

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia, 1993 [10]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Rice, Susan

Original OA/ID Number:

277

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	5	1	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Situation Report No. 22 (1 page)	06/18/1993	P1/b(1)
002. report	Situation Report No. 20 (1 page)	06/17/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	06/18/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. report	Somalia: Situation Report #9 (3 pages)	06/18/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Response to President Gouled (2 pages)	06/16/1993	P1/b(1)
005. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: Somalia, Accelerated US Troop Withdrawal (1 page)	04/06/1993	P1/b(1)
006. note	Somalia Core Group Meeting notes (1 page)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
007. list	Somalia Core Group Meeting [partial] (1 page)	04/02/1993	P3/b(3)
008. cable	Re: Security for Relief Operations in Somalia (10 pages)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [10]

2012-0659-F

ke4140

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

WA HFAX R C (PT)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

C

'93 JUN 18 P7:40

MESSAGE NO. 10048 CLASSIFICATION C No. Pages 1

FROM: TASK FORCE: S/S-0 647-1512 7516
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SITUATION REPORT: 22

COUNTRY: Somalia

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

A ~~CEA, PPS~~

C NSC, WHSR

D JCS, NMCC, SECDEF

~~NSA, NSAC~~

G NMIC

~~INR, DIA~~

FOR: ☐ CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ FEMA

REMARKS:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Somalia Report

☒ LAKE	☒ WALKER	☒ CLARKE
☒ BERGER	☒ HOLL	☒ BEERS
☒ SODERBERG	☒ KUPCHAN	☒ CANAS
☒ ITOM	☒ LOWENKRON	☒ RICE
☒ KENNEY	☒ KELLY	☒ SCHWARTZ
☒ REED	☒ GATI	☒ WILSON
☒ FUERTH	☒ BURNS	☒ DARRIGH CLAUSSEN
☒ OVP STAFF	☒ GOTTEMOLLER	
☒ McLARTY	☒ FORSYTHE	☒ JETT
	☒ SANNER	
☒ KRECKZO		☒ PONEMAN
☒ ROSNER	☒ BELL	☒ HARRIS
☒ STEINBERG	☒ ANDREASEN	☒ AOKI
	☒ FRY	
☒ INDYK	☒ HAHN	☒ TENET
☒ SATTERFIELD	☒ JONES	☒ KELLY
☒ RIEDEL	☒ WITKOWSKY	☒ WAGUESPAK
☒ WIEDEMANN		☒ O'LEARY
☒ KRISTOFF	☒ FAUVER	☒ SIGLER
☒ SAEED	☒ KYLE	☒ SDO
	☒ BARTH	☒ COMMS
☒ FENBERG	☒ PRIMOSCH	☒ NSA ANALYST
☒ OWENS	☒ WALSH	☒ 303 ANALYST
☒ ROSSIN	☒ WHYMAN	☒ PEOC

S/S Officer: [Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: YDE Date: 12/04/17

2012-0659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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001. report	Situation Report No. 22 (1 page)	06/18/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Somalia

Q. Why are the goals of U.S. actions in Somalia? Are we entering a quagmire?

-- As I told the American people on Saturday, the objectives of ~~our actions~~ ^{the UN} in Somalia are clear and finite.

-- Over the past week, ~~we have~~ ^{the UN} moved against ~~forces~~ ^{armed gangs} that have contributed to the deaths of ~~literally hundreds of~~ ^{over 300,000} ~~thousands of~~ people by obstructing humanitarian relief efforts.

-- These same ~~forces~~ ^{gangs} were responsible for the worst attack in three decades on U.N. peacekeepers, killing 23 of them. To allow this act to go unpunished would have destroyed the capacity of the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping not only in Somalia, but around the world.

-- U.N. actions over the past 10 days are sending a clear message: the world will not accept the interference of armed gangs in the process of rebuilding Somalia and protecting innocent lives.

-- These actions enjoy the broad support of the world. Twenty-two nations have forces participating in the action in Somalia.

-- I was particularly moved by the thanks expressed to the American people yesterday by President Nujoma of Namibia. President Nujoma said that the leadership shown by the United States and later the U.N. in Somalia has ended the starvation of thousands of Africans and restored hope for the people of that country.

Q. Is the United Nations still committed to going after Aideed?

A. -- The United Nations has now ordered the arrest of ~~General~~ ^{this gangster's} Aideed. Aideed's actions over the past weeks have shown that he remains the principal obstacle to peace and security in Somalia. U.N. actions are designed to end his ability to frustrate the vast majority of Somalis who long for peace.

-- ~~Our~~ ^{The UN} actions over the past week have been very successful. We have destroyed vast amounts of weapons, ammunition and military vehicles while keeping to a minimum the danger to civilians.

-- The focus on the capture of ~~General~~ Aideed should not divert our attention from the important progress achieved so far in rebuilding Somalia or from the work that remains ahead.

-- This is far from a quagmire. The US has already withdrawn about 25,000 troops. With the disarming of the gangs, we bring closer the day the UN will withdraw.

Q: Why did the U.S. take this action ~~by itself~~?

A: -- This is not an American action; it is a United Nations action. Twenty-two countries currently have nearly 20,000 troops in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II. The U.S. has about 3,000 noncombat logistics troops and 1,100 in a quick reaction force. Pakistan has the largest contingent in Somalia. Other major troop providers in the country are France, Italy, Morocco and Belgium. Pakistan has been primarily responsible for Mogadishu, where our quick reaction force is also based. France, Italy, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey also have troops in Mogadishu.

Q: What is the Administration's reaction to the death of 20 Somali civilians at the hands of the UN contingent?

A: -- We deeply regret the loss of life in Somalia resulting from this and other recent incidents.

-- As you know, there has been a tense situation on the ground in Mogadishu that comes in the aftermath of the cold-blooded ambush by General Aideed's forces of UN peacekeepers on June 5, using civilians as a shield.

-- The United Nations is conducting an investigation to determine what actually took place during the demonstrations last Sunday.

-- In general, I am satisfied with how the UN operation is proceeding.

Q: Have the United States and the United Nations lost the moral high ground because of this attack, as some relief agencies have alleged?

A: -- We should not allow the events of the last 10 days obscure the real progress that has occurred in Somalia since the engagement of the U.S. forces late last year and the introduction of the UNOSOM forces thereafter.

-- As I noted on Saturday, by the time we arrived, more than 350,000 Somalis had died in a savage civil war that had caused the disintegration of Somali society. Today, crops are being planted and harvested, schools and hospitals are re-opening and refugees are returning home.

-- I understand that relief organizations have criticisms of and concerns about the current UN operation in Somalia.

-- The relief organizations have expressed legitimate concerns about violence. That is why UNOSOM has moved against Aideed's forces. If the relief organizations are to operate as they were before, order has to be reestablished. That is what UNOSOM is doing now.

Already it is clear that ~~this was staged~~
~~as a front to protect the~~
~~Pakistanis, by armed gangsters.~~
willing to sacrifice ~~armed~~ UNARMED civilians.

Q: Is the UN planning to take over the administration of Somalia?

A: -- The United Nations has no desire to exercise sovereign power in Somalia. In the absence of a Somali-designated authority, however, it must carry out its humanitarian mission and protect its people from attack, as authorized in Security Council Resolutions 814 and 837.

No.

The UN is ~~not~~ restoring power to the Somali people by removing the armed gangs that have blocked the will of the people.

Q. Isn't Aideed a legitimate Somali leader?

A. No. He is a criminal. His money comes from drug running and extorting relief organizations.

The "popularity" you see is from a ~~hand~~ hand-full of people in his employ in one small section of one city, where the TV cameras are.

He is responsible for the civil war that raged his country and in which over 300,000 people died.

WA HFAX R C IPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VOC Date: 01/04/17

2012-0659-F

S/S #

BC

MESSAGE NO. 100393 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 1

FROM: TASK FORCE: M6501 S/S-0 647-1512 7516
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SITUATION REPORT: 20

COUNTRY: Somalia

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

A CIA, FBIS
C NSC, WHSR
D JCS, NMCC, SECDEF
F NSA, NSOC
G NMIC
I DOE
K1 TREASURY
M FEMA

CLEARANCE

REMARKS:

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

SOMALIA

/ LAKE	WALKER	/ CLARKE
/ BERGER	HOLL	BEERS
/ SODERBERG	KUPCHAN	CANAS
/ ITOH	LOWENKRON	/ RICE
/ KENNEY	KELLY	SCHWARTZ
/ REED		WILSON
	GATI	/ <u>DARRAH</u>
/ FUERTH	BURNS	CLAUSSEN
/ OVP STAFF	GOTTEMUELLER	
/ McLARTY	FORSYTHE	/ JETT
	SANNER	
/ KRECZKO		PONEMAN
/ ROSNER	BELL	HARRIS
/ STEINBERG	ANDREASEN	AOKI
	FRY	
/ INDYK	HAHN	/ TENET
/ BATTERFIELD	JONES	KELLY
/ RIEDEL	WITKOWSKY	WAGUESPAK
/ WIEDEMANN		/ O'LEARY
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/ SAEED	KYLE	/ SDO
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/ FEINBERG	PRIMOSCH	/ NSA ANALYST
/ OWENS	WALSH	/ 303 ANALYST
/ ROSSIN	WHYMAN	PEOC

EQUEST ☐

COMMENT ☐

S/S Officer: [Signature]

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002. report	Situation Report No. 20 (1 page)	06/17/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [10]

2012-0659-F
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003a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	06/18/1993	P1/b(1)
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003b. report	Somalia: Situation Report #9 (3 pages)	06/18/1993	P1/b(1)

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Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
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FOLDER TITLE:

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*Lead
at last*

'93 JUN 19 P12:43

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**

S/S #

*Somalia**C*

MESSAGE NO. 100518 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2
FROM: GLYN DAVIES S/S 647-5302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO DJIBOUTI: RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT GOULED

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	NANCY SODERBERG	456-6534	WHSITRM
	WILL ITOH		
	KRISTIE KENNEY		
	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		
	<i>Clarke</i>	<i>Jett</i>	
	<i>Rice/Schwartz</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: June 21

Thanks

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: LOE Date: 01/01/16

2012-0659-F

S/S Officer: Javi 6/19 MDZ

GLYN DAVIES

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

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IO/UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES -7- DATE 3/29/93FROM IO/UNP: W. Frank TELEPHONE _____TO OFFICE: DOD FAX TEL NUMBER _____DISTRIBUTE TO: OSD/ISA/AF LTC M JOHNSON fax 703-695-4620 ✓
Tel 703-697-9753NSCS: Susan Rice: ~~tel: 703-395-3736~~
fax ~~703-395-1199~~JCS/JS Col P. Baltimore ~~tel 703-614-9406~~
fax 703-697-0255 ✓SUBJECT Final Text: Somalia/UNOSOM II Res.REMARKS _____

UNCLASSIFIED

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/814 (1993)
26 March 1993

RESOLUTION 814 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3188th meeting,
on 26 March 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 and 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II),

Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia and the threat they pose to the reconciliation process,

Deploing the acts of violence against persons engaging in humanitarian efforts on behalf of the United Nations, States, and non-governmental organizations,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and for the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Concerned that the crippling famine and drought in Somalia, compounded by the civil strife, have caused massive destruction to the means of production and the natural and human resources of that country,

Expressing its appreciation to the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement for their cooperation with, and support of, the efforts of the United Nations in Somalia,

Further expressing its appreciation to all Member States which have made contributions to the Fund established pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 794 (1992) and to all those who have provided humanitarian assistance to Somalia,

Commending the efforts, in difficult circumstances, of the initial United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992),

Expressing its appreciation for the invaluable assistance the neighbouring countries have been providing to the international community in its efforts to restore peace and security in Somalia and to host large numbers of refugees displaced by the conflict and taking note of the difficulties caused to them due to the presence of refugees in their territories,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Convinced also of the need for broad-based consultations and deliberations to achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of transitional government institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions,

Recognizing that the re-establishment of local and regional administrative institutions is essential to the restoration of domestic tranquillity,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national, regional and local levels, including and encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Expressing its readiness to assist the people of Somalia, as appropriate, on a local, regional or national level, to participate in free and fair elections, with a view towards achieving and implementing a political settlement,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, in particular the conclusion at that meeting of three agreements by the Somali parties, including movements and factions, and welcoming also any progress made at the Conference on National Reconciliation which began in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993,

Emphasising the need for the Somali people, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace,

Noting the reports of States concerned of 17 December 1992 (S/24976) and 19 January 1993 (S/25126) and of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 (S/24992) and 26 January 1993 (S/25168) on the implementation of resolution 794 (1992),

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (S/25354 and Add.1 and 2),

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to seek maximum economy and efficiency and to keep the size of the United Nations presence, both military and civilian, to the minimum necessary to fulfil its mandate,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

A

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for convening the Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with the agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and for the progress achieved towards political reconciliation in Somalia, and also for his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somalis, including movements, factions, community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are suitably represented at such conferences;
3. Welcomes the convening of the Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and the willingness expressed by Governments through this process to contribute to relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia, where and when possible;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national

reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, including in particular:

(a) To assist in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs, and taking into account, as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs;

(b) To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

(c) To assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country;

(d) To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;

(e) To assist the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;

(f) To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia;

(g) To create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realisation of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes;

B

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

5. Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its mandate in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 56-88 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1992, and the provisions of this resolution;

6. Authorizes the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the Security Council;

7. Emphasizes the crucial importance of disarmament and the urgent need to build on the efforts of UNITAF in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

8. Demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, annex III);

9. Further demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, take all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of the United Nations and its agencies as well as the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organizations engaged in providing humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to support from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992), utilizing as available and appropriate the UNOSOM II forces authorized by this resolution, and to report on this subject, with any recommendations regarding more effective measures if necessary, to the Security Council;

11. Calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992);

12. Requests the Secretary-General to provide security, as appropriate, to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced persons, utilizing UNOSOM II forces, paying particular attention to those areas where major instability continues to threaten peace and security in the region;

13. Reiterates its demand that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law and reaffirms that those responsible for such acts be held individually accountable;

14. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, taking account of the particular circumstances in each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, and in this regard to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II;

C

15. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

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UNITAF forces and for the establishment of Somali police, and calls on Member States to make contributions to this fund, in addition to their assessed contributions;

16. Expresses appreciation to the United Nations agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the ICRC for their contributions and assistance and requests the Secretary-General to ask them to continue to extend financial, material and technical support to the Somali people in all regions of the country;

17. Requests the Secretary-General to seek, as appropriate, pledges and contributions from States and others to assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia;

18. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement the present resolution, in particular to submit as soon as possible a report to the Council containing recommendations for establishment of Somali police forces and thereafter to report no later than every ninety days on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in the present resolution;

19. Decides to conduct a formal review of the progress towards accomplishing the purposes of the present resolution no later than 31 October 1993;

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

TO	FROM
NAME: <u>Richard Clarke</u>	NAME: <u>Ann Wright</u>
OFFICE: <u>NSC</u>	OFFICE: <u>PM-ISO</u>
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U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

*International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program*

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20530

March 31, 1993

Ms. Ann Wright
Action Officer
Somalia Task Force
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ms. Wright:

The attached report on the Auxiliary Security Forces of Somalia is being submitted as requested and pursuant to an in-country assessment by the ICITAP team of Patrick Lang and Donald Havekost, March 5-10, 1993.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David J. Kriskovich", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

David J. Kriskovich
Director

Enclosure

cc: Mr. John Rogovin
Office of the Attorney General

03/31/93 16:18 ☎202 653 2280
03/31/93 15:33 ☎271777

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**EVALUATION OF THE ASF
SOMALIA**

MARCH 5 - 10, 1993

PATRICK H. LANG and DONALD G. HAVEKOST

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ICITAP

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

Purpose

This document reports the findings from a survey of the Auxiliary Security Forces (ASF) of Somalia, conducted from March 5 - 10, 1993, through first-hand observation and interviews with UNITAF, UNOSOM, and USG officials as well as Somali individuals involved with ASF activities. This effort attempted to:

- (1) Assess the nature and quality of law enforcement service currently being provided by ASF and, in so doing,
 - Identify the nature of responsibilities now undertaken by ASF and their appropriateness in the context of a civilian law enforcement mission;
 - Assess ASF capabilities given its organization and resource levels.
- (2) Assess the viability of the ASF as an interim law enforcement resource for Somalia which could facilitate the eventual transfer of responsibility for public order matters from international entities to a defined permanent law enforcement authority capable of meeting Somalia's basic public safety requirements.
- (3) Evaluate the ASF as a foundation upon which to base a comprehensive long-term law enforcement development effort, including the level and quality of existing human and other resources to draw from for a long-term effort.

Current Public Safety Environment

The current public safety environment in the UNITAF Zone of Control in Somalia reflects the impact of years of a corrupt dictatorship, civil war, complete collapse of all governmental institutions, and the emergence of heavily-armed criminal organizations intent on establishing and maintaining control by force, violence, extortion, and intimidation. With the December 1992 international intervention in Somalia the objective has been to marginalize the influences of these criminal elements and try to establish an environment wherein Somali public safety requirements eventually can begin to be met through civilian-type law enforcement institutional approaches, with respect for the law and human rights.

The international forces have been successful in the first stages of achieving a basic level of public order which permits the humanitarian relief programs to go forward. The fact remains, however, that there are no governmental Somali institutions in

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existence which can be called upon to participate in the effort to provide for public safety. The only Somali resource which has become available and which has a potential to contribute to meeting Somalia's public order and safety requirements is the unofficial element known as the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF), which began to come into existence in late December of 1992 and is derived completely from elements of Somalia's former National Police force. The ASF numbers approximately 4,000 and appears to generally retain the favorable reputation reportedly enjoyed by the former National Police.

The rudiments of a concept for a future Somali police service are present in the ASF. Former members of the National Police appear to be motivated to participate in bringing order to their society and being a part of a productive law enforcement entity. In the near term, it appears that the ASF could begin to address Somalia's public order and safety needs as a Somali responsibility and thereby possibly relieve the international community of what is a full-time responsibility. If properly encouraged and resourced, the ASF could serve as the foundation for a process of law enforcement institution building in the long term.

The immediate challenge is to insure that reasonable and equitable treatment of ASF members can be achieved in terms of payment of wages and other support for their services and to provide necessary equipment and materials which would give ASF members a predictable level of capability.

Former National Police of Somalia

By all reports, the now non-existent organization known as the National Police of Somalia was known for its basic level of competence and apparently was respected for its overall level of integrity. The National Police mission was essentially based in traditional civilian policing concepts and the process of enforcing the law was subject to a system which provided for prosecutorial and judicial oversight of police functions. Moreover, the National Police was recognized for its bona fides as a police agency having an orientation to the rule of law and reportedly served as a meaningful component of Somalia's criminal justice system.

The former Director of the National Police, Mohamed Ahmed Jama Mussa, in remarks supported by other interviews, explained that when the National Police functioned as an institution and was respected by the Government and the community as

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a public resource, the National Police had an overall complement of nearly 18,000 individuals. Of this force, approximately 60% served in operational law enforcement duties and approximately 40% were dedicated to administrative, management, training and support responsibilities. The police services covered a range of public safety and criminal investigative responsibilities and included special services such as a border and coastal patrol, a criminalistics laboratory, and a reaction team specially-trained and sufficiently mobile to serve as an effective force to mediate clan disputes. Police training programs were formalized at all levels, and provided a range of in-service and specialized training.

To the credit of the leaders and members of the former National Police, the record indicates that the organization was not subverted to the purposes of the dictatorship. However, as a result of the National Police's effort to remain independent, other "police" organizations willing to serve the dictatorship emerged. Because of this the National Police was marginalized in its role and its overall importance diminished. In the end the National Police was rendered ineffective as an organization able to provide traditional police services to Somalia. Also a result of their marginalization, the basic resources critically needed by the police to sustain the organization became scarce and was one of the reasons that police personnel at all levels left the service. In addition, during this time of conflict some were jailed, some reportedly were killed, and the majority sought a low profile for self preservation. The eventual collapse of the National Police as an institution was accelerated by the total breakdown of authority resulting from Somalia's civil war.

Prospects for the ASF

At this juncture, it is clear that National Police's reputation and many of its former members have survived. As a result, the remnants of National Police, i.e., the ASF, currently represents a usable foundation upon which to begin to address the short-term requirements for Somalis to attempt to participate in the process of meeting Somalia's public order and safety requirements. The ASF also represents a viable entity which should be factored into any process of defining solutions to Somalia's long-term law enforcement needs.

Only if international assistance is forthcoming and is sustained at the levels required to effectively utilize, develop, and support what limited resources now appear to exist can the ASF be capitalized upon and used to good effect. In this regard, the

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emergence of the ASF from the remnants of the National Police should be viewed as a positive sign that some potential exists in Somalia for law enforcement institution building in the future. The fact that such a resource exists should be considered and taken into account when formulating any plans for international assistance. However, three fundamental considerations must be kept in mind when examining this prospect:

- The international donor community must recognize and accept that any effort to bring the ASF into a condition where it is capable of meeting even threshold levels of public order in Somalia will demand a significant commitment of funds. Because of the current absence of any meaningful Somali governmental institutions or resources, funding must support immediate law enforcement service needs and insure sustained availability of the most basic level of required logistical and material support to insure continued delivery of public safety services. Funding must be continued until there is an identified and predictable means to establish a sustained level of Somali self-sufficiency to acquire resources (i.e., Somali ability to generate income) that can be applied to support public safety requirements.
- Any law enforcement organization, to be any more than a mere security service, must be aligned with the other traditional elements of a criminal justice system. This is important so that law enforcement actions can be validated through a process of legal oversight and review and thereby safeguard against abuses.
- There cannot be any expectation that in Somalia's current dangerous environment an under-prepared, under-resourced police organization of any kind can successfully meet the full range of Somalia's public order and safety requirements.

Failure to realistically acknowledge the above considerations places the ASF at risk when international support is reduced. This risk threatens not only the safety of members of the ASF and the community, but also endangers any institutional respect and credibility which the ASF has as a carry over from the National Police. This positive reputation does in fact now exist and is a valuable resource to build upon, however, credibility and reputation are perishable. The ASF should not be undercut by asking its members to do more than they are trained, equipped or prepared to be responsible for.

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ASF Personnel and Recruiting

The Auxiliary Security Force currently comprises former members of the National Police who have come forward voluntarily to be included in the ASF. The more than 4,000 ASF members are present primarily in Mogadishu and reportedly also are in evidence in other principal Somali communities within the UNITAF Zone of Control. ASF members are generally identifiable to the public by their attire - faded remnants of their National Police uniforms and their still-familiar blue berets - which lends them some semblance of official stature. The caution, however, is to not characterize the ASF as a police organization because it is at best an informal association of individuals seeking to establish an institutional identity and defined purpose as a public safety entity.

The current ASF recruiting process is informal and elementary at best, relying primarily upon word-of-mouth communication. What is crucial, however, is that there are provisions, though rudimentary, for screening those individuals interested in service with the ASF and who claim prior membership with the National Police. The screening includes a process based on a review of the limited, if any, police records that can be located; these are then supplemented by the personal recollections of former commanders or associates within the National Police. The basic criteria for selection to serve with the ASF are that members: 1) must be Somali, 2) must not have committed an offense against the Somali society, 3) must have been in National Police service until 1 January 1991 with a minimum of two years of service (candidates are allowed to maintain the rank held as of that date), 4) must have no handicaps.

The vetting process for selection of ASF members is imprecise by any standard but the net result is that a police-type force is being drawn together and its members are beginning to be productively assigned to a limited range of policing-type responsibilities. With their responsibilities comes at least a de facto recognition from the community and international representatives of the ASF as having some "official" stature.

ASF Somali Oversight

The current level of Somali oversight, policy decision, and direction provided the ASF is in the hands of the Police Committee, an outgrowth of the Political Committee concept established in Mogadishu following the intervention. Although informal in many respects, the Police Committee is primarily a committee composed of former National Police command-level officers. It should be noted that the committee is not without its

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political dimensions and does include among its members individuals who were not former National Police. Nevertheless, the Committee is organized so that specific members are responsible for addressing a variety of issues important to the organization, development, operational assignments, and administrative functioning of the ASF.

While certainly not an ideal, the Police Committee should receive some credit for the fact that it exists and is functioning such that basic issues are discussed and decisions are being made, and where the committee provides some direction for the implementation of plans and the assignment of responsibilities. The Police Committee's authority and leadership generally have been recognized and accepted by the members of the ASF. Also, the committee is accessible to official international representatives in Somalia and can be effectively engaged in dialogue on policy and operational issues related to the ASF.

ASF Command & Supervisory Level Personnel

Because the ASF takes into account the rank held by its members at the dissolution of the National Police, a basic chain of command as well as a workable mechanism for communication exists within the ASF. This fact should be recognized not only because it represents an important resource to be used in the implementation of near-term ASF activities regarding both the operational assignments and the policy concerns of the ASF, but also because it is an existing resource with potential use in any long-term development plans in as much as it represents the potential for effective utilization of some of the experience with civilian policing that remains in Somalia.

Equally significant is that the ASF's structure resembles that of the former National Police as the ASF roughly adopted the defunct institution's organizational diagram. This is useful as a point of reference in attempting to define what is a loosely-organized, informal structure and helps to establish an element of functional capability for the ASF along familiar organizational lines.

With the current state of organization of the ASF and in the short time allotted, it is impossible to adequately assess the full capacity or the actual capability and quality of leadership within the ranks of the mid-level commanders and supervisors functioning within the ASF. However, the fact that a leadership resource with experience exists is of extreme importance and should be used and supported to every extent of its capability for the short-term requirements of leading the ASF. Additionally, the experience of

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these former police leaders should be taken advantage of if long-term development of civilian policing is considered important to the future of Somalia and is to be undertaken.

ASF Operational Level Personnel

The operational-level members of the ASF have been tasked with some very fundamental and very basic policing assignments. Only those ASF members functioning in the Mogadishu area were observed, and these were seen performing such tasks as providing elementary crowd control at the humanitarian relief feeding centers, basic traffic control at select intersections, perimeter security to public areas (including some limited assignments at the port and the airport), and basic physical security at some of those former police facilities still intact to varying degrees. ASF officers also were reportedly successfully involved in providing an element of order and security to the relocation of Somalis to their rightful homes and in removing squatters as necessary.

Within the limited context that brief observation permitted, the performance of these ASF members can be assessed as adequate. Their ability to conduct these activities and the apparent cooperation from the community at large to accept their service can be attributed to several factors. One factor seems to be that the public appears to associate the ASF with the former National Police and extends their memory of the latter to ASF members, perhaps by virtue of the image projected by their attire, which generally consists of the remnants of their former uniform. The second factor contributing to ASF fulfillment of basic tasks may be attributed to their commitment to the job at hand and, moreover, that ASF members appear to genuinely want to return to providing police-type service to the community. ASF service, until recently, was purely voluntary, however there is an expectation on the part of these individuals that regular pay and some type of employment status may be formalized. A recently-instituted U.N. program of food commodity allotments in lieu of pay or providing commodities as a supplement to pay has begun to address the compensation issue.

Whatever the nature of ASF members' motivation, the point remains that there is a willingness on their part to become engaged with the ASF and to serve in policing-type activities. This appears to be true in spite of the inherent dangers and the obvious hardships associated with attempting to function as a police officer in an environment which lacks the most basic items of individual and institutional police equipment and related resources. Although during this assessment no opportunity presented itself to

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observe ASF members in actual action confronting violence-prone demonstrators or similar confrontational situations, the reports indicate that when such incidents have occurred there is a demonstrated willingness on the part of ASF members to step forward and assume this type of policing responsibility.

This willingness to become involved and the dedication of ASF members is demonstrated not only in their established record of responding to dangerous situations, but also in that the record shows two ASF members have recently lost their lives and one his leg as a result of wounds received in such action. In this regard it is important to underscore the fact that even the simplest of policing functions becomes profoundly difficult in the face of a complete lack of the resources which are critical to the support of ASF members seeking to achieve any of their policing objectives and particularly so when the level of danger is elevated by the nature of the responsibility.

It is important to note that members of the ASF have also been engaged on a limited basis in what can be described as a "joint patrol" concept with UNITAF forces. While the ASF presence can be described as limited in terms of its actual contribution to the policing effort, it provides the ASF as an entity with visibility with regard to policing actions and recognition of Somali participation in public safety responsibilities. With the backing of well-equipped international forces, the joint patrols help to reinforce the image of the ASF and give it a measure of credibility. ASF participation in joint patrols also is positive in that it serves to help mediate conflicts which may arise between Somalis and international forces.

ASF Administrative and Logistical Resources

During the course of the survey of the ASF, it became apparent that beyond its personnel, the ASF has no meaningful resource base (e.g., no vehicles, no communications, no personal police equipment) to speak of which can be applied to support any of its operational requirements. The overall support being provided by UNITAF in terms of transportation, communications, and material is absolutely essential to the efforts of the ASF in their attempts to meet common public safety objectives, particularly with regard to any operational-type responsibilities. For this reason, development of an elementary resource base is fundamental to any independent capability of the ASF for either operational or development purposes.

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In addition to the lack of operational resources, the basic elements of administration of the ASF are similarly without meaningful resources. What is encouraging is the apparent existence of a basic understanding of the need for administrative mechanisms to allow a police-type organization to function. During the survey, for example, the issue of vetting the pool of applicants for entry into the ASF was discussed in a variety of contexts. The process of verification of prior service in the National Police was one of the central themes of three discussions. During the course of a visit to former National Police Headquarters (unoccupied and unusable in its present form) there was an opportunity to view what remains of the central personnel records system of the National Police. Former National Police members were engaged (many on their hands and knees) in the laborious task of trying to resurrect a body of records from the vandalized remains of the police personnel records section in order to develop an information base upon which to support the recruitment and vetting process. The dedication of individuals to such a task is impressive but what is clearly seen in this example is the fact that there are not even the most basic resources available to support the simplest and most routine tasks. As evidenced in this activity, as is common throughout, the ASF lack of such basics as paper, notebooks, office supplies, equipment, and furniture, not to mention the lack of the other basics such as water, electricity, and fuel are needed to support all projects to be undertaken by the ASF.

Criminal Investigative Division and Forensic Crime Laboratory

During the course of the survey a visit was made to the building which housed the former Criminal Investigative Division of the National Police as well as its forensic laboratory. The multi-storied building, while structurally intact, has been rendered unusable and cannot be occupied as a result of vandalism. However, the existing facility merits renovation and the building is being provided security by the ASF. Apparent from the visit was that at one time the building housed a relatively complete forensics laboratory with modern equipment. While the facility is useless in its present form and its fixtures destroyed, it raises the question as to the potential availability, somewhere in the community, of technical staff who may be willing and able to return and contribute to a future Somali police service.

The site visit also disclosed that there remained in part of the building complex a small quantity of what can be described as routine "booking" and "criminal case report" forms. While insignificant in quantity, it is important to note that at least there did exist under the former system a formal method of developing records on criminal subjects and

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criminal investigations. During this visit, a member of the ASF who claimed to have served as an investigator with the National Police was using these forms. He had completed the documents with the required information and also included photos of the two subjects of the file (taken by members of the Italian Forces), having developed what was in fact the beginning of a respectable "case" file sufficient to track not only the status and identity of the detained subjects, but also to record the details of the offense.

Committee of Judges and Lawyers

In a meeting with a committee composed of Somali lawyers and judges the concept of police service was discussed in terms of its legal role in a criminal justice process. The consensus of opinion was that Somalia's laws and constitution of the pre-dictator era were considered valid and with full utility as providing a legal framework within which to redevelop and proscribe police activities. What was emphasized by the committee, however, was that the police cannot exist independently as a law enforcement institution and any attempt to do so risks a potential for abuses. The general opinion of this committee was that although without current actual legal status, the ASF could be successful if it followed the basic law enforcement philosophies which existed at the time of the National Police. These attorneys believed that, if successful in this regard, the ASF could be effectively accepted by the community as having some legitimacy as a police service. The committee underscored that for policing to be successful in the long term, development of the other elements of the criminal justice process must also take place.

ASF - Prison Conditions Mogadishu

A visit was made to the prison located in Mogadishu, reportedly the only custodial-type facility in full-time operation in Somalia. The principal elements of this facility were constructed during the last century, however, a women's section that is part of the complex is of more recent vintage. The prison facility is remarkable in the sense that it appears to be one of the few public facilities in Mogadishu which has not been vandalized or destroyed. Its shortcomings are essentially reflective of the lack of resources. The overall capacity of the facility to house prisoners is approximately 1,000 and while at the time of the visit only 32 prisoners were in custody in the facility, the ability to handle any prisoners is actually limited more by available resources such as food, water, and fuel for cooking fires than it is by available space.

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The current director of the facility, who is a member of the Police Committee, has been an official at the prison since 1959. He is a lawyer claiming some formal corrections training. The management of this facility, while tacitly under the auspices of the ASF, reflects a methodological regard for commonly-accepted correctional procedures for the safety and security of prisoners and staff as well as the basic administrative procedures needed to insure accountability for prisoners and their property. The prison receives prisoners basically from the ASF and apparently through an unofficial process of case review by volunteer judges, prisoners do secure some threshold level of attention to the principles of due process and are thereby released or further detained, or at least paid attention to, as is considered appropriate. The security staff, who are members of the ASF, are basically functioning as a team under the Director and with the barest minimum of resources available they seem to be attempting, in good faith, to comply with the basic human rights concerns for prisoners within a most adverse environment.

Although the prison environment is clearly substandard, it does at least reflect the existence of a basic institution which could directly benefit and perhaps demonstrates a capacity for immediate improvement if even minimal level of resources became available.

ASF - Protection of Former National Police Facilities

The ASF has taken upon itself the responsibility of gradually retaking and preserving and securing, to the best extent possible, the former National Police facilities which remain in existence, particularly those which have some potential for rehabilitation into useable police resources. During the course of the survey the majority of the police facilities in the city of Mogadishu were visited, to include the former Criminal Investigation Division, the National Police Headquarters, and a number of the precinct-level stations.

The easy conclusion to be reached is that, without exception, these facilities have suffered extensive damage and to one degree or another will require significant repairs to be put back into use. It is important to recognize however, that these facilities fully merit consideration for preservation and rehabilitation to at least a functional level of service. By and large the buildings reflect a type of design appropriate for use as a police facility and it is likely that in the general perception of the public the buildings remain identified with National Police and can thereby again serve as a focal point of a

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law enforcement presence and authority at the community level. The ASF effort to prevent further damage to these buildings is an important activity reflecting not only an interest in the preservation of what remains of these assets but establishes an environment of security and responsibility permitting a process of rehabilitation to begin. More importantly, these facilities support the preservation of the concept of a police presence at the community level with the station representing a place where members of the community can seek assistance.

Police Academy - Mogadishu

During the survey a visit was made to the location of the former National Police Academy in Mogadishu. Former police officers related that new recruit training for the National Police took place at other locations outside of Mogadishu but emphasized the fact that the Police Academy in Mogadishu served as the principal National Police location for the training of officers, the center for its specialized training, to include investigations, and supported a full program of in-service training at the officer level.

There was a consensus among those interviewed that the Police Academy in Mogadishu enjoyed a reputation of professionalism for its training programs and its related contributions to the National Police. The facilities in their current form are fortunately substantially intact. In addition to what was a large auditorium, there remain approximately 20 classrooms, as well as dormitories, administrative offices, logistical and gymnasium space. However, all elements of the Academy are in disrepair and are currently occupied by drifters or displaced persons. In this sense, although requiring substantial cleaning and rehabilitation, the overall facility carries the potential to again serve as a training center for use by the ASF and, as such, may carry with it some of the aura of credibility associated with the location itself, as a respected element of the former National Police. As with the former police Forensic laboratory the question can be raised as to what prior instructor staff of the National Police may still be in the community and available for reactivation. Any training site selected must contemplate not only instructors and training programs, but will also depend upon the acquisition and availability of the most basic of resources such as classrooms and student materials of all types.

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ASF Training Needs

As the ASF continues to develop and as it takes on a more formal structure and level of responsibility, its members will be required to become engaged in some sort of basic re-training or orientation process. While, as it has been noted, the ASF is made up of individuals with former police experience, they have not been in actual police service for several years. They not only logically require refresher-type training on basic police skills but they also are in need of an orientation to the ASF as an organization in order to understand its objectives and its mission. This is important not only to fully understand the expectations which are placed upon them, but also to insure uniformity in their activities and attempt to insure against potential abuses of authority by both the institution and its members because of their possible misunderstanding of its purpose.

The short-term training issue is an important one and should not be delayed, as it not only impacts upon the potential for effectiveness of the ASF but also directly impacts upon the safety of individual officers and members of the community.

It should be noted that during the time of this survey, a decision was made by UNTTAF to release to members of the ASF a number of weapons suitable for police use to support operational requirements. The number of weapons to be eventually released was limited to a figure approximately equal to 20% of the overall force complement. Clearly, as the ASF takes on a higher level of responsibility, especially in the current lawless environment of Somalia, the availability of firearms to police officers is key to any level of ASF success in meeting their public safety mission. Firearms skills are perishable. The judgmental aspect of firearms use in a policing environment is especially crucial to police credibility. As a first step to address this need, the Italian forces present in Mogadishu have begun a process of firearms familiarization training with members of the ASF consistent with the weapons release. An important issue will be to not only insure that such familiarization training continues, but that there is also a beginning of the development of a use-of-force policy which, as a concept, can be adopted by ASF members at the operational level and used to guide the nature of police conduct in use-of-force matters.

Support to the ASF

To date, the support given by elements of UNTTAF and UNOSOM to the development of the ASF has addressed some of the most critical of its short-term needs.

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

The relevance and correctness of this support is apparent in as much as attention has focused upon the most immediate requirements, such as issues of pay, uniforms, individual police equipment, transportation, and communications. Although not intended to be a comprehensive resolution of ASF requirements, the impact of the actual or projected delivery of sorely-needed material not only enhances the capability of the ASF but directly and positively supports the continued level of individual commitment to the ASF. Such basics as boots and uniforms are invaluable to the effort.

Equal to the importance of the provision of basic resources to the ASF by international forces is the advice and direction provided and crafting of a basic set of instructions for oversight of ASF activities. Specifying both operational and administrative rules helps to guide the overall functioning and accountability of the ASF.

As found through this survey, international assistance in terms of material support and policy guidance, appears to have been consistently relevant and responsive to the immediate needs. The assistance effort is valuable in that it is oriented toward civilian policing objectives and support of the ASF has not taken any direction which can be viewed as becoming any future impediment to long-range law enforcement development.

The primary observation that can be made from the effort to date is that significant additional financial resources will have to be applied to sustain the momentum of the ASF in the short term, and specifically to insure that continued pay is available and that equipment and related resources are provided at sufficient levels to permit the ASF to have the capability to meet its responsibilities with credibility.

The complete lack of resources of all kinds which are needed by the ASF is overwhelming. The level of necessary support of the ASF to permit it to achieve even basic levels of operational self-sufficiency and competence is substantial and must not be underestimated or ignored. The basic approaches for assistance taken, and the procurement initiated, have been fully appropriate. However, the needs remain considerable and will continue throughout any interim phases of ASF activities until full development plans can be formulated and long-term law enforcement development program implementation can begin.

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from the information set forth above are summarized as follows:

- The ASF comprises members of the former National Police Force of Somalia and currently can be characterized as a loosely-defined, informal law enforcement-type organization recognized as having some "official stature" by the Somali community and international representatives.
- The ASF has shown a capability for providing a limited range of the most basic law enforcement-type services to certain regions of Somalia to include crowd control, traffic regulation, facility security, and joint patrol activities.
- The activities of the ASF can be viewed as appropriate within the context and mission of civilian law enforcement responsibilities and would appear not to prejudice any future law enforcement development efforts in Somalia.
- The ASF is without meaningful material and logistical resources of all types, at all levels, but appears to be capable of functioning when material and logistical support is provided.
- The availability of former National Police personnel and remnants of physical installations such as buildings merits preservation, rehabilitation, and utilization as a short-term approach to meeting Somali public safety needs and as a base for use in possible long-term institution building.
- Although intangible, the reputation and experience of the former National Police constitute a resource which exists and should be recognized and taken advantage of in discussions or actions related to short- and long-term law enforcement development in Somalia.
- The international support and direction given to the ASF in its development has been relevant and has established a base upon which the ASF can responsibly continue its growth and potentially be of use in a more comprehensive police development effort.

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

- The value of the ASF as an interim resource or a long-term asset depends wholly upon the willingness of the international community to make available the substantial resources required to address a wide range of issues relating to paying, staffing, training, equipping, and institutionally developing a law enforcement organization with the effectiveness and credibility to begin to develop Somali self-sufficiency in taking responsibility for public safety issues.
- A concerted effort should be made to identify the personnel resources available to the ASF who are able to provide Somali expertise for law enforcement development.
- Law enforcement development in Somalia must be pursued in the context of a complete criminal justice system to insure that police actions adhere to the tradition of Somali law.

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

To begin to address the above issues in the context of costs for supporting the ASF as an interim entity which could then serve as an established resource upon which to predicate long-term development efforts, the following notional budgets have been prepared to exemplify needs for salary, material and related logistical support. These figures are not in any way intended to be comprehensive but do reflect basic requirements.

AUXILIARY SECURITY FORCE (ASF) START-UP SIX MONTH ESTIMATES

ADMINISTRATIVE

1 - In-Country Administrator @ 150 k/6 mos	\$ 150,000
1 - In-Country Fiscal Coordinator @ 75 k/6 mos	\$ 75,000
2 - In-Country Logistics Coordinators @ 75 k/6 mos	\$ 150,000
Misc. Administrative Equipment & Supply Costs (for ASF use in personnel and administrative development)	\$ 250,000
	<u>\$ 625,000</u>

ASF PERSONNEL

6 - Somali Police Advisors @ \$350/mo.; \$2100/6 mos	\$ 12,600
5,000 - Policemen Salary (see pg. 20)	\$ 3,392,000
5,000 - Police Uniforms + Individual Equip @ \$150/mem	\$ 750,000
	<u>\$ 4,154,600</u>

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

POLICE STATION RESTORATION

35 - Stations @ 5 k each	\$ 175,000
35 - Generators @ 5 k each	\$ 175,000
35 - Water Tanks @ 2 k each	\$ 70,000
35 - Basic Station Content Kits @ 2 k each	\$ 70,000
35 - Administrative Supplies @ \$3 k each	\$ 105,000

\$ 595,000

TRANSPORT

2 - Admin. Vehicles (4x4) @ 30 k	\$ 60,000
6 - Advisor Vehicles (4x4) @ 30 k	\$ 180,000
35 - Station Vehicles (4x4) @ 30 k	\$ 1,050,000
35 - Station Light Trucks @ 50 k	\$ 1,750,000
Vehicle Maintenance (parts, tools, fuel, etc.)	\$ 1,000,000

\$ 4,040,000

COMMUNICATIONS

35 - Base Stations @ 2 k each	\$ 70,000
225 - Hand sets @ 5 k each	\$ 1,125,000

\$ 1,195,000

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

TRAINING (Start-Up Only)

1 Week Orientation Training - 5,000 Policemen	\$ 500,000
Firearms Familiarization	
Training Ammunition @ 100 rounds/man	\$ 20,000
Basic Academy Restoration and Fixtures (Start-Up Only)	\$ 1,500,000
Orientation Training Lunches (30,000) @ \$1	\$ 30,000

\$ 2,050,000

ESTIMATED TOTAL COST FOR
START-UP + 6 MOS. (5,000 MAN ASF)

\$12,659,600

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

This chart reflects a proposed pay structure which takes into account the rank and grade of the old National Police and the basic concepts of the pay-job responsibility equation set forth in the United Nations recommended salary scale for Somalia effective Feb. 1993.

ASF START-UP COMPENSATION PAY STRUCTURE

	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>\$/DAY</u>	<u>\$/MOS</u>	<u>NO/ GRADE</u>	<u>TOTAL \$/MOS</u>	<u>\$/6 MOS</u>	<u>\$/YR</u>
Patrolman	ASF-1	3.00	90.00	3775	339,750	2,038,500	4,077,000
Corporal	ASF-2	3.50	105.00	630	66,150	396,900	793,800
Sergeant	ASF-3	4.00	120.00	315	37,800	226,800	453,600
Shift Sgts	ASF-4	4.50	135.00	105	14,175	85,050	170,100
Shift Supervisor	ASF-5	5.00	150.00	105	15,750	94,500	189,000
Station Vice - Cmdr.	ASF-6	5.50	165.00	35	5,775	34,650	69,300
Station Cmdr.	ASF-7	6.00	180.00	35	6,300	37,800	75,600
Chief of Police	ASF-8	6.50	195.00	9	1,755	10,530	21,060
Police Commissioner	ASF-9	7.00	210.00	10	2,100	12,600	25,200
Net				5,019	\$489,555	\$2,937,330	\$5,874,660
Special Pay*					\$ 75,700	\$ 454,200	\$ 908,400
Gross					\$565,255	\$3,391,530	\$6,783,060

* Special Pay reflects the cost value of commodity supplements to salary.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: Somalia, Accelerated US Troop Withdrawal (1 page)	04/06/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [10]

2012-0659-F
ke4140

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
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006. note	Somalia Core Group Meeting notes (1 page)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [10]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007. list	Somalia Core Group Meeting [partial] (1 page)	04/02/1993	P3/b(3)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [10]

2012-0659-F
ke4140

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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~~SECRET~~

(SVTS)
Somalia Core Group Meeting
Friday, April 2, 1993, 2:00 P.M.
White House Situation Room

Chaired by: Richard Clarke

JCS

Frank Bowman

(703) 695-6585

OSD

Jim Woods

(703) 697-2864

STATE

David Shinn

647-9742

OMB

Gordon Adams

x4657

(b)(3)

[007]

OVP

Jim Carmen

x6033

NSC

Randy Beers

x5066

Dennis Jett

x3391

Susan Rice

x3736

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 01/04/17

202-0059-F

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD ON DISCUSSIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY**

DATE: March 16, 1993

LOCATION: West Wing Office

TIME: 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

- The Vice President
- Ambassador Robert Oakley
- Bill Wise
- Hank Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
- Dennis Jett, Acting NSC Senior Director for African Affairs
- Jim Carman

DISCUSSION:

- Vice President What about our endgame - are we headed in the right direction?

- Ambassador Oakley We're playing it right. It's a three phased operation. First, we accomplished our original goal as outlined last December by Secretary Cheney and General Powell (provide a secure environment for delivery of relief operations). Second, we need to empower civil society and create a climate conducive to reconstruction. And finally, we need to pluck the war lords' feathers.

Now, the UN must resume efforts at job creation and economic reconstruction. These efforts were suspended when the U.S. went in with UNITAF. There has been a decrease in clan warfare but an increase individual armed banditry. Many people have no other means of livelihood than to rob others of material goods. I have a Somali friend who had three cars stolen in three weeks. These traits were present in the Somali people when I was there in the mid-eighties, but not in the large numbers you find now. This was the problem with the Irish nurse who was murdered - she strayed from a convoy to visit a friend in an outlying area.

But the problem relief workers were sent in to solve is solved.

Vice President

How is the transfer of responsibilities from UNITAF to UNOSOM proceeding?

Ambassador Oakley

The UN needs to move along with demobilization of the armed clans, collect the heavy weapons, and get along with rebuilding, including relief activities and rehabilitation.

The key task for UNOSOM II is to tell the war lords that we (the UN) only recognize leaders who command popular support, continue to push on disarming, and deal with individual armed violence.

General Bir and Admiral Howe will make the transition work. After early May, the UN is in the lead, and we are in a supporting role.

Vice President

What countries are contributing the majority of forces to UNOSOM II.

Ambassador Oakley

India, Pakistan, and the U.S. have the largest number of forces pledged. Australia, Belgium, Canada, and Italy also have major commitments.

Vice President

Is there a danger of a large Italian component?

Ambassador Oakley

Some; their businessmen and politicians cause problems - they supported Siad Barre to the last day. But, the Italian military is well respected.

Some of the countries that are participating in UNITAF, Canada and Australia in particular, are hedging on involvement in UNOSOM II because of domestic political considerations. A word to these countries from you or the President that their participation in UNOSOM II is important would be helpful.

Note: VP scheduled to meet head of the Nigerian Transitional Council March 23. Peacekeeping in Somalia will be discussed.

I would like to commend the discipline and professionalism of the U.S. military

personnel in Somalia. This is a very nasty country and our people are always at risk. Even under these conditions, our military has shown great respect for the Somali people. There have only been three or four incidents of unauthorized shootings and I am terribly proud of the manner in which our military is conducting themselves. General Johnston has authorized our people to use their weapons when they feel threatened, and our people have shown great restraint in a very violent environment. In addition, our military has also taken the lead in a number of humanitarian activities. They are just doing a great job.

Vice President

We have a super military now. We will ensure they are properly recognized for their service in Somalia. Thank you again. It was a pleasure talking to you.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AFRICA REGION

NAME: Mr. Richard Clarke

FAX NUMBER: 2/395-1199

OFFICE NUMBER: 2/395-3393

REMARKS: For your information.

FROM: James L. Woods

OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER: DASD/AFR, 703/697-2864

DATE/TIME SENT: 3/23/93

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDES THIS COVER SHEET) 4



U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

19 MAR 1993

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ADMINISTRATOR

THROUGH: A-AA/PHA: Lois Richards *LR*
FROM: D/PHA/OFDA: James R. Kunder *JR Kunder*
SUBJECT: Security for Humanitarian Efforts

I would like to draw your attention to what may quickly evolve into a crisis for the international humanitarian effort in Somalia: relief workers leaving the country.

While U.S. military commanders focus on drawing down the U.S. troop presence in Somalia and the international community focuses on transitioning to UNOSOM II, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are seriously considering pulling out of Somalia entirely -- a move that will render all other current relief efforts useless. At the U.N. coordination meeting on humanitarian assistance held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on March 11-13, donors and NGOs stressed the need for improved security for relief workers. NGO representatives have also voiced the strongly held view that, due to increased insecurity coupled with declining emergency needs, it may no longer be worth the risk to remain in Somalia.

Several recent problems illustrate the situation. For example, a standoff continues between the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) and Somali "guards" demanding "back payment" for services that were not rendered. The former port security guards, who were forced upon WFP by General Aideed and were paid regularly prior to December 9, have never been effective, certainly not since troop arrival and the subsequent takeover of port security by Unified Task Force (UNITAF) troops. As a result of this incident and resulting threats on his life, WFP's chief of operations left Somalia on March 18 at the recommendation of General Montgomery. CARE, WFP's implementing partner, has also pulled out most of its expatriate staff and is considering leaving Mogadishu completely if WFP further reduces staff. CARE's departure would have a devastating impact on the overall relief operation; together, WFP and CARE are responsible for over 50% of the food deliveries in Somalia.

In Kismayo, relief operations never really recovered from General Morgan's invasion in late February. Morgan's incursion instigated wide pread looting and the flight of frightened

supporters of Morgan's enemy, Colonel Jess, including NGO guards, drivers, food distributors and medical personnel. The loss of NGO staff and the looting of NGO stocks of food, seeds, and other relief supplies combined with continued clan tension have made it difficult to resume relief activities. This week's invasion by Morgan, shortly after the majority of U.S. troops departed, served to increase NGO nervousness as they were left with an inadequate number of military guards for their compounds. Plans for intervention by the U.S. rapid response force are seen by NGOs as reactive rather than proactive. The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Concern and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF)/Belgium now plan to pull out of Kismayo indefinitely.

Brava, a village located near troop-secured Merca, remains insecure, forcing NGOs to position expatriate relief staff in Merca who must then rely on military escort to participate in their Brava relief programs. Often, NGO staff must wait days for military escort while their programs in Brava suffer from lack of expert staff. In the absence of increased troop presence in Brava or higher priority for NGO military escort needs, MSF/France is considering closing down its urgently needed supplemental feeding center. Actually, MSF groups from France, Belgium and Holland are considering pulling out of Somalia entirely due to a combination of inadequate security and their sense that the emergency phase of the operation is completed.

There is no doubt that UNITAF troops have had a tremendous positive impact on the ability of relief supplies to reach desperate populations. Malnutrition rates have decreased by 50% since troop arrival due to regular food deliveries and increased medical care. However, the humanitarian progress will be quickly reversed if relief organizations pull out -- and many are on the verge of such an action. Three expatriates have been killed since Operation Restore Hope began, as compared to the two expatriate deaths that occurred in the two years of anarchy that preceded multi-national military involvement in Somalia

Part of the growing security problem is related to differing perceptions of the role of UNITAF forces. Since its deployment, UNITAF has focused on food delivery security issues, not on personal protection of relief workers and general law and order. All of us, perhaps, expected that personal security would improve along with food delivery systems -- an expectation that has not come to pass. The current environment requires UNITAF or follow-on forces to re-examine what it means to support a relief operation, and may require additional focus on personal security or changes to the current system which subjects NGOs to security regulations that prevent them from providing their own security. UNITAF disarmament of NGO guards -- an often necessary tactic resulting from attacks on UNITAF personnel by off-duty NGO guards -- has increased NGO vulnerability while UNITAF has not fully compensated by providing continuous UNITAF protection for NGO compounds. UNITAF regulations also prohibit any show of force in NGO vehicles, a technique that previously deterred attacks.

While the Department of Defense is anxious to pull the majority of U.S. troops out of Somalia, it is important at this juncture to look at the sustainability of any progress that has been made in light of the current insecurity. The United Nations needs to take the lead role in managing the international military and humanitarian effort but, given the history of U.N. involvement in Somalia, NGO skepticism that UNOSOM II will be able to deliver what UNITAF could not -- security for relief workers -- is well founded.

The U.S. Government must look seriously at the pace of its troop withdrawal from Somalia, the rules of engagement of UNOSOM II and methods that can be taken to provide relief agencies with the security they need to do their jobs. Without a functioning government in Somalia, these relief organizations are the foundation of all relief and rehabilitation efforts. The donor community cannot fulfill its objectives without their help.

cc: AFR:DCobb
AFR/EA:RMachmer
AF/E:MChesher
IO:MKimble
PM:SEnglesby
HA:JKaufmann
RP:MMckelvey

FHA/OFDA:VNewsom:security.nmo:77558

(212) 415-4846

Res.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Mar-1993 02:30 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX_MAIL@OEOB
RAGLE@A1@OEOB
JETT@A1@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS SOMALIA RESOLUTION

<DIST>
SIT: CLARKER JETT RAGLE VAX
<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0292
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0494
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0266
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1807
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0419
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0409
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0477
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0327
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0398
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0196
RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 0132
RUFHTH/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0289
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0373
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
<SUBJ>

SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS SOMALIA RESOLUTION
MARCH 26

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001528

E.O.12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, PHUM, UNSC, SO

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS SOMALIA RESOLUTION
MARCH 26

1. BY UNANIMOUS VOTE LATE AFTERNOON MARCH 26 THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED A RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE EXPANSION, AND CHAPTER 7 ENHANCEMENT, OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA (FINAL DRAFT FAXED TO DEPT). TODAY'S SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ALSO OFFICIALLY TRIGGERS THE START OF THE TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM RESPONSIBILITY FOR CREATING AND MAINTAINING SECURE CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUED RELIEF. THE DRAFT ADOPTED PRESERVED ALL KEY FEATURES OF THE US TEXT CIRCULATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON MARCH 19. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S EXPLANATION OF VOTE FOLLOWS IN PARA 4.

2. SPEECH AFTER SPEECH OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS CONVEYED A SENSE THAT THE UN WAS EMBARKING UPON AN HISTORIC TASK EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF ITS ROLE IN UNPRECEDENTED BUT NECESSARY WAYS. THERE WERE MANY ENCOMIUMS FOR THE US ROLE IN ORGANIZING AND LEADING OPERATION RESTORE HOPE AND INUCRAFTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR A SMOOTH HAND-OFF TO UNOSOM II. IN A TRIBUTE TO UNITAF'S WORK IN SOMALIA AS WELL AS AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S DIPLOMACY IN NEW YORK, UK DEPUTY PERM REP RICHARDSON THANKED "THE US WITHOUT WHOSE EFFORTS WE WOULD NOT BE ADOPTING THE UNOSOM II RESOLUTION TODAY".

3. IMPORTANT SPEECH THEMES INCLUDED: FRANCE'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE CONTRIBUTING 1100 TROOPS; CHINA'S CAUTION AGAINST "IMPRUDENT USE OF CHAPTER 7" - (COMMENT: WE CAN'T RESIST THE INFERENCE THAT BEIJING ACCEPTS "PRUDENT" USES OF 7); JAPAN.S COMMENT THAT IT WAS "PLEASED TO CONTRIBUTE \$100 MILLION" TO UNITAF AND WILL "EXPLORE HOW BEST TO SUPPORT SOMALI NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS" WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON "JOB CREATION"; BRAZIL.S OBSERVATION THAT THE PROFOUND UN INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALI DOMESTIC MATTERS WAS "A NECESSARY STEP GIVEN THE TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF A GOVERNMENT"; MOROCCO'S ASSERTION THAT THE SOMALI EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATED "AN INSOLUBLE LINK BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY"; THE UK OBSERVATION THAT THE UNITY OF THE COUNCIL DISPLAYED BY THE UNANIMOUS DECISION WAS CRITICAL TO ITS TAKING SUCH AN HISTORIC STEP; AND RUSSIAN STRESS ON MAKING THE MOST CAUTIOUS AND ECONOMICAL USE OF FUNDS IN ORDER TO KEEP TOTAL COSTS TO A MINIMUM; AND NEW ZEALAND DWELLING ON THE FACT THAT EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT WAS A PRECONDITION TO ALL THE UN'S OTHER GOALS IN SOMALIA.

4. BEGIN TEXT.

US EXPLANATION OF VOTE
SOMALIA RESOLUTION

MARCH 26, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT, BY ADOPTING THIS RESOLUTION THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL SIGNIFY THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO RESUME ITS RIGHTFUL LEADERSHIP ROLE IN RESTORING PEACE TO SOMALIA AND IN CREATING CONDITIONS FOR SOMALIS TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FUTURE. WE APPRECIATE THE VITAL ROLE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL THUS FAR AND LOOK FORWARD TO HIS CONTINUED VISION AND LEADERSHIP NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 ON DECEMBER 3 LAST YEAR, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PLEASED TO JOIN WITH MORE THAN 30 OTHER UN MEMBERS IN A MILITARY MISSION OF MERCY UNPRECEDENTED IN SIZE OR PURPOSE.

THOSE COUNTRIES ARE TOO NUMEROUS TO NAME HERE BUT THEY CAME FROM EVERY REGION AND THEY GAVE ASSISTANCE
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001528

E.O.12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, PHUM, UNSC, SO

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS SOMALIA RESOLUTION
MARCH 26

OF EVERY TYPE: INFANTRY, DOCTORS AND NURSES,
ENGINEERS, HUMANITARIAN

WORKERS, POLICE SPECIALISTS,
TRUCKS, AIRCRAFT, LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF ALL KINDS,
USE OF NAVAL AND AIR BASES, AND OF COURSE GENEROUS
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT TO UNDERSTATE THE TASKS AHEAD: AS GREAT AS THE CHALLENGES IN SOMALIA HAVE BEEN, THOSE BEFORE US ARE EVEN GREATER. BUT IT CAN BE FAIRLY SAID TO ALL THE MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE THAT THEY HAVE MET THEIR CALLING: TODAY HOPE HAS RETURNED TO SOMALIA.

IT IS NOW TIME FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO COMPLETE THE WORK BEGUN BY THE UNIFIED TASK FORCE. MR. PRESIDENT, BY ADOPTING THIS RESOLUTION WE WILL EMBARK ON AN UNPRECEDENTED ENTERPRISE AIMED AT NOTHING LESS THAN THE RESTORATION OF AN ENTIRE COUNTRY AS A PROUD, FUNCTIONING AND VIABLE MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. THIS IS AN HISTORIC UNDERTAKING. WE ARE EXCITED TO JOIN IT AND WE WILL VIGOROUSLY SUPPORT IT.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE SOBERLY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THIS RESOLUTION ENGAGES THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE ASSISTANCE EVER GIVEN TO ANY COUNTRY BUT TO DO SO WITH FEW LESSONS AND NO MODELS TO GUIDE OUR PATH. YET WE ARE CERTAIN OF THIS: EACH ELEMENT OF THE PROGRAM FOR SOMALIA IS NECESSARY TO ITS OVERALL SUCCESS AND THAT COUNTRY'S RECUPERATION. THROUGH HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL

MUST OVERSEE :

- THE CONTINUED CEASEFIRE,
 - DISARMAMENT,
 - MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY,
 - FURTHER RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
 - RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL,
 - REFUGEE REPATRIATION,
 - CREATION OF CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION, AND
- ESPECIALLY,
- POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

INDEED BY TODAY'S ACTION THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL COMMIT THE UN TO WHAT IS PROBABLY THE TOUGHEST COORDINATION CHALLENGE OF ITS HISTORY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO OVERSTATE THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS SUCCESS OR THE COSTS OF FAILURE. MR. PRESIDENT, LET US COMMIT OURSELVES TO ITS SUCCESS. THANK YOU.

ALBRIGHT

BT

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SECTION: 01 OF 02

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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008. cable	Re: Security for Relief Operations in Somalia (10 pages)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [10]

2012-0659-F
ke4140

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AF/E, AF/RA, AF/EP

F A X C O V E R S H E E T

DATE: March 29, 1993 Page 1 of 15

TO: Susan Rice

OFFICE: NSC

PHONE: # 395-5066 FAX #: 395-1199

FROM: David Shinn

OFFICE: AF/E

PHONE #: 647-8852 FAX #: 647-0810

SUBJECT: Addis Ababa 02040

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01
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O 291343Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5914
INFO USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
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SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 02040

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, SO, ET
SUBJECT: tfso01: somalia: final text of the "addis ababa
- agreement of the first session of the conference
- on national reconciliation in somalia"
- 27 march 1993

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ref: addis ababa 1980

begin text: after long and costly years of civil war that ravaged our country, plunged it into famine, and caused acute suffering and loss of life among our people, there is the light of hope at last: progress has been made towards the restoration of peace, security and reconciliation in somalia.

-- We the somali political leaders, recognized how vital it is that this process continue. It has our full commitment.

-- By our attendance at this historic conference, we have resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile our differences through peaceful means. We

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pledge to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of this year. National reconciliation is now the most fervent wish of the somali people.

-- We commit ourselves to continuing the peace process under the auspices of the united nations and in cooperations (sic) with the regional organizations and the standing committee of the horn as well as with our neighbors in the horn of africa.

-- After an era of pain, destruction and bloodshed that turned somalis against somalis, we have confronted our responsibility. We now pledge to work toward the rebirth

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of somalia, to restore its dignity as a country and rightful place in the community of nations. At the close of the holy month of ramadan, we believe this is the most precious gift we can give to our people.

-- The serenity and shade of a tree, which according to our somali tradition is a place of reverence and rapprochement, has been replaced by the conference hall. Yet the promises made here are no less sacred or binding.

-- Therefore, we, the undersigned somali political leaders, meeting at africa hall in addis ababa, ethiopia between 15 and 27 march 1993, hereby reaffirm our commitment to the agreements signed during the informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation in january 1993.

-- In concord to end hostilities, and to build on the foundation of peace for reconstruction and rehabilitation in somalia, we agree to proceed within the framework of the following provisions and decisions:

i. Disarmament and security:

1. Affirm that uprooting of banditry and crime is necessary for peace, stability, security, reconciliation, reconstruction and development in somalia;
2. Further affirm that disarmament must and shall be comprehensive, impartial and transparent;

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3. Commit ourselves to complete, and simultaneous disarmament throughout the entire country in accordance with the disarmament concept and timeframe set by the cease-fire agreement of january 1993; and request that unitaf/unosom assist these efforts so as to achieve a substantial completion of the disarmament with 90 days;

4. Further reiterate our commitment to the strict, effective and expeditious implementation of the cease-fire/disarmament agreement signed on 8 and 15 january 1993;

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INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01
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5. Reaffirm our commitment to comply with the requirements of the cease-fire agreement signed in

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january 1993, including the total and complete handover of weapons to unitaf/unosom;

6. Urge unitaf/unosom to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the cease-fire agreement of january 1993;

7. Stress the need for the air, sea and land borders of somalia to be closely guarded by unitaf/unosom in order to prevent any flow of arms into the country and to prevent violation of the territorial waters of somalia;

8. Further stress the need for maximum cooperation by neighboring countries to assure that their common borders with somalia are not used for the movement of weapons in somalia, in keeping with the united nations arms embargo against somalia;

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9. Agree on the need to establish an impartial national and regional somali police force in all regions of the country on an urgent basis through the reinstatement of the former somalia police force and recruitment and training of young somalis from all regions, and request the assistance of the international community in this regard.

ii. Rehabilitation and reconstruction:

1. Affirm the need to accelerate the supply and operation of relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation

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programs in somalia;

2. Welcome the conclusion of the third coordination meeting on humanitarian assistance to somalia;

3. Express our appreciation to donor countries for their continued humanitarian assistance to somalia and, in particular, for the generous pledge, made at the third coordination meeting, to mobilize usd 142 million for relief and rehabilitation efforts in somalia;

4. Call upon unosom, aid agencies and donor countries to immediately assist in the rehabilitation of essential public and social services, and of necessary infrastructure, on a priority basis by the end of june 1993;

5. Assure the international community of the full desire of somali leaders to re-establish, with the assistance of unosom, a secure environment for relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation operations and the protection of relief and rehabilitation workers and supplies;

6. Condemn the acts of violence committed against relief workers and all forms of extortion regarding humanitarian operations;

7. Urge the organizations within the un system and ngo's to effectively utilize somali human resources in the rehabilitation process in somalia.

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iii. Restoration of property and settlement of disputes;

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1. Affirm that all disputes must henceforth be settled
by dialogue, negotiations and other peaceful and legal
means;

2. Further affirm that all private or public properties
that were illegally confiscated, robbed, stolen, seized,
embezzled or taken by other fraudulent means must be
returned to their rightful owners;

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, SO, ET
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3. Decide to deal with this matter within the framework

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specified in the report of the committee on the peaceful
settlement of disputes.

iv. Transitional mechanisms:

the somali people believe that there is concurrence among
the people of somalia that somalia must retain its
rightful place in the community of nations and that they
must express their political views and make the decisions
that affect them. This is an essential component of the
search for peace.

-- To achieve this, political and administrative
structures in somali need to be rebuilt to provide the
people as a whole with an opportunity to participate in
shaping the future of the country.

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-- In this context, the establishment of transitional mechanisms which prepare the country for a stable and democratic future is absolutely essential. During the transitional period, which will last for a period of two years effective from the date of signature to this agreement, the emphasis will be upon the provision of essential services, complete disarmament, restoration of peace and domestic tranquility and on the attainment of the reconciliation of the somali people. Emphasis will also be put on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure and on the building of democratic institutions. All of this will prepare the country to enter a constitutional phase in which the institutions of

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~~democratic~~ governance, rule of law, decentralization of power, protection of human rights and individual liberties, and the safeguarding of the integrity of the somali republic are all in place.

-- Therefore, we have agreed to a broad outline of a framework for a transitional system of governance to allow for the provision of essential services, the creation of a basis for long-term planning, and for the resumption of greater administrative responsibility by somalis. In general terms, this system will be composed of four basic administrative components that will be mandated to function during the transitional period.

-- Taking into account the reality of the situation in somalia today and the need for stability, we hereby agree to the establishment of the following four basic transitional organs of authority:

1. The transitional national council (tnc)

the tnc will:

- a) be the repository of somali sovereignty;
- b) be the prime political authority having legislative functions during the period in question;
- c) interact, as appropriate, with the international community, including unosom;
- d) appoint various committees, including the

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transitional charter drafting committee, as required;

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- e) appoint officers for its various functions;
- f) appoint the heads of administrative departments;
- g) oversee the performance of the departments created,
and
- h) establish an independent judiciary.

The tnc shall be composed of:

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01
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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 02040

E.O. 12356: N/A
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a) three representatives from each of the 18 regions
currently recognized, including one woman from each

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region;

b) five additional seats for mogadishu;

c) one nominee from each of the political factions
currently participating in the first session of the
national reconciliation conference.

2. The central administrative departments (cad's)

the tnc will appoint the heads of the central
administrative departments, whose prime function will be
to re-establish and operate the departments of civil
administration, social affairs, economic affairs and
humanitarian affairs, paving the way for the re-
establishment and operation of a formal government. The

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cad's shall comprise skilled professionals having the ability to reinstate, gradually, the administrative functions of national public administration. The performance of these departments will be overseen by the tnc.

3. Regional councils (rc's)

regional councils shall be established in all the existing 18 regions of somalia. The present 18 regions shall be maintained during the transitional period. The regional councils shall be entrusted primarily with the task of implementing humanitarian, social and economic

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programs in coordination with the tnc and will also assist in the conducting of the internationally-supervised census. The regional councils will liaise with unosom ii, un specialized agencies, ngo's and other relevant organizations directly and through the central administrative departments and transitional national council. The regional council shall also be responsible for law and order at the regional level. In this regard, the law enforcement institution will be a regional police force and a regional judiciary. The district councils (see below) in each region shall send representatives who will constitute the regional councils.

4. District councils

district councils shall be established in the present districts in every region. District council members shall be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with somali traditions. The district councils shall be responsible for managing the affairs of the district including public safety, health, education and reconstruction.

V. Conclusion

the conference agreed on the appointment, by the tnc, of a transitional charter drafting committee referred to in section iv 1 (d) above. In drafting the transitional charter, the committee shall be guided by the basic principles of the universal declaration of human rights

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and by the somali traditional ethics.

-- The conference agreed that the tnc shall appoint a "peace ~~delegation~~" composed of political movements and other social elements to ~~travel to all parts of the country for the purpose of advancing the peace~~ and reconciliation process as well as to explain the agreements reached in addis ababa.

-- We further agree that the tnc shall appoint a national

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INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01
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	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/051W	

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O 291343Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5918
INFO USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 02040

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, SO, ET
SUBJECT: tfso01: somalia: final text of the "addis ababa

national
committee to bring about reconciliation and seek
solutions to outstanding political problems with the snm.

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-- the conference also calls upon the international community and in particular on the neighboring states to facilitate the noble effort at reconciliation by providing moral and material support.

-- In conclusion, we the undersigned, in agreeing to the above, resolve that never again will somalia suffer the tragedy of the recent past. Emerging from the darkness of catastrophe and war, we somalis herald the beginning of a new era of peace, of healing and rebuilding, in which cooperation and trust will overcome hatred and suspicion. It is a message we must pass on to our children and our grandchildren so that the proud somali family, as we knew it, can once again become whole.

-- We, the undersigned, hereby pledge to abandon the

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logic of force for the ethic of dialogue. We will pursue the process of national reconciliation with vigor and sincerity, in accordance with this declaration and with the cooperation of the people of somalia as a whole.

-- Recognizing the tragic and painful recent history of problems in our country, we pledge to achieve comprehensive national reconciliation through peaceful means. We also pledge to adopt, in all parts of somalia, transitional measures that will contribute to harmony and healing of wounds among all the people of somalia.

-- We invite the secretary-general of the united nations and his special representative in somalia, in accordance

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with the mandate entrusted to them by the un security
council, to extend all necessary assistance to the people
of somalia for the implementation of this agreement.
End text.

Signed: 1. Samo - mohamed r. Arbow, chairman; 2. Sda -
- named f. Abdullahi, chairman; 3. Sdm - abdi musse
mayow, chairman; 4. Sdm (sna) - mohamed nur alio,
chairman; 5. Sndu - ali ismail abdi, chairman;
6. Snt - gen. Omar haji mohamed, chairman; 7. Snu -
mohamed rajis mohamed, chairman; 8. Spm - gen. Aden
abdullahi nur, chairman; 9. Spm (sna) - ahmed hashi
mahmmud, v/chairman; 10. Ssdf - gen. Mohdammed (sic)
abshir musa, chairman; 11. Ssnm - abdi warsame isaq,
chairman; 12. Usc(sna) gen. Mohammed farah h. Aidid,
chairman; 13. Usc - mohammed qanyare afrah, chairman;
14. Ust - abdurahman dualah ali, chairman; 15. Usp -
mohamed abdi hashi, chairman.

Modadishu minimize considered. Baas

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION