

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia, 1993 (continued) [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Rice, Susan

Original OA/ID Number:

277

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35	5	1	1	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	04/19/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: 27 March Deputies Committee: Somalia PRD/Pan AM 103 (3 pages)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	Small Group Meeting (1 page)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	U.S. Policy Toward Somalia (12 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	Deputies Committee Discussion Paper (2 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002e. agenda	Somalia Core Group (1 page)	04/23/1993	P1/b(1)
002f. memcon	Memorandum for the Record on Discussions with Ambassador Robert Oakley (3 pages)	03/16/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Secretary of State Letter on Troop Contributions for the UNOSOM II Mission in Somalia (7 pages)	04/07/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	NSC Modification to Cable (1 page)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: [Planning Order] (5 pages)	04/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 (continued) [4]

2012-0659-F

ke4144

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 12, 1993

NOTE FOR RAC
RICE
SHEEHAN

Amb David Shinn would like to have
our review/comments on the attached
lessons/learned document.

Randy

Attachment
a/s



Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AF/E, AF/RA, AF/EP5F A X C O V E R S H E E T

DATE: May 12, 1993 Page 1 of 7

TO: Mr. Randy Beers

OFFICE: NSC

PHONE: # 395-1199 FAX #: 395-50 66

FROM: Amb. David Shinn

OFFICE: AF/E

PHONE #: 647-9742 FAX #: 202-647-0810

SUBJECT: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CAPSTONE Program - May 19 - 1015 to 1045
Background on Peace Keeping in Somalia

A brief background follows on the peace keeping operation in Somalia. This paper complements the remarks on lessons learned which will be given by Ambassador David Shinn to participants in the CAPSTONE Program. Ambassador Shinn requests that members of the program read this background before his presentation. This, in turn, will permit more time for questions during this half hour session.

Civil war broke out in Somalia in 1988, culminating in early 1991 in the total breakdown of law and order and the disintegration of national government. US forces were called in to evacuate the American embassy in Mogadishu as fighting raged around the compound. An estimated 500,000 Somalis died as a result of the civil strife and subsequent starvation in the southern part of the country. Eventually the media focused sufficient attention on the problem that the international community, especially the US under the Bush Administration, decided to take forceful action in the fall of 1992.

UN Military Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) began in September 1992 with about 600 lightly armed Pakistani soldiers sent primarily to provide security at the Mogadishu airport and port. The Pakistanis were too few, inadequately armed and had inappropriate rules of engagement. They were barely able to fend off attacks by Somali snipers and irregulars, known locally as technicals, who normally used four wheel drive vehicles mounted with heavy machine guns.

The Security Council adopted resolution 794 on December 3, 1992, which accepted a US offer and led to the creation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the subsequent landing of US and allied forces in Somalia on December 9. Previous UN peace keeping activities were usually authorized under the UN Charter's Chapter VI entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." The Security Council purposely established UNITAF under US command but with a Security Council mandate, utilizing the more aggressive Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Unlike UNOSOM I, therefore, UNITAF was well armed and had robust rules of engagement. But UNITAF's mandate was limited to the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." In other words, UNITAF was intended only to stop the starvation and permit non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to distribute food and relief supplies.

At its peak, UNITAF had about 38,000 US and coalition forces on the ground or off shore. American forces in theater reached a peak of 25,800 in mid-January. 23 countries from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, North America and the South Pacific contributed troops to UNITAF. The UNITAF area of operation was limited to the southern 40 percent of Somalia.

The Security Council adopted resolution 814 on March 26, 1993, which authorized establishment of UNOSOM II, the successor to UNITAF. The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II took place on May 4 when Operation Restore Hope was dubbed Operation Continue Hope. UNOSOM II represents the first ever Chapter VII enforcement action in which the armed forces of various countries are under United Nations command. Consequently, UNOSOM II is using the same robust rules of engagement initiated by UNITAF.

But the overall mandate for UNOSOM II is much broader than the one for UNITAF. UNOSOM II was given responsibility for all of Somalia, not just the southern 40 percent of the country. It is expected to provide humanitarian assistance, rehabilitate the political institutions and economy, promote political reconciliation, assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, reestablish a civil service and police force, develop a program for the removal of mines and recreate a civil society. In other words, UNOSOM II is charged with returning Somalia to the community of nations.

To carry out this task, UNOSOM II expects to assemble 28,000 troops throughout Somalia and build up a UN civilian workforce of more than 2,000. This will constitute the largest UN peace keeping operation ever undertaken so far. The goal is to finish the task by March 1995. As many as 35 countries may ultimately contribute military contingents to this effort. There are currently about 21,000 UNOSOM troops in Somalia; most of them served in UNITAF. The UNOSOM Commander is Turkish; his deputy is American. The UN Secretary General's Special Representative in charge of the UN operation in Somalia is an American, retired Admiral Jonathan Howe.

The US troop level will soon go down to about 3,800--1,300 as a quick reaction force and 2,500 logistics personnel. The goal is to reduce the US contingent to 1,400 by the end of 1993 and to zero by the end of 1994.

The UN is currently engaged in 14 peace keeping operations. Somalia and the others may well typify the kind of military actions in which US forces find themselves in the future.

Enough background, what are the lessons learned?

--On the assumption that you have read the background paper on peace keeping in Somalia, I would like to turn immediately to the lessons learned.

--Looking first at what we learned in the US.

--It was extremely useful to organize quickly task forces on Somalia at State, DOD and CIA. In retrospect, however, some efficiency was lost in the early days because the Joint Staff decided not to colocate its key officers (J2, J3, J4 and J5). Eventually, it did offer one-stop shopping. OSD was also slow in staffing its Crisis Coordination Center on a 24 hour basis. Nevertheless, the task forces at the different agencies allowed US policy to move forward much faster than would otherwise have been the case.

--For its part, the State Department significantly complicated handling of cable traffic by insisting that all telegrams other than administrative issues dealing with Somalia carry the restrictive Exdis Horn caption. Consequently, several concerned bureaus in the Department of State and even CENTCOM did not receive Somali cable traffic on a timely or regular basis until the problem was rectified well into the crisis.

--The State Department also shut down its task force in late February and gave the lead in State for coordinating policy on Somalia to the Bureau of African Affairs. But the Bureau didn't staff up adequately to deal with the problems previously handled by the Somali task force. Momentum was lost for a couple of weeks while the African Bureau organized itself to deal with the additional workload.

--Interagency cooperation involving NSC, DOD, State, CIA, AID, USIA and OMB was outstanding. This fact contributed enormously to the success of Operation Restore Hope and during the early stages of its successor, Operation Continue Hope.

--Within the USG, Operation Restore Hope was effectively coordinated by the interagency CORE Group chaired by the NSC. Major policy decisions on Somalia were approved by the interagency Deputies Committee, which met less frequently.

--In those few cases where there were disagreements among the agencies, the NSC stepped in firmly and quickly to settle any arguments.

--From the beginning there was frequent consultation between the USG and UN, sometimes relying on the USUN staff to convey messages and on other occasions by using the State/DOD team which met regularly in New York with Kofi Annan, the UN Under Secretary General for Peace Keeping, and members of his staff.

--In lining up troops to replace the departing Americans, we worked closely with the UN to help it anticipate needs and to support its requests to individual countries. This double teaming probably persuaded some countries to participate that otherwise would not have done so.

--Wealthier countries were expected to pay all their costs of participation in UNITAF. (Costs for participation in UNOSOM are reimbursed through UN assessments.) In order to permit poorer countries to take part in the UNITAF operation, the US and UN established a Voluntary Fund for Somalia (financed primarily by Japan) to cover the costs of poorer countries. As a result, countries like Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan sent significant numbers of troops for UNITAF.

--In retrospect, during the early stages of Operation Restore Hope, there should have been more information sharing and consultations with Congress, which is concerned about its responsibility under the War Powers Resolution. Although we improved considerably in this regard as time progressed, it continued to be an area for improvement. Those briefings and consultations that did take place were useful and appreciated by Congress.

--US officials were generally careful in public statements dealing with Operation Restore Hope. There were several occasions, however, when unnecessary problems developed because public statements were interpreted as being critical of the UN and Italian participation in Somalia. It is essential to avoid this kind of problem in the future.

--Early on during the crisis, we urged AID, the UN, the World Bank and the IMF to begin focusing on rehabilitation and reconstruction in Somalia. This saved valuable time later on when the security aspects of the operation were largely under control.

--Turning now to aspects of the operation that offer lessons for both headquarters and the field.

--It was important that the mandate of the UN-sanctioned military operation in Somalia be as unambiguous as humanly possible. This permitted the multinational force to focus its energy rather than be distracted by desirable but unachievable goals.

--The rules of engagement were robust; appropriate force was available to deal with all foreseeable problems. This avoided the kinds of problems experienced in the former Yugoslavia where UN forces found themselves standing around watching people being killed.

--When the UN took responsibility for the operation, the command and control arrangement for US forces was innovative and so far has worked well in the field. (Spell out plan for logistics forces and QRF.) If it continues to work as expected, it may have application for other crises.

--Terms of reference were drawn up in advance by the US and UN for use of the QRF in UNOSOM II. We believe the guidelines are appropriate. The QRF is designed "to counter specific threats that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II Force Command units. It will not be used to spearhead routine operations, escort convoys, or perform long-term security actions."

--The US was quick to provide UNOSOM II with American support staff to ensure the success of Operation Continue Hope. Admiral Howe was named the Secretary General's representative in Somalia, General Montgomery became the Deputy Commander of the UN Forces and American civilian and military personnel were assigned to the UNOSOM staff. We also sent working level staff frequently to the UN HQ in NY to work out the operational problems of standing up UNOSOM II. This assistance was critical to a smooth transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM.

--Finally, what lessons were learned in the field?

--Ambassador Robert Oakley arrived in Mogadishu a few days ahead of US troops. He immediately began discussions with the warlords in Mogadishu and eventually in outlying areas before the arrival of the military forces. This tactic probably prevented considerable bloodshed and loss of life.

--Cooperation on the ground between Ambassador Oakley and General Johnston was outstanding throughout the time both of them served together in Somalia. Although this mutually supportive relationship was in large part the luck of the draw, it does underscore the need to try to select carefully the military and diplomatic leaders in any future operation where both military and diplomatic officials play such an important role.

--On a couple of occasions, military decisions in the field were not communicated to Washington and/or to the US Liaison Office in Mogadishu on a timely basis. The UNITAF decision to leave fewer American forces with UNOSOM II than the number being used publicly by officials in Washington is a case in point. In another instance, UNITAF sent the QRF to Kismayu without informing the US Special Representative in a timely fashion. Both of these decisions had significant political and diplomatic implications.

--There were constant pressures on UNITAF to expand the nature of their mission, e.g. collect small arms, canton heavy weapons outside the UNITAF area of operation, protect individual members of NGO organizations, etc. This became known as mission creep. General Johnston hewed carefully to the original mandate. Although one could--and sometimes did--argue forcefully for a broader mission, there were clearly requests that did not merit serious consideration. In an operation of this type, the commanding officer must be alert to the pressures--both well intentioned and not--of mission creep.

--The NGOs played a critical role in providing humanitarian assistance to the Somalis. Operation Restore Hope could not have succeeded without their help. For the most part, US military and civilian officials in Somalia understood the need to assist them in every reasonable way possible.

--When NGOs play such an important role in a crisis, it is essential to establish a mechanism for sharing information on the ground with the NGOs. This was done effectively through the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), which was described by a visiting management SWAT team as "the single most important institutional structure created in this emergency which tied the military, donor aid programs, UN agencies, and NGOs together."

--Third world countries like Botswana, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe gained invaluable experience through their participation in UNITAF. They learned to work cooperatively with American and other forces from the industrialized world. As a result they will be better prepared for use in future peace keeping activities.

--One of the weak points in Operation Restore Hope was the lack of an effective UN public relations effort aimed at the Somali population which advances the military, political, humanitarian and security goals of the operation. In the future, the UN needs to be more alert from the outset to this critical need.

--To a considerable extent, this gap was filled by an excellent psyops campaign organized by UNITAF. US forces established a radio transmitter in Mogadishu and distributed a Somali language newspaper in the major towns in the UNITAF area of operation. Some have suggested that this operation was worth several battalions of troops.

--Intelligence collection was fast and of high quality. This factor also saved many lives. On the negative side, most of the intelligence community in Washington was unaware until very late in the operation that excellent overhead material was available in the field.

--UNITAF set up nine operational zones. Some were controlled by American forces; others by non-Americans. One set of rules for weapons collection and movement of Somalis applied in one zone and another set in another zone. This created unnecessary confusion. In the future, when an area is organized by zone, it is important to standardize the regulations.

--Both General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley understood early on the need to stand up quickly a local Somali police force. This took considerable prodding of the bureaucracy in Washington and New York to locate funding, but the effort was surprisingly successful.

--Although this comes as no surprise, it is important that all military and civilian personnel have as complete an understanding of the local culture as possible. During the Christmas season, for example, a few soldiers tried to teach Muslim Somalis Christmas songs. A completely innocent undertaking, it was nevertheless misinterpreted and blown out of proportion by some Somalis. Rock throwing by Somali children is a national past time. Westerners, with good reason, treat this as a hostile act. In Somalia, however, it is helpful to keep the custom in a local context.

--In the world of peace keeping operations, Somalia is unique in that there was no government when the peace keeping force arrived. Although UNITAF was not charged with standing up a government, UNOSOM has this responsibility. There are different theories for approaching the problem. The US favors a focus on building local and regional governmental structures followed by a national government. The UN puts more stock in the national level from the outset. Whatever the model, it requires a network of UN political officers to meet with Somalis and prepare the ground throughout the country. Albeit a herculean task, this effort was slow to get underway.

--Moving from a US-led operation to a UN-led one is no easy task. From the beginning, we talked about the need for a "seamless web" from UNITAF to UNOSOM. Although the web was not as seamless as we would have liked, the transition of this exceedingly complex operation was surprisingly smooth. This was a credit to everyone--military and civilian--who played a role.

--I would be happy to take your questions.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Kice 20392

April 21, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE/RAND BEERS

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Somalia

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the (SVTS)
Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia, Monday, April 19, 1993, at
2:30 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to forward the transmittal memo
to his counterparts at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 01/05/17
2012-0689-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 12/05/17
2012-0659-F

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DAVID MEIN
Executive Secretary
(Acting)
Agency of International
Development

COLONEL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to the
United Nations

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Somalia (U)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the (SVTS)
Deputies Committee on Somalia, April 19, 1993, at 2:30 p.m. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	04/19/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER/TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 (continued) [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4144

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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002a. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: 27 March Deputies Committee: Somalia PRD/Pan AM 103 (3 pages)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
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002b. agenda	Small Group Meeting (1 page)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. agenda	Somalia Core Group (1 page)	04/23/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 (continued) [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4144

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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002f. memcon	Memorandum for the Record on Discussions with Ambassador Robert Oakley (3 pages)	03/16/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 (continued) [4]

2012-0659-F

ke4144

RESTRICTION CODES

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: LOE Date: 04/15/17

2012-0654-1

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APR 15 P3:42

B

006888

S/S #

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ No. Pages 7

FROM: GLYN DAVIES S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO BUENOS AIRES: SECRETARY OF STATE LETTER
ON TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE UNOSOM II MISSION IN SOMALIA

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>NANCY SODERBERG</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WH SITRM</u>
	<u>WILL ITOH</u>		
	<u>KRISTIE KENNEY</u>		
	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
	<u>RICE JETT CLARKE</u>		
	<u>SCHWARTZ INFO: BERGER, LAKE</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: MUST GO 4/15

Needest Friday morning at posts in order to carry
out demarches before weekend. Thanks

S/S Officer: Gavin 4/15:1500
GLYN DAVIES

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Re: Secretary of State Letter on Troop Contributions for the UNOSOM II Mission in Somalia (7 pages)	04/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 (continued) [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4144

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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004. paper	NSC Modification to Cable (1 page)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1)
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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

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005. cable	Re: [Planning Order] (5 pages)	04/15/1993	P1/b(1)
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National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 (continued) [4]

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REPORT TO
ADMIRAL JONATHAN HOWE
ON THE
FUTURE OF
UNOSOM II

MOGADISHU
15 APRIL 1993

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LIST OF TEAM MEMBERS

**Ambassador Sheldon J. Krys
Team Leader**

**James Roberts
Deputy Team Leader
(Organizational Structure)**

**Ross Branstetter
Procurement and Legal**

**Gary Bresnahan
Communications**

**Jim Colvin
Logistics**

**Amb. Frances Cook
Public Affairs**

**Pat Cronin
Secretary**

**Charles Duelfer
Field Operations**

**Bob Howard
Management/Budget**

**Sara Maddux
Personnel**

**Bob MacCallum
Management/Administration**

**Stephen Mull
Command Center Operations**

**Andrew Natsios
Humanitarian Affairs**

**William Stettinius
Civil Police**

OVERVIEW

In creating a model for future multinational enterprises, the goals of UNOSOM II are both specific - as defined in UNSC Res. 814 - and general - as the first Chapter VII enforcement operation. The first is highly dependent upon the Somalis themselves; the latter is to a large degree dependent upon the UN system, a multi-agency universe with diverse goals, funding mechanisms, personnel systems and reporting responsibilities. We believe the civilian side of the operation will determine your success and may be the most resistant to being pulled together. It requires substantial and forceful management attention now, with the establishment of a command and control mechanism, and goal-setting by agency and section, to be completed within one month of the standup of UNOSOM II. While management by exception is a good way to kickstart a diffuse and transitional body, you will want to move rapidly to a set-up that is structured to be responsive, collaborative, and efficient - but lean. The early establishment of such an organization will facilitate the accomplishment of UNOSOM II's multiple tasks and be of long term benefit to the international community which funds, and those who staff, this pioneering endeavor.

Personnel and staffing of civilian and military positions will be key to UNOSOM II's success: You will need special authority to hire quickly - and transfer or fire - key players in headquarters and field civilian staff. The constant turnover here ultimately is not good in such a complex environment, which requires a certain start up time. A time-limited exercise doesn't allow for endless in-briefs of new staff. Six month renewable contracts should be the norm, not the exception, for all; military and civilian. Burnout must be seriously guarded against, with, for example, 3-4 days off, out of country, every 6 weeks or so. The toughest times are ahead for this operation and an investment in staff welfare now will pay off later.

You cannot change the U.N. system from distant Mogadishu. The agencies will continue to have stovepipes to their headquarters and their people here will be more inclined to please their bosses at home. For the success of your mission, agency heads must accept your overall coordination function in the field. A great deal will depend on the personal relations you establish here and with the leadership in N.Y. Your efforts there could ensure needed flexibility both with staffing and with budget.

It will be important for the success of the operation, and for your second goal, to recruit as many qualified international employees as possible, particularly those from the surrounding region. This approach has worked well in Cambodia. A staff that is widely perceived as an American operation, while undoubtedly pleasing to the Somalis, would not be appropriate for your second goal (UNOSOM II as a "model" of a multinational Chapter VII operation) and might raise expectations that the USG is not prepared to satisfy.

As political issues move to center stage, well-staffed and focused political, humanitarian and public affairs staffs, which are deeply operational, will be needed. Operations in, and communications with, field offices must be enhanced as must coordination and interaction with the critical NGO effort in Somalia. Due to a labor-intensive political agenda, a Policy Planning Staff will need to be created as part of your office. We believe that use of Polads with military forces and some inter-mixing of civilian and military at staff level (from the command center, to public affairs and policy planning staffs) should complement the ongoing dialogue you have with your military commanders.

Finally, we make some recommendations concerning administrative operations, an area starved for human and material resources. The current support organization, though ably and imaginatively led, is inadequate to meet even today's needs. Even with a lean operation, there is an urgent need for a substantial technical/support staff, which the UN system probably cannot meet. You will need to increase the local procurement ceiling, improve the living conditions of the international staff and professionalize the workplace practices of the Somali staff.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Command Center Operations

Tab F

- Establish a Command and Control Center to coordinate UNOSOM's routine and emergency operations, monitor events in-country, control and track action requests made of UNOSOM and provide regular, real-time briefings for UNOSOM principals, staff and NGOs.

Communications

Tab G

- Hire a private contractor to engineer the communications network for UNOSOM and more technicians for the current staff.
- Install an expandable digital network infrastructure in Mogadishu. This can start with a triangular configuration and expand as requirements dictate.
- Design a user-friendly telephone dial scheme that can be technically accommodated, with controls on international dialing.

Public Affairs

Tab H

- Greatly expand UNOSOM's public affairs program with a focus on the Somali audience to advance the political, humanitarian and security agendas.
- Unify the UNOSOM's Public Affairs effort under one person, who would be Director of Public Information/Spokesman. Goals/Themes will change over time.
- Give urgent attention to procuring personnel and equipment for the entire Public Affairs operation.

Field Operations

Tab I

- Establish clear cut guidelines for responsibilities within the zones. As the Ambassador is the head of a country team, so should the Zone Director have primacy for his area.
- Develop an action plan and identify and set aside resources for quick implementation of Zonal disarmament activities.
- Give Zone Directors close control over resources coupled with strong, dedicated staff support from Mogadishu.

Political Section**Tab J**

- Develop a quarterly reporting plan with the review and approval of the SRSG/DSRSG.
- Establish a rational division of responsibilities between the DSRSG and political department head in dealing with the near term political reconciliation process.
- Direct all field reporting to the Command and Control Center, which will determine action office and taskings.

Information Considerations**Tab K**

- Establish a close working relationship between Command Center/Field Operations staff and the UNOSOM II/Mil U-2 staff to ensure the widest possible sharing of operational information in the political, relief, public information and tactical military spheres.
- Design training program for political and military information collection and reporting.

Funding Considerations**Tab L**

- Grant authority to SRSG to approve spending for items up to \$500,000 without submitting request through UN headquarters. (Such authority has been granted to the UNTAC Director).
- Provide ADP equipment and additional high quality staff to the finance office to deal with increased demands for financial data AND analysis.
- For humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, (a) formulate a coherent and prioritized program plan that donors can accept, and (b) work with donors, UN organizations and NGOs to implement this plan. Seek to provide the SRSG with discretionary funds that he could be used for quick reaction projects and to augment other programs.

Humanitarian Affairs**Tab M**

- Design a modestly funded, administratively decentralized, tightly managed relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction program for only those essential activities which will make Somalia able to sustain life without a massive expatriate presence and not attempt to repair all the damage of the last two years.
- Improve the relationship between the NGO community and the UN system, including the establishment of a \$5 million grant program for immediate interventions in relief and rehabilitation through indigenous and international NGOs.
- Aggregate data from ICRC, UN agencies, and NGO field offices on nutritional and health conditions on a monthly basis in order to create early warning systems to head off potential crisis in these areas and to allow you to judge the progress of the humanitarian program.

Justice System**Tab N**

- Establish a judicial system that, in concert with Somali police, can impartially and expeditiously mete out criminal justice. The near-term judicial system should be based on Somali law, but should also be tailored to this period of transition. In particular, the legal process during the transition must ameliorate the divisive effects of clan-based factionalism and must not undermine the present flexibility of the United Nations to guide and, if necessary, to intervene in judicial affairs.

Law Enforcement Issues**Tab O**

- Contract a private company to establish and run a Somali Law Enforcement Academy.
- Establish a Law Enforcement Directorate within UNOSOM to assist in creating, funding, advising, and logistically supporting a Somali law enforcement system.
- Staff each of the five UNOSOM zones and 14 sub-zones to manage, oversee, report and assist the development of the regional law enforcement system.

Personnel and Staffing**Tab P**

- Seek authority to fill all or a large portion of planned technical/support positions through a contract with scheduled benchmarks for recruiting/training Somali replacements.
- Establish lines of authority for zone chiefs on issues relating to the operations/reporting of individual agency representatives which affect other agencies. The zone chiefs and sub-zone chiefs' reporting should include that of all team members.
- Establish a protocol/visitors unit within the SRSG Executive Secretariat to support official visitors to the Mission.
- Maintain one day a week (Friday?) without scheduled meetings and mandatory, regularly scheduled R&R outside of Somalia for all staff, including senior personnel.

Logistics**Tab Q**

- Plan and identify specific logistics capabilities required for expanded UNOSOM operations to the UN Field Operations Division.
- Integrate the military operational plan to pursue the UN mandate into the zone office structure, including all military, humanitarian and political activities into a comprehensive, coordinated plan.

Procurement**Tab R**

- Obtain and allocate personnel to support the UNOSOM CAO, especially in procurement matters.
- Detail temporarily a small number of UNOSOM military personnel to the CAO to help in procurement, logistics, and budgeting. Ask the UN to loan UNOSOM personnel from UN operations in Cambodia and Yugoslavia to "prime the pump" in starting a reliable flow of supplies and services into Somalia.
- Dedicate an energetic and capable person to establishing necessary UN contracts immediately.

UNOSOM II ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

Introduction

This paper describes, in outline form, an organizational concept for the UNOSOM II headquarters, functional staff, and field operations units. At each of these levels it recommends broad responsibilities and functions for major elements, and provides a general estimate on initial staffing requirements. Of course, staffing levels should be evaluated and adjusted over time, based on organizational experience and levels of activity in functional areas and in regional zones.

Section I

Office of the SRSG

Responsibilities include: leadership, advocacy, overall program direction and management; establishment of accountability throughout the organization; supervision and control of program resources, and operations.

The Office of the SRSG includes the immediate offices of the SRSG, the Deputy SRSG, and the Chief of Staff. It also includes three attached offices; the Policy Planning Staff, the Executive Secretariat, and the Operations Center. Relationships and descriptions follow:

1. Immediate Office of the SRSG

Includes the:

SRSG, a

Personal staff and two Special Advisors:

Personal Staff:

- Military Assistant
- Executive Assistant
- Confidential Secretary

Special Advisors:

- Senior Military Advisor - (LTG Bir) also serves as (or directs) the Director of Military Operations
- Spokesperson - also serves as the Director of Public Information

2. Office of the Deputy SRSG

Includes the DSRSG, and a Personal Staff composed of:

- Executive Assistant
- Military Assistant
- Confidential Secretary

3. The Policy Planning Staff

This is a small, carefully selected "think tank/troubleshooting" staff, composed of military and civilian specialists whose function is to provide "quick turn" specialized advice directly to the SRSG and DSRSG on key issues. This staff should not exceed 10 specialists.

4. Office of the Chief of Staff

Includes the Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and a Personal Staff composed of:

- Executive Assistant
- Military Assistant
- Administrative/Communications Officer, and
- Two secretaries

The Chief of Staff directly supervises the Executive Secretariat and the Command Center. The Chief of Staff does not have supervisory (rating) authority over the functional Staff Directors or the Zone Directors, but he is responsible for the daily management and integration of Staff and Zone activities for the DSRSG and the SRSG.

5. The Executive Secretariat includes the

- Legal Advisor, and

Officers responsible for:

- Management of OSRSG interpreters/translators
- Protocol and VIP Visitor management (integrates Joint Information Bureau escort functions)
- Management of SRSG driver and security detail, and drivers/security for other OSRSG Principals

6. The Command Center manages:

Coordination of daily operations and activities, information collection and reporting functions, communications with adjacent higher, and subordinate elements, emergency response (such as coordination of medical evacuation) and security activities.

Tasks include:

- Maintenance of 24 hour operations
- Reports Collection, Integration and Briefing
- Emergency Response - Crisis Management Function
- Coordination of NGO activities with Military Operations
- Communications with:
 - Military Forces
 - Zone Offices
 - Local Offices and facilities
 - UNDP - Nairobi
 - UN HQ - New York
 - and
 - USLO, Mogadishu
- Staff Action Assignment and Control

The Operations Center Staff is composed of an Operations Center Director (Military 0-6), an Administrative Assistant and 5 Watch Teams. Each Watch Team includes a:

- Senior Watch Officer
- Watch Officer
- Briefing/Reports Officer, and a
- Communications/Clerical Assistant

Section II

The Staff Directorates

Responsibilities for each staff section include development of strategy and policy options for review by the policy planning staff and decision by the SRSG; design, management and staff integration of functional programs; establishment of intermediate program objectives and milestones; provision of guidance, assistance and daily management for field operations; collection, integration and dissemination of reported information; integration of activities horizontally with other directorates of the functional staff.

The six Directorates should manage the following broad areas of responsibility:

- Military Affairs
- Law Enforcement
- Public Information
- Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
- Political Affairs
- Resource Management

(1) Director for Military Affairs

(Force Commander and his staff)

(2) Director for Law Enforcement

includes 3 components:

- Office for Military Liaison - for coordination of:
 - integration of military reports information
 - presence, stability operation
 - patrolling
- Office for Disarmament coordination:
 - heavy weapons control/cantonment
 - individual weapons policy enforcement
- Law Enforcement Activities
 - Urban Operations
 - city, town security activities
 - guard force development
 - incident response/investigations
 - police academy and training
 - Rural and Border Operations
 - border patrol and customs functions
 - rural security
 - incident response/investigations
 - route and point security operations
 - rural weapons control policy enforcement
 - Judicial and Prison Operations
 - criminal code
 - Judiciary Corps
 - Prison development and administration
 - linking of prison and judicial authorities to national sovereignty

(3) Director for Public Information

(also serves as the SRSG's personal spokesman)

Responsibilities include:

- Media Relations

- **Staff Spokespersons**
 - military - conducts liaison with UNOSOM II Military Commander's spokesperson
 - humanitarian
 - political
- **Public Information Programs**
- **RAJO Activities**
 - Radio
 - Newspaper

(4) Director for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (R3)

This office will have primary responsibility for coordination with NGO/PVO's, ICRC and UN Agencies. Responsibilities include management and coordination of R3 activities in the five relief functional areas. Each of the 14 districts should be assigned four R3 officers, not including the district deputy in charge of R3, each zone should be assigned three officers, not including the deputy, and the central headquarters should have 20 staff, 14 of whom should be devoted to logistical and program support for each of the 14 districts. The remaining 7 staff would include the director of the office, a deputy director, one clerical, two planners, one information management specialist, and one accountant to oversee the financial accountability of field programs. Key functional areas for R3 activities include:

- Food and food production
- Water and Sanitation
- Medical care
- Employment Programs and Banking
- Resettlement and Repatriation

(5) Director for Political Affairs

The Directorate for Political Affairs is subdivided into two sections:

- **Section for Reporting and Analysis:**

Responsible for the tasking, collection, reporting and analysis of political information
- **Section for Political Reconciliation:**

Responsible for nurturing the national political reconciliation process. Includes functions such as:

- Coordination and liaison with NGO/PVOs on political matters
- Conduct/facilitation of Negotiations
- Encouragement of grass roots level Somali political institutions
- Claims settlement processes
- Integration of UNOSOM II political activities with development of Somali political institutions
- Movement of UNOSOM/MIL to the north
- Somaliland Integration Process
- Political Reconciliation
- Somali Political Infrastructure Development

(6) Director for Resource Management

The Director for Resource Management's responsibilities include:

- Personnel management
- Programming and Budget/Finance
- Contracting/Procurement
- Field Operations Support
- Engineering and Facility Management
- Information Systems Management
- Property Management/Maintenance
- Communications
- Medical Support

Resource management and staff sustainment functions require significant and dedicated staff resources, well above those found in "normal" staffing ratios, because the living and working conditions throughout Somalia are austere and challenging.

Section III

Field Operations

A. Responsibilities include the conduct of field operations in pursuit of the SRSG's strategy and policies, designing and gaining approval for local adaptations of those policies as required, and coordination/execution of zone and district activities.

B. Functions include:

- Implementation of Strategy and Policies
- Monitoring and Reporting
- Adjustment of policy for local conditions
- Program Management and Review
- Coordination of programs with adjacent, higher and subordinate elements.

C. Responsibilities and functions for the Zone and District levels are similar. Zone Headquarters will be located at:

Hargeisa
Bossasso
Mogadishu
Baidoa
Kismayu

Two or three District Headquarters will be located within each Zone.

D. Primary Staff required at the Zone Headquarters includes:

Zone Director
Deputy Director (coordinates work of District Offices,
also zone spokesperson)
Secretary
Deputy for Law Enforcement (also does liaison with military)
Deputy for Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction
Political Reporting Officer
Security Officers (X 2)
Communications Officer
Administrative Officer

Each Zonal Military Brigade Commander (BG) will have a Political Advisor (POLAD) assigned to his staff.

E. Primary Staff Required at the District Headquarters includes:

District Director
Deputy Director (Political Officer, also District spokesperson)
Secretary
Deputy for Law Enforcement (also does liaison with military)
Deputy for Humanitarian Affairs
Security Officer
Communications Officer (also does Administration)


Section IV

Summary of Organizational Changes

This proposed organizational concept for UNOSOM II includes the following changes from the current structure:

- Expanding the Office of the SRSG to include a Policy Planning Staff with military and civilian representatives. (We understand that planning for such a staff is already underway.)
- Establishing a Command Center and an Executive Secretariat, both under the supervision of the Chief of Staff. The Command Center would coordinate daily operations and activities, as well as information collection and reporting functions. It also would be responsible for staff action tasking and control. The Executive Secretariat would contain the Office of the Legal Advisor, and the protocol and security staffs for the SRSG.
- Establishing a separate Directorate for the consolidation and management of Public Information, to permit the integration of all UNOSOM II informational activities including Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Public Information Programs and military PSYOP activities.
- Establishing a new Directorate for Law Enforcement responsible for police, judicial, and prison related functions.
- Renaming the Administration Directorate as the Resource Management Directorate and augmenting it with a Field Operations Support Section.
- Expanding the Field Operations Staffs at the Zone and District levels, consistent with current plans.

These organizational changes are designed to provide focus and adequate staffing at three levels of management. The Office of the SRSG must dedicate its resources to leadership and broad policy advocacy for UN programs in Somalia, and avoid operations and support business. The Directorate Staffs are designed to provide the SRSG with strategies and policies required to facilitate execution of programs in the various functional areas represented. The field staffs have been beefed up to provide substantive UN representation and specialized operational support at both the Zone and District levels. Finally, we have added significant administrative and logistical support structure to the entire organization in an effort to overcome the challenges involved in sustaining a large, yet efficient, professional organization in the difficult living and working environment found throughout Somalia.



UNOSOM II COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER

Effective command and control of an organization of UNOSOM's scope and complexity demand centralized communications through a single "nerve center" which can monitor events throughout Somalia 24 hours a day, coordinate UNOSOM's ongoing and emergency operations, provide a control system for action requests of UNOSOM offices and integrate information from a wide variety of sources into comprehensive, real-time briefings for UNOSOM principals and staff. UNOSOM already has many of these components scattered throughout its organization: the HOC maintains a vital link between headquarters and field operations and coordinates military support for humanitarian activity; the radio room provides 24-hour communications support; and the chief of staff's office tracks responses to action requests made of UNOSOM. We recommend consolidating all of these functions into one UNOSOM Command and Control Center (CCC).

We encountered some resistance to the idea of embedding the HOC's operation within a larger command and control center. This is understandable -- the HOC's performance in coordinating military support for humanitarian activity has been one of UNOSOM's greatest successes to date. Nevertheless, it is difficult to justify redundant 24-hour communications structures in a lean managerial structure. Separate operations centers run a risk that not all appropriate branches of the UNOSOM will be involved in responding to emergency situations. They aggravate a common NGO complaint we heard that the HOC fails to give a fully integrated picture of the situation on the ground. Finally, separate operations centers create an organizational confusion: e.g. whom does an NGO staffer contact to report his residence is under attack to energize an emergency response? In light of these concerns, we recommend that the UNOSOM management integrate the HOC into the broader UNOSOM Command and Control Center within six months.

UNOSOM's military operations pose a special problem. The highly technical, sensitive and specialized nature of military operations requires a separate command and control structure that would not easily or efficiently integrate with civilian (i.e. political, administrative and humanitarian) operations. Consequently, we recommend UNOSOM/MIL continue its plans for a transition from the UNITAF Operations Center. To maintain the critical link between UNOSOM's military and civilian operations, however, we recommend the establishment of a Military Liaison desk within the command center staffed by a fixed core of officers from the UNOSOM/MIL Operations Center. This desk would coordinate humanitarian/military operations as the HOC does now, maintain constant contact with the UNOSOM/MIL Operations Center and perform other key support functions as described below.

Integrating the UN Agencies' operations into a centralized command structure is more problematic. We recommend you continue your invaluable daily coordination meetings with UN agency heads as a means of maintaining contact with and oversight of their activities.

Functions

The CCC should be responsible for at least these ten functions:

1. **Monitor** events throughout Somalia, with particular focus on the security situation, political developments and humanitarian/military operations. The Watch Center should not only review all incoming reports from the field, UN headquarters and each UNOSOM division -- it should also have the authority to seek out information by actively and regularly initiating contact with any UNOSOM component. The CCC staff should also monitor both local and international media reports for items of concern for the UNOSOM operation. The staff of each shift should maintain a **log of all significant events and fast action requests** during the shift approved by the Senior Watch Officer and distributed to the Office of the SRSG, his deputy, the Chief of Staff, and the head of each UNOSOM division.
2. **Brief** UNOSOM principals and staff, NGOs and UN headquarters with a daily sitrep which provides a comprehensive summary of all pertinent information from the above sources. The sitreps should maintain a standardized format, and should always address events in the political, humanitarian relief, military and UNOSOM operational spheres. The CCC staff should also be prepared to provide oral briefs as requested and should have access to a mapping capability to assist in briefing. As the HOC phases out of operation, an appropriate representative of the Command and Control Center staff should take over the daily briefing meeting at 0800 for all interested UNOSOM, UN and NGO personnel.
3. Maintain a **duty officer system** consisting of a duty officer on a weekly basis for each of the Directorates, including an interpreter service, each of the UN agencies, and the NGO executive committee. Duty officers must be accessible to the CCC staff on a 24 hour basis, and each week's duty officer list must contain explicit instructions on how to contact the duty officer. The CCC staff should be responsible for alerting the relevant duty officer(s) to urgent developments and requests.
4. Maintain **centralized communications** for UNOSOM headquarters with all local and zone offices with the use of HF radio, INMARSAT connections (with Zone offices only) as well as serve as the telephonic hub for UNOSOM headquarters with direct connections to UNOSOM/MIL, UN Headquarters, USLO, UN Agency Offices and each of the UNOSOM principals' offices. All **field reporting** should be given to the CCC to determine distribution.
5. Command a rapid response team of security personnel that can provide a quick reaction to security emergencies involving UNOSOM, UN agency and NGO personnel and facilities in the immediate Mogadishu area. The members of the team should be billeted in close proximity to the command center.

6. Serve as the principal locus for overall **crisis management** throughout the UNOSOM mission by integrating all crisis-related information from all sources and providing communications support for the use of the UNOSOM leadership. All UNOSOM components throughout Somalia should be instructed to contact the CCC in the event of any emergency or other development requiring headquarters' urgent attention. Any Crisis Task Forces which UNOSOM's leadership convenes should set up operation in the CCC. The Military Liaison desk will play a critical role in ensuring careful coordination between the UNOSOM leadership and its military command structure during a crisis situation.
7. Ultimately coordinate **military support for humanitarian operations** as HOC functions are merged into the CCC's Military Liaison Desk. The desk should assume all of the functions now performed by the HOC, including the validation and coordination of requests for military support for humanitarian operations, the issuance of HRO identification papers, arrangements for military transportation for NGO staff, and liaison on weapons confiscated from NGOs.
8. Maintain a **daily whereabouts list** for the SRSG, the DSRSG, the Chief of Staff, the director of each UNOSOM division and UN agency and UNOSOM's military commander, including a means for contacting the officials throughout the course of the day. The list should be distributed to each of these officials' offices and maintained in the command center.
9. Serve as the principal **tasker** for all action requests made of or by UNOSOM. The CCC will also keep a **tracking log** of all such taskings which should be updated and submitted daily to the Chief of Staff.
10. Provide **staff support** to UNOSOM principals and staff after hours, including short drafting tasks and communications support.

Staffing Components

We recommend staffing the CCC front office with the following positions:

- **Director** - This officer (with the military equivalent rank of Colonel) would conduct the overall management of the CCC and serve as UNOSOM's principal tasker for action requests, according to the procedure set out below. S/he will also set CCC policy, issue guidance to watchstanders and generally maintain a high standard for CCC performance.
- **Administrative Assistant** - This clerical assistant would assist the Director in fulfilling administrative requirements placed on the CCC, including scheduling, producing and distributing the duty officer list, and the maintenance of the Director's slow paper tasking log.

We recommend establishing five teams with each of the following positions to staff the Command and Control Center itself:

- **Senior Watch Officer (SWO)** - This officer (with the military equivalent rank of Lieutenant Colonel), would supervise all activities on the Watch, conduct the morning briefing of UNOSOM and NGO personnel, coordinate all emergency responses and task items on behalf of UNOSOM principals. The SWO would be responsible for activating the Rapid Response Team in an emergency situation.
- **Watch Officer (WO)** - The WO (with the military equivalent rank of Major), would be responsible for monitoring events through message traffic, radio communication with field offices and other sources, maintaining the shift log, conducting alerts on urgent developments, responding to requests and assisting the SWO in his/her duties.
- **Briefing/Reports Officer (BRO)** - The BRO (with the military equivalent rank of Major) would be responsible for drafting sitreps, initiating contact with UNOSOM components and NGO staffers for updates, providing oral briefings as required, and drafting more limited focus briefings for the SRSG and other UNOSOM principals as requested.
- **Commo Assistant/Secretary (CA)** - The CA would perform clerical support for the CCC's operations, and keep communications networks in good working order.

Five teams of four officers each is the minimum staffing level required to staff the CCC 24 hours a day, seven days a week. As the demands on UNOSOM headquarters decrease, we recommend considering a reduction in coverage to 16 hours per day, with an on-call duty system for overnight coverage. This could be staffed with three teams of four officers each.

We recommend that each member of the team receive at least two weeks of one-on-one training before working solo. A procedural manual, containing standard instructions for alerting, briefing, log and sitrep formats, message distribution and other regular CCC procedures is a necessity.

As noted above, this team would have the assistance of a Military Liaison Desk (MLD), which should be staffed by at least two officers with the military equivalent rank of Major. In addition to coordinating military/humanitarian operations, the MLD will maintain regular contact with the UNOSOM/MIL Operations Center, provide mapping and other briefing resources to the CCC, and other tasks requiring rapid coordination with UNOSOM/MIL such as field emergencies (MEDEVACS, etc.).

The Rapid response force should consist of 15 security officers who rotate through 12 hour shifts, five officers per shift. They and an emergency response vehicle should be within easy reach of the CCC; and remain in constant communication with the SWO. The senior officer on duty in the CCC would be responsible for dispatching the force to the scene of an emergency.

Although there are numerous scheduling modules available, we attach one example which regularly and rapidly rotates five teams (A, B, C, D, E) through full 24 hour coverage. The accelerated rotation allows greater exposure to ongoing operations, as well as minimizes stretches of unpopular overnight shifts (which will typically be much slower paced).

SCHEDULING MODULE EXAMPLE

Day:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Shift I 0000- 0800	C	C	D	D	E	E	A	B	B	C	C
Shift II 0800- 1600	E	A	B	B	C	C	D	D	E	E	A
Shift III 0000- 0800	D	E	E	A	B	B	C	C	D	D	E
Special Projects*	A		A		A						
Day:	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
Shift I 0000- 0800	D	D	E	E	A	A	B	C	C	D	D
Shift II 0800- 1600	A	B	C	C	D	D	E	E	A	A	B
Shift III 1600- 0000	E	A	A	B	C	C	D	D	E	E	A
Special Projects*	B		B		B						

* - Special Project duty (indicated here for Teams A & B) provides additional staffing resources in the event of annual or sick leave as well as a pool of assistants to the front office to assist in administrative duty. Three alternating days of special project duty should rotate to each team every seven days, i.e. Team C should be scheduled for the first of its special project day beginning on day 23 according to this rotation.

Action Tasking

The CCC should play the central role in routing and following up on all action requests made of UNOSOM, whether from the field, UN headquarters or within the organization. Action requests will arrive in two forms - more routine requests through memoranda, telegrams and other correspondence ("slow paper") and more urgent requests that come through telephone/radio calls ("fast paper"). The principal official for ensuring that action requests are appropriately routed and acted upon should be the CCC Director. We recommend that s/he institute the following procedures:

I. Slow Paper

- A. All "slow" communications are routed to the WO on duty who will review each piece and make an initial determination of whether any action is required.
- B. The WO delivers action items to the Director, who will determine whether the action request is appropriate (e.g. whether the action has already been handled by other means).
- C. The Director notes which office should take action and which should receive info copies and note them on a covering standardized "buck slip." We recommend that the Director generally give info copies to each of the six directorates.
- D. The Director enters each action tasking into a continuous daily log, with entries to indicate the source and date of the action request, the nature of the action to be taken, the deadline for completion and the final disposition of the request. The daily log should be distributed daily to the Chief of Staff, who should have ultimate responsibility for ensuring proper coordination and completion of action requests.
- E. Action and info copies of the requests should then be distributed to the appropriate offices' boxes in the CCC.
- F. All completed actions should be routed back to the Director who will make the appropriate routing and note the completion of the action on the log. The Administrative Assistant should be responsible for checking with the action office on the deadline day and reporting any problems to the Director and the Chief of Staff.

II. Fast Paper

- A. The WO or other CCC official learns of an urgent action request by telephone, cable or radio report.
- B. The WO consults with the SWO on which officials should be alerted and asked to respond. The Director and Chief of Staff should be alerted to every fast paper action request. CCC resources and staff should play a strong supportive and coordinating role in ensuring the appropriate action is taken.

C. The WO enters onto the log the time of the action request, the nature of the action request, whom was alerted and at what time, and finally the time and final disposition of the action request. The Director should review every shift log to follow up on any outstanding action requests.

Requirements

The CCC should contain at least the following equipment and other resources:

1. Switchboards, with conferencing capabilities, at each CCC position containing "drop" lines to the following offices:
 - The SRSG, DSRSG, COS, and each Directorate
 - UNOSOM/MIL Operations Center
 - UN Headquarters
 - UNDP/Nairobi
2. The base communications unit for radio and INMARSAT contacts with Zone and field offices.
3. A large wall map of Somalia with acetate overlays showing the locations of Zone and field offices and locations of UNOSOM forces.
4. A large wall map of Mogadishu with acetate overlays showing the locations of all UNOSOM, UN Agency and NGO facilities.
5. Communications manuals and directories containing instructions for contacting each UNOSOM office and official.
6. Three clocks showing local, Zulu and New York time.
7. An emergency response vehicle for the use of the rapid response team.
8. Television connection to CNN.
9. Subscriptions to all local press publications.
10. Large briefing area and briefing equipment where the CCC staff can conduct the morning briefing.
11. Mailboxes for each UNOSOM operational component.
12. Console furniture arrangements which will keep all CCC personnel in easy sight and hearing of each other.
13. Crisis management space adjacent to the CCC, with appropriate radio and phone equipment, for use in managing crises by UNOSOM management.
14. A manual outlining CCC standards and procedures.

UNOSOM II COMMUNICATIONS

ISSUES

A. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE

1. Mogadishu communications infrastructure.
 - a. Current
 - b. Near Term
 - c. Future
2. Somalia communications infrastructure.

B. LOGISTICS/PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT

1. On-hand equipment status to handle the UNITAF/UNOSOM transition.
2. Outstanding equipment to complete the UNITAF/UNOSOM transition.
 - a. On order
 - b. In shipment
 - c. Customs delays/problems
3. Planning and tracking of order/repaired equipment.

C. DAILY OPERATIONS

Status of on-line equipment

Authorization process for circuit outages due to reengineering and maintenance.

What service is effected with equipment outages/failures.

Direct and operator assisted international telephone service policy.

Automated equipment - computers, printers, copiers, telephones, etc.

/II. DISCUSSIONS/OBSERVATIONS

A. UNOSOM ENGINEERS/TECHNICIANS

1. Chief of communications and his technicians are fully qualified.
2. There are not enough technicians for the mission. Demand is too much for such a small under manned team.
3. Frustrated with the lack of equipment for the mission due to the procurement/shipping process.

B. UNITAF J6 RELATIONSHIP WITH UNOSOM

1. UNITAF J6 Commander and his staff have worked many hours with the UNOSOM communications staff in all aspects of the transition.
2. J6 staff along with the Signal Brigade troops have worked with UNOSOM in installing and engineering of the UNOSOM network.
3. J6 has assisted UNOSOM in their customs difficulties in Kenya with a report on this issue to follow.

III. ESSENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS**A. MOGADISHU COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE**

1. Procure a Digital Microwave network between the new UNOSOM Headquarters, the old UNOSOM Headquarters facility, and the airport.
Approximate cost \$80K-100K
2. Procure "smart" multiplexers between the same three facilities. This multiplexer must automatically and dynamically allocate bandwidth. These multiplexers should also use an aggregate bandwidth of 1.544MHz with a minimum capacity of 4 T1s.
Approximate cost \$40K-60K
3. Procure Uninterrupted Power Supplies (UPS) for all critical communications equipment.
Approximate cost \$40K-60K
4. Procure channel banks that will allow telephones and radio circuits to be remoted from UNOSOM to the other two facilities with smart multiplexers.
Approximate cost \$15K-25K
TOTAL APPROXIMATE COST \$175K-245K

B. ZONE OFFICE INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Procure 1000 watt HF radios for use as the main voice communications within country. Sub-zones should use 100 watt HF radios.
2. Procure INMARSAT terminal(with facsimile) for use as back-up and emergency communications.
(DIAGRAMS ARE PROVIDED FOR THE ABOVE)

C. LOGISTICS

1. Dedicate an individual to work for the chief of communications to be the communications supply person.
2. Set up a tracking/status system of all equipment.
3. Get daily updates from UN NY on all communications procurement until communications is reliable and diverse.
4. Work a system with the custom authorities to prevent delays. Insure that equipment that is destined for UNOSOM is properly marked by vendors so that it will be recognized as such by customs. Also set up a line of communications between the supply person and the customs section.

D. TECHNICAL/ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE

1. An Engineer from a private contractor should be hired to oversee the network engineering.
2. The current director of communications is too busy with daily operations to handle the network engineering.

E. TELEPHONE OPERATIONS

1. The telephone numbering system is not user friendly nor robust enough to accomplish the mission. Until the large switchboard arrives the move to the new UNOSOM HQs will become even less user friendly. The new switch(to be located at UNOSOM HQs) will help make the system more user friendly as well as give the capability to extend telephones directly via the recommended channel banks to the airport and the old UNOSOM HQs.
2. Direct International telephone access should be restricted to the SRSg, SRSg staff, communications centers, and any others authorized by the UNOSOM COS.
3. All others will have international telephone access through an operator that will be log. The operator should have an authorized users list provide by the COS office. All long distance calls should be logged for accounting purposes.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. The chief and technicians of UNOSOM communications along with the UNOSOM military communicators have all the technical competence needed to perform the mission. They are just short of manpower and the proper equipment.


B. Upon the procurement and installation of the essential recommendations listed in paragraph III the Mogadishu communications will have a sound infrastructure that will allow for expected future requirements.

C. The use of HF radios as a primary means of communications outside of Mogadishu is recommended, primarily based on the cost of satellite communications.

D. Although there are diagrams recommending network enhancements for the future, the computer requirements were not address because UNOSOM is already heading in the right direction. Providing they get what they ordered.


E. The remote sites are limited in their communications because of cost. If time and money allow, the remote zone offices should be upgraded.

SOMALIA COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY




LEGEND


HF = HIGH FREQUENCY 1000 WATT TRANSDUCER
 INMARSAT = INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SATELLITE



MOGADISHU COMMUNICATIONS CONECTIVITY



ZONE OFFICES



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

I. INTRODUCTION There is an urgency about establishing guidelines/tasks for the public affairs effort: except for the SRSG spokesman function, all other Public Information duties have been assumed by UNITAF uniformed forces who are due to depart before the end of the month with their equipment. (The psyop unit has reportedly received orders delaying its departure until June 1, but only provides slight breathing room, given the need for overlap, the slowness of UN recruitment procedures and the need to order equipment now.)

The UNOSOM II public affairs mandate will be broader than was the case earlier, and should make a real contribution to the internal political process. It therefore requires leadership and design involvement by someone experienced both in UN peacekeeping and elections supervision efforts. Once the SRSG authorizes the plan, hiring, based on the plan, should commence immediately.

II. GOALS AND THEMES:

Goals and themes derived from UNOSOM II's mandate should guide the public affairs program. They should be reviewed periodically, will change over time, and emphasis will vary by region.

A. Current:

(a) "Seamless Transition" from UNITAF to UNOSOM: power of enforcement is undiminished.

(b) SRSG, as incarnation of the United Nations, represents the international community's pledge to help all Somalis come together and restore national life: as such, he is impartial.

B. Ongoing:

Stress specific goals of UNSC resolutions and Addis Agreements brokered by UNOSOM, from humanitarian (relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction) to security (disarmament, re-establishment of national police, role of UNOSOM forces). National reconciliation and need for Somalis themselves to accept burden of negotiations for good of all should infuse most information products directed at the home audience.

C. Limited in Time and Space:

Stress the goals of UNOSOM II's operational sections as program proceeds

-- Political: disseminate national political documents so that all Somalis are informed on the process and can hold leaders accountable for what they sign. (The Addis agreements have yet to be distributed. Later, the draft national charter, the draft constitution will need to be the focus of major campaigns).

-- Humanitarian (including rehabilitation and reconstruction): details of the relief operation will be replaced by specific information for DPs in Kenya, for example, and public works activities.

-- Security: information on counterforce military operations will be replaced over time by a targeted info campaign for border security, the move north, de-mining, etc.

D. Review and Coordination:

The SRSB should chair a formal meeting every four months to approve public information (PI) goals for the upcoming period. Views of each UNOSOM II operating section, and the public affairs coordinator for each zone, should be solicited for the proposal the Public Affairs section prepares for that meeting.

III. TARGETS:

In contrast with the UNOSOM I/UNITAF period, where the focus of the United Nation's PI effort was the international media, the weight of the effort now switches to the internal audience and advancing the UNOSOM II agenda. A residual effort will be necessary for the small international press corps, as well as for periodic surges from the large Nairobi-based group. The Public Affairs shop will need to continue to be responsive to Department of Public Information/New York requirements, and preparing information materials for donor nations (e.g., on smaller coalition force contingents).

IV. ACTIVITIES:

Except for television, the full range of media can be exploited effectively, and creatively. Radio is the most important tool currently. Activities by the Public Programs shop will become a major tool for the reconciliation, political, and security programs. As is the case with other UNOSOM endeavors, sustained effort must be made to carry these messages and programs to the zones and regions. International media activities will continue to be focused in the capital, with field trips.

A. RADIO

(a) RAJO should be transferred to the Public Affairs shop and current operations maintained until control of the national stations (currently held by Aideed and Ali Mahdi) can be negotiated to U.N. control. The U.N.

should hold (repair and operate) them on behalf of all the Somali people, until a government is installed. In preparation for these negotiations, which should have a high priority, the German government should be solicited for the rehabilitation of Radio Mogadishu ("Radio Aideed"), once it is turned over to the U.N., to include the provision of a technician to maintain the station on behalf of the U.N. during the period it is under U.N. control.

(b) To expand RAJO's current range, UNOSOM II should negotiate contracts now with Radio Peace based in Addis. (Note: This short wave station, connected to the missionary effort in East Africa, is managed by a longtime USIS Ethiopian employee. It is currently selling UNICEF one hour/day for broadcast to Somalia, and is believed to reach most of the country). Variety programs could be written and translated into Somali here, and faxed to Addis for broadcast.)

(c) The contract, signed by DPI/New York, with Radio Cairo (following DPI's February mission to Mogadishu) should be cancelled. The Somali programming from Cairo is inaudible in Somalia. UNOSOM II should insist on clearance authority for any contracts DPI/York might contemplate entering on its behalf, whether programmatic or personnel.

B. Press

(a) Domestic - Responsibility for RAJO newspaper - the only non-partisan journal in the Somalia - should be transferred to the SRSG's Public Affairs Office. The 6x weekly paper should then continue to be published until it can be turned over to an elected government. It must continue to be the "political" vehicle it now is, and not become a tribune to applaud various U.N. agencies' activities (they can continue to do that in their house organs). Early attention should be focused on getting it to your Zone Directors (so that it becomes truly "national," and a vehicle for unifying the country, rather than continuing the Mogadishu distribution focus it now has). An eventual goal could be either a weekly wrap-around, or additional page, on Zone news, to be added in the field: people like to read about themselves; when they're making positive contributions to national reconciliation or rehabilitation, they should be able to do so.

(b) International - Given the small size of the resident international press corps, one doubts the utility of continuing a daily briefing indefinitely, as long as principals and public affairs staff remain readily available. A weekly briefing with political, humanitarian and military briefers on current activities should be adequate, with a bi-weekly or monthly meeting with the SRSG a target. An informal "sundowner" session with the SRSG, to discuss goals, themes and accomplishments ("spin") might bear more fruit than a weekly session that per force deals with the trees, rather than the forest.

-- An effort should be made in the direction of Nairobi (See XI: "Actions to Take Now"), including its large-resident press corps.

-- International Press should continue to be invited on all SRSG trips, and deputy spokesmen should arrange escorted periodic field trips

for the international press corps to observe UNOSOM II programs in action (the vestiges of UNITAF's JIB operation should be moved to the SRSG's Protocol and Special Visitors office and could provide escort duty from there for both international media and VIP visitors).

-- A special effort should be made with the U.S. press, to correspond with the fall session of the UNGA and the fall budgetary cycle on the Hill (e.g., "60 Minutes," wide-circulation magazines, and similar).

C. Field Programs

The U.N., the ICRC, and various NGOs have experience with mobile field teams which take the message to the people. This needs to be developed rapidly, by someone with experience in these kinds of activities: it has enormous potential in a society which places primacy on the oral tradition. Street theatre, puppet theatre, poetry presentations and contests, Somali dance and songs - all by mobile teams - can advance your agenda in everything from national reconciliation to how-to-recognize-and-report mines.

-- A design shop, headed by an expat, should support this operation with the development of logos, posters, T-shirts, pamphlets, etc. on UNOSOM II agenda items, which will be the subject of field programs.

-- This operation will need the authority to short term-hire Somalis in a wide variety of the arts, and would therefore be something of an income generator for a self-important group (the "intellectuals") who haven't been fully engaged to date in UNOSOM activities.

V. STAFFING

For the public affairs program to have coherence, relevance, and be operationally effective, it needs to be unified under the SRSG Spokesman. There should be a Deputy Director Spokesman for Military/Security Affairs, and another Deputy Director for Humanitarian Affairs -- each responsible for liaison with those operations, and for daily updates on their activities; the Department Head/Spokesman should assume the same functions for the SRSG office and the Political Department. When Public Affairs is fully staffed, there would be Assistant Directors for designated areas, i.e., Radio, Media Relations, Field Programs, etc.

-- Technical staff (largely Somali) should be pooled, so that translators, writers, etc., can work for all divisions, and keep the public affairs staff lean. A small expat technical staff (a photo journalist/staff photographer; a graphic designer; a computer layout desktop publishing specialist) should be hired now for the section. A video team should be brought in periodically to make films for the mobile teams on specific subjects - to hire one permanently for UNOSOM Public Affairs would impose a burden regarding development, editing and duplication equipment that is unnecessary, and likely unmaintainable.

-- The RAJO Somali staff should be brought over, pretty much in toto, to facilitate transition, with the understanding that their duties would expand (be "pooled") under a combined PI operation. A small portion of

the military staff (See VIII) should be transitioned and put under the U.N. hat pending hiring of the full expat group for UNOSOM II Public Affairs.

-- The deputy head of each Zone Office should be deputized as Zone spokesman and have coordination and input for the Public Affairs office, at the Zone level, as one of his or her enumerated responsibilities.

-- The ultimate shape and size of the public affairs staff would depend on what activities the SRSG opts to have included in his public information program. New activities (e.g., field programs) should have a staff designed by the section head.

VI. INTERFACING WITH THE MILITARY

After numerous meetings, we believe this will be less of a problem than feared, once it becomes clear the SRSG intends to have a unified public information program under the direction of the UNOSOM II Spokesman, as staff are transferred and combined to make that point.

A. Current Military Activities

-- Vestiges of UNITAF's JIB staff should be transferred to the new Protocol and VIP Visitors Office in the Secretariat.

-- The Military Commander's spokesman should continue to be a member of his personal staff, and be charged with liaison and coordination with the Deputy Director/Spokesman for Military and Security Affairs on the Public Affairs staff.

-- The RAJO functions (radio, newspaper) and staff should be transferred to the Spokesman's office; the PSYOP functions (flyers, loudspeaker teams, etc.) should be transferred to the new military PSYOP shop.

B. Public Affairs Office

-- Should have a military officer (Lt.Col. rank) as Deputy Director/Spokesman, who would liaise and coordinate with the Military Commander's spokesman and the SRSG's military aide. He would have an equally important task as the officer responsible for public security matters in the PI shop - everything ranging from border security and disarmament, to tracking the reestablishment of the Somali police force.

VII. EQUIPMENT

The necessary equipment obviously will depend on the kind of public affairs program you opt for. We believe all the RAJO equipment (with the exception of the shortwave antenna, which another U.S. Government agency has indicated its willingness to loan to UNOSOM II) is at the end of its useful life and/or should depart with the U.S. military. The CAO has already ordered 2 Risograph printers to replace RAJO's equipment, and should now be instructed to complete the order of duplicate items of RAJO's lean inventory, which has proved its usefulness for information

programs in the Somali environment. In the future (something UNITAF did not have to take into consideration) more attention needs to be paid to companies which have established repair facilities in Nairobi (e.g., Gestetner), given the heavy use public affairs equipment will have.

FIELD OPERATIONS

Background. Our review was conducted while the UNOSOM staff was engaged in the development of its own plans for enhanced regional operations. We have commented on those plans, and believe they fundamentally are sound. This report will highlight some key elements of the plan which will require careful attention in implementation. It also makes some suggestions for greater emphasis in selected areas. The military's concept of operations has not yet been established and therefore was not reviewed. It is assumed that the closest coordination between the military planners and civil UN planners will occur. Recommendations concerning requirements for implementation of humanitarian and reconstruction activities at the District level are made in the organizational concept section. These requirements will evolve as needs become evident.

The recommendations of this report are intended to simplify the command structure and to provide maximum authority to UN civilian chiefs in the Zones. In order to restore an environment in which Somalis can reestablish a satisfactory level of government and societal structure, the civilian UN leadership must design activities quickly and back them with appropriate resources expeditiously.

Discussion: The key tasks requiring coordination at the Zone headquarters level include:

- Security

Several activities are required to immediately facilitate the maintenance of order by UN military forces. Operations and patrols of the UN military forces must be coordinated to meet the needs and objectives as prioritized by the Zone Director. This will include such requirements as protection of NGOs and UN relief field operations, protection for appropriate Somali activities, and other related issues.

In addition to this immediate requirement for security, longer term security will require the establishment and training of indigenous police or gendarmerie elements. This also must be coordinated through the Zone headquarters, although training may be accomplished at a centralized location in Mogadishu. (Specific recommendations on Police Training are made in a separate section of this report.)

Another security activity to be coordinated at the Zone level is the disarmament of clan militias and the cantonment of their larger (crew-served, or vehicle mounted) weapons. This will require close cooperation between UN military and civilian authorities.

Another key activity related to security is mine-clearing. While this may be contracted for from Mogadishu, the designation of appropriate areas should be coordinated through the Zone headquarters.

- **Political Relations**

The goal throughout the country is to create, zone by zone, an environment in which the Somalis can govern themselves. All activities in the Zones must be conducted with this in mind. The provision of basic humanitarian relief efforts by NGOs will, undoubtedly, remain as a longer term effort. The Zone Directors, to create and maintain their credibility with local leaders, must be able to make commitments and to deliver on them in the time and manner promised.

- **Reporting**

A daily brief on local events - concise and directed toward insightfulness, rather than volume - should be a mainstay. The zones must be linked among themselves, and with the headquarters in Mogadishu. Ten to fifteen minute round-ups each day should be the norm.

- **Administrative Support**

A single point of contact for UN Zone activities must be established within the Directorate for Resource Management. The Zone offices should be able to contact one person in the Directorate, who will pursue all administrative matters on their behalf.

- **Communications**

Robust communications from the Zone to the Special Representative's headquarters, with the subordinate District Offices and with the Zone Brigade must be achieved and maintained. Communications are addressed in more detail elsewhere in this report.

- **Staffing**

Recruitment will need to emphasize longer term commitments and some form of introductory training is needed for new-hires. The people selected to fill the 4 or 5 substantive slots are the key to the success of the zone operations. Headquarters should look at the pool of personnel available to them and prioritize, by zone, which particular positions (e.g., humanitarian, political, etc.) at specific posts require the strongest possible person. Dealing with the total number of officers and matching them against the varying needs in the zones should permit better use of all - from the strongest to the weakest.

KEY ISSUES

The following issues require immediate attention to execute the regional field operations envisioned for UNOSOM II.

Issue: Command Relationships

A clear command relationship between civilian authorities and military leaders must be established.

Recommendation: A concise written statement of the responsibilities of each Zone director and the local military commander needs to be drafted specifying who is in charge under what circumstances. While good personal relations between the Zone director and Brigade commander will avoid many problems, explicit written guidance is required to avoid confusion. Also, to improve coordination, it would be wise to designate a military liaison officer to the Zone offices and attach a POLAD to the staff of each of the military brigade commanders.

Issue: Policy Focus

A clear chain of command and coordination process among zone elements must be established. It will also be essential to coordinate interaction with local Somali officials. The UN will need to speak with one voice and execute one policy when working with local Somali representatives. To achieve maximum influence with limited resources, all activities need to be coordinated through the Zone Director.

Recommendation: A reporting/command system for all UN agencies and representatives, reporting through the Zone Director on specified issues and activities, must be instituted. Written guidelines should be drafted to address issues such as:

- All reporting on political activities and/or support related to Somali political groups should be cleared through the Zone Director.
- Responses to requests from Somali government officials should be cleared with the Zone Director.
- Requests for support from military elements should be coordinated with the Zone Director.
- Policy guidance on interface with local Somalis will be required to guard against being "whipsawed" by factions playing one UN agency off against another.

At the District level, site specific arrangements may be necessary, depending upon the particular personnel assigned. However, it should be clear that the reporting chain is through the Zone headquarters and that the Zone Director is accountable for activities in his Districts. Recognizing that some zone staff will belong to independent organizations, it may be advisable to establish a procedure for their, in a limited sense, "secondment" to the Zone Director.

Issue: Resource Management

To be effective, the Zone Director must have strong control over the resources to be directed to his region. He needs to be able to make commitments and deliver on them to the local Somalis. A strong mechanism must exist to support this objective.

Recommendation:

Authority for use of resources must be delegated to the Zone Director to the maximum extent possible. Procurement and contract support should obviously come from Mogadishu, but reasonable discretion in determining requirements and needs should be assigned to the Zone Director. This will require dedicated support to each of the zones from within the UNOSOM headquarters Resource Management Directorate.

Additionally, since UNOSOM funding itself is fairly limited in purpose, coordination at the zone and sub-zone levels for those UN elements with separate funding--such as UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR will be essential.

Issue: Disarmament Policy

A detailed action plan, with associated resources, for disarmament, cantonment and training of Somali forces will be required.

Recommendation: The Addis Accord specifies that UNOSOM take actions to effect disarmament. A program to establish a process for simultaneous disarmament will be extremely difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, this issue must be addressed--especially in those regions where no military forces have yet been deployed. A game plan is being developed to establish cantonments and transition camps where armed forces would temporarily be housed until entering training programs for alternative employment. This program will require extraordinary coordination between the various UN agencies to create and fund the training courses. Since disarmament is such a fundamental issue, it is essential that training programs be established quickly. If funding and other resources for training are needed, separate from the current budgets of UN organizations, a special request should be forwarded soonest. Funding for cantonment (for larger weapons) and bivouacking of inactivated forces needs to be set aside from other aspects of the UNOSOM II budget.

Issue: Communications

Close coordination between zones and SRSG headquarters depends on reliable communications systems.

Recommendation: Assuming a robust HF communications system is established (addressed in the communications section of this report) the SRSG should consider convening a daily conference call among all zones and the SRSG headquarters. This would assure tight coordination and provide routine opportunities to resolve any ambiguities or issues. The SRSG or his Deputy should chair these conference calls.

Issue: Policy Congruity

All zones need to be working with the same set of priorities and objectives.

Recommendation: As part of the start-up process, a mission statement should be established, then updated on a continuing basis. Regular meetings, perhaps monthly, of all Zone Directors should be convened in Mogadishu. This will be particularly important as national reconciliation efforts progress. Continuous interaction between the Zones and Mogadishu will be essential.

POLITICAL SECTION

As UNOSOM II becomes more operational, the Political Section in Mogadishu, which, from limited observation, appears to be running in low gear, must become far more involved with the political officers in the zones, the NGOs locally and the Office of Public Affairs.

Several themes emerged about the political section:

- The field doesn't get its mail answered;
- The NGOs are starved for briefings and cannot make useful contact (they, especially in the zones, could give as much information as they receive);
- The Public Affairs office is not provided the needed "ammunition" to tell the UNOSOM story, day in day out.

We have suggested a structure which divides the Directorate into two sections: Reporting and Analysis and Political Reconciliation. The slots suggested reflect the varied tasks which fall to the political section. As important as any of the staffing patterns one might choose are the outlook and goals pursued by the officers in the Directorate.

The office needs an updated reporting plan which is known and understood through the ranks. Time lines should be established for the more important aspects of their work. The DSRSG and each Director should be familiar with the political office's proposed mission and should contribute to the creation of the plan. The SRSG should review and approve the overall plan. On a quarterly basis, the SRSG and the DSRSG should review the plan with the Director for Political Affairs.

The DSRSG and the present Director of the Political Directorate should divide the political tasks with each playing to his strength. While somewhat unconventional, the DSRSG may become more involved with the direct supervision of portions of the Directorate which are involved in the broader picture which is the responsibility of the DSRSG.

The chain of command linking the field offices to headquarters will become increasingly more complicated and should be established now. While notionally field offices should continue to direct their reports to the SRSG, the reporting in fact will go to the Command and Control Center which will assign action based on contents, and designate info addressees. The field office directors should be advised, up front, of the procedures employed.

UNOSOM II - INFORMATION CONSIDERATIONS

Background:

UN Peacekeeping Operations traditionally have avoided the inclusion of intelligence (information in UN parlance) functions within their staffs, in a deliberate attempt to maintain impartiality, and because intelligence operations and staff were not seen as necessary to accomplish the Observer Force mission of a Chapter 6 Operation.

UNOSOM II is the first Chapter 7 Operation. Such an operation will certainly involve extensive security missions and the potential for active combat operations cannot be discounted. These missions require tactical military intelligence capabilities at staff levels throughout the force structure. To address these concerns an intelligence concept has been designed into the UNOSOM II/MIL command, control, communications, and intelligence architecture.

Discussion:

A relatively robust US military intelligence capability has been included in the UNOSOM II/MIL/US force package. It is unlikely however, that this slice will be able to provide complete intelligence support to all the forces assigned to UNOSOM II/MIL. When UNITAF intelligence operations close down, the U.S. will also terminate several bilateral intelligence sharing arrangements with close allies, which have been in force during the UNITAF phase of Operation PROVIDE HOPE.

There are several impediments to broad intelligence sharing during the UNOSOM II phase of the operation, including classification issues, intelligence sharing policy matters, and technical communications challenges. Additionally, there may be United Nations sensitivities about various types of intelligence activities. Furthermore, there will likely be a great disparity between the capabilities of the various S-2 (Intelligence Staff) shops within the battalions sent from participating nations. Finally, a key source of tactical intelligence will be the operating forces in field. Although a common reporting format has been provided by UNITAF J-2 to the UNOSOM U-2, there likely will be great differences in the degree of detail and responsiveness of the intelligence reporting provided by the many forces. From some reporting will likely be outstanding, from others it may be non-existent.

Recommendations:

That the UNOSOM Command Center and Field Operations staffs work closely with the UNOSOM II U-2 staff and field military intelligence reporting elements in the Zones and Districts to foster the widest possible sharing of reported information from political, relief, public information and tactical military elements, at all levels of the organization. The goal should be to develop a single integrated daily political/military intelligence (information) picture for use by both the UNOSOM II political and military elements. This product should be unclassified and shared with all elements of UNOSOM II, as well as with NGO's and PVO's.

That the UNOSOM II/MIL/ U-2 staff design a short (2 day) course in tactical military intelligence collection and reporting procedures to cross-level the capabilities of the various units deployed to the field, in an effort to improve reporting capabilities and to provide adequate data for analysis.

That the Command Center staff develop a similar training course for officers scheduled for field duty in the UNOSOM II political structure. Officers with political, humanitarian, and public information responsibilities should all attend the course, prior to their dispatch to field sites. Standard daily reporting formats should also be developed.

UNOSOM FUNDING

The one year cost estimates of UNOSOM II, now under consideration by the UN, total \$1.55 billion. We understand that this amount is likely to be reduced because of likely delays in the phasing-in of the UNOSOM operation. Costs will be financed through assessed contributions of which the U.S. share is about 30%. (There is interest in Washington in working with the UN to understand the assumptions underlying Somalia cost estimates and several meetings have already occurred with UN, State, DOD and OMB staffs.) Although no firm decisions on the overall UNOSOM II budget is likely to be made in the near future, we understand that the UN will make about \$350 million available as an advance payment. This amount includes \$70 million of UNOSOM I excess funds. The attached table displays estimated full-year and six-month costs by major category of expense. It indicates for each category the location (New York headquarters or Somalia) of disbursement control, showing that only about \$300 million or 20% of total spending is under the direct control of the field.

The amounts shown in this table are under review and are subject to change. For example, it appears that full-year funding for civilian police would need to be increased above the current \$9 million estimate. We understand that once a total has been approved by the UN, there exists substantial reprogramming flexibility to allow the funds to be redistributed as evolving circumstances warrant.

It should be recognized that UNOSOM funding, provided through assessed contributions, does not include funding for humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. Such funding would be covered by voluntary contributions to appeals by UN relief agencies (See below).

The roughly 20% share of UNOSOM funding disbursed by the field is subject to significant and possibly burdensome headquarters controls. Under current UN rules, UNOSOM must obtain permission from UN headquarters for authority to spend more than \$70,000 on any single item. UNOSOM has recently been granted a waiver by the UN to increase this limit to \$300,000. We would suggest that in order to avoid unnecessary delays in program execution, the SRDG should seek authority to approve items of up to \$500,000. This authority has been granted to the UNTAC Director, so there is a precedent.

We believe that it is also desirable that the SRSB be provided with some discretionary funding for humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance that could be used for quick reaction projects, that could augment the programs of the UN agencies, and NGOs. In this connection, possibilities should be explored of providing discretionary funding of up to \$5 million through existing State Department or AID resources.

Finally, increased demands for financial data and analysis resulting from an expanded UNOSOM program argues for additions of high quality staff to the finance office and for reliable equipment. Difficulties have already occurred in providing up-to-date financial data to the UN because of shortages in both staff and equipment.

Note on financing of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction programs: At the 27 March Addis Conference, donors pledged funding of \$143 million to cover 1993 costs of humanitarian assistance. It is not yet known, however, when (and if) pledges will be met or how funds will be allocated by missions or by organizations (UN suborganizations and NGOs). In particular, it is not clear how pledged funds will relate to the \$166 Million UN program plan, since the allocation of pledged funding is at the discretion of individual donor states. We understand that a new program plan is being formulated by the Humanitarian Assistance Directorate and will be available shortly. This plan allocates funding by mission, organization and region. We also understand that the Directorate proposes that UNOSOM seek up to \$200 million additional funding, the allocation of which would be under UNOSOM control. It is not clear if such additional contributions can be achieved. We would strongly support efforts to (a) formulate a coherent and prioritized program plan that donors would accept; (b) aggressively work with donors, UN organizations and NGO, to implement this plan. Currently, there is the danger of both fragmentation and confusion of effort and of unrealistic expectations.

Cost Estimates for UNOSOM II
(\$ millions)

CATEGORY	<u>FULL-YEAR</u> (May 91-May 93)	<u>FIRST</u> SIX MONTHS	<u>LOCATION OF</u> <u>DISBURSEMENT</u> <u>AUTHORITY</u>
1. Military	836	437	NY
Personnel	(599)	(320)	
Other	(237)	(117)	
2. Civilian Police	9	9	MOG
3. Civilian Staff and travel	167	57	NY/MOG
4. Rental and Maintenance of Premises	166	122	MOG
5. Vehicle Ops	62	40	NY/MOG
6. Air Ops	180	91	NY
7. Commo and other Equipment	60	48	MOG
8. Supplies, Services, Freight and other Support	52	39	MOG
9. Mine Clearance	18	12	NY
	1550	855	

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, REHABILITATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION (RRR) OPERATIONS OF THE UN**

ISSUE.

The UN Humanitarian Assistance Program in Somalia suffers from several institutional weaknesses which affect relief responses in complex emergencies in other countries as well, except that in Somalia chaotic conditions have exacerbated these inadequacies. A humanitarian assistance organizational structure must be designed quickly to plan and implement your RRR program which is sensitive to the constraints of the existing international humanitarian order.

DISCUSSION.

1. With the exception of Somalia, in every recent complex emergency in which there has been an international response, a lead UN agency has been appointed to conduct political negotiations with rebel groups, governments, and local leadership over such issues as movement of relief through conflict lines, the neutrality of relief efforts, and the protection of relief workers. The lead agency personnel and contracting systems provide for planning staff and central administrative staff for the entire UN effort, while each UN agency provides for their own internal requirements.
2. The absence of a lead agency in Somalia has meant internal administrative systems, personnel, and decision making processes have had to be created from scratch. Essentially a new institution must be created in Somalia to manage the emergency; an undertaking the UN by culture and organization does not do particularly well.
3. Emergency operations by their nature demand heirarchical rather than linear organizational structures which are field driven rather than central office driven in which tactical and logistical decisions can be made and executed instantly at the village level. The central headquarters should design an overall strategy and support the field operation. The most appropriate metaphor to describe how an emergency operation should be structured is an inverted military organization: heirarchical, but field driven where the central office only sets general policy, provides logistical support for the field driven programs, and conducts only national negotiations on these policies with national authority figures. This is how the ICRC is structured.

4. The international relief system is designed in precisely the opposite manner: it is a feudal system where the relief barons--the line UN agencies--are entirely independent of each other and to a great degree, of the Secretary General. Boutros Ghali has little power to reform the UN portion of the system. The UN agencies are in active competition with each other, and rely primarily for implementation on NGO's which have a pronounced aversion to the UN system and which are themselves independent actors in competition with one another.

5. This is because the front line UN agencies which are operational in complex emergencies--WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and UNDP--are governed by independent boards of governors made up of donor governments and developing countries. These agencies are funded by voluntary, not assessed contributions, which can be increased or decreased based on performance. For example, the USG (USAID and USDA) contributes a third of all food and funding to WFP, the largest of the UN agencies in terms of budget. This relationship between donors and voluntary agencies permits some measure of control by donors over what the agencies do in the field. You may wish to take advantage of this arrangement if you are unable to convince an agency representative in the field that some course of action ought to be taken. Three of the four of these principle line agencies are led by Americans. In the fourth the chief operating officer is an American.

6. Correcting these weaknesses in the international humanitarian relief system will take years of effort by donor governments, but the existing system can be made to work.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Given the relatively short time you will spend in Somalia we suggest you accept the humanitarian system as it is currently constructed and work to improve it. Do not try to reform the way the system is structured or correct its deficiencies in any comprehensive way, but rather focus on making the agency programs do what you want them to.

2. You need to establish a greater level of trust between the NGO community and the UN agencies in Somalia. We suggest you do this using the following guidance:

a. Attend the morning CMOC meetings at least once a week. They are only 15 minutes long and will show you care and make you accessible to NGO workers.

b. Have dinner maybe once a week at the compounds of the NGOs, perhaps having a couple of NGOs combine their dinners to increase your coverage. Listen to what they say. Don't promise anything (particularly things you aren't sure you can deliver on). If you do promise something make absolutely sure you deliver. Unkept promises are what has soured relations with Somalis and NGOs alike.

c. You may wish to select two or three of their most common and most legitimate complaints and fix them.

3. Establish a \$5 million fund to provide money for small immediate interventions through both international and indigenous NGOs. This can be done by umbrella grants of \$2 million each by OFDA and ECHO (the EC equivalent of OFDA) to a leading international NGO in Somalia and \$1 million from the Special Emergency Fund of \$50 million controlled by Jan Eliason at DHA. These umbrella grants must be used for relief purposes (OFDA money can not legally be used for development or reconstruction) and could be structured, if you can find an NGO to agree, to give your humanitarian program manager approval power over each individual intervention and allow you to initiate proposals yourself. In an umbrella grant the grantee does no service delivery themselves, but rather acts as an administrative office to give many small grants to other smaller NGOs, international or indigenous.

4. The CMOC is the single most important institutional structure created in this emergency which ties the military, donor aid programs, UN agencies, and NGOs together operationally and sectorally. UNOSOM II should continue its operation. We endorse the CMOC organizational diagram and statement of responsibilities designed by COL Kevin Kennedy with three caveats: the center should have no more than 10 employees (your current staffing plan proposes to increase the staffing from the current level of 10 to 30, an increase which probably will make the center dysfunctional not more efficient), an MP squad with transport and communications should be attached to and be colocated with the CMOC for dispatch by the CMOC Director when there are security crises which require immediate attention, and finally ensure all ten of the CMOC staff are fluent in English, the language of international relief.

5. The Director of the CMOC should be close personally to the UNOSOM II military commander, and should see that commander on a daily basis.

6. The field operation of humanitarian assistance should be heavily weighted towards the field. At least 65% of the total staff should be located at the subregional level, 10% percent of the contingent at the four regional offices and 25% at the UNOSOM II Headquarters with most of this HQ contingent devoted to a field support and logistics division. The proposed field personnel chart is top heavy and should be reviewed now before the staff is deployed and it is difficult to change the structure. The field staff should have the power to spend money (from the \$5 million fund mentioned above) up to perhaps \$50,000 on a specified list of interventions. The field staff should monitor all expenditures at their level carefully and constantly to ensure the money is not misspent or used improperly. In hiring humanitarian field staff officers the most important quality to look for is long experience in managing development programs at the field level in third world countries.

7. The failure by UN central headquarters in many complex emergencies to provide field staff themselves with food, water, medical care when they become ill, decent housing, and security has collapsed field operations overnight. The absence of this sort of support for staff has made-UN operations ineffective in the past as staffs spend a large amount of their time trying to survive or physically removing themselves from their miserable living conditions by coming to central headquarters rather than

doing substantive work. Beyond a logistical support system for the field staff the other major functions of the central headquarters should be in policy and planning and an oversight function (perhaps a traveling field accountant to assist in setting systems of accounts up) to ensure quality management at the field level.

8. The field offices should be tasked with collecting monthly data from UN, ICRC, and NGO offices on nutritional surveys, morbidity and mortality tracking systems, and market and household surveys.

9. The three sets of data from UN, ICRC and the NGO's will tell you the nutritional condition of children, how many people are dying from what cause by area, and the price of food compared to income. These early warning systems will tell you whether or not a food or medical emergency is developing before they reach crisis proportions so that you can intervene. Given that a serious nutritional situation still exists in some areas with death rates which are unacceptably high, the system will also tell you when these existing conditions are improving. These surveys are regularly done now by the ICRC, UNICEF, MSF and CARE, but the data is not aggregated centrally and reviewed by UN HQ staff. The data if read by you personally and reviewed monthly with Hugh Cholmondeley, would give you invaluable information from each area.

10. We suggest that your humanitarian office design and post large wall size charts on RRR programs for the purposes of UN, ICRC and NGO coordination with plastic overlays so they can be updated easily. These charts should be placed in the OPS center so each NGO can put their program up by type of intervention, target dates for completion, size of target population, and geographic area.

ISSUE.

Design a five-part program for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country during the two year UN presence which will make the country:

(1) able to feed itself through domestic protection (animal herds and agriculture) and provide carefully targetted food aid to vulnerable groups unable to support themselves,

(2) provide three essential services for survival--water, sanitation and medical care,

(3) job creation through the private sector. The UN should create a minimal banking system in an effort to maintain a stable currency to prevent the currency merchants from manipulating the value of the Somali shilling which they have been successfully doing for the last five months. The demining effort can create a number of jobs and will make parts of the countryside habitable which aren't now. Create jobs in the public sector by funding the salaries of public sector employees for services which employ large number of critically important people--police, judges and teachers. Job creation should be the consequence of the provision of public services not the purpose of it,

- (4) provide for civil order (police, judges, and prisons), and
- (5) resettle displaced people and repatriate refugees.

DISCUSSION.

Under the chaotic circumstances in Somalia, small-scale, modest programs directed towards making the country even marginally functional are more realistic than grand strategies to rehabilitate or reconstruct everything destroyed over the past two years. The Somalis are an industrious, ingenious, and shrewd people who we can expect will begin to restore civil society on their own. The ICRC reports that 10,000 children in South Mogadishu are now in schools reopened by about 50 women who run the ICRC feeding centers acting on their own. These mothers recruited hundreds of teachers from the old system, somehow without any money collected blackboards and books, and opened schools in the feeding centers they managed. They never told the ICRC they were doing this and never asked for any money or help.

Team members saw similar schools in North Mogadishu and in Merca where 3500 children are in school.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. The UN's broad strategy on RRR programs for the next two years should be to determine what needs to be done and what the NGO's, ICRC and UN agencies actually intend to do within the four goals listed above--much of this work was done by Phil Johnston already. For any initiatives which they promise but fail to carry out, or which no one intends to do, but needs to be done, private corporate contractors should be found. In other words use private contractors to fill the gaps. Hugh Cholmondeley has proposed this approach and we fully endorse it as a mechanism for improving accountability. Most donor governments for a variety of reasons, channel most of their contributions to a country in crisis through the ICRC and NGOS, not to the UN. This is true particularly for undesignated grants.

The modest initiatives listed above will (1) further reduce death rates which are still well above acceptable levels and prevent them from skyrocketing again and (2) make the society marginally self-sufficient in those matters essential to maintaining life.

2. All other activities, e.g. opening the university system, rebuilding the transportation system, reconstructing the electrical power grid should be put aside--donors won't pay for them. Thugs may steal whatever the international community builds in the way of infrastructure. The society is too traumatized and unstable to accomplish such tasks. The country can't sustain these sort of large scale activities once the international community leaves, and the economy of Somalia does not have the capacity to absorb that amount of money. Too much money will corrupt further the

already damaged value system of Somali society. Modest projects to encourage initiatives by people in their own communities are where RRR money should be directed. Small is beautiful. Size is not.

3. Use the UN resolutions, Secretary General's reports, and the Addis Conference agreements as general guidance for what you are allowed to do in RRR in a very general sense, not as a plan for what you should do operationally or programmatically. Some of the RRR programs suggested in these documents cannot be accomplished managerially or even begun over the next two years.

4. The resettlement and repatriation program is essential to the restoration of food production, since as much as 50% of these people are farmers according to UNHCR. More of the interriverine people between the Juba and Shebelle rivers, who tend to be farmers, died or were displaced by the civil war and starvation than any other group. Many farmers have returned from displaced camps to plant the crop leaving their wives and children in the camps. If they succeed in planting the crop and rural insecurity continues, farmers may refuse to harvest the crop or permanently relocate their families to the villages. Much of the starvation last year was a function of food stocks being stolen by clan militias from farmers, leaving them nothing to eat or seed to plant.

ICRC reports as much as 45% of the displaced population of Mogadishu has informally returned to their villages. We do not believe a massive repatriation program is necessary as long as people are given several months food, seeds and tools when they depart. They can manage their own relocation.

5. Because of the nature of Somali culture and patterns of behavior, large scale programs, with large amounts of money, limited Somali leadership, and distant management by expatriates have usually disappointed. That is not what the country needs right now.

THE SUBSTANTIVE UN RRR PROGRAM SHOULD EMPHASIZE MODEST PROGRAMS, TARGETTED TO THE FIVE OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED ABOVE, WITH STRONG LOCAL SOMALI LEADERSHIP, CLOSELY MONITORED BY UN FIELD STAFF, AND FUNDED WITH VERY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF OUTSIDE MONEY.

REBUILDING THE SOMALI LEGAL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

Presently there is no national legal system operational in Somalia. There are ad hoc decisions by elders and religious leaders. In the Baidoa area there is a functioning police-judiciary-prison system sponsored by Australian UNITAF forces and based primarily upon the Somali penal code. And there are apparently other regional or sub-regional criminal justice systems functioning, e.g. the US UNITAF-sponsored effort in Merka. But there remains an urgent need to develop regional legal systems in all areas under UNOSOM control in the near term, and to work toward a self-supporting transregional legal system as soon as possible.

The severe clan-based factionalism of Somalia presents a monumental challenge to reestablishment of a national legal system. But there is cause for cautious optimism, based not only on the nascent local criminal law enforcement, but also based on recent political progress, e.g. the Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, dated 27 March 1993.

GOALS

Establish a transitional system for prosecuting and punishing criminals.

Set the stage for a transregional, hopefully national, legal system.

TASKS

Focus UNOSOM law-related resources, including military judge advocates accompanying UNOSOM forces, on achieving a workable judicial system suitable for the transition away from the present chaos toward a self-governing, self-sustaining Somali society.

Identify geographical areas with highest likelihood of an early return to acceptance of, and reliance upon, a judicial system. Allocate resources to those areas first.

Use UN resources to meet minimum needs of a transitional Somali court system, e.g., funding for salaries and supplies. Only a small number of courts will be needed initially; in a single area perhaps only one court at each level, i.e. a trial court and an appeal court.

Identify individuals willing to, and qualified to, serve as judges. At a minimum judges should be individuals that have previously held such positions. Optimally, judges should be people that have previously sat as judges at the level at which they are proposed to serve, e.g., the trial or appellate level, and should be vetted by the police and by an independent association of jurists.

Assure judicial impartiality. In single-clan areas this will be easier. In multiple-clan areas impartiality must still be achieved, perhaps by requiring judges to function in three-judge panels in cases involving serious offenses. Prosecute and punish criminal. Publicize the offense and the outcome.

Establish a secure environment for courts. Collocate courts with police stations, ideally with a separate entrance to emphasize the independence of the judiciary from the prosecutorial police function. Have UNOSOM forces visibly support police stations and courts, particularly during court proceedings.

Protect judges from intimidation and revenge. Provide police security in the near term, if possible. Consider using UN-appointed judges to make the detention decision, i.e., the decision that there is probable cause to hold an accused party in jail pending trial. Consider diluting responsibility for the outcome of criminal prosecution, e.g., by using a panel of judges, rather than a single judge.

Promote professionalism, collegiality, and impartiality of Somali jurists. A single multiple-clan, multiple-faction bar association should be encouraged, e.g., by giving the bar association input into creation of the transitional legal system.

Speed the process of drafting the Transitional National Charter. Use preexisting Somali legal principles to the greatest extent possible, but share power among the factions (to minimize mistrust), and retain flexibility for the UN to guide or intervene in the judicial system, if necessary, without contravening the Charter.

Nurture and guide progress toward a transregional legal system. A national system is unlikely any time soon, but as regions develop legal systems the regions can perhaps be tied together at least as a loose confederation of regions as time goes on.

STAFFING

A primary responsibility of UNOSOM will be active involvement in mediating formulating and implementing legal systems at the Transitional National Council level, e.g., participation in the Charter drafting process and liaison with jurists. That responsibility would be best performed by attorneys. We recommend two attorneys be hired for this purpose, one temporarily (to "jump start" the Charter drafting process) and one "permanently" (to help keep the Transitional National Council moving forward in developing an independent judiciary and to look out for UN interests).

a. One expert in constitutional law and history should be immediately sought for assistance in drafting the Transitional Charter and should be hired for only that period. The qualifications for that expert, in descending order of importance, are expertise in constitutional law and history, outstanding legal credentials (i.e., schools, writings, and jobs), and third world experience. This hiring is urgent because the Charter drafting process is scheduled to take only 45 days from 10 April 1993.

b. Another, more permanent, attorney will be needed to serve as the Legal Advisor to the SRSG. The primary responsibility of the Legal Advisor will be to maintain the momentum of the current peace process over the long haul. The Legal Advisor will need to be able to provide legal guidance over a broad range of matters, e.g., criminal justice, constitutional law, interpretation of UN resolutions, rules of engagement, etc. Accordingly, we recommend seeking a talented, mature generalist (rather than a specialist) with substantial experience as a staff legal advisor. This individual will need to be suited for daily contact, on both a professional and a social basis, with military judge advocates of UNOSOM forces and with Somali jurists.

The Legal Advisor will be one of two full-time attorneys (one attorney is committed to international procurement) and a number of part-time consultants (including the constitutional law expert dedicated to the Charter drafting process) employed on an as-needed basis. Additionally, a secretary and two translators will be needed.

The legal section should be located in the Executive Secretariat, but the Legal Advisor must have unimpeded access to the SRSG.

UNOSOM LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE

I. ISSUE: UNOSOM II management structure for the development of a Somali Law Enforcement Infrastructure.

II. DISCUSSION: We are not at a point where, in the absence of a government in Somalia, there is any body other than UNOSOM capable of creating and administering a critically needed law enforcement establishment. The task of putting the current infrastructure in place - recruitment, training, communications, logistics, payment, etc. - is costly and should, at the outset, provide only essential services. The goal in this venture parallels UNOSOM's overall philosophy: put the organization on its feet solidly enough to ensure the Somalis can take it over within a minimum time frame. A recommended staffing plan is provided below. It is a lean organization whose primary function will be to assist in establishing, funding, advising, and logistically supporting a nascent Somali law enforcement system. It is recommended that a training academy be instituted using a reputable contractor. The contract should be flexible enough so that the institution could change with the needs of the evolving Somali legal system. The institution should be set up in such a way as to permit it to transition and become the Somali National Law Enforcement Academy. We propose that UNOSOM begin by providing training for potential Somali law enforcement trainers.

III. RECOMMENDATION:

A. Establish a Law Enforcement Directorate within UNOSOM.

1. Director
2. Deputy
 - a. Logistics staff (2)
 - b. Clerical staff (4)
3. Assistants (Subject Matter Experts)
 - a. Judicial (prosecutor or judge)
 - b. Police (3 positions)
 - (1) Police
 - (2) Rapid deployment
 - (3) Riot police
 - c. Customs
 - d. Border patrol
 - e. Law Enforcement Academy Programs Officer

B. Man each of the five UNOSOM Zones with a staff to manage, oversee, report and assist the development of the regional law enforcement system. Coordinate with the regional UNOSOM provost marshal on all law enforcement matters to include, but not limited, to combined police patrols, training, and emergency support to bolster the local police.

1. Zone Advisor
2. Deputy
 - a. Administrative assistant

C. Man each of the 14 UNOSOM sub-Zones with a staff to advise the local law enforcement organizations, provide logistics support, coordinate liaison with UNOSOM military forces and report on organizational progress.

1. Advisor
2. Assistant

D. Contract with a private company to establish and run a Somali Law Enforcement Academy. The academy should cover all aspects of law enforcement and should be the center for visiting academic jurists who could advise Somali judges in their establishment and enforcement of Somali law. If required, the law Enforcement Academy should be prepared to adjudicate, represent, or prosecute cases where clan tensions make a fair trial impossible. Areas to be covered are:

1. Basic police academy
2. Criminal investigation
3. Somali law
4. Riot police training
5. Rapid deployment force training
6. Customs training
7. Border patrol training and tactics
8. Maritime patrol training and tactics
9. Custodial force training (prison guards/prison administration).

Specialized training, Items D, 2-9, would be performed on an "as required or available basis." Some disciplines such as maritime patrol may exceed UNOSOM resources and may be achieved in other ways.

ISSUE - UNOSOM II PERSONNEL AND STAFFING LEVELS

The current UNOSOM II staffing plan includes the establishment of five regional zones with fourteen subzones, and envisions the staffing configuration on the chart below:

	<u>Profess- ional</u>	<u>GS/ES</u>	<u>Total Int'l</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters (Program)	57	52	109	24	133
Field Posts	72	86	158	124	282
Headquarters (Admin)	78	460	538*	375	913
TOTAL	207	598	805	523	1,328

* = 14 in Kenya/Djibouti

The involvement of 255 UN Volunteers and 600 local contractors (char force, gardening, drivers and porters) is also planned.

Though the total numbers for international administrative staff may be slightly in excess of the leanest possible profile, it is clear that current administrative resources, both human and material, are inadequate to support the existing UNOSOM operation. Therefore, especially given the need to support 19 remote field locations, the size of the administrative staff will have to increase in percentage terms by more than the program staff. Somalia is a case where increasing the "tooth to tail" ratio of the international staff to the levels of more typical missions would be counter-productive. It would insure nothing except that program staff will continue to spend disproportionate amounts of their time on survival and self-support, significantly decreasing their productivity. In short, the staffing plan is generally sound and should be supported.

The recruitment of professional staff is proceeding about as well as could be expected given the many high priority missions on the UN's platter. Emphasis on secondment of reporting officers from member states, especially individuals with experience in Africa and/or field operations,

should continue. Once identified, the UN personnel system has been able to move quickly to get secondees aboard. For other professional staff, especially in the administrative area, knowledge of the UN system is essential. Even here, the efforts of the Mission CAO and the Personnel Officer have begun to bear fruit as the Mission has been notified of 32 new professional staff recruits in the pipeline as of April 10.

As UNOSOM I becomes UNOSOM II, it is extremely important to regularize the lifestyle of the staff. The institution of a six-day workweek and the relocation of the staff into a single compound with reliable plumbing, air conditioning, security and CNN will provide a great deal of psychological support needed to normalize the work environment. Currently many staff members, especially senior personnel, are working long hours seven days a week. There is too little personal time to enable individuals to continue their intensive level of commitment and performance. There are few to no opportunities for normal, short term diversions short of taking leave outside Somalia. At present, the post is too pressed to have massive departures for leave. Nevertheless, many of the key staff members are nearing burnout.

Of great concern is the UN system's ability to fill the nearly 600 technical/support positions on a timely basis. There may, however, be a faster and more flexible way to get these jobs filled, i.e. a "body contract" with a major international company with demonstrated ability to operate effectively in Somalia. Such a contractor could draw from its own staff throughout the world and/or recruit in countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, India or Pakistan where there are large numbers of highly-trained technical/support personnel willing to come to Somalia on short notice. Many of these individuals speak English and have job experience in Islamic countries. We believe that the overhead/profit of the contractor would be more than offset by substantially lower compensation and subsistence costs paid to direct hire UN employees.

Another virtue of the contract approach would be its flexibility, i.e. the speed with which personnel could be added or subtracted. Indeed, a specific provision of the contract should be that the contractor establish and carry out a training program to systematically replace expatriates with Somalis. This latter consideration will be particularly important in the context of the contemplated future "Somaliaization" of the work force. Such an approach to filling personnel requirements is at variance with the UN's usual procedures but a similar program was authorized for UNPROFOR. UNOSOM should request and the USG should support similar authority for UNOSOM. For maximum effectiveness, UNOSOM should be authorized to limited competition for this contract award to firms with demonstrated ability to operate successfully in environments similar to Somalia.

UNOSOM currently receives a substantial number of official visitors. The outlook, as its mission budget and staff expand and security is enhanced, is for significant increases in both UN and member state delegations. This issue was not a high priority for UNOSOM I and previous staff limitations would have made a special visitor unit a luxury. The situation, however, has changed and the need becomes more apparent each day.

Finally, as the establishment of five zone and fourteen sub-zone offices will provide an opportunity to expand exponentially UNOSOM's knowledge of the situation countryside, it will also raise questions of lines of authority and reporting channels within the zones. The chiefs of zone teams should, on one hand, have the authority to see and comment on all substantive communications (other than those of a purely internal agency program management nature) and, on the other hand, have the responsibility to solicit and include as appropriate in their reports the views of all team members. A case in point for the need for clear Zone Chief authority is the recent incident in Hargeisa involving the WHO rep who allegedly jeopardized the operations of all other agencies by authorizing a major importation while all other agencies were holding off doing so while negotiating for more reasonable handling charges.

LOGISTICS FOR THE UNITAF-UNOSOM TRANSITION

BACKGROUND: At the initial stages of the operation, U.S. Marine Forces, with a U.S. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), provided common item and combat service support logistics for UNITAF forces. Major common items support included subsistence, water, barrier/construction materials, petroleum products (bulk and packaged), ammunition and repair parts. Handling of confiscated weapons and ammunition was also a common item service provided by Marine Forces. As U.S. Army Combat Service Support units arrived, common item and combat service support logistics, to include the confiscated weapons and ammunition, was transitioned from Marine Forces to these units under the Commander, Unified Task Force, Support Command (UNITAF SUPCOM) and was completed by Day 50 (D+50). As a result of this transition, the UNITAF J-4 assumed responsibility for all theater logistics functions. These responsibilities are now in the process of transition to the UNOSOM II military logistics staff (Chief Logistics Officer/CLO). The purpose of this paper is to highlight issues with recommendations that will ensure a "seamless logistics transition" to UNOSOM II.

ISSUE: Need for an Operational Plan

Discussion: In order to specifically identify logistics requirements, an Operational plan for the Force Command responsibilities of the UN mandate must be completed. The CLO will continue to be hampered in the logistics planning area without a clear picture of the mission to be supported (i.e., forces involved, level of possible conflict, scheme of maneuver, etc.). This plan must also be done in coordination with the Zone Office structure.

RECOMMENDATION: Complete the Operational Plan for the primary and secondary Force Command mission objectives as soon as possible.

ISSUE: Inadequate personnel and equipment staffing

Discussion: Although the organizational structure for the office of the CLO is adequate, the staffing in terms of personnel and equipment is far from sufficient to proceed with logistics planning. As of 11 April 93 only 23 of 66 personnel positions had been filled. A lack of logistics planning personnel will require planning assistance from UNITAF in the interim and will delay the transition to UNOSOM II. Specifically, the

consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment; disarmament activities; expanded mineclearing; assistance in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; and other Force Command missions will be slowed. Additionally, office equipment (desks, chairs, lamps, supplies, phones, and automation capability) is an acute shortage that also is slowing the logistics planning process.

RECOMMENDATION: Staff and equip the UNOSOM II military staff as soon as possible.

ISSUE: Inadequate military logistics force structure

DISCUSSION: At the present time, there is an inadequate military logistics force structure to proceed with the UN mandate. The present logistics force structure is capable of supporting the current UNITAF area, however, expansion to other regions of the country is not logistically feasible at this time. Specificity of logistics requirements is unclear and will remain so due to a number of factors. Two of these factors were discussed above. Additional factors include the UN hesitancy to pursue logistics contributions with other donor nations. The UN has approached other potential donor nations at lower levels in the organization, not at the necessary national levels. The US government has assisted in the identification of many potential contributors and has offered, in official correspondence, to follow up UN official requests with US demarches to these countries. The UN Field Operations Division continues to look to more contributions from the US government even though the US position has been made clear. The US position is based on a variety of factors, including downsizing of the defense structure in terms of personnel and dollars; other present/future operations; and a 75/25 percent breakout of Reserve Component (RC)/Active Component (AC) logistics force structure. Finally, identification of UNOSOM II logistics requirements for solicitation of donor nations by the UN must be specific in nature as to the type and/or capabilities required. For example, a UNOSOM II request to the UN, SUBJECT: German Support for UNOSOM II, stated "...we could use help in administration, logistics, communications and other forms of support functions." This is clearly too general in nature. More specificity in the requirement is a must in order to solicit other donor nations. As an example, "Request you solicit the German government to provide a Medium Truck Company (2-1/2 ton/5 ton) that is capable of transporting 250 tons of dry cargo per day. This company should include its own first and second echelon maintenance/spares capability." This type of request reflects not only adequate logistics requirements planning at the UNOSOM II staff level but also greatly increases the likelihood of donor nation acceptance.

RECOMMENDATION: UNOSOM II CLO staff should specifically identify type unit/capabilities required to UN FOD.

ISSUE: Integration of Military, Humanitarian and Political Activities into the Zone Structure

DISCUSSION: The operational plan to pursue the UN mandate must integrate all military, humanitarian and political activities. The five zone office structure must coincide with the five military Brigade areas. UN agencies

and NGO field operation headquarters should co-locate in the same general vicinity of each Brigade headquarters for numerous reasons, i.e., security, coordination, communications, logistics, etc. The proposed thirteen (13) subzone offices should also co-locate with a military element, preferably a military Battalion level headquarters, for the same reasons. A clearcut chain of command between the military and civilian leaders in each zone must also be established.

RECOMMENDATION: Integrate all three elements of the zone structure into the operational plan.

ISSUE: Identification of Donor Country Logistics Contributions

DISCUSSION: Even without logistics type unit/capabilities information from the UNOSOM II CLO staff, the UN Field Operating Division has successfully recruited several donor countries to provide a logistics capability. However, as previously recommended, the specificity of type unit and capabilities is missing and, hence, hinders further logistics planning for the utilization of these units.

RECOMMENDATION: The UN FOD should only recruit using specific type unit/capabilities information provided by the UNOSOM II CLO staff.

Logistics Concept for the Future: With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the threat of global warfare has dramatically decreased. Hence, defense structures in UN member nations, to include the United States, are in a downsizing mode. This downsizing includes the logistics capabilities to support U.S. as well as other international coalition efforts throughout the world. An immediate logistics capability is the key to the success of present and future UN operations. As evidenced by UN operations in Somalia, combat forces are readily offered by donor countries. The same is not true in the logistics arena. To overcome this decreasing logistics capability, I propose the UN investigate the establishment of a UN logistics force structure for essential equipment augmented by contractor support. An excellent example of this proposal in action is the logistics of the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, Egypt. A common set of logistics equipment (material handling equipment, vehicles, tankers, cargo haulers, etc.) augmented by civilian contractor for services (food, laundry, maintenance, etc.) has successfully operated for over ten years. These proposed sets of equipment and contractor support could be purchased, stored and maintained throughout the world for immediate use by the UN. Other options could include prepositioning afloat on UN purchased or contract shipping or simply the establishment of open contracts with suppliers to provide this equipment/services within a specified timeframe.

RECOMMENDATION: Propose that the UN establish a blue ribbon panel to investigate the feasibility of this proposal and report on their findings within 90 days.

UNOSOM PROCUREMENT

INTRODUCTION

The ability of UNOSOM to support Somalia depends in large part upon UNOSOM's ability to support itself. The transition from UNITAF/UNOSOM to UNOSOM II carries with it a risk that the orderly, timely flow of supplies and services will be disrupted by the transition of responsibilities; that must not be permitted to happen. Due to personnel shortages, UNOSOM is not presently ready to assume complete procurement responsibility and is stretched much too thin to operate efficiently. This shortfall in personnel will likely resolve itself in due course, but UNOSOM cannot afford to wait. Action also should be taken now to fill critical vacancies. Action also should be taken now to effect critical contract actions.

GOAL

Ensure that all actions that require procurement occur in a timely fashion to support UNOSOM operations.

TASKS

Fill critical positions in the CAO office, e.g., Technical Services Chief (Erich Yaros (ph) has been tentatively identified), Administrative Services Chief, and Engineering Services Chief (though this is less urgent than it might be because military engineers are available for some purposes). Filling these positions will not only have impact upon the matters normally within their areas of responsibility, but will also have beneficial impact on all the people that are performing those functions now, in addition to their own duties.

Consider temporarily detailing UNOSOM military personnel to the CAO office to assist in logistics, procurement, and comptroller functions. These personnel would share the workload in the CAO office and would facilitate necessary liaison with UNOSOM forces.

Request that UN operations in Cambodia and Yugoslavia, which are much more established and much more accessible, be tapped to provide personnel to UNOSOM long enough to help build inertia in the UNOSOM procurement and logistics systems, to get fuel moving on a regular, routine basis.

Raise the dollar threshold at which contract actions must be approved by "New York" from the present \$300,000 level (until recently it was \$70,000) to \$500,000, which is the threshold reportedly applied in contracting for the UN operation in Cambodia.

"New York" and the US Department of State reportedly have approved a six-month arrangement in which the US Army Corps of Engineers LOGCAP contract with a US contractor may be used by UNOSOM on a reimbursement basis, i.e., UNOSOM may order services directly from the US contractor and reimburse the US. That UN approval must be confirmed, approval by the US contracting officer (in the US Army Corps of Engineers) must be confirmed, and implementing arrangements worked out so UNOSOM can initiate urgent contract actions, e.g., well drilling.

Begin now the process of establishing UN contracts for services and supplies to be provided in Somalia. The indirect relationship that may be used in the US LOGCAP contract is not a good long-term solution.

Bring in an attorney experienced in UN contracting for the purpose of advising the CAO and his office in procurement matters.

ATTORNEY STAFFING

The UNOSOM procurement office operates, of course, internationally. Thus there is a spectrum of legal systems concerning which legal advice may need to be provided. Accordingly, we recommend an attorney specializing in procurement be obtained for UNOSOM and that Somali consultants be put on retainer and used on a part-time, as-needed basis in conjunction with local contracting.

The procurement attorney must be experienced in UN contracting in field operations, ideally in Africa. There simply is not time to learn the trade. A person in this position will have no one to turn to with technical questions and must be able to contribute immediately.

The procurement attorney should be located in the Executive Secretariat under the supervision of the Legal Advisor to the SRSG.