

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Somalia/UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia]/War Powers [1]				
Staff Office-Individual: Legislative Affairs-Rosner, Jeremy				
Original OA/ID Number: 4				
Row: 40	Section: 3	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Diplomatic Strategy for U.S. Withdrawal from Somalia (3 pages)	12/09/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	George Tenet to Nancy Soderberg, Jeremy Rosner, and Richard Clarke, re: Somalia (1 page)	10/27/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. report	Re: [Somalia] (3 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legislative Affairs (Rosner, Jeremy)
OA/Box Number: 4

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia/UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia]/War Powers [1]

2012-0659-F

ke4157

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File:
Samba: 10/13 Report*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT: Call to Senator Byrd

I would urge you call Sen. Byrd back to tell him that you cannot guarantee delivery of the Somalia report by Monday -- that it will be late Tuesday or early Wednesday. I would urge you to make the following points:

- I am calling back to let you know that, unfortunately, I cannot promise you that our report on Somalia will be ready by Monday.
- We plan to work over the weekend to incorporate the new aspects of my policy that I will be discussing with you and others tomorrow.
- We also need to consult with some of our allies and partners on our new policy, and that also will make it difficult to complete the report by Monday.
- I know you understand that this is an important document; I want to make sure we do it right.
- I understand you want to have the benefit of reading the report before you introduce an amendment on Wednesday. For that reason, I will do everything I can to have the report to you by late Tuesday or very early Wednesday.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Tom —

This is all we came up with
(working with Clarke's shop);
I afraid it sounds too
weak to send forward. Ideas?

Jeremy

File Somalia

**DRAFT STATEMENT
ON
SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENTS**

I want to note for the record the U.S. military personnel who are deploying to and redeploying from Somalia this week. On Monday there was an announcement in Mogadishu about the redeployment of USS America and two surface units which had been operating in the region since October. About 6,000 Navy personnel are involved in that redeployment. Arriving in Mogadishu this week are about 550 Army personnel from Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, Fort Story and other bases. These new arrivals are primarily transportation specialists and military police who will help with the redeployment.

About a week ago there was an announcement in Mogadishu about the deployment to the region of four U.S. Air Force C-130s and associated support personnel. At the time of the announcement, it was pointed out that these aircraft will assist in the redeployment of the U.S. forces.

We have now reached the maximum number of U.S. military personnel ashore in Mogadishu since we began the October buildup. In the near future you will begin to see the departure of some of the logistics support personnel and some of the infantry units. The redeployments will occur gradually so that we can meet the goal of having the bulk of our personnel out of Somalia by March 31, 1994.

TO: LAKE

FROM: ALBRIGHT, M

DOC DATE: 09 DEC 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

UN

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS

SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY SOMALIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 14 DEC 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

CLARKE

FOR CONCURRENCE

BEERS

RICE

WARD

FOR INFO

GROSS

INDYK

ROSNER

SATTERFIELD

SCHWARTZ

File: Somalia

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1



DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

By VOE NARA, Date 01/13/17
2012-0059-F

9686

December 9, 1993

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM : AMBASSADOR MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT *UKA*
SUBJECT : SOMALIA - DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

At the recent Principals Committee meeting on Somalia, you asked USUN for a diplomatic strategy on approaching the United Nations regarding withdrawal of U.S. troops and decentralization. Attached is our proposed strategy which Ambassador Dobbins concurs in.

Scheduling is critical right now. The Secretary-General leaves the country later next week. Secretary Christopher and I are scheduled to lunch with him in Washington on Thursday, December 16. It is therefore important to see him on this matter beforehand in New York so that the issue can be pressed (and not introduced) during the lunch. Once the New York meeting is held, subsequent strategy items can be executed.

Please call me to let me know your thoughts on this.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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COLLECTION:

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

9-3-93

File.
SOMALIA - LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

- Aspin--cover letter transmitting his speech was sent to all Senators and Representatives on 9-3-93
- State to circulate fact sheets and position papers on amendments to Legislative Task Force on Tuesday morning
- DOD to meet with Marilyn Elrod Tuesday to discuss floor strategy, get HASC POC, and arrange follow on meeting with House Leadership staff.
- DOD to track Murtha markup and determine Murtha's position.
- State to meet with Billy Pitts -- objective to convince Minority Leader Michel not to make Somalia leadership issue.
- State talked to Byrd staff re possible amendment. Advised that Byrd has not yet decided what he will do. DOD will follow up with Byrd's defense staff.
- DOD will contact Arnold Punaro re Nunn's intentions. Also will talk to Levin, Robb, Thurmond, and Warner staff.
- State talked to Hamilton and Lugar staff about op ed pieces. Hamilton staff was positive and asked State for suggested material. Lugar's staff was not optimistic that he would agree but will talk to him and get back to State on Tuesday. If negative response, will approach Sen Lieberman.
- State reports that SFRC Africa subcommittee members will all support Administration. Sen Jeffords, ranking Republican, was enthusiastic.
- State reports no amendments on Somalia expected in mark-up on Foreign Assistance bill.
- Next conference call Tuesday at 1:00PM

cc: R. Clarke

(S)

TO: LAKE
BERGER

FROM: ROSNER

DOC DATE: 08 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL

SOMALIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ON SOMALIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 12 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSNER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ROSNER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9302263

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 93040815 FOR DECISION
X 93080614 NOTED BY LAKE

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2263
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG NA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	<u>COPY</u>	_____
ExecSec	_____	<u>COPY</u>	_____
Staff Director	_____	<u>COPY</u>	_____
D/APNSA	<u>1</u>	<u>Dep. Asst. Sec. Advisor has seen</u>	<u>A</u>
APNSA	_____	<u>✓</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>NA</u> <u>4/19</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action


cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

93 1 1 1

INSTRUCTIONS:



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 8, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: JEREMY ROSNER

SUBJECT: Congressional resolution on Somalia

Netl Sec Advisor
has seen
Deputy Netl Sec Advisor
has seen

Undersecretary Tarnoff is likely to call Sandy today regarding the House Foreign Affairs Committee's resolution regarding UNOSOM II. This memo provides background on the issue he will likely raise, and recommends we work to get HFAC to add language to make the resolution more acceptable to the White House.

Chmn. Hamilton has drafted an authorizing resolution for UNOSOM II (Tab I); he is planning a Committee mark up soon after recess. State has worked with HFAC staff to negotiate language, while maintaining the Administration welcomes, but does not view as necessary, congressional support for our UNOSOM II involvement.

The current draft states the authorization will expire 12 months after enactment. Hamilton reportedly feels this is important for passage, in part because Rep. Gilman (Ranking) prefers only a 6-month authorization. Dick Clarke sees this language as problematic: it could encourage mischief by Somali warlords by suggesting our troops will withdraw on a date certain; it could suggest US support is more limited than that of the UN, which provided for possible extension (Tab II, highlighted); and it sets the wrong precedent for the involvement of US troops in UN peacekeeping. State L, working with Clarke, has suggested wording that could be added to resolve such problems (Tab III).

Chmn. Hamilton reportedly wants to know the Administration's position on the draft. State and UN staff, reflecting Tarnoff's and Ambassador Albright's inclinations, reportedly communicated to HFAC staff that the 12-month provision is acceptable, although they presumably would prefer less restrictive language if it could be negotiated with HFAC. Tarnoff reportedly would not mind Albright or Assistant Secretary Moose calling Hamilton to get the additional language included, but is not inclined to call himself. Tarnoff is likely to call Sandy today to ask his position and gain his concurrence on the 12 month provision.

RECOMMENDATION

That you: 1) tell Tarnoff the White House prefers the addition of the kind of language at Tab III; 2) ask Tarnoff whether he would call Hamilton to seek his acceptance of the additional language; 3) if Tarnoff is unwilling, tell him you plan to call Hamilton to seek his acceptance of the additional language.
Hamilton is in his office until about 3:00 today.

Concurrence: Alan Kreczko, Richard Clarke

[DRAFT COMMITTEE PRINT]

MARCH 24, 1993

AMENDMENTS IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR S.J. RES. 45

[Strike out the preamble. Strike out all that follows the resolving clause and insert in lieu thereof the text shown below in italic. An amendment to the title of the resolution is shown on the last page below.]

**103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**

S. J. RES. 45

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 16, 1993

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

JOINT RESOLUTION

**Authorizing the use of United States Armed Forces in
Somalia.**

- 1 Whereas an estimated 200,000 Somalis reportedly have**
- 2 died of hunger or as casualties of widespread violence**
- 3 since the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991;**
- 4 Whereas international relief agencies had been unable to**
- 5 deliver adequate assistance to those most in need due**

1 to increasingly difficult and dangerous security condi-
2 tions, including pervasive banditry and looting;
3 Whereas Congress has expressed its support for a greater
4 United Nations role in addressing the political and hu-
5 manitarian situation in Somalia through Senate Reso-
6 lutions 258 and 132 and House of Representatives
7 Resolution 270;
8 Whereas the United Nations Secretary General and Unit-
9 ed States officials had concluded that massive inter-
10 vention in Somalia would be necessary to avert further
11 starvation on this scale;
12 Whereas the United Nations Security Council on Decem-
13 ber 3, 1992, enacted Resolution 704, authorizing the
14 use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as
15 possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
16 operations in Somalia";
17 Whereas President Bush began deploying United States
18 armed forces on December 3, 1992, in response to
19 United Nations Resolution 704;
20 Whereas more than 20,000 American servicemen and
21 women are now in Somalia under Operation Restore
22 Hope and have been joined by troops from many other
23 nations;
24 Whereas President Bush has emphasized that United
25 States Armed Forces will be withdrawn and that the

1 security mission will be assumed by the United Na-
2 tions' UNOSOM operation as soon as a "secure envi-
3 ronment" for the delivery of food has been created,
4 and

5 Whereas, on December 10, 1992, President Bush formally
6 reported to Congress on the deployment of United
7 States Armed Forces in Somalia: Now, therefore, be
8 it

9 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
10 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

11 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

12 "This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authoriza-
13 tion for Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia".

14 **SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES**
15 **ARMED FORCES.**

16 (a) **AUTHORIZATION.**—The President is authorized to
17 use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Na-
18 tions Security Council Resolution 794 in order to imple-
19 ment the Resolution, which authorizes the use of "all nec-
20 essary means to establish as soon as possible a secure en-
21 vironment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".

22 (b) **WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.**—
23 Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolu-
24 tion, the Congress declares that this section is intended

1 to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
2 meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution:
3 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 (a) **UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES.**—It
5 is the sense of Congress that the President should consult
6 with the Secretary General of the United Nations and with
7 the other member countries of the United Nations Secu-
8 rity Council to ensure that peacekeeping forces from other
9 countries of the United Nations continue to be deployed
10 in Somalia to maintain a secure environment and to allow
11 United States Armed Forces to transfer the mission to
12 a United Nations-led force at the earliest possible date.

13 (b) **MEASURES OF SELF-PROTECTION.**—It is the
14 sense of Congress that the President should make every
15 effort to ensure that United States Armed Forces serving
16 in Somalia as part of a United Nations-led force are per-
17 mitted to take all reasonable measures to protect them-
18 selves.

19 (c) **ASSESSMENT OF COSTS.**—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that the President should submit a report to Con-
21 gress providing an assessment of the costs of Operation
22 Restore Hope, indicating the costs assessed to the United
23 States, the United Nations, and other countries and relat-
24 ed organizations involved in the operation.

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H.L.C.

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1 **SEC. 4. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.**

2 Not later than September 1, 1993, the Secretary of
3 State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit
4 to Congress a report on the introduction and commitment
5 of United States Armed Forces into combat situations.

6 This report shall include—

7 (1) a specific review of the goals of United
8 States policy in Somalia and an outline of objective
9 criteria which will enable the United States to evaluate
10 when those goals are achieved;

11 (2) a review of all actions taken to ensure that
12 United States material contributions to United Nations
13 forces in Somalia are counted against United
14 States assessments in Somalia;

15 (3) a review of United States international interests
16 and their correlation to the commitment of
17 United States Armed Forces;

18 (4) a description of the factors to be used in
19 evaluating future commitments of United States
20 combat forces;

21 (5) specifically, a review of the many situations
22 in the world where there are intense humanitarian
23 needs and a means of evaluating what elements,
24 when present, would permit these situations to rise
25 to a level of importance necessary for the commitment
26 of United States combat forces; and

(6) considerations which will affect whether United States Armed Forces will be permitted to be engaged as a portion of an international peacekeeping force, including—

(A) United States command of United States troops;

(B) equitable financial contributions of nations so engaged; and

(C) the right of United States combat forces to defend themselves throughout all levels of conflict.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia Resolution".

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) *An estimated 300,000 Somalis have died as a result of hunger and widespread violence since the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991.*

(2) *On December 3, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 794 in which the Security Council—*

(A) *determined that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Soma-*

lia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security", and

(B) acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorized the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".

(3) United States Armed Forces entered Somalia on December 9, 1992, in response to Security Council Resolution 794.

(4) The United Nations Secretary General concluded in his report of March 3, 1993, that without improved security throughout Somalia "the political process cannot prosper and humanitarian relief operations will remain vulnerable to disruption".

(5) The Secretary General recommended in his report that the United Nations Security Council adopt a resolution effecting the transition from the United States-led force in Somalia to a United Nations-led force, with the formal date of transfer of command to be May 1, 1993.

(6) The Secretary General's report envisioned a United Nations-led force having a multinational mili-

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1 tary component of 20,000 personnel, plus an addi-
2 tional 8000 personnel to provide logistic support.

3 (7) On ???? , ??, 1993, the United Nations Secu-
4 rity Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter
5 of the United Nations, adopted Resolution ??? in re-
6 sponse to the Secretary General's report. This resolu-
7 tion provides for the establishment of the United Na-
8 tions-led force in Somalia by expanding the size and
9 mandate of the original United Nations peacekeeping
10 force in Somalia (commonly referred to as
11 "UNOSOM") in accordance with the reco-
12 mmendations contained in the report of the Sec-
13 retary General.

14 (8) United States Armed Forces will participate
15 in the United Nations-led force in Somalia as part of
16 the multinational logistic support contingent, provid-
17 ing logistical, communications, and intelligence sup-
18 port.

19 (9) In addition to logistic forces, the United
20 States will make available a battalion-sized tactical
21 quick reaction force to respond to requests for emer-
22 gency assistance from the United Nations Force Com-
23 mander in Somalia. This quick reaction force will be
24 under United States operational control.

1 (10) *The transfer of operations in Somalia from*
2 *the United States-led force to the United Nations-led*
3 *force will result in a substantial reduction in the*
4 *number of members of the United Armed Forces that*
5 *are deployed in Somalia and in the costs incurred by*
6 *the United States as a result of United Nations-au-*
7 *thorized operations in Somalia.*

8 (11) *The Congress must authorize any use of*
9 *United States Armed Forces to implement United Na-*
10 *tions Security Council Resolutions 794 and 999.*

11 (12) *By providing such an authorization, the*
12 *Congress will facilitate the transfer of operations in*
13 *Somalia from the United States-led force to the Unit-*
14 *ed Nations-led force.*

15 **SEC. 3. SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS IN SOMA-**
16 **LIA.**

17 *The Congress supports United Nations efforts in*
18 *Somalia—*

19 (1) *to help provide a secure environment for*
20 *famine relief efforts;*

21 (2) *to prevent a resumption of violence;*

22 (3) *to help restore peace, stability, and order*
23 *through reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruc-*
24 *tion of Somali society; and*

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1 (4) to help the people of Somalia create and
2 maintain democratic institutions for their own gov-
3 ernance.

4 **SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF ARMED FORCES.**

5 (a) **IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLU-**
6 **TIONS.**—The President is authorized to use United States
7 Armed Forces to implement United Nations Security Coun-
8 cil Resolutions 794 (1992) and 797 (1993) as follows:

9 (1) United States Armed Forces may be used to
10 carry out operations under the authorization provided
11 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 794
12 (1992) until the transition to the United Nations-led
13 force in Somalia is completed.

14 (2) United States Armed Forces may be used to
15 provide logistic support for the United Nations-led
16 force in Somalia under the authorization provided by
17 United Nations Security Council Resolution 797
18 (1993).

19 (3) United States Armed Forces may be used as
20 a tactical quick reaction force, under United States
21 operational control, to respond to requests for emer-
22 gency assistance from the United Nations Force Com-
23 mander in Somalia.

24 (b) **STATEMENTS OF INTENT REQUIRED BY WAR POW-**
25 **ERS RESOLUTION.**—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the

1 War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that sub-
2 section (a) is intended to constitute specific statutory au-
3 thorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War
4 Powers Resolution to the extent that any United States
5 Armed Forces being used for the purposes described in sub-
6 section (a) are or become involved in hostilities or situations
7 where imminent hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
8 cumstances.

9 (c) **EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS.**—The author-
10 izations provided by subsection (a) shall expire—

11 (1) at the end of the 12-month period beginning
12 on the date of enactment of this joint resolution, un-
13 less the Congress extends the period of such authoriza-
14 tions; or

15 (2) upon the expiration of the mandate of the
16 United Nations-led force in Somalia,
17 ~~whichever occurs first~~

18 **SEC. 5. REPORTS REGARDING USE OF UNITED STATES**
19 **ARMED FORCES.**

20 (a) **PERIODIC REPORTS.**—

21 (1) **INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED.**—The Presi-
22 dent shall submit periodic reports to the Congress
23 with respect to United States Armed Forces partici-
24 pation in and support for the United Nations-led
25 force in Somalia. Each such report shall—

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1 (A) specify the number of members of the
2 United States Armed Forces participating in the
3 United Nations-led force in Somalia or operat-
4 ing in support of that force;

5 (B) specify where United States Armed
6 Forces are deployed as part of the United Na-
7 tions-led force in Somalia and where United
8 States Armed Forces are deployed that are oper-
9 ating in support of that force;

10 (C) specify the functions being performed by
11 United States Armed Forces participating in the
12 United Nations-led force in Somalia;

13 (D) specify the functions of United States
14 Armed Forces operating as a tactical quick reac-
15 tion force in support of the United Nations-led
16 force in Somalia, and describe any use of United
17 States Armed Forces as a quick reaction force;

18 (E) specify the command arrangements ap-
19 plicable with respect to United States Armed
20 Forces participating in the United Nations-led
21 force in Somalia or operating in support of that
22 force;

23 (F) specifying the anticipated duration of
24 the deployment of United States Armed Forces as

1 part of the United Nations-led force in Somalia
2 or in support of that force; and

3 (G) describe any equipment transferred by
4 the Department of Defense to the United Na-
5 tions-led force in Somalia, specifying the types
6 and amounts of equipment transferred, the au-
7 thority under which it was transferred, and the
8 terms on which it was transferred.

9 (2) **REPORTING DATES AND PERIOD COVERED BY**
10 **EACH REPORT.**—A report pursuant to this subsection
11 shall be submitted—

12 (A) not later than July 1, 1993, covering
13 the period since March 3, 1993; and

14 (B) not later than January 1, 1994, and
15 July 1, 1994, covering the period since the pre-
16 ceding report pursuant to this subsection.

17 (3) **WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REPORTING RE-**
18 **QUIREMENTS.**—The requirements of this subsection do
19 not supersede the requirements of section 4(a) of the
20 War Powers Resolution.

21 (b) **REPORT ON TRANSITION TO UN-LED FORCE.**—The
22 first report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall
23 specify—

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1 (1) the number of members of the United States
2 Armed Forces, if any, remaining in Somalia as part
3 of the United States-led force in Somalia;

4 (2) where they are deployed;

5 (3) the functions they are performing; and

6 (4) how long they will remain in Somalia as
7 part of that force.

8 (c) AGREEMENTS WITH UNITED NATIONS.—The Presi-
9 dent shall transmit promptly to the Congress a copy of any
10 memorandum of understanding or other written agreement
11 entered into by the United States with the United Nations
12 Security Council, the Secretary General of the United Na-
13 tions (or his Special Representative), or the United Nations
14 Force Commander in Somalia —

15 (1) regarding the participation of United States
16 Armed Forces in the United Nations-led force in So-
17 malia;

18 (2) regarding United States Armed Forces oper-
19 ating as a tactical quick reaction force in support of
20 that force or otherwise in support of that force; or

21 (3) otherwise regarding the availability to the
22 United Nations Security Council of United States
23 Armed Forces, assistance, or facilities to implement
24 Security Council Resolution 794 or 999.

1 **SEC. 4. REPORTS ON COSTS OF UNITED NATIONS-AUTHOR-**
2 **IZED OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA.**

3 (a) **REQUIREMENT FOR PERIODIC REPORTS.**—The
4 President shall submit to the Congress periodic reports re-
5 garding the costs of the United States-led force in Somalia
6 and the United Nations-led force in Somalia.

7 (b) **INFORMATION ON COSTS AND OTHER CON-**
8 **TRIBUTIONS.**—Each report pursuant to this section shall
9 specify (to the extent such information is available to the
10 United States)—

11 (1) the amount of the incremental costs incurred
12 by the United States and by each other participating
13 country as the result of its participation in the Unit-
14 ed States-led force in Somalia or as the result of its
15 participation in or military operations in support of
16 the United Nations-led force in Somalia;

17 (2) the amount of other in-kind or financial con-
18 tributions pledged, and the amount of such con-
19 tributions made, by each country toward the costs as-
20 sociated with the United States-led force in Somalia
21 and the United Nations-led force in Somalia, includ-
22 ing contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund
23 for Somalia and excluding amounts reported pursu-
24 ant to paragraph (3);

25 (3) the amount assessed by the United Nations to
26 the United States and each other country for its

1 *tributions to the costs associated with the United Na-*
2 *tions-led force in Somalia;*

3 *(4) for the United States and each other country,*
4 *the extent to which the costs and other contributions*
5 *described in paragraphs (1) and (2) are being count-*
6 *ed toward the amount of the assessment described in*
7 *paragraph (3); and*

8 *(5) the amount received by the United States*
9 *and each other country as reimbursement from the*
10 *United Nations or other countries for costs that it in-*
11 *curred as the result of its participation in the United*
12 *States-led force in Somalia or as the result of its par-*
13 *ticipation in or military operations in support of the*
14 *United Nations-led force in Somalia, including reim-*
15 *bursments from the United Nations Trust Fund for*
16 *Somalia.*

17 *(c) DESCRIPTION OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO*
18 *OBTAIN EQUITABLE COST SHARING.—Each such report*
19 *shall also review all actions taken by the United States to*
20 *ensure that in-kind United States contributions to the Unit-*
21 *ed States-led force in Somalia and to the United Nations-*
22 *led force in Somalia are counted against the amount of the*
23 *United States assessed contributions to the United Nations*
24 *for peacekeeping or other military operations in Somalia*
25 *carried out pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council.*

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1 (d) *REPORTING DATES AND PERIOD COVERED BY*
2 *EACH REPORT.*—A report pursuant to this section shall be
3 submitted—

4 (1) not later than 1 month after the date of en-
5 actment of this joint resolution, covering the period
6 ending on the last day of the penultimate month pre-
7 ceding the enactment of this joint resolution; and

8 (2) not later than 7 months, 13 months, and 19
9 months after that date, covering the 6-month period
10 following the period covered by the preceding report
11 pursuant to this section and also providing cumu-
12 lative information.

13 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.**

14 *As used in this joint resolution—*

15 (1) the term "United Nations Force Commander
16 in Somalia" means the commander appointed by the
17 Secretary General of the United Nations to command
18 the United Nations-led force in Somalia;

19 (2) the term "United Nations-led forces in Soma-
20 lia" means the expanded force (commonly referred to
21 as "UNOSOM II") authorized by paragraph 5 of
22 United Nations Security Council Resolution ???
23 (1998);

24 (3) the term "United Nations Trust Fund for So-
25 malia" means the trust fund established and main-



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/814 (1993)
26 March 1993

RESOLUTION 814 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3188th meeting,
on 26 March 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 and 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Commanding the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II),

Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia and the threat they pose to the reconciliation process,

Deplored the acts of violence against persons engaging in humanitarian efforts on behalf of the United Nations, States, and non-governmental organizations,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and for the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Concerned that the crippling famine and drought in Somalia, compounded by the civil strife, have caused massive destruction to the means of production and the natural and human resources of that country,

Expressing its appreciation to the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement for their cooperation with, and support of, the efforts of the United Nations in Somalia,

Further expressing its appreciation to all Member States which have made contributions to the Fund established pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 794 (1992) and to all those who have provided humanitarian assistance to Somalia,

Commending the efforts, in difficult circumstances, of the initial United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992),

Expressing its appreciation for the invaluable assistance the neighbouring countries have been providing to the international community in its efforts to restore peace and security in Somalia and to host large numbers of refugees displaced by the conflict and taking note of the difficulties caused to them due to the presence of refugees in their territories,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Convinced also of the need for broad-based consultations and deliberations to achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of transitional government institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions,

Recognising that the re-establishment of local and regional administrative institutions is essential to the restoration of domestic tranquillity,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national, regional and local levels, including and encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Expressing its readiness to assist the people of Somalia, as appropriate, on a local, regional or national level, to participate in free and fair elections, with a view towards achieving and implementing a political settlement,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, in particular the conclusion at that meeting of three agreements by the Somali parties, including movements and factions, and welcoming also any progress made at the Conference on National Reconciliation which began in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993,

Emphasizing the need for the Somali people, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace,

Noting the reports of States concerned of 17 December 1992 (S/24976) and 19 January 1993 (S/25126) and of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 (S/24992) and 26 January 1993 (S/25158) on the implementation of resolution 794 (1992),

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (S/25354 and Add.1 and 2),

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to seek maximum economy and efficiency and to keep the size of the United Nations presence, both military and civilian, to the minimum necessary to fulfil its mandate,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

A

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for convening the Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with the agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and for the progress achieved towards political reconciliation in Somalia, and also for his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somalia, including movements, factions, community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are suitably represented at such conferences;
3. Welcomes the convening of the Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and the willingness expressed by Governments through this process to contribute to relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia, where and when possible;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national

reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, including in particular:

(a) To assist in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs, and taking into account, as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs;

(b) To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

(c) To assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country;

(d) To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;

(e) To assist the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;

(f) To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia;

(g) To create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realisation of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes;

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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its mandate in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 56-58 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1992, and the provisions of this resolution;

✱ 6. Authorizes the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the Security Council;

7. Emphasizes the crucial importance of disarmament and the urgent need to build on the efforts of UNITAF in accordance with paragraphs 56-59 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;

8. Demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, annex IX);
9. Further demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, take all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of the United Nations and its agencies as well as the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations engaged in providing humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to support from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992), utilising as available and appropriate the UNOSOM II forces authorized by this resolution, and to report on this subject, with any recommendations regarding more effective measures if necessary, to the Security Council;
11. Calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992);
12. Requests the Secretary-General to provide security, as appropriate, to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced persons, utilising UNOSOM II forces, paying particular attention to those areas where major instability continues to threaten peace and security in the region;
13. Reiterates its demand that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law and reaffirms that those responsible for such acts be held individually accountable;
14. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, taking account of the particular circumstances in each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, and in this regard to organise a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II;
- C
15. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of

UNITAF forces and for the establishment of Somali police, and calls on Member States to make contributions to this fund, in addition to their assessed contributions;

16. Expresses appreciation to the United Nations agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the ICRC for their contributions and assistance and requests the Secretary-General to ask them to continue to extend financial, material and technical support to the Somali people in all regions of the country;

17. Requests the Secretary-General to seek, as appropriate, pledges and contributions from States and others to assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia;

18. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement the present resolution, in particular to submit as soon as possible a report to the Council containing recommendations for establishment of Somali police forces and thereafter to report no later than every ninety days on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in the present resolution;

19. Decides to conduct a formal review of the progress towards accomplishing the purposes of the present resolution no later than 31 October 1993;

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

#3500

House draft S.J. Res. 45
Expiration of Authorization

Alternative formulations below of Section 4(c), "Expiration of Authorizations" would provide a longer authorization, and thereby avoid altogether, or for longer, reopening with Congress the authorization question. (New language underscored; deletions not indicated.)

Option 1:

"(c) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS. -- The authorizations provided by subsection (a) shall expire --

(1) at the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this joint resolution, or

(2) upon the expiration of any extension of the mandate of the United Nations-led force in Somalia beyond the period referred to in subparagraph 1 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 814, in which the President has concurred after consultation with Congress."

Option 2:

"(c) CONSULTATION ON USE OF ARMED FORCES. -- United States Armed Forces may be continued to be used in accordance with the terms and conditions of subsection (a) --

(1) through the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this joint resolution, or

(2) ~~or~~ ^{through} such later date as the President may determine after consultation with the Congress.

Option 3:

In subpar. (1), substitute "18" for "12"

-- This would extend to approximately one year from October 31 the mandatory expiration. This may be a practical solution if it is believed that the UNSC is likely to renew in mandate for one-year periods which correspond to the regular sessions of the UN bodies, and that the US forces will not be needed beyond Oct. 1994.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	George Tenet to Nancy Soderberg, Jeremy Rosner, and Richard Clarke, re: Somalia (1 page)	10/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legislative Affairs (Rosner, Jeremy)
OA/Box Number: 4

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia/UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia]/War Powers [1]

2012-0659-F
ke4157

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Divider Title: _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. report	Re: [Somalia] (3 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Legislative Affairs (Rosner, Jeremy)
OA/Box Number: 4

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia/UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia]/War Powers [1]

2012-0659-F
ke4157

RESTRICTION CODES

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B

Divider Title: _____

UN position in Somalia called dire

US data warn of Aidid attack

By Paul Quinn-Judge
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON - US intelligence reports out of Somalia this week say UN troops in south Mogadishu are isolated, on the defensive and facing the risk of a major assault by forces loyal to warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. (S)

The reports, sharply grimmer than anything that has been said publicly, are likely to undermine even further any remaining US resolve to stay in south Mogadishu.

The air of pessimism was deepened by an official here who said yesterday that hopes of capturing Aidid, who has been on the run from the United Nations since 24 Pakistani troops were killed in an ambush last June, are fading fast. (S)

The efficiency of the US Army Ranger and Delta force teams sent in to track Aidid were "decreasing by the day," the official said yesterday.

A detailed CIA report dated earlier this week depicts the situation in south Mogadishu, Aidid's home base and the site of key economic and political installations, in a way that is reminiscent of Vietnam toward the end of the US intervention there. (C)

In particular, it indicates that Saturday's downing of a US helicopter, when three servicemen were killed, was not the isolated incident that US military officials have suggested. (Twenty-three) helicopters have reported coming under fire from small arms and rocket-pro-

pelled grenades in recent weeks, the detailed report states. On some occasions crew members have been injured.

Another 12 US helicopters have been damaged on the ground in mortar attacks on the main air strip in the Mogadishu port area, it adds.

Commenting on the reports, the official said that the destruction caused in these attacks was not just due to luck. "They basically have the grid coordinates" for helicopters on the ground, he said. This indicates that Aidid has developed a sophisticated spotter system and may have resourceful agents.

Overall, the picture is of a small and largely invisible guerrilla force, increasingly sophisticated and daring, apparently eroding layer by layer UN military control over the city.

The strategy has been waged methodically and carefully, the report indicates. In June, when the first serious clashes between Aidid's men and UN forces occurred, the gunmen used small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. In July, they added mortars and command-detonated land mines to their arsenal.

In August, they started to concentrate on challenging the US helicopters that were trying to tip the scales in what by then had become serious urban insurgency.

Now Aidid's forces are slicing away at the roads linking parts of the city to the main UN bases, the US Embassy, and the vital port area. At the same time, Aidid is attempting, apparently successfully, to keep open his supply lines with central Somalia. (D)

It has become increasingly clear to intelligence analysts that Aidid has consolidated his position within his clan and in south Mogadishu. As a result, he is able to move around with increasing ease.

The opposite is true for UN troops.

Some parts of south Mogadishu have been declared no-go zones for UN forces, the report says. UN contingents from the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Nigeria are isolated in one of Aidid's strong points, the Villa Somalia, and are essentially unable to leave their bases, the report says. (E)

Aidid's forces, meanwhile, have set up military checkpoints on some of the city's main roads, and have established staging posts for mortar attacks near two of Mogadishu's main hospitals. Proximity to the hospitals makes it harder for UN forces to fire back on the mortar batteries, the official said. (F)

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Los Angeles Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Washington Times _____
USA Today _____
Associated Press _____
UPI _____
Reuter _____

Boston Globe p. 1
Date 30 Sept 1993

CONTINUED

75

✓ The official, who is well-versed in unconventional warfare, observed that Western officials seem to have repeated the mistake made in Vietnam and elsewhere. The opposing forces seem to be a rag-tag band of thugs who would look ridiculous on a parade ground, he said. But Aidid's guerrillas "are making maximum and creative use of the terrain and the weapons available," he said.

Quoting sources, the CIA summary notes that Aidid is now reportedly concentrating his forces in one part of the city, apparently with the aim of launching a major and politically debilitating attack on UN forces. (G)

The aim, the official said, is clearly to inflict on the UN forces "a price higher than what their governments back home are willing to pay."

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C

Divider Title: _____

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

October 22, 1993

The Honorable Dan Glickman
Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
H-405 Capitol
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, on October 3, 1993, a force of about one hundred elite U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu embarked on a mission that quickly turned into a disaster. Eighteen soldiers were killed in action, over seventy were wounded, at least one was captured (and later released), and at least one more is still missing in action.

In the wake of this tragic episode, you were quoted in the Washington Post as saying you "don't think we've given the intelligence function of this military operation the priority that it should have had." That may be true. Even more troubling, however, is the possibility that our intelligence community possessed timely and accurate intelligence information on the danger to our forces, but failed to provide it to policymakers or to appropriate military leaders. Worse, it may have been provided to policymakers who either ignored it or failed to take it seriously.

An article in the September 30, Boston Globe -- several days before the costly Ranger mission -- describes a "detailed CIA report" which apparently contained information that may have foretold the tragic events of October 3-4. According to the article (enclosed), the CIA report portrayed a rapidly deteriorating security situation for UN and U.S. forces in Mogadishu. The CIA report is said to reveal that General Aidood was "concentrating his forces in one part of the city, apparently with the aim of launching a major and politically debilitating attack on UN forces."

We are writing to ask you to initiate an in-depth inquiry into this matter. It would seem appropriate to seek answers to these and other questions:

1. Does the "CIA report" referred to in the September 30, Boston Globe article really exist? If so, its exposure in that story is one more lamentable leak that deserves investigation.
2. Were there other intelligence community reports, analyses, and/or estimate(s) that made similar assessments before October 3?

The Honorable Dan Cluckman

page two


3. When and by whom was the "report" completed? When and to whom was it distributed?
4. Was the content of the "report" replicated, in whole or in part, in other community products and if so, to whom were they distributed?
5. Can the report or reports be declassified?

We hope you will share our view that these and other pertinent questions related to this issue must be answered as soon as possible. We look forward to hearing from you.


Sincerely,




Newt Gingrich
Republican Whip



Dick Arney
Republican Conference




Henry Hyde
Chairman
Republican Policy Committee



Joe McDade
Ranking Republican
Committee on Appropriations



Floyd Spence
Ranking Republican
Committee on Armed Services



Ben Gilman
Ranking Republican
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

cc: Larry Combest
Ranking Republican

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: JEREMY ROSNER (JR)
SUBJECT: Congressional Calls on Somalia

On Thursday, November 4, congressional calls were placed by NSC, State and DoD regarding guidance for our troops in Somalia.

NSC

Berger talked with Speaker Foley.

STATE

Leadership

H Staff talked with staffs of Mitchell, Dole, Michel and Bonior; left message for staff of Gephardt and Gingrich.

Mitchell's staff urged call to Byrd. Dole's wanted more specificity on "lines of communication." Bonior's concerned about impact on Gilman resolution vote.

Others

Amb. Shin called: Hamilton, Gilman, Johnston and Burton.

H Staff called: staffs of HFAC, Obey, Livingston, Leahy, McConnell, Glickman, DeConcini.

Secretary briefed SFRC on this and other issues.

Obey's staff supportive. Livingston's and McConnell's still critical of Admin. policy. DeConcini's appreciated call.

[Note: this is as of mid-day Thursday; other calls were to follow; update to come.]

DoD

Wisner called: Nunn, Warner, Thumond, Inouye, Murtha, Stevens

Leg.Affrs staff called or left msgs with: staffs of Dellums, Nunn, Byrd, Inouye, and others.

Nunn supportive; felt we had previously overreacted in pulling back so far. Warner and Stevens favorable. Murtha wanted us not to be doing UN's fighting.

We are sending 3 pages, including this cover.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Lin Wells *W*

SUBJECT: Somalia ROE; USDP Congressional Phone Calls
(As of 11/4/93, 1515 Hours)

- Nunn said it sounds right to him. He felt that we had over reacted in pulling back so far, and a responsible forward-leaning posture was appropriate. Nunn asked that:
 - An officer from the JCS call Rick Debobis on his staff TODAY to review the new ROE.
 - Ambassador Oakley arrange to see him next week.
- Senator Warner also responded positively. He asked that:
 - A JCS briefing on ROE be given to COL Brownlee on his staff
 - Ambassador Oakley see him as well.
- Senator Thurmond was appreciative of the call, but made no further comments. A briefing on the ROE was offered by Mr. Wisner; it should be followed up at the staff level.
- Senator Inouye said, "the first time the Somalis do something in the face of the warnings they've been given, we should fire the tanks and armored vehicles." He asked that we call Richard Collins of his staff and he also is interested in an Oakley briefing.
- Congressman Murtha wanted to be sure that we were not doing the fighting for the UN. Once reassured of this fact, he was supportive. He asks that John Plashal of his staff be contacted concerning the ROE.
- Senator Stevens liked the concept. He wanted to be sure that the soldiers would be able to defend themselves. He asked that he be included in any briefings which were given to Senator Inouye.

OSD-Legislative Affairs

NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET

	CONTACTED	COMMENTS	DT/TIME
HASC	Marilyn Elrod	to agree prior 20pm	4/4/93
	Audrey Ellis	discovered	
SASC	Arnold Purnace	didn't return call	4/4/93
	Dick Raymond	1.7mbx - hadn't seen Post	11/4/93 2:30
	Dick D'Amato	didn't return call	11/4/93
HAC(D)	Sam Rockeford	to agree	4/4/93
	Kevin Faddi	to agree	
SAC(D)	Richard Collins	thanks	11/4/93 12:45
	Steve Cortese	thanks	11/4/93 12:50

HPSCI

SSCI

House Leadership

Senate Leadership

Wiener called Nease Mustha
 Thurmond
 Warner
 Thayer
 Stivers

Prepared by:
 Michael Landrum, DASD-House Affairs
 Jane Matthias, DASD-Senate Affairs

Somalia Calls: 11/4/93,

Call Status as of 1:30pm:

Senate Leadership

Mitchell (Ed King) by H staff; appreciated call; urged call to Byrd

Dole (Randy Scheunneman) by H Staff; sought greater specificity on what we mean by lines of communication

House Leadership

Gephardt (Margee Sullivan) by H Staff: left message

Michel (Bill Gavin) by H Staff: appreciated call, will pass info to Michel

Bonior (Myles Lackey) by H Staff: concerned about impact on vote next week on Hamilton resolution, believes this will cause problems

Gingrich (Dan Meyer) by H Staff: left message

HFAC

Hamilton (by Amb. Shinn); awaiting report of call

Hamilton staff (Kojm) by H Staff; agreed that there had been no change in U.S. strategy

Gilman (by Amb. Shinn); awaiting report of call

Johnston (by Amb Shinn); awaiting report of call

Burton (by Amb Shinn); awaiting report of call

SERC

all calls pending conclusion of Secretary's hearing

HAC

Obey (Peel) by H Staff; appreciate call; supportive

Livingston (Sackett) by H staff; remains critical of policy

SAC

Leahy (Newsome) by H staff; satisfied with information provided
McConnell (Bond and Cleveland) by H staff; critical of U.S.
policy; "how many troops need to get killed before we change
our policy again and sit them down in the barracks until March
31 (Bond)"

HSFCI

Glickman (Giza) by H staff; call was helpful in putting story
in perspective

SSCI

DeConcini (Bradley) by H staff: appreciated call; had not seen
story

CJS Appropriators

(awaiting report on staff calls)

DRAFTfile
20-119**TALKING POINTS ON AMB OAKLEY'S TRIP**

- In his meetings with the various factions in Mogadishu, AMB Oakley has made some significant progress towards political reconciliation and laid the groundwork for an important conference that will take place in Addis Ababa on November 29th.
- AMB Oakley has also worked to reestablish the Security Advisory Committee that functioned so effectively during UNITAF to help clear up misunderstandings and prevent incidents between Somalis and U.S. forces.
- During his discussions with Somali leaders, AMB Oakley has stressed the need for continued stability and security in Mogadishu to allow progress on political reconciliation to occur and to permit U.S. and UNOSOM forces to carry out their humanitarian mission in Somalia.
- The re-establishment of the Security Advisory Committee and the presentation of requirements by AMB Oakley are partially in response to the heightened levels of potentially hostile activity evidenced by the open display of weapons in Mogadishu and crew-served weapons ("technicals") appearing once again in violation of the Addis Ababa Accords.
- Both U.S. and UNOSOM forces have reduced their military activities in Mogadishu during Ambassador Oakley's trip in order to encourage dialogue and political progress. However, this increased military activity on the part of some factions requires the United States to take steps to guarantee the security of both its forces and those of our coalition partners.
- Our intention is to use the Security Committee to explain to the various factions what is required of them in order to maintain security and preserve the ceasefire and so that all can move about without fear. We are clarifying the rules and requirements for Somalis so that they will know what is expected of them.
- All factions will also be warned that, while our preference is for peaceful compliance with U.S. and UNOSOM requirements, we are prepared to take appropriate military action if they do not comply. U.S. and UNOSOM forces will not undertake offensive actions, but they will accomplish the mission that President Clinton laid out for

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them: force protection and securing the lines of communication to allow humanitarian relief to get through.

- There has been no "shift in strategy" in Somalia; U.S. forces have been directed to secure the LOCs, remove roadblocks, and conduct joint patrols with our UNOSOM partners -- all of which are exactly in line with the mission of our forces, as stated by the President in his 13 October report to Congress.

- Not to take these steps at this critical point during the de facto cease-fire and the emerging climate of political reconciliation could dash hopes for a peaceful solution to Somalia's problems and encourage a return to the chaos that existed before the U.S. and UN intervened.

DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1993

*new file
(Congressional
Consultation)*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JEREMY ROSNER

SUBJECT: Congressional consultation on Bosnia/Somalia

Per your request:

1. There were four Members who are not part of the "21" who were contacted with staff-to-staff consultation calls on Bosnia: Bonior, Gingrich, Biden and Lugar. DoD called Bonior; State called the other three.
2. An invitation to a meeting was discussed with the offices of Gingrich, Biden and Lugar. DoD's conversation with Bonior's office only said that we would be consulting further.

The following represents a consolidated recommendation of the Legislative Affairs directors of NSC, State and DoD:

1. Start with the 21: Five leaders (Mitchell, Dole, Foley, Gephardt, Michel); Armed Services (Nunn, Thurmond, Dellums, Spence); Foreign Policy (Pell, Helms, Hamilton, Gilman); Intelligence (DeConcini, Warner, Glickman, Combest); and Defense Appropriators (Inouye, Stevens, Murtha, McDade).
2. Add (in decreasing order of preference):

Bonior & Gingrich	because they're key and Gingrich thinks he's already invited
Sen. Byrd	As Senate Pres. Pro Tem, because he's very key
Ford & Simpson	Because you can't invite House Whips without Senate Whips
Biden & Lugar	Because they already think they're invited; they can help on Bosnia
Foreign Ops. Appropriators: Leahy, McConnell, Obey, Livingston	Because we'll need them on aspects of Bosnia and on many other foreign policy projects (e.g., Russia)

****We all recommend you make AT LEAST these additions.****

(The next level would be the four Commerce-Justice-State appropriators, who fund peacekeeping: Hollings, Domenici, Smith, Rogers.)

3. We may not be able to make this meeting happen before next week, but we would urge no later than Monday or Tuesday.

Calls on Somalia: November 4, 1993

Calls to be made on Somalia:

<u>Office to be called:</u>	<u>Call to:</u>	<u>Level of Caller:</u>
<u>NSC</u>		
Foley	Member	Berger
<u>DoD</u>		
Byrd	Member	Wisner or higher
Nunn	Member or staff	Wisner or DoD Leg.
Thurmond	"	"
Dellums	"	"
Spence	"	"
Murtha	"	"
McDade	"	"
Inouye	"	"
Stevens	"	"
<u>State</u>		
Mitchell	staff	State/H staff
Dole	"	"
Gephardt	"	"
Michel	"	"
Bonior	"	"
Gingrich	"	"
Hamilton	member or staff	principal or staff
Gilman	"	"
Pell	"	"
Helms	"	"
Leahy	"	"
McConnell	"	"
Obey	"	"
Livingston	"	"
Smith	staff	staff
Rogers	"	"
Hollings	"	"
Domenici	"	"

Optional:

Africa, IO subcomm. chairs and rankings

NOTE: This may be covered at SFRC hearing by Sec.State

DEADLINE: All completed or message left -- not later than noon for principal calls; not later than 2pm for all others.

OK (52)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Talking Points on Somalia: November 4, 1993

- I want to give you some background regarding the stories in today's papers about our troops in Somalia.
- There has not been a "shift in strategy" in Somalia; efforts to secure the lines of communications, remove roadblocks, and possibly to resume joint patrols with our coalition partners have always been elements of the mission of our forces, as stated in the President's speech of October 7.
- As stated by Ambassador Oakley, the decision to have a more visible presence in the streets of Mogadishu does not represent a change to a more aggressive policy, but is rather in keeping with our plans to use forces to keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communication that are essential to keep the flow of food, supplies and people moving freely through the city and throughout the country.
- We cannot afford to neglect such steps, especially at this early point during the de facto cease fire and emerging political climate of the reconciliation. If we failed to take such steps now, it could encourage those who want a return to the chaos that existed prior to the first arrival of our forces.
- This all depends in major part on the status of Ambassador Oakley's discussions and negotiations with clansmen; those discussions set the political stage for further security and military actions in Mogadishu and other areas of Somalia.
- As the President has repeatedly stressed, the essence of our military mission in Somalia has always been to provide security for the humanitarian effort.

CLEARED BY NSC:



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CF -
Pls make copies
for Clarke,
Ward, Berger,
Soderberg, &
a note saying
"FYI" from me.
— T. B. (D)

CF
File
Soderberg

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (H)

FAX

TO:

FROM:

DATE:

TIME:

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover sheet):

URGENT

FOR CLEARANCE

FYI

PER YOUR REQUEST

MESSAGE:

Ockley wanted the attached to be
distributed at the NSC. I leave it to
you to decide who else should see it.

FAX # OF SENDER (202) 647-2762

TRANSMISSION PROBLEMS CALL (202) 647-
PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

DATE: October 21, 1993

SUBJECT: Ambassador Oakley's Briefings for Members of Congress

During the week of October 18, Ambassador Oakley conducted the following briefings on Somalia for Members of Congress:

- o October 19, Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Attended by Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Simon, Mathews, Feingold, Lugar, Kassebaum, Jeffords, Coverdell;
- o October 20, House Leadership: Attended by Speaker Foley, HFAC Chairman Hamilton and ranking member Gilman, HASC Chairman Dellums and ranking member Spence, HPSCI Chairman Glickman and ranking member Combest, DOD Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Murtha and ranking member McDade, Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Obey and ranking member Livingston;
- o October 21, Senator Nunn.

In the three briefings, Ambassador Oakley described his trip to Mogadishu, provided his analysis of the situation in Somalia, and discussed his own role in the process of political reconciliation. The Ambassador stressed the following main points:

- o The President had decided that a "course correction" was necessary in U.S. policy towards Somalia.
- o Even before June 5, the UN had allowed the process of political dialogue to lapse and had created a perception of no longer being even-handed in its dealing with the clans.
- o After June 5, the UN's search for Aided had only served to strengthen him.

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- 2 -

- o The Security Council had failed to pay close attention to how the mandate in UNSC 837 was being implemented. The use of force had become more and more indiscriminate and many of the arrests of Aided clan members took place with little supporting evidence.
- o At the same time, the UN had also come up with "visionary" nation building plans which were "too naive, too ambitious and too culturally insensitive." Instead, it would have been better to focus on Somali solutions, even if they were "rough and ready" rather than ideal.
- o The Ambassador's visit had been intended to restart the political track with the Somalis, put the UN back on course, and free both the American and Nigerian detainees.
- o The freeing of detainees had been unconditional, although the Ambassador had promised his "best efforts" in looking at the problem of the Somali detainees.
- o Progress had been made in lowering the political "temperature." Lapsed mechanisms such as the ceasefire and disarmament committee and the military security committee were being restarted.
- o The message had been delivered to the other clans that they should not expect the U.S. to do their work in fighting Aided.
- o The direction over the next six months would be to move towards the creation of interim political entity.
- o This would not be an easy process and the chances of success were perhaps fifty-fifty. However, it was up to the Somalis to make it work. If the Somalis could not do so by the end of March, then the international community would not bear the blame for Somali failure and would be under no obligation to continue helping the Somalis.
- o During this period, the Ambassador would return to the region and Somalia periodically to help move the process forward. To remain in Mogadishu on a more permanent basis would risk creating a perception that the U.S. was again taking over from the UN.

In all three briefings, there was general agreement from the Members that the Administration's plan was probably the best under conflicting circumstances. There was also broad agreement with the Ambassador's observation that if the Somalis failed in their efforts at political reconciliation in the next six months, the international community was under no obligation to continue to help. Other specific comments during the

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- 3 -

briefings are noted below.

Briefing for Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The Senators expressed their appreciation for the Ambassador's briefing and for the role he played in freeing the U.S. detainee. In their questions and comments, the Senators raised a number of concerns. Senator Simon and Senator Jeffords expressed doubt that six months would be sufficient to allow enough progress towards political reconciliation. Senator Jeffords and Senator Feingold urged that African countries, particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea, be engaged in the reconciliation process. Senator Kassebaum agreed with the importance of more balanced dealings with the clans. Senator Lugar commented that it appeared the U.S. forces were "hunkered" down in Somalia, and therefore there was little reason to keep them there.

Meeting with House Leadership

In comments during the Ambassador's briefing for key House members, Rep. Murtha described the efforts he had made during his trip last week to Mogadishu, working with Ambassador Oakley, to ensure that the UN and US personnel there understood the need to change their approach. Rep. McDade raised the need for changes at the UN both in New York and Mogadishu. Rep. Dellums agreed with Ambassador Oakley's remarks on the need for Somali solutions and commented favorably on the diplomatic work being done with the Ethiopians and Eritreans. He also concurred with the Ambassador's comment that the international community would be under no further obligation to help the Somalis if they failed to put aside their differences and the country lapsed back into civil war. Rep. Glickman voiced doubt that six months would be enough time for the Somalis to work out a political reconciliation.

Rep. Obey expressed concern about the setting of a date for withdrawal which locked the U.S. on a course. Speaker Foley agreed, but said that it would have been impossible to obtain Congressional approval for any resolution without a deadline. The Speaker added that the Congress was still struggling with the U.S. military role in the post-Cold War world and was being pulled in different directions by those who favor the extremes. Rep. Hamilton pointed out that the UN's performance in Somalia had been discouraging but it was not in the U.S. interest to see the UN undermined. Speaker Foley agreed that the UN provided the only real framework for peacekeeping activities. Rep. Dellums observed that the U.S. was in uncharted waters and no one really knew what to do. The weakness of the UN was a problem but it was a problem which needed to be solved. In resolving the problem, Dellums urged that a distinction be made between difficulties relating to individuals such as the Secretary General and those relating to the UN's structure and organization.

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- 4 -

Meeting with Senator Nunn

In addition to touching on many of the same points as in the two previous briefings, Senator Nunn and Ambassador Oakley discussed the current U.S. military role in Somalia. Ambassador Oakley stressed that the U.S. military would not carry out disarmament activities nor would it engage in offensive actions. However it was important that the U.S. forces be used to keep lines of communication open. They should not simply "hunker down" in Mogadishu. Instead, they could have a role in dealing with some of the small conflicts which had begun to flare up outside Mogadishu. U.S. forces, by virtue of their presence alone, without engaging in combat operations, would have a "calming effect." Senator Nunn agreed with this point, adding that this was a sensible use of U.S. forces while they still remained in Somalia.

Drafted:H:RBradtke
10/22/91 ext. 71050
HFRONT# 628

Cleared:Amb. Oakley

Distribution:

P - Mr. Tarnoff
AF - Ambassador Shinn
PA - Mr. Donilon
NSC - Mr. Rosner
DOD - Ms. Stuart (for U/S Wisner and General McCaffery)

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Sep 7

TO: JEREMY

FROM: BEV.

Amb. Schiffer
would like you
to SEE THE ATCH'd
DRAFT MEMO.

— file Somalia

September 7, 1993

SUBJECT: Somalia

After twenty-one years of dictatorial rule, President Siad Barre of Somalia was overthrown in January 1991. The groups responsible for deposing Siad Barre were unable to agree on the formation of a new government. As a result, Somalia, a country of more than 7 million people, sank into anarchy. Local warlords organized military bands, which occasionally fought against each other, but which, above all, plundered the civilian population. The country's fragile economy was progressively destroyed. As farmers fled the land, food production plummeted. Somalia's GNP dropped precipitously.

In November 1991 a truce negotiated between the two rival warlords in Mogadishu came apart. Subsequent fighting made it impossible for emergency food shipments to be distributed in the capital and in the countryside. It became evident that the disruption of food production and of food distribution would lead to mass starvation. People soon were dying by the thousands. By the end of 1992, the number of deaths from starvation in Somalia was to climb up to 500,000, about 7% of the country's total population.

The phenomenon of mass starvation resulting from dislocation caused by war or as the result of deliberate measures of warfare can be encountered frequently. But the conditions of Somalia in 1991 and 1992 were unusual for our time period, in that people were starving to death simply because warring tribal leaders and marauding thugs were preventing food from being produced and distributed. The basic fabric of human civilization was in the process of being destroyed in Somalia as the result of the creation of a state of utter lawlessness.

The situation in Somalia was uniquely suited for consideration by the United Nations Security Council. The country lacked any semblance of national government. No major power had a political or economic stake there. Thus, when the United Nations Security Council in early 1992 began to deal with the issue, it could deal with a humanitarian problem in its purest form. No one could argue that it was necessary to await an appeal from the government affected, because there was no government. For the same reason, no one could argue that this was a case of interference with the domestic concerns of a member government.

Recognizing that the humanitarian relief organizations were simply unable to perform the tasks which they had set themselves, unless they received military protection, the United Nations decided to provide such protection. In April 1992 the Security Council arranged for 500 soldiers to be dispatched to Somalia. The troops, supplied by Pakistan, began to arrive in Somalia in September 1992. But it turned out that they were too few in number and were not adequately equipped to provide the needed military shield for the distribution of food. The problem of mass starvation continued with approximately one thousand Somalis dying each day through the Summer and Fall of 1992.

These were the circumstances which caused President Bush in December 1992, to send United States troops into Somalia, to lead an international force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Within a matter of weeks, they were able to establish sufficient security for the distribution of food supply throughout the country. As order was restored, the problem of mass starvation was brought to an end. Yet, recognizing that disarming all the military bands throughout the country was a well-nigh impossible task, the U.S. forces made no effort to disarm any of the bands beyond insisting that armed vehicles be garaged. It was hoped that mere intimidation would suffice to restore order.

The policy worked in most parts of Somalia. Tens of thousands of Somali farmers have returned to their farms. The 1993 crop is expected to meet most local food requirements. Some order has been restored to areas of the country in which about 85% of the people of Somalia reside. Efforts have begun to reconstitute government from the ground up, bringing all elements of Somali society into a process dominated since early 1991 by the warlords.

Early this year it became evident, however, that one of the warlords, Mohammed Farrah Aideed, not only wanted to be installed as President of Somalia, but would disrupt any effort to arrange for a solution to the country's problems which was likely to preclude the achievement of his goal. Committed to attaining his objective by force, he refused to participate in any meaningful truce negotiations. As a result, we have witnessed sporadic terrorist attacks in Aideed's home territory, South Mogadishu, by Aideed forces against soldiers of the United Nations contingents.

It is estimated that Aideed's armed band has approximately 500 members, almost all of whom are located in South Mogadishu. Mogadishu is only one city, but it is Somalia's capital and it has a population of about one million people. Although Aideed's band is small, it is large enough to stir up a great deal of trouble in a sprawling urban area, where combatants can suddenly emerge from a civilian crowd, often dressed as women, discharge their arms at U.N. soldiers, and quickly disappear again. Difficult as the task of bringing peace to Mogadishu may be, it must be taken on if our goals in Somalia are to be achieved.

The other warlords have so far been intimidated. If they see that Aideed can successfully defy the United Nations, they, too, will revert to their previous practices. Thus, as long as the situation in Mogadishu is not resolved, the stability of the entire country continues to be at risk.

It was clear from the outset that the United Nations effort, in order for it to have a chance of succeeding, would (a) have to have significant U.S. military support, and (b) would have to continue over the extended period of time needed to reestablish a semblance of law and order in the country. It is, therefore, incorrect to suggest that the mission of the U.N. contingents has changed. The mission was, from the beginning, to end the turmoil which has resulted in more than 300,000 victims from starvation and which, should it reoccur, could claim hundreds of thousands more. Nothing would have been accomplished by the major effort undertaken since December, 1992, if Somalia returns to the conditions which existed prior to a landing of U.S. forces, if U.N. intercession has meant no more for many Somalis than a postponement by one year of death and starvation. Yet such a disastrous result would be inevitable if the United States now withdraws its support from the United Nations operation.

The Somali expedition has been and continues to be a United Nations effort. Twenty-three other countries are engaged in Somalia, providing nearly 20,000 troops. Our present participation is down from 28,000 at its peak to about 4500 now, consisting of about 3100 logistical and other support personnel and a quick-reaction force of about 1400. We do not intend to Americanize the problem. It must be resolved with the active participation of the United Nations and of forces from other U.N. members. In this Chapter VII effort the United Nations is in uncharted waters, trying to put back together a state torn apart by warlords and thugs. It should come as no surprise that there have been unexpected developments, some of them quite unpleasant. What remains at stake is the survival of the millions of Somalis who were rescued by the United Nations operation. What is also at stake, is the reputation of the United Nations as an organization capable of dealing with threats to the peace.

It is clear that the problems of Somalia can not ultimately be solved by anyone but the Somali people themselves. That is why the United States has given its support to efforts to lay the foundation for a democratic government in Somalia and for the creation of institutions which would advance the rule of law.

THE
FORUM
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
POLICY

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION SHEET

FOR: MIKE ANDRICOS

FAX: 395-7350

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT AND ROBERT GATES

Somalia

6 pages to follow

Hope you find the attached perspectives on the developments in Moscow and Somalia useful. Please don't hesitate to call if you have further questions.

THE FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

1750 K STREET, N.W. ♦ SUITE 800 ♦ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ♦ 202-429-4299 ♦ FAX 202-429-4298

ISSUE ALERT

October 1993
Number: 93-3

President

Brent Scowcroft

Chairman of the Board

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Members of the Board

Howard H. Baker

Lloyd N. Cutler

Dante B. Fascell

Robert M. Gates

Rita E. Hauser

Carla A. Hills

Michel Oksenberg

Harold A. Poling

Condoleezza Rice

Brent Scowcroft

Robert S. Strauss

Steven J. Wallace

RUSSIA: BEYOND THE CRISIS

From the beginning of the crisis that rocked Moscow for the past two weeks, the Clinton Administration has strongly backed Russian President Boris Yeltsin. That policy has been correct, in putting us on the side of the Russian people in their quest for political and economic freedom, and in support of the leader whom they freely elected.

But two points are worth emphasizing. First, the U.S. supports the principle of democratic reform and all those in Russia who are committed to it. That is the reason we have backed Yeltsin against those who would attempt to seize power by violence and rule out of the barrel of a gun. We should not find ourselves tied to any particular political leader or personality, regardless of his program or actions. Second, the transitional nature of the institutions and practices in Russia does not offer a clear yardstick against which to measure constitutional rights and wrongs. It was right to have stood behind Yeltsin because of his clearer commitment to reform and our recognition that, in the present extraordinary case, he had no choice but to take the steps he did. That said, we should not lose sight of the fact that Yeltsin acted outside the only constitution that is currently operative in Russia and dismissed deputies who were chosen in elections by the Russian people.

The Clinton Administration now needs to make clear to Yeltsin--privately but clearly--both the basis on which he received U.S. support and our expectations about his future course of action. Specifically, the Clinton Administration should convey the following message to Yeltsin:

- U.S. support rests squarely on Yeltsin's continued commitment to democratic reforms. We would not understand or support his taking anti-democratic measures.
- Yeltsin should take concrete steps to begin a process of reconciliation and to reaffirm and reinforce his commitment political and economic reform. Among specific measures, he should:

2

- Cancel, as soon as possible, the emergency measures put in place to respond to the confrontation with parliamentary forces.
- Stick to his commitment to hold new parliamentary elections by the end of the year, even if this means utilizing existing electoral laws, procedures, and institutions to meet that timetable.
- Announce the immediate reconstruction of the gutted Russian "White House," to be accomplished on a crash basis as a matter of the highest priority.
- Call for new presidential elections on a date closer to, if not simultaneous with, parliamentary elections.

The Clinton Administration also needs to ensure that both the American public and the Russian people understand its support for Yeltsin is a reflection of its support for political and economic reform in Russia and extends to everyone in Russia who subscribes to those principles. Finally, it would be useful for the established democratic states to consider ways to offer advice to Russian democrats about how to organize parties to participate more effectively in the political process, promote their programs in the legislature, and work together despite their differences.

The actions of the past few weeks have opened and deepened wounds in the Russian body politic. Having stood by the supporters of reform when they took severe measures to deal with profound threats to that reform process, the U.S. should now actively encourage actions to help heal those wounds. It is important that we do what we can to increase the chances that this crisis was the last rather than the first chapter in violent confrontations over the shape of a new political and economic future for the Russian people.

THE FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

1750 K STREET, N.W. ♦ SUITE 800 ♦ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ♦ 202-429-4299 ♦ FAX 202-429-4298

ISSUE BRIEF

October 1993
Number 93-2

President

Brent Scowcroft

Chairman of the Board

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Members of the Board

Howard H. Baker

Lloyd N. Cutler

Danie B. Fasel

Robert M. Gates

Rita E. Hauser

Carla A. Hills

Michel Oksenberg

Harold A. Poling

Condoleezza Rice

Brent Scowcroft

Robert S. Strauss

Steven J. Wallace

SOMALIA

In recent weeks, both houses of Congress have asked the Clinton Administration to provide a plan of action for Somalia which sets out the objectives, size, function and command arrangements of a U.S. military operation in Somalia. This report to Congress is due on October 15, and both the Senate and the House have marked November 15 as the date by which they "believe" the President should seek and receive congressional authorization to continue the deployment.

In the days ahead, the Administration will need to construct a plan that addresses the congressional and public concerns over Somalia. Such a plan is most likely to succeed if it returns us to the goals and missions established by the United States and the UN at the end of last year. It therefore is useful to retrace some of the decisions and events that led Congress to demand a plan of action.

In November of last year, the United States decided to lead a humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Thousands of Somalis had already died and hundreds of thousands were on the threshold of starvation. The Somali political system had collapsed into anarchy, and local warlords were using food as a weapon and selling it as booty. By late November, the warlords regularly were preventing the distribution of humanitarian supplies and endangering the lives of international relief workers who were trying to help. The United States had unique political standing and military capabilities to restore security which could permit the delivery of food and medicine. A multilateral coalition, led by the United States, was formed quickly and within weeks Operation Restore Hope was shipping and delivering food and medicine to thousands of starving Somalis.

The goal of this operation was clear cut: to provide a secure environment to ensure the safe delivery of food and medicine. The United States was firm in its articulation of this vital but limited objective, acknowledged by the UN and endorsed in Security Council Resolution (794) which called for the establishment "of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations."

In early December, the Security Council and Secretary General Boutros Ghali began devising a plan that would take effect after the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope had re-established security for the delivery of food. This "second phase" operation was to be a UN-led program that would maintain the restored security so that the relief supplies would continue to be protected and also begin the difficult task of helping Somalis rebuild their government and their nation. The United States made clear that it would play only a supporting role in this UN-led operation; a role that would contribute only non-combat technical forces - such as logistic and communication units. Washington also agreed to leave an "off-shore" combat unit that could be called upon to assist the UN forces in extreme security emergencies.

The Problem

By February 1993, the U.S.-led military operation had resulted in enough security in central Somalia so that food and medicine could be delivered to all of the starvation threatened areas; Operation Restore Hope was a humanitarian success. On May 4, Marine General Robert Johnston turned over his command to the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II); phase two began. But in early June, the warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed launched a series of bloody attacks on UNOSOM forces. This has led to armed conflict between UN military forces and an indigenous guerrilla force that is based on clan and sub-clan loyalties. The UNOSOM forces, contrary to expectations, proved unable to cope with Aideed forces without the presence of U.S. combat troops. As a result, U.S. combat forces are intricately and routinely involved in day-to-day military operations on the streets of Mogadishu. There have been a growing number of UN casualties, including Americans, and Aideed continues to evade a much-publicized UN effort to capture him.

UNOSOM's primary tasks of maintaining security for humanitarian assistance and facilitating the restoration of Somalia political institutions have been seriously sidetracked in south Mogadishu by Aideed. This is not the case, however, in other areas of the country. Outside of Mogadishu, the centuries old elder system that is inherent in every clan and sub-clan is reemerging and political decisions are being made on a local level. Police forces, for instance, are reappearing in numerous towns and villages throughout Somalia. With the assistance of the UN, Somalis are creating a new government and are writing a new constitution. In areas outside Mogadishu, districts and regions are selecting delegates that will go to a national conference, known as the "Transitional National Council," that will form Somalia's transitional government and draft Somalia's constitution.

Next Steps for the United Nations

In order for the UN to be successful in its attempts to facilitate new political structures for Somalia, it must adopt a new approach to dealing with Aideed. Since June, the UN

has been engaged in a futile attempt to arrest him. Indeed, the effort to arrest him and respond to his guerrilla strikes has forced the UN to expend large military resources and drawn U.S. forces into frequent fire fights that have involved American soldiers firing on Somali civilians. This, in turn, risks alienating the local population, acts as a major roadblock to the formation of a transitional government, severely handicaps the ability of the UN to act as an honest broker and unnecessarily highlights the role of the United States.

An alternative for the UN might be to marginalize Aideed by cordoning him off in south Mogadishu, (while securing the airport and port), thus allowing the UN to build on its political and practical successes outside of Mogadishu. The Transitional National Council could meet outside of Mogadishu, and continue to develop political structures without Aideed. Many of the districts and regions are willing to start the rebuilding process. This is beginning to occur already in parts of Somalia, where local leaders are eager to throw their support behind clan and sub-clan leadership that do not use terror and weapons to gain power. It is encouraging that, thus far, other warlords have failed to join Aideed in trying to thwart UN efforts in Somalia. Nurturing this process, and maintaining the reasonably good security situation that now prevails virtually everywhere in Somalia outside of Mogadishu should be the focus of UNOSOM's programs.

U.S. Involvement

Marginalizing Aideed would also allow the United States to return to its original goals and objectives. A return to this original policy would mean "de-Americanizing" the UN military operation. U.S. combat forces are currently engaged in high profile missions and exercises unrelated to the original purpose of the U.S. combat force, and American citizens continue to play prominent roles in the UNOSOM operations. U.S. helicopter gunships make daily sweeps of the city and U.S. Ranger units carry out frequent missions. Ironically, these very visible symbols of American presence do not reflect accurately the truly multinational nature of the UN operation in Somalia, where the U.S. forces make up about 15 percent of the UNOSOM forces. Nevertheless, the perception remains that UNOSOM is a U.S.-dominated military and civilian operation.

Marginalizing Aideed is therefore the best approach to the current problem. However, it may not be possible to cordon his forces off in a manner which can prevent his creating an unacceptable level of interference with the UN mission. If that is the case (and this is a military judgment) then Aideed's forces must be confronted directly. That obviously cannot be done without participation of U.S. combat forces, if necessary augmented by additional capability.

During this current crisis, in view of the fact that the combat capability of the UNOSOM has not lived up to expectations - and thus itself needs strengthening - the United States cannot cut and run. There would be a very real cost to the perception that the United

States does not live up to its commitments. Not only would it leave the Somali people in a perpetual state of anarchy (and thus famine), but it would undermine the U.S.'s credibility as a partner and leader around the world. Hence, the United States, working with UNOSOM, needs to deal with the unacceptable level of conflict between UNOSOM and Aideed in south Mogadishu and thus allow UNOSOM to get on with its task of rebuilding Somalia's political and social institutions.

The Congress has challenged the Administration to give them reasons and explanations for the U.S. involvement in Somalia. The forementioned ideas offer a strategy for achieving peace and stability in Somalia. It is critical that the U.S. act in a way which will allow it, in the shortest possible time to return to its original policy, and remove U.S. combat forces. Success would permit the UN to accomplish its goals: to provide security, humanitarian relief and help rebuild a broken country. It would also protect U.S. national interests that extend well beyond the Horn of Africa. Abandonment of Somalia risks future reluctance on the part of the United States to intervene in other regions of the world where U.S. national interests may dictate, and a reluctance on the part of key regions to accept a U.S. role. The United States must act in a way which preserves our ability to respond to world events that demand our participation.

Principal Author

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FAX TRANSMITTAL

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Richard Clarke

To <i>D. Stenberg</i>	From <i>R. Clarke</i>
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Fax #	Fax #

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Remarks Prepared for Delivery

Honorable Les Aspin

Secretary of Defense

CSIS

August 27, 1993

File
Somalia

The President's decision to deploy an additional 400 U.S. troops to Somalia has focused renewed attention on the security aspect -- indeed on the U.S. military aspect -- of what is happening there. That focus is much too narrow. There is much more to what is happening in Somalia than the story of military conflict in Mogadishu. And if there is to be a solution to Somalia's problems, it must be much more than a military solution.

Somalia was a tragedy that touched America and the world. We went there to save a people and we succeeded. We are staying there to help those same people rebuild their nation. To understand how we intend to achieve this, let's briefly recall the circumstances that prompted this international outpouring.

By the early 1990s, Somalia had seen years of brutal civil war. Bloody fighting raged between warlords who used not only arms but also food and famine as weapons against each other and a helpless population. The result was chaos and lawlessness on a massive scale. Drought made the famine worse. An estimated 1,000 a day were dying. Nearly 800,000 refugees were forced into exile.

Official sources and voluntary relief organizations estimated that as many as half a million people, largely women and children, had perished by the end of 1992. Two million more -- a quarter of Somalia's population -- were at risk.

Somalia's political institutions had crumbled, its fragile economy was virtually destroyed, and its people were almost entirely dependent on outside assistance for their survival.

The chaos and violence blunted international donor relief efforts. Many of the organizations curtailed their operations or left entirely after their food convoys were attacked, their warehouses looted, and their personnel assaulted.

U.S. involvement in Somalia began in August of 1992 and has gone through three stages in the last year. The first lasted from August to December and focused on providing food. The United States first provided large amounts of food but soon found, as other donors did, that the chaos and lawlessness in the country prevented overland delivery. The U.S. military then joined in a military airlift -- Operation Provide

Relief -- to bring food into the heart of the country. From August 1992 until February 1993 more than 30,000 metric tons of urgently needed food and other relief supplies were delivered to Somalia, 70% by the United States.

It soon became clear, however, that air delivery of food would not be enough. Violence and theft still impeded -- in some cases prevented -- deliveries within the country. Better security was needed if food supplies were to reach starving Somalis.

When we helped transport a Pakistani battalion to protect the food convoys under U.N. auspices, the forces of Mohammed Farah Aided pinned the battalion down in the Mogadishu airport and conditions in Somalia worsened.

That ushered in the second stage -- the UNITAF stage -- of U.S. involvement that lasted from December of 1992 until May of 1993. The focus now was on providing security as well as food. The United States offered to lead a military effort to provide sufficient security to deal with the famine, and the United Nations accepted in Security Council Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992.

This stage of U.S. involvement would eventually see 26,000 U.S. troops in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. Those forces, along with 13,000 troops from twenty-one other countries, operated under the U.S.-led Unified Task Force, or UNITAF. UNITAF's 39,000 troops brought about a radical change in the Somali situation.

Sufficient order was restored to permit food to reach the needy through over a thousand feeding centers. Markets reopened and the first crops in many years were planted. By the Spring of 1993, chaos and banditry throughout much of Somalia had been greatly reduced.

To sum up, UNITAF had achieved its goal of improving the security situation and feeding the population in central and southern Somalia. What remained was the task of institutionalizing the gains -- preventing the country from backsliding into the chaos that had caused the famine in the first place.

The third stage -- the UNOSOM II stage -- began in May of 1993 and extends to the present. Its focus is to create conditions whereby the Somali people can rebuild their country. Under UNOSOM II the U.N. broadened its efforts under a new Security Council resolution, UNSCR 814, passed on March 26, 1993. It called for the U.N. to begin the work of rebuilding the government, reestablishing the essential elements of a national economy and developing an adequate system of justice and police to maintain order. As agreed, the United States quickly reduced our troop contingent of more than 25,000 to about 4,000.

So where are we now? Over the course of our involvement, our objectives fell

in four categories: food, security, economics and political rebuilding. How did we do?

On food, we have done very well. The food emergency that galvanized international efforts on behalf of the Somali people effectively is over. As a direct result of United Nations humanitarian effort, catastrophic mass starvation was averted.

This year's agricultural production was good. There are still pockets of hunger but reports we receive from Mogadishu say that there is more than enough food to feed the Somali people.

U.N. officials on the scene feel confident enough to bring the emergency food supply effort to a close. Emergency food deliveries are scheduled to end this month. On security, we have made progress. Banditry has been significantly reduced throughout Somalia and in some places eliminated. Somalia is generally peaceful except for south Mogadishu, which is a very significant exception as we shall see. But it is important to understand that -- compared to what existed when UNITAF arrived in December -- progress has been dramatic.

In south Mogadishu, the Aideed stronghold, we have a major challenge to the whole U.N. enterprise. I believe the current crisis there was initiated because Aideed's power base was being eroded politically and militarily by UNOSOM. It may be small comfort today, but our present difficulty is the result of our previous success. The danger now is that unless we return security to south Mogadishu, political chaos will follow the U.N. withdrawal. Other warlords will follow Aideed's example. Fighting between the warlords will ensue, which is what brought the famine to massive proportions in the first place. The danger is that the situation will return to what existed before the United States sent in the troops.

On economics and the political reconstitution of the country, some progress has been made but more work needs to be done. Some small shops are reopening, some schools and orphanages have reopened, and in central Somalia, former government employees are back on the job providing health and education services to the population. Overall, however, economic conditions remain dire and progress towards political reconciliation has been stalled by the deteriorating security situation in the southern part of the capital. More successful work is being done in the countryside, but greater effort must be devoted to push this along. From this we see that the current situation in Somalia is mixed, and that we have some pressing problems yet to deal with.

This afternoon I want to suggest how we might go about the next phase of work in Somalia. Put another way, what are the elements of the end game in Somalia for the international community? We had goals for UNOSOM I and they were not met. That prompted us to move to UNITAF. We had goals for UNITAF and they were met, creating the conditions for a turnover to UNOSOM II. How will we know when

UNOSOM II has succeeded?

Our overall criteria for success should include progress in economic, political and security elements of the Somali problem. On security. Clearly, UNOSOM has to establish reasonable security in south Mogadishu, but it does not end there. Real progress must be made in reducing the heavy weapons in the hands of warlords and effective police forces must be created. The overall effect must be such that no group of armed Somalis should be able to take over the country by force to impose their political will and loot the markets.

On economics. The country should be sufficiently open and secure so that its markets are functioning, goods and services can flow and basic services like water and electricity are provided.

On political rebuilding. There should be a political process that reflects clan interests, regional interests, and the interests of the people of Somalia whatever their clan or region. The question remaining, of course, is how do we get from here to there? I'm going to propose here a series of specific action items that could bring real progress.

First, we should bring U.N. combined troop strength up to planned levels. The United States has recently added 400 more combat troops to its Quick Reaction Force. UNOSOM II, however, is approximately 5,000 troops short of its planned complement of 28,000. We fully expect others to do their share, as they have promised.

Second, additional efforts to set up a police force should begin immediately. Credible, neutral police forces in major population centers are critical to success in establishing security.

Third, we should continue removing heavy weapons from the militias and begin planning for implementation -- in conjunction with Somali police -- of a consistent weapons control policy. Such a policy will give those willing to cooperate some confidence that their enemies cannot rearm. The policy could begin in areas of the country where some disarmament success has been achieved.

Fourth, the United Nations must develop a detailed plan with concrete steps that will pull together its economic, political and security activities into an overall strategy. And it must provide adequate staff and budget to make progress on its political and economic objectives in Somalia.

Fifth, the United Nations should draw on the experience of its success in Cambodia to form a core group of nations to support and speed its work in Somalia. Such a group might consist of African countries as well as other members of the

United Nations that have a special interest in assisting in the political and economic reconstruction of the country.

Sixth, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity should act now to bring the parties back together on the peace track. They might use the promising model of two previous conferences on Somali national reconciliation held in Addis Ababa.

Those are concrete steps that could be taken now to put us on the path to success in Somalia. There is also another, related question that is closer to home for us. President Clinton has directed that U.S. forces remain long enough to complete their mission and no longer. The completion of the mission chiefly concerns security in Somalia.

For U.S. combat troops, I think there are three items on the checklist. First, the security issue in south Mogadishu must be settled. Second, we must make real progress toward taking the heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords. Third, there must be credible police forces in major population centers. When these three conditions are met, I believe we can remove the U.S. Quick Reaction Force from Mogadishu.

We can reduce U.S. logistics troops supporting other UNOSOM II forces when the security situation in Mogadishu permits larger scale hiring of civilian contract employees to provide the support functions.

When we consider Somalia just a year ago, we can be proud of what the United States has achieved, particularly our men and women in uniform. We should also take considerable interest in the success of the United Nations in Somalia. Without the United Nations as a first-rate peacekeeping and peace enforcing organization, we could be called upon to shoulder much more of the load. And we should also note that the most important element of any lasting solution in Somalia must be the Somali people. Just as the international community has invested greatly in creating conditions for political and economic growth in Somalia, so too must the people of Somalia invest themselves in the reconstruction of their own country.

In the meantime, President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia once again provide for its people. This is what the new world asks of American leadership and American partnership.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

22-Oct-1993 13:49 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jeremy D. Rosner

(ROSNER)

FROM:

Sean J. Darragh
(DARRAGH)

SUBJECT:

Reuter story on the rangers

see below

file:
Swalia

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

22-Oct-1993 12:40 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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FROM: White House Situation Room
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SUBJECT: THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT@

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The applications which we saw in DESERT STORM, then, really, were just the tip of the iceberg. What the technology can do with us in battlefield situation awareness is truly revolutionary, truly dramatic changes over what we have been able to do to date. Now, as we do this, what we are basically doing is, either eliminating this battlefield fog or at least being able to see through it to the extent that we can still continue to gain the decisive advantage on the battlefield.

The second area for information technology to make its major improvement is in the field of simulation. And I invite all of you who have not seen it to go down and see the amazing display that the Army has on simulation, talking about the Louisiana maneuvers and the battle laboratories -- because we have been doing simulation for a decade or two, but just scratching the surface of what could be done. It has the potential to revolutionize the way we train, the way we conduct exercises, and the way we develop and test our new weapons systems.

The Army has come a long way in its use of simulation to enhance training. It no longer has to take units to the field to

get effective training. That is now one way of training; simulation is another way -- and best of all combining simulation with field exercise gives the most effective combination of all. and it's not just with individual units. The commanders can electronically link different units in different parts of the country or different parts of the world to conduct their exercises. The simulations are also helping us determine what we need to develop for the future. And they have the potential of completely compressing the 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4 -- or our evolutionary cycle of acquisition, cutting that time in half and correspondingly decreasing the expense that goes with it.

General Sullivan's Louisiana maneuvers makes use of information technology to not only enhance exercises, but also to try out new ideas, new weapons systems ideas. Through simulations, the Army can vary organizations, use different weapons, alter tactics, and make many changes to what works and what doesn't work.

The third area that we can apply simulation to is in support for our logistics operations. DESERT STORM showed the complexity of logistical support for operations far away from our normal base of support. But providing that support is a key requirement in the post- Cold War era, where we're looking at regional conflicts thousands of miles from our bases. In determining the logistics requirements and

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keeping track of the equipment as it moves these vast distances, is an information intensive exercise. And the new information technology is dying to be applied to that problem.

Industry is working closely with the Army to provide the tools that the Army needs to make improved use of the information technology and situation awareness and simulations and logistics support. But the impact of this information technology is reaching beyond even those applications. It's reaching beyond the area where industry and the Army interact. It goes right down to the factory floor into the engineering laboratories.

Indeed, it is affecting the heart of industry itself, which is the production of our equipment -- and that is the fourth application of information technology -- the general improvement of the design and the manufacturing process. Technology is being used to streamline design and acquisition processes and to make fundamental changes in the manufacturing process. We have talked for a decade about paperless manufacturing, and we are now beginning to do it. And we're not only doing the paperless manufacturing, but we are integrating into integrated product teams, the engineering and the manufacturing teams. And it is the computer, it is the information technology which is the glue which holds all of this together.

This approach will reduce production costs. It will reduce development times. And it is the most exciting -- of all of these four applications, it is the most exciting to apply in the next decade because we are on the verge of doing it, and it will

make enormous differences in the efficiency and the effectiveness of these operations. We have seen it being applied in some major programs. One which has received a fair amount of publicity is the Boeing design of the 777 passenger transport. The interesting thing about that program is not simply that you're using the information technology and not simply that you're using integrated product teams, but this is the only way they have of doing it. They do not have the old system. They do not have the paper back-up. They are betting the farm on this new technology working -- and working right the first time.

Now, in the '60s and the '70s, the defense sector developed the most critical technologies. But as we look forward into the '90s and beyond, we see that the defense sector is no longer the dominant producer of technology. And so, one of the things that is very different, one of the biggest changes we're going to have a head of us in the '90s, is that we have to somehow take advantage of the fact that the commercial sector is leading in the technologies which are most important to us.

The department's purchases, for example, account for less than 5 percent of the computer industry today -- the computer market today or the semi-conductor market today. So, we're no longer leading, we're no longer driving those markets. We have to figure out a way of getting on the shoulders of these industries and taking full advantage of them. And, in order to do that, we have to integrate a defense

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industrial base into the national industrial base. We can no longer afford to maintain these two different bases in splendid isolation from each other.

In order for you, in industry, to do that, we in the Defense Department have to remove the barriers that keep that from happening. The barriers are well known to you. There are unique contracting process for standards and specifications -- the so-called mil specs -- and the unique sort of security requirements we impose. These are formidable barriers. And I will commit to you that we're going to make a determined effort in this administration if not to remove them, at least to batter them down to size -- because those barriers separate us from quality commercial technology. They impose tremendous overhead and management costs. And therefore, our first order of business in managing the Defense Department is to find a way of reducing all three of those barriers.

I'd like to conclude by observing that, while technology -- this new technology will give us great advantages in the Army, that we have to understand that American interests can be threatened and Americans can be killed in a low-tech war just as they can in a high-tech war. And the Army must be prepared to deal with either. We see the challenges most clearly in Somalia. How does a high-tech Army deal with a low-tech force? Where are the mines? Where are the mortars? How do we locate ambushes? How do we tell the enemy from friends? And how do we attack the former while protecting the latter. The low-tech war challenge

drives home an important point. Technology changes many aspects of war, but one thing remains unchanged -- we cannot lose sight of the importance of discipline and courage of the individual soldier.

The untold story behind all of the headlines of that fierce fire- fight that took place in Mogadishu a few weeks ago is that the Rangers, operating in a hostile environment and outnumbered more than 10 to 1, demonstrated these superb qualities of discipline, skill, and courage. Indeed, in the face of these odds, they conducted -- successfully conducted -- their search and seizure mission, and they inflicted casualties on their attackers of perhaps ten times as high as the casualties they themselves suffered. Indeed, it can be said that they effectively disabled General Aidid's militia.

I would like to pay tribute to those courageous Rangers, as well as express a personal sense of loss at the casualties we suffered in that operation. Americans can be proud that today's Army is filled with professional, well-trained soldiers. The United States, today, truly has the finest Army in the world. To keep it that way, the Army and those in industry that support it must continue to seek to understand how the technological revolution is changing the way we will fight. But even more than that, the Army must sustain its leadership skills and its confident spirit.

Two-hundred-and-twelve years ago, yesterday, General George Washington accepted the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown --

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one of the U.S. Army's greatest victories. Shortly later, that same General Washington wrote -- and I quote -- ``Perseverance and spirit have done wonders in all ages.'' Well, perseverance and spirit will still do wonders for the Army in this information age.

I thank you. (Applause.)
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