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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Zimbabwe's UNOSOM Withdrawal (2 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: [UNOSOM II] (4 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: UNOSOM II Withdrawal Planning Meeting 14 Oct (4 pages)	10/15/1994	P1/b(1)
004. talking points	Draft Talking Points: U.S. Support of UNOSOM's Withdrawal (3 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Principals Committee Discussion Paper Addendum (1 page)	10/11/1994	P1/b(1)
006a. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting (1 page)	10/03/1994	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	Re: [UNOSOM Withdrawal] (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
006c. memo	Memorandum to the President, re: US Military Support of UNOSOM Withdrawal (3 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	Sean Darragh to Anthony Lake, re: Briefing Memorandum for Principals Meeting on Somalia (3 pages)	09/30/1994	P1/b(1)
007b. paper	[Duplicate of 006b] (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
007c. memo	[Duplicate of 006c] (3 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: Whose Assets Will Support UNOSOM's Withdrawal? (5 pages)	10/06/1994	P1/b(1)

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A**General Assembly**Distr.
GENERALA/49/492
7 October 1994

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Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 18**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES****Question of Western Sahara****Report of the Secretary-General**

1. The General Assembly, at its forty-eighth session, adopted, without a vote, resolution 48/49 on 10 December 1993, on the question of Western Sahara. The present report, which covers the period from 18 September 1993 to 30 September 1994, is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 6 of that resolution.
2. The Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), has continued to exercise his good offices with the parties concerned.
3. On 24 November 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report 1/ to the Security Council in which he provided an account of the further efforts which he and his Special Representative, Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan (Pakistan), had made during the preceding months in order to resolve the issues still standing in the way of the implementation of the settlement plan for Western Sahara. 2/
4. The Secretary-General recalled in his report 1/ the basic positions of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) regarding the compromise proposal on the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility, 3/ which he had put forward to the two parties during his visit to the mission area from 31 May to 4 June 1993. Explaining certain key provisions of his compromise proposal, he reiterated that those provisions were a sound point of departure for determining potential participation in the referendum. However, the Frente POLISARIO maintained its substantial reservations about the compromise, as it remained concerned about the possible inclusion, in the electorate, of members of some tribal units which it did not consider as existing in the Territory.

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5. The Security Council was informed that the Special Representative had explored the possibility of resuming the direct talks between the two parties which had been held in his presence in July 1993 at Laayoune. Encouraged by the interest shown by both sides and by the positive reaction of the Council, he had invited comments of the parties on the conditions and modalities for a second round. Ground rules for such a second round had been laid down in a memorandum of understanding dated 27 September 1993 addressed by the Special Representative to the two parties. It was eventually agreed that the talks would be resumed on 25 October 1993 in New York. While the memorandum of understanding gave to each party the right to choose the composition of its delegation, the presence of former POLISARIO officials in the Moroccan delegation was not considered by the Frente POLISARIO to be conducive to a propitious climate for dialogue. Under the circumstances, the meeting could not take place as scheduled.

6. The Secretary-General reported that, on 3 November 1993, the Chairman of the Identification Commission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Mr. Erik Jensen (Malaysia), had officially announced the launching of the process leading to the identification and registration of potential voters in the referendum. As a first step, the revised 1974 census lists and instructions for registration were to be published and made available to the population, and the application forms for participation in the referendum were to be distributed. The Identification Commission had prepared a supplement to the revised lists, adding the names of those individuals excluded from the 1991 revision because they had not reached 18 years of age at that time. On 19 November 1993, following a series of meetings with the Identification Commission, the Moroccan authorities had agreed to implement the initial stages foreseen in the work programme of the Commission. The revised lists of the 1974 census and supplement to the lists had thus been announced and made accessible to the population in Laayoune on 22 November 1993. On the same day, the Frente POLISARIO, which had indicated its readiness to begin the process as soon as similar action was taken on the Moroccan side, had taken steps, in consultation with the Commission, to make the revised lists available to the population in one refugee camp in the Tindouf area.

7. In the same report, 1/ the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the appointment of Brigadier-General André Van Baelen (Belgium) as Force Commander of MINURSO had been renewed on 1 October 1993 for an additional one-year period. Pending the fulfilment of the conditions necessary for the commencement of the transitional period in accordance with the settlement plan, the military mandate of MINURSO had remained restricted to monitoring and verifying the cease-fire in effect since 6 September 1991. Violations of the cease-fire had been without exception of a non-violent nature and thus had not resulted in casualties on either side.

8. The Security Council was also informed that the Police Commissioner, Colonel Jürgen Friedrich Reimann (Germany), had arrived in the mission area early in June 1993, followed by deployment of the Security (Civil Police) Unit of MINURSO. The main responsibility of the security component of MINURSO was to ensure that order was maintained in and around the identification and registration offices.

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9. In a letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General dated 6 December 1993, 4/ the members of the Council agreed that a compromise proposal referred to in his report 1/ was a sound framework for determining potential participation in the referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara as foreseen in the settlement plan. They welcomed his determination to move ahead and proceed with voter identification and registration. They reaffirmed the role of the Secretary-General as guarantor of an objective and impartial referendum and expected any difficulties with the compromise to be resolved by early 1994.

10. On 15 February 1994, in a statement read by his representative at the opening session of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Secretary-General said that Western Sahara continued to be of concern to the international community. The General Assembly had recently adopted, for the fifth time, a consensus resolution on the question. He expressed the firm belief that the unanimity over five consecutive years reflected the political will of the international community to bring about the final settlement of the conflict as quickly as possible (A/AC.109/PV.1429).

11. On 10 March 1994, the Secretary-General submitted a report 5/ to the Security Council in pursuance of Council resolution 809 (1993) of 2 March 1993, his previous report to the Council of 24 November 1993 1/ and the letter addressed to him by the President of the Security Council dated 6 December 1993. 4/

12. The Secretary-General reported that, during the preceding months, he and his Special Representative had held consultations at the highest level with the two parties, the two neighbouring countries and OAU to find ways of settling the remaining difficulties. The assurances provided by his Special Representative that objectivity and sound judgement would govern the Identification Commission at every stage of its work had thus far proved to be insufficient to allay the concerns of the Frente POLISARIO over the compromise proposal. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General remained confident that his proposals constituted a sound compromise and that they could be implemented in a fair and judicious manner. He observed that, in the meantime, applications for participation in the referendum had proceeded in Laayoune and the Tindouf area. However, the completion of the identification and registration process remained uncertain in the absence of agreement by the Frente POLISARIO to the compromise as a whole.

13. The Secretary-General recalled that, in the concluding remarks of the compromise text 3/ put forward to the two parties, he had pointed out that it could not, of course, be expected to meet all their concerns or conform entirely to their views. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the criteria and the procedures for verification represented a compromise between conflicting positions that was even-handed and fair. Furthermore, the text was aimed at establishing as judiciously as possible a Saharan electorate for determining the future of the Territory of Western Sahara.

14. The Secretary-General further recalled in his report 5/ that the goal of the settlement plan on which all were agreed was the holding of a free, fair and impartial referendum for the people of Western Sahara, organized and conducted

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by the United Nations in cooperation with OAU and without any military or administrative constraints. Four essential conditions had to be met for that goal to be achieved and for MINURSO to be able to carry out its responsibilities effectively and impartially; the support and backing of the Security Council; the full cooperation of the two parties; the cooperation and support of the neighbouring countries; and the necessary financial resources.

15. Taking fully into account the above observations, and in view of the decision of the Security Council, in its resolution 809 (1993), to ensure that the referendum took place without any further delays, the Secretary-General offered three options for the Council to consider. Under Option A, the United Nations would proceed to hold the referendum in December 1994 on the basis of the compromise proposal, regardless of the cooperation of either party. Under Option B, the Identification Commission would continue its work during a prescribed period, by the end of which the Council would review the progress achieved and decide on the next course of action for the fulfilment of the United Nations mandate for Western Sahara. Meanwhile, the United Nations would continue its efforts to obtain the cooperation of both parties on the basis of the compromise proposal. Under Option C, the Council would conclude that the cooperation of both parties in the completion of the identification and registration process could not be obtained and would decide either that the whole MINURSO operation should be phased out within a given time-frame or that the registration and identification process should be suspended but that a reduced United Nations military presence should be retained to encourage respect for the cease-fire.

16. On 29 March 1994, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 907 (1994), in which the Council agreed to the course of action outlined in Option B of the Secretary-General's report. 5/ In this course of action, the Identification Commission would analyse all applications received and proceed with the identification and registration of potential voters by 30 June 1994, on the basis of the compromise proposal on the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility, the terms of reference of the Identification Commission, and the relevant provisions of the settlement plan. The Council supported the Secretary-General's intention to continue efforts to obtain the cooperation of both parties and urged strict compliance with the timetable of Option B, with a view to holding the referendum by the end of 1994. The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council not later than 15 July 1994 on progress achieved in the work of the Commission as well as other aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the settlement plan.

17. In pursuance of the above resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on 12 July 1994. 6/ The Council was informed that the Chairman of the Identification Commission, Mr. Erik Jensen, had been appointed Deputy Special Representative on 15 March 1994. In conformity with the settlement plan, he was in charge of the Mission during any absence of the Special Representative from the Mission area. Upon the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 907 (1994), the Deputy Special Representative requested urgent meetings with both parties to discuss implementation of that resolution. In the course of these meetings, each party agreed to implement the provisions of the resolution. The Frente POLISARIO confirmed their agreement in a letter to the Deputy Special Representative dated 30 April 1994. In a letter to the

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Secretary-General dated 20 May 1994, His Majesty King Hassan II reiterated the commitment of the Government of Morocco to respect the deadlines set by the Security Council.

18. During the reporting period, application forms for participation in the referendum were provided to the parties, as requested, for distribution to potential voters. As requested by the Special Representative, both sides began delivering completed application forms to the Identification Commission in May 1994 to enable it to analyse the data received and start identifying and registering potential voters early in June. Meanwhile, clear procedures and guidelines were developed to assist the identification teams in their work. Information sheets were to be given to applicants, explaining the identification process step by step. The sheikhs and official observers, that is, representatives of the two parties and OAU, were also to be provided with written instructions defining their duties. As agreed in exchanges of letters between the Special Representative and the Government of Morocco, Frente POLISARIO and the Government of Algeria between May and October 1993, it was understood that, in the performance of their duties with the Identification Commission, the sheikhs and observers of the parties were accorded immunities and privileges under articles VI and VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

19. The Secretary-General observed in his report 6/ that the Identification Commission had focused its efforts on achieving the agreement and cooperation of both parties in order to proceed with the identification of potential voters. As a result, the Commission succeeded in completing, with the cooperation of the parties, all the necessary groundwork for launching the operation. The Commission was to have started identifying potential voters on 8 June 1994, with the assistance of the tribal chiefs (sheikhs) and in the presence of observers of the two parties and OAU. However, difficulties over the designation of OAU observers, described in the following paragraph, could not be resolved in time to enable the Commission to start as scheduled.

20. On 2 June 1994, a note verbale from MINURSO advised Morocco of the imminent start of the identification and registration operation and the participation of two OAU officials who had been designated as observers by the OAU secretariat in August 1993 on instructions from the then Chairman of OAU. Morocco was also advised that those observers would be accorded immunities and privileges in accordance with articles VI and VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 8 June 1994, the Prime Minister of Morocco confirmed the agreement of his Government to the observers' immunities and privileges. However, he reiterated the position of his Government that they should be designated personally by the current Chairman of OAU, as expressed in a previous letter to the Secretary-General dated 19 August 1993. He specified that they should not be officials of the OAU secretariat. Questioning the impartiality of that organization, he said Morocco had hoped that OAU would, at the very least, have suspended membership of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)" until completion of the referendum.

21. In response to a note verbale from MINURSO dated 8 June 1994, the Frente POLISARIO accepted on 11 June 1994 the status conferred on the OAU observers.

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The POLISARIO leadership subsequently stressed that the identification operation could only begin with an OAU presence.

22. In order to overcome the difficulty over the OAU observers, the Secretary-General held extensive consultations with the current Chairman and the Secretary-General of OAU and with other interested parties. In letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia and the Secretary-General of OAU dated 17 June 1994, he drew the attention of President Ben Ali and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim to the position of Morocco on the question. Under the circumstances and in order not to delay further the beginning of the identification and registration operation, he invited President Ben Ali, in his capacity as current Chairman of OAU, to designate his representatives as soon as possible, in consultation with the Secretary-General of OAU.

"23." In the same report, 6/ the Secretary-General provided an overview of the main elements of the settlement plan, and activities undertaken or to be undertaken accordingly. He recalled that the plan provided for a transitional period starting on D-Day, during which the United Nations would have sole and exclusive responsibility for the organization and conduct of the referendum. All prisoners of war from both sides would be released under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Moroccan troops in the Territory would be reduced to a level not exceeding 65,000 and, with limited exceptions, would be located in static or defensive positions along the same wall. The POLISARIO troops would be confined to locations designated by the Special Representative. All Saharan political prisoners and detainees would be released. Laws or measures which could obstruct the conduct of a free and fair referendum would be suspended. A referendum commission would be established to assist the Special Representative in the organization and conduct of the referendum. Those Western Saharans who were identified as eligible to vote in the referendum and who wished to return to the Territory to do so would be repatriated under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The referendum, by which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco, would be held 24 weeks after D-Day and its results proclaimed within 72 hours.

24. The Secretary-General indicated in his report 6/ that he intended, in subsequent weeks, to give priority to the conclusion of a code of conduct and the confinement of troops in designated locations. On the assumption that the Identification Commission would soon be able to proceed with the identification and registration of potential voters, and that the Security Council subsequently decided to hold the referendum, it was also the Secretary-General's intention to recommend in his next report that the transitional period should start on 1 October 1994 and that the referendum should take place on 14 February 1995.

25. In a statement made by its President on 29 July 1994, 7/ the Security Council noted that, in the light of delays in the registration process, the Secretary-General had proposed a revised timetable for the organization and conduct of the referendum on 14 February 1995. The Council looked forward to his next report, at the end of August 1994, on the basis of which it hoped to be able to take appropriate decisions on the organization and timing of the referendum. It welcomed the goodwill shown by the parties thus far and urged them to continue to cooperate with the Secretary-General and MINURSO to ensure the earliest possible implementation of the settlement plan.

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26. As a result of his consultations, the Secretary-General received a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia on 23 July 1994, in which President Ben Ali provided a "unique and indivisible" list of four OAU observers, comprising the two observers previously designated and two others. Subsequently, the Identification Commission planned to start identifying and registering potential voters on 8 August 1994. However, owing to the unavailability of one newly designated OAU observer and delays in the arrival of his replacement in the Mission area, the operation did not begin until 28 August.

27. From 28 to 31 August 1994, the Identification Commission identified the first 400 applicants, who were members of two tribal subgroups with which the Commission had decided, in consultation with the parties, to start the process. The operation was conducted with the assistance of the sheikhs concerned and in the presence of the observers of the two parties and OAU. It took place simultaneously at the identification and registration centres set up in Laayoune and one refugee camp in the Tindouf area. During the process, the observers of the parties and OAU were of the general view that the operation had been conducted with appropriate transparency and rigour. The Deputy Special Representative also noted the degree of cooperation between all parties concerned. The operation had to be adjourned on 1 September 1994 because of previous official commitments of one OAU observer, but was resumed on 21 September. Meanwhile, the Identification Commission continued to computerize and analyse the 81,500 completed application forms it had collected thus far. In a letter to the parties dated 21 September 1994, the Deputy Special Representative set 15 October 1994 as the deadline for the receipt of applications. As of 30 September, the Identification Commission had identified a total of about 1,400 potential voters.

28. On the basis of the above, the submission of the next report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in pursuance of Council resolution 907 (1994) of 29 March 1994 has been deferred to the second half of October 1994. As indicated in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 29 July 1994, 1/ it is expected that the Security Council will then be able to take appropriate decisions on the organization and timing of the referendum.

Notes

- 1/ S/26797.
- 2/ S/21360 and S/22464.
- 3/ S/26185, annex I.
- 4/ S/26848.
- 5/ S/1994/283.
- 6/ S/1994/819.
- 7/ S/PRST/1994/39.



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Lessons Learned from SomaliaAn American Perspective

by Linton Wells II and Stuart J.D. Schwartzstein

Overview

From the U.S. point of view, the peace operations in Somalia produced two major lessons, among others:

- Operations must be well defined and tied to clear goals, objectives and exit criteria, and
- Use of military forces must be closely coordinated with political, economic and humanitarian efforts.

These lessons were embodied in a comprehensive Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on multilateral peace operations signed by President Clinton on May 3, 1994. This review addresses some of the lessons learned from the U.S. experience in Somalia, outlines their influence on the development of the Presidential directive, and then examines how these lessons have been applied in Rwanda and Haiti, as well as in Bosnia.

Background of the Somalia Intervention

The civil war and anarchy in Somalia which so devastated that country in 1992 had its origins some four years earlier in a challenge to President Mohamed Siad Barre's authoritarian and corrupt regime in 1988. In that year, clans in the north of Somalia declared their open opposition to Siad, to which the regime responded with brutal force. The long-simmering resentment of Siad, the members of his clan who had handsomely profited from his rule, and the other kleptocrats in his thrall came to a boil and by January, 1991 Siad and his supporters were forced to flee the capital, Mogadishu. A number of clan-based faction leaders, often referred to as "warlords," attempted to fill the resulting power vacuum. As violence increased in Somalia, particularly in and near Mogadishu, the ever-fragile economy collapsed and even subsistence farming and animal husbandry suffered serious disruption. Food and other supplies were controlled by the strongest forces. Looting, theft and killing became commonplace.

Even without conflict, Somalia has always been one of the poorest countries in the world.¹ The land is dry savanna, but much of it has been able to support relatively sparse populations at subsistence levels through grazing herds of sheep, goats and camels, except in years of drought.² The two riverine regions are fertile enough for agricultural production, but even in years when water is

¹Somalia's poverty and low level of development have been indicated in a variety of reports and using a number of indices. The 1994 Human Development Index published by the United Nations Development Program ranked Somalia 165th — close to the bottom of the list of countries in the world. The "International Human Suffering Index" published annually by the Population Crisis Committee (now Population Action International) has annually placed Somalia among those countries with "extreme human suffering."

²Stuart J.D. Schwartzstein. "Population, Population Growth and Land Use in Somalia," paper presented at the Rene Dubos Center for Human Environments Forum on Population, Environment and Development, September 1993. A short version of the paper was printed in Earth Times, November 5, 1993.

plentiful, they have not produced enough to feed Somalia's population.³ There are no known minerals worth extracting, and other natural resources of value have not been discovered, though there have been rumors of potential oil fields. Since independence in 1960, Somalia has received the highest level of foreign assistance per capita in Africa; yet it remains one of the poorest countries on that continent.⁴ (Indeed, in the mid-1970s the average per capita income was estimated at \$150 annually; by the late 1980s the estimate had fallen to about \$120 annually.)

As the economy has stagnated, the population has grown. In the period between independence and the humanitarian crisis of 1991-1992, the average annual population growth rate was on the order of 2.6 or 2.7%. This resulted not only in rapid and almost-chaotic urbanization, but also in a very young population (more than 50% are age 20 or younger) with little chance of education, training and eventual employment. One might see the seeds of conflict in the decline in the resource base and the increase in population alone.⁵

The depth of the divisions among Somalis, as well as the bitterness and intensity of the conflict, surprised many observers who have noted that Somalis are

³Population data for Somalia are estimates and while significant differences exist, particularly with respect to overall numbers, most estimates place the total population of Somalia at over 7 million and a net annual population increase of 2.6 percent or more. The question of "carrying capacity" is even less precise, but most estimates suggest Somalia would be hard pressed to support a population of over six million.

⁴Over the last decade, Somalia's deteriorating economic situation and increasing dependence on foreign aid was reported occasionally by various writers, such as Edward Theberton, whose article "Muddling into Misery" appeared in *The Spectator* (London), July 27, 1985.

⁵There is increasing interest in considering the role of environmental degradation, resource scarcities and population growth in conflict situations. There have been several noteworthy articles by Thomas F. Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto, such as "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Case" in the Summer, 1994 issue of *International Security*. Population as a threat to stability was also discussed in, for example, Michael S. Teitelbaum, "The Population Threat" in the Winter, 1992/93 issue of *Foreign Affairs*; more recently, the highly pessimistic article by Robert D. Kaplan, entitled "The Coming Anarchy" in the February, 1994 issue of *The Atlantic Monthly* is another example of current thinking of the links between population, environment and resource scarcities.

(with a few minor exceptions) homogeneous in race, language, religion and ethnicity. The traditional divisions within Somali society are by lineage groups ("clan" and "clan family") which, unlike tribal divisions, are exogamous [marrying outside clan group] and similar in virtually all cultural aspects. Nonetheless, rivalries between individuals, families, clans and clan families are intense; perhaps more so than between most ethnically different groups comprising the same nation state. Lineage identification in Somalia is all important, a fact which poses serious problems for any form of political reconciliation and makes for highly complex, convoluted political situations even at the best of times.⁶

Even now, it is not entirely clear either why Somali society (and the "social contract" making governance possible) so disintegrated or how the deep fissures within Somali society can be bridged, at least enough to permit some reconstitution of a civil society. There were many factors in addition to clan and sub-clan rivalries: the greed and ambition of the "warlords," the damage done by the more than 20-year authoritarian and, at times, brutal rule of Siad Barre; endemic poverty; the disparity between scant resources and a rapidly growing population; the tradition of violence; and the lack of employment, particularly among the young men of the country. None alone seems to hold the answers -- no doubt all of those are factors, but the flash points are not entirely apparent.⁷

⁶Said Samatar in his chapter in the Library of Congress' *Somalia: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C., 1993) noted the difficulty of Somalia society adapting itself to democratic government: "Lineage segmentation of the Somali variety inherently militates against the evolution and endurance of a stable, centralized state. Although exacerbated by Siad Barre's exploitation of interclan rivalries, institutional instability is actually woven into the fabric of Somali society."

⁷Considerable background information can be found in I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia*, Longman, London & New York, 1965, 1980. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, *Somalia: A Country Study*, op.cit., also contains a good deal of valuable information. Useful data can be found as well in issues of the *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, published bi-monthly by the Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, Sweden.

However, it is critical that we understand the dynamics of conflict in situations such as Somalia as we examine: (1) when and where peacekeeping operations are appropriate and feasible, (2) what kinds of commitments -- of troops, humanitarian aid, and other assistance -- are likely to be necessary, and (3) what risks are involved. Indeed, a better understanding of such dynamics may be most important in identifying problem situations before they become violent and while efforts such as mediation and diplomatic or economic pressure can obviate a need later for peacekeeping forces.⁸

In this view, the experience in Somalia has reinforced for many in the U.S. Government the importance of understanding other cultures and other societies, and appreciating the importance of local values, conditions and procedures. Even the amount of time that we, as Americans, think should be necessary for discussions or negotiations may be different in other societies. Drawing again from our experience in Somalia, it now seems apparent that those who said that it would likely require many months, if not years, for the Somalis to achieve even a modus vivendi were closer to the mark than those who felt that it could be achieved in short order.⁹

Americans must find a way to balance their impatience and desire to reach solutions quickly with these transnational realities. There is a high likelihood that

⁸In the case of Somalia, the former Special Representative of the Secretary, General Mohamed Sahnoun, believes that there were missed opportunities for mediation and other actions by the UN in 1988 and 1989 that could well have forestalled the later tragedy. Similar comments have been made about Yugoslavia, prior to the break-up. See Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 1994.

⁹In an October 15, 1993 column in the Guardian (U.K.) Somalia expert, Professor I.M. Lewis pointed out that "There is a huge culture gap between them (UNOSOM) and the Somalis and a marked lack of effective dialogue." It is interesting that Professor Lewis, in 1993, came to the view that political reconciliation could best be achieved under a UN trusteeship. This, in good part, stems from his view that the process of political reconciliation will take a very long time, a view shared by a number of knowledgeable observers."

Americans will find themselves disappointed and disillusioned when their efforts to find quick remedies to a situation fail.

U.S. Experience in Somalia

In late November, 1992, President Bush offered to send U.S. forces to Somalia to secure the delivery of humanitarian relief to thousands of starving Somalis. By that time, it was clear that the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia (United Nations Operation in Somalia or UNOSOM) had not been successful, and there was not likely to be any respite in the conflict which caused the famine. Indeed, it was clear by then that the fighting was intensifying, starvation was rampant, and there was little likelihood that humanitarian assistance efforts could resume without a major military intervention.¹⁰ On December 3, 1992 the Security Council (in Resolution 794) endorsed the U.S. proposal and provided the legal basis for the U.S. - led military intervention in Somalia called "Operation Restore Hope" (this coalition also had the United Nations name of Unified Task Force or UNITAF).

U.S. forces landed in Somalia on December 9, 1992, amidst extensive news coverage. The immediate goals of the operation were straightforward: (1) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible, and (2) to help international relief agencies to distribute enough food to halt the famine that then was killing thousands of Somalis per day.¹¹

¹⁰An (unclassified) State Department analysis by Vincent J. Farley in August, 1992 noted: "No amount of emergency aid to Somalia can succeed in stopping starvation unless it is backed by a political solution to the problem of lawlessness." He went on to note that "The fighting has destroyed agriculture, infrastructure and trade, and the economic collapse fuels looting and banditry that are often beyond the warlords' control."

¹¹The kind of thinking behind the U.S. intervention at that time is illustrated by an (unclassified) state Department memorandum drafted by Anne Reid in the Intelligence and Research Bureau noting the views

Security Council Resolution 794, while authorizing U.S. military intervention in Somalia, continued to demand that Somali parties cease the violence, reaffirmed that the responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction was that of the Somali people themselves, and reiterated the need for a political settlement, for which the Secretary General and his Special Representative were asked to continue efforts.

The U.S. public may have been little aware of the nature of the Somalia conflict or the years of civil war, but by late 1992, it was well aware of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. News coverage was extensive, with scenes of death, starvation and disease brought into virtually every American home. In this context, the U.S. military intervention seemed well supported by the U.S. people. As importantly, the dispatch of U.S. troops to Somalia in December, 1992 was supported in the Congress.

The U.S. commitment -- in terms of troops, civilian involvement and a high-profile American presence in Somalia -- was intended by the Bush Administration neither to be open-ended, nor to include broad mandates for political reconciliation, reconstruction or repair of the shattered state. It was meant to address a crisis situation in which earlier, multilateral efforts (UNOSOM) had been unsuccessful. Although many questioned the feasibility or practicality of President Bush's original goal to have U.S. forces out by Inauguration day (January 20, 1993), the U.S. clearly intended to turn the operation over to the UN within a matter of months. (Indeed, in the weeks following the sending of troops to Somalia much of the discussion within the U.S. government was on exit criteria,

of a panel of experts which included two former U.S. ambassadors to Somalia. The emphasis was on outside intervention "to ward off one to two million deaths from starvation or disease."

timing, and the ways in which the U.S. could turn operations over to a second multilateral force.)

After several months of negotiations, a plan was announced to transition to U.N. control by April 1993. However, because arrangements were not yet in place, this was postponed.

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- Despite the
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- Unity of effort suffered from coalition differences most importantly in interpretation of mission. There should have been greater emphasis on common understanding and agreement with respect to goals and methods.
- There were fundamental problems in implementing the UNOSOM goal of disarming the factions. Most importantly, the multilateral forces under UNOSOM did not have adequate strength to achieve such a goal: considerably more assets would have been needed, particularly if all factions not just one or two were to have been disarmed. But if the goal was unrealistic, it was also one that, currently, was seen as addressing

the major impediment to both political reconciliation and reconstruction and to humanitarian missions. The widespread availability of arms within Somalia and the continued attempts by factions to gain advantage by force of arms made it clear that without reducing the level of violence little real change would be possible. This fact created additional pressures to pursue a goal that was unrealistic. But by May, as the US saw itself in a supporting and sustaining role rather than a lead role it did not insist on a more careful and realistic ratio of goals and capabilities.

- The multilateral command structure was awkward and cumbersome and not conducive to effective operations, especially when combined with the wide range of both views and capabilities present among the participating national contingents. Local commanders felt that they could not respond quickly enough, and coordination between national forces was neither as effective nor as rapid as it should have been. Perhaps more importantly, ambiguities in the UNOSOM II mandate, together with the command and control structure, led to contentious situations between some commanders and acrimonious exchanges among several capitals over the conduct of operations.
- The U.N.'s approach to political reconciliation, was seen by many Somalis as an effort to force faction/clan leaders (like Aideed) to accept the imposition of a foreign political formula, as well as UN decision-making, in areas traditionally left to states themselves such as in the decision by UNOSOM to consider the 1962 Somali penal code to be

back in effect.¹² (At the same time, it must be acknowledged that there was no Somali state to make decisions, so the U.N. was left to innovate in many cases.)

- The lack of clear-cut roles for the Special Representative of the Secretary General (in 1993, Adm Howe), the various senior U.N. officials, and the representatives of the United States and other countries, led to both confusion and conflict.

The political arrangements which could be put in place for rebuilding Somalia remained ambiguous. Indeed, it is fair to say that there was no well-delineated formula for a political settlement which could be used as a goal for measuring progress.¹³ The Addis Ababa meetings of clan leaders in March 1993 produced a plan for a political settlement which many supported in principle, but whose implementation proved difficult.¹⁴ To compound the problem, Security Council Resolution 814 of March 26, 1993, called for the disarming of factions, and political reconciliation, but ignored the fact that the resources necessary for such a task were beyond those available to either UNITAF -- soon to hand over its mission -- or UNOSOM II. At the same time, to a significant degree the problem lay in the fact that there was a serious question of whether or not faction/clan

¹²Report of Matthew M.S.W. Ngulube, Chief Justice of Zambia and Chairman of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, March 1994. This is a separate issue from the decision to use military power to "hunt down" Aideed after his attack on U.N. peace keepers. Those operations were intended to marginalize him and his operation, not to improve a foreign political formula by military force.

¹³NPR African affairs correspondent Sunni Khalid wrote in the Baltimore Sun of November 12, 1993 that "The concept of central government was discredited during the Siad Barre regime which was seen as corrupt, parasitic and oppressive. No political figure is acceptable to all clans and factions; no one can realistically claim to be president of Somalia..."

¹⁴I.M. Lewis however saw the Addis agreement as possibly dangerous, paving the way for the Mogadishu warlords to "manipulate" UNOSOM and thereby frustrating the peace process and rehabilitation of Somalia. (Private communication, April 5, 1993.)

leaders such as Aideed should or could be involved in any political reconciliation process. To include such warlords posed several problems including the possibility of their subverting the reconciliation process and of the UN conferring legitimacy on them. To exclude them, however, was to run the risk of making the UN their enemy and to force them -- in order to retain power -- to confrontations. There was no satisfactory answer.

During the spring of 1993, it became evident that efforts at political reconciliation were neither progressing far, nor were they even leading to the kinds of conditions that would permit a withdrawal of UN forces without again leaving the country in a state of anarchy, civil war and, no doubt, humanitarian crisis. Nonetheless, at that time, opinion polls still showed that the U.S. public support for the operation.¹⁵ Moreover, Somali political reconciliation still was a key goal for the U.S. and the U.N.--as only that could make possible long-term improvements--even if progress was not encouraging

To compound the problem, for the UNOSOM II mission as a whole there were established neither clear criteria for success, nor "milestones" by which to mark progress. This ultimately made UNOSOM efforts difficult to justify not only to the Somalis, but also to the public in the United States (and in other countries with forces there), especially as the costs and casualties began to rise. For many Somalis, occupation by foreign forces was increasingly seen as less a humanitarian mission than a new era of colonialism -- and Somali xenophobia, never far from

¹⁵ According to Andrew Kohut and Robert Toth ("The People, the Press and the Use of Force," August 1994 paper for the Aspen Strategy Group) even in June, 1993 two-thirds of the American public approved of UN efforts against a warlord. Nonetheless, U.S. political support should not be seen as having extended to political reconciliation efforts. Even in December 1992 -- before public impatience set in -- the Gallup Poll reported a 2-t-1 margin in favor of limiting the U.S. role to delivering relief supplies in Somalia. (Gallup Survey # GO 322036, Dec. 1992 poll for CNN/USA Today).

the surface, was effectively exploited by Aideed (and other faction leaders when tactically advantageous).

A key factor in subsequent developments was that the UNOSOM charter also included a security role, which was necessary to protect the lives of the U.S. and the U.N. troops who, in turn, were trying to save Somali lives, even if that was not appreciated by a number of Somalis. Several Somali faction leaders — Aideed in particular — exploited the fears and suspicions of many Somalis that the role of UNOSOM in attempting to protect lives was a pretext for an occupation or taking sides in an internal conflict. Whether later actions by clan leaders were motivated by a sense that they were being cut out of the process, or simply a matter of attempting to gain tactical advantage by playing on Somali xenophobia is not clear. But the absence of an inclusive political dialogue ultimately led to a perception by too many Somalis that the U.N. had taken sides in the internal conflict. This, in turn, cost U.N. forces the protection which might have been provided by being seen by Somalis as maintaining neutrality and impartiality.

Thus, when supporters of faction leader Mohammed Farah Aideed attacked and killed some 24 Pakistani troops (as well as wounding 57 Pakistanis, three Americans and killing one Italian) on June 5, 1993, conditions were ripe for another cycle of violence. This, in turn, led to a new U.N. resolution, and to a shift in the de facto goal of UNOSOM II from feeding people and re-building the country to capturing Aideed and his key supporters.

From the perspective of hindsight, the net result was that the military objectives of the U.N. operation began to diverge from the fundamentally humanitarian goals of the U.S.-led mission which had been presented to the

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American public and the Congress many months earlier. In the wake of the June 5 attack, U.S. forces were augmented in the summer of 1993, and their mission was directed increasingly against Aideed and his supporters. Continued frustration culminated in the decision in late August to deploy a significantly more powerful unit known as Task Force Ranger. Meanwhile, Aideed was vilified in U.N. -- and in U.S. statements -- although it seemed to some observers that the shift in focus was creating a Somali national hero. At the same time, Aideed's escapes and taunts not only made the U.S. forces there seem lacking in effectiveness, but also called further into question the reasons for the continued presence of U.S. troops in that country -- troops whose morale, as reported in the U.S. press, was deteriorating.

Throughout this process there was not adequate appreciation for the changes in the context of the mission itself -- that the environment for peacekeeping in Somalia had changed and was continuing to change. Towards the end of the summer, U.S. policy began to reemphasize efforts to find a political solution to Somalia's problems, but little progress had been made by early October.

As a result, when the fighting on October 3, 1993 took eighteen American lives, there was surprise in many quarters at the scope and focus which our operations had taken, and questions around concerning what else could be expected if the presence of U.S. forces continued. In the absence of a public or Congressional mandate, support for our presence in Somalia -- already much eroded by the seemingly unending conflict in a distant place in which the people seemed hostile to our efforts to help them -- quickly crumbled. Under intense public and media pressure, Congress set a date for the termination of the U.S. military presence.

The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)

The events in Somalia cannot and should not be viewed in isolation -- either from the greatly changed international politics in the post-Cold War world, nor from the global demands (current and potential) on the United Nations and the major powers for peacekeeping, peace enforcement or humanitarian operations.¹⁶

The decisions on deployments to Somalia during the summer of 1993 were tempered by the prospects that a peace settlement in Bosnia also might lead to significant U.S. troop commitments there, as well as the fact that there might be deployments to Haiti, spurred by the October 30, 1993 expiration of the Governor's Island accords. If these pending commitments made U.S. decision-makers very wary of "mission creep" in Somalia, the firestorm of controversy in the wake of the October 3 fighting, coupled with the prospect of continuing demands for peace keepers and peace enforcement missions, made U.S. policy makers determined to draw careful lessons from the Somali experience which could be applicable elsewhere. Among the most valuable were:

- goals, objectives and exit criteria must be clear, must be realistic, and must be consistent with available resources;
- an integrated political - military - humanitarian and economic strategy is necessary;

¹⁶In his February, 1994 Atlantic Monthly article "The Coming Anarchy," Robert D. Kaplan notes -- correctly, in our view -- that "scarcer resources will place a great strain on many peoples who never had much of a democratic or institutional tradition to begin with". Somalis, with a scant nine years of democracy in their entire history, clearly can be seen as one such people -- and as resources, at least on a per capita basis, continue to decline, the ability to reconstitute a democratic government may well decrease.

- it must be clear what the U.N. can and cannot do at this point in time;
- there must be a constant reassessment of the mission in response to events;
- personnel must have training appropriate to the circumstances

These conclusions corresponded very well with the emerging draft policy on peace operations, which was finalized as a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) in May 1994.

The primary purpose of the PDD is to ensure that the U.S. supports, uses and participates in peace operations selectively and effectively. In addition to providing guidelines as to when to engage in peace operations, it also provides guidelines regarding U.S. support for new peace operations. It states the U.S. will first consider whether each peace operation has (1) a clear mandate and a specified time-frame tied to intermediate or final objectives, (2) realistic criteria for ending the operation and (3) an integrated political-military strategy, well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts.

Specifically, the PDD addresses six major areas for improvement and reform:

- Making disciplined and well-analyzed choices about which peace operations to support;
- Reducing U.S. costs for U.N. peace operations
- Defining U.S. policy regarding command and control of U.S. military forces participating in multilateral peace operations;
- Reforming and improving the U.N.'s capability to manage peace operations;
- Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations;

- Creating better relations between the Executive Branch, the Congress and the American public with respect to U.S. support and participation in peace operations.

The Presidential Directive also mandates that when U.S. forces are to participate in such U.N. operations, the U.S. Government will consider whether:

- participation advances U.S. interests and that there is an international community of interest to deal with the problem multilaterally;
- there are clear objectives and an understanding of the nature of the mission and the means to accomplish the mission are available -- including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission;
- both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered commensurate with the interests at stake;
- domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled;
- command and control arrangements are acceptable.

In proposing a number of measures to increase the effectiveness of UN peace operations, including managerial reforms and budgetary changes, the directive reflects the U.S. view that if peace operations are to be successful -- both domestically and multi-nationally -- both the effectiveness and the image of U.N. peace operations must be improved. Cost-benefit ratios also must be improved. (In addition, in light of increased wealth in a variety of countries around the world, the U.S. believes that our assessment for peace operations should be reduced from its current level of over 30% to 25%.)

Applications of Lessened Learned from Somalia

The Somalia experience made the U.S. government determined to make the best use of the lessons which were learned, and several recent situations have provided test cases. Some of the issues pre-date both the Somalia intervention and the PDD, and these are not perfect case studies. For example, the Clinton Administration's commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti dates from statements made by then-candidate Clinton in the 1992 campaign. Moreover, the U.S. agreed to support the monitoring of a peace agreement in Bosnia before the PDD was drafted. Nevertheless, the combination of this Somali lesson learned and the PDD has provided guidelines for decision-making. As noted earlier, the factors for consideration are not immutable rules -- many factors play in government decisions.

Rwanda:

The appalling massacres in Rwanda, the bloody ethnic conflict, civil war, refugee flows and attendant disease and further conflict certainly commanded global attention. No doubt the reactions of most people were that "this must be stopped." But the question of whether the U.N. should intervene militarily, cannot be answered solely on that basis of whether we are witnessing a tragedy, even one of major proportions. These considerations themselves reflect the framework which was being put in place even as the Somalia experience was unfolding.

In the case of Rwanda, it seemed that even if foreign forces could intervene to stem a good deal of the violence, the costs of doing so would be very high. Tragic though the situation was, it was difficult to gain an international consensus on the need for the use of force to stop it, or to find those willing to provide deploying forces as part of a U.N. operation. Moreover, the conditions were not

the sort to which the U.S. would likely support the deployment of troops -- a seemingly intractable conflict in a distant place where there was a high degree of risk and in which not only was success doubtful, but any engagement also could require an open-ended commitment. More importantly, perhaps, the goals and objectives of a UN peace enforcement operation were not readily apparent. No integrated political-military-humanitarian strategy was articulated for Rwanda.

So long as the situation on the ground in Rwanda was chaotic, U.S. forces were deployed only for humanitarian relief. However, shortly thereafter, when the situation in Rwanda improved, the U.S. also helped provide air flights, equipment, and services in strengthening the U.N. forces there. Nevertheless, once the immediate situation in the refugees camps had been stabilized, and the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) forces deployed, U.S. forces were withdrawn. We will, however, continue to provide support as appropriate to humanitarian efforts.

Haiti:

The proximity of Haiti to the U.S., the pressure of flows of refugees, the importance of stability in the Caribbean and, most of all, our commitment to democracy, argued strongly for both involvement to help end human rights abuses in the country and the search for a solution to the Haitian political crisis. The U.S. presence in Haiti, under the United Nations Security Council mandate, reflects our attempt to ensure that the PDD guidelines are followed. The political, military and humanitarian objectives are integrated and under constant, and high level review to ensure past lessons learned are reflected in our actions.

Bosnia:

The devastating, bitter, and seemingly intractable conflict in Bosnia could pose a serious threat to international peace and security — particularly in Europe, the security of which is vital to U.S. national interests. But even if one accepts that assessment, more importantly, there is not adequate international support to resolve the matter and, indeed, there are serious differences among European states. Prior to the promulgation of the PDD, the U.S. had agreed to introduce troops to Bosnia only if a peace agreement was reached voluntarily by all sides to the conflict. Any actual commitment of U.S. forces there also will be carefully reviewed according to the guidelines of U.S. policy.

Summary

We have learned many lessons from our experience in Somalia. We have become much more mindful that the finite resources available for peace operations demand hard-headed and coldly analytical reviews of those multilateral peace operations in which we participate. The Presidential Decision Directive provides a number of factors to be considered in making such decisions. The U.S. government is well aware that the key criterion of U.S. interest must be satisfied and explained before the commitment of U.S. resources. Beyond that, much of what we have learned relates to the conditions of U.S. participation — the practicality and feasibility of such engagement, and the kinds of arrangements (including command and control plans) necessary to make effective use of U.S. military assets. The lessons from Somalia also have highlighted the need for clear-cut — and realistic — goals and objectives, for an integrated political-military-humanitarian strategy, and for a continual reassessment of our goals and objectives in light of changing circumstances.

Although the PDD addresses multilateral actions, we remain mindful that the U.S. must be willing and able to act unilaterally, where our interests dictate -- to fight and win wars where and when necessary. UN peace operations, valuable as they are, cannot substitute for this capability. Used selectively and carefully, however, they can take us closer to a world in which unilateral action is less necessary and, we hope, in which discussion and negotiation take the place of violent conflict.

APPENDIX A

Factors to be Considered Concerning Peace Operations

The Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:

- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on multilateral basis.
- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
 - International aggression, or;
 - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence;
 - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence.
- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a cease-fire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.
- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

In addition, using the factors above, the U.S. will continue to scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. The U.S. will also consider voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing to meet established objective in order to free that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.

ii. Participating in UN and Other Peace Operations

The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operation. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:

- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Zimbabwe's UNOSOM Withdrawal (2 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4148

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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002. cable	Re: [UNOSOM II] (4 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
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Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
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003. cable	Re: UNOSOM II Withdrawal Planning Meeting 14 Oct (4 pages)	10/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4148

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

For Susan
from
Sean

WASHFAX RECEIPT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

94 OCT 18 P3 19

Sanalika

Hill

MESSAGE NO. 012286 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 3

FROM: Stevenson McIlvaine AF/E 64644 5240.
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Sean Darragh	456-9261	302
OSD	Vince Kern	697-9753	4B747

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 01/10/16

2012-0659-F

S/S Officer: _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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004. talking points	Draft Talking Points: U.S. Support of UNOSOM's Withdrawal (3 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4148

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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→ Sean**IO/UNP****UNCLASSIFIED FAX**

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FROM:**GREG STANTON****TO:**

David Shinn	AF	7-0810-2120
Susan Rice	NSC	456-9360
Balbeer Sihra	IO/PHO	7-4006
Barry Schutz	OSD/PKPE/SR	703-693-0519
Col. Al Piotter	JCS	703-697-0255
Chuck Ikins	OSD/ISA/AFR	703-695-4620
Joan Donahue	L/AF	6-7115
George Taft		
Leslie Bassett	P/AF	7-4780

SUBJECT: Somalia

SOMALIA: GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION

1. The lack of progress in the peace process and on national reconciliation among Somalis, taken together with the lack of Somali co-operation over security issues, make continuation of a UN peacekeeping mission (UNOSOM) beyond March 1995, the date already foreseen for termination of that mission, fruitless.
2. This will imply an orderly and progressive phasing out of the military activities of UNOSOM in advance of that date. Somali lack of co-operation with that process is more likely to accelerate than to retard it.
3. The United Nations will be ready to sustain a facilitating or mediating political role beyond March 1995 if that is what the Somalis want.
4. The United Nations will continue to work with regional organisations, in particular the OAU, and with the governments of neighbouring countries to promote reconciliation in Somalia and the re-emergence of a civil society there.
5. The United Nations will do its best to sustain humanitarian activities through Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organisations to do likewise. But their ability to do so will depend almost entirely on the degree of co-operation and security offered by Somalis.

OCT-18-94 WED 05:28

10/UNP

FAX NO. 202 646 4179

P.03

10. 17. 04 10.18 FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK

TO

94154415 P.003/005

6. The United Nations will remain ready to provide through its various agencies rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance if the situation in Somalia develops in such a way as to make that practicable.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

OCT-14-94 SAT 13:57
10. 14. 84

IO/UNP

03:10 PM

FAX NO. 202 646 4179

P. 02

*U. S.

MISSION TO U. N. P02

→ Sauvalia

The President of the Security Council presents his compliments to the members of the Council and has the honour to transmit herewith, for their information,

copies of a letter dated 12 October 1994 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Gambia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

14 October 1994

MISSION PERMANENTE D'OBSERVATION
DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'UNITÉ AFRICAINE
AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES



PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO
THE UNITED NATIONS

346 EAST 50TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
TELEPHONE (212) 319-3490 TELEX 425084 ORQA UT
TELEFAX (212) 319-7135

NY/OAU/POL/89/655/94

12 October 1994

Mr. President,

1. The African Group after a thorough review and assessment of the situation in Somalia has decided to communicate its concerns to the relevant authorities of the United Nations.

2. In doing so the Group wishes to express its deep appreciation to the International Community especially to the United Nations, for its commitment, generosity and patience in responding to the crisis in Somalia, thus averting a humanitarian disaster.

3. The African Group is of the view that despite the slow pace of national reconciliation and political settlement, some significant progress has been made in as much as inter-clan fighting has receded and the Somali faction leaders are now on talking terms as opposed to a year ago. In view of such positive developments, however slow and in view of the fact that sudden and total withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces would create a vacuum which could renew inter-clan fighting in Somalia the African Group strongly recommends the following steps to be taken:

- a. The mandate of UNOSOM II to secure a stable environment for humanitarian intervention and political settlement should be adhered to and carried out;
- b. Any withdrawal of UNOSOM II should be on a gradual and phased out basis so as to give a chance to Somali leaders to iron out their differences and form a central authority;

S.E. Sir David Hannay, KCMG
Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017


- 2 -

- c. A political mission to Somalia to convey the Council's views to the Somali people on the future of UNOSOM II and the need to speed up the reconciliation process should be sent as soon as possible by the Security Council. The mission should preferably be sent before the Council takes any further decision on the future of UNOSOM II.
 - d. In gradually reducing UNOSOM II forces, resources saved should be allocated to social and economic rehabilitation, reconstruction and for the continuation of the reconciliation process and political settlement. no way.
 - e. The Somali leaders should convene the broad-based reconciliation conference without further delay to serve as a turning point in the reconciliation process.
 - f. The United Nations should enhance its efforts aimed at promoting national reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia, and, in this connection coordinate its efforts with those of the OAU and neighbouring countries. In this regard the African Group notes with appreciation the role being played by President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia on behalf of the OAU and encourages him to continue its mediation efforts.
4. It is deeply felt by the African Group that at this point in time, the UN presence is essential for the future of Somalia. The tragic experience in Rwanda after the abrupt scaling down of UNAMIR should be a good lesson for the International Community. Efforts should be made to avoid the escalation of the conflict in Somalia.
5. The African Group urges the Security Council to extend in the first instance, the mandate of UNOSOM II until March 1995 and also requests the international community as a whole to support the reconciliation process during this time. It emphasizes the need for Somali leaders and all Somalis to cooperate with the International Community which is trying to alleviate the crisis situation in Somalia and do everything to reach acceptable political solution as soon as possible.

.../.

- 3 -

6. The African Group reiterates its commitment to do its utmost to help UN efforts in the spirit of cooperation, collaboration and partnership. At present actions that make a difference between anarchy and the formation of a civil society are needed. It is primarily the responsibility of the Somali people to avoid violence and anarchy in Somalia and to form a national government. The International Community has also the obligation to assist the Somalia to achieve this goal.



Momodou Kebba Jallow
Acting Permanent Representative
of The Gambia,
Chairman of the African Group (October)



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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Principals Committee Discussion Paper Addendum (1 page)	10/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4148

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21138

Somalia

October 1, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President
The White House

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. AARON WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Somalia

Attached at Tab A is the Agenda for the Principals meeting on Somalia on Monday, October 3 from 2:00 - 2:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. NSC Discussion Paper is at Tab B. Attendance is limited to Principals plus one.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary


Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper
Tab C JCS Withdrawal Plan

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KOE NARA, Date 10/17/2017
2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting (1 page)	10/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4148

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006b. paper	Re: [UNOSOM Withdrawal] (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F

ke4148

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006c. memo	Memorandum to the President, re: US Military Support of UNOSOM Withdrawal (3 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4148

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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21138

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

September 30, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH

RICHARD A. CLARKE *RC*

FROM:

SEAN J. DARRAGH *SJD*

SUBJECT:

Principals Meeting on Somalia

Attached is a discussion paper and agenda for the Principals Committee meeting which will be held on Monday, October 3 at 2 p.m. This meeting will be used to decide how much support the U.S. military will provide for UNOSOM's withdrawal from Somalia.

Concurrences by:

Susan Rice, MacArthur, Deshaizer *DR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to send the attached agenda and discussion paper to his agency counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts
- Tab A Principal's Committee Agenda
- Tab B Discussion Paper
- Tab C JCS Withdrawal Plan

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *KDE* NARA, Date *01/10/2017*
2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SOMALIA TASK FORCE

THE SOMALIA TASK FORCE IS A NETWORK OF ACADEMIC SPECIALISTS AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES
WHOSE PURPOSES ARE POLICY DISCUSSION, INFORMATION SHARING AND ADVOCACY.

Squalee

CRITIQUE OF THE "REPORT" BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA, 17 SEPTEMBER 1994"

The Somalia Task Force
Washington DC
October 1994

Coordinators:

Ken Menkhaus Phone (717) 245-4269 Fax (717) 245-3279 e-mail kmenkhaus@davidson.edu
John Prendergast Phone (202) 635 2757 ext.32 Fax (202) 832 9494 e-mail jprender@vita.org



The Somalia Task Force is an independent policy discussion group composed of academic specialists and representatives of NGOs, as well as observers from U.S. and U.N. agencies. It serves as a forum for interaction between research specialists and practitioners in Somalia, in order to generate policy proposals that best serve the long-term interests of the Somali people. The following is one of a series of planned critiques and discussion papers regarding the present and future role of the international community in Somalia.

Introduction

The report on Somalia issued by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on September 17, 1994 (S/1994/1088) comes at a critical moment in U.N. policy toward Somalia, as the Security Council deliberates on the future mandate of UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia). The document in question is the first of a two-part report. Part one is intended to give "a factual account of recent developments in Somalia;" part two, to be submitted in mid-October, will provide recommendations for the Security Council, based in large part on the results of the visit to Somalia undertaken from September 15-19 by Mr. Kofi Annan, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations.

Disturbingly, the September 17 report to the Security Council contains some inaccurate and misleading analyses of the situation on the ground in Somalia. While distortions in earlier UN reporting on Somalia have been cause for concern, the inaccuracies in the section "Political Developments" of the most recent report are especially egregious and require clarification. In the critique which follows, the Somalia Task Force attempts to correct some of the most serious misreadings contained in the Secretary-General's report.

We also raise more general concerns about the need for honest, depoliticized, and accurate reporting by the UN administration to its member-states. The criticism we level at the reporting of the UN Secretariat is intended to be constructive, based on our collective desire to see the UN function more effectively, in Somalia and elsewhere. To be effective as it takes on new and complex challenges, the organization must, at a minimum, build and maintain a reputation for truthful and transparent reporting.

The Making of a Secretary-General's Report

Routinely, the Security Council requests of the office of the Secretary-General progress reports on the growing number of U.N. peacekeeping missions. The report is generally due one month prior to the Security Council's decision to renew the mandate of the mission in question -- usually once every six months. The Secretary-General's report carries both a factual account and analysis of the situation and a set of recommendations regarding the mandate of the peace operation. While key member-states lobby for their own proposals during the drafting of the report, the UN Secretariat clearly is able to protect its own

organizational interests as well. Once the final report is submitted, it is unusual for the Security Council to deviate significantly from the recommendations made by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's report is, therefore, of considerable importance.

In the case of Somalia and UNOSOM, the first drafts of the Secretary-General's many progress reports to the Security Council have been written by UN officials in Mogadishu. Though the document reflects continuous dialogue with New York, the officials in Mogadishu have considerable influence in shaping both the analysis of the current situation and the recommendations submitted for the Security Council's consideration. Yet the officials in Mogadishu also have the strongest personal and organizational interests to protect the mission from criticism, budget reductions, and premature closure. As a result, UNOSOM officials have been tempted to cleanse reports of unpleasant realities facing the mission. It is likely that this dynamic affects the reporting practices of other UN field operations as well. For a number of reasons outlined below, it is a corrupting and potentially dangerous practice.

Critique of the September 17 Report on Somalia

Sections of the Secretary-General's report in question are provided in bold print; the critique follows.

II. Political Developments

3 "... the Council will recall that, in my previous report (S/1994/977), I expressed agreement with the assessment of my Special Representative that conflicts within the Hawiye clan constituted the major obstacle to national reconciliation and that the successful conclusion of a Hawiye peace conference would greatly facilitate the national reconciliation process."

In reality, top UNOSOM officials in Mogadishu have acknowledged in interviews that they never believed that a pan-Hawiye peace conference was possible in the short-term. Moreover, virtually no one in New York, either in the Secretariat or among Security Council member-states, believed it either, as UN officials admit. Throughout the summer and into September of 1994, heavy intra-Hawiye clashes occurred outside the walls of UNOSOM in south Mogadishu, making the proposition that a Hawiye reconciliation was within grasp seem unlikely. Yet that was the premise on which UNOSOM sought, and secured, justification for the renewal of its mandate.

4. "... the Imam of Hirab confirmed to my Special Representative the willingness of both Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aideed to participate in the [Hawiye] conferences."

This was in fact what UNOSOM has been led to believe, by both the faction leaders and the Imam of Hirab. But at the same time that the Secretary-General's report was released, General Aideed unexpectedly told UN officials that he believed the focus on a Hawiye reconciliation was divisive and was creating tension among non-Hawiye clans; therefore he would not support the process. In

this instance, the Secretary-General's report was simply overtaken by events on the ground, and is no longer accurate.

Paragraphs 4-10. [Summarizes developments for a pau-Hawiye peace meeting, and the initiatives of the Imam of Hirab to reconcile various Hawiye sub-clans].

The report is at this point guilty of omission. In a full page reporting on developments toward Hawiye reconciliation, the report fails to mention any of the very serious incidents of armed hostilities which have occurred within the Hawiye clan, including: the Hahr Gedr attack on the Hawadle clan in Isled Weyn and surrounding towns; Hawadle-Habr Gedr clashes in the airport area of south Mogadishu; the fighting within the Murocade which has divided along SNA-USC lines and threatens to spill over into broader factional clashes in Mogadishu; and Murocade-Habr Gedr fighting in the Medina neighborhood of South Mogadishu. A "factual account of recent developments" should not have omitted these important setbacks in the search for Hawiye reconciliation; they are critical prerequisites for clear assessment of the likelihood of successful Hawiye peace initiatives.

12. "The Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference was successfully concluded on 18 June 1994. There have been no major violations of the Lower Juba peace agreement and the cease-fire is holding. The implementation committee has been meeting in Kismayo with a view to formulating a plan of action for the implementation of the agreement. The leaders of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference and the Absame Reconciliation Conference have continued to meet in both the Lower and the Middle Juba regions. The Chairman of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference, General Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed "Liqiqato," held successful meetings from 7 to 9 September 1994 with Imam Sayid Hussein, Chairman of the Absame Reconciliation Conference, and General Mohamed Said Horal "Morgan." Agreement was reached at these meetings to set priorities for the Juba regions and to expedite the implementation of the Lower Juba and Absame Peace agreements."

This summary of the situation in the Juba/Kismayo region is misleading and omits important contrary information:

-- The lower Juba reconciliation conference was not as successful as UNOSOM has portrayed it. In fact, it was seriously flawed, as it omitted one of the two main parties to the conflict -- the Ogadeni clan -- from the conference. The signing of a peace between Morgan and the Habr Gedr representatives in the Juba valley will not resolve the underlying conflict in the region between the Ogadeni and Harti clans.

-- Recently the Habr Gedr have withdrawn their militia and representatives from the lower Jubba valley, leaving the "administration" of the region in the hands of Ogadeni Col. Omar Jess, who rejected the lower Jubba accord. This very likely means that the lower Jubba accord is dead in the water.

-- UNOSOM's own internal reports acknowledge that the Absame reconciliation meeting, far from representing another successful local peace, essentially broke up without resolving most of the differences still dividing the clan.

-- Fighting has broken out in two locations in the Juba region. In Jilib, armed clashes have taken place on several occasions between the Habr Gedr and their former allies, the Ogadenis, with numerous casualties; and fighting between the Aulihan (Ogadenis) and the Ajuraan clan in Buale has led to casualties and

instability.

-- Tensions in Kismayo are extremely high, as the Marehan clan and it of the Dolbahanto clan have broken ranks with General Morgan over the signing of the peace treaty with the Habr Gedr. This tension was especially high during the meeting between Sayid Hussein, Liqiqato and Morgan, which was not successful, contrary to UNOSOM's assessment.

-- Virtually all international NGOs and UN agencies have withdrawn from Kismayo and the Jubba region due to continued security problems and extortion.

In sum, the situation in the Jubba region is much more troubled than the Secretary-General's report portrays it.

13. "The Fifth Congress of SSDF, following two months of intensive consultations, elected Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as its new Chairman on 22 August 1994. The election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf has been accepted and Mr Abdirazak Haji Hussein, the nominee of the supreme committee of the sultans of the north east to the chairmanship of SSDF, has recognized the election of Abdullahi Yusuf. . . Following his election as SSDF Chairman, Colonel Yusuf has affirmed his commitment to assist in bringing together the southern factions in Mogadishu in order to facilitate national reconciliation, on the basis of the Addis Ababa agreement and the Nairobi Declaration."

This assessment of the political situation in the north-east of Somalia is extremely deceptive. In reality, there is considerable confusion over the leadership of the SSDF and the Mijerteen clan. After the committee of sultans nominated Abdirazak -- a surprise choice -- Abdullahi Yusuf rejected their nomination and convened his own congress, which named him Chairman of SSDF. This meeting was by no means representative of all of the Mijerteen, however, who remain divided over leadership of the SSDF. Abdirazak left the north-east under physical threat by the Yusuf militia, which does not, as UNOSOM falsely implies, constitute an endorsement of Yusuf on the part of Abdirazak. Gen. Mohamed Abshir Moussa, Abdullahi Yusuf's rival, did not participate in the conference which selected Yusuf, and rejects the outcome. Most observers fear that tensions within the Mijerteen clan may soon spill over into armed clashes, which would be especially tragic since the northeast has been the one region to escape armed conflict during the Somali civil war. But nowhere does the Secretary-General's report reflect this concern. Nor does it adequately capture the level of complexity and flux which now characterizes politics in the northeast of Somalia.

14. "With respect to developments concerning the participation of SNM in the national reconciliation process as called for under the Nairobi Declaration, the SNM Chairman, Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, met with the chairmen of the other three north-west-based political factions (SDA, USP, and USF), in Djibouti, from 13 to 17 August 1994, to consider the situation in the north-west. At the end of their meeting, they issued a joint statement declaring, inter alia, that secession of the north was neither feasible nor desirable and that the national reconciliation conference envisaged under the Nairobi Declaration was long overdue and should be convened not later than September 1994. The statement also proposed the adoption of a federal system of government for Somalia and conveyed an offer by the four factions to use their good offices to mediate between the factions in the south."

This paragraph is also extremely misleading, as it fully implies that there is broad support in the northwest, or "Somaliland," to rescind the declaration of secession and rejoin efforts at national reconciliation in the south. In reality, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali "Tour" represents very few of his Isaaq clanmen and has been repeatedly and explicitly rejected as a representative of the people of the northwest by the "government" of Somaliland. UNOSOM is aware that Tour possesses almost no constituency and therefore does not meaningfully represent anyone in these meetings. Indeed, it was in part because of its continued dealings with Tour that UNOSOM was expelled from "Somaliland" by the Egal government in August, a serious setback that the Secretary-General's report fails to discuss, referring only once to the lack of any UNOSOM presence throughout northern Somalia. This section of the report thus bears very little resemblance to political reality in the northwest of Somalia. In this instance UNOSOM seems to be willfully misleading the Security Council, and in the process raising false expectations of an impending political settlement of the northwest issue.

Furthermore, since the issuing of the September 17 report, Tour has publicly distanced himself from this initiative and denounced the possibilities of reaching a southern reconciliation. Therefore, the UNOSOM initiative with Tour is no longer relevant to national reconciliation efforts in Somalia.

III. Military and Security Aspects

[Paragraphs 17-27 review the first steps of the UNOSOM military drawdown, and comments on recent security problems, including the attacks on UNOSOM forces at Beled Weyn (29 July) and Bale Dogle (22 August), in which a total of eight UN soldiers were killed. These incidents are reported as follows:]

26. "On 29 July, in Beled Weyne, troops of the Zimbabwean contingent were completely overrun by a strong militia force. . . . On 22 August, an Indian unit escorting a supply convoy was ambushed by armed militia. . . ."

The report omits a critical aspect of these and several other security incidents that have resulted in UNOSOM casualties -- that they were unprovoked attacks by the militia of the Habr-Gode, the clan of General Aideed. This fact has been a major political complication for UNOSOM in its dealings with Aideed, and should be an important factor in the Security Council's deliberations over UNOSOM's relationship with the Somali faction/militia leaders and its current negotiating strategy.

Conclusions

There is ample evidence to suggest that the September 17, 1994, Secretary-General's report on Somalia bears little resemblance to actual political developments on the ground. Moreover, while some of the inaccuracies in the report are the result of changing circumstances in the months of August and September, many appear to be willful misreadings and misrepresentations, designed to portray the situation in Somalia in a much more positive light than the

situation warrants.

There are a number of dangers inherent in misleading and possibly politicized reporting within the UN. First, it is possible that the Security Council will act on faulty information, issuing resolutions that do not serve the best interests of either the host population (in this case, the Somali people) or the international community. More realistically, however, most of the Security Council members have their own independent sources of analysis and will not be misled by poor reporting on the part of the Secretariat. But that presents a different kind of danger to the office of the Secretary-General -- namely, the erosion of the credibility of the institution. In the case of Somalia, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, member-states, the media, and the Somali people are all well aware of the actual political situation in Somalia. The UN only damages its own credibility by issuing reports that distort or omit the truth.

The Somalia Task Force appeals to the office of the Secretary-General to insure that its reporting to the Security Council, and, by extension, the international community, reflects the highest levels of integrity and accuracy. In particular, we appeal to the Secretary-General's office to insure that the upcoming October 15 report on Somalia, which will contain important policy recommendations on the future of UNOSOM, reflect a realistic assessment of the situation in Somalia rather than the largely illusory one presented in the September 17 report. To this end, the Somalia Task Force will commit itself to the task of critically reviewing future UN reports on Somalia and, if necessary, issuing public rejoinders. Finally, we call on academic area specialists and NGOs working in other countries in which the UN has major operations to assume a similar "watch-dog" role in order to hold the UN to the highest standards of accurate and depoliticized reporting.

TO: LAKE

Somalia

FROM: DARRAGH
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 29 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER FOR PC MTG RE SOMALIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 03 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF: 9421138

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES: SOM

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEERS
CLARKE
DARRAGH
DESHAZER
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
RICE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 11/10/2017

2012-0689-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9421139

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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X 94101215 NOTED BY LAKE

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	Sean Darragh to Anthony Lake, re: Briefing Memorandum for Principals Meeting on Somalia (3 pages)	09/30/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 276

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
ke4148

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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007b. paper	[Duplicate of 006b] (4 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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007c. memo	[Duplicate of 006c] (3 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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Somalia - UNOSOM [United Nations Operations in Somalia] [2]

2012-0659-F
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008. cable	Re: Whose Assets Will Support UNOSOM's Withdrawal? (5 pages)	10/06/1994	P1/b(1)
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