

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia, 1993 [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Rice, Susan

Original OA/ID Number:

277

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	5	1	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Meles Agrees to Write Ltr to UNSC on Commission of Inquiry (4 pages)	10/23/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Ethiopian/Eritrean Proposals on Somalia (6 pages)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Strategy for Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry on Somalia (3 pages)	10/21/1993	P1/b(1)
004a. fax	Fax Coversheet (1 page)	10/12/1993	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	Memorandum for Distribution, re: OSD Somalia Task Force (STF) (1 page)	10/12/1993	P1/b(1)
004c. list	OSD Somalia Task Force [partial] [10 USC 424] [partial] (1 page)	10/12/1993	P3/b(3)
005. report	Situation Report No. 19 (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
006. report	Situation Report No. 21 (1 page)	10/15/1993	P1/b(1)
007. report	Situation Report No. 20 (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
008. chart	Major UNOSOM II Contributors Force Size and Type (1 page)	09/23/1993	P1/b(1)
009. map	Somalia: Deployment of Coalition Forces (1 page)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F

ke4135

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Susan

What New Isolationism?

Wrong, Pundits. We Still Feel a Global Duty, Even in Somalia

By Steven Kull

WHEN THE pictures of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu flashed across the nation's TV screens on Oct. 5, a consensus crystallized in the minds of policymakers and pundits: The rising tide of isolationism will now surely swell into a tidal wave, a demand that the United States immediately withdraw from Somalia. This impression was confirmed by self-selected irate constituents who called their members of Congress. Within 48 hours, the president went on national television, pleading for more time, but nonetheless accommodating U.S. policy to this new political "reality."

But is this image of the American public as skittish in the face of troop fatalities really correct? This is an important question. If the public is becoming isolationist and is not able to abide losses, except perhaps in direct defense of the country, then the United States is not really a viable partner in a system of collective security.

Steven Kull is director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland.

A system of international law, just like domestic law, requires means of enforcement that at times require that lives be put in jeopardy.

According to polling data, the image of a jumpy isolationist public appears to be a Beltway-based mirage. An Oct. 15-18 poll of 803 Americans by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found that only 28 percent of the public favors immediate withdrawal. Some 43 percent polled favors withdrawal in six months, while 27 percent does not want to withdraw until "we have stabilized the country, even if this takes longer than six months." The poll's margin of error was plus-or-minus 3.5 to 4 percent.

These findings are corroborated even by polls taken shortly after the gruesome report of the deaths of the U.S. troops. These polls found evidence of diminished support for the operation in Somalia, a willingness to limit its objectives and an eagerness to withdraw at some point. But of the five polls taken in this period by ABC, CNN, USA Today and Time, the average level of support for immediate withdrawal was 41 percent. And even this level of support was temporary—the PIPA poll, carried out the next week, found it had dropped 13 points.

Furthermore, some of the same polls found majority sentiments in support of increased involvement, at least in the short run. CNN/USA Today and ABC found 55 to 56 percent favored sending more troops. ABC found that 78 percent favored going after Somali warlord Aideed with a "major military attack" if the American prisoners could not be released through negotiations. Somehow these key findings were overlooked by the talking heads who held forth nightly on what the American people want.

Poll results have also contradicted the prevailing wisdom that the public is being swept by a tide of isolationism. When the PIPA poll asked Americans more general questions about their foreign policy views, only 35 percent agreed that "the United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own."

Rather, the kind of globalist sentiments that prompted the American public to support the original Somali intervention got an overwhelming level of support. Eighty-eight percent agreed that "because the world is so interconnected today it is important for the United States to participate, together with other countries, in efforts to maintain peace and protect human rights."

So why does it seem like Americans are so quick to cut and run at the sight of blood? When the media reaffirms a certain image of the public—implicitly as well as explicitly—this image simply becomes part of the given political reality. The PIPA poll suggests that even the public itself has begun to interpret itself through this image. When respondents were asked to estimate how many Americans, upon first receiving the news of the troop fatalities in Somalia, wanted to immediately withdraw, the average estimate was 62 percent—substantially more than the 41 percent the polls found at the time.

If the public—despite the media image—is neither isolationist nor intolerant of troop losses, why do most Americans pull for leaving Somalia within six months or less? While this timing suggests support for a significant ~~and~~ effort, it's questionable whether Somalia will really be stabilized in the next six months. To some extent, the support for the six-month timetable may be a response of support for the president. But the PIPA poll findings suggest two additional reasons.

One reason Americans want to leave in the near future may be that they think the Somalis want them to. Asked to give their impression of Somali attitudes, 58 percent of respondents assumed that the Somalis wish the United States and other U.N. forces would go home. Only 33 percent assumed the Somalis "want the U.N. to stay and help them rebuild their country." Asked if the Americans should leave if a substantial majority of Somalis ~~want that~~,

a resounding 88 percent said yes. This is consistent with deeply held American values that respect the desire of the majority as well as an understandable dislike for having one's hand bitten while feeding. But more importantly, when asked the opposite question—if a Somalia majority wants us to stay, should we?—54 percent said we should stay.

A second reason that Americans may want to leave Somalia, even before the job is done, is that they sense the job is never really done—that the world's needs are unlimited. Even the United States has limited resources, and at some point we have to decide whether we have done enough for now.

For most Americans, the feeling seems to be that feeding the starving Somalis is as much as they want to do right now. A strong majority of respondents agreed that "now that people are eating, our job is done and it is time to bring our boys home." Still, this is not a conclusion that Americans feel easy with. Nearly as many respondents also found convincing arguments that to leave Somalia before it is stabilized may lead to a resumption of civil war and starvation, and thus would be morally wrong.

Within Americans, globalist values and isolationist values will clearly continue to compete. And the loss of American lives will probably cause surges of isolationist feeling. But the news of the death of globalism is greatly exaggerated.

UNCLASSIFIED
IO/UNP

Randy

Connect ASAP

Markings on

Susan Rice's

NUMBER OF PAGES 3 DATE 22 OCTOBER 1993

FROM IO/UNP: SUSAN ZELLE TELEPHONE 647-0042

TO OFFICE: NSC FAX TEL NUMBER 395-1199

DISTRIBUTE TO: NSC

SUSAN RICE
phone-202-395-7310

SUBJECT

SOMALIA

REMARKS

Susan - this is the state draft. Please
clear (I've also sent to Jennifer Ward).

Susan

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP FAX NUMBER 202-647-0039
TELEPHONE 202-647-2392

Underscores the importance of ~~political~~

~~conf. political~~ (as soon as feasible)
progress in creating interim political, economic

and administrative institutions at the local,

regional & national levels; ~~advances~~

all Somalis to ~~can~~ reconcile their

differences & work together for the edification

and underscores that the UN role is
to ~~assist~~ ~~the Somali~~ to assist Somalis

in attaining this objective as well as
assisting with
the ~~country~~ by delivery of humanitarian
assistance to economic rehabilitation

Somalia Resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent resolutions,

Underlining the continued commitment of the international community to help Somalis regain a normal, peaceful life, while *stressing* recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for, *reaching a political settlement + achieving* national reconciliation and reconstruction,

~~Stressing that the task of reaching a political settlement rests primarily with the people of Somalia and noting concern~~ *at the lack of progress towards achieving (political goals, including political settlement and the reestablishment of political institutions,*

Recognizing that a secure environment is necessary to the implementation of humanitarian and political goals, and noting with great concern that ~~this has not yet been achieved~~ *throughout the country, a secure environment is adequate progress towards achieving ...*

Deploing the continuing armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts on behalf of the United Nations, Member States and non-governmental organizations,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of such acts and extending condolences to those Member States and to the Somali people, for the casualties which have occurred in Somalia,

Subject to review by Jan 30
Decides ^{1) through} to renew the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of 6 months, with further extensions ^{significant} subject to the proviso that the Council determines ~~by April 15~~ that progress has been made towards national reconciliation ~~such as~~ *and the* implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements *for Somali people have made sufficient progress*

frankly + reasonable
Specific tangible benchmarks?
Underscores the importance of attaining political goals, specifically, the establishment of all district councils by December 31, 1993 and all regional councils by February 15, 1994.

not what we want
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council by January 15, 1994 and by March 15, 1994 on whether or not substantial progress has been made on achieving national reconciliation and on attaining political and humanitarian goals, and to provide on an urgent basis a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities, as requested in Resolution 865 (1993);

- to take note*
2) Urges the Secretary-General to make clear to the parties that continued UN involvement in Somalia depends on the goodwill of Somalis and tangible progress towards a political settlement;

as well as continued peace process

The period of this mandate

Letter of Africa Committee

4) ^{accelerates} Calls on all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, to ~~redouble~~ ^{immediately} their efforts to achieve political reconciliation, peace and security, and urges them to abide by the cease-fire and ~~begin the disarmament process as agreed to~~ ^{agreements reach} in the Addis Ababa Agreements; ^{+ urges in particular immediate containment of all heavy weapons.}

Welcomes and ~~endorses~~ ^{supports ongoing} diplomatic efforts made by President Meles and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table;

* Asks the Secretary-General to report on ways the UN can help carry out the recommendations of the World Bank meeting of donors on economic rehabilitation held October 22, and calls on donor Nations to ~~contribute~~ ^{make contribution} to Somalia's reconstruction contingent upon demonstrable political progress;

Requests the Secretary-General to make every effort to continue the process of national reconciliation, ~~to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy;~~

Welcomes offers by Member States to provide financial contributions and additional troops to help UNOSOM II carry out its mandate;

^{+ financial support} Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have contributed troops to UNOSOM II, and calls on those who have not yet done so to contribute, on an urgent basis, troops and military support to enhance UNOSOM II's capability to carry out its mandate;

~~Expresses its appreciation also to those Member States that have made contributions and pledges to assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia;~~

Urges the Secretary-General to ask the Somalia Trust Fund Committee to review claims, make payments and allocate the surplus towards re-establishment of the Somalia police, on an urgent basis;

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Drafted: SWZelle
SEUNPA 1830

Hissing: Strongest tie of continued inter presence + down & to progress on political front

Jan 31 - Council review of progress + mandate to judge whether to renew and/or scale back in light of Somali peoples' demonstrated commitment to political solution

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2012-0659-F
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003. cable	Re: Strategy for Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry on Somalia (3 pages)	10/21/1993	P1/b(1)

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Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
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TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 20 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
UN

PEACEKEEPING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT COMMIS OF INQUIRY ON SOMALIA - NEXT STEPS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 26 OCT 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

CLARKE

FOR CONCURRENCE

BEERS

RICE

WARD

FOR INFO

INDYK

ITOH

KENNEY

SODERBERG

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1



9324268

8228

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 20, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Independent Commission of Inquiry on Somalia:
Next Steps

We are instructing USUN (cable being crosshatched to you tonight) to seek as soon as possible UNSC agreement to a statement by the President of the Security Council requesting Ethiopian President Meles and Eritrean President Isaias, with the possible help of former Presidents Nyerere and Carter, to set up an impartial commission of inquiry on Somalia. The Presidential Statement would set out the mandate of the commission, which would be established and run independent of the Secretary General and UNOSOM. The commission's mandate would be to investigate events leading up to and including the June 5 attack on the UN peacekeepers. It would not be judicial or prosecutorial in nature, nor would it determine or allocate blame or fault.

The commission could consist of one or two prominent jurists from Africa and perhaps a private academic expert on Somalia. No Somalis would be members of the commission. The UN Secretariat and UNOSOM would be asked by the Council to provide assistance and support as requested by the commission to perform its mission.

After the UNSC Presidential statement is issued, ideally within a week, we would follow up, bilaterally and discreetly, with Presidents Meles and Isaias to offer our technical assistance, and, if necessary, financial support for the commission. We anticipate that it would take several weeks to assemble the commission. It would then go to Somalia to gather evidence, then move to a neighboring capital, probably Addis Ababa, to write its report. The commission would submit a report of its findings to the Security Council for any follow-up action.

We will probably have to work closely with Meles and Isaias to see this project through to completion. It is vital, however, that we and the UN not become directly involved in the actual investigation.

Thank you for your assistance.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

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UN

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DUE DATE: 26 OCT 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
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INDYK
ITOH
KENNEY
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COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSJDA

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DOC 1 OF 1



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Washington, D.C. 20520
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12 Oct 93**

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[004c]

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Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)
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Washington, D.C. 20318-5101

Dick — 12 October 1993

MEMO TO: Mr. Clarke, NSC

1. Superb document -- great teamwork evidenced here -- glad we were able to stay in loop with you this weekend.
2. Minor text adjustments attached. As broader comment-strongly recommend we shift order of presentation to emphasize overall UN mission first, followed by US political aspects, and ending with US military issues. Specifically, would revise document order as reflected in attached marked-up table of contents.
3. Acting Chairman and many others feel this revised order extremely important in conveying to Congress overall theme of President's plan (political over military).

Barry
BARRY R. McCAFFREY
Lieutenant General, US Army

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Security Council

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17 August 1993

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED IN
PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 18 OF RESOLUTION 814 (1993)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council Resolution 814 (1993) of 20 March 1993, in which the Council requested me to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement the resolution, in particular recommendations for the establishment of Somali police forces, and on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in the resolution.
2. The substance of resolution 814 (1993) reflects the complexity of the anarchic situation that had developed in Somalia from factional strife, causing prolonged suffering of its people. It was evident that, to reconstruct the country's political, social and material infrastructure on a lasting basis, much time and effort would be required. The effective action by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in the early part of 1993 and, after 4 May, by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) with an expanded mandate has led to a significant improvement in conditions almost all over Somalia. Unfortunately, the recalcitrance and narrow interests of certain elements have prolonged unstable and insecure conditions in Mogadishu, seriously hindering UNOSOM's efforts to help Somalia towards recovery.
3. The present report covers the activities of UNOSOM up to 31 July 1993. Section I deals with the organization of the mission. Section II contains an outline of developments on the progress made in the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment in Somalia and the issues of cease-fire, disarmament and the removal of mines. A brief account of the progress made towards the re-establishment of the Somali police force, judicial and penal systems is covered in section III and my recommendations on the assistance UNOSOM could provide for the re-establishment of the Somali police force are to be found in the annex to the present report. The promotion and advancement of political reconciliation and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration are dealt with in section IV. The relief, economic rehabilitation and repatriation of refugees and displaced persons are discussed in section V. Section VI covers public information activities in support of UNOSOM objectives. I have included my observations in section VII, for the consideration of the Council.

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I. ORGANIZATION OF MISSION

4. Following the transfer of military command from UNITAF to UNOSOM on 4 May 1993, the organizational plan for assigning areas of responsibility was modified to reflect the composition of existing forces of UNOSOM. ~~The nine UNITAF humanitarian relief sectors were realigned to reflect areas of responsibility: Ganyo, Balboa, North Mogadishu and South Mogadishu.~~

5. In accordance with the UNOSOM operational plan, the consolidation of United Nations forces in areas for which UNITAF had undertaken responsibility was completed. UNOSOM Commanders continued normalization and stabilization actions and fine-tuning command and control of assigned units in their respective areas. A number of adjustments were necessary owing to the departure of the bulk of the United States units before 4 May, the Australian contingent on 16 May and the Canadian contingent on 1 June.

6. ~~The reinforcement of UNOSOM military units has not been as rapid as planned,~~ but both Force Headquarters Command and total strength have been progressively built up. Current strength is a little over 20,000 troops and other military personnel from 27 countries. The additional deployments planned for the months of August and September 1993 will bring the force strength to the authorized level of 28,000. At the peak of its deployment, UNITAF had 37,000 troops distributed over approximately 40 per cent of the territory of Somalia. As at 31 July 1993, the UNOSOM contingent breakdown was as follows:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Australia	Movement control unit	30
Bangladesh	Infantry battalion	25
Belgium	Brigade headquarters	
	Infantry battalion	
	Total, Belgium	928
Botswana	Infantry company	204
Canada	Headquarters staff	5
Egypt	Infantry battalion	340
France	Brigade headquarters	
	Infantry battalion	
	Aviation unit	
	Logistics battalion	
	Total, France	1 130
Germany	Logistics unit	772
Greece	Field hospital	110
India	Headquarters staff	5
Italy	Brigade headquarters	
	Infantry battalions	
	Aviation unit	
	Logistics/engineering	
	Medical unit	
	Total, Italy	2 538

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Kuwait	Infantry company	108
Malaysia	Infantry battalion	873
Morocco	Infantry battalion	
	Support unit	
	Total, Morocco	1 341
New Zealand	Supply unit	43
Nigeria	Recon battalion	561
Norway	Headquarters company	137
Pakistan	Brigade headquarters	
	Infantry battalions	
	Signal unit	
	Supply and transport company	
	Engineer squadron	
	Medical unit	
	Electrical and mechanical engineering workshop	
	Ordnance company	
	Total, Pakistan	4 973
Republic of Korea	Engineer battalion	61
Romania	Field hospital	236
Saudi Arabia	Infantry battalion	678
Sweden	Field hospital	130
Tunisia	Infantry company	143
Turkey	Infantry battalion	320
United Arab Emirates	Infantry battalion	763
United States	Logistical unit	2 703
Zimbabwe	Infantry battalion	928
Headquarters staff		284
Provost Marshal section		68
Grand total		20 707

(The United States Quick Reaction Force, with a total of 1,167 all ranks, is deployed in support of UNOSOM, but is not part of the United Nations force.) Efforts will be made to have additional units deployed in the next few weeks, including:

India	Infantry brigade	4 983
Bangladesh	Remaining contingent	935
Germany	Remaining contingent	868
Ireland	Transport company	80
Nepal	Infantry battalion	317
Republic of Korea	Remaining contingent	189
Uganda	Infantry company	300
Zambia	Infantry battalion	500

UNOSOM plans to expand to the central region to help to provide stability in a heretofore contested area, to the north-east, which is relatively stable, and to the southern border area to facilitate the return of the large numbers of Somali

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refugees from Kenya. However, these efforts are heavily dependent on the timing of arrival and size and capability of the additional forces.

7. ~~At~~ ~~at~~ 31 July 1993, UNOSOM military casualties were 39 killed and 160 wounded. Six Somali civilians working for UNOSOM were also killed.

8. From the outset, a major difficulty was created by the administrative and logistical requirements of supporting and deploying this very large number of troops from many countries within a relatively short time-frame. Administrative, financial and logistical procedures sometimes caused delays, impeding rapid deployment.

9. Thus, the military component of UNOSOM has faced acute growing pains, which have slowed the mission's ability to fulfil its mandate. Some troop-contributing countries, especially those having recently joined UNOSOM, were not in a position to provide the troops within scheduled time-frames. Others found it difficult to provide their soldiers with adequate weapons and equipment. In some cases, the provision of weapons and equipment from third countries had to be arranged, causing further delays.

10. These factors had a direct impact on the fulfilment of the mandate laid down by the Security Council. UNOSOM planning had assumed that, with the arrival of new troops, the mission would be in a position to deploy into the central and northern regions of Somalia by mid-July and August. Unfortunately, some of the scheduled reinforcements did not arrive in time and in some cases they arrived without the proper equipment. This delayed the capacity of UNOSOM to extend its operations throughout the country, which was essential to implement the mission's mandate. This also emboldened certain elements who seemed intent on undermining the efforts of the United Nations to bring stability, rehabilitation and political reconciliation to Somalia.

11. UNOSOM also comprises other important components with major roles in the implementation of the complex task of the mission. These include divisions dealing with humanitarian relief and rehabilitation, political affairs, justice, public affairs and administration and logistics. The work of these divisions is described in the relevant sections of the report.

11. THE CONSOLIDATION, EXPANSION AND MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT

12. From the start of the tasks of UNOSOM in Somalia, certain factions overtly demonstrated their hostility to the international community's efforts to assist their country and to control the anarchic conditions that had developed in the preceding years. To illustrate, two days after UNOSOM took over responsibility for security from UNITAF, the militia of Ahmed Omar Jess launched an attack on the port city of Kismayo on 6 and 7 May 1993. Over time, control of Kismayo had changed hands several times amongst the various clans in the area. In March, the militia commanded by Mohamed Said Harsi (Morgan), from the Darod Harti sub-clan, had taken over the city and the militia of Jess of the Darod Ogadeni sub-clan was ousted from the city to Goobweyne. The attack by Jess's militia in May was repulsed by the Belgian forces of UNOSOM.

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13. Hostile actions have been pursued by some factions in Mogadishu, particularly since 5 June 1993 when 24 UNOSOM soldiers from Pakistan were killed. Since my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26022), pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), the investigation called for by that resolution has been concluded. Its conclusions are being studied and a summary report will be presented to the Council.

14. ~~I have repeatedly emphasized that disarmament is a prerequisite for the~~ establishment of peace and security in Somalia. This is not only mandated by the Security Council, but also recognized by virtually all Somalis, including the leaders of political factions who agreed in Addis Ababa in January and March to such disarming and urged UNOSOM to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the cease-fire agreement of January 1993. They showed awareness that humanitarian and political progress could not be achieved rapidly unless stability was assured in the country. For the most part, Somalis strongly wish to shift from the cult of violence to the rule of law.

15. Disarmament efforts are aimed primarily at the militias which had intimidated and terrorized Somali society, and their heavy weapons. Voluntary disarmament is the basic assumption underlying the disarmament programme. If certain factions refuse to disarm voluntarily, UNOSOM is left with no choice but to disarm them through compulsion. Efforts to disarm and demobilize militias have to be complemented by a programme to rehabilitate, and reintegrate the ex-militiamen into productive life in society, to prevent their becoming hardened into lawless ways of life. Funding is urgently needed to expedite rehabilitation programmes.

16. There are reliable indications that increased activity by UNOSOM forces is having an effect on the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) militia operations in south Mogadishu. However, there is still potential for the militia to direct attacks against UNOSOM forces. The June incidents, and their aftermath, have provided ample evidence of the overabundance of heavy, medium and light weapons in the southern part of the city. Low-intensity attacks on key facilities, such as the Mogadishu port, the Force Command headquarters, the airfield and other main support bases, may continue. In these circumstances and as mandated by Security Council resolution 837 (1993), ~~UNOSOM will have to initiate a forceful disarmament programme in~~ south Mogadishu as long as resistance continues. More active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations against USC/SNA militia depots have been undertaken, together with a public information campaign to ensure that the population understands UNOSOM actions.

17. UNOSOM intends concurrently to encourage cooperative disarmament by the many factions that are already coming forward to participate. A cooperative process is being followed in the north-east and, gradually, in the central regions. ~~The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) military leadership in~~ the north-east has expressed a wish to disarm voluntarily in cooperation with ~~UNOSOM~~. A UNOSOM disarmament team has been assisted in examining many of the SSDF's stocks of heavy weapons and ammunition in the region, including Galkayo. Voluntary disarmament has been agreed upon, or is being negotiated, in the north-west and the Lower Juba, respectively. Other militias are stepping

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forward as well to begin discussions. It is to be hoped that such voluntary disarmament will become the norm in the whole of Somalia.

18. Over the last eight months, UNOSOM, and before that UNITAF, have removed and destroyed hundreds of tons of weapons and ammunition. During March and April alone, UNITAF had confiscated about 150 handguns; more than 750 rifles; more than 200 machine-guns and an equal number of other heavy weapons such as rocket launchers and mortars; nearly 50 armoured vehicles including tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and self-propelled guns; more than 400 artillery pieces; almost 700 other weapons and close to 79,000 items of ordnance. These figures notwithstanding, the attainment of the level of disarmament required for a lasting peace in Somalia would involve continuation of a major effort on the part of UNOSOM. In this endeavour, the cooperation of neighbouring countries in helping to enforce the arms embargo is essential.

19. ~~The removal of mines is a prerequisite for the return of refugees and the resumption of agricultural and livestock production.~~ It is also essential to the welfare of the population, since many mines were planted in populated areas as well. Preliminary estimates indicate that there are up to a million mines to be removed and that the largest concentration of mines is in the north-west. Efforts are now concentrated on ascertaining where exactly, within the general areas identified, the mines are located, as well as the type of mines and the estimated numbers. The most efficient type of removal equipment would be defined by the topography of the particular areas. An operational demining plan is being developed. At the moment, some UNOSOM contingents are removing mines from the roads in their respective areas of responsibility. Somalis in certain areas, such as Belet Uen, have also attempted to clear some mines that interfere with their livelihood. In the north-west, a consortium of European and North American countries is financing the removal of mines until the end of 1993.

20. Thus, the overall situation in Somalia has stabilized. Outside Mogadishu, in areas where UNOSOM forces are deployed, significant gains have been made in reducing banditry and in fostering the goodwill of the majority of the local population. UNOSOM has continued providing protection for humanitarian relief and undertaking disarmament operations in those areas, and these are gradually being expanded.

III. ASSISTANCE IN THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOMALI POLICE FORCE, JUDICIAL AND PENAL SYSTEMS

21. The key to establishing security and law and order in a system managed by Somalia lies in the re-establishment of the police, judicial and penal systems. Following the transition from UNITAF, UNOSOM has continued to support the Somali police force in the current UNOSOM area of operations and has endeavoured to assist in the north-east and north-west as well. UNOSOM has also developed, together with the Mogadishu legal and judicial community, mechanisms for the selection of judges and magistrates in Mogadishu, and has provided resources and assistance to the prison population in that city. It has also encouraged the development of judicial and penal systems in other areas.

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22. The report annexed to the present document details UNOSOM goals and strategies for the next two years and provides a one-year (May 1993-April 1994) budget estimate for the justice programme. Current embryonic programmes are very fragile and urgently in need of support. Immediate and adequate funding for these programmes is imperative, if the responsibility for maintaining a secure environment is to be assumed by the Somalis themselves as quickly as possible.

IV. PROMOTION AND ADVANCEMENT OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

23. Following the successful Informal Preparatory Meeting for the Conference on National Reconciliation which I convened in Addis Ababa in January 1993, the first session of the Conference was held on 15 March 1993, also in Addis Ababa. Two hundred and fifty participants from a broad cross-section of Somalia, representing political movements, community, religious and women's groups, civic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as elders and eminent persons were invited to the Conference. On 27 March 1993, the Somali political leaders signed a comprehensive agreement covering disarmament and security issues, reconstruction and rehabilitation, restoration of property and the peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of a transitional mechanism. The Addis Ababa agreement was adopted at the closing meeting on 28 March 1993 of the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation.

24. The agreement provides for a transitional period of two years, effective 27 March 1993. The transitional mechanisms will consist of the following four basic organs of authority:

(a) The Transitional National Council (TNC), which will act as the repository of Somali sovereignty and serve as the prime political authority having legislative functions during the transitional period. ~~The Transitional National Council will comprise 1 representative from each of the 18 regions of Somalia, including 1 woman from each region, 1 additional seat for Mogadishu, and 1 nominee from each of the 13 political factions that participated at the Conference. The total membership of the Transitional National Council will be 74;~~

(b) Central administrative departments, which will be responsible for the re-establishment and operation of departments of civil administration and social, economic and humanitarian affairs, thus preparing for the restoration of a formal Government;

(c) Regional councils, to be established in all 18 regions of Somalia, comprising 3 representatives from each district ~~council~~ in the region;

(d) District councils, to be established in the present districts in every region. Members will be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions.

25. The agreement also provides for the appointment by the Transitional National Council of a Transitional Drafting Committee, to draft a transitional

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charter following the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Somali traditional ethics.

26. In the agreement, the Somali parties invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for its implementation. In a statement issued on 29 March 1993, the Secretary-General urged the Somali leaders to proceed without delay to work out the practical arrangements for the implementation of the agreement. On 30 March 1993, the leaders decided on a programme of implementation and also agreed to appoint the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee immediately.

Implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement

1. Deliberations of the Addis Ababa committee

27. The Transitional Charter Drafting Committee was established in Mogadishu from 15 to 20 April 1993. The initial Committee was composed only of the representatives of the 12 political factions. This was not in conformity with Security Council resolution 714 (1992) which requested the Secretary-General to ensure that all Somali political factions were represented in the process of political settlement and emphasized the need for broad-based consultation and participation to achieve agreement on the setting up of transitional government institutions and for consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions.

28. It was one of the major objectives of UNOSOM to ensure that all Somalis, including politically, religious and community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other social groups were suitably represented in the process of preparing the transitional charter. In consultation with representatives of the political factions, my Special Representative convened a meeting of a Subcommittee of the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee with broad-based participation, including equal numbers of political and non-political participants. The Subcommittee commenced its work on 26 April 1993 and focused on elaborating the following six chapters for the draft transitional charter, which had been identified during the initial 15 to 20 April 1993 meeting: general principles; functions and powers of the Transitional National Council; central administrative departments; regional administration; judiciary; and transitional rules. The Subcommittee completed its work on 2 May 1993.

29. On 26 May 1993, my Special Representative convened a meeting of an expanded Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, comprising 30 representatives of political factions and an equal number of non-political participants. The Committee worked on refining the working paper produced by the Subcommittee. It completed its work on 4 June 1993 and set up a small working group to finalize the text of the Transitional Charter. The Group however had to suspend its work owing to the outbreak of violence in Mogadishu on 5 June 1993.

30. The Addis Ababa Conference also called for the creation of a committee on the peaceful settlement of disputes in order that claims for the restoration of private and public properties that were illegally confiscated, robbed, stolen, seized, embezzled or taken by other fraudulent means as well as all other disputes among Somalis should be settled in a peaceful manner.

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31. This Committee held its first session in Addis Ababa from 19 to 21 March 1993. Its second session was convened by my Special Representative in Mogadishu from 15 to 21 April 1993, with the participation of all signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement. As in the case of the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, my Special Representative, in consultation with the Somalis, expanded the composition of this Committee to ensure broad-based representation of all sections of the Somali society.

32. Another session of the Committee was convened from 25 May to 4 June in order to refine further the guidelines relating to such issues as compensation and procedures for the settlement of property claims.

33. The Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee established in Addis Ababa for the purpose of implementing the cease-fire and disarmament agreement signed by the leaders of the political factions on 8 January held several meetings in Mogadishu during the period 7 March to 25 May 1993 and undertook investigations into incidents of cease-fire violations. During its meetings, the Committee continued the process of developing procedures and guidelines for disarmament and for handling cease-fire violations. During its session of 30 and 31 March 1993, the Committee reached agreement on a set of penalties to be applied against factions violating the cease-fire. The agreed measures include condemnation of the offending party, withdrawal of militias that may occupy territory in violation of the cease-fire, withholding of any aid that the offending faction might be receiving, disarmament of the offending militia and compensation to the victims. During the same session the Committee completed the process of delineating regions that should be disarmed simultaneously in implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. At a further session, held on 27 and 28 April 1993, the Committee agreed that the disarmament process should also cover small weapons in the hands of the civilian population.

34. The Committee investigated the cease-fire violations during the incidents involving clashes between supporters of the Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance (SPM/SNA) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in Kismayo on 16 March, 3 April and 6 and 7 May 1993. The attacks on Kismayo of 6 and 7 May were investigated by a special committee previously established by the Cease-fire Committee, to which it reported its findings.

2. Establishment of district councils

35. ~~It was agreed in Addis Ababa that the 22 districts of Somalia would be those that were functioning as at 31 December 1990. The Transitional Charter Drafting Committee subsequently decided that each district council would have 21 members, selected in accordance with Somali tradition. Any resident of a district over the age of 25 would be eligible for selection. Each district council would select three of its members to serve on the regional council and each regional council would in turn select three citizens of the region to serve on the Transitional National Council.~~

36. UNOSOM is assisting the Somalis to implement this part of the agreement. In May, UNOSOM began consultations with the Somali people on the establishment of district councils in the north-east region of Somalia. The UNOSOM Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, led a delegation to Bossaso

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for discussions with local leaders. Further consultations were conducted by a UNOSOM team in the districts of the Bari and Nugal.

37. The process continued in early June with a UNOSOM political team, led by the Director of Political Affairs, visiting the districts of the Niran region and consulting with elders, politicians, religious groups, women's organizations and intellectuals.

38. The consultations were interrupted briefly by the tragic events of June. However, in view of the importance of sustaining the Addis Ababa process, consultations were resumed on 27 June with UNOSOM visits to districts of the Gedo, Bakool, Lower Shebelle, Middle Shebelle and Bay regions.

39. The people consulted in these districts have expressed overwhelming support for the establishment of these institutions, through which the people of Somalia will assert their sovereignty. On 3 July 1993, Buur-Makaba in the Bay region became the first to celebrate formally the establishment of a district council. On 4 and 5 July 1993, Baldoa, also in the Bay region, and Hoddur in the Bakool region became the second and third to establish their district councils. By the end of July, a total of 31 district councils had been formed, including 2 in the north-east. The full list of district councils established as of 31 July 1993 is as follows:

Bakool region:	El Barde	Tieglo
	Hoddur	Wajid
	Rabdhurre	
Bay region:	Baldoa	Buur-Makaba
	Bardale	Qansah Dere
Gedo region:	Selet Hawa	Dolo
Hiran region:	Sulo Burti	Mahas
	Jalalasi	
Lower Shebelle region:	Merca	Afgoye
Middle Shebelle region:	Salad	Aden Yabel
	Adale	
Bari region:	Garso	Bander Beyla

With such strong support from the people, it is anticipated that in the months ahead, many other district councils will be established around the country.

3. National reconciliation

40. In order to reinforce the process of national reconciliation which the Somali political leaders set in motion in Addis Ababa, UNOSOM has undertaken to help to resolve conflicts at the regional level and to assist in resolving intercommunal disputes. A regional peace conference was convened in Kismayo, one of the most conflict-ridden areas of the country. The conference brought together 172 elders from 18 clans in the Juba region to discuss issues crucial to the restoration of normalcy in the region, such as the reopening of all areas of the region for the free movement of people and commercial traffic, reunification of communities, settlement of property claims, the cessation of hostilities and disarmament. The conference made good progress in its work, and the cooperation of the elders and religious leaders from communities hitherto in conflict

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brought relative stability to Kismayo, a city that had seen fighting as recently as May. On 6 August 1993 Conference representatives signed the Jubaland peace agreement in which the signatories committed themselves, on behalf of their clans, to end all hostilities among the more than 20 clans that inhabit Jubaland.

41. During the month of May 1993, UNOSOM also attempted to assist Somalia in organizing a regional conference on Galkayo and the central region, another area where tension had persisted among the various militias since the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement. The leaders of the factions most actively involved - Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali National Front (SNF), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) - were invited to Mogadishu. The conference however could not take place under the auspices of UNOSOM because of the position of Mohammed Farah Aidid, who insisted on assuming responsibility for the security and the entire organization of the conference. Consequently, the meeting was limited and excluded some of the key parties to the conflict who would not accept his terms. However, some of the agreements reached between SNA, SNDU and a faction of SSDF that took part in the limited meeting were positive and should contribute to the re-enforcement of the objectives of the Addis Ababa agreement, particularly disarmament and peaceful settlement of intercommunal disputes.

42. In the north-west, UNOSOM provided some logistical support for the regional reconciliation conference held in Boroma from March to May 1993. This conference settled a number of regional disputes and reached decisions pertaining to disarmament and the re-establishment of police forces. UNOSOM is assisting in the implementation of the decisions of the conference, consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions on Somalia.

V. THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC REHABILITATION

43. The Third Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia was held from 11 to 13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. The meeting was attended by representatives of Governments providing humanitarian assistance to Somalia, regional organizations, United Nations agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. One of the highlights of the meeting was the active participation of 190 Somali political leaders, community elders and representatives of women's organizations and indigenous NGOs. The Somali participants were the first to underline the importance of security and peace for the effective implementation of relief and rehabilitation programmes.

44. The 1993 relief and rehabilitation programme, which was launched at the March meeting, was endorsed as a valid and useful framework for activities for the remainder of the year. The programme called for US\$ 160 million and, as of 27 July 1993, \$16 million had been pledged. At the same time, it was recognized that flexibility would have to be maintained, taking into account the realities of the situation in Somalia. There was a consensus that national capacity-building should be given urgent attention. Unless local institutions, including police, judiciary and local administrations, were established, rehabilitation efforts would not be very effective.

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45. With available resources, United Nations agencies and NGOs have made considerable efforts to implement relief and rehabilitation programmes throughout Somalia. A number of indicators would suffice to show the broad picture: starvation has largely been eradicated; children who only a few months ago were dying of preventable diseases have now been protected through vastly improved nutrition and massive immunization programmes; schools shut down for three or four years, or destroyed, are steadily reopening; plans to open vocational and teacher training schools are well under way in some parts of the country; the ~~dry~~ harvest was good and, thanks to the large amount of seeds and tools distributed, the prospects for the coming harvest are said to be excellent; livestock export, the main source of foreign exchange, has been supported and facilitated through extensive inoculation programmes and the provision of veterinary services; and the number of commercial ships arriving at Somali ports has steadily increased. Unless a lasting peace is established, however, these encouraging signs of recovery of economic and commercial activity could quickly be reversed.

46. Projects designed to generate employment have a particularly high significance in the range of rehabilitation programmes. Thousands of young Somalis continue to be engaged in armed banditry and need to be given an opportunity to be involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction schemes as the process of disarmament progresses. High priority must be accorded to funding projects that will generate jobs, which in turn will make a concrete contribution to a more secure environment.

47. As I mentioned in my report to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) (S/26022), the attacks on UNOSOM forces on 5 June and subsequent events have obliged many of the international relief workers to relocate to Nairobi. As a result of insecurity in south Mogadishu, many humanitarian programmes had come to a temporary standstill. Understandably, humanitarian agencies were concerned about the immediate and longer-term implications of the disruption in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In spite of the difficult circumstances, a number of agencies maintained their operations to ensure that urgently needed relief supplies reached as many people as possible.

48. While the situation remains tense in Mogadishu South, it has been possible gradually to increase the coverage of humanitarian assistance with protection provided by UNOSOM forces. Humanitarian programmes in most other parts of Somalia were not disrupted with the exception of areas dependent on supplies dispatched from Mogadishu. Staff attached to the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM are now located in all the regions of Somalia, including the north-west, and are working together with Somali and international relief workers in expanding rehabilitation schemes.

49. Informal consultations between the United Nations, Governments providing assistance to Somalia and NGOs have been held twice so far in Nairobi, on 22 June and 27 July. There is a clear commitment to work together to meet the immediate as well as the longer-term requirements. In the same way that efforts have been made to involve Somalis in the preparation of the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme, the challenge now is to ensure that they assume an active role in the longer-term recovery plan and effort.

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50. In order to overcome continued dependence on relief assistance, the emergence of indigenous institutional structures at the community, district and regional levels is of critical importance. While the shift from relief to rehabilitation gains momentum, it is essential that adequate resources are made available to support activities that are responsive to the evolving political and security environments. To date less than 15 per cent of the requirements of the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme has been made available. Unless sufficient funds are provided for rehabilitation programmes, it will be difficult to achieve long-lasting peace and security. The following five areas require attention and urgent action to the end of 1993 in order to set the stage for longer-term development on a sustainable basis:

(a) Continuing emergency relief operations. Throughout most regions of Somalia, in both urban and rural environments, despite the successful efforts of the Somalia and the international community, ~~there are still~~ ^{there are still} pockets of immense suffering and deprivation. The identification of these remaining areas, the quantification of affected persons and an assessment of their needs is an urgent and essential task. This will lead to a refinement of those strategies that will improve their condition and prepare them for a return to productive endeavour;

(b) Resettlement. ~~As estimated, 1.5 million~~ Somalis are now located away from their homes as internally displaced persons or as refugees in neighbouring countries. Whether they remain in their present environment or return home, the economic, political and social implications are enormous. Planning for the future is contained in UNOSOM's resettlement policy which is currently being implemented in several regions, albeit with minimum resources;

(c) Reinvigoration of the productive sector, in particular agriculture, livestock and fisheries. The agriculture, livestock and fisheries sector has traditionally made the greatest contribution to Somalia's gross national product. ~~Agriculture has been responsible for 55 per cent of employment and 70 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings.~~ The challenge is to target support for the Somali efforts to return large numbers of their people to productive endeavour by removing constraints to expansion and growth;

(d) Revitalization of the social services. Somalis, in all regions, with extraordinary support from NGOs, United Nations organizations and UNOSOM, have made critical contributions to the re-establishment and maintenance of the education and health systems. The rebuilding of schools and health centres has proceeded steadily. These efforts have been possible only through volunteer contributions of Somali teachers, health workers and community leaders. The stage is now set for external contributions of low-cost high-value materials and supplies to enhance these volunteer efforts to improve the quality of Somali life;

(e) Resuscitation of commerce and trade. With minimal encouragement from external sources, Somalia's formal and informal private sector in all regions long ago began the task of breathing life into commercial and trading activities. Street vendors, farmers, businessmen and traders demand services from ports and airports in an effort to stimulate business and expand the base for employment. Somali and foreign investors have developed plans to expand business and provide a wide range of consumer services to their communities.

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These services include international transportation and telecommunications, petroleum distribution, banking and finance.

51. While efforts to implement the above priority programmes continue, consultations have been initiated with the World Bank on planning for long-term reconstruction and recovery. Two consultations with bilateral and multilateral donors have already been held and a third meeting is expected to take place on 21 October 1993 in Paris. UNOSOM intends increasingly to involve emerging Somali organizations in this process.

VI. PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF UNOSOM ACTIVITIES

52. In accordance with paragraph 4 (f) of Security Council resolution 814 (1993), UNOSOM has developed appropriate public information programmes in support of United Nations activities in Somalia.

53. While international media attention has been more focused on UNOSOM's military and security-related actions in Mogadishu, the United Nations continues to implement a wide range of activities throughout the country to promote Somalia's political reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Fostering greater awareness of these activities and of UNOSOM's broad mandate among the international media and the Somali people has been the primary objective of the public information programme, but without great success.

54. The public information activities of UNOSOM are coordinated closely with United Nations agencies and NGOs. Information materials are regularly prepared and distributed to international and Somali media at daily news briefings held at UNOSOM headquarters. Regrettably, these efforts have had little effect on the media.

A. Radio programming

55. The high rate of illiteracy in Somalia and its scattered population, in conjunction with its lack of infrastructure and telecommunications, has made radio programming an essential component of UNOSOM's public information campaign. Radio Maanta broadcasts a 45-minute programme 7 times a day. Broadcasts consist of information on UNOSOM activities, statements issued by my Special Representative and the Force Commander, features highlighting progress made in promoting Somalia's political reconciliation and economic recovery, recitations from the Koran and traditional Somali music.

56. Radio Maanta broadcasts on short-wave, reaching Mogadishu and outlying areas. The programme is also broadcast once a day over the Italian contingent's FM station in Mogadishu. However, Radio Maanta is not received clearly in many parts of the country because of the limited capacity of its present transmitter and aerial.

57. Countering anti-UNOSOM propaganda has been an important task of its information programme. UNOSOM's disarmament operation of 12 June effectively neutralized Radio Mogadishu, which had been under the control of USC/SNA and was

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a source of increasingly hostile propaganda against UNOSOM. Since that period, however, ~~radio broadcasts have sought to disrupt~~ Radio Maanta and, other Somali broadcasts, by broadcasting at the same time and on the same frequency.

58. To extend Radio Maanta's outreach to the entire country and to prevent its being jammed by sources of hostile propaganda, additional transmitters are required in other parts of Somalia. A preliminary technical study suggests that the use of medium-wave transmitters should alleviate some of the transmission problems that Radio Maanta currently faces. The strengthening of this prime means of communication is being proposed as an urgent addition to the budget.

59. Until additional transmitters can be established, UNOSOM is examining the possibility of transmitting radio programming over the external short-wave radio services of neighbouring countries. Consultations on the matter are currently under way with authorities in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

B. Print media

60. ~~UNOSOM's Somali-language newspaper, Maanta, is published 6 days a week in Mogadishu and distributed to 11 other cities in Somalia. Its circulation, however, has been limited to 25,000 copies.~~

61. UNOSOM currently relies on the military to transport Maanta newspaper to other parts of Somalia. However, military aircraft have been unable to make daily deliveries of the paper. In Mogadishu, distribution has been hampered by the heinous murder on 7 July of six Somalis employed to deliver the newspaper. Other Somali staff of both Maanta and Radio Maanta have expressed concern for their personal safety. UNOSOM is at present considering an offer from a Somali contractor to undertake Maanta's distribution in Mogadishu. The provision of additional resources would enable UNOSOM to transmit the newspaper and other information materials, such as press releases, electronically to various cities in the country for local printing and dissemination.

62. UNOSOM has also recently introduced an English-language version of Maanta, for dissemination to United Nations agencies, NGOs and others in the international community.

C. Media relations

63. The peace-enforcement mandate of UNOSOM and the large number of Member States contributing military personnel have heightened the attention of the international media. To serve their needs for information, as well as that of the local Somali press, UNOSOM continues to extend its media outreach through press briefings, the issuance of media releases and fact sheets, answering media inquiries and coordinating media interviews of senior UNOSOM officials.

64. Regular daily briefings by the UNOSOM civilian and military spokesmen ensure an outflow of information on political, military and humanitarian aspects of the work of UNOSOM. Summaries of these briefings are prepared daily and

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transmitted to United Nations Headquarters in New York and to the United Nations Information Centre in Nairobi for redissemination.

65. UNOSOM has organized visits to different areas in Somalia for journalists and these have enhanced media coverage of UNOSOM humanitarian activities, such as flood relief or the distribution of food rations. Journalists have also accompanied UNOSOM officials engaged in consultations with community leaders throughout Somalia on the establishment of district and regional councils.

D. Public outreach

66. In addition to Maanta newspaper and radio programming, UNOSOM has sought to reach out to the Somali population through its presence in the field. Regular updates on political, humanitarian and security-related aspects of UNOSOM's activities are translated and provided in both English and Somali to each of the UNOSOM zone offices for redissemination to local communities.

67. Leaflet drops and posters issued by UNOSOM military officials have also served to highlight UNOSOM objectives and activities.

68. Given the lack of telecommunications in Somalia, personal contact between UNOSOM officials and the Somali public has been an effective means of conveying UNOSOM's message. My Special Representative, his Deputy and other UNOSOM officials, especially those in the zone and sub-zone offices, have held numerous meetings with Somali community leaders, elders, women's and youth groups, representatives of businesses and political movements and local NGOs throughout Somalia to promote public understanding and support of UNOSOM's mandate and objectives. This programme will improve as zone and sub-zone offices become properly manned.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

69. The mandate established by Security Council resolution 814 (1993) reflected the deep complexities in the situation then prevailing in Somalia, which the United Nations undertook to resolve. It was evident that UNOSOM would need to receive full cooperation from the people of Somalia, especially the faction leaders, if it was to accomplish its tasks smoothly. At the same time, the international community had recognized that the complexities of the situation could lead to major difficulties in the tasks set for UNOSOM. It was precisely for this reason that the Security Council decided to establish UNOSOM II under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

70. Regrettably, the short-sighted attitudes of leaders of a few factions aggravated the difficult situation. Despite their deliberate attempts to obstruct UNOSOM from performing the tasks assigned by the Security Council, the overall situation in Somalia has undergone a major transformation. The course had already been determined by the highly effective intervention by UNITAF. Following the establishment of UNOSOM II, conditions in most parts of the country have stabilized. Humanitarian assistance is reaching its destinations, protected from attacks and looting by armed bandits and militia. People are going about their normal routines. Schools are reopening. Land is being

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tilled, crops are being planted and livestock even being exported. Local councils of clan elders are meeting and cooperating with the United Nations efforts to help Somalia to re-establish normal conditions. This contrasts starkly with the situation at the beginning of 1993, when the Somali people still were suffering from the effects of a brutal civil war fuelled by the ambitions and enmities of warlords that had claimed hundreds of thousands of innocent Somali lives.

71. A major task that fell to UNOSOM after it took over responsibility from UNITAF was the disarmament of the armed groups who had terrorized the people and made extortion from humanitarian assistance agencies the source of their considerable income. At the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Cairo last June, I had the opportunity to exchange views with several African leaders on the situation in and relating to Somalia. There was strong support for the United Nations effort in Somalia, particularly for the need to take appropriate measures to ensure the full implementation of the disarmament provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement. These views were expressed in Cairo both in the resolution adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers and the statement issued by the Horn of Africa Standing Committee on 23 June 1993. In my discussions with the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, strong support was also expressed for the United Nations role in Somalia.

72. The priority that UNOSOM gave to disarmament generated the hostility of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their power, towards UNOSOM. The ambushing of UNOSOM personnel by such elements on 5 June and on subsequent occasions left UNOSOM no choice but to take forceful action to effect the disarming required under the Addis Ababa agreement. The exploitation of such actions to provoke hostilities towards UNOSOM has ill-served the people of Somalia and has led to loss of life for which the responsibility rests squarely with the faction leaders, in particular Mohammed Farah Aidid.

73. I am conscious of the feeling in some quarters that UNOSOM is deviating from its primary task of ensuring the safe distribution of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia, and is concentrating disproportionate efforts and resources in military operations. I know that some of this criticism is well motivated by good intentions. However, the international community has known from the beginning that effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords is conditio sine qua non for other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate, be they political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruction. ~~Disarmament is fully implemented, it would not be~~ reasonable to expect UNOSOM to fulfil other aspects of its mandate. The fact that UNOSOM has been able to achieve the progress that it has in different parts of the country, despite the armed hostility that it faces almost daily from Mohammed Farah Aidid and his militia, is testimony to the Somali people's as well as UNOSOM's resolve not to be deterred by such obstacles as well as to the desire of the Somali people for peace and normalcy. But the fact remains that the country will not enjoy complete stability unless and until the criminal elements have been apprehended and brought to justice as demanded by the Security Council in its resolution 817 (1993). I am convinced that the Security

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74. In view of these circumstances, I have reached the conclusion that UNOSOM requires the assignment of an additional brigade in order to extend its, ~~operations~~, pursue the programme of disarmament in the central and northern regions of the country, restore security through disarmament in Mogadishu and adequately tackle the refugee problem. This additional troop strength should enable the military component to be more effective, more rapid and move widely. Such broader effectiveness should in turn enable UNOSOM to fulfil its mandate within a shorter period of time. This step would result in a temporary increase in UNOSOM's troop strength, and I would endeavour to meet the additional costs from within the appropriation levels already approved.

75. The restoration of security and stability to Somalia requires the re-establishment of the Somali police force, the judicial system and the penal system, in order to enable Somalis quickly to assume full responsibility for law and order in their country. The initial steps must be taken within the framework of the transitional machinery envisaged in the Addis Ababa agreement, beginning with the district and regional levels. Ultimately, this will facilitate the progressive disengagement of the United Nations from its present role in Somalia. Furthermore, once Somalia has surmounted the dangers posed by the wide prevalence of heavy weapons, a well-organized and effective police force would be able to limit the spread of light weapons. It is therefore imperative and urgent that resources in funds and training assistance, as well as in efficacious transitory arrangements, be made available by donor Governments.

76. A high priority for UNOSOM is its assistance to the political reconciliation process. District councils have been formed, and efforts to sustain this momentum will continue in order to form the regional councils and the Transitional National Council as quickly as possible. UNOSOM has also sponsored the reconciliation meetings of clan elders in various regions in Somalia, where the effects are apparent in the restoration of stable and secure conditions, in stark contrast with the suffering from inter-clan conflict. It is my hope that these successes will encourage peaceful reconciliation in other parts of the country.

77. Looking beyond the situation in Somalia, the focus of this report, it is necessary to give attention to the serious problems encountered in establishing UNOSOM, which are symptomatic of the inadequacies of the present structure and procedure for coping with the heavy demands of the new generation of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Especially in UNOSOM, but also in the establishment of other large missions over the last two years, the delays and complications arising from the application by the Secretariat of established administrative, financial and logistical procedures, made their obsolescence obvious. As members of the Council are aware, measures already are under way to improve the procedures and practices in the Secretariat, and I am grateful for the support being received from various Governments.

78. Another serious and sensitive problem that arose in UNOSOM, and of which members of the Council are aware, is the one related to command and control over United Nations peace and security operations. The principle and practice of unity of command that was developed over decades of peace-keeping operations have come under strain in recent operations whose mandates fall, at times partially, under Chapter VII. Owing perhaps, to the particularly complex and

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dangerous conditions under which UNOSOM found itself operating, the actions of some contingent commanders had the effect of weakening the integrity of UNOSOM's military command structure. Following clarification at both the political and the operational levels, those difficulties were settled. ~~As the case of the Italian contingent, which received undue media attention, I am glad to report that there is complete coordination between the United Nations and the Italian authorities and the matter has been resolved. The Italian contingent of 2,540 troops in Somalia is largely located in the Jalalasi area, with some units in Northern Mogadishu. While there has been constant and intense discussion in the Jalalasi area, for the Mogadishu area a diversity of views has been expressed about some modalities of the implementation of the United Nations mandate. Consequently, Italy has asked that its Mogadishu units be redeployed elsewhere in Somalia, and this request has been agreed through an exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister of Italy and myself. Talks are already under way to define where these units will be redeployed.~~ Italy

79. Nevertheless, this issue deserves attention in order to avoid future complications that could weaken the effectiveness of United Nations missions in the interest of international peace and security. When the Council authorizes an operation under Chapter VII of the Charter, clearly there will be an increased risk of casualties among military personnel under United Nations command. It is entirely understandable that Governments will be highly sensitive to this risk and that they will wish to ensure the highest possible security for their personnel. Yet, I am certain that all States Members of the United Nations will agree that such risks can be minimized only if there is effective command and control on the ground by the Force Commander. This also ensures that the Commander is able to make the maximum use of his resources to achieve the objectives in the mandate received from the Council. Therefore it is clear that it is in the interest of the United Nations that the integrity of the command and control of United Nations military operations be respected in all peace and security operations, whether under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. Of course, it is essential that troop-contributing countries be fully consulted and be kept fully informed, at both the political and the operational levels. I am ensuring that this be done on a regular basis and I am confident that all concerned will cooperate in the common interest.

80. In concluding the present report, I wish to express my warm appreciation to my Special Representative, Admiral Howe, to the Force Commander, General Bir, and to all the men and women, soldiers and civilians, who have made a superb contribution to the furtherance of the United Nations mandate in Somalia under very difficult conditions. My appreciation also extends to the International Committee of the Red Cross, NGOs and the many Governments that have assisted and strengthened UNOSOM in the fulfilment of its historic tasks. Above all, I wish to pay profound tribute to the soldiers of UNOSOM, the Somalis working for UNOSOM, relief workers as well as the journalists who lost their lives in endeavouring to help Somalia, under United Nations auspices, in its hour of need.

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Annex I

The re-establishment of security in Somalia: the police, judicial and penal systems

1. The Somali political leaders agreed during the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, held at Addis Ababa in March 1993, inter alia, on the "need to establish an impartial national and regional Somali police force in all regions of the country on an urgent basis through the reinstatement of the former Somali Police Force and recruitment and training of young Somalis from all regions", and requested "the assistance of the international community" in that regard.
2. The Addis Ababa agreement also provided for the Transitional National Council, as the repository of Somali sovereignty, to establish an "independent judiciary".
3. In my previous reports (S/24992, para. 30; S/25168, para. 23 and S/25354, para. 46), I stated that the establishment of an effective Somali police force would be a crucial step to create a secure environment in Somalia.
4. The Security Council, in its resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, requested the "Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993". This included, assistance in the "re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate, at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law" (see resolution 814 (1993), para. 4).
5. In my report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354, para. 50), I indicated that I would bring to the attention of the Council my recommendations based on a more detailed assessment of the re-establishment of the Somali police force. The present report contains those recommendations.

I. THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION

6. Despite recent divisions in the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which exerts administrative control over the region, the north-east seems to be secure and peaceful. There is practically no banditry problem. The traditional concern of the region has been possible attack by armed elements from across regional borders to the south and west. However, ongoing political reconciliation and disarmament programmes should reduce this threat. "SSDF controls the security situation in the region." At present there are approximately 700 policemen in the region, about 70 per cent of whom were members of the former Somali National Police Force..

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7. The Bay region also has a relatively satisfactory security situation except for banditry along the Hoddur-Baidoa road. The police patrol Baidoa, the capital of the region, without arms.

8. In the Gedo region, the security situation is relatively satisfactory, although isolated acts of banditry still occur. Police in Bardera conduct joint patrols with UNOSOM military forces in the city, but there is need for a rural guard to provide protection in outlying areas. For example, Somali refugees returning from Kenya recently were attacked by bandits about 50 kilometres from Bardera. The 2,000-strong police force which existed before the civil war was needed partly because of the long border with Kenya and Ethiopia.

9. The aftermath of the 5 June 1993 attack on UNOSOM military forces has caused serious security problems in Mogadishu. Security has deteriorated in the city owing to the presence of large numbers of weapons and large numbers of clan fighters still residing in the city. ~~Three thousand~~ former members of the Somali police have been re-formed into a new police force. In general, police and weapons are confined to the stations at night, unless joint operations are planned with UNOSOM. Police have continued their duties during the recent security incidents involving UNOSOM military forces and participate with these forces in selected missions.

10. The crime problem in Afgoi is exacerbated by looters along the Merca-Afgoi road and others leaving Mogadishu who pass through the area. Rural guards or a mobile quick reaction force may be needed to assert control in this area.

11. After the successful conclusion of the four-month Borama conference, political conciliation among clans and a broad-based administration determined to disarm and demobilize the clan-based militias have emerged in the north-west region. Disarming and demobilization are expected to improve security in the region as the security problem in the north-west has stemmed primarily from clan-based militias.

12. In Kismayo, armed factions have conducted military raids into the city and control of the city has changed twice in the last four months from one faction to another. Likewise, the police have been reorganized twice in the city. UNOSOM political and military elements are working with elders of all clans/factions to defuse tension in the Kismayo region.

13. It is clear that, while the security situation in some parts of Somalia is still less than satisfactory (particularly in Mogadishu), security has improved in the north-east, north-west, Bay and Gedo regions. A critical element in creating the security conditions necessary for the re-establishment of the Somali police force is the disarmament of the entire country, a task which is part of the UNOSOM mandate.

14. The restoration of law and order, peace and stability in Somalia requires not only the strengthening of the police forces but also a legal system that provides the basis and framework for police activities. This should include the basic laws that the police will have to enforce; a judicial system to adjudicate the cases of those arrested by the police and a penal system that can detain and punish offenders. Additionally, as a result of the civil conflict in Somalia over the last five years, investigation and facilitating the prosecution of

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serious violations of international humanitarian law will require a special approach, perhaps using international investigative staff and justices.

II. PROPOSED UNOSOM STRATEGY

A. Police

1. Objectives

15. The attainment of the overall objective of UNOSOM with regard to the establishment of a national neutral police force must be approached through a framework comprising three tiers - national, regional and district - with police forces being answerable to appropriate local authorities in each tier. In the light of the fact that at the moment only at the district level have local authorities been established, i.e. district councils, implementation of the overall objective must, therefore, begin at that level and expand to the regional and national levels, involving ultimately the Transitional National Council when established. UNOSOM's role in this endeavour must remain that of a facilitator.

16. Expansion of the 5,000-person police force composed of former policemen into a force of 10,000 can be accomplished by bringing into the UNOSOM programme approximately 1,500 police operating in the north-east and approximately 1,500 police operating in the north-west. The police in these regions would need immediate on-station, in-service police training. Additionally, 2,000 persons would be recruited country-wide and undergo basic training in groups of 400. If training begins in October 1993, 5 cycles of 400 recruits in each cycle will produce 2,000 new policemen by December 1994.

17. The number of police required to perform law enforcement and security duties is a matter of continuing assessment. To develop an 18,000-person-strong police force (the number of police prior to the civil war) that can assume law enforcement and security duties by March 1995 (the currently projected time for completing the UNOSOM mandate) existing police units must be expanded and police forces developed in the smaller population centres throughout the country. While former policemen (approximately 3,000) will provide the foundation for this expansion, the police recruit training process also can help to reintegrate carefully selected ex-militia into Somali society by providing them with professional employment and discipline. The ex-militia would take a loyalty oath to Somalia and would be carefully observed during their training to ensure that factional loyalty is eliminated. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 more recruits could be trained as policemen by December 1994 if two additional training academies are made available through international donor programmes.

18. A national police structure could be in place if the Transitional National Council so decides. Pending the establishment of the national structure, the police will be organized and operationally controlled on a regional and district basis. The governmental authority could request that international police advisers continue their service, if needed.

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2. Strategy

19. Until a Somali governmental structure is established, the police force(s) will be under the operational control of the regional and district councils. An international police component of UNOSOM will provide assistance to these entities in the discharge of their responsibilities and will provide advice and training to the police forces.

20. The regional police commanders will be assisted by international experts who will act as police advisers. Regional political and operational considerations will determine if UNOSOM will appoint a national police chief for the interim report.

21. During this period, close coordination and cooperation between the UNOSOM military and Somali police is critical in ensuring comprehensive and coordinated security policies and operations. However, upon the arrival of the full component of international police advisers, UNOSOM military forces will end their control of police activities. None the less, close policy and operational coordination will be maintained between the police advisers, UNOSOM military and the Somali police.

22. A police training academy/institute will be created and organized with the assistance of international police advisers. The police institute will begin its first basic police courses in October 1993. Refresher courses for serving police officers will be carried out throughout the country by mobile training teams. The institute will train 400 recruits per cycle in a three-month basic police training programme, thereby meeting the recruit training objective of 2,000 which will increase the police force to 10,000 by December 1994. Recruitment will be proportional among clans on a regional basis and the clan balance will be maintained throughout all phases of recruitment.

23. Additionally, the institute will maintain a police personnel evaluation centre and a police documentation centre, which will be available to the entire police force. Training programmes will be provided to basic, intermediate and supervisory police personnel. The institute also will provide instruction for magistrates and custodial corps personnel.

24. In providing assistance, UNOSOM will build on the Auxiliary Security Force initiated by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) as the foundation of the UNOSOM-supervised Somali police force. UNOSOM will, however, conduct a review of members of the Auxiliary Security Force to determine if they meet the following requirements:

(a) Two years' prior experience before 26 January 1991 with the former Somali Police Force;

(b) No crimes committed against the Somali people;

(c) No physical disability, with rare exceptions.

Those who do not meet the requirements will not be retained in the police force. Special care will be taken to retain the most competent. Where militia have been the foundation of existing police forces, UNOSOM will consider supporting

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those forces with salaries and equipment, but will require that militia undergo, in a timely fashion, basic police and human rights training. Police officers must renounce loyalty to political and paramilitary forces and take an oath to the objectives and goals of the new Somali National Police Force and to serve the Somali people and nation.

25. To increase the strength of the police to 10,000 in Somalia by December 1994, UNOSOM will start a new recruitment programme, as soon as the training facilities and the trainers are available, using as a minimum the following criteria. Recruits must:

- (a) Be between 18 and 25 years of age;
- (b) Not have committed any crime against the Somali people;
- (c) Have no physical disability;
- (d) Have a certain level of literacy;
- (e) Be selected by the local chief of police, recommended by community leaders and in consultation with the UNOSOM regional military commander, where applicable;
- (f) Be selected in such a way as to ensure a proportional balance of clan representation.

26. UNOSOM will evaluate, region by region, the need to organize and train mobile quick reaction forces. This type of force can be used to assist in rural area bandit apprehension, disarmament operations under the supervision of the UNOSOM military and other quick reaction missions. Where there is a need for a regional mobile quick reaction force, the force would be under the operational control of the UNOSOM regional international police adviser and the UNOSOM military commander.

27. Taking into account the security environment of each region, UNOSOM military and police advisers will determine on a station-by-station basis, the number of weapons that will be provided to each police station.

28. Initially, UNOSOM will provide modest salaries, undertake limited renovation of police facilities, provide basic transportation and communications equipment, conduct basic police training and provide some specialized training. The salary scale must be sustainable by revenues generated by the future Somali Government.

B. Judicial system

1. Objectives

29. By 31 October 1993, an interim three-tier judicial system will be in place. The 1962 Criminal Procedure and Penal Codes will be enforced. Initially, judges and magistrates for the system will be compensated modestly by UNOSOM and encouraged to consider this involvement as a civic responsibility. Court rooms

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and administrative workspace will be renovated and office equipment will be furnished for each court.

30. By 31 March 1995, the Transitional National Council will have determined the type of judicial system and laws of the country. The interim judicial system will be adjusted to accommodate the system called for by the Transitional National Council.

2. Strategy

31. After the Transitional National Council is formed, it will be asked by UNOSOM to take an early decision on the structure and organization of the judiciary and the applicable laws, both civil and criminal, throughout Somalia.

32. Since 4 May 1993, the 1962 Somali Criminal Procedure Code and Penal Code continue in force in areas where there exists a functioning judicial system. Consistent with the decision of the Boroma Conference, the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, which was in use in the north-west prior to 1960, will be in force in that region.

33. The interim judicial system will be modelled on the 1962 court system and will have three levels: courts of appeal, regional courts and district courts. District courts are to hear civil and criminal cases where conviction would result in imprisonment for less than 10 years. Regional courts are to review cases from district courts and are to have original jurisdiction over criminal cases in which conviction would result in imprisonment for three years or more.

34. In Mogadishu a Judicial Selection Committee made up of 13 respected Somalis and advised by UNOSOM Justice Division officials will select judges and magistrates for the court system in the city and will oversee issues of ethics and discipline in the judiciary. Similar councils will be formed in other regions of Somalia for the selection of judges and magistrates.

35. Should Somali judges be threatened or intimidated and therefore either refuse to adjudicate particular cases or are pressured into issuing decisions not based on legal grounds, UNOSOM will consider, after consultation with the Judicial Selection Committee, a programme whereby consideration may be given to foreign judges being asked to serve in selected courts. (It should be noted that foreign judges did serve in the Somali court system in the 1960s and foreign judges are serving in some East African countries today.) Upon request, UNOSOM military forces will provide security for judicial proceedings until Somali police forces are able to provide the required security.

36. A probable-cause hearing must be held within 48 hours of detention, unless there is no magistrate within a reasonable distance. The hearing will take place as soon as possible, depending on the location of magistrates and their schedules.

37. UNOSOM will have civilian judicial advisers assigned to provide advice and assistance in the re-establishment of the interim Somali judicial system.

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38. As required by the UNOSOM mandate from the Security Council, UNOSOM police and judicial advisers will assist the Somali justice system in investigating allegations of serious criminal violations, including "crimes against the Somali people", and in facilitating the prosecution of criminals.

39. When security conditions require and until appropriate Somali prisons are renovated, UNOSOM will assist in maintaining a detention facility for persons whose security cannot be guaranteed in existing confinement facilities. United Nation standards on human rights will be respected in these facilities.

40. UNOSOM, with the assistance of the Police Institute and an appropriate university training faculty, will fund a judicial training or review programme for judges and magistrates and a court administration training programme for administrative staff.

41. UNOSOM will fund modest renovation of court facilities, provide limited equipment and supplies, training and modest salaries for judges and court administrative personnel.

C. Prison system

1. Objectives

42. ~~By 31 October 1991, basic renovation of the prison facilities in Mogadishu and Hargeisa will have been completed, salaries paid and food for prisoners supplied.~~ UNOSOM advisers will provide advice and supervision to detention facilities and prisons.

43. By 31 March 1994, if necessary, other prisons will have been re-established in other areas, including Bossaso and Kismayo.

2. Strategy

44. Humane treatment of prisoners is of the utmost concern.

45. UNOSOM will rehabilitate prison facilities in Mogadishu and Hargeisa and a juvenile detention centre in Mogadishu.

46. ~~UNOSOM will employ members of the old Custodial Corps to manage the prisons.~~ Initially, UNOSOM/International Concern will pay salaries for 1,000 members of the Custodial Corps: 400 in Mogadishu, 200 in Hargeisa, 200 in Bossaso and 200 in Kismayo. Salary levels will be calculated so they can be sustained by local revenues following UNOSOM's departure.

47. Custodial Corps personnel must fulfil the following conditions:

- (a) Have had two years' custodial experience prior to 26 January 1991;
- (b) Have committed no crime against the Somali people;
- (c) Have been vetted by senior Custodial Corps personnel.

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48. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will be requested to provide food for prisoners.
49. UNOSOM will supply an appropriate number of weapons for prison staff.
50. Upon request, UNOSOM military will back up external security when required.
51. UNOSOM prison advisers will give legal, penal and human rights assistance to prison officials located in their zones.
52. UNOSOM will ask the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations agencies (e.g. the World Health Organization) and NGOs (such as Amnesty International), to monitor conditions in the prisons and any human rights violations.

D. Investigation of violations of international humanitarian law

1. Objectives

53. In order further to meet the requirements of Security Council resolution 814 (1993), UNOSOM will establish an Office of Human Rights to "investigate and facilitate prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law".
54. By 15 August 1993, the UNOSOM Office of Human Rights will be staffed by a six-person investigation team from Member States and will, among other things, assist in the establishment of a local Somali human rights committee.
55. At its forty-ninth session, in February-March 1993, the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations recommended, and the Economic and Social Council, on 28 July 1993, approved, the appointment of an Independent Expert on Human Rights for Somalia. In addition to the Independent Expert's specific human rights function, the Expert could act as Ombudsman for police, judicial and prison issues.
56. By the end of 1993, ongoing investigations possibly will lead to the apprehension of several suspects in several major human rights cases. International justices will conduct trials in these human rights violation cases if Somali justices decline to hear cases as a result of threats or intimidation.

2. Strategy

57. The Security Council, in its resolution 814 (1993) enjoins UNOSOM to assist in the "restoration of peace, stability, law and order, including investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations".
58. UNOSOM will establish a team of international specialists which will investigate, in cooperation with the Somali police, human rights violations committed against the Somali people, as well as against international assistance workers. Such violations include mass murders of Somali citizens, murder, attempted murder and threats of bodily harm against international assistance workers and UNOSOM employees.

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59. UNOSOM will establish a central registry of murders, attempted murders, threats to security and crimes against property. The registry will maintain investigation files on each case.

60. UNOSOM will establish a property claims investigation team to deal with crimes involving: theft of money, looting and destruction of United Nations agencies, the offices and warehouses of NGOs; looting and destruction of Somali Government buildings, infrastructure, vehicles and other assets; looting and destruction of diplomatic missions. The team will decide whether a reported property crime comes under its jurisdiction. All property crimes not under the jurisdiction of the team will be directed to the Somali police for investigation.

61. ~~UNOSOM will encourage the Transitional National Council to establish a~~ property claims division as a special division of the regular Somali court system to deal with crimes against property committed from 26 January 1991 to the present. This division of the court should have the authority to punish perpetrators of property crimes in accordance with applicable Somali laws and should be enabled to order restitution of property, or payment of damages, or both. This initiative will build on the work accomplished by the committee for the peaceful resolution of property disputes.

62. UNOSOM will encourage international human rights groups to assist Somali human rights organizations with human and financial resources.

63. The estimated one-year cost of establishing an internationally staffed office for investigation and facilitating prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law is estimated at \$2,322,000. This office will be staffed under the peace-keeping budget and from international volunteers.

III. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

64. ~~The total cost of the disintegration of the reestablishment of the Somali~~ justice system is estimated at \$45,130,000 for the first year (see appendix). It needs to be emphasized that this is considered the minimum amount required to start the Somali justice system going so that it may take over as soon as possible from UNOSOM the function of maintaining law and order. If nations donate actual equipment, budget requirements will be reduced. When I submitted the addendum to my last report (S/25356/Add.1), a detailed assessment of the extent of the disintegration of the Somali justice system and the destruction of its infrastructures had not been made. At that time, I proposed a figure of \$5,900,000 needed just to continue the support of the 5,000-person Auxiliary Police Force to be inherited from UNITAF.

65. To implement this programme, UNOSOM will have international police management and advisory staff at UNOSOM headquarters, zone, sub-zone and district levels to ensure daily contact with Somali police down to the station level. UNOSOM will also have the required international expertise to assist the Somalis to re-establish their judiciary and prison systems and to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian law. I estimate that the international staff needed for this undertaking will cost \$10,308,000 per annum. These positions will be funded under the peace-keeping budget.

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67. Member States could contribute funding, equipment or training on either a nationwide or regional basis. If contributions are provided on a regional basis, UNOSOM would provide guidance to ensure inter-operability of equipment and to ensure a logical proportional balance of equipment and training based on the needs of the regions.

68. The overwhelming desire of the Somali people for the restoration of peace and law and order to their country and the eagerness of members of the former Somali police force and Custodial Corps, magistrates and judges who have resurfaced and offered their services to restore and re-establish their justice system have convinced me that the Somalis will respond positively and constructively to the assistance extended by the international community.

69. Successful police and justice systems in Somalia will cut the cost of peace-keeping operations as fewer military forces will be required to maintain security. In addition, with required basic infrastructures of the whole justice system rebuilt during the first year, significantly lower financial resources should be required during the second year to bring the system back to a level capable of maintaining internal security throughout the entire country.

70. The objectives of the UNOSOM humanitarian programme include assisting in the regeneration of the Somali economy and the re-establishment of its public finance system. There are indications that the Somali economy, at least the agriculture, livestock and lands sectors, have been relatively resilient in withstanding the civil war. It is expected, therefore, that the transitional national authority and regional authorities will be in a position to finance their newly re-established justice system as soon as their public finance system is restructured. It should be noted that the north-east region is financing its police force at a modest level substantially through revenue from the Bossaso port.

71. The full maintenance of internal security by the Somalis themselves would not only enable them to embark on their own rehabilitation, reconstruction and development process but, as I indicated in my previous report (S/25384, para. 86), would also render a substantial United Nations military presence no longer necessary. This modest expenditure to re-establish the Somali justice system would therefore enable a rapid reduction in the relatively large UNOSOM military expenditures. I consider, therefore, that this expenditure for the justice system is cost-effective.

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Appendix

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)

Summary of financial implications for one year of operation

in thousands of United States dollars


	<u>Main expenditure group</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>July 1993</u>	<u>Previous</u>	<u>1992</u>
1.	Personnel costs (compensation to Somali personnel)	16 848	1 644	1 045	19 537
2.	Renovation of premises	350	355	400	1 105
3.	Supplies, services and equipment	735	850	40	1 625
4.	Uniforms	1 500	-	200	1 700
5.	Vehicle operation	11 092	579	188	14 019
6.	Communications equipment	440	-	-	440
7.	Weapons	3 000	-	96	3 096
8.	Training	3 540	68	-	3 608
	Projected (gross) requirements	29 865	3 496	2 369	34 030

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1993

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the United Nations and the United States, approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

- o We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.

- o What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."

- o We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would

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send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 13, 1993.

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W H F A X R C I P T
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**

S/S #

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MESSAGE NO. 106774 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 1FROM: TASK FORCE: 3 S/S-O 647-1512 7516
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SITUATION REPORT: 19COUNTRY: SomaliaTO: (Agency)DELIVER TO:ExtensionRoom No.A CIA, FBISC NSC, WHSRD JCS, NMCC, SECDEFF NSA, NSOCG NMICI DOEK TREASURYM FEMACLEARANCE ☐INFORMATION ☒

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REMARKS: _____

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Somalia			
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☒ REED	BURNS		GEORGE
	BEYRLE		
☒ FUERTH	GOTTEMÖELLE	☒	CLARKE
☒ OVPSTAFF	FORSYTHE		BEERS
McLARTY			CANAS
	BELL	☒	RICE
SCHIFTER	ANDREASEN		SCHWARTZ
ROGNER	HAHN		WILSON
	JONES	☒	DARRACH
KRECKZO	WITKOWSKY		
WOLIN			TENET
	PONEMAN		KELLY
STEINBERG	HARRIS		WAGUESPAK
	AOKI		
INDYK	CLEMENTS		
SATTERFIELD			
LAIPTON	FAUVER	☒	SIGLER
	KYLE	☒	SDO
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CLAUSSEN	PUNKE		PEOC

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2012-0659-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	Situation Report No. 19 (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4135

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ No. Pages 1
FROM: TASK FORCE: _____ S/S-0 _____ 647-1512 _____ 7516
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SITUATION REPORT: #21
COUNTRY: Somalia

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

A CIA, FBIS

C NSC, WHSR

D JCS, NMCC, SECDEF

F NSA, NSOC

G NMIC

I DOE

K1 TREASURY

M FEMA

CLEARANCE ☐

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REMARKS: _____

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM		
SOMALIA		
☒ LAKE	☐ WALKER	☒ CLARKE
☒ BERGER	☐ FRIED	☐ BEERS
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☒ McLARTY	☐ FORSYTHE	
	☐ SANNER	☒ WARD
☐ KRECZKO		
☐ ROEMER	☐ BELL	☐ POMERAN
☐ STERNBERG	☐ ANDREASEN	☐ HARRIS
	☐ HAHN	☐ AOKI
☐ INDYK	☐ JONES	
☐ SATTERFIELD	☐ WITKOWSKY	☐ TENET
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☐ WIEDEMANN		
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☐ SAEED	☐ KYLE	☒ SIGLER
	☐ CLEMENTS	☒ SDO
☐ FENBERG	☐ WALSH	☐ COMBS
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006. report	Situation Report No. 21 (1 page)	10/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4135

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: DOE Date: 2012/09/16
2012-0659-F

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S/S #

'93 007 14 P6:23

MESSAGE NO. 106819 CLASSIFICATION Conf No. Pages 1
FROM: TASK FORCE: S/S-0 647-1512 7516
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SITUATION REPORT: 20

COUNTRY: Somalia

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

A CIA, FBIS

C NSC, WHSR

D JCS, NMCC, SECDEF

F NSA, NSOC

G NMIC

I DOE

K1 TREASURY

M FEMA

CLEARANCE ☐

REMARKS:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM		
Somalia		
☒ LAKE	☐ WALKER	☐ FEINBERG
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☒ KENNEY		☒ WARD
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007. report	Situation Report No. 20 (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4135

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 1993

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

10:21 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm sorry I am a little late, but I just finally got through to Ambassador Oakley, and I wanted to have a chance to speak with him directly for a couple of minutes before I came out here.

I also spoke with Mrs. Durant this morning to congratulate her and to wish her well. Obviously, she is very happy. She has now had an extended conversation with her husband. And he is, as you know, in a U.N. field hospital in Mogadishu. But he will be going to Germany as soon as the doctors say that he can travel. And then, as soon as possible, he'll be back home with his family and his friends.

I welcome his release, and I want to express my deepest thanks to the African leaders who pressed hard for it and to Bob Oakley, the International Red Cross, and to the United Nations, to all who have worked on this for the last several days.

Over the past week, since the United States announced its intention to strengthen our forces in Somalia, as well as to revitalize the diplomatic initiative and send Bob Oakley back, we have seen some hopeful actions -- the release of Michael Durant and the Nigerian peacekeeper, the cessation of attacks on the United States and U.N. peacekeepers. That demonstrates that we are moving in the right direction and that we are making progress.

Our firm position on holding Durant's captors responsible for his well-being and demanding his release, I think, send a strong message that was obviously heard. Now, we have to maintain our commitment to finishing the job we started. It's not our job to rebuild Somalia's society or its political structure. The Somalis have to do that for themselves. And I welcome the help of the African leaders who have expressed their commitment to working with us and with them.

But we have to give them enough time to have a chance to do that, to have a chance not to see the situation revert to the way it was before the United States and the United Nations intervened to prevent the tragedy late last year.

I want to also emphasize that we made no deals to secure the release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. We had strong resolve, we showed that we were willing to support the resumption of the peace process, and we showed that we were determined to protect our soldiers and to react when appropriate by strengthening our position there. I think the policy was plainly right. But there was no deal.

If you have any questions, I'll be glad to try to answer them.

Q Mr. President, there's still a \$25,000 bounty on Mr. Aideed. Would you still like to see Mr. Aideed arrested? Do you

MORE

think that's appropriate? And do you think that the United Nations now should release Mr. Aideed's forces that it's captured recently?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the first question. The United States position is that we have a U.N. resolution which says that there must be some resolution of the unconscionable incident which started this whole thing, which was the murder of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers who were not there in battle, but were simply there, doing the job that we all went there to do -- the humanitarian mission. I think that it's very important to remember that.

It is further our position that we cannot afford to have any police work that we were asked to do as part of the U.N. mission be transformed into a military endeavor that, in effect, made many people believe that there was no longer a diplomatic initiative going on in Somalia. So there still has to be some resolution of that. We have a U.N. resolution, and we ought to pursue it. Now, there may be other ways to do it, and I am open to that.

As far as the release of any people concerned, that will obviously be up to the United Nations. But they have to consider what our obligations are with regard to the murder of the Pakistani peacekeepers. That's what started this whole thing.

Q Mr. President, isn't it pretty clear, though, that he must have -- Aideed must have been given some immunity from arrest, because he talked to reporters? He seems to be pretty available. You don't seem to be laying a glove on him. Have you called off the dogs?

THE PRESIDENT: There was no deal made, I can tell you that. We have taken account of the behavior of others on the ground there, and we will continue to do that. But for the next few days, we have to work through what the resolution will be of the U.N. requirement that got us all into the position we were in last week, which is that we have to have some means of resolving what happened to the Pakistanis, who were clearly not in anybody's combat, were just doing their jobs. And we have to do it.

Q Well, do you hold him responsible?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have to -- he offered, if you remember, an independent commission to look into that. The United Nations asked the United States to attempt to arrest him and to go out of our way not to hurt him while arresting him because he was suspected of being responsible. So if he's willing to have somebody that we can all trust look into that, then that's something I think that Mr. Oakley is certainly willing to entertain over there.

Q Mr. President, despite your success today, there's been a lot of criticism that U.S. foreign policy has been run in naive and somewhat disorganized way. What's your response to that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can tell you first of all, I've had people who were involved in the two previous administrations say that our national security decision-making process was at least as good as the two in the previous ones, perhaps better. Secondly, I think on the things that really -- the biggest issues affecting the future and the security of the United States, we have a good record.

We have done very well with Russia, the most important issue. We have set up a system that did not exist before we came to office to deal with the other republics of the former Soviet Union and to work on nuclear issues and other issues. I think we have done quite well with the Middle East peace process and with its aftermath. I think we have done well to establish the groundwork of a new basis of a relationship with Japan and with Asia generally. We have certainly put nonproliferation on a higher plane than it was there

before. I think we did very well. We had the most successful -- the United States had the most successful meeting of the G-7 in over a decade. That was clear. The first time in 10 years we were complimented instead of criticized, making real progress there.

So I think that the people who say that because of what happened in Somalia last week have a pretty weak reed to stand on. And in terms of Haiti -- and maybe we can get to that -- there was -- when I took office, what we had was everybody in Haiti thinking about whether they could leave and come to the United States because they thought there was no way that anybody would ever stick up for the democratic process in Haiti; and the fact that two-thirds of the people voted for somebody to lead their country that was then ousted by the old regime. At least we have made an effort to try to change that. And I assure you that my determination there is as strong as ever.

So I think that -- it's easy to second-guess. When you get into something like Somalia, I think anybody who really thought about it at the time the decision was made, I supported it. I think it was the right thing to do. I think we went there for the right motives. But you had to know when we went there that there was -- that, a, that there was no way America was going to get out in January and because there was no political process in place there that could have given the Somalis a chance to survive; and, b, that there was every chance that someone, for their own reasons, at some point during this mission, might kill some peacekeepers, which would complicate the mission.

We are living in a new world. It's easy for people who don't have these responsibilities to use words like "naive" or this or that or the other thing. The truth is, we're living in a new and different world, and we've got to try to chart a course that is the right course for the United States to lead, while avoiding things that we cannot do, or things that impose cost in human and financial terms that are unacceptable for us. But I think that in this new world, we've made a pretty good beginning, and clearly on the things that affect us most.

Q Mr. President, you were very clear last week in saying that you did not want your reaction to events in Somalia to be the wrong signal to the world's thugs and bullies. I wonder, sir, if it occurs to you that the events of Haiti may indicate that that signal was sent anyway?

THE PRESIDENT: No. The problem we had in Haiti with the boat was that we sent 200 Seabees over there who were commissioned specifically to train military officers to do more work to rebuild the country. They were lightly armed, they were not in any way -- they were not peacekeepers or peacemakers.

I would remind you that the Governors Island agreement basically was an agreement among all the major parties in Haiti which clearly set forth the fact that they did not want other countries' forces or a U.N. force coming in there to provide law and order. They wanted French-speaking forces to come in and retrain the police force. They wanted French-speaking Canadians and the United States to come in and retrain the Army to rebuild the country.

So those people were simply not able or ever authorized to pursue any mission other than that. I was not about to put 200 American Seabees into a potentially dangerous situation for which they were neither trained nor armed to deal with at that moment. And I did not want to leave the boat in the harbor so that that became the symbol of the debate. I pulled the boat out of the harbor to emphasize that the Haitian parties themselves who were still there in Haiti are responsible for violating the Governors Island Agreement. We moved immediately to reimpose sanctions to include oil. We are

going to do some more things unilaterally in the next day or two. And I think that we still have a chance to get this done. Because the people who were there who don't want to give up power agreed to the Governors Island Agreement, and we're going to do our best to hold them to it.

Q You don't think that those thugs on the dock there in Haiti were encouraged by the events in Somalia, to try what they tried?

THE PRESIDENT: They may or may not have been, but they're going to be sadly disappointed. I think those people on the docks in Haiti were probably the hired hands of the elites that don't want democracy to come to Haiti. So I don't they had drawn any sophisticated interpretation from world events. But if they did, they ought to look at what else has happened in Somalia. Look at the way we have bolstered our forces. Look at the reports in the newspaper today.

What we've done in Somalia -- let me go back to that -- is consistent with our original mission. We did not go there to prove we could win military battles. No one seriously questions the fact that we could clean out that whole section of Mogadishu at minimum loss to ourselves if that's what we wanted to do.

The reports today say that 300 Somalis were killed and 700 more were wounded in the firefight that cost our people their lives last week. That is not our mission. We did not go there to do that. We cannot let a charge we got under a U.N. resolution to do some police work, which is essentially what it is, to arrest suspects turn into a military mission. But the people in Haiti would be sadly misguided if they think the United States has weakened its resolve to see that democracy -- the expressed will of two-thirds of the people of Haiti.

I noticed Congressman Kennedy on the television this morning saying that President Aristide won an election victory with a higher percentage of the vote than any leader in the Western Hemisphere. And he can't even get into office. We're going to try to change that.

Let me just make one other comment about Haiti. This is very important to me. In addition to President Aristide, there is a government that has been struggling mightily to function in Haiti, headed by Prime Minister Malval, a businessperson, a person who basically did not ask for the responsibilities that he has undertaken. I want to send a clear signal today, too, that the United States is very concerned about his ability to function and his personal safety and the safety of his government. That is very important to us. Malval is key to making this whole thing work. He is recognized as a stabilizing figure, as a person who will work with all sides, as a person who will be fair to everybody. And it would be again a grave error to underestimate the extent to which this country regards him as an important part of the ultimate solution.

Q Mr. President, I'd like to go back to what you said about Aideed, because it appears that you've opened the door to leave him a way out this morning, when you said that we have to take into account what others did on the ground there. Do you think there's a possibility that Aideed was not directly responsible for the attack on the Pakistani U.N. forces? And do you believe there's also a possibility that Aideed could now become part of the political process and indeed may someday become president?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me answer the questions somewhat separately. First of all, to take the second question. What happened over the last several weeks -- and let me back up and say -- I understood why the United States was thought to have the

only capacity to pursue the police function, once the Pakistanis were killed. But keep in mind what that function was. That function was to arrest people suspected of being involved in that, not to be judge and jury, not to say we know exactly what happened, not to find people guilty in advance.

So our young soldiers, at significant risk to themselves, went out of their way to capture people without killing them. As a consequence, however, because of the circumstances, as we all know, several of them lost their lives and hundreds of Somalis who were fighting them, either with weapons or by getting in their way, lost their lives.

Now, that never should have been allowed to supplant -- as I said at the United Nations, before this incident occurred -- that never should have been allowed to supplant the political process that was ongoing when we were in effective control up through last May.

So we had to start the political process again. We have no interest in keeping any clan or subclan or group of Somalis out of the political process affecting the future of their people. The clan structure seems to be the dominant structure in the country. It is not for the United States or for the United Nations to eliminate whole groups of people from having a role in Somalia's future. The Somalis must decide that with the help and guidance, I believe primarily, of the African states and leadership around them, first of all.

Secondly, with regard to the specific incident, what I want to do is to see the U.N. resolution honored. That is, we want to know that there is some effort, honest, unencumbered effort, to investigate what happened to those Pakistanis and to have some resolution of that, consistent with international law. We cannot expect the United Nations to go around the world, whether it's in Cambodia or Somalia, or any of the many other places we're involved in peacekeeping, and have people killed and have no resolution of it.

Aideed, himself, as you know, offered in a letter to President Carter to have a genuinely unbiased commission look into this and have evidence presented to it. The United Nations may choose to take a different course in this, but we should honor the resolution. That is, you asked me a question about Aideed, personally. I can't answer that. I can say that I believe in the strongest terms that the United States should continue to say, if you want us to be involved in peacekeeping, if peacekeepers get murdered doing their job, the way the Pakistanis did, and others, there has to be an effort to look into who did it and to hold those accountable.

If there is another way to do that, that's fine. What I said at the U.N., I will reiterate: The United States, being a police officer in Somalia, was turned into the waging of conflict and a highly personalized battle which undermined the political process. That is what was wrong, and that is what we have attempted to correct in the last few days.

Q Mr. President, your statement reassuring Prime Minister Malval of Haiti about his personal security raises the question, of course: Is there a threat to his personal security, and what happens if something happens to Prime Minister Malval?

THE PRESIDENT: If something happens to him, it would be a very difficult situation for the Haitians. It would make President Aristide's job more difficult, and it would further isolate the military and police authorities there, and the people who are sponsoring them from the international community. I hope that he is not in danger. I do not have any information that he is in imminent danger. He's continuing to function, but if you know how he works

down there, I mean, he has very limited security, he does a lot of work out of his home, he has not constructed a military apparatus around himself. He really is a good citizen serving his country, and he is a necessary part of the glue that would permit President Aristide to go back down there.

Keep in mind, Aristide gave these people amnesty. The truth is, a lot of them never thought he'd do it. I know -- there are people who have criticized Aristide, who say that, you know, maybe he's not really a political person, can't do this. All I know is that in our dealings with him, he has done what he said he would do. And I think they were disoriented by the fact that he issued the amnesty order when they didn't think he would. And I am genuinely concerned that the forces in Haiti -- let me back up and say -- they signed off on the Governors Island agreement because they realized that the sanctions were having a crushing blow on them. And in the end, they and the people who were funding a lot of their activities understood that it was going to cost them more to stay with the present course than to permit this transition to democracy.

And what we're trying to do now -- our policy clearly is to remind them of why they signed off in the first place in the most forceful terms and to make it absolutely clear that no one in the international community is going to walk away from our previous policy toward Haiti if they don't honor their commitments under that agreement.

Q Mr. President, would your experiences this month in Somalia and Haiti make you more cautious about sending American peacekeepers to Bosnia?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, my experiences in Somalia would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command with direct accountability to the United States here.

Now, to be fair, our troops in Somalia were under an American commander. And even though General Bir was the overall commander, it was clear always that General Hoar, here in the United States, was the commanding officer of General Montgomery. But because we got a general charge from the U.N. to try to arrest people suspected of being involved in the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, not every tactical decision had to be cleared here through General Hoar.

What I've made clear all along, the reason I've said that I thought that any Bosnian operation would have to be operated through NATO -- the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is an American general that talks every day to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that works in very clear cooperation with the other NATO forces. They have drilled together. They have trained together. They have trained together. They have worked together. It is a much more coherent military operation. And I would have a far higher level of confidence about not only the safety of our troops, but our ability to deal with that as a NATO operation. It's a whole different issue, Bosnia, but I would have much higher level of confidence there.

With the U.N. -- let me just say, to go back to the U.N. -- I still believe that U.N. peacekeeping is important. And I still believe that America can play a role in that. But when you're talking about resolving longstanding political disputes, the United States as the world's only superpower is no more able to do that for other people than we were 30 years ago, or 20 years ago.

That's why if you go back and look at Somalia, what's going to happen here, and compare it to what the U.N. did in Cambodia, where the U.N. went into Cambodia first of all with this

theory about what they had to do to or with the Khmer Rouge, and then they moved away from any kind of military approach and sent a lot of very brave peacekeepers, none of whom were Americans and some of whom lost their lives -- Japanese and others -- they worked through the politics of Cambodia by, in effect, creating a process in which the local people had to take responsibility for their own future. If we are going to do that kind of work, we ought to take the Cambodian model in Somalia and everywhere else.

Where we have to do peacekeeping, if we're going to do that in a unified command, even if the Americans are always under American forces, we have got to make the kind of changes in the United Nations that I advocated in my speech to the U.N. We have got to have that international peacekeeping apparatus far better organized than it is now. And if you go back to the U.N. speech, it receives little notice because of the momentary and important crises in Somalia and elsewhere. But the reorganization of the peacekeeping apparatus of the U.N. is an urgent mission because keep in mind, the U.N. peacekeepers with no American soldiers there are involved all over the world now, and they have done an awful lot of good work. But we plainly have to reorganize that and strengthen that. Got to go. Thank you.

Q Would you support the blockade in Haiti, President Clinton? Would you support a blockade?

THE PRESIDENT: I support strongly enforcing the sanctions and -- I want to answer that. I support strongly enforcing these sanctions -- strongly. And over the next few days we will be announcing the form in which the sanctions enforcement will take place.

Thank you.

Q Is that a yes or a no?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the word "blockade" is a term of art in international law, which is associated with a declaration of war, so I have to --

Q How about patrols?

THE PRESIDENT: I have to be careful in using that word, but I think that we have to enforce the sanctions.

END

10:44 A.M. EDT

1199



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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TRANSMISSION NUMBER: 202-395-5691

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TO:

Sean Darragh (x1492)

FROM:

Annette Rooney (x7300)

NOTE:

Per your request, Peter Tarnoff's
testimony. We received a draft
of this testimony last night at
6:45 & this final this morning.
The hearing was at 10:00 this
morning.

NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW:

6 + cover

DATE:

10/19

TIME:

1035

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE DIVISION
ROOM 7230
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

TESTIMONY OF UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

PETER TARNOFF

BEFORE

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

OCTOBER 19, 1993

U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

I. INTRODUCTION

GOOD MORNING, MR. CHAIRMAN. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA.

THIS COMMITTEE, THIS CONGRESS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REQUIRE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S GOALS AND MISSIONS IN SOMALIA, HOW OUR EFFORTS RELATE TO THE UN'S ROLE, AND WHY WE BELIEVE OUR STRATEGY IS SOUND.

I WANT TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THIS EXPLANATION AND ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS. MY COLLEAGUE, WALTER SLOCOMBE FROM THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CAN ADDRESS YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE, SIZE AND PLAN FOR RETURN OF OUR MILITARY FORCES FROM SOMALIA.

II. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

OUR GOALS IN SOMALIA ARE HUMANITARIAN. WE SEEK TO SUPPORT UNOSOM IN ITS EFFORTS TO HELP THE SOMALI PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES IN FASHIONING A LASTING POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THEIR CIVIL CONFLICT, AND TO PRODUCE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT TO ENABLE THE FREE FLOW OF HUMANITARIAN AID.

WE BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT THESE GOALS ARE WORTHY, AND THAT THEY SERVE AMERICA'S INTERESTS. OUR COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS IS FIRM, BUT IT IS NOT OPEN ENDED. DESPITE THE INTENSE FOCUS ON SOUTH MOGADISHU, REMARKABLE PROGRESS TOWARDS ENDING THE FAMINE AND FOSTERING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL HAS BEEN MADE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE REINVIGORATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT, AND REPORTED TO CONGRESS ON OCTOBER 13, WILL PRESERVE THESE GAINS AND FULFILL U.S. OBJECTIVES BY MARCH 31, 1994.

III. THE U.S. ROLE/THE UN MISSION

IN DETERMINING OUR GOALS AND MISSIONS, WE HAVE DESCRIBED BOTH THE MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MISSION OF UNITED STATES FORCES. THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY THE 27 GOVERNMENTS WITH FORCES IN SOMALIA, HAS TAKEN ON A BROAD MISSION IN UNOSOM II -- TO HELP SOMALIA DEVELOP BASIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING A JUDICIARY AND POLICE FORCE SO SOMALIS CAN KEEP ORDER IN THEIR COUNTRY AND PREVENT A RETURN TO THE CHAOS AND FAMINE WHICH CAUSED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INTERVENE LAST YEAR.

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HAVING LED THE FIRST PHASE OF THE UN MISSION BY PROVIDING THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE FORCES FOR THE UNITAF OPERATION, THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO UNOSOM II NOW IS MORE LIMITED.

- WE ARE PROVIDING MILITARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO UN FORCES SO THEY CAN MAINTAIN ORDER IN SOMALIA. THESE LOGISTICAL TROOPS ARE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE UN FORCE COMMAND.
- WE ARE PROVIDING AN INTERIM FORCE PROTECTION SUPPLEMENT, THE QUICK REACTION FORCE, TO UN FORCES TO DEAL WITH EMERGENCIES. ALL U.S. COMBAT FORCES ARE UNDER U.S. OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND ALL U.S. FORCES ARE UNDER U.S. COMMAND.
- WE ARE HELPING ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION -- WHICH WILL COME FROM AFRICAN LEADERS SUCH AS PRESIDENTS MELES OF ETHIOPIA AND ISSAIAS OF ERITREA WORKING WITH SOMALI LEADERS -- BY DISPATCHING AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY TO THE REGION TO HELP THE UN ENCOURAGE THIS PROCESS.
- WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY PRESENCE UNTIL MARCH 31, 1994 AFTER WHICH WE WILL LEAVE SEVERAL HUNDRED NON-COMBAT ADVISERS IN SOMALIA.

IN ESSENCE, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE ARE PROVIDING THE UN WITH SUPPORT FOR A TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS AND NON-U.S. FORCES AND ASSISTANCE IN ACCELERATING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. WE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THESE GOALS BY MARCH 31, 1994. THIS TIMEFRAME IS NECESSARY TO ALLOW FOR A SMOOTH TURNOVER OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ADEQUATE TO SIGNAL TO THE SOMALIS THAT THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION INTO THEIR OWN HANDS -- WHILE ENJOYING THE PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- IS FINITE.

IV. THE AMERICAN STRATEGY

WE BELIEVE OUR STRATEGY IS SOUND BECAUSE IT PROTECTS OUR PEOPLE, PROTECTS THE GAINS OF THE MISSION SO FAR AND, FRANKLY, PROTECTS OUR INTERESTS AS A WORLD LEADER.

IT HAS TWO PRIMARY COMPONENTS: FIRST, TEMPORARILY STRENGTHENING OUR MILITARY POSTURE SO WE FULFILL OUR TRANSITION ROLE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH; AND SECOND, REFOCUSING UNOSOM'S EFFORTS ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

A POSITION OF STRENGTH

THE PRESIDENT RECENTLY ORDERED ADDITIONAL ARMY COMBAT PERSONNEL AND ADDITIONAL ARMORED VEHICLES TO SOMALIA. THIS WILL ALLOW US TO COMPLETE OUR MISSION IN SOMALIA FROM A POINT

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

- 3 -

OF STRENGTH AND SAFETY. OUR TROOPS WILL BE SUPPORTED OFFSHORE BY AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND TWO MARINE AMPHIBIOUS GROUPS, ALL UNDER AMERICAN COMMAND.

THEIR MISSION IS FIRST AND FOREMOST TO PROTECT AMERICAN TROOPS IN SOMALIA.

SECOND, THEY ARE TO KEEP OPEN AND SECURE THE ROADS, THE PORT, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE UN AND RELIEF WORKERS TO KEEP THE FLOW OF FOOD, SUPPLIES, AND PEOPLE MOVING FREELY THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.

THIRD, THEY ARE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THOSE THAT THREATEN TO CUT OFF RELIEF ASSISTANCE AND ATTACK OUR PEOPLE.

FOURTH, OUR TROOPS, ALONG WITH FORCES FROM 30 OTHER COUNTRIES, WILL HELP TO RESTORE ORDER AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR SOMALIS TO WORK TOGETHER TO RESOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS.

THEY WILL PROTECT OUR FORCES, BUT ALSO PROTECT THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF OUR PRESENCE IN SOMALIA. WE MUST RECALL THAT THANKS TO THE U.S.-LED RELIEF EFFORT, STARVATION IN SOMALIA HAS VIRTUALLY CEASED AND LIFE IS RETURNING TO NORMAL IN MANY AREAS ALTHOUGH MILLIONS OF SOMALIS STILL DEPEND ON RELIEF SUPPLIES TO SURVIVE. CROPS ARE GROWING, TENS-OF-THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN ARE BEING INOCULATED, AND MARKETS ARE OPENING IN MOST OF THE COUNTRY.

REFOCUSING ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

MR. CHAIRMAN, WE BELIEVE THE ONLY LASTING SOLUTION TO SOMALIA'S PROBLEMS IS A POLITICAL ONE. AS WE UNDERSTOOD WHEN WE SUPPORTED THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE, THERE MUST BE A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT ALLOWS SOMALIS TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO BEGIN TO REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY. THIS EMPHASIS WAS NEGLECTED DURING THE MILITARY EFFORT TO RESPOND TO THE BRUTAL ATTACK ON THE PAKISTANI PEACEKEEPERS LAST JUNE BUT THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE CORRECTION IS DESIGNED TO PUT THIS EFFORT FRONT AND CENTER. THE UN UNDERSTANDS OUR VIEW AND SUPPORTS OUR POSITION.

THE PROCESS OF REVIVING THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION BEGAN LAST WEEK. AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, WHO SERVED AS THE SPECIAL ENVOY TO SOMALIA FROM DECEMBER 1992 UNTIL MAY 1993, HAS TRAVELLED TO THE REGION AND CONSULTED WITH REGIONAL LEADERS. DURING THE OCTOBER 10-14 PERIOD, AMBASSADOR OAKLEY SPOKE TO PRESIDENT ISSAIAS OF ERITREA, OAU SECRETARY-GENERAL SALIM SALIM, ETHIOPIAN PRESIDENT MELES, AND HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH UNOSOM OFFICIALS AND SOMALIS REPRESENTING THE AIDED AND ALI MAHDI FACTIONS IN MOGADISHU.

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- 4 -

PRESIDENTS MELES AND ISSAIAS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ARE WILLING TO ASSUME AN ACTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING TOGETHER THE DIFFERENT SOMALI FACTIONS AND OTHER REGIONAL LEADERS TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT.

WE HAVE ALREADY TO BEGUN TO SEE THIS EMPHASIS BEAR FRUIT.

- REGIONAL AFRICAN LEADERS ARE FULLY ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO KEEP THE PEACE AND ENCOURAGE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN SOMALIA.
- THE INFORMAL CEASE FIRE HAS HELD UP IN MOGADISHU FOR MORE THAN A WEEK.
- GENERAL AIDEED'S MILITIA HAVE REMOVED A NUMBER OF THE BARRICADES ON ROADS IN SOUTH MOGADISHU. MOST IMPORTANT, AIDEED'S FORCES RELEASED UNCONDITIONALLY THE TWO UNOSOM DETAINEES THEY WERE HOLDING -- AMERICAN CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER DURANT AND NIGERIAN PRIVATE SHANKALI.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WE WILL ALSO ENSURE THAT THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE FOR THE MURDERED PEACEKEEPERS ARE SERVED AS WELL. WE ARE WORKING WITH UNOSOM, THROUGH AMBASSADOR OAKLEY, TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO COMPLETE THE NECESSARY INQUIRIES INTO THE EVENTS OF JUNE 5, 1993 IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. HOWEVER, UNOSOM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT JUSTICE IS DONE. IT IS NOT THE MISSION OF U.S. FORCES TO ACT AS A POLICE FORCE IN SOMALIA.

V. A SOUND STRATEGY

THERE ARE SOME AMERICANS WHO BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SOMALIA IMMEDIATELY. WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE WRONG -- WRONG FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS AND WRONG FOR AMERICAN VALUES. WE BELIEVE OUR PLAN IS THE RIGHT ONE -- BECAUSE IT PROTECTS OUR PEOPLE, PRESERVES THE HUMANITARIAN GAINS OF TWO ADMINISTRATIONS AND PROJECTS AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AS IT SHOULD -- WITH AMERICA ACTING AS A RELIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE LEADER AND PARTNER. WE BELIEVE THE SENATE'S VOTE IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN.

- OUR PLAN PROTECTS U.S. FORCES THROUGH OUR ENHANCED DEPLOYMENT.
- BY ALLOWING A REASONABLE TIME FOR A POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRANSITION, WE CAN FULFILL OUR MISSION AND PRESERVE THE HUMANITARIAN GAINS OF TWO ADMINISTRATIONS. A PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE COLLAPSE OF THE UNOSOM MISSION AND DEVALUE THE BRAVE EFFORTS OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOMALIA TO DATE.

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- 5 -

- OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS A WORLD LEADER, AS A POWER WITH FORCES DEPLOYED IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND AS A PROPONENT OF THE VIEW THAT OTHER NATIONS MUST SHARE THE BURDENS OF RELIEVING HUMANITARIAN DISTRESS ARE PROTECTED AS WELL:

- FIRST, BECAUSE WE KEEP OUR WORD TO THOSE ALLIES WHO CAME TO SOMALIA BECAUSE WE ASKED THEM TO JOIN US. IF WE ABANDON THOSE WHO TRUSTED US, WE WOULD RAISE SERIOUS DOUBTS IN THE MINDS OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES AROUND THE WORLD.
- SECOND, BY MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENT AS A DETERRENT TO THOSE WHO OPPOSE OUR POLICIES. BY BOLSTERING OUR MILITARY PRESENCE TO PROTECT OUR TROOPS WE SHOW THE AGGRESSORS AND TERRORISTS OF THE WORLD THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT STATED, YOU CANNOT CHANGE OUR POLICY BY KILLING OUR PEOPLE.
- THIRD, BY PLAYING A RESPONSIBLE, ALBEIT LIMITED, ROLE IN UNOSOM'S MISSION, WE SHOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT WE WILL PLAY OUR PART IN COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO RELIEVE HUMANITARIAN DISTRESS, AND HELP OTHERS TO DO THE SAME, BUT THAT OUR COMMITMENTS AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT OPEN ENDED.

VI. CONCLUSION

WE STARTED THIS MISSION, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, "FOR THE RIGHT REASONS, AND WE INTEND TO FINISH IT IN THE RIGHT WAY." THIS A COMMITMENT TO FINISH OUR MISSION RESPONSIBLY AND TO BRING OUR TROOPS HOME SAFELY AND ON TIME.

IN ORDER FOR OUR POLICY AND OUR SOLDIERS TO SUCCEED WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

LET US -- THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION -- WORK TOGETHER TO BRING OUR TROOPS HOME IN A WAY THAT HONORS OUR COMMITMENTS AND ACCOMPLISHES OUR IMPORTANT MISSION. WITH YOUR SUPPORT WE CAN REMOVE ALL OF OUR COMBAT TROOPS BY MARCH 31 AND LEAVE BEHIND A SOMALIA WHERE STARVATION HAS ENDED AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION CAN BE WELL ADVANCED.

THANK YOU.

*DONOT INCLUDE
USA*

ANNEX IV

UNOSOM FORCE CONTRIBUTORS
(as of October 6, 1993)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>	<u>Type of Forces</u>	<u>Location</u>
Australia	30	Log Staff	Mogadishu
Bangladesh	948	Inf/Sig	Mogadishu
Belgium	952	Infantry	Kismayu
Botswana	247	Infantry	Bardera
Canada	4	Staff	Mogadishu
Egypt	539	Infantry	Mogadishu
France	1117	Infantry	Oddur
Germany	1727	Eng/Log	Belet Uen
Greece	110	Med/Log	Wajid
India	3606	Inf/Log	Belet Uen
Ireland	80	Trans	Mogadishu
Italy	2663	Infantry	Gialalasi
Korea	250	Infantry	Mogadishu
Kuwait	138	Infantry	Mogadishu
Malaysia	870	Inf/MP	Mogadishu
Morocco	950	Infantry	Baledogle
New Zealand	43	Air Trans	Mogadishu
Nigeria	614	Infantry	Belet Uen
Norway	130	HQ staff	Mogadishu
Pakistan	5003	Infantry	Mogadishu
Romania	236	Fld Hosp	Mogadishu
Saudi Arabia	678	Infantry	Mogadishu
South Korea	252	Engineer	Mogadishu
Sweden	148	Medical	Mogadishu
Tunisia	142	Infantry	Mogadishu
Turkey	320	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.A.E.	663	Infantry	Mogadishu
U.S.A.	2781	Log	Mogadishu
<u>Zimbabwe</u>	<u>894</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Baidoa</u>
Force HQ	297		
Prvt Mrshl	143		
SSG	<u>63</u>		
Subtotal	26,645		
U.S. QRF	1,358		
U.S. Rangers	<u>600</u>		
Total	28,603		

UNCLASSIFIED

FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

International Programs

FROM: Susan Rice

PHONE: (202) 395-3736/37

FAX: (202) 395-1199

PRIORITY

DATE SENT: 12 OCT 73

TO

FAX**PHONE**

(703)

Ann Montgomery (908) 448-9782

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4135

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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
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009. map	Somalia: Deployment of Coalition Forces (1 page)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
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
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UNITAF

UNOSOM II TROOP FLOW DECEMBER '92 - OCTOBER '93



Unit
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