

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia, 1993 [8]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Rice, Susan

Original OA/ID Number:

277

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	5	1	1	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Security Council Discusses Draft Resolution on Extension of Somalia Mandate (6 pages)	11/17/1993	P1/b(1)
002. report	Re: [Somalia] (10 pages)	07/19/1993	P1/b(1)
003. report	Re: [Aideed] (5 pages)	07/14/1993	P1/b(1)
004. report	[Duplicate of 002]\ (10 pages)	07/19/1993	P1/b(1)
005. memo	Douglas Bennet to Mr. Tarnoff, re: Dealing with the Italians (4 pages)	07/29/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [8]

2012-0659-F

ke4138

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

Sonahed
Res.

IO/UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES 10 DATE 1/12/94FROM: John The Smyler TELEPHONE 92-1192TO: DEALING NGC-S FAX TEL NUMBERDIS: to Susan RiceSonahed Extension (II)as discussed - Not yet finished

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PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

UNITED
NATIONS



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/26767

18 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 12 November 1993 (S/26738),

Noting the significant improvement in the overall situation in most areas of Somalia achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) as described in that report,

Noting also paragraph 72 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/26738),

Recognising that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Stressing the commitment of the international community to continue helping Somalia in its efforts to accelerate the process of national reconstruction and to promote stability, rehabilitation and political reconciliation and to regain a normal, peaceful life,

Recalling that the highest priority of UNOSOM II continues to be to support the efforts of the Somali people in promoting the process of national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions,

Affirming that the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 and the Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia signed on 27 March 1993, establish a sound basis for resolution of the problems in Somalia,

Emphasizing also in this context, the crucial importance of disarmament in achieving lasting peace and stability throughout Somalia,

Condemning the continuing acts of violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts and paying tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel of several countries who have been killed or injured while serving in Somalia.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

S/26757
English
Page 2

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/26738);
2. Commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the personnel of UNOSOM II for their achievements in improving the conditions of the Somali people and in promoting the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction of the country;
3. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to renew the mandate of UNOSOM II for an additional period expiring on 31 May 1994;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council by 15 January 1994, or at any time before that if the situation warrants, on the progress made in achieving national reconciliation by the Somali people and that made in the attainment of political, security and humanitarian goals, and further requests the Secretary-General, as part of that report, to provide an updated plan setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to humanitarian, political and security activities;
5. Decides to undertake a fundamental review of the mandate of UNOSOM II by February 1994 in light of the report of the Secretary-General and his updated plan;
6. Urges all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, to accelerate their efforts to achieve political reconciliation, peace and security, and immediately to abide by the cease-fire and disarmament agreements reached in Addis Ababa, particularly the immediate cantonment of all heavy weapons;
7. Underlines the importance of the Somali people attaining specific goals in the context of political reconciliation, in particular the early establishment and effective functioning of all district and regional councils and an interim national authority;
8. Stresses in this regard the importance it attaches to the accelerated implementation by the Somali people, with the assistance of the United Nations and donor countries, of the recommendations contained in annex I of the Secretary-General's report of 17 August 1993 (S/26317) and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993), and in particular the establishment of an operational police, penal and judiciary system at the regional and district level as soon as feasible;
9. Reminds all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, that continued United Nations involvement in Somalia depends on their active cooperation and tangible progress towards a political settlement;
10. Welcomes and supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts being made by Member States and international organizations in particular those in the region to assist United Nations efforts to bring all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, to the negotiating table;

11. 18. 93

05:43 PM

AUS MISSION APOLESEA

F03

S/26767

English

Page 3

11. Reaffirms the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 733 (1992);

12. Expresses ~~the~~ concern at the destabilizing effects of cross-border arms flows in the region affirms the importance it attaches to the security of the countries neighbouring Somalia and calls for the cessation of such arms flows;

13. Welcomes the fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia to be convened in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993;

14. Emphasizes the relationship between national rehabilitation and progress in the process of national reconciliation ~~and in the context of~~ Somalia, encourages donor countries to make contributions to Somalia's rehabilitation as demonstrable political progress occurs, and in particular to contribute urgently to rehabilitation projects in those regions where progress on political reconciliation and security has been made;

15. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have contributed to or provided logistical or other assistance to UNOSOM II or offered to do so, and encourages those who are in a position to do so to contribute, on an urgent basis, troops, equipment, ~~and~~ financial and logistical support to enhance UNOSOM II's capability to carry out its mandate and to ensure the safety of the personnel;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to ask the Somalia Trust Fund Committee to review claims and make payments on an urgent basis and urges Member States to make funds available directly or through the Somalia Trust Fund for priority projects, including the re-establishment of the Somali police and demining, on an urgent basis;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

IO / UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES _____ DATE _____

FROM IO/UNP: Susan FELLE TELEPHONE 647-0042TO OFFICE: NSC FAX TEL NUMBER 395-1199DISTRIBUTE TO: NSCSUSAN RICE
phone 202-395-7310

SUBJECT _____

REMARKS _____

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP FAX NUMBER 202-647-0039
TELEPHONE 202-647-2392

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

1. We cannot accept either the French language in para 2 reftel or the Secretariat version. The joint task force has functions, e.g. protection of other US forces in Somalia, which are not in support of UNOSOM and it is inappropriate and unnecessary to mention the joint task force explicitly in this resolution. mission should make the argument that pp 1 welcomes the report of the SYG, and that para 72 of that report notes the arrival of the the JTF. If absolutely necessary, mission can propose a new preambulatory para which states:

- Noting paragraph 72 of the secretary general's report (S/26738) of 12 November 1993;

2. In preambular para C, if the words "significant" and "overall" cannot be removed, mission should insist that "in most areas of Somalia" be added to the para.

3. We can accept no reference to progress on reconciliation in OP 5, if ~~and only if~~ the phrase "by the somali³ people" is inserted in the first sentence of OP 4 between "on the progress made" and "in achieving national reconciliation."

4. In OP 16, mission should work to reinsert the clause "urges the Secretary General to ask the Somalia Trust Fund Committee to review claims" be inserted before the language now contained in reftel. We recognize the difficulties the Japanese have with the trust fund, but it is important that the Council emphasize the need for the claims review process to continue.

5. In OP 4, the date for the SYG's report should be changed back to January 15. (For Mission's info only: this will bring the report closer to our own internal review date of January 1.)

6. The final pp ("acting under Chapter VII of the Charter") should be moved to OP 3, since renewal of UNOSOM's mandate is the only part of the resolution being undertake under Chapter VII.

*OK, Harney
Africa*

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→ Clarke/
Dana

IO/UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES

4

DATE

17 NOV 93

(including cover)

FROM IO/UNP:

SUSAN FELLE

TELEPHONE

647-0042

TO OFFICE:

NSC

FAX TEL NUMBER

395-1199

DISTRIBUTE TO:

NSC

SUSAN RICE

phone-202-395-7310

SUBJECT

SOMALIA

REMARKS

Please call me at 2:30.

And share with Sean + Jennifer.

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP FAX NUMBER 202-647-0039
TELEPHONE 202-647-2392URGENT

Latest changes to Somalia Draft Resolution

17 November 1993 - 12h50

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

✓ A. Reaffirming its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

B. Having considered the report of the Secretary General (S/26738) of 12 November 1993,

? C. Noting the significant improvement in the overall situation in Somalia^{✓ areas} achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) as described in that report,

✓ D. Stressing the commitment of the international community to help Somalia regain a normal, peaceful life, while recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

✓ E. Emphasizing that the purpose of UNOSOM II is to support the efforts of the Somali people to achieve those goals,

✓ F. Affirming that the agreements reached in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993 establish a sound basis for resolution of the problems in Somalia,

✓ G. Emphasizing, also in this context, the crucial importance of effective disarmament in achieving lasting peace and stability throughout Somalia,

? H. Condemning the continuing acts of violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts and paying tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel of several countries who have been killed or injured while serving in Somalia,

expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of such attacks.

I. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary General (S/26138) of 12 November 1993 ;

2. Decides to renew the mandate of UNOSOM II for an additional period expiring on 18 May 1994 ;

3. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council by 31 January 1994, or at any time before that if the situation warrants, on the progress made by Somali people in achieving national reconciliation and on the progress made in attaining political and humanitarian goals, and further requests the Secretary General, as part of that report, to provide an updated plan setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities ;

? **4. Decides to undertake a fundamental review of the mandate of UNOSOM II by 15 February 1994 in light of the report of the Secretary General and his updated plan ;** *degree to which the Somali people have made sufficient progress towards national reconciliation*

✓ **5. Urges all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, to accelerate their efforts to achieve political reconciliation, peace and security, and immediately to abide by the cease-fire and disarmament agreements reached in Addis Ababa, particularly the immediate cantonment of all heavy weapons ;**

✓ **6. Underscores the importance of the Somali parties attaining specific goals in the context of political reconciliation, in particular the early establishment of all district and regional councils and an interim national authority ;**

✓ **7. Stresses in this regard the importance it attaches to the accelerated implementation by the Somali people, with the assistance of the United Nations and donor countries, of the recommendations contained in Annex I of the Secretary-General's report of 17 August 1993 (S/26317), and in particular the establishment of an operational police, penal and judiciary system at the regional and district level as soon as feasible ;**

✓ **8. Reminds the parties that continued United Nations involvement in Somalia depends on their active cooperation and tangible progress towards a political settlement ;**

9. Welcomes and supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts being made by member States and organisations, in particular those in the region, to bring the parties to the negotiating table;

The OSCE leaders of + Plan of Africa
+ Calls upon UNOSOM to cooperate effectively with them in these efforts.

10. Expresses its concern at the destabilising effects of cross-border arms flows from Somalia into neighbouring countries, affirms the importance it attaches to the security of these neighbouring countries and calls for the cessation of such arms transfers;

11. Welcomes the fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia to be convened in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993;

12. Calls on donor countries to make contributions to Somalia's reconstruction *as contingent upon* demonstrable political progress occurs, and to contribute urgently to rehabilitation projects in those regions where the greatest progress on political reconciliation and security has been made; *short term, high impact*

13. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have contributed to or provided logistical or other assistance to UNOSOM II or offered to do so, and calls on those who are in a position to do so to contribute, on an urgent basis, troops, equipment and financial support to enhance UNOSOM II's capability to carry out its mandate and to ensure the safety of its personnel;

14. Urges the Secretary-General to ask the Somalia Trust Fund Committee to review claims, make payments and bring forward proposals for the allocation of surplus funds towards priority projects, including the re-establishment of the Somali police and demining, on an urgent basis;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KOE Date: 11/14/93

2012-0659-F

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

cleared

93 NOV 13 P2:05

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 108466 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 3
FROM: MAX ROBINSON S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO USUN NEW YORK: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION ON
EXTENSION OF UNOSOM.

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>NANCY SODERBERG</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WHSITRM</u>
	<u>WILL TTON</u>		
	<u>KRISTIE KENNEY</u>		
	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
	<u>Clarke Schumert Ward</u>	<u>Beers</u>	
	<u>DARRAH</u>	<u>Rice</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: NOVEMBER 14 - SUNDAY - *MUST GO*
USUN is having Monday ^(11/15) morning discussions in New York
and needs the guidance in this message.

S/S Officer: *Max Robinson*
MAX ROBINSON

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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3 Am 4 Am 5 Am
6 Am 7 Am 8 Am

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IO/UNP:SNYDER
L/UNA:RASHKOW; AF:PBUSHNELL
PM:MCNAMARA;JCS:RMACKE
S/S:

AF/SCS:DSHINN
OSD:LONSTRETH;P:WMCILHENNY
NSCS:
S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE UN SE, MOGADISHU

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

By KDE NARA, Date 01/04/17
0012-0689-F

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SO

SUBJECT: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION ON EXTENSION OF UNOSOM

REF: USUN 5535

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. USUN IS INSTRUCTED TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DISCUSS USG DRAFT OF THE RESOLUTION TO EXTEND UNOSOM'S MANDATE AS PRESENTED BELOW. MISSION IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO CONSULT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND UN SECRETARIAT STAFF AS APPROPRIATE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 733 (1992) OF 23 JANUARY 1992 AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS, STRESSING THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA BEAR THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REACHING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION,

EMPHASIZING THAT THE PURPOSE OF UNOSOM IT IS TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE THOSE GOALS,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

AFFIRMING THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN ADDIS ABABA IN JANUARY AND MARCH OF 1993 ESTABLISH A SOUND BASIS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS IN SOMALIA.

DEPLORING THE CONTINUING ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST PERSONS ENGAGED IN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AND EXPRESSING OUTRAGE AT THE LOSS OF LIFE AS A RESULT OF SUCH ATTACKS.

✓ A} DECIDES TO RENEW THE MANDATE OF UNOSOM II FOR A PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THIS RESOLUTION;

B} DECIDES TO REVIEW THE MANDATE BY FEBRUARY 15 IN LIGHT OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOMALI PEOPLE HAVE MADE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, SUCH AS PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT;

sl C} REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE ON AN URGENT BASIS A DETAILED PLAN WITH CONCRETE STEPS SETTING OUT UNOSOM II'S FUTURE CONCERTED STRATEGY WITH REGARD TO ITS HUMANITARIAN, POLITICAL AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES, AS REQUESTED IN RESOLUTION 865;

D} CALLS ON ALL PARTIES IN SOMALIA, INCLUDING MOVEMENTS AND FACTIONS, TO ACCELERATE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, PEACE AND SECURITY, AND URGES THEM TO ABIDE IMMEDIATELY BY THE CEASE-FIRE AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS REACHED IN ADDIS ABABA, PARTICULARLY THE IMMEDIATE CANTONMENT OF ALL HEAVY WEAPONS;

E} UNDERScores THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE ATTAINING SPECIFIC GOALS IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, SPECIFICALLY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL DISTRICT AND REGIONAL COUNCILS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND AN INTERIM NATIONAL AUTHORITY AS SOON AS FEASIBLE THEREAFTER;

F} URGES THE ACCELERATED IMPLEMENTATION BY THE SOMALI PEOPLE, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN ANNEX I OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF 17 AUGUST 1993 (S/26317) AND IN PARTICULAR TO BEGIN ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OPERATIONAL POLICE, PENAL AND JUDICIARY SYSTEM AT THE REGIONAL AND DISTRICT LEVEL AS SOON AS FEASIBLE;

G} REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY JANUARY 15, 1994 AND BY MARCH 15, 1994 ON WHETHER OR NOT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND ON ATTAINING
POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN GOALS;

HJ URGES THE PARTIES TO TAKE NOTE THAT CONTINUED UN
INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA DEPENDS ON THE GOODWILL OF SOMALIS
AND TANGIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT;

IJ WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS THE ONGOING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
MADE BY PRESIDENT MELES, THE HORN OF AFRICA COMMITTEE AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO BRING THE
WARRING FACTIONS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND CALLS UPON
UNOSOM TO COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY WITH THEM IN THESE EFFORTS;

JJ CALLS ON DONOR NATIONS TO MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
SOMALIA'S RECONSTRUCTION CONTINGENT UPON DEMONSTRABLE
POLITICAL PROGRESS, AND TO CONTRIBUTE URGENTLY TO SHORT
TERM, HIGH IMPACT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN ORDER TO
ESTABLISH DEMONSTRABLE LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL PROGRESS
AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE;

KJ EXPRESSES ITS APPRECIATION TO THOSE MEMBER STATES
WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO UNOSOM II OR OFFERED TO DO SO,
AND CALLS ON THOSE WHO HAVE NOT YET DONE SO TO CONTRIBUTE,
ON AN URGENT BASIS, TROOPS AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO
ENHANCE UNOSOM ITS CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE;

LJ URGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ASK THE SOMALIA TRUST
FUND COMMITTEE TO REVIEW CLAIMS, MAKE PAYMENTS AND
ALLOCATE THE SURPLUS TOWARDS RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
SOMALIA POLICE, ON AN URGENT BASIS;

MJ DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER. END
TEXT.

4. MOGADISHU MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Unofficial Translation

Letter from the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Italy
addressed to the
Secretary of Defense of the United States of America
.....

"Rome
July 22, 1993

Dear Les,

Motivated by the cordial and friendly relations existing between us, I feel that I should discuss with you personally, in more depth and with the utmost candor and frankness, Italy's position on the methods being used by the UN peace mission in Somalia. The perception of many countries and of respected U.S. and European editorialists is that ever since the 23 Pakistani soldiers were killed on June 5 last, military actions in the city of Mogadishu aimed at fighting the militia of General Aideed appear to have become ends in themselves, losing sight of the instrumental role of the United Nations mission in humanitarian aid and reconciliation.

Bearing in mind the characteristics of the urban landscape, this succession of limited skirmishes is clearly inapt for conclusive results in establishing a genuine framework of security in the Somali capital, and it inevitably produces numerous civilian victims, arouses strong tensions in the relations between the Somalis and the UN contingent, and -- paradoxically-- results in consolidating General Aideed's status. Any impartial observer is hard put not to express concern on the results, entirely unsatisfactory, attained with this procedure.

This devolution in implementation of the mandate has prompted Italy to pose, in a constructive spirit, a question of high political valence, that assumes even greater significance at a phase when the United Nations is experimenting-- as is the case at any rate in each of our countries -- with innovative approaches for interventions of stabilization and peace: in other words, the issue of limitations and characteristics of the use of force to achieve humanitarian objectives and reconciliation specific to the UN mission, even those undertaken, as in the case of Somalia, under the norms of Chapter VII of the Charter.

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Unfortunately, with a method seemingly intent on purposely penalizing the image of Italy, and in particular of its Armed Forces, this initiative on our part, which in my opinion goes to the very crux of the process of consolidating the new international order, is being staged as an attempt to weaken UNOSOM's command structure through preposterous accusations of insubordination, or worse, of disloyalty directed against the Commander of the Italian contingent made in public by high ranking officials of the United Nations in New York and in Mogadishu. Need I remind that as to the suspicion leaked through Newsweek magazine whereby Aideed had been warned of the attack of the quick reaction force on July 12, the Italian contingent was apprised of the action only after it had begun. I am perplexed at how we could have informed anyone!

As to the inference of entertaining relations with Aideed himself, I can only repeat once again that on June 10 the Italian contingent informed UNOSOM of the concrete possibility of capturing him, and the response was an invitation to desist from intervening. During my June 15 visit to Mogadishu I personally witnessed the continued indecisiveness of the UN leadership to a precise request by General Loi of whether he should proceed to the arrest of Aideed if the opportunity arose. It is patently obvious that one does not spontaneously offer to capture a person with whom has special relations.

The situation is quite delicate and I very much hope that it can be quickly closed. I will spare no efforts to this end. I know that the U.S. administration has demonstrated its sensitivity to our considerations, which were recently confirmed by the 12 EC partners, on the need to reexamine the mission in Somalia, bringing back into focus its original objectives of reconciliation and distribution of humanitarian aid, and in any case defining a more coherent and compatible correlation between means and ends.

From a perspective most closely affecting us as Defense authorities, I would be appreciative if you would enlist the influence of the Pentagon so that in the interval before the initiative to reconcile the Somali factions is relaunched, the UNOSOM minimizes the more belligerent and life-threatening military activities so as not to disturb resumption of political dialogue and to dispel the impression -- which, as exaggerated as it may be, is still widespread in public opinion, and not only in my country-- that UNOSOM is no longer capable of productively directing and maintaining under firm control in discharge of the mandate established by the Security Council. I wish to stress that Italy will not waver from its duties. It is clear that if efforts to revive the dialogue and encourage a political solution

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are of no avail, there would be no alternative other than a conclusive operation, supported by the use of necessary force, aimed at the disarmament of all factions in Mogadishu.

Countries such as the United States and Italy, strongly committed to enhancing the role of the UN as the guardian of stability and peace, all have an interest in collaborating so that the peace mission develops in the desired way. I would also like to be quite frank with you in saying that we should not spare any efforts also because -- as your Embassy in Rome has in all likelihood already informed -- Italy's problems with the United Nations are sometimes perceived -- despite all the precautions taken by the Government to prevent this from happening -- as problems in the bilateral relations with the United States, a matter which instead, as I had occasion to stress in Parliament, is not and cannot be made open to discussion.

I am confident, dear friend and colleague, that you will use your authoritative influence in whatever manner your political sense and experience suggest as best and wisest to overcome these problems, and I thank you even now for any action you might take.

In concluding, allow me to stress that, whatever the future may hold, the Somalia issue should not either disrupt or disturb the long standing friendship and alliance between our countries, a cornerstone of Italian foreign policy.

I am confident that you will receive this letter in the same spirit as it was written. I look forward to seeing you again, and in the meantime extend a very cordial greeting.

[My best regards,
Fabio Fabbri]

Fabio Fabbri"

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TRANSLATION

(Insignia)

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

Rome, 22 June 1993

Ref.n. 3/52221/9.2.32(93)

Dear Colleague,

Regarding the developments in the operational situation in SOMALIA, the Italian Army Contingent under the aegis of UNOSOM 2 needs to be provided with ten M 60 A1 tanks with reactive armor, in service by the US Marine Corps, to replace our present tanks which are not adequately protected.

Contacts made by telephone through diplomatic and military channels have confirmed the possibility of reaching an agreement to temporarily transfer the tanks in question.

In any case I would be grateful if you could use your influence to help in facilitating a quick settlement to the negotiations.

Respectfully yours,

Signed: Fabbio FABBRI

Honorable Les ASPIN
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. U.S.A.

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AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

93 JUL -9 AM 11:47

Unofficial Translation

Letter from the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Italy
addressed to the
Secretary of Defense of the United States of America
.....

"Rome
July 8, 1993

Dear Les.

The Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Rome, Mr. Serwer, has certainly reported on the extended conversation we had yesterday on the situation in Somalia. Prime Minister Ciampi and Foreign Minister Andreatta spoke of it with President Clinton and Secretary Christopher in Tokyo.

In turn I think it fitting to personally share with you my thoughts, recalling the constructive understanding established between us and the deep bonds of collaboration existing between the armed forces of our two countries, soldered by over forty years of membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

From the time of "Restore Hope" we have been firmly convinced that controlling the territory and eliminating the weapons in Mogadishu are indispensable prerequisites for the distribution of humanitarian aid and for transforming the current armed confrontation among rival factions into a political dialogue and national reconciliation.

The dangerous extremist turn taken by the situation in Mogadishu as of June 5, with the murder of Pakistani soldiers which was followed by that of three Italian troops, confirms the accuracy of this analysis and encourages an urgent and forceful resumption of the UN initiative.

In Italy's opinion, based on a meditated assessment by the heads of the Armed Forces and the leaders of our contingent in Somalia, the preferred stance would be that of giving an immediate and clear demonstration to the faction chiefs and to the population that the United Nations intends to consolidate its control throughout the territory of the capital, soliciting the voluntary consignment of all weapons in circulation.

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Should this appeal fall on deaf ears, as it conceivably might, UNOSOM should launch a blatant operation to remove weapons from the entire area of Mogadishu, employing most, if not all, the available contingents.

In our opinion an approach of this kind offers two advantages: it minimizes the risks for our men, operating on a massive scale and neutralizing all the neighborhoods of the capital; it concretely eliminates, without arousing accusations of partiality toward one or another faction, the significant quantities of weapons in circulation which riddle UNOSOM operations with danger and pose obstacles to humanitarian ones.

Conversely, we consider sectorial and partial actions to be inadequate and dangerous. They do not resolve the issue of security in the Somali capital and they expose the peacekeeping forces to the animosity of part of the population. These considerations apply in particular to the problem of checkpoint Pasta, which appears to me risks being over-emphasized: according to the most current analysis prepared by the military on the target, the armed militias had reinforced it to the point where it was to be considered a veritable "stronghold."

I hope that in principle you find this position attainable and that you will entrust General Montgomery, Vice Commander of UNOSOM, to have an open and frank discussion about it with General Loi, Commander of the Italian contingent.

Trusting in your attention, I extend my most cordial wishes.

[warmly,

Fabio Fabbri]"

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AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

93 JUL -8 AM 8:29

Unofficial Translation

Letter from the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Italy
addressed to the
Secretary of Defense of the United States of America

.....

"Rome
July 5, 1993

Dear Les,

The tragic death of Italian soldiers in Somalia has reintroduced, with renewed urgency, the matter of conducting the operations. Strictly connected to this is Italy's expectation, of which I had spoken to you personally both in Washington and in Rome, for greater participation in the definition of UN strategies and the inclusion of one of our officers, in a position of responsibility, within the UNOSOM command structure.

The Embassy of Italy in Rome has certainly reported on the emotions that were roused by the loss of our soldiers. The Government, with the backing of broad sectors of Parliament and public opinion, does not intend to draw back from its commitment in a country with which we have long standing and deep human and historical ties.

Moreover, in Italy the widespread and understandable feeling that the real difficulties being encountered by the UN mission in Somalia is a consequence of inadequate collaboration in determining the political and military policies within the framework of the United Nations.

My colleague Andreatta spoke of this with Secretary Christopher and I expect that Prime Minister Ciampi will likely bring it up with President Clinton at some point during the summit meetings in Tokyo.

Recalling the attentive openness you showed in my regard, I am addressing myself to you personally to renew the hope that the United States, moved by the spirit of strict friendship and alliance between us, will give our expectations the needed forceful support at the UN.

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As I had occasion to underline, we are not moved by nationalistic concerns, but simply by the desire to contribute more incisively toward an effective common action for Somalia.

Confident of your active consideration, I extend my most cordial wishes.

*[Dear Les, I thank you in advance
for your decisive help.*

*For Italy it is a vital issue.
A denial would cause
consequences difficult to keep under
control.*

Warmest regards

Fabio]"

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	[Duplicate of 002]\ (10 pages)	07/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4138

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: ITOH

Susan

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 26 JUL 93
SOURCE REF: 9317145

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOMALIA -- PAPERS ON US POLICY & STRATEGY FOR COMMUNICATING IT
SUBSEQUENT TO CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 JUL DC MTG

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 30 JUL 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF: 9320769 9320781

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
CLARKE

FOR CONCURRENCE
WARD

FOR INFO
BLOXTON
INDYK
ITOH
KENNEY
SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 11/04/17

2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL:OADR

July 26, 1993


MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Somalia: Papers on U.S. Policy and a Strategy
for Communicating It

Subsequent to the conclusions of the July 14 Deputies
Committee meeting on Somalia, the State Department is
forwarding the following papers for NSC consideration:

- Statement of U.S. Policy in Somalia;
- Strategy to Communicate Administration Policy to
Congress;
- Public Affairs Strategy/Challenges.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.


Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 5/10/17

0012-0659-F

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U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA

WHY THE U.S. IS IN SOMALIA

In December 1992, the U.S. troops in Somalia sought to establish "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations ..." The arrival of U.S. forces led to the creation of UNITAF, a multilateral effort that ended in May 1993. UNITAF's legacy is significant. It helped to end the mass starvation that had claimed 300,000 lives, fashioned an efficient structure for ensuring the regular distribution of humanitarian aid, and made it possible for needy populations throughout the country to get the help they need.

To preserve these gains, it will be necessary to help Somalis reconstitute a functioning society and government and to disarm Somali warlords. That is why U.S. military personnel remained in Somalia after the completion of UNITAF's humanitarian mission to support one of the most important operations ever undertaken by the United Nations -- helping Somalia return to the community of nations. The United Nations authorized this effort in March with the creation of UNOSOM II, United Nations Operations Somalia.

Somalia is one example of a growing number of conflicts where a multilateral military response is most appropriate. UNOSOM II limits U.S. involvement (we are contributing 4,000 of the 21,000 troops now serving with UNOSOM) yet enables us to advance humanitarian values. A total of 27 countries are taking part in UNOSOM; together, they will provide sufficient troops to reach the 28,000 ceiling authorized by the U.N. The Somalia operation is the first such response to take place under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes peace enforcement, rather than to peacekeeping. Given the unprecedented nature of these challenges, the U.S. must play an active role to ensure UNOSOM's success or risk jeopardizing the promising future of multilateral responses to humanitarian crises caused by armed conflict.

WHAT THE U.S. IS DOING IN SOMALIA

Americans are a vital part of UNOSOM II. An American, retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, is the Secretary General's Special Representative in Somalia, and another American, US Army Major General Montgomery, is Deputy Commander of UNOSOM's military component. A significant number of American military and civilian personnel serve on UNOSOM's military and civilian staff.

Of the approximately 4,000 U.S. troops now assigned to UNOSOM, about 75 percent provide key logistical support. The effort would collapse without them. The other U.S. forces form a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that is not under direct UNOSOM command. For the time being, their firepower is another

element essential to UNOSOM's success. The number of logistical troops should drop to about 1,400 by January 1994 and the QRF will, as conditions warrant, redeploy outside the country while remaining on an on-call status. Other U.S. military assets have assisted UNOSOM operations from time to time.

The U.S. Government has played a leading role in the herculean task of addressing the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. To date, the U.S. has provided over \$250 million in assistance, including over 311,000 metric tons of food aid, to assist the estimated 4.5 million Somalis at risk from civil strife. U.S.-funded food distribution, supplementary feeding, and emergency health and water activities have helped reverse the crisis in Somalia. Support for seeds and tool distribution and funding for livestock vaccination and employment generating activities are helping to revitalize Somalia's economy. The U.S. will continue to work in concert with other donors to address Somalia's needs.

WHY THE AIDEED ISSUE NEEDS TO BE KEPT IN PERSPECTIVE

The two year civil war resulted in the near destruction of virtually all organized Somali institutions, including the government and essential public services. The U.S. is helping UNOSOM to restore such services and to help recreate governing institutions based upon broad-based representation. Under the UN's leadership other countries are committed to helping rebuild the Somali police force. Despite the continuing standoff with factional leader Mohammed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu, measurable movement toward reconciliation is taking place outside the capital. One sign of this progress can be seen in the five district councils established so far by UNOSOM officials. An additional 35 councils will be in operation shortly, some in a number of formerly troublesome spots like Baidoa and Belet Weyne. Once in place, these bodies have the job of conducting local administration while also carrying out reconciliation efforts.

The situation in Kismayu in the south has brightened notably since the violence of April-May. No serious incidents have taken place for a month in this area, where Belgian troops are maintaining security and where a retired US Army Colonel is helping tribal elders conduct peace talks under UNOSOM sponsorship. The situation in the central region and north is on the upswing as well. A number of NGO's have resumed operations in the area and, in the north, clan elders are starting their own local peace conference in Erigavo. Relief and rehabilitation activities outside Mogadishu have continued despite the problems in the capital. That said, it is important to note that Aideed has a strong base of sub-clan supporters and weapons, notably in the central region. While many of these resources undoubtedly are engaged now in his

struggle in Mogadishu, he can release them for action elsewhere.

In contrast to the relative calm prevailing elsewhere in Mogadishu, violence since the start of June has centered almost entirely on south Mogadishu, an area dominated by General Aideed's forces. At the General's instigation, these forces launched a premeditated attack against Pakistani peacekeepers serving with the U.N. on June 5. The Pakistanis lost 23 soldiers in this incident, which led the U.N. Security Council to pass Resolution 837. This resolution authorizes the Secretary General to take "all necessary measures" against those responsible for attacks against UNOSOM, including their arrest, detention, trial, and punishment. UNOSOM began to implement the resolution on June 12 by destroying several Aideed strong points and by ordering the arrest of General Aideed and several of his top lieutenants. The U.S. units assigned to or working with UNOSOM have played a full part in this continuing effort.

Aideed and his supporters have responded brutally. On June 17, Aideed forces, some operating near a hospital, attacked and killed five Moroccan and one Pakistani peacekeepers and wounded 48 conducting a search of an Aideed-controlled area. The General's men killed two Pakistani peacekeepers on June 29 and three Italian soldiers on July 2. Civilians have suffered as well, as evidenced by the abduction and murder of six Somali employees of UNOSOM on July 6 and, on July 12, the killing of four journalists by a mob gathered outside an Aideed command site attacked earlier by UNOSOM.

These incidents underscore the importance of supporting the U.N. effort in Somalia. Implementation of Resolution 837 is necessary to maintain past gains in Somalia and to preserve the future credibility of peacekeeping operations.

SOMALIA

Strategy to Communicate Administration Policy to Congress

Background

Largely due to negative press reporting of the violence in Mogadishu, some members of Congress have begun to complain about continued U.S. involvement in Somalia. Most of these concerns have been partisan (e.g., Senator Pressler, Congressman Gilman). However, the recent objection to U.S. involvement by Senate President Pro Tem and Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Byrd and the long-standing qualms held by Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha are of particular concern. Also, many members who support continued U.S. involvement in Somalia are convinced that Somali warlord Aideed must be quickly neutralized so nation rebuilding can move forward. The following strategy is designed to address these Hill concerns:

- Administration officials will testify on Somalia before the Congress leaves for its August 9 - September 7 recess. This follows A/S Moose's July 14 briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Ambassador Albright's July 22 and 23 briefings (of the House Foreign Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations, Chairmen of the Senate and House State Justice Commerce Appropriations Subcommittees, and House Armed Services Committees).
- Under Secretary Peter Tarnoff will present the Administration's case before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 29.
- A/S Moose and an appropriate DoD official testify on Somalia before the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee on July 29.
- The Somalia Interagency Assessment Team will brief members and staff of the SFRC, HFAC, Appropriations, and Armed Services Committees the week of August 2.
- Secretary Christopher has agreed to discuss Somalia with Senator Byrd at lunch after the Secretary returns in August.
- A/S Moose personally will call on HFAC and HFAC AF Subcommittee Ranking Republicans Gilman and Burton and CBC Chairman Mfume.
- A member of the JCS personally will call on House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha.
- State Department will provide copies of Tarnoff's hearing statement to all members of Congress.

SOMALIA

Strategy to Communicate Administration Policy to the American Public

SETTING: The current reporting out of Mogadishu is extremely limited. Most major US news organizations have withdrawn their reporters out of concern for their safety. Many journalists are based in Nairobi instead of Mogadishu. The main story line continues to be Aideed. Success stories are occurring outside of Mogadishu. The famine is over. Crops are beginning to be harvested. Political reconstruction from the grassroots level up is occurring. To date, five district councils have been established. By the end of this month (July) 40 out of a possible 93 councils should be operative. Despite encouragement from the UNOSOM spokesman in Mogadishu, reporters are not picking up on these stories.

REPORTER PERCEPTIONS: Many reporters in Mogadishu feel that the US/DOD contingent has not been accurate in their reporting of casualties and weapons used. Eyewitnesses have noted these discrepancies. DOD should make a concerted effort to make its accounts credible if it want the media to believe it.

The general view remains that the UNITAF operation was a more tightly run, smooth operation with control and mission goals clearly defined. Reporters do not view UNOSOM this way.

MESSAGE:

Two-year time commitment: We should continue to maintain that the Somali effort is a two-year UN initiative that will impact on peacekeeping throughout the world.

Humanitarian relief effort is a success: We should continue to push this positive element.

MECHANISMS:

- I. **Speakers:** It is imperative that we increase the profile of:

UNOSOM: Admiral Howe. To date, very few American know what Admiral Howe looks like. He needs to become more visible and explain the situation on the ground. Strong consideration to purchase a satellite dish installed on the embassy/university would make UNOSOM officials more accessible to major international media outlets.
Possible venues: MacNeil/Lehrer, Nightline, Larry King Live.

USUN: Ambassador Albright has made herself accessible to the press. More interviews have been planned with major news organizations.

ACADEMICS: We should put together a list of Somali academics and make them available to US and Foreign Press Center officials both in Washington and New York

IO: We should put the International Organizations Assistant Secretary Doug Bennet out in front to talk about Somalia in the context of peacekeeping. Suggest National Public Radio, a host of backgrounders with major media representatives.

DOD: We should utilize Under Secretary Wisner in prime television shows, i.e., Nightline, to talk about the US role in the context of international peacekeeping. Assistant Secretary for Regional Security Affairs Freeman should be scheduled to make major media presentations on the Somalia effort. Specifically, we should seek placement in Time, Newsweek and US News and World Report.

OFDA: We should have AID schedule briefings with major news organizations to talk about the humanitarian effort and the success outside of the Mogadishu area.

II. Briefings:

OFDA: A briefing should be organized for Mr. Garvelink to talk about the positive things that are moving forward in Somalia. If possible, a flight should be arranged from Nairobi to Kismayo or another area to show the progress that has occurred.

Joint Administration Briefing: In an effort to show that the Administration talks with one voice, we should consider a joint press backgrounder on Somalia using USUN/DOD/STATE with a select group of 15-20 journalists in the next week.

III. Direct Line Interviews:

A series of Direct Line Interviews in key congressional districts as well as major media markets should be orchestrated to push that the famine is over and the grassroots effort is taking shape in other parts of Somalia.

IV. Written Press Option:

Op-Ed Pieces: We should put together a set of five to ten op-ed articles and seek placement throughout the United States. Thought should be given to placement in home districts of key congressman/senators or those members that might need additional support from the administration on their support of the Somalia effort.

V. Added dimensions:

Work with Today, Good Morning America shows to see if they would consider a story of the success of the famine relief effort -- perhaps with the Health Reporter.

Profile on the Average UN Peacekeeper: We see no coverage/profile of the average peacekeeper. Perhaps this would be an interesting story that one of the news magazines should pick up.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005. memo	Douglas Bennet to Mr. Tarnoff, re: Dealing with the Italians (4 pages)	07/29/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [8]

2012-0659-F
ke4138

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
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**STATEMENT BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

Acting pursuant to Security Council Resolution 837 (1993), I have instructed Lieutenant General Bir, Commander UNOSOM II Forces, to arrest General Mohammed Farah Aidid. In order to ensure his safety, he is requested to give himself up peacefully to UNOSOM military forces.

In my statement of 12 June 1993 to the people of Somalia, I expressed regret that certain elements in South Mogadishu deliberately disrupted the safety and security of Somali citizens and of United Nations Personnel. Twenty-three brave soldiers of the Pakistan Brigade of UNOSOM II were murdered while carrying out their humanitarian and security duties. Fifty-six more were severely wounded. Three Americans were also wounded.

These criminal acts against UNOSOM II Forces were condemned in the strongest terms by the Security Council and seen by that body as part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent, by intimidation, UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.

The Security Council reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary-General to investigate, arrest and detain the individuals responsible for the armed attack, including those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, for prosecution, trial and punishment.

The investigation of circumstances leading to, during, and subsequent to the acts of 5 June 1993 in Mogadishu has progressed to a point where safeguarding of the Somali public and United Nations personnel requires detention of General Aidid pending completion of the investigation and appropriate criminal proceedings. Charges being investigated include:

- Conspiracy to conduct premeditated attacks against UN Forces.
- Crimes against humanity (Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949).
- Endangering civilians and UN personnel through organized incitement of violence.

Matters relating to subsequent prosecution, trial and punishment, as foreseen in SCR 837 (1993), are being studied at UN Headquarters in New York.

The investigation to determine all those responsible for the criminal acts of 5 June 1993 will continue.

**UNOSOM II****UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA****OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

17 June 1993

Early this morning UNOSOM forces began a coordinated ground and air operation whose purpose is to search, clear and disarm the area in South Mogadishu known as the USC/SNA stronghold. Several clandestine arms storage sites in this area had already been neutralized on 13 and 14 June.

A separate operation has also been directed to accomplish the arrest of General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The UNOSOM II Force Commander has been directed to detain him as soon as feasible in connection with the investigation, mandated by United Nations Security Council, of the June 5 armed attacks against UNOSOM II, and of the public inciting of such attacks.

These actions are being taken under the authority of Security Council Resolution 837, which authorizes detention pending completion of the current investigation of their actions. The resolution specifically authorizes "all necessary measures against all those responsible...including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment."

Detention of General Aidid will ensure his safety and that of the Somali people. He will be granted all appropriate rights. Others will also be arrested if evidence is developed implicating them in the same or similar crimes. We are also investigating related illegal activities subsequent to the 5 June attacks on UNOSOM II.

These actions are not aimed at the USC or any clan group. All those who wish to participate peacefully in the political reconciliation and reconstruction processes are encouraged to do so. It will be the people of Somalia who ultimately will decide who their leaders will be. However, UNOSOM II will not tolerate actions by individuals which threaten the fulfillment of its political and humanitarian mandates under UN Security Council Resolutions 814 and 837.

It is important at this critical junction in Somali history to recall why the Security Council created UNOSOM II, and why the international community decided to invoke, for the first time, the Chapter VII peace enforcement authority vested in the UN Charter in Somalia. Units of the Pakistani Frontier Force Battalion first arrived in September, 1992, followed by the Unified Task Force in December, 1992 and the handover to UNOSOM II on May 4. It must never be forgotten that this intervention was the result of the world's outrage over the anarchy that a few individuals had inflicted on their country. The intervention rescued thousands of Somalis from the starvation and lawlessness that had prevailed in this country for the previous two years.

(PAGE MISSING)

clock. Mass starvation and chaos that prevailed in this country only a few short months ago will not return. On 5 June twenty-three brave Pakistanis -- a number of whom were brutally murdered at a feeding station -- died to protect the people of Somalia from return to those days. Fifty-six others will bear the scars of wounds suffered that day for the rest of their lives. Eleven of these have been crippled for life. Just as tragically, many Somalis have been misled into sacrificing themselves for a false cause.

The mandate of UNOSOM II is to work with the Somali people to develop a healthy and free Somalia which can rapidly be turned over to the Somali people. We can not go forward economically or politically if there is injustice and public disorder. After all that the Somali people have suffered and their friends around the world have sacrificed, no individual or group of individuals will be allowed to return Somalia to anarchy.

General Aidid will be treated decently, fairly, and with justice. I call on him to give himself up now to UNOSOM II Forces peacefully, to cease his disruptions of public order, and to urge his followers to surrender their arms without further delay.

e. mt.

read out by Joe 5-28
in Am. 226

Statement attributable to a Spokesman for the Secretary-General
=====

UNOSOM, tonight Thursday 17 June 1993 at approximately 1.30 a.m. Somalia time, began a raid in Mogadishu against the headquarters and weapons stores of the SNA/USC faction headed by Mohamed Farah Aideed.

The UN action is intended to deprive Aideed of the weapons and propaganda tools he needs to continue the intimidation of the Somali people.

That includes removing the heavy weapons, the command and control facilities, and the public broadcasting system which he has been using to create and incite violence in Mogadishu.

The raid is being conducted by a coalition of French, Pakistani and Italian forces, with air support provided by the United States. It is part of a long-term plan to provide relief to innocent and hungry people, to restore civil society, to bring anarchy to an end, and ultimately to allow the Somali people to choose a new government peacefully and democratically.

Aideed needs to be understood for what he is: one of the warlords largely responsible for the death of 350,000 Somalis -- people who were killed or starved to death by power-hungry warlords, and particularly those who refused to stop fighting.

When this military operation is over the UN will again be able to concentrate on humanitarian relief, reconstruction and political recovery.

UN Headquarters, 16 June 1993

Themes

- o This is entirely a UN operation. There are over 20,000 UN troops in Somalia. Less than four thousand are American and most are serving in logistics support capacities.

- The raid on Aideed's compound was conducted by a coalition of French, Pakistani, and Italian forces. The US only provided air support.

- o The aim was to damage Aideed's weapons stores and diminish his ability to incite violence.

- We deeply regret the loss of life.

- In order to minimize casualties, the UN troops warned all people to evacuate the area before using any force. Citizens were allowed to leave the area peacefully.

- o The UN is not engaged in wanton violence. This is part of a clear, long-term UN plan to provide relief to innocent and hungry people, to restore civil society, bring anarchy to an end, and ultimately to allow the Somali people to choose a new government peacefully and democratically.

- Without peace and the restoration of civil society, Somalia will revert to the dismal state it was in where violence caused mass starvation and suffering.

- To provide humanitarian assistance and achieve peace, the UN must curb the anarchy and violence sponsored by warlords like Aideed.

- o Aideed needs to be understood for what he is: not a national hero, not a victim, but a very cunning and dangerous thug.

- Don't forget: Aideed is the warlord largely responsible for the death of 350,000 Somalis-- people who were killed or starved to death because power-hungry warlords, and foremost Aideed, refused to stop fighting.

- Aideed did not hesitate to use innocent women and children as human shields when his forces attacked and killed 23 UN soldiers.

- There is considerable evidence that he staged the latest confrontation with Pakistani soldiers.

- Again he used women and children.

- His forces shot at the Pakistanis first and then turned their fire on Somali civilians to increase the death toll attributed to the UN forces.

- Aideed's latest provocation was obviously intentional and so well-planned that he

managed to distribute fliers condemning the violence just minutes after the incident occurred.

-- There are even reports by witnesses on the ground that seemingly bloodied Somalis got up and casually walked away after the TV cameras left.

o The UN's actions are intended to deprive Aideed of the weapons and propaganda tools he needs to continue the violence and intimidation of the Somali people.

o Most Somali people oppose Aideed and want a return to peace. The crowds that have been shown on TV supporting Aideed are a small group of fanatical supporters who are concentrated in the Southern part of Mogadishu. They are not representative of the Somali people as a whole.

Somalia

Q. Why are the goals of U.S. actions in Somalia? Are we entering a quagmire?

- A. -- As I told the American people on Saturday, the objectives of our actions in Somalia are clear and finite.
- Over the past week, we have moved against forces that have contributed to the deaths of literally hundreds of thousands of people by obstructing humanitarian relief efforts.
- These same forces were responsible for the worst attack in three decades on U.N. peacekeepers, killing 23 of them. To allow this act to go unpunished would have destroyed the capacity of the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping not only in Somalia, but around the world.
- U.N. actions over the past 10 days are sending a clear message: the world will not accept the interference of armed gangs in the process of rebuilding Somalia and protecting innocent lives.
- These actions enjoy the broad support of the world. Twenty-two nations have forces participating in the action in Somalia.
- I was particularly moved by the thanks expressed to the American people yesterday by President Nujoma of Namibia. President Nujoma said that the leadership shown by the United States and later the U.N. in Somalia has ended the starvation of thousands of Africans and restored hope for the people of that country.

Q. Is the United Nations still committed to going after Aideed?

- A. -- The United Nations has now ordered the arrest of General Aideed. Aideed's actions over the past weeks have shown that he remains the principal obstacle to peace and security in Somalia. U.N. actions are designed to end his ability to frustrate the vast majority of Somalis who long for peace.
- Our actions over the past week have been very successful. We have destroyed vast amounts of weapons, ammunition and military vehicles while keeping to a minimum the danger to civilians.
- The focus on the capture of General Aideed should not divert our attention from the important progress achieved so far in rebuilding Somalia or from the work that remains ahead.

Q: Why did the U.S. take this action by itself?

A: -- This is not an American action; it is a United Nations action. Twenty-two countries currently have nearly 20,000 troops in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II. The U.S. has about 3,000 noncombat logistics troops and 1,100 in a quick reaction force. Pakistan has the largest contingent in Somalia. Other major troop providers in the country are France, Italy, Morocco and Belgium. Pakistan has been primarily responsible for Mogadishu, where our quick reaction force is also based. France, Italy, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey also have troops in Mogadishu.

Q: What is the Administration's reaction to the death of 20 Somali civilians at the hands of the UN contingent?

A: -- We deeply regret the loss of life in Somalia resulting from this and other recent incidents.

-- As you know, there has been a tense situation on the ground in Mogadishu that comes in the aftermath of the cold-blooded ambush by General Aideed's forces of UN peacekeepers on June 5, using civilians as a shield.

-- The United Nations is conducting an investigation to determine what actually took place during the demonstrations last Sunday.

-- In general, I am satisfied with how the UN operation is proceeding.

Q: Have the United States and the United Nations lost the moral high ground because of this attack, as some relief agencies have alleged?

A: -- We should not allow the events of the last 10 days to obscure the real progress that has occurred in Somalia since the engagement of the U.S. forces late last year and the introduction of the UNOSOM forces thereafter.

-- As I noted on Saturday, by the time we arrived, more than 350,000 Somalis had died in a savage civil war that had caused the disintegration of Somali society. Today, crops are being planted and harvested, schools and hospitals are re-opening and refugees are returning home.

-- I understand that relief organizations have criticisms of and concerns about the current UN operation in Somalia.

-- The relief organizations have expressed legitimate concerns about violence. That is why UNOSOM has moved against Aideed's forces. If the relief organizations are to operate as they were before, order has to be reestablished. That is what UNOSOM is doing now.

Q: Is the UN planning to take over the administration of Somalia?

A: -- The United Nations has no desire to exercise sovereign power in Somalia. In the absence of a Somali-designated authority, however, it must carry out its humanitarian mission and protect its people from attack, as authorized in Security Council Resolutions 814 and 837.

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→ Somalia : June '93

OUTSTANDING UN REQUESTS FOR US ASSISTANCE FOR UNOSOM II

AS OF 25 JUN 93

OFFICIAL REQUESTS:

<u>REQUEST/DATE</u>	<u>ITEM DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
LOA/22 JUN 93	Equipment/Services 2 SUN work stations with assoc hardware; software licenses; on-line access rights to relevant US info libraries; training on usage of system -- JDISS	OSD has for action
LOA/18 JUN 93	Equipment 72 riot shotguns; 10,000 regular ammo (9-12 pellet lethal buckshot); 1,000 CS impregnated rubber projectiles (#23 shells); 6,000 shot ammo, non-lethal, non-impregnated (#23 rubber pellets)	OSD requested JS coord; in coord in JS; CENTCOM concurred
LOA/18 JUN 93	Equipment 60 M-79 grenade launchers; 2,000 CS gas cartridges; 3,000 HE cartridges; 1,000 anti-personnel cartridges	OSD requested JS coord; in coord in JS; CENTCOM nonconcurred with HE and anti-personnel items
LETTER FROM BARIL/1 JUN 93	Personnel/Services Continue to support UNOSOM periodic emergency situations by providing aeromedical evacuation specialists	Awaiting UN answers on J4 list of questions on the details of this request
NOTE VERBALE/ 26 APR 93	Personnel Three officers for work in small special operations planning cell at UNOSOM II Hq	In coordination in OSD

P.02

*7#912124154154

TO

JCS-MEAF

FROM

10:47

JUN-25-1993

P.03
*74912124154154
TO
JCS-WEAF
FROM
10:47
JUN-25-1993

INFORMAL REQUESTS:

<u>REQUEST/DATE</u>	<u>ITEM/DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Phone call from USUN/24 JUN 93	Airlift 8-10 tanks from Istanbul, Turkey to Mogadishu	J4 provided UNDIV cost and that relayed to USUN
Message from USCINCCENT/24 JUN 93	Personnel/Equipment US military signal support to include phones; installation of commercial C3 system; limited US military comm support for German BDE HQ	unknown; J5 never received/informed on ref UNOSOM communications
USUN msg ref Annan ques/17 JUN 93	Equipment 60 APCs	J4 sent back cost info on 48 tanks from Kuwait and 12 from other location; awaiting formal LOA; State sent back msg saying US would sell APCs
Howe letter/8 JUN 93	Equipment/Personnel 12 items: marine amphibious force (harriers, helos, hospital, marines, etc); aircraft carrier welcome; 6 attack helos; OH-58 Delta capability; tank company (Paks want 2 companies—perhaps US could lift some); 16 APC (improved armor over 113); AC-130 gunships; 4 CH- 47 helos; A-10s or similar; 2 C-130s; special forces (delta) capability; riot control equipment; logistics by sea	parts have been worked: outside UNDIV channels

USUN msg re UN
Secretariat
list/6 JUN 93

Equipment

15 riot control items: 3,600 protective shields; 3,500 riot batons; 3,500 face shields; 3,500 protective masks; 7,000 filters for masks; 1,000 CS grenades; 60 pr asbestos gloves; 72 riot shotguns; 500 rounds of CS impregnated rubber projectiles; 5,000 regular shotgun ammo; 3,000 shotgun ammo, non-lethal, non-impregnated projectiles; 30 megaphones and batteries for these; 5,000 flexicuffs; 2,000 kqyan pepper spray

J4 sent back cost and availability; some of these came down on two LOAs; one request is completed (for 481 body shields, 3600 batons, 3600 gas masks, 7000 filters, 60 gloves, and 1000 CG gas grenades--last item dealt with separately); second LOA in coord now (for riot shotguns and ammo)

Phone call to
J4 from FOD
(David
Hightt)/22 JUN
93

Personnel

1 individual familiar with food service contracts to evaluate bids for UNOSOM II food service contracts

UNDIV received call from J4 (25 Jun) FYIing us that the Army was sending a person to UN on Monday for 3-5 days to assess food contract bids

TOTAL P.04