

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Rice, Susan

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277

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)
002. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 page)	07/14/1993	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Mike Sheehan to Ambassador Inderfurth, re: Somalia Strategy (4 pages)	09/27/1993	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Somalia: Re-Energizing the Political Process and Improving Public Relations (5 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re: Draft Summary & Conclusions of Somalia DC (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re: Draft Somalia PC Paper (4 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
005c. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re: Draft Somalia Q&A (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: Somalia Policy - Regaining the High Ground (2 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, re: Message to Mubarak on Somalia (1 page)	09/14/1993	P1/b(1)
007b. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Egypt Concerning Somalia (1 page)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
007c. draft	Draft cable, re: Message from President Clinton to Hosni Mubarak (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F

ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	08/30/1993	P1/b(1)
008b. report	Re: Somalia: Dangers Inherent in Another National Conference (4 pages)	08/30/1993	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: [UNOSOM II] (2 pages)	07/01/1993	P1/b(1)
010a. memo	To Ambassador David Shinn, et al., re: Somalia - Evidence of 5 June Incident (1 page)	06/17/1993	P1/b(1)
010b. report	Re: [Somalia] (6 pages)	06/17/1993	P1/b(1)
011a. report	Re: [Aideed] (2 pages)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)
011b. report	Re: [Aideed] (3 pages)	06/15/1993	P1/b(1)
011c. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	11/04/1992	P1/b(1)

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

MEMORANDUM FOR SOMALIA WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: US contribution to the establishment of the Somali National Police Force
(SNPF)-ACTION MEMORANDUM

ISSUE: Cost of reestablishing the SNPF is not part of the assessed cost of UNOSOM II and is of such significance that no single donor country is able, or willing, to incur it unilaterally.

FACTS: Draft United Nations Secretary General report to the Security Council detailing the requirements for the reestablishment of a SNPF estimated the first year start up cost to be approximately 52 million US dollars with an additional 10 million for investigation of violations of international humanitarian law.

- US AID has offered to fund the first year cost for the Somali Judicial System (approximately \$6 million).
- There are numerous provisions within the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which would permit the US to provide equipment to UNOSOM. However, transfer of the equipment to the SNDF would be legally questionable since there is no existing Somali government. The Secretaries of State and Defense could agree to provide the equipment using the UN Participation Act. However, the UNPA is only available for UN chapter VI operations. It is questionable whether we can split this effort out from UNOSOMs chapter VII mandate.


OPTION

- US Weighs in with meaningful contribution to the development of the SNPF and uses diplomatic arm twisting to get the other donor countries to do the rest.
 - The UN plan outlines requirements for significant transportation equipment, communications equipment, police station restoration and weapons all of which could be rapidly provided with US stocks, services and training and would account for a significant amount of the plan. (Transport \$18,240,000; Communications \$3,140,000; Police station restoration \$1,085,000; Weapons (AK 47 and side arms) \$3,000,000; Total \$25,465,000. According to Anne Wright, the author of the plan, all cost are rough order of magnitude).
 - This contribution combined with the US AID offer to fund the \$6 million towards the Somalia Judicial System accounts for more than 50% of the estimated cost of reestablishing the SNPF.
 - Could be done rapidly without increased US force deployments.

- Provides USUN significant leverage with the other donor countries to do their part.

STRATEGY

- Policy decision that it is in the US interest to provide the equipment. (NSC/DoS/DoD)
- The Secretary of State sends a memo to the President requesting authorization to notify Congress that we will provide the equipment described above to UNOSOM using section 552 (c) (2) notwithstanding sections 660 (prohibition on assistance to civilian law enforcement) and notwithstanding section 505 (end user transfer assurances). This memo should be combined with the 614 memo on the \$2 million. Drawdown could include but would not be limited to transportation equipment, communications equipment, weapons, generators, spares, services, and training not to exceed \$25 million. (DSAA wording consideration for the Presidential Directive are at TAB)
- A meeting is called in New York to solicit commitments, based on the draft UNOSOM police plan, from other donor countries to help share the burden of reestablishing the SNPF, and to expedite their involvement.
- DSAA is directed to task the services to send technical assessment teams to UNOSOM to identify technical requirements of the equipment and services US agrees to provide. (ie water tanks how big, generators how powerful etc.)
- DSAA tasks the services to locate equipment identified, by the technical assessment teams, and transport the equipment to Somalia for delivery to UNOSOM.



Ambassador Walter Stadler
Senior Fellow

Prepared by CDR William Stettinius OASD (SO/LIC) X35210

COORDINATION:

DoS AF: Mr. Martin Cheses
ASD RSA: Mr James L. Woods
JCS J-5 : RADM Boman

Proposed wording for Presidential Determination

Following is the proposed wording for the Presidential Determination for support of Somalia police as it applies to the section 552 drawdown of defense articles and services.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (the "Act"), I hereby:

(1) determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish to UNOSOM up to \$25 Million of defense articles and services pursuant to the authorities of section 552(c)(2) of the Act, for retransfer to and in support of a police force in Somalia, without regard to sections 505, 660, and 652 of the Act, or any other provision of law within the scope of section 614;

Pursuant to the authority of section 552(c)(2) of the Act, I hereby determine that

(1) as a result of an unforeseen emergency, the provision of assistance under chapter 6 of Part II of the Act in excess of funds otherwise available for such assistance is important to the national interest of the United States;

(2) such unforeseen emergency requires the immediate provision of assistance under chapter 6 of part II of the Act.

I therefore direct the drawdown of services, training and articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense to include: communications equipment, vehicles, small arms appropriate for a police force, uniform items, and basic facility utilities infrastructure items necessary for police stations, of an aggregate value not to exceed \$25 million to support a police force in Somalia under the auspices of UNOSOM and I hereby authorize UNOSOM to retransfer these items to elements of a Somali police force.

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Sec. ____ . Sense of Congress regarding United States Policy towards Somalia.

Whereas United States Armed Forces made significant contributions under Operation Restore Hope towards the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and restoration of peace in the region to end the humanitarian disaster that had claimed more than 300,000 lives.

Whereas . . .

Whereas . . .

(a) Sense of Congress.

(1) Consultations with Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the President should continue to consult closely with the Congress regarding U.S. policy with respect to humanitarian and peacekeeping activities in Somalia, including in particular the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in that country, whether under United Nations or United States command.

(2) Goals and objectives.--It is the sense of the Congress that the President should ensure that the goals and objectives supporting deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia are clearly articulated and continuously evaluated to ensure that the deployment is at all times consistent with United States interests and objectives.

(3) Duration of deployment. It is the sense of the Congress that U.S. Armed Forces should remain deployed to Somalia only as long as is necessary to meet valid goals and objectives consistent with United States interests and that every effort should be made to urge the United Nations to replace U.S. Armed Forces with those of other Member States.

AS Modified

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To limit further military operations in Somalia.

IN T AMENDMENT No 782 1st Sess.

By BYRD

To a Bill/Res. No. S. 1298

2 pages

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GPO : 1982 60-142 (m)

2 pages

GPO : 1982 60-142 (m)

Referred

and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. BYRD

Viz:

- 1 On page 242, strike out line 19 and insert in lieu
- 2 thereof the following:
- 3 crew of that historic warship.
- 4 SEC. 1067. INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED FORCES IN SOMALIA.
- 5 (a) LIMITATION.—Effective 30 days after the date of
- 6 the enactment of this Act, funds available to the Depart-
- 7 ment of Defense may not be obligated for support of oper-
- 8 ations of the Armed Forces in Somalia except to the extent

AS Modified

1 authorized in a law enacted after the date of the enact-
2 ment of this Act.

3 (b) UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS IN SOMALIA.—(1)
4 Not later than ¹⁰~~30~~ days after the date of the enactment
5 of this Act, the Secretary of State shall ^{complete}~~conduct~~ a thor-
6 ough review of the purposes of United Nations policy and
7 actions in Somalia and submit to Congress a detailed as-
8 sessment of the purposes of such policy and actions.

9 (2) The President is requested and urged to ^{inform}~~direct~~

10 ~~the United States Representative to the United Nations~~ that the U.S.
11 ~~States ~~that~~ will neither fund nor participate in~~
12 ~~and Representative in the Security Council to veto~~

12 ~~(A) any proposed authorization by the United~~
13 ~~Nations Security Council of continued operations of~~
14 United Nations forces in Somalia after October 31,
15 1993, ~~and~~

16 ~~(B) any proposed authorization by the United~~
17 ~~Nations Security Council of funding for continued~~
18 ~~operations of United Nations forces in Somalia after~~
19 ~~that date,~~

20 except to the extent authorized in a law enacted after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

10/PHO

Susan
Jean

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

FACSMILE COVER SHEET

Pls. get back
to Bob LoftisDATE 9/8 TIME 6:15 PAGES 24 PLUS COVERComments
CarrensTO: FAX: 395-1199NAME: Susan RiceFROM: FAX: 202-647-4006NAME Bob Loftis

Here are Q&A for Tarnoff we are giving to George Elmer
after we update the figures and a few of the points. Nate
Bluhm is drafting a short statement, drawing largely on
these, which we'll send ~~later~~ later.

By the way, my new direct line is 736-7788,
my secretary's number is 647-2708.

Cheers.

Bob

UNCLASSIFIED

TARNOFF: PURSUIT AND PROSECUTION OF AIDEEDQuestion

What are we trying to do with General Aideed -- kill him, capture him? Why can't we seem to find him when he can give press interviews? What will we do with him when we finally get him? Have we personalized this humanitarian effort into a war against one man?

Answer

- o We support General Howe's order to arrest Aideed and have him brought to justice.
- o Aideed-instigated attacks are a serious threat to security, political reconciliation and the delivery of humanitarian relief and thus require considerable attention by UNOSOM. As a participant in UNOSOM, the U.S. is supporting the effort.
- o The U.N. enforcement action in Mogadishu is implementing a Security Council resolution to deal aggressively with the killers of 23 Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5; Howe's order to arrest Aideed is part of this larger enterprise.
- o Security Council Resolution 837 reaffirmed the Secretary General's authority to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the June 5 attacks, including their investigation, arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment. The U.N. would determine how to proceed in bringing General Aideed to Justice.
- o UNOSOM has known Aideed's location at various times but the goal of capturing Aideed must be weighed against the desire to limit casualties. We note that the press has not held any interviews with the General lately; this suggests that he has chosen to go underground. U.N. lawyers are in Somalia developing information which could be used if he and his henchmen are taken into custody. Some regional leaders like Ethiopia's President Meles have suggested variations on the Italian idea of a cooling-off period, during which Aideed would go into exile or be placed under house arrest at a secure location.

TARNOFF: EXIT STRATEGY -- U.S. and U.N.Question

How long do we plan to remain in Somalia? Weren't we told we would leave once food supplies were flowing again? What is the timetable for phasing out U.S. involvement in the peace-keeping operation? When will the U.N. operation be over -- when Somalia is fully functioning state?

Answer

- o The Secretary General's Special Representative in July set forth a 2-year timetable for political reconstruction during which the country's governance will be returned to the Somali people. Full rehabilitation will take longer. The U.S., working to support the U.N., will remain engaged in this effort but it will be up to the Somali people to determine if the process works.
- o The U.S.-led UNITAF operation ended in May 1993 and handed over responsibility for helping the Somali people to the United Nations. By that time, the number of U.S. troops had dropped from over 30,000 to close to 5,000. There are now around 4,000 U.S. troops in the country.
- o Current plans for reducing the number of U.S. troops to around 1,400 by the end of this year; the QRF will remain on call for support of U.N. operations. Our ability to meet this schedule and to continue troop reductions will depend on evolving circumstances.
- o UNOSOM II's initial mandate extends through October. We expect it will be renewed.

Background

Admiral Howe's July 1 address to the Somali people outlined an ambitious list of goals in all spheres of UNOSOM activities, including political reconciliation and economic rehabilitation. He endorsed the goal, as agreed in Addis Ababa by Somali representatives, of a two year period for political reconstruction during which elected Somali officials would assume responsibility for self governance. Two years, however, is a goal rather than a firm target date.

TARNOFF: U.N. MISSION OBJECTIVESQuestion

What objectives is the U.N. trying to achieve? Feed the starving? Disarm the warlords? Rebuild Somali society? Maintain the U.N.'s credibility?

Answer

- o The objectives for UNOSOM are spelled out in Security Council resolution 814. They include promoting national reconciliation, assisting the people of Somalia in re-establishing their political institutions and economy, providing humanitarian assistance, and assisting in the repatriation of refugees.
- o Resolution 814 recognizes the crucial importance of disarmament in accomplishing those goals. It demands that Somalia factions comply with undertakings on disarmament agreed to in March at the Addis Ababa talks. It also charges the UNOSOM commander with establishing a secure environment so that the mission's humanitarian goals may be achieved.
- o In the wake of the June 5 attacks on UNOSOM troops, the Security Council passed resolution 837. It reaffirmed the importance of disarming all Somali factions and authorized UNOSOM to investigate and arrest those responsible for the unprovoked attacks on UNOSOM troops.

Background

- o Much of the mandate for UNOSOM as established in resolution 814 was originally outlined in resolution 794 of December 1992 which accepted the US offer to deploy troops under UNITAF.

Question

Why are Somali warlords outwitting the U.N.'s more sophisticated forces? Do we have a new strategy for getting the job done right?

Answer

- o UNOSOM troops in fact have made progress in disarming and neutralizing armed Somali factions.
- o Unlike the forces allied with the Somali warlord Aideed, who have used women and children as shields in their brutal attacks on U.N. troops, UNOSOM has consistently attempted to minimize civilian casualties in fulfilling its Security Council mandate.
- o UNOSOM's concern for the lives of non-combatants has occasionally caused it to pass up opportunities to strike more decisive blows against Aideed's militia.
- o At the same time, progress is being made in areas outside of Mogadishu that have traditionally been controlled by Somali warlords. Thirteen district councils have been established throughout Somalia so far by UNOSOM officials, peace talks are being conducted under UNOSOM sponsorship in Kismayo, and the large-scale starvation that prompted the international community's intervention has come to an end.
- o General Aideed wants to return Somalia to its pre-intervention anarchy; where guns determined power and food was used as a brutal weapon in inter-clan warfare. The U.N. is determined not to allow him to succeed in disrupting humanitarian relief and peaceful political reconciliation in Somalia.
- o The interagency team which has returned from an assessment mission to Somalia should have some recommendations on refining UNISOM's objectives and effective strategies for fulfilling them.

TARNOFF: U.S. MILITARY PROFILE IN SOMALIAQuestion

What forces have we deployed there? Why were U.S. troops placed under a foreign commander? Do we intend to increase our profile in Somalia? Under whose command?

Answer

- o U.S. forces in Somalia number around 4,000 and include about 3,000 logistics troops and approximately 1,000 troops who belong to the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The logistics unit serves as part of UNOSOM's force structure; the QRF is not under direct UNOSOM command, but, if called in to support U.N. forces, may be subject to tactical command by non-Americans.
- o Our troops are part of an international force to which 27 countries currently contribute 21,000 troops (building to the goal of 28,000). The U.N. Secretary General has chosen a Turkish officer to lead this force and an American to serve as his deputy.
- o The U.S. troops are and will remain a key element in UNOSOM's military component. We see no need and have no intention of increasing U.S. military involvement; but as our response to the U.N.'s request for help to respond to the June 5 attack by General Aideed on Pakistani peacekeepers demonstrates, we are not rigidly wedded to a precise contribution regardless of events. Current plans are to reduce U.S. forces to around 1,400 by the year's end.

Background

Placement of U.S. forces under foreign command is permissible under the President's constitutional authority, so long as the President retains the ability to withdraw them. Precedents include the placement of U.S. forces under Marshal Foch's command during World War I and under allied officers in World War II. Current examples of U.S. forces detailed to international organizations include the contingent in Macedonia, the medical unit serving in Croatia, and the two Army battalions serving under multinational command in the Multinational Force of Observers in the Sinai.

TARNOFF: VISIT OF INTERAGENCY TEAM TO SOMALIAQuestion

What is the interagency team doing in Somalia? What have they determined? Does it change our strategy?

Answer

- o The interagency team, which is enroute home from an assessment mission to Somalia, will provide recommendations on how implementation of U.S. policy can be refined to best support UNOSOM efforts to attain the goals set forth in U.N. resolutions. The group has met with UNOSOM officials, Somali political and grassroots organizations, relief agencies and officials of troop contributing and neighboring countries.
- o The preliminary feedback we have received is that the inter-related objectives of UNOSOM remain valid and that considerable progress has been made in the countryside both on the security front and in laying the basis for the restoration of civil society and local authority.
- o Yet progress is uneven and we expect the team to provide ideas which can be shared with the U.N. on how UNOSOM can reach agreed objectives. Once the team has returned to the U.S. and senior Administration officials have received its report we will be pleased to brief the Members again.

Background

A team led by Somalia Coordinator Ambassador David Shinn was in Somalia between July 20-27 and is in Europe today. The group included State and DoD representatives. They travelled in the interior, met with key UNOSOM officials, NGOs, Somali leaders, and a visiting Italian delegation. The Italian press has reported falsely that the team intends to negotiate a settlement with Aideed.

TARNOFF: BURDENSARINGQuestion

How much has the peacekeeping operation in Somalia cost us?

Answer

- o The total US cost for UNITAF and UNOSOM operations through the end of FY 93 will be \$1.148 billion. UNITAF cost the Pentagon an estimated \$700 million; in addition, the UN has assessed the United States \$158 million for UNOSOM operations in 1992-93, with a supplemental assessment of \$58 million expected later in FY 93. The Pentagon will also incur "incremental" costs during FY 93 of an estimated \$232 million for UNOSOM II.

Question

How much humanitarian aid have we provided?

Answer

- o Direct USG humanitarian aid to Somalia in FY 1991-1993 (to date) totalled \$256.5 million. An additional \$72 million was contributed to UNHCR and ICRC by the Bureau of Refugee Programs for refugee and migration relief in the Horn of Africa.

Background

- o Broken down on an annual basis, aid increased from \$29.6 million in FY 91 to \$95.1 million in FY 92; thus far in FY 93 humanitarian aid has reached \$131.7 million. 50 percent of aid consisted of food donations.
- o Other forms of aid included food distribution, medical, emergency, water, agricultural, monetization, airlift, and refugee activities.

Question

How much more do we expect to pay for peacekeeping and humanitarian activities?

Answer

- o Peacekeeping costs will rise until UNOSOM II reaches its peak strength of 28,000, possibly as early as August. Afterward, costs will depend on the stability of the Somali political situation. The State Department will monitor these costs closely.
- o In terms of humanitarian assistance, USAID estimates it will spend an additional \$16 million this fiscal year in Somalia. Overall, humanitarian aid is expected to decrease in FY 94, despite the introduction of a USAID \$25 million rehabilitation program, with disaster assistance falling from an estimated \$50 million in FY 93 to \$10-15 million in FY 94.
- o Greater stability will also reduce the need for food donations. The winter harvest earlier this year was 60 percent of normal; the prognosis is for an even better summer harvest.

Question

How much have other countries contributed?

Answer

- o Peacekeeping: As of July 21 there were 20,977 UNOSOM troops in Somalia, including 3,914 US servicemen. Other large contingents were from Pakistan (5,018), Italy (2,156), Morocco (1,341), France (1,086), Zimbabwe (1,086), Belgium (980), Malaysia (873), UAE (721), Saudi Arabia (678), Nigeria (556) and Egypt (540). US troops constituted 19 percent of total UNOSOM strength.

- o Additional large contingents of troops have been pledged by India (4,347), Germany (1,366), Egypt (750), and Zambia (570).
- o Humanitarian Aid: USAID has reported that the largest individual donors of Somali aid are (figures in millions of dollars): United States (257), Germany (79), UK (60), Japan (47), Italy (38), Sweden (22), Netherlands (18), Canada (15), Belgium (10), and Saudi Arabia (10).
- o The EC also contributed a total of \$161 million, but that figure may include some of the individual nations' contributions already cited.
- o Some statistics did not account for the value of donated food.

Question

Will we be reimbursed for our contributions, such as from the Japanese fund?

Answer

- o DoD has submitted \$12 million in claims for reimbursement from the so-called Japan fund. Moreover, it generally receives reimbursement for the ad hoc provision of supplies and services. The UN also pays a monthly stipend of \$988-1279 per month per soldier to member nations with troops stationed in Somalia.

Background

- o In January the UN agreed to reimburse DoD for up to 85 percent of a \$113 million trust fund, to which Japan had contributed \$100 million. The intent was to reimburse DoD for its expenses in helping troops from developing nations deploy to Somalia as part of the UNITAF operation; Tokyo has not yet agreed to the UN's proposed uses of the trust fund to meet UNOSOM II expenses.

- The Pentagon sometimes renders services without remuneration.
- Specialists qualify for the higher \$1279 monthly UN reimbursement.

TARNOFF: STATUS OF RECONCILIATION NEGOTIATIONSQuestion

What is the status of the Addis Ababa Peace Accord negotiations? Are the negotiations worth pursuing now that one of the major players, Aideed, has withdrawn?

Answer

- o The Addis Ababa peace accord remains an excellent basis for ensuring political reconciliation and the restoration of the Somali government. However, recent events in Mogadishu have complicated efforts to form the "Transitional National Council" called for in the agreement. That said, political reconciliation is continuing from the bottom up through the establishment of district councils outside Mogadishu. Local peace talks are continuing in Kismayu as well, also under UNOSOM's auspices.
- o Aideed has taken himself out of the political equation by attacking U.N. peacekeepers. While events since June 5 have given Aideed inordinate international publicity our discussions with countless Somalis lead to the conclusion that his political power has waned. The political marginalization of Aideed should not be interpreted to mean that his sub clan - the Habr Gedr - will be excluded from the political process. They will be important players.
- o The conflict with Aideed shows why it is even more important now to move forward with political reconciliation and with disarmament of all factional militias, UNOSOM's most important goal. As UNOSOM moves forward on both fronts, prospects for a durable settlement will improve.

TARNOFF: THREAT TO HUMANITARIAN EFFORTQuestion

Isn't this military effort incompatible with our humanitarian effort? Aren't innocent civilians being killed? Is Eliasson's charge that the U.N. spends ten dollars for military efforts for every dollar spent on humanitarian aid true?

Answer

- o The effort to restore security in Southern Mogadishu is not incompatible with the humanitarian effort, it is essential to it. Delivery of humanitarian assistance cannot be maintained and political reconciliation cannot flourish while one warlord flouts the UN and wreaks terror on the population.
- o The disaster that befell Somalia during the past few years has led to the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. Operation Restore Hope and now UNOSOM have helped to stanch this bloodletting.
- o We deplore the civilian casualties which have occurred, but the consequences of allowing the situation to return to the chaos which prevailed before the UN effort began would be far more deadly.
- o Eliasson's statistics are misleading when read out of context. Before December, we estimate that almost 80 percent of relief food was being looted before it reached needy people. That has stopped because U.S. and other foreign troops are there to provide security. It is therefore misleading to compare the amount spent on the military side with other expenditures since, without the military, the other programs could not go forward.

TARNOFF: CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION ON SOMALIAQuestion

Aren't we ending up just taking sides in the battle for power between Somalia's clans? Aren't Aideed's enemies rejoicing now that peace-keeping forces are trying to destroy his military capabilities?

Answer

- o The major threat now to security and to the safety of U.N. peacekeepers comes from Aideed. Consequently, UNOSOM'S military actions in the capital have centered on his forces.
- o Disarmament remains an urgent requirement for the success of UNOSOM. All the signatories to the Addis Ababa Accord acknowledged this fact, including Aideed. We believe progress toward this goal will be made easier by UNOSOM'S clear determination to deal forcefully with Aideed.

TARNOFF: LESSONS LEARNED: COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUESQuestion

Aren't the problems with the Italians and others just showing that UN-led peacekeeping operations won't work; that there are too many command and control difficulties?

Answer

- o Despite some obvious difficulties, the UN effort in Somalia has been greatly successful in providing humanitarian relief and starting a process of political reconciliation.
- o UNOSOM II is a peace enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the Charter that involves unprecedented complexity.
- o UNOSOM II has nevertheless been highly successful, especially outside Mogadishu, in increasing the flow of humanitarian assistance and rebuilding civil society. Once stability is restored in the capital, we expect to repeat these successes there, too.
- o Naturally, in an operation this complex, there will likely be differences of opinion about aspects of the operation. Those between Italy and the UN have been well publicized. The important point, however, is that the UN, Italy, and the other troop contributors are working hard to resolve these differences.

TARNOFF: SOMALIA - WAR POWERSQuestion

Why hasn't the Clinton Administration sought Congressional authority for U.S. involvement in Somalia? Have we complied with the WPR to date? What happens if our participation extends beyond the 12 month period? If our military profile increases, will further notification be required? How can you argue, as the State Department did in its letter of July 21, that what is happening in Somalia is not a sustained conflict?

Answer

- o The President has committed the Administration to being active in keeping Congress fully informed on significant deployments. He provided reports to Congress on Somalia, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, on June 10 and July 1.
- o The President has continued the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Somalia as part of, and in support of, UNOSOM II pursuant to his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. Although we do not believe that specific statutory authority is necessary, the Administration welcomes Congressional support for U.S. activities in Somalia.
- o The President's reports provided information on the June 5 attacks against UN peacekeepers and our actions since that time in support of the U.N. mandate and directed against those responsible for the murder or wounding of peacekeepers. UN-led operations against Aideed's forces and compound have not involved sustained military action.
- o The Administration conveyed its views on S.J. Res. 45, which was passed by the Senate and, in a modified version, by the House. We welcomed the support expressed therein by Congress for our efforts in Somalia.

Background

- o The Administration is currently conducting a thorough review of War Powers issues.
- o In the unlikely event that significant additional forces were deployed to Somalia, we would continue to keep the Congress fully informed as we have done to date.

o The House and Senate resolutions on Somalia have not yet been reconciled -- no clock is "ticking" yet on any purported 12 month time period. House version of S.J. Res. 45 contains a 12-month limit on its authorization for the U.S. deployment, unless extended by further Congressional action. We would prefer that there be no such time limit. As a legal matter, we believe the President could continue the U.S. deployment beyond the 12-month period, based on his constitutional authority. However, since the issue depends on events still months away and on legislation not yet enacted, it is not necessary to take a definitive position at this time on what the Administration would do.

o We do not believe the 60-day withdrawal provision of the War Powers Resolution presently applies. No previous Administration has considered that intermittent military engagements involving U.S. forces overseas, whether or not constituting "hostilities," would necessitate withdrawal of such forces pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. Whether or not our military actions in June and July constituted "involvement in hostilities", there has not been sustained involvement over a 60-day period.

TARNOFF TESTIMONY: DISARMAMENT

Question

Why did the U.S. not disarm the Somali warlords when we had a chance? Didn't we oppose this goal when it was proposed by some observers? Is the current deployment sufficient?

Answer

- o UNITAF dealt with the issue of disarmament only within the context of its limited mission -- ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid in the southern part of the country. To have done otherwise would have involved the U.S.-led coalition in matters that would have complicated attempts to make sure that starving people received food. That said, to carry out its mission, UNITAF found that it had to negotiate a number of limited disarmament accords.
- o The U.S.-led coalition did recognize the importance of disarmament before UNOSOM began the larger task of rehabilitation. Among other things, UNITAF strongly encouraged the signatories to the Addis Ababa Agreement to make disarmament one of the key objectives. During this period, the U.S. and others also ensured that this goal was included in the U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized UNOSOM.
- o Progress has slowed since the transition to UNOSOM for a number of reasons including the slow arrival of expected troops. Once the full complement of forces is on hand, we expect this effort to gain a higher priority.

Question

Did the U.S.-led UNITAF coalition make a mistake in building up people like Aideed? Why were the warlords not dealt with more decisively when we had the chance?

Answer

- o UNITAF did not "build up" the so-called warlords like General Aideed. Given their weapons and authority, it was necessary to deal with such figures to prevent or minimize obstacles to the delivery of food. To have done otherwise could have delayed the successful outcome of Operation Restore Hope.
- o The factional leaders, including Aideed, have signed the Addis Ababa agreement, which commits them to disarmament and political reconciliation. General Aideed has failed to live up to the agreement. The current conflict with him stems from this failure.

TARNOFF TESTIMONY: FOOD AND AID DELIVERIES

Question

What is our view on the status of food and aid deliveries?

Answer

- o Despite pockets of suffering, the widespread hunger evidenced in 1992 has ended. Relief agencies are beginning to shift their activities from the massive distribution of free food toward targetted distribution to displaced persons and other vulnerable groups. Food distribution is also being scaled back to avoid providing disincentives to farmers.
- o In Mogadishu, UNOSOM security has permitted relief ships to continue berthing and unloading cargo normally. The lack of sufficient military escorts coupled with diminished requirements in the countryside has led to a reduction in convoys. To address the escort question, UNOSOM has recently begun to inform relief agencies regularly of the availability of escorts.
- o In Mogadishu, food distributions have been scaled back to three times a week because of security concerns and because of diminished need. Food is distributed through 21 centers in areas controlled by Aideed and by his chief rival Ali Mahdi. About 63,000 people receive family rations of 2 kilograms regularly; this benefits an estimated 315,000 people.

BURDENSARING IN SOMALIAQuestion

How much has the peacekeeping operation in Somalia cost us?

Answer

- o The total US cost for UNITAF and UNOSOM operations through the end of FY 93 will be \$1.148 billion, based on current DoD estimates of UNITAF and UNOSOM II costs plus State Department reports of UN assessments. DoD estimates UNITAF cost \$700 million and projects "incremental" costs for UNOSOM II during FY 93 of \$232 million. The UN has also assessed the United States \$158 million for UNOSOM operations in 1992-93, with a supplemental assessment of \$58 million expected later in FY 93.

Question

How much humanitarian aid have we provided?

Answer

- o Direct USG humanitarian aid to Somalia in FY 1991-1993 (to date) totalled \$256.5 million. An additional \$72 million was contributed to UNHCR and ICRC by the Bureau of Refugee Programs for refugee and migration relief in the Horn of Africa.

Background

- o Broken down on an annual basis, aid increased from \$29.6 million in FY 91 to \$95.1 million in FY 92; thus far in FY 93 humanitarian aid has reached \$131.7 million. 50 percent of aid consisted of food donations.
- o Other forms of aid included food distribution, medical, emergency, water, agricultural, monetization, airlift, and refugee activities.

Question

How much more do we expect to pay for peacekeeping and humanitarian activities?

Answer

- o Peacekeeping costs will rise until UNOSOM II reaches its peak strength of 28,000, possibly as early as August. Afterward, costs will depend on the stability of the Somali political situation. The State Department will monitor these costs closely.
- o In terms of humanitarian assistance, USAID estimates it will spend an additional \$16 million this fiscal year in Somalia. Overall, humanitarian aid is expected to decrease in FY 94, despite the introduction of a USAID \$25 million rehabilitation program, with disaster assistance falling from an estimated \$50 million in FY 93 to \$10-15 million in FY 94.
- o Greater stability will also reduce the need for food donations. The winter harvest earlier this year was 60 percent of normal; the prognosis is for an even better summer harvest.

Question

How much have other countries contributed?

Answer

- o Peacekeeping: As of July 21 there were 20,977 UNOSOM troops in Somalia, including 3,914 US servicemen. Other large contingents were from Pakistan (5,018), Italy (2,156), Morocco (1,341), France (1,086), Zimbabwe (1,067), Belgium (980), Malaysia (873), UAE (721), Saudi Arabia (678), Nigeria (556), and Egypt (540). US troops constitute 19 percent of total UNOSOM strength.
- o Additional contingents of troops have been pledged to increase troop strength to the UN-authorized ceiling of 28,000 and replace departing troops as needed. The largest contingents on hand or en route include those of Pakistan (4,718), India (4,520), the United States (3,900), Morocco (3,140), Italy (2,430), and Germany (1,640).
- o Humanitarian Aid: USAID has reported that the largest individual donors of aid to Somalia in the current crisis are (figures in millions of dollars): United States (257), Germany (79), UK (60), Japan (47), Italy (38), Sweden (22), Netherlands (18), Canada (15), Belgium (10), and Saudi Arabia (10).
- o The EC has contributed \$81 million since 1992 to Somalia.

Question

Will we be reimbursed for our contributions, such as from the Japanese fund?

AnswerUNITAF

- o The UN's Somalia Trust Fund of \$113 million was established to cover costs incurred by troops participating in UNITAF from developing nations. Japan contributed \$100 million to the fund.
- o It is expected that much of the Trust Fund will be used to reimburse the US military for services it provided to these other participants.
- o When former President Bush first sent troops to Somalia last fall, he decided at that time to have the US military cover its own costs. We are not seeking reimbursement from the UN for DoD costs associated with its participation in UNITAF.

UNOSOM II

- o US participation in UNOSOM II, however, is covered by the same reimbursement arrangements the UN provides other troop-contributing countries.
- o The DoD receives reimbursement from the UN for the provision of supplies and services under a formal agreement. In addition, the UN pays a monthly stipend of \$988-1,279 per month per soldier to member nations with troops stationed in Somalia, plus an additional \$106 per month for clothing and per diem.
- o The State Department is assessed our usual share of UN peacekeeping costs - 30.4 percent - for the total costs of UNOSOM II.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 page)	07/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

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003. memo	Mike Sheehan to Ambassador Inderfurth, re: Somalia Strategy (4 pages)	09/27/1993	P1/b(1)
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TO: LAKE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 29 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
UN -

DEFENSE POLICY
MEDIA

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS

HOAGLAND, JIM

SUBJECT: PRES QUESTIONS ON ARTICLE FM WASHINGTON POST / DEAD OR ALIVE IN
SOMALIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 04 OCT 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
CLARKE

FOR CONCURRENCE
BEERS
BELL
HAHN
RICE
STEINBERG
WARD

FOR INFO
INDYK

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

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Buy - I like this but doesn't
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then think they could?

THE WASHINGTON POST

Jim Hoagland

Dead or Alive in Somalia

NEW YORK—When American citizen Ion Perdicaris was kidnapped by Berber chieftain Raisuli in Morocco, Theodore Roosevelt dispatched this message: Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead. The American was promptly released.

It is impossible to imagine Bill Clinton being either that terse or that categorical. Nor could he afford to be. Today, Raisuli might lob a chemical warhead at a rescue party. He would certainly have in his arsenal recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenades powerful enough to stop U.S. tanks and helicopters, as Somalia's Mohamed Farah Aideded does.

Because the United States and the Soviet Union lookshipped high-tech weaponry on bloodthirsty regimes and bandit groups posing as ideological enemies throughout the Cold War, no American president can now be as succinct and as immediately successful as TR was in 1904.

Aideded's challenge to American forces operating in Somalia is more than an outrage. It is a sign of the times.

Aideded forces have blown up four U.S. soldiers with mines and over the weekend killed three others by shoot-

"Aideded is a thoroughly rotten villain but not a terribly important one for the world's only superpower."

ing down their helicopter in Mogadishu. Total fatalities in the U.N. force the Americans serve with have reached 56 since June.

Clinton administration strategists underestimated how much things have changed, along with Aideded's determination and the sophistication of his band's weaponry. Aideded came out shooting rather than accepting ultimatums to cooperate in a political redesign for Somalia that would eliminate his power. He has also ignored demands that he surrender to be tried for his crimes. No Raisuli he.

What began 10 months ago as a benign effort by 28,000 American soldiers to feed starving children has mushroomed into a small war between Aideded and United Nations peacekeepers, who rely on American firepower for their offensive capability.

Each new atrocity makes it more

difficult for the Clinton administration to extricate the remaining 5,000 U.S. soldiers from Somalia as promised, even as the new deaths create public pressure on Clinton to withdraw. As U.S. casualties mount, Pentagon and other officials grimly say we cannot cut and run and leave Aideded unpunished.

Most of us can share that sentiment. America's dead should be avenged, for moral and practical reasons. America's future support for multinational peace missions—including in Bosnia—will be dramatically undermined if local warlords can knock off GIs with impunity.

That reality should lead Clinton to switch tracks now. Instead of dispatching Rangers and other special forces to hunt down Aideded, which deepens U.S. involvement and risks even more casualties, U.S. policy makers should reflect on the Perdicaris-Raisuli history.

Aideded is a thoroughly rotten villain

but not a terribly important one for the world's only superpower. The American attention he gets builds him, or his successor within his clan army, into a national symbol of resistance. It turns him into a tool for more important anti-American forces like Iran or Sudan, ever alert for new opportunities to pull Uncle Sam's beard.

It is time to shrink and clarify America's goals in Somalia, which cannot serve as a model for democracy in Africa without a massive U.S. commitment, one that Clinton is in no position to make. This fight should no longer be cast as a U.S. vendetta against one Somali warlord.

Although the Perdicaris-Raisuli story has been often told, a key detail is usually omitted. Roosevelt did not lend his verbal thunderbolt to the bandit. He sent it to the sultan of Morocco. It was up to the sultan to deliver one alive American or one dead bandit. The sultan got Raisuli to back off.

The closest thing to a sultan for Somalia is U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who pushed for the expansion of the mission from humanitarian relief to political reconstruc-

tion when the United Nations took over from American commanders in March.

U.S. troops (and U.S. civilian officials working for Boutros-Ghali) should take themselves off the Aideded hunt. This would prove that Washington's protestations that this is not a U.S.-Aideded battle are genuine. It would also force the United Nations, which has been willing to let the United States carry the burden of opposing Aideded almost alone to pull up or shut up.

Will Boutros-Ghali and the political leaders and military contingents of the other U.N. members in Somalia then commit the resources needed to bring Aideded to justice? If the answer is no, the United States should understand what that says about the United Nations' weakness compared with its ambitious goals. America then should cease its participation in the Somali operation.

Clinton's speech to the General Assembly yesterday failed to reflect America's growing misgivings about Somalia. While it would not have the ring of TR's one-liner, there is a brief ultimatum that Clinton should deliver: The United Nations must do more to bring Aideded to justice or its hopes for greater American help in peace-keeping will wind up dead.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1993 THE WASHINGTON POST

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004, paper	Somalia: Re-Energizing the Political Process and Improving Public Relations (5 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re: Draft Summary & Conclusions of Somalia DC (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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005b. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re:Draft Somalia PC Paper (4 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
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005c. email	Richard Clarke to Kristen Cicio and Samuel Berger, re:Draft Somalia Q&A (2 pages)	09/11/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Public support for UN efforts in Somalia has waned. Violent acts against UN forces by Somali warlords have raised questions in major donor countries (including the U.S.) and inside Somalia about the UN's ability to carry out its mission. U.S. leadership in the UN effort has been viewed in some key donor countries as U.S. "dominance." Ironically, the success of the famine relief effort has caused publics in the U.S. and other key donor countries to question the continued need for the UN effort in Somalia.

The UN effort in Somalia may be brought to an abrupt end if support is not quickly renewed with publics in key donor nations, especially the U.S., in significant non-donor countries, and inside Somalia. Without a continued UN effort, Somalia will suffer continued anarchy and a return of famine. Failure of the UN effort in Somalia will seriously undermine the credibility of future international peace making/keeping initiatives at a time when such efforts may be critical.

B. GOALS

To renew public support for the UN effort and the U.S. role in Somalia requires:

- explaining the need for continued UN effort in Somalia to reconstitute civil society and to ensure famine does not recur;
- informing the U.S. public and the world community of progress made in stabilizing food production, development and rehabilitation, and in forestalling anarchy in areas outside Mogadishu;
- informing target audiences of progress being made to improve the security environment in Somalia so that the number of U.S. troops there may be reduced; and
- explaining the importance of the UN effort in Somalia to future peace making/keeping initiatives.

C. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POINTS OF EMPHASIS

- Emphasize progress in meeting the criteria for withdrawing U.S. combat troops in Somalia as established by Secretary Aspin's August 27 address, i.e., settling the security issue in south Mogadishu, disarming the warlords, and establishing credible police forces in the major Somali population centers.

- 2 -

- Emphasize the international character of the effort in Somalia; while the U.S. is providing key leadership and many resources, this is an international effort under the UN.
- Emphasize the great progress that has been made in most of Somalia, despite the continuing problems in southern Mogadishu.
- Emphasize the success of the international humanitarian relief effort.
- Emphasize UN progress in helping Somalis rebuild civil society, i.e., the restoration of law and order and the reestablishment of a police force, a judiciary and local and regional governments.
- Emphasize the role Somalis are taking in restoring their country with UN assistance.
- De-emphasize the personalities of the Somali warlords in public statements.

D. AUDIENCES

The public affairs effort must reach several different audiences. These audiences are not isolated from one another and messages directed at one audience will also influence the others. Maintaining a clear message to all audiences requires constant communication and coordination between all Washington agencies, between Washington agencies and the USUN, and between U.S. government agencies and the USLO in Mogadishu.

Support of the American public is essential to continued U.S. participation in the UN effort in Somalia. U.S.G. officials and authoritative opinion leaders must persuasively explain why international peace making/keeping efforts are important to world peace, and why the U.S. and the UN have important roles in those efforts.

A similar case must be made to publics in other major and potential donor nations. This must be balanced with the message that the effort in Somalia is an international one and that UNOSOM is not U.S. "dominated." Greater support (financial and military) from other donors must be urged.

Perceptions in non-donor countries, especially those in Africa, are important because those countries will judge the UN's peace-making/keeping ability by its success or failure in Somalia.

The public affairs effort with the Somali people is directed at informing them of progress on immediate security issues, at supporting Somali efforts to rebuild the civic sector, and at drawing emerging groups into cooperation with other Somalis under UNOSOM.

E. ACTIONS

- State and DOD will continue to highlight authoritative statements by USG officials on U.S. policy toward Somalia.
- State, DOD and AID, in coordination with the NSC, will continue to meet with members of Congress to provide information on the U.S. role and the UN effort in Somalia.
- State, AID and DOD will continue to seek opportunities for interviews, television appearances, and op-ed pieces from spokespersons and opinion leaders to articulate the need for US support of the UN effort in Somalia. Such persons would include officials of the present and previous administrations, members of congress, PVO representatives, and respected academics.
- USIA will continue to highlight official statements of U.S. policy and commentary by authoritative opinion leaders on Somalia to audiences overseas. Media products include texts carried by the Wireless File, video items carried by USIA TV, and radio reports via the Voice of America.
- DOD will continue its program for facilitating visits to American military units from home town journalists.
- All agencies, in coordination with USLO/USIS Mogadishu and USIS Nairobi, will continue to work with foreign media in Somalia.
- USLO Mogadishu, AID, State and DOD will continue to seek opportunities to focus media attention on improvements in the situation in Somalia.
- USIS Mogadishu will continue program efforts to help rebuild the civic sector and draw emerging groups into cooperation with UNOSOM.
- Radio remains the most important medium in Somalia. However, the current UN controlled radio station in Somalia is received only weakly in the Mogadishu area and is not received at all in most of the rest of the country. State will encourage the UN quickly to establish a more powerful radio station in Somalia. USIA has asked the Voice of America to continue its Somali broadcast beyond the six month period originally agreed upon.
- The USG should strongly encourage and offer assistance as required to the UN in establishing a public affairs planning staff for international peace keeping/making initiatives.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	Re: Somalia Policy - Regaining the High Ground (2 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, re: Message to Mubarak on Somalia (1 page)	09/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Egypt Concerning Somalia (1 page)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. draft	Draft cable, re: Message from President Clinton to Hosni Mubarak (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	08/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. report	Re: Somalia: Dangers Inherent in Another National Conference (4 pages)	08/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
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CHRONOLOGY

Somalia

1. UNSC RESOLUTION 775: August 28, 1992

Authorized the humanitarian mission to Somalia (UNOSOM I). Pakistani forces arrived with insufficient force in Mogadishu and immediately were pinned down in the airport by Aideed. The Pakistani contingent of approximately 500 men set up at the airport in Mogadishu and never succeeded in establishing security outside this area, and therefore relief supplies did not move.

2. UNSC RESOLUTION 794: December 3, 1992

Authorized a U.S.-led coalition (UNITAF) to operate under Chapter 7: the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief in Somalia. The U.S. put over 25,000 troops on the ground and established control over southern Somalia, including Mogadishu. The beginnings of a permissive environment were established and relief agencies were given the opportunity to stop rampant starvation.

Amb. Oakley (on behalf of the U.S.) managed to convince local Somali warlords to permit the introduction of U.S. forces without challenge through a combination of threats and the opportunity to participate in Somalia's political future. In addition, the U.S. and UN representative in Somalia initiated efforts at building a political process.

UNITAF began to initiate a grass roots political process following U.S. entry in December. In January, the first Addis Ababa Conference of faction leaders, including Aideed, agreed to cease-fire and disarmament. Private markets began to return and replanting of crops started. UNITAF patrolled heavily and set up strong points in Mogadishu to ensure a secure environment. In March, the second Addis Conference added regional council representatives and called for an elected Transitional National Council. During this period Aideed began to feel marginalized and politically threatened by the emerging democratic process.

3. UNSC RESOLUTION 814: March 26, 1993

Authorized UNOSOM II. The U.S. mission had been to protect relief organizations; to create "a secure environment for humanitarian operations." The new UN mission included security for relief operations but formalized as part of the UN mandate ongoing efforts at disarmament, the political process of rebuilding a government along the lines of Addis II, refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction. As U.S. forces handed-off to the UN in late April, UNOSOM forces were under strength and with few armored vehicles. They were not able to maintain the active patrols or continuous presence in Mogadishu's neighborhoods. The U.S. maintained a logistical unit to support UNOSOM and a Quick Reaction Force to be used in emergencies. The QRF was to have left in August and the 3000 person logistics unit to drop to 1400 by January 94, with complete withdrawal no later than the end of 1994.

Aideed became increasingly marginalized by the UNOSOM sponsored, open political process which moved away from recognizing war lords to participatory district councils.

4. JUNE 5, 1993:

For the first time since U.S. forces arrived, Aideed breaks the cease-fire and attacked UN forces, ambushing Pakistanis; 24 are killed. Until then, Aideed had been one partner of the UN in its operations and a faction leader recognized by the Addis Conference.

5. UNSC Resolution 837: June 6, 1993

Authorized the investigation into the events that lead to the deaths of 24 Pakistanis and the arrest of those determined to be responsible, i.e. in effect, adding Aideed's arrest to the UNOSOM mission.

6. July 12, 1993:

U.S. forces at UN request, attack Aideed strongholds with AC-130 gunships and Cobra attack helicopters, to destroy heavy weapons he had introduced in violation of the Addis Ababa I agreement of January.

This is the first time that the QRF was used in an offensive role. During this period, skirmishes between Aideed forces and UN contingents increase. The U.S. QRF becomes increasingly used in Mogadishu to keep the peace. Efforts by the UN to seize Aideed are unsuccessful. The UN repeatedly requests that U.S. special forces capability be introduced to seize Aideed.

7. August 8, 1993:

Four U.S. soldiers killed by detonated mine on road patrol in Mogadishu by Aideed forces. Attacks on UNOSOM patrols (by mines) and UNOSOM compound (by mortar) increase.

8. August 24, 1993:

To enhance capability of UNOSOM to capture Aideed and halt his intensifying assaults, the U.S. sends 400 U.S. Special Forces (Rangers) to Somalia to assist in capturing Aideed.

9. UNSC RESOLUTION 865: September 21, 1993

Authorized the formation of the Somali police force and penal and judicial systems. The U.S. has allocated \$6 million to assist in reestablish a Somali judiciary and \$2 million (plus equipment) to reestablish police. Germans, Dutch, Italians, and Japanese also have pledged funds for these efforts, which have been delayed in the UN. Also urged that political dialogue be initiated with all factions within Somalia to foster a political solution.

10. October 4, 1993:

Rangers go after top Aideed lieutenants identified as being in the Olympic Hotel. Seize 24. Helicopters in that operation are hit exiting area, with 2 falling in Aideed neighborhood where they are surrounded by hostile forces. U.S., Pakistani and Malaysian forces go to crash site, where they are pinned down, with further extensive casualties.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNOSOM II

C

'93 JUN 31 P6:28

B

S/S #

101181

MESSAGE NO. Katie Sol CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 2
FROM: AKO PM/ISO 7-3136 7428
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Cable to Ankara.

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Dick Clarke</u>	<u>395-5068</u>	<u>302</u>
<u>OSD/ISA</u>	<u>Lt. Col. D. Johnson</u>	<u>697-9753</u>	<u>4B 746 6 Site 1</u>
<u>JCS/J5</u>	<u>Maj. P. Davis</u>	<u>614-9406</u>	<u>2B 885</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: P/S. Contact Katie
Solar at 202 647-3136
re clearance.

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 12/30/16
2012-0659-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	Re: [UNOSOM II] (2 pages)	07/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. memo	To Ambassador David Shinn, et al., re: Somalia - Evidence of 5 June Incident (1 page)	06/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010b. report	Re: [Somalia] (6 pages)	06/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011a. report	Re: [Aideed] (2 pages)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011b. report	Re: [Aideed] (3 pages)	06/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011c. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	11/04/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4137

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Deaths at Demonstration in Somalia

- Q. What is the Administration's reaction the death of 20 Somali civilians at the hands of the U.N. contingent?
- A. -- Let me emphasize that we deeply regret the loss of life in Somalia resulting from this and other recent incidents.
- As you know, there is a tense situation on the ground in Somalia that comes in the aftermath of the cold-blood ambush by General Aideed's forces on U.N. peacekeepers on June 5.
- The United Nations is conducting an investigation to determine what actually took place during the demonstrations on Sunday.
- In general, I am pleased with how the U.N. operation is proceeding.
- Q. How long will the U.S. air attacks take place? In light of the other events over the weekend, do you have second thoughts now about approving the air strikes over the weekend?
- A. -- Our on-going efforts are designed to achieve the goals identified in last Sunday's U.N. Security Council Resolution.
- Our actions over the weekend were highly successful. Our strikes on military targets were accurate and precise, and minimized the risk of danger to civilians. They have considerably reduced the stocks of weapons, ammunition and military vehicles. These attacks have greatly lessened the capacity of General Aideed to wreck havoc on the people of Somalia.
- Q. Have the United States and the United Nations lost the moral high ground because of this attack? One NGO official said that the U.N. blue flag is in danger of becoming a dirty rag in the minds of the Somalis.
- A. -- We should not allow the events of the last 10 days obscure the real progress that has occurred in Somalia since the engagement of U.S. forces late last year and the introduction of the UNOSOM forces thereafter.

-- As I noted on Saturday, by the time we arrived, more than 350,000 Somalis had died in a savage civil war that had caused the disintegration of Somali society. Today, crops are being planted and harvested, schools and hospitals are re-opening, and refugees are returning home.

-- General Aideed and others are trying to divert attention from their own lawless actions by focussing on this latest incident. The truth is that it was

Q. Is the United Nations still committed to going after Aideed?

A. -- The United Nations remains committed to following through on its Security Council resolution calling for the detention and ultimate trial of the faction leaders responsible for the killings on June 5.

Q. Independent observers, such as representatives of NGO's, have described callous actions by the Pakistani peacekeepers, including killing of children and refusal to help the wounded. What action do you plan to take against the peacekeepers if these allegations are found to be true?

A. -- It is for the United Nations to determine if peacekeepers under their authority acted within the terms of engagement defined for their mission in Somalia.

BACKGROUND

Unconfirmed press reports indicate that a U.S. Army Cobra helicopter fired into Aideed's compound today at a multiple rocket launcher that was aimed at the U.N. compound.

The reports indicate that the helicopter fired twice, and one of its rockets hit a civilian residence. They also note that the multiple rocket launcher was already inoperable.

We are unable to verify whether there were any civilian casualties.