on some of the core issues, that Jerusalem, as you all knew

it would be, remains the biggest problem for the reasons you know.

But what we have to find here, if there is going to be an agreement -- by definition, an agreement is one in which everybody is a little disappointed and nobody is defeated, in which neither side requires the other to say they have lost everything and they find a way to -- a shared result.

And there's no place in the world like Jerusalem. There is no other place in the world like Jerusalem, which is basically at the core of the identity of all three monotheistic religions in the world, at the core of the identity of what it means to be a Palestinian, at the core of the identity of what it means to be an Israeli. There is no other place like this in the world. So they have to find a way to work through this.

And it shouldn't surprise you that when they first come to grips with this in an official, disciplined way where somebody has to actually say something instead of sort of be off in a corner having a conversation over a cup of coffee that no one ever -- that has no -- it just vanishes into air, that it's hard for them to do.

Q But did they make enough progress, sir, to now go back home, check with their people, and possibly come back during your administration -- next month or in September -- to come back to Camp David and try again?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know if they need to come back to Camp David. I think that it rained up there so much, I'm not sure I'll ever get them back there. (Laughter.) But I think if you asked me did they make enough progress to get this done? Yes. But they've got to go home and check; they've got to feel around. And what I want to say to you is, the reason I tried to keep them there so long -- and I feel much better about this than I did when we almost lost it before -- and you remember, and I got them and we all agreed to stay -- I didn't feel that night like I feel today.

Today, I feel that we have the elements here to keep this process going. But it's important that the people whose -- both leaders represent, support their continuing involvement in this and stick with them, and understand that this is a script that's never been written before. They have to write a script and they've got to keep working at it.

But, yes, I think it can happen --

Q During your administration?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Not because it's my administration, that's irrelevant. They're operating on their timetable, not mine. It has nothing to do with the fact that

it's my administration. I think it can happen because they set for themselves a September 13th deadline. And if they go past it, every day they go past it will put more pressure on the Palestinians to declare a Palestinian state unilaterally and more pressure on the Israelis to have some greater edge in conflict in their relations as a result of that.

Neither one of them want that; so I think they will find a way to keep this going. And the only relevance of my being here is that I've been working with them for eight years, and I think they both trust us and believe that Secretary Albright and Dennis and Sandy and our whole team, that we will heave to, to make peace.

Q But, Mr. President, the Prime Minister came here in quite a precarious position to begin with back home. And some of the things you call bold and courageous, his critics back home have called treason. Can he go home, and do you believe he will have the political stability to come back at this, and did he voice any concerns to you about that?

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, this is not a weak man. It's not for nothing that he's the most decorated soldier in the history of Israel. He didn't come over here to play safe with his political future; he came over here to do what he thought was right for the people of Israel, and I think that he -- he knows that he would never do anything to put the security of Israel at risk, and that the only long-term guarantee of Israel's security is a constructive peace that's fair with her neighbors -- all of them -- starting with the Palestinians.

So I think the people of Israel should be very proud of him. He did nothing to compromise Israel's security, and he did everything he possibly could within the limits that he thought he had, all the kinds of constraints that operate on people in these circumstances to reach a just peace. So I would hope the people of Israel will support him, and let this thing percolate, not overreact, and say keep trying.

I want the people on both sides to tell their leaders to keep trying -- to keep trying. You know, that's the only real answer here is just to bear down and go on.

Q Mr. President, couldn't you have gotten a partial agreement and left Jerusalem for later? Was that a possibility at all?

THE PRESIDENT: That possibility was explored and rejected.

Q Why?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't talk about it. If they want to talk about it, that's their business; but I can't.

Q Have you done all you can do, sir, or would you be making more proposals?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I think -- well, first of all, we all agreed to reassess here. So the first thing we're going to do is, we're going to let each side go home and try to get a little sleep. I mean, we've all been sort of -- we're kind of -- nobody knows what time it is, I don't think, on either team.

Last night, we quit at 3:00 a.m.; the night before, we went all night long. And so, we've been working very hard at this. So what I'm going to do is let them take a deep breath and then our side, Madeleine and Sandy and all of our team and I -- Dennis, we'll try to think what we think we ought to do, then we'll ask them what they want to do, and then we'll figure out what we're going to do.

We don't have a lot of time, and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that all of us will be coming up with new ideas here. I wouldn't rule anything out. The clock is still working against us. The bad news is, we don't have a deal. The good news is, they are fully and completely and comprehensively engaged in an official way for the first time on these fundamental issues.

Keep in mind: When the Oslo Agreement was drafted, these things were put down as final status issues because the people that drafted them knew it would be hard. And they took a gamble. And their gamble was that if the Israelis and the Palestinians worked together over a seven-year period and they began to share security cooperation, for example, they began to -- we had some land transfers and we saw how they would work in a different geographical way, and if they kept making other specific agreements, that by the time we got to the end of the road, there would be enough knowledge and trust and understanding of each other's positions that these huge, epochal issues could be resolved.

Now, we started the process and we've got to finish. And so, and again, I say, the thing I hope most of all is that the people in the Middle East will appreciate the fact that a lot was done here and we'll support their leaders in coming back and finishing the job. The venue is not important; the mechanisms aren't important. But we know what the state of play is now and if we'll keep at it, I still think we can get it done.

Q Can you describe what type of U.S. role was discussed in sealing the agreement financially and otherwise?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say, first of all, anything that would require our participation, other than financial, was not finalized. But there were a lot of ideas floated around. None of it amounted to large numbers of people. But they were

potentially significant in terms of the psychology of the situation. But there was no decision made about that.

On the money, basically, you know, I think that the United States should be prepared to make a significant contribution to resolving the refugee problem. You've got refugees that have to be resettled, you've got some compensation which has to be given, and there are lots of issues in that refugee pot that cost money, and then there's the whole question of working out the economic future of the Palestinians and the whole question of working out what the security relationships will be and the security needs will be for Israel and in this new partnership that they will have -- the Palestinians. How is that going to work and what should we do.

I also, when I went to the G-8, I gave a briefing to the G-8, and I asked the people who were there to help pay, too. I said, you know, this is going to have to be a worldwide financial responsibility, but because of the United States' historic involvement, which goes back many decades in the Middle East, we were the first country under President Truman to recognize Israel, we've had Republicans and Democrats alike up to their ears in the Middle East peace process for a long time, and because we have such a lot of strategic interest over there, if there could be an agreement, I think we ought to lead the way in financial contributions, but the others who are able to do so should play their part as well.

Thank you.

END

12:30 P.M. EDT

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release
July 25, 2000
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ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
ON
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS

Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: As President Clinton said earlier today, the negotiations were extraordinary. They were intense. They were very difficult. They were unprecedented in terms of delving into the details of the most sensitive issues of permanent status, and they did make progress.

Unfortunately, while progress was made on all the core issues, it wasn't possible to reach agreement at this time. Nevertheless, both leaders agreed that after a period of reflection and assessment the negotiating process would continue; that the aim of the negotiations is to put an end to decades of conflict; that an agreement on all permanent status issues should be concluded as soon as possible; that negotiations based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only way to achieve such an agreement; that unilateral actions that prejudice the outcome of negotiations should be avoided; and that there will be close consultations with the President and with me in the period ahead.

In convening this summit, the President had no illusions about the difficulties of the task, but the deepening deadlock between the two sides required a bold decision on our part, and the President took it. Clearly, after 14 days at Camp David, the parties have not overcome their differences and must still bridge real gaps, but they approach this challenge now having tackled issues that were off limits previously, and having gained far greater insight into the possibilities and limitations on each side.

Both need to reflect on the meaning of their discussions at Camp David, and how to draw the appropriate lessons from them.

For our part, we will work with both sides in the next few weeks as they address the best way to resume their discussions and move towards peace.

Before I take your questions, I'd like to express our deep condolences to the families of those who were on the Concorde and crashed, and we are working with local authorities and doing everything we can to be of assistance in this.

Q Madame Secretary, who gave up first in these talks? Was it the Palestinians, the Israelis, or did President Clinton just decide that you couldn't go on?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think it was - we had spent so much time working, and I think it became evident at like 1:00 or 2:00 this morning that basically there were some gaps that could not be overcome at this session and that it would be better, as I said in my statement, as the President said, to break that up and to go back to the region to reflect.

But I think that it's very important that people understand how intensely the negotiations were carried on, how everybody gave it his or her best, and how much people were seeking for answers. So I don't think it's really - the question is not who gave up what, or who gave up first, or who is to blame, but basically that it was everybody worked very hard, and that it just was evident that at this time it was not possible to come to a conclusion.

Q Madame Secretary, can you say what it will take now, in order to address the topics which were not resolved by these talks?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that what we have to do is, as the President made clear in his statement, nothing is agreed on until everything is agreed on and the commitments that were made by all are set aside. But what has not been set aside is the ability now, I think, that's present of the two parties to see more deeply into each other's needs, and to understand some of the elements of what it takes to deal with these core issues.

The truth is that these were issues that seven years ago had been kind of pushed down the road, at Oslo, and we had talked about them. But this intensity of dealing on - I can say a day-and-night basis for 14 days, allowed the two parties to see more inside each other. And I think what it will take is a

continuation of discussions at a variety of levels and to see if agreement can be reached on these. There's a lot of good work that was done, and we now have to build on it.

Q Madame Secretary, if you could have found a solution on Jerusalem, do you think that the other core issues, refugees and borders, would have fallen into place? Were the gaps on those other core issues more narrow than they were with Jerusalem?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, again, as the President said and I certainly saw, Jerusalem was the hardest issue. There's no question about it. And it's hard because it hasn't been resolved for a thousand - you know, hundreds of years, and it's a very unique place that requires a lot of careful thought and working together.

So clearly it was the hardest, but the others were hard, too. I think that we made a lot of progress. And, again, I think that there were elements of the other core issues that were coming quite close, but there still were certain gaps that needed to be resolved on those, and a lot of details. And as we often know, the devil is in the detail. So while there was incredible progress, I think across the board, there still is work to do on all the issues.

Q Madame Secretary, back to Jerusalem, just two quick things. Did you ever take Jerusalem off the table and try for a partial agreement? And, also, what do you think will happen to Barak and Arafat when they go back home, particularly Barak, who President Clinton said made the most of the compromises and moved the furthest?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that there were a number of ways that we tried to look at Jerusalem and looked at ways of kind of pushing that further down the road, but that was not acceptable. And there were lots of different ways of examining the issue and trying to figure out how to work it.

As far as both leaders, I think Prime Minister Barak has made no secret of the fact that he is going to experience difficulties. He was experiencing them before he left. But I think that what he did was bold and courageous and clearly showed his dedication to peace.

And what I have found interesting, though - I clearly haven't read enough - is that something that has happened now in Israel, is that there is an ongoing discussion about issues that really were not discussed before, so it has opened up a dialogue. And I just say that some of the other Israeli - members of the Israeli delegation thought that it was very useful, that the people are now in Israel talking about subjects that they had not really talked about before. So I expect that there will be a lively political debate. Israel is known for that. But I think Prime Minister Barak should go home proud of what he tried.

Chairman Arafat, I think, has to - you know, he will be going back to his Palestinian people also explaining all the things that happened. And I think they need to be more apprised, be much more a part of this political discussion and begin to think more about some of the issues that came out. Both the publics have to be more a part of what is going on. And I think it's very important that Chairman Arafat share his experiences and his knowledge of what the Israeli people need now with his public, as I hope very much that Prime Minister Barak will share more his knowledge about the Palestinian need.

Q If I could follow up, one of the reasons we were given, I believe on background during the Camp David talks, was that you didn't want the leaders to go home and have the pressures from their people. Why now do you think that might help?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, pressures isn't the right word. I think that what I think is going to be useful is to try to have informed publics about what is going on because I think - I know this sounds a little crazy because we've all talked about these issues quite a lot here, but the truth is that a lot of these issues have been kind of off the table for a lot of time. People might have been talking about them privately but they were not part of the public discourse. And I think that that will help in terms of how the publics and the leaders relate on the difficult aspects.

I am not underestimating the difficulties of them going home and dealing with this. I think they both, in different ways, will have to deal with it. But it's important; I think we accomplished a lot; I think the President did the right thing in having this summit; and we now have to, after a period of reflection, follow up.

Q A two-parter. First of all, Madame Secretary, did you manage to win an agreement from Yasser Arafat not to declare independence on September 13th; and secondly, how critical was his letter last night as the turning point, this point at which you realized that you could - that there was no agreement imminent?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, we've made very clear that we think that unilateral actions are not useful. That includes the declaration of a Palestinian state. And I think we made that very evident, and we'll continue to do so.

The letter, I think - it's hard to describe this exactly. I mean, it was, whatever, 4:00 in the morning or something, or 3:00. But I think that we had kind of a sense that this kind of thing was coming because we'd spent a lot of time just previous to that with negotiators, and I think this was kind of an official way of stating it. But it was evident, unfortunately, that we weren't going to --

Q Was there any chance that this was brinksmanship that went awry, that he was trying to perhaps squeeze some kind of a concession out of the Israelis, and that -

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I'm not going to psychoanalyze here. I think that it was hard negotiations across the board with delegations at every hour of the day and night, either walking or in these golf carts or in eating in various places. And I think that there were various - you know, as in any negotiation of this kind, there's a certain rhythm, and I wouldn't call it brinksmanship. I think that everybody worked very hard.

And I think that it's very important for people to understand the personal effort that went into this by the leaders, and especially President Clinton, who I think the American people should be very proud of the amount of time that he personally spent on every detail of this.


Q Secretary Albright, the statement about no unilateral actions, does that last until September 13th? Does it endure beyond September 13th?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, we have believed that it's important - you know, what we were working at was to have a Palestinian state as part of a comprehensive aspect, not unilateral. We don't think that that's the right approach to this, and we hope very much that we can get back to having

comprehensive negotiations that will include all of this and that the unilateral actions have not proven the most useful in this peace process. And what we have to keep our mind on is that trying to accomplish a peace still continues to be the major goal of the parties and of the United States, and we will continue to do everything we can.

And all of us know, probably more than we did going in, that these are really tough issues. Some of them don't lend themselves to pragmatic solutions. Some of them are deeply held views and principles, and both the parties know and need to continue to know that neither can get 100 percent of what it wants.

MR. REEKER: Thank you very much. Thank you, Madame Secretary.



Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/11/2000 12:33:04 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #1: Middle East Summit at Camp David: Leaders Arrive and Meetings Begin

Pool Report #1

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Leaders Arrive and Meetings Begin

July 11, 2000

Joe Lockhart reported this afternoon that the first bilateral meeting between President Clinton and Chairman Arafat has begun. They met outside the President's cabin at 12:02 p.m., walked around briefly, Lockhart said, then sat down to talk. President Clinton arrived at 11:25 a.m. Mr Barak has been here since 6 a.m and Mr. Arafat since 1 a.m.

John Omicinski
Gannett News Service



Nanda Chitre
07/11/2000 03:26:05 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: 7/11/00 Remarks By The President In Photo Opportunity With Chairman Yasser Arafat Of The Palestinian Authority And Prime Minister Ehud Barak Of Israel

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Camp David, Maryland)

For Immediate Release

July 11, 2000

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH
CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
AND
PRIME MINISTER EHUD BARAK OF ISRAEL

Camp David, Maryland

2:25 P.M. EDT

Q Mr. President, how is it going, Mr. President?

Q How long is it going to take, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: We pledged to each other we would answer no questions and offer no comment, and I'd like to set a good example. (Laughter.)


Q Can you resist us, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: It's difficult to resist, but I will make it -- today, at least.

Q Is that the only agreement you have reached so far? (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: That would be answering a question. (Laughter.) Thank you.

END 2:26 P.M. EDT



Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/11/2000 08:33:36 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #2: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: End-of-Day Read-Out

Pool Report #2

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: End-of-Day Read-Out

July 11, 2000

At 8:10 p.m. Lockhart reported that President Clinton completed two bilaterals this afternoon and evening with Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat. That totals four bilaterals and one plenary session for the day. Following the last meeting, all three delegations will dine together at Laurel cabin. A group of about 40 were expected to gather together at round tables for the dinner. No menu was available. Mr. Lockhart promises that in the morning. There were possible further meetings after the dinner, but the news lid is on, effective 8:10 p.m.

Lockhart will brief Wednesday at 11 a.m. from the Summit Media Center at Thurmont Elementary School

John Omicinski
Gannett News Service

Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/13/2000 07:57:50 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #3: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Day 3

Pool Report #3

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Day 3

July 13, 2000

After spending the night at Camp David, the president, wearing a dark blue suit with a white shirt, boarded Marine One at 9:35 a.m. en route to Baltimore for the final day of the NAACP annual convention.

The helicopter touched down at Fort McHenry at 10:05 a.m., under cloudy skies and mild temperatures. The presidential motorcade headed out at 10:15 a.m. After a 10-minute ride, the president arrived at the Baltimore Convention Center.

Clinton walked on stage at 10:35 a.m., accompanied by NAACP Chairman Julian Bond, NAACP President Kweisi Mfume and Baltimore Major O'Malley. The crowd greeted the president with a roaring applause and a standing ovation. As Clinton moved across the stage, he hugged and shook hands with NAACP leaders and their guests.

Bond and Mfume each spoke for about five minutes, praising Clinton for his work on behalf of African Americans. When Clinton rose to speak, the crowd again stood and cheered as they waved hand-sized U.S. and NAACP flags. A tearful Clinton spoke about how far the country has come during his time in office and how the economic situation of minorities, especially African Americans, has improved. Clinton also praised Al Gore, calling him the "most influential" vice president in history. He told the crowd about the differences between the presidential candidates and that when they look at those differences, they will know who best represents them.


After a lengthy 53-minute speech, Clinton thanked the crowd for their support for the last 7-and-1/2 years. The president then went into the crowd, hugging and touching hands, amid singing by a church choir.

The motorcade left the convention center at 12:08 p.m. for Fort McHenry. Clinton's helicopter took off at 12:30 p.m. and landed at the White House at 1:05 p.m. After quick lunch, Clinton left for the U.S. Capitol Building at 1:40, arriving 10 minutes later. The president spent an hour at the Gold Medal Ceremony for Father Theodore Hesburgh, attended by Speaker Hastert, Sen. Dick Lugar, Ind., and other leaders of Congress. Clinton spoke for about 10 minutes, the priest, a former president of Notre Dame and peace-maker, was a "genuine citizen of the world."

Clinton left the Capitol at 3:20 p.m., returning to the White House for about an hour. At 4:30 p.m., Clinton took off on Marine One for Camp David, arriving at 4:55 p.m.

After landing, Clinton met with his team, including Albright, Berger, Ross, Podesta on the day's negotiations. Clinton and his team will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat for dinner at 8:30 p.m. The dinner is expected to last an hour.

Mark Helm
Hearst Newspapers



Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/14/2000 10:51:38 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #4: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: End-of-Day

Pool Report #4

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: End-of-Day

July 14, 2000

After President Clinton completed informal discussions with various combinations of the negotiating teams on "final core status issues," leaders from Israel, the PLO and the United States sat down at 9:45 p.m. for the traditional Jewish Shabbat (sabbath) dinner in the Laurel Cabin hosted by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, according to P.J. Crowley, National Security Council spokesman.

Barak invited the U.S. and PLO delegations, and both accepted. President Clinton, Barak and PLO leader Yasser Arafat sat together at one of three tables. They were joined at the large table by other negotiators from each delegation.

The meal began with a traditional blessing and was followed by a song, which served as the "blessing for the angels of peace," Crowley said.

The menu was unavailable. Crowley said informal negotiations "could" take place during the meal and afterwards, but there were no firm plans.

Tony Pugh
Knight Ridder Newspapers



Nanda Chitre
07/15/2000 11:36:55 AM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #5: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Saturday at 11:30 am

Pool Report #5

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Saturday at 11:30 a.m.


July 15, 2000

President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat met late Friday night and early Saturday in their second three-way meeting of the summit, a White House official said Saturday. The meeting ended about 1 a.m. Saturday. Only interpretators and notetakers in addition to the three leaders.

The tri-lateral meeting followed a traditional Sabbath dinner hosted by Barak and attended by members of all three delegations, the official said.

The president held a breakfast meeting with his peace team starting about 10:30 a.m. Saturday.

Norm Kempster
LA Times



Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/15/2000 08:45:16 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #6: Middle East Summit at Camp David: PJ Crowley Read-Out

Pool Report #6

Middle East Summit at Camp David: PJ Crowley Read-Out

July 15, 2000

Late Saturday morning, the president started the day with a meeting of the U.S. delegation.

The teams dealing with the core final status issues met informally during the day. The president looked in on several of those meetings.

"The president was actively engaged with them," Crowley said of the core issue teams.

Saturday afternoon, the president reassembled the U.S. delegation for another meeting. At about 8 p.m. the president completed a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Barak.


Crowley said he expected that the delegations would have dinner together as they did on the first three nights of the summit. He also said he could not rule out post-midnight meetings of the sort that happened during the last two nights.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had an informal discussion with Arafat.

"There was an informality today brought on by the Sabbath," Crowley said. "But I expect as we move into day 6, an intensification of the discussions among the leaders and the negotiators."

He said there has been no change in the president's plans to leave for the G-8 summit.

Norman Kempster
Los Angeles Times



Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/16/2000 11:06:58 AM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #7: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Sunday Morning

Pool Report #7

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Sunday Morning

July 16, 2000

Two items this morning. The president is going to church at Camp David at 10:30 a.m., then he will huddle with his advisors. Also, there was a small fire outside the doors to the East Wing this morning. It happened in the course of some painting being done, and a floor board caught fire. Apparently, it was very minor.

A few details on POTUS and church. The service is being held in the Evergreen Chapel, which was consecrated in April 1991 and was paid for entirely through private donations. The chapel is on the Camp David grounds. A Navy chaplain is assigned to the chapel, although sometimes a Catholic priest holds mass -- as is the case today. When Potus is there, there are usually 60 to 70 people attending. When he's not, it's about 40 people. Those who attend the service are the military on the base and their families.

Francine Kiefer
The Christian Science Monitor



Jason H. Schechter
07/16/2000 09:05:51 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #8: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Crowley Readout

Pool Report #8

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Crowley Readout

July 16, 2000

NSC spokesman P.J. Crowley spent most of the 8 p.m. readout answering questions about the president's comments on the peace talks with the New York Daily News. He said the decision of the president to do the interview was his own, and that Joe Lockhart found out about it after the fact, and decided to release that portion pertaining to the peace talks. Potus wanted to respond to the interview request, says P.J., because the subject was about a "New York related subject" (i.e. Hillary). P.J. was not clear exactly what process the interviewer went through, but the request did not come through the press office and it was the president who returned the call to the Daily News.

When asked whether Potus's comments would jeopardize the talks, P.J. answered "not at all. I think you'll find that the way the president characterized where we are is similar to what Joe has said at the podium in one form or another."

When it was pointed out that Joe has made no comments on progress whatsoever (the Potus statement said he was "more optimistic than I was when they got here."), P.J. answered that he would let the president's words "speak for themselves" and restated his belief that the Potus interview will do nothing to "sway" the talks.

In answer to another pointed question, whether the POTUS interview opens up the way for the other leaders to hold interviews -- which goes against the spirit of the news blackout -- P.J. mentioned that this interview was about a different subject, and that these questions just came as kind of an "oh, by the way," at the end, and so Joe made the decision to release them. Later, P.J. commented that "the leaders have had the opportunity to make phone calls if they choose." He recounted one instance where the characterization of a principal's phone call made news. "Do the leaders have the opportunity to make phone calls if they choose? They do and they have," he said.

On other subjects, P.J. said there were no formal meetings since Joe's afternoon briefing, and unlike other nights, there will be no formal dinner tonight. There will be a buffet where delegates can help themselves and the president "has the option of dining in his cabin." He had no forecast of meetings either later tonight or tomorrow.

Meanwhile, one journalist complained of no new video since day one, and P.J. said he would take that under advisement. When asked if the pool could have an interview with the president, since he had spoken to the Daily News, P.J. said no.

Francine Kiefer
The Christian Science Monitor



Jason H. Schechter
07/18/2000 10:50:51 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #9: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David-- PJ Crowley Readout

Pool Report #9

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David-- PJ Crowley Readout

July 18, 2000

At 9:50 p.m., NSC spokesman P.J. Crowley offered "a couple of morsels and some guidance," deflected most questions and declared a lid until midnight when he said he would "see where we are" and get back to the pool with more details.

Among the specific questions Crowley did not answer was whether Clinton would spend the night at Camp David.

Crowley said the president was presently on the back deck of Laurel cottage finishing up dinner with "some of the negotiators." Asked to be more specific, Crowley declined to say who was with the president. He also refused to say if the negotiators were high level. He later described Clinton's presence as "a drop in at Laurel."

This evening, since Lockhart's last briefing, the president had an "extensive meeting" with his team, Crowley said. Berger, Albright and Ross have been shuttling to various negotiating teams throughout the evening.

He said that Barak and Arafat have spent "virtually the entire day with their respective teams." There have been no meetings between the two today. They've had only two meetings - one formal and one informal - during the summit. Crowley would not say whether any one-on-one meetings were anticipated.

Asked if Clinton has had time to rest today, after being up til 5 this morning, Crowley said he didn't know. "I'm sure that he's had a chance to relax where he can but I'm also sure he focused on moving the parties forward," he said.

Marsha Mercer
Media General



Jason H. Schechter
07/19/2000 01:11:39 AM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #10: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David-Trip Delay


Pool Report #10

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David-Trip Delay

July 19, 2000

At 12:30 am, NSC spokesman PJ Crowley relayed to the pool the following statement by Press Secretary Joe Lockhart: "The President regrets he will have to delay his trip to Japan for one day. The President will now leave Thursday morning and arrive in Japan for the opening of the G8 summit Friday. The President believes this is in the best interest of the Middle East Peace Process." Lid at 1:00 am until 9:00 am Thursday morning, with a briefing by Lockhart expected at 11:00 am.

Miles Benson
Newhouse News Service



Jason H. Schechter
07/19/2000 11:40:38 AM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #11: Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Lockhart briefing

Pool Report #11

Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Lockhart briefing


July 19, 2000

Lockhart briefed at 11:10 am, reporting the talks were continuing but that he was unable to say if the participants were going to be able to "take the difficult decisions for peace."

"The meetings are still unfolding in a way with the best chance for an agreement," Lockhart said. Lockhart said the plan is still for the President to depart for Japan sometime after midnight tonight. He said that the President had conducted bilateral talks with Barak at the Prime Minister's cabin last night until after 10:00 pm. He said the President had then hosted Arafat at a meeting in the President's cabin until 1:00 am and that he was meeting again this morning with Arafat as the briefing was being conducted.

Lockhart indicated he would brief again at 5:00 pm.

Miles Benson
Newhouse News Service



Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/23/2000 09:00:06 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: Pool Report #1: The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Return to Camp David

Pool Report #1


The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Return to Camp David

July 23, 2000

President Clinton departed White House at 6:04 p.m., arriving aboard Marine One at Camp David at 6:36. Aides said he went immediately into meetings with senior advisors. He was expected to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders into the night. White House declared a coverage lid at 8 p.m.

Thomas Hargrove

Scripps Howard News Service



Jenni R. Engebretsen
07/23/2000 09:47:50 PM

Record Type: Record

To:

cc:

Subject: RESEND: Pool Report #11: The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Return to Camp David

Pool Report #11

The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David: Return to Camp David

July 23, 2000

President Clinton departed White House at 6:04 p.m., arriving aboard Marine One at Camp David at 6:36. Aides said he went immediately into meetings with senior advisors. He was expected to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders into the night. White House declared a coverage lid at 8 p.m.

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