

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Somalia, 1993 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Rice, Susan

Original OA/ID Number:

277

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	5	1	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Mogadishu and Kismayo Disturbances - Roadblocks to Peace? (3 pages)	02/24/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Oakley's Last Visit with Aideed (3 pages)	03/01/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: UNOSOM II Commander's Visit to Somalia (3 pages)	03/03/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Issues Affecting Release of SYG Somalia Report, and UN Support for Interim Police (2 pages)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: Mogadishu in Turmoil February 24-25 (4 pages)	02/25/1993	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: UN Says Somalia Report Will Not Be Changed or Delayed by Recent Disturbances in Mogadishu (2 pages)	02/25/1993	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: German Participation in UNOSOM II (2 pages)	02/25/1993	P1/b(1)
008. email	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, et al., re: somalia: mini-crisis (2 pages)	02/24/1993	P1/b(1)
009. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	02/24/1993	P1/b(1)
010. report	Situation Report No. 114 (1 page)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
011. memo	Re: Problems in Somalia (1 page)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F

ke4133

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

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Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AF/E, AF/RA, AF/EPsF A X C O V E R S H E E T

DATE:

03.12.93

Page

1 of 7

TO:

James Carman

OFFICE:

Office of the Vice President Rm 29

PHONE:

395-6033

FAX #:

395-6042 OEOB

FROM:

AF/E: Bruce E. Thomas~~OFFICE:~~STATE

PHONE #:

647-6453

FAX #:

647-0810

SUBJECT:

Per your reqt, docs for
V.P.'s mtg w/ Amb. Oakley
Call if more is required

Marty Chesser

P. Office

* Distinguished
Public Service Award2 weeks
ago...Award — Gen. Johnston
in Mog. (Aspin was
going to bring)

Regards,
Bruce

State Dept's Distinguished Service Award — Warton
Highest — Winner to grant
Eagleberger signed



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. James Carman
Assistant to the Vice President for
Political Affairs

FROM: AF/E - Martin L. Cheshes

SUBJECT: Material for Vice President Gore's Meeting with
- Former U.S. Special Envoy for Somalia Robert Oakley

Jim:

You will find attached the background material requested for Vice President Gore's meeting with Ambassador Bob Oakley on March 16. Included are suggested topics for the discussion on Somalia; a brief list of Ambassador Oakley's accomplishments as U.S. Special Envoy; and a copy of Bob's bio.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Attachments: As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

- This meeting is an opportunity for Vice President Gore to hear Oakley's assessment of the current situation in Somalia and his prognosis for future U.N. and U.S. efforts there.
- The UNITAF/UNOSOM II Transition
 - Key members of Congress are skeptical of the U.N.'s wherewithal to attract sufficient troops for UNOSOM II and fund it adequately. They are concerned that the U.S. military is in for a protracted stay in Somalia and that U.S. taxpayers will foot the bill.
 - On the other hand, Ambassador Oakley is optimistic about developments in Somalia. He anticipates that the transition from the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the U.N. peace-enforcement/peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM II) will go smoothly. The UNOSOM II Commander, Turkish General Cevik Bir, is expected to return to Mogadishu March 15. Work is now well underway to set up and staff UNOSOM II's headquarters.
 - More than 20 countries have offered approximately 21,000 troops for UNOSOM II. Several of the foreign units in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), most of which are also slated for duty in UNOSOM II, have already distinguished themselves. Among these are the Belgians, Australians, Botswanans, Canadians, French, Italians and Zimbabweans. This bodes well for effective UNOSOM II security operations.
 - The next immediate step is to have the U.N. Security Council adopt a resolution authorizing UNOSOM II. We expect this to happen by the close of next week. The administrative hand-off from UNITAF to UNOSOM II is tentatively scheduled to begin May 1.
 - We are waiting to see a preliminary budget for the UNOSOM II forces. The figures are likely to be significant, and even our share of 30.4 percent will be considerable.
 - UNITAF has largely succeeded in creating an environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance in the south and central regions of Somalia. UNITAF's insistence on the implementation of cease-fire and disarmament agreements has also reduced the effectiveness of military power as a political instrument between Somalis.
 - UNOSOM II must continue this process of marginalizing the warlords, which permits legitimate local and regional organizations to assert themselves politically. UNOSOM II will expand its operations to include the northern region of Somalia, which has been spared from famine and wide-scale violence.

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- UNOSOM II's prospective deployment to the northwest could encounter local opposition. It should be done without prejudice to the self-declared independence of the "Somaliland Republic."

- Objectives of the Relief and Reconciliation Conferences

- Both the March 11-13 Humanitarian Assistance Conference and the subsequent March 15-30 Preliminary Reconciliation Conference in Addis Ababa can serve to reinforce the leadership roles of women, intellectuals, elders and professionals in resolving the Somali crisis.
- Somalis must take charge of their own affairs and we, together with the U.N., can help promote this process.
- The conferences provide an opportunity to enhance cooperation with the Somalis on a coordinated relief, security, rehabilitation and reconciliation strategy.
- The focus will be on our preferred strategy for political reconciliation in Somalia which is to begin institution building from the "bottom up" through local and regional organizations.

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Ambassador Oakley's Accomplishments

- Ambassador Oakley's tenure as U.S. Special Envoy for Somalia was distinguished by his leadership, dedication, courage and professionalism.
- He performed superbly in coordinating U.S. policy in Somalia with U.N. initiatives on security, humanitarian relief and political reconciliation.
- His close cooperation with the command of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) contributed immeasurably to UNITAF's significant progress toward creating a secure environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance in the famine-wracked southern and central regions of Somalia.
- Indeed, Ambassador Oakley almost single-handedly paved the way for the peaceful deployment of UNITAF forces through early and constructive consultations with the leaders of Somalia's armed factions.
- Working with the U.N.'s Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Ismat Kittani, Ambassador Oakley successfully pursued initiatives leading to a dialogue between the major factional leaders in Mogadishu. This, in turn, led to the opening of political discussions among all major Somali factions.
- As a consequence, 15 factional leaders met in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and concluded an agreement for a cease-fire, the disarming of their respective militias, and the demobilization of these forces.
- This agreement has made it possible for a broad-range of groups to emerge and assert themselves politically, resulting in the beginnings of a vibrant political dialogue in Somalia.
- Ambassador Oakley's performance in Somalia exemplifies the highest traditions of American diplomacy.

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Somalia Resolution:

- Resolution is still being worked through P-5
- consultations now being expanded to all 15 (2-3 days)
- Goal = end of week, v. early next week

Problems

- Russia = difficulties w/ assessed contribution
- France = Ch. 7; don't want it applied to whole mandate
fears it will exclude Germany
- China has technical problem w/ Ch. 7,
want to work on US draft, but leaning
toward French proposal.

UNSC Draft
must not exceed UN Charter mandate
⇒ nation-building component
- Rule has changed

Justified = enough problems in
draft ... not dead certain

Russia - want to wait to outcome of Addis
Conf. before entering into level of detail
- cast in context of Addis Conf.

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→ SUSAN
→ RANDY
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

*International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program*

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20530

March 31, 1993

Ms. Ann Wright
Action Officer
Somalia Task Force
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ms. Wright:

The attached report on the Auxiliary Security Forces of Somalia is being submitted as requested and pursuant to an in-country assessment by the ICITAP team of Patrick Lang and Donald Havekost, March 5-10, 1993.

Sincerely,

David J. Kriskovich
Director

Enclosure

cc: Mr. John Rogovin
Office of the Attorney General

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EVALUATION OF THE ASF SOMALIA

MARCH 5 - 10, 1993

PATRICK H. LANG and DONALD G. HAVEKOST

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ICITAP

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Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

Purpose

This document reports the findings from a survey of the Auxiliary Security Forces (ASF) of Somalia, conducted from March 5 - 10, 1993, through first-hand observation and interviews with UNITAF, UNOSOM, and USG officials as well as Somali individuals involved with ASF activities. This effort attempted to:

- (1) Assess the nature and quality of law enforcement service currently being provided by ASF and, in so doing,
 - Identify the nature of responsibilities now undertaken by ASF and their appropriateness in the context of a civilian law enforcement mission;
 - Assess ASF capabilities given its organization and resource levels.
- (2) Assess the viability of the ASF as an interim law enforcement resource for Somalia which could facilitate the eventual transfer of responsibility for public order matters from international entities to a defined permanent law enforcement authority capable of meeting Somalia's basic public safety requirements.
- (3) Evaluate the ASF as a foundation upon which to base a comprehensive long-term law enforcement development effort, including the level and quality of existing human and other resources to draw from for a long-term effort.

Current Public Safety Environment

The current public safety environment in the UNITAF Zone of Control in Somalia reflects the impact of years of a corrupt dictatorship, civil war, complete collapse of all governmental institutions, and the emergence of heavily-armed criminal organizations intent on establishing and maintaining control by force, violence, extortion, and intimidation. With the December 1992 international intervention in Somalia the objective has been to marginalize the influences of these criminal elements and try to establish an environment wherein Somali public safety requirements eventually can begin to be met through civilian-type law enforcement institutional approaches, with respect for the law and human rights.

The international forces have been successful in the first stages of achieving a basic level of public order which permits the humanitarian relief programs to go forward. The fact remains, however, that there are no governmental Somali institutions in

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existence which can be called upon to participate in the effort to provide for public safety. The only Somali resource which has become available and which has a potential to contribute to meeting Somalia's public order and safety requirements is the unofficial element known as the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF), which began to come into existence in late December of 1992 and is derived completely from elements of Somalia's former National Police force. The ASF numbers approximately 4,000 and appears to generally retain the favorable reputation reportedly enjoyed by the former National Police.

The rudiments of a concept for a future Somali police service are present in the ASF. Former members of the National Police appear to be motivated to participate in bringing order to their society and being a part of a productive law enforcement entity. In the near term, it appears that the ASF could begin to address Somalia's public order and safety needs as a Somali responsibility and thereby possibly relieve the international community of what is a full-time responsibility. If properly encouraged and resourced, the ASF could serve as the foundation for a process of law enforcement institution building in the long term.

The immediate challenge is to insure that reasonable and equitable treatment of ASF members can be achieved in terms of payment of wages and other support for their services and to provide necessary equipment and materials which would give ASF members a predictable level of capability.

Former National Police of Somalia

By all reports, the now non-existent organization known as the National Police of Somalia was known for its basic level of competence and apparently was respected for its overall level of integrity. The National Police mission was essentially based in traditional civilian policing concepts and the process of enforcing the law was subject to a system which provided for prosecutorial and judicial oversight of police functions. Moreover, the National Police was recognized for its bona fides as a police agency having an orientation to the rule of law and reportedly served as a meaningful component of Somalia's criminal justice system.

The former Director of the National Police, Mohamed Ahmed Jama Mussa, in remarks supported by other interviews, explained that when the National Police functioned as an institution and was respected by the Government and the community as

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a public resource, the National Police had an overall complement of nearly 18,000 individuals. Of this force, approximately 60% served in operational law enforcement duties and approximately 40% were dedicated to administrative, management, training, and support responsibilities. The police services covered a range of public safety and criminal investigative responsibilities and included special services such as a border and coastal patrol, a criminalistics laboratory, and a reaction team specially-trained and sufficiently mobile to serve as an effective force to mediate clan disputes. Police training programs were formalized at all levels, and provided a range of in-service and specialized training.

To the credit of the leaders and members of the former National Police, the record indicates that the organization was not subverted to the purposes of the dictatorship. However, as a result of the National Police's effort to remain independent, other "police" organizations willing to serve the dictatorship emerged. Because of this the National Police was marginalized in its role and its overall importance diminished. In the end the National Police was rendered ineffective as an organization able to provide traditional police services to Somalia. Also a result of their marginalization, the basic resources critically needed by the police to sustain the organization became scarce and was one of the reasons that police personnel at all levels left the service. In addition, during this time of conflict some were jailed, some reportedly were killed, and the majority sought a low profile for self preservation. The eventual collapse of the National Police as an institution was accelerated by the total breakdown of authority resulting from Somalia's civil war.

Prospects for the ASF

At this juncture, it is clear that National Police's reputation and many of its former members have survived. As a result, the remnants of National Police, i.e., the ASF, currently represents a usable foundation upon which to begin to address the short-term requirements for Somalis to attempt to participate in the process of meeting Somalia's public order and safety requirements. The ASF also represents a viable entity which should be factored into any process of defining solutions to Somalia's long-term law enforcement needs.

Only if international assistance is forthcoming and is sustained at the levels required to effectively utilize, develop, and support what limited resources now appear to exist can the ASF be capitalized upon and used to good effect. In this regard, the

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emergence of the ASF from the remnants of the National Police should be viewed as a positive sign that some potential exists in Somalia for law enforcement institution building in the future. The fact that such a resource exists should be considered and taken into account when formulating any plans for international assistance. However, three fundamental considerations must be kept in mind when examining this prospect:

- The international donor community must recognize and accept that any effort to bring the ASF into a condition where it is capable of meeting even threshold levels of public order in Somalia will demand a significant commitment of funds. Because of the current absence of any meaningful Somali governmental institutions or resources, funding must support immediate law enforcement service needs and insure sustained availability of the most basic level of required logistical and material support to insure continued delivery of public safety services. Funding must be continued until there is an identified and predictable means to establish a sustained level of Somali self-sufficiency to acquire resources (i.e., Somali ability to generate income) that can be applied to support public safety requirements.
- Any law enforcement organization, to be any more than a mere security service, must be aligned with the other traditional elements of a criminal justice system. This is important so that law enforcement actions can be validated through a process of legal oversight and review and thereby safeguard against abuses.
- There cannot be any expectation that in Somalia's current dangerous environment an under-prepared, under-resourced police organization of any kind can successfully meet the full range of Somalia's public order and safety requirements.

Failure to realistically acknowledge the above considerations places the ASF at risk when international support is reduced. This risk threatens not only the safety of members of the ASF and the community, but also endangers any institutional respect and credibility which the ASF has as a carry over from the National Police. This positive reputation does in fact now exist and is a valuable resource to build upon, however, credibility and reputation are perishable. The ASF should not be undercut by asking its members to do more than they are trained, equipped or prepared to be responsible for.

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ASF Personnel and Recruiting

The Auxiliary Security Force currently comprises former members of the National Police who have come forward voluntarily to be included in the ASF. The more than 4,000 ASF members are present primarily in Mogadishu and reportedly also are in evidence in other principal Somali communities within the UNITAF Zone of Control. ASF members are generally identifiable to the public by their attire - faded remnants of their National Police uniforms and their still-familiar blue berets - which lends them some semblance of official stature. The caution, however, is to not characterize the ASF as a police organization because it is at best an informal association of individuals seeking to establish an institutional identity and defined purpose as a public safety entity.

The current ASF recruiting process is informal and elementary at best, relying primarily upon word-of-mouth communication. What is crucial, however, is that there are provisions, though rudimentary, for screening those individuals interested in service with the ASF and who claim prior membership with the National Police. The screening includes a process based on a review of the limited, if any, police records that can be located; these are then supplemented by the personal recollections of former commanders or associates within the National Police. The basic criteria for selection to serve with the ASF are that members: 1) must be Somali, 2) must not have committed an offense against the Somali society, 3) must have been in National Police service until 1 January 1991 with a minimum of two years of service (candidates are allowed to maintain the rank held as of that date), 4) must have no handicaps.

The vetting process for selection of ASF members is imprecise by any standard but the net result is that a police-type force is being drawn together and its members are beginning to be productively assigned to a limited range of policing-type responsibilities. With their responsibilities comes at least a de facto recognition from the community and international representatives of the ASF as having some "official" stature.

ASF Somali Oversight

The current level of Somali oversight, policy decision, and direction provided the ASF is in the hands of the Police Committee, an outgrowth of the Political Committee concept established in Mogadishu following the intervention. Although informal in many respects, the Police Committee is primarily a committee composed of former National Police command-level officers. It should be noted that the committee is not without its

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political dimensions and does include among its members individuals who were not former National Police. Nevertheless, the Committee is organized so that specific members are responsible for addressing a variety of issues important to the organization, development, operational assignments, and administrative functioning of the ASF.

While certainly not an ideal, the Police Committee should receive some credit for the fact that it exists and is functioning such that basic issues are discussed and decisions are being made, and where the committee provides some direction for the implementation of plans and the assignment of responsibilities. The Police Committee's authority and leadership generally have been recognized and accepted by the members of the ASF. Also, the committee is accessible to official international representatives in Somalia and can be effectively engaged in dialogue on policy and operational issues related to the ASF.

ASF Command & Supervisory Level Personnel

Because the ASF takes into account the rank held by its members at the dissolution of the National Police, a basic chain of command as well as a workable mechanism for communication exists within the ASF. This fact should be recognized not only because it represents an important resource to be used in the implementation of near-term ASF activities regarding both the operational assignments and the policy concerns of the ASF, but also because it is an existing resource with potential use in any long-term development plans in as much as it represents the potential for effective utilization of some of the experience with civilian policing that remains in Somalia.

Equally significant is that the ASF's structure resembles that of the former National Police as the ASF roughly adopted the defunct institution's organizational diagram. This is useful as a point of reference in attempting to define what is a loosely-organized, informal structure and helps to establish an element of functional capability for the ASF along familiar organizational lines.

With the current state of organization of the ASF and in the short time allotted, it is impossible to adequately assess the full capacity or the actual capability and quality of leadership within the ranks of the mid-level commanders and supervisors functioning within the ASF. However, the fact that a leadership resource with experience exists is of extreme importance and should be used and supported to every extent of its capability for the short-term requirements of leading the ASF. Additionally, the experience of

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these former police leaders should be taken advantage of if long-term development of civilian policing is considered important to the future of Somalia and is to be undertaken.

ASF Operational Level Personnel

The operational-level members of the ASF have been tasked with some very fundamental and very basic policing assignments. Only those ASF members functioning in the Mogadishu area were observed, and these were seen performing such tasks as providing elementary crowd control at the humanitarian relief feeding centers, basic traffic control at select intersections, perimeter security to public areas (including some limited assignments at the port and the airport), and basic physical security at some of those former police facilities still intact to varying degrees. ASF officers also were reportedly successfully involved in providing an element of order and security to the relocation of Somalis to their rightful homes and in removing squatters as necessary.

Within the limited context that brief observation permitted, the performance of these ASF members can be assessed as adequate. Their ability to conduct these activities and the apparent cooperation from the community at large to accept their service can be attributed to several factors. One factor seems to be that the public appears to associate the ASF with the former National Police and extends their memory of the latter to ASF members, perhaps by virtue of the image projected by their attire, which generally consists of the remnants of their former uniform. The second factor contributing to ASF fulfillment of basic tasks may be attributed to their commitment to the job at hand and, moreover, that ASF members appear to genuinely want to return to providing police-type service to the community. ASF service, until recently, was purely voluntary, however there is an expectation on the part of these individuals that regular pay and some type of employment status may be formalized. A recently-instituted U.N. program of food commodity allotments in lieu of pay or providing commodities as a supplement to pay has begun to address the compensation issue.

Whatever the nature of ASF members' motivation, the point remains that there is a willingness on their part to become engaged with the ASF and to serve in policing-type activities. This appears to be true in spite of the inherent dangers and the obvious hardships associated with attempting to function as a police officer in an environment which lacks the most basic items of individual and institutional police equipment and related resources. Although during this assessment no opportunity presented itself to

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observe ASF members in actual action confronting violence-prone demonstrators or similar confrontational situations, the reports indicate that when such incidents have occurred there is a demonstrated willingness on the part of ASF members to step forward and assume this type of policing responsibility.

This willingness to become involved and the dedication of ASF members is demonstrated not only in their established record of responding to dangerous situations, but also in that the record shows two ASF members have recently lost their lives and one his leg as a result of wounds received in such action. In this regard it is important to underscore the fact that even the simplest of policing functions becomes profoundly difficult in the face of a complete lack of the resources which are critical to the support of ASF members seeking to achieve any of their policing objectives and particularly so when the level of danger is elevated by the nature of the responsibility.

It is important to note that members of the ASF have also been engaged on a limited basis in what can be described as a "joint patrol" concept with UNITAF forces. While the ASF presence can be described as limited in terms of its actual contribution to the policing effort, it provides the ASF as an entity with visibility with regard to policing actions and recognition of Somali participation in public safety responsibilities. With the backing of well-equipped international forces, the joint patrols help to reinforce the image of the ASF and give it a measure of credibility. ASF participation in joint patrols also is positive in that it serves to help mediate conflicts which may arise between Somalis and international forces.

ASF Administrative and Logistical Resources

During the course of the survey of the ASF, it became apparent that beyond its personnel, the ASF has no meaningful resource base (e.g., no vehicles, no communications, no personal police equipment) to speak of which can be applied to support any of its operational requirements. The overall support being provided by UNITAF in terms of transportation, communications, and material is absolutely essential to the efforts of the ASF in their attempts to meet common public safety objectives, particularly with regard to any operational-type responsibilities. For this reason, development of an elementary resource base is fundamental to any independent capability of the ASF for either operational or development purposes.

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In addition to the lack of operational resources, the basic elements of administration of the ASF are similarly without meaningful resources. What is encouraging is the apparent existence of a basic understanding of the need for administrative mechanisms to allow a police-type organization to function. During the survey, for example, the issue of vetting the pool of applicants for entry into the ASF was discussed in a variety of contexts. The process of verification of prior service in the National Police was one of the central themes of three discussions. During the course of a visit to former National Police Headquarters (unoccupied and unusable in its present form) there was an opportunity to view what remains of the central personnel records system of the National Police. Former National Police members were engaged (many on their hands and knees) in the laborious task of trying to resurrect a body of records from the vandalized remains of the police personnel records section in order to develop an information base upon which to support the recruitment and vetting process. The dedication of individuals to such a task is impressive but what is clearly seen in this example is the fact that there are not even the most basic resources available to support the simplest and most routine tasks. As evidenced in this activity, as is common throughout, the ASF lack of such basics as paper, notebooks, office supplies, equipment, and furniture, not to mention the lack of the other basics such as water, electricity, and fuel are needed to support all projects to be undertaken by the ASF.

Criminal Investigative Division and Forensic Crime Laboratory

During the course of the survey a visit was made to the building which housed the former Criminal Investigative Division of the National Police as well as its forensic laboratory. The multi-storied building, while structurally intact, has been rendered unusable and cannot be occupied as a result of vandalism. However, the existing facility merits renovation and the building is being provided security by the ASF. Apparent from the visit was that at one time the building housed a relatively complete forensics laboratory with modern equipment. While the facility is useless in its present form and its fixtures destroyed, it raises the question as to the potential availability, somewhere in the community, of technical staff who may be willing and able to return and contribute to a future Somali police service.

The site visit also disclosed that there remained in part of the building complex a small quantity of what can be described as routine "booking" and "criminal case report" forms. While insignificant in quantity, it is important to note that at least there did exist under the former system a formal method of developing records on criminal subjects and

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criminal investigations. During this visit, a member of the ASF who claimed to have served as an investigator with the National Police was using these forms. He had completed the documents with the required information and also included photos of the two subjects of the file (taken by members of the Italian Forces), having developed what was in fact the beginning of a respectable "case" file sufficient to track not only the status and identity of the detained subjects, but also to record the details of the offense.

Committee of Judges and Lawyers

In a meeting with a committee composed of Somali lawyers and judges the concept of police service was discussed in terms of its legal role in a criminal justice process. The consensus of opinion was that Somalia's laws and constitution of the pre-dictator era were considered valid and with full utility as providing a legal framework within which to redevelop and proscribe police activities. What was emphasized by the committee, however, was that the police cannot exist independently as a law enforcement institution and any attempt to do so risks a potential for abuses. The general opinion of this committee was that although without current actual legal status, the ASF could be successful if it followed the basic law enforcement philosophies which existed at the time of the National Police. These attorneys believed that, if successful in this regard, the ASF could be effectively accepted by the community as having some legitimacy as a police service. The committee underscored that for policing to be successful in the long term, development of the other elements of the criminal justice process must also take place.

ASF - Prison Conditions Mogadishu

A visit was made to the prison located in Mogadishu, reportedly the only custodial-type facility in full-time operation in Somalia. The principal elements of this facility were constructed during the last century, however, a women's section that is part of the complex is of more recent vintage. The prison facility is remarkable in the sense that it appears to be one of the few public facilities in Mogadishu which has not been vandalized or destroyed. Its shortcomings are essentially reflective of the lack of resources. The overall capacity of the facility to house prisoners is approximately 1,000 and while at the time of the visit only 32 prisoners were in custody in the facility, the ability to handle any prisoners is actually limited more by available resources such as food, water, and fuel for cooking fires than it is by available space.

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The current director of the facility, who is a member of the Police Committee, has been an official at the prison since 1959. He is a lawyer claiming some formal corrections training. The management of this facility, while tacitly under the auspices of the ASF, reflects a methodological regard for commonly-accepted correctional procedures for the safety and security of prisoners and staff as well as the basic administrative procedures needed to insure accountability for prisoners and their property. The prison receives prisoners basically from the ASF and apparently through an unofficial process of case review by volunteer judges, prisoners do secure some threshold level of attention to the principles of due process and are thereby released or further detained, or at least paid attention to, as is considered appropriate. The security staff, who are members of the ASF, are basically functioning as a team under the Director and with the barest minimum of resources available they seem to be attempting, in good faith, to comply with the basic human rights concerns for prisoners within a most adverse environment.

Although the prison environment is clearly substandard, it does at least reflect the existence of a basic institution which could directly benefit and perhaps demonstrates a capacity for immediate improvement if even minimal level of resources became available.

ASF - Protection of Former National Police Facilities

The ASF has taken upon itself the responsibility of gradually retaking and preserving and securing, to the best extent possible, the former National Police facilities which remain in existence, particularly those which have some potential for rehabilitation into useable police resources. During the course of the survey the majority of the police facilities in the city of Mogadishu were visited, to include the former Criminal Investigation Division, the National Police Headquarters, and a number of the precinct-level stations.

The easy conclusion to be reached is that, without exception, these facilities have suffered extensive damage and to one degree or another will require significant repairs to be put back into use. It is important to recognize however, that these facilities fully merit consideration for preservation and rehabilitation to at least a functional level of service. By and large the buildings reflect a type of design appropriate for use as a police facility and it is likely that in the general perception of the public the buildings remain identified with National Police and can thereby again serve as a focal point of a

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law enforcement presence and authority at the community level. The ASF effort to prevent further damage to these buildings is an important activity reflecting not only an interest in the preservation of what remains of these assets but establishes an environment of security and responsibility permitting a process of rehabilitation to begin. More importantly, these facilities support the preservation of the concept of a police presence at the community level with the station representing a place where members of the community can seek assistance.

Police Academy - Mogadishu

During the survey a visit was made to the location of the former National Police Academy in Mogadishu. Former police officers related that new recruit training for the National Police took place at other locations outside of Mogadishu but emphasized the fact that the Police Academy in Mogadishu served as the principal National Police location for the training of officers, the center for its specialized training, to include investigations, and supported a full program of in-service training at the officer level.

There was a consensus among those interviewed that the Police Academy in Mogadishu enjoyed a reputation of professionalism for its training programs and its related contributions to the National Police. The facilities in their current form are fortunately substantially intact. In addition to what was a large auditorium, there remain approximately 20 classrooms, as well as dormitories, administrative offices, logistical and gymnasium space. However, all elements of the Academy are in disrepair and are currently occupied by drifters or displaced persons. In this sense, although requiring substantial cleaning and rehabilitation, the overall facility carries the potential to again serve as a training center for use by the ASF and, as such, may carry with it some of the aura of credibility associated with the location itself, as a respected element of the former National Police. As with the former police Forensic laboratory the question can be raised as to what prior instructor staff of the National Police may still be in the community and available for reactivation. Any training site selected must contemplate not only instructors and training programs, but will also depend upon the acquisition and availability of the most basic of resources such as classrooms and student materials of all types.

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ASF Training Needs

As the ASF continues to develop and as it takes on a more formal structure and level of responsibility, its members will be required to become engaged in some sort of basic re-training or orientation process. While, as it has been noted, the ASF is made up of individuals with former police experience, they have not been in actual police service for several years. They not only logically require refresher-type training on basic police skills but they also are in need of an orientation to the ASF as an organization in order to understand its objectives and its mission. This is important not only to fully understand the expectations which are placed upon them, but also to insure uniformity in their activities and attempt to insure against potential abuses of authority by both the institution and its members because of their possible misunderstanding of its purpose.

The short-term training issue is an important one and should not be delayed, as it not only impacts upon the potential for effectiveness of the ASF but also directly impacts upon the safety of individual officers and members of the community.

It should be noted that during the time of this survey, a decision was made by UNTAF to release to members of the ASF a number of weapons suitable for police use to support operational requirements. The number of weapons to be eventually released was limited to a figure approximately equal to 20% of the overall force complement. Clearly, as the ASF takes on a higher level of responsibility, especially in the current lawless environment of Somalia, the availability of firearms to police officers is key to any level of ASF success in meeting their public safety mission. Firearms skills are perishable. The judgmental aspect of firearms use in a policing environment is especially crucial to police credibility. As a first step to address this need, the Italian forces present in Mogadishu have begun a process of firearms familiarization training with members of the ASF consistent with the weapons release. An important issue will be to not only insure that such familiarization training continues, but that there is also a beginning of the development of a use-of-force policy which, as a concept, can be adopted by ASF members at the operational level and used to guide the nature of police conduct in use-of-force matters.

Support to the ASF

To date, the support given by elements of UNTAF and UNOSOM to the development of the ASF has addressed some of the most critical of its short-term needs.

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Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

The relevance and correctness of this support is apparent in as much as attention has focused upon the most immediate requirements, such as issues of pay, uniforms, individual police equipment, transportation, and communications. Although not intended to be a comprehensive resolution of ASF requirements, the impact of the actual or projected delivery of sorely-needed material not only enhances the capability of the ASF but directly and positively supports the continued level of individual commitment to the ASF. Such basics as boots and uniforms are invaluable to the effort.

Equal to the importance of the provision of basic resources to the ASF by international forces is the advice and direction provided and crafting of a basic set of instructions for oversight of ASF activities. Specifying both operational and administrative rules helps to guide the overall functioning and accountability of the ASF.

As found through this survey, international assistance in terms of material support and policy guidance, appears to have been consistently relevant and responsive to the immediate needs. The assistance effort is valuable in that it is oriented toward civilian policing objectives and support of the ASF has not taken any direction which can be viewed as becoming any future impediment to long-range law enforcement development.

The primary observation that can be made from the effort to date is that significant additional financial resources will have to be applied to sustain the momentum of the ASF in the short term, and specifically to insure that continued pay is available and that equipment and related resources are provided at sufficient levels to permit the ASF to have the capability to meet its responsibilities with credibility.

The complete lack of resources of all kinds which are needed by the ASF is overwhelming. The level of necessary support of the ASF to permit it to achieve even basic levels of operational self-sufficiency and competence is substantial and must not be underestimated or ignored. The basic approaches for assistance taken, and the procurement initiated, have been fully appropriate. However, the needs remain considerable and will continue throughout any interim phases of ASF activities until full development plans can be formulated and long-term law enforcement development program implementation can begin.

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from the information set forth above are summarized as follows:

- The ASF comprises members of the former National Police Force of Somalia and currently can be characterized as a loosely-defined, informal law enforcement-type organization recognized as having some "official stature" by the Somali community and international representatives.
- The ASF has shown a capability for providing a limited range of the most basic law enforcement-type services to certain regions of Somalia to include crowd control, traffic regulation, facility security, and joint patrol activities.
- The activities of the ASF can be viewed as appropriate within the context and mission of civilian law enforcement responsibilities and would appear not to prejudice any future law enforcement development efforts in Somalia.
- The ASF is without meaningful material and logistical resources of all types, at all levels, but appears to be capable of functioning when material and logistical support is provided.
- The availability of former National Police personnel and remnants of physical installations such as buildings merits preservation, rehabilitation, and utilization as a short-term approach to meeting Somali public safety needs and as a base for use in possible long-term institution building.
- Although intangible, the reputation and experience of the former National Police constitute a resource which exists and should be recognized and taken advantage of in discussions or actions related to short- and long-term law enforcement development in Somalia.
- The international support and direction given to the ASF in its development has been relevant and has established a base upon which the ASF can responsibly continue its growth and potentially be of use in a more comprehensive police development effort.

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

- The value of the ASF as an interim resource or a long-term asset depends wholly upon the willingness of the international community to make available the substantial resources required to address a wide range of issues relating to paying, staffing, training, equipping, and institutionally developing a law enforcement organization with the effectiveness and credibility to begin to develop Somali self-sufficiency in taking responsibility for public safety issues.
- A concerted effort should be made to identify the personnel resources available to the ASF who are able to provide Somali expertise for law enforcement development.
- Law enforcement development in Somalia must be pursued in the context of a complete criminal justice system to insure that police actions adhere to the tradition of Somali law.

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

To begin to address the above issues in the context of costs for supporting the ASF as an interim entity which could then serve as an established resource upon which to predicate long-term development efforts, the following notional budgets have been prepared to exemplify needs for salary, material and related logistical support. These figures are not in any way intended to be comprehensive but do reflect basic requirements.

AUXILIARY SECURITY FORCE (ASF) START-UP SIX MONTH ESTIMATES

ADMINISTRATIVE

1 - In-Country Administrator @ 150 k/6 mos	\$ 150,000
1 - In-Country Fiscal Coordinator @ 75 k/6 mos	\$ 75,000
2 - In-Country Logistics Coordinators @ 75 k/6 mos	\$ 150,000
Misc. Administrative Equipment & Supply Costs	\$ 250,000
(for ASF use in personnel and administrative development)	
	\$ 625,000

ASF PERSONNEL

6 - Somali Police Advisors @ \$350/mo.; \$2100/6 mos	\$ 12,600
5,000 - Policemen Salary (see pg. 20)	\$ 3,392,000
5,000 - Police Uniforms + Individual Equip @ \$150/mem	\$ 750,000
	\$ 4,154,600

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

POLICE STATION RESTORATION

35 - Stations @ 5 k each	\$ 175,000
35 - Generators @ 5 k each	\$ 175,000
35 - Water Tanks @ 2 k each	\$ 70,000
35 - Basic Station Content Kits @ 2 k each	\$ 70,000
35 - Administrative Supplies @ \$3 k each	\$ 105,000

\$ 595,000

TRANSPORT

2 - Admin. Vehicles (4x4) @ 30 k	\$ 60,000
6 - Advisor Vehicles (4x4) @ 30 k	\$ 180,000
35 - Station Vehicles (4x4) @ 30 k	\$ 1,050,000
35 - Station Light Trucks @ 50 k	\$ 1,750,000
Vehicle Maintenance (parts, tools, fuel, etc.)	\$ 1,000,000

\$ 4,040,000

COMMUNICATIONS

35 - Base Stations @ 2 k each	\$ 70,000
225 - Hand sets @ 5 k each	\$ 1,125,000

\$ 1,195,000

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Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

TRAINING (Start-Up Only)

1 Week Orientation Training - 5,000 Policemen	\$ 500,000
Firearms Familiarization	
Training Ammunition @ 100 rounds/man	\$ 20,000
Basic Academy Restoration and Fixtures (Start-Up Only)	\$ 1,500,000
Orientation Training Lunches (30,000) @ \$1	\$ 30,000

\$ 2,050,000

ESTIMATED TOTAL COST FOR
START-UP + 6 MOS. (5,000 MAN ASF)

\$12,659,600

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

Evaluation of the ASF Somalia

This chart reflects a proposed pay structure which takes into account the rank and grade of the old National Police and the basic concepts of the pay-job responsibility equation set forth in the United Nations recommended salary scale for Somalia effective Feb. 1993.

ASF START-UP COMPENSATION PAY STRUCTURE

	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>\$/DAY</u>	<u>\$/MOS</u>	<u>NO/ GRADE</u>	<u>TOTAL \$/MOS</u>	<u>\$/6 MOS</u>	<u>\$/YR</u>
Patrolman	ASF-1	3.00	90.00	3775	339,750	2,038,500	4,077,000
Corporal	ASF-2	3.50	105.00	630	66,150	396,900	793,800
Sergeant	ASF-3	4.00	120.00	315	37,800	226,800	453,600
Shift Sgts	ASF-4	4.50	135.00	105	14,175	85,050	170,100
Shift Supervisor	ASF-5	5.00	150.00	105	15,750	94,500	189,000
Station Vice - Cmdr.	ASF-6	5.50	165.00	35	5,775	34,650	69,300
Station Cmdr.	ASF-7	6.00	180.00	35	6,300	37,800	75,600
Chief of Police	ASF-8	6.50	195.00	9	1,755	10,530	21,060
Police Commissioner	ASF-9	7.00	210.00	10	2,100	12,600	25,200
				Net	5,019	\$489,555	\$2,937,330
				Special Pay*		\$ 75,700	\$ 454,200
				Gross		\$565,255	\$3,391,530
							\$6,783,060

* Special Pay reflects the cost value of commodity supplements to salary.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 7, 1993

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

5:02 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Today I want to talk with you about our nation's military involvement in Somalia. A year ago, we all watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands -- dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation. Of starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country.

This past weekend we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot -- all of them soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people themselves. These tragic events raise hard questions about our effort in Somalia. Why are we still there? What are we trying to accomplish? How did a humanitarian mission turn violent? And when will our people come home?

These questions deserve straight answers. Let's start by remembering why our troops went into Somalia in the first place. We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time. A third of a million people had died of starvation and disease. Twice that many more were at risk of dying. Meanwhile, tons of relief supplies piled up in the capital of Mogadishu because a small number of Somalis stopped food from reaching their own countrymen.

* Our consciences said, enough. In our nation's best tradition, we took action with bipartisan support. President Bush sent in 28,000 American troops as part of a United Nations humanitarian mission. Our troops created a secure environment so that food and medicine could get through. We saved close to one million lives. And throughout most of Somalia -- everywhere but in Mogadishu -- life began returning to normal. Crops are growing. Markets are reopening. So are schools and hospitals.

? Nearly a million Somalis still depend completely on relief supplies, but at least the starvation is gone. And none of this would have happened without American leadership and America's troops.

Until June, things went well, with little violence. The United States reduced our troop presence from 28,000 down to less than 5,000, with other nations picking up where we left off. But then in June, the people who caused much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani and other troops who were there just to keep the peace.

Rather than participate in building the peace with others, these people sought to fight and to disrupt, even if it means returning Somalia to anarchy and mass famine. And make no mistake about it: If we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The relief effort would stop, and starvation soon would return.

MORE

* That knowledge has led us to continue our mission. It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society, or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help. But we -- we in the United States -- must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance to succeed.

We started this mission for the right reasons, and we're going to finish it in the right way. In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We've nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave them now, those embers will reignite into flames and people will die again. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place.

We also have to recognize that we cannot leave now and still have all our troops present and accounted for. And I want you to know that I am determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or held captive. Anyone holding an American right now should understand, above all else, that we will hold them strictly responsible for our soldiers' well-being. We expect them to be well-treated, and we expect them to be released.

So now we face a choice. Do we leave when the job gets tough, or when the job is well done? Do we invite a return of mass suffering, or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a decent chance to survive?

Recently, General Colin Powell said this about our choices in Somalia. "Because things get difficult, you don't cut and run, you work the problem and try to find a correct solution." I want to bring our troops home from Somalia. Before the events of this week, as I said, we had already reduced the number of our troops there from 28,000 to less than 5,000. We must complete that withdrawal soon, and I will. But we must also leave on our terms. We must do it right. And here is what I intend to do.

* This past week's events make it clear that even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there. We need more armor, more air power, to ensure that our people are safe and that we can do our job. Today, I have ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and to complete our mission. I've also ordered an aircraft carrier and two amphibious groups with 3,600 combat Marines to be stationed offshore. These forces will be under American command.

Their mission, what I am asking these young Americans to do, is the following: First, they are there to [protect our troops and our bases.] We did not go to Somalia with a military purpose. We never wanted to kill anyone. But those who attack our soldiers must know they will pay a very heavy price.

Second, they are there to [keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communication that are essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely throughout the country so that starvation and anarchy do not return.]

Third, they are there to [keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people. Not to personalize the conflict, but to prevent a return to anarchy.]

Fourth, [through their pressure and their presence, our troops will help to make it possible for the Somali people, working

with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve their problems and survive when we leave.] That is our mission.

I am proposing this plan because it will let us finish leaving Somalia on our own terms and without destroying all that two administrations have accomplished there. For, if we were to leave today, we know what would happen. Within months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets. Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.

That is why I am committed to getting this job done in Somalia, not only quickly, but also effectively. To do that, I am taking steps to ensure troops from other nations are ready to take the place of our own soldiers. We've already withdrawn some 20,000 troops, and more than that number have replaced them from over two dozen other nations. Now we will intensify efforts to have other countries deploy more troops to Somalia to assure that security will remain when we're gone.

* | And we'll complete the replacement of U.S. military logistics personnel with civilian contractors who can provide the same support to the United Nations. While we're taking military steps to protect our own people and to help the U.N. maintain a secure environment, we must pursue new diplomatic efforts to help the Somalis find a political solution to their problems. That is the only kind of outcome that can endure.

* | For fundamentally, the solution to Somalia's problems is not a military one, it is political. Leaders of the neighboring African states, such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, have offered to take the lead in efforts to build a settlement among the Somali people that can preserve order and security. I have directed my representatives to pursue such efforts vigorously. And I've asked Ambassador Bob Oakley, who served effectively in two administrations as our representative in Somalia, to travel again to the region immediately to advance this process.

* | Obviously, even then there is no guarantee that Somalia will rid itself of violence and suffering. But at least we will have given Somalia a reasonable chance. This week some 15,000 Somalis took to the streets to express sympathy for our losses, to thank us for our effort. Most Somalis are not hostile to us, but grateful. And they want to use this opportunity to rebuild their country.

It is my judgment and that of my military advisors that we may need up to six months to complete these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal. We'll do what we can to complete the mission before then. All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred support personnel in noncombat roles.

If we take these steps, if we take the time to do the job right, I am convinced we will have lived up to the responsibilities of American leadership in the world. And we will have proved that we are committed to addressing the new problems of a new era.

When our troops in Somalia came under fire this last weekend, we witnessed a dramatic example of the heroic ethic of our American military. When the first Black Hawk helicopter was downed this weekend, the other American troops didn't retreat,

although they could have. Some 90 of them formed a perimeter around the helicopter and they held that ground under intensely heavy fire. They stayed with their comrades. That's the kind of soldiers they are. That's the kind of people we are.

So let us finish the work we set out to do. Let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right.

Let me express my thanks and my gratitude and my profound sympathy to the families of the young Americans who were killed in Somalia. My message to you is, your country is grateful, and so is the rest of the world, and so are the vast majority of the Somali people. Our mission from this day forward is to increase our strength, do our job, bring our soldiers out, and bring them home. Thank you, and God bless America.

END

5:11 P.M. EDT



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

October 7, 1993

Mr. Howard Paster
Director of Legislative Affairs
The White House
West Wing
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Howard:

The President's report to the country should put everything in context:

1. Bush was right: 350,000 died, maybe 2,000,000 saved.
2. At our request with our leadership 27 countries have come (list names).
3. At our request and with our leadership other countries have helped maintain security; Pakistani losses, other losses; they have suffered, more are suffering; they are still holding firm. /X
4. The loss of a retreat would be large and worldwide.
 - a. Killing Americans gets Americans out
Every terrorist, every faction will learn that, and every American everywhere will be in greater danger; ✓
 - b. every nation which came in at our request will feel betrayed; ✓
 - c. the Somali people will be in danger of starvation and death again; ✓
 - d. the future challenges to freedom and human rights will face huge costs of distrust and disbelief in American staying power; ✓
 - e. the losses are tragic, our heart goes out to their families; we will do everything to protect our young men and women and we will do everything we can to avenge our dead, but the cost of retreat would devalue their lives and deprive their deaths of meaning. Precisely because they died for a noble cause, we must honor their sacrifices by sustaining that cause for freedom. ✓

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GEPHARDT

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

Amendment offered by Mr. GEPHARDT:

At the end of title X (page 348, after line 20), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1042. INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED FORCES IN SOMALIA.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOMALIA.—

(1) Since United States Armed Forces made significant contributions under Operation Restore Hope toward the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and restoration of peace in the region to end the humanitarian disaster that had claimed more than 300,000 lives.

(2) Since the mission of United States forces in support of the United Nations appears to be evolving from the establishment of "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations," as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992, to one of internal security and nation building.

(b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY.—

(1) CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS.—The President should consult closely with the Congress regarding United States policy with respect to Somalia, including in particular the deployment of United States Armed Forces in that country, whether under United Nations or United States command.

(2) PLANNING.—The United States shall facilitate the assumption of the functions of United States forces by the United Nations.

(3) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

(A) The President shall ensure that the goals and objectives supporting deployment of United States forces to Somalia and a description of the mission, command arrangements, size, functions, location, and anticipated duration in Somalia of those forces are clearly articulated and provided in a detailed report to the Congress by October 15, 1993.

(B) Such report shall include the status of planning to transfer the function contained in paragraph (2).

(4) CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.—Upon reporting under the requirements of paragraph (3) Congress believes the President should be

November 15, 1993, seek the necessary congressional authorization in order for the deployment of United States forces to Somalia to continue.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT) will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Arizona (Mr. STUMP) will be recognized for 30 minutes in opposition.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT).

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I wish to yield half my time in support of this amendment to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for purposes of yielding time.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) will be recognized for 15 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON), the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished majority leader for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment, because it achieves several important aims. First of all, it requires the President to report to the Congress on the goals and objectives of United States deployment in Somalia. It mandates the Congress to authorize the continued deployment of United States forces in Somalia. It facilitates the United Nations assuming the functions now performed by the United States Armed Forces. Finally, the amendment preserves a bipartisan approach to United States policy in Somalia.

Now, I have some questions about this amendment. It is not perfectly drafted, as far as I am concerned. It is incomplete and one-sided. It is the account of the history of our involvement in Somalia. The timetable in it I think is unrealistic, and it does not adequately state the role of the Congress.

But putting those concerns aside, I want to remind my colleagues that we voted in May to authorize United States participation in the U.N. mission in Somalia. In doing that, the House did what it was supposed to do: we authorized the deployment of U.S. forces for combat purposes overseas. The Senate has that legislation before it, and the Senate should act.

Without going into a lot of the history of the United States involvement in Somalia, let me really make a single point. We went into Somalia by order of President Bush for two purposes: to create a secure environment so that food could move to the people in Somalia. The President stated that very carefully in December. Then when the U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 was adopted in December 1992, those purposes were restated. And I use the words of the U.N. resolution now, use force, if necessary, "to secure the environment for humanitarian relief operations". Then after Operation Restore Hope was ended and U.N. Security Council Resolution 814 came into effect, setting up UNOSOM II, the United States role in Somalia became more limited than it has been under Operation Restore Hope. It was limited in two specific ways: we have withdrawn now 80 percent of our forces, so we have had fewer forces under UNOSOM II than in Operation Restore Hope. We had 28,000 United States troops in Somalia last December. Today that figure is about 5,000.

But not only was there a limitation with respect to the numbers. We also reduced our costs. The United States was responsible for the entire cost under Operation Restore Hope. Under UNOSOM II we were responsible only for the U.N.-assessed rate, and we are

reimbursed for our logistic troop contribution.

I do not believe that the United States should be engaged in nation building in Somalia. That is the task of the United Nations. That is not the task of the United States. The mission for the United States remains today exactly what it was when we went in: to ensure a secure environment for humanitarian relief.

We have achieved the humanitarian relief. There is no starvation today in Somalia. We have almost achieved the secure environment, but not quite. We have made a lot of progress in Somalia. No longer is there mass starvation. In half of Somalia's 60 districts, representative councils are functioning, schools and hospitals are opening, thousands of people have been spared from starvation, and efforts are underway to rehabilitate the country's police force and the prison system.

Where do we go from here? There is no doubt that we have got a difficult problem in the southern part of the capital city, Mogadishu, and our goal should be to reduce and to eliminate the United States military presence in Somalia as soon as possible.

We are clearly moving in that direction. The objectives of the United States and Somalia should be what they have always been, to establish a secure environment so that humanitarian relief can flow.

United States interests are going to suffer if there is an immediate and precipitous withdrawal from Somalia. It is in the U.S. interests that the U.N. become successful at the business of peacekeeping so that we do not always have to go it alone in the world, so that we do not have to be the world's policeman.

In addition, we have invested a large amount of capital and resources, and, indeed, some lives, in an effort to end the starvation and to provide some stability in that country. If we pull out immediately, anarchy will return swiftly, and our past investment will be lost.

We should not sacrifice the substantial gains that have been made in the last 10 months. I urge adoption of this amendment.

No one can deny that efforts to achieve progress in Somalia under Security Council Resolution 814 have been difficult. This is the first U.N.-led chapter VII enforcement action. It is critical that it achieve success, because it is in the U.S. interest that the U.N. become successful at peacekeeping. The United States cannot and should not be the world's policeman.

At the end of Operation Restore Hope, the United States found itself in a difficult position. Without continued international involvement, the gains achieved in Somalia would be jeopardized. The United Nations was ready to assume precedent-setting control of the operation. At the same time, the U.N. acknowledged its need for continued strong U.S. support and leadership to provide security for humanitarian relief.

DRAFT

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DRAFT

BUREAU FOR FOOD AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

FACT SHEET

October 7, 1993

SOMALIA - Civil Strife

Area Affected: All of Somalia, neighboring areas of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

No. Affected: According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC), up to 500,000 people have died as a result of famine and civil strife in Somalia. An estimated 700,000 Somalis remain displaced, completely dependent on relief assistance. There are also over 500,000 Somali refugees in neighboring countries who will require relief assistance once they return home.

Current Humanitarian Situation: Somalia today presents a vastly different picture than seen one year ago. Thanks to the international relief operations, military intervention, and the efforts of the Somali people, widespread starvation has been eliminated during the past several months. Health and nutritional conditions have dramatically improved due to the distribution of food and medical supplies to the Somali population. Economic activity flourishes in most areas of Somalia as food security continues to improve.

Relief Efforts:

While the situation in Mogadishu has significantly deteriorated due to attacks by militia loyal to General Aided against UNOSOM forces, relief efforts in other areas of Somalia are proceeding to the rehabilitation stage. Donors, U.N. Agencies and non-governmental organizations are shifting from relief assistance to general economic reconstruction and political rehabilitation. NGOs have integrated Somalis into their programs in an effort to prepare Somalia to be less dependent on foreign assistance once the international community departs.

The following NGOs and PVOs are among those currently providing humanitarian assistance throughout all of Somalia:

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides health care.

Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) has established food for work projects and seed distribution centers.

Action International Contre La Faim (AICF) provides emergency and post-emergency health care throughout Mogadishu and the northern regions Somalia.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) provides building construction and rehabilitation in Baidoa.

U.S. Government (USG) Assistance: The U.S. Government has provided over \$273 million in assistance to Somalia to address the humanitarian crisis. This figure does not include funds expended to support U.S. military airlift operations and Operation Restore Hope. In fiscal year 1993 alone, the U.S. Government will provide an estimated \$169 million in humanitarian assistance, including almost 215,000 metric tons (MT) of food aid valued at \$85.5 million, which Food For Peace (FFP) and USDA have allocated for distribution through the World Food Program (WFP), Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), ICRC, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World Vision Relief & Development (WVRD).

A.I.D.'s Africa Bureau is also considering allocating \$6 million to support the re-establishment of the Somali justice system, which USG considers essential to any progress on sustainable development. A.I.D. has also allocated an additional \$6 million to establish a PVO umbrella grant that will include funding for local Somali NGOs implementing rehabilitation activities. A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has given almost \$51 million in relief assistance so far in FY 93. This includes almost \$14 million to airlift food and relief supplies and an estimated \$32 million in grants to international relief organizations. The State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) spent over \$20 million on repatriation and resettlement programs. A.I.D. activities focus on interventions in the health/nutrition, water/sanitation, agriculture/livestock, employment generation, food security and resettlement sectors.

Summary of USG Assistance

FY 1993 AID/AFR (Rehabilitation Assistance)	\$12,000,000
FY 1993 AID/OFDA (Emergency Aid)	\$50,560,827
FY 1993 AID/FFP (Food Aid)	\$51,737,900
FY 1993 USDA (Food Aid)	\$33,830,000
FY 1993 STATE/RP (Refugee Assistance)	\$20,990,175
 TOTAL FY 1993 USG Assistance	 \$169,118,902
 FY 1991-1993 USG Assistance	 \$273,193,083

TALKING POINTS ON HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN SOMALIA

Mogadishu:

-- In Mogadishu, CARE is providing dry food rations thrice weekly through 32 distribution centers, reaching 400,000 people. This distribution system is scheduled to phase out soon due to the availability of food on the market.

-- Certainly humanitarian efforts in Mogadishu have been severely hampered by the violence in the capital, but there is also a reduced need for emergency assistance in the city.

-- Save the Children, U.K., which produced a survey in May providing convincing evidence that supplementary feeding should continue in some parts of town, is now reporting that by mid-October, all supplemental feeding in Mogadishu should cease. Apparently, many of the children attending the special feeding centers no longer fall within the nutritional criterion for feeding and are ready to graduate to regular dry food distributions.

Country-wide:

-- While feeding kitchens and general food distributions have stopped, targeted food distributions to displaced persons and other vulnerable groups throughout southern Somalia remain necessary. Supplemental feeding of high-protein foods for children under five-years-old continue to insure that improved nutritional conditions are sustained.

-- While feeding programs in Somalia have been reduced due to improved nutritional conditions, certain groups in Somalia continue to be blocked access to food and relief supplies due to inter-clan rivalries. Vulnerable groups, particularly displaced persons, women and children under five, continue to exist in pockets of suffering.

-- In Kismayo, for instance, the U.N. halted food distribution programs in displaced camps to encourage displaced persons to return home, but when they did not move out of the camps, malnutrition re-surfaced.

-- In Bardera, a poor harvest forced many displaced who had gone home to return to the city only to find that food distributions had stopped. In the primary displaced camp in Bardera, the population has swelled from 2,000 to 9,000 in the past month as displaced persons who had returned home to surrounding villages were forced to return to the camp when crops failed.

-- While the U.N. and NGOs moved quickly to respond to both these situations when they arose, these examples serve to illustrate that humanitarian progress made in Somalia remains extremely fragile. Maintenance of progress made and forward movements are contingent on expanded and sustainable security as well as continued relief and rehabilitation assistance.

-- While UNITAF was able to secure food delivery routes, UNOSOM is only beginning to address the root causes for the problems in Somalia and withdrawal of U.S. troops at this time would result in the disintegration of the international peace-making effort, which would cause Somalia to revert to the humanitarian crisis situation that existed in mid-1992.

- Even during "normal" times, Somalia relied on donor assistance for much of its food requirements, all of its investment and development funding, and a significant part of its recurrent budget.
- Because of the frequency and severity of drought, farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology. With improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could perhaps in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption.
- Somalia needs an estimated 700,000 metric tons of grain annually of which some 500,000 metric tons could be produced in Somalia in years with good rains. Historically, the shortfall has been made up by donor relief and commercial imports. With a growing urban population, serious production and marketing constraints, variable and poorly distributed rainfall, and a large proportion of the country not suited to crop production, Somalia is unlikely to become food self sufficient.
- Since the present conflict began, the agriculture sector has been devastated by drought, looting, and the resulting displacement of large numbers of rural dwellers. Preceding military intervention in December 1992, cultivation of food crops had declined to a tiny fraction of the approximately one million hectares of arable land. Seed stocks were consumed for food. Livestock was stolen and slaughtered.
- Because of favorable rains, resettlement of some agricultural households and NGO support for agricultural inputs, there has been significant planting in some areas. Continued improvement will depend heavily on security, good rainfall and expanded distribution of agricultural inputs.
- Restoring a sustainable food delivery system will depend ultimately on the private sector, including farmers, merchants and traders and commercial importers. The elements of this system are in place and only need encouragement, sound policies and a secure operating environment in the towns and countryside.

Press Guidance on Release of the Somalia Report

Q: The report says that the President is now planning to send 3,000 additional combat forces to Somalia instead of 1,700. Why is he sending additional forces?

A: The forces are being sent to perform the security tasks described in the report, in particular to protect the U.S. personnel already in Somalia.

- The Pentagon is continuously reviewing U.S. force requirements to ensure that ~~the~~ appropriate steps are being taken to protect U.S. personnel in Somalia.
- The original 1,700 troops are straightforward fighters: a light infantry battalion and an Armored task force.
- The additional forces are being sent to enhance force protection. They include: engineers who will reinforce U.S. bases and facilities on the ground; artillery units that can respond to mortar fire without putting U.S. personnel directly in harm's way; and additional helicopter units to replace those lost or disabled. There is also a brigade headquarters for command and control purposes, tanks, and other support units.

Q: How do you explain the discrepancies in the numbers? The report says that prior to October 7, there were roughly 4,500 U.S. personnel in Somalia: 2,800 logisticians, 1,300 in the QRF, and 400 Rangers. By October 11, there were approximately 2,900 logisticians, 1,400 in the QRF, and 950 Rangers.

A: It's important to remember that things are moving very fast. We have been deploying forces rapidly. The numbers provided in the report are close approximations and are accurate as of the dates provided.

- For instance, we have more than doubled the numbers ~~in~~ in the Ranger Task Force within the last week. They were sent to reinforce the units already there, including those that were attacked.
- The number of logisticians has risen slightly as the support requirements have increased. Their numbers ~~has~~ ~~have~~ always fluctuated a little bit since the UN operation began in May.
- The QRF has also been reinforced by the addition of the 14 Bradley fighting vehicles and 4 tanks.

Q: Why doesn't the report mention the large number of personnel that will be stationed off-shore in the aircraft carrier and in the Amphibious Ready Groups? How many are there?

A: The report details all the U.S. units and personnel in the region that will be stationed on the ground in Somalia or that could be called upon to go ashore.

- The others that you refer to will not go ashore. They include Navy personnel who will provide offshore support to the Marines (approximately 3,800 personnel) and those aboard the aircraft carrier Lincoln (6,000).
- Only the approximately 60 aircraft aboard the Lincoln could be used Somalia, and they are included in the report.

Q: The report says that as of October 11, there had been 25 Americans killed in Somalia since the UN operation began. Does that include the body of the soldier just recovered yesterday?

A: No. Today, the total is 26.

Q: How were the others killed?

A: Four were killed in by a command detonated mine on _____. Eighteen died in the fighting on October 3. The remainder died _____.

Q: The report says that all U.S. troops in Somalia are under U.S. command but that the logisticians are under the operational control of the UN. Isn't that a false distinction?

A: No. Let me be very clear about this. All U.S. forces in Somalia are under U.S. command and, ultimately, the President's command as Commander-in-Chief.

- In the past, such as in World War I & II and currently in NATO, the U.S. has temporarily placed U.S. forces under the operational control of foreign commanders. But the U.S. never delegates command.

- Command is about to whom the troops ultimately answer. It is about where the buck stops. It is who pays our troops, who disciplines them, who promotes them, and to whom they owe their loyalty.
- Command means that the Commander-in-Chief can always rescind operation control, when he has delegated it.

- In Somalia, none of the U.S. combat units are under the operational control of the UN.

- Only the approximately 2,900 U.S. logistical support personnel, who do not perform combat functions, are under are the operational control of the UN-- temporarily and only for the specific missions outlined in the Security Council resolutions, to which the U.S. agreed.

- This means that the UN Commander, Gen. Cevik Bir of Turkey, or the Deputy Commander, an American, Major General Thomas Montgomery, can give instructions to our logisticians about such things as what cargo to move, who to deliver rations to, where to store supplies, and what units to support.
- The U.S. retains the right to withdraw U.S. forces from a UN mission at any time and to take whatever measures we and we alone deem necessary to protect them.



THE JOINT STAFF FAX COVER SHEET



FROM: <i>LtCol. Jim Thiapen</i>		ORG: J-5 UNITED NATIONS BRANCH PENTAGON, WASHINGTON D.C. 20318-5144	
TO: <i>Susan Rice</i>		PHONE: <i>703-697-5738</i>	
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		PHONE: <i>202-395-7312</i> FAX NO: <i>202-395-1199</i>	
CLASSIFICATION: (CIRCLE ONE) SECRET CONFIDENTIAL <u>UNCLASSIFIED</u>			
SUBJECT: <i>COMMAND vs. operational control</i>			
REMARKS:			
NUMBER OF PAGES: <i>6</i>	FAX SENT BY: <i>T</i>	DATE SENT: <i>8 Oct 93</i>	TIME SENT: <i>11:54</i>

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

UN COMMAND OF US FORCES

For Use with UN, US officials and Congress

✓ US has set reasonable and proper conditions on the use to which the UN may put forces placed under its operational control.

✓ Any lesser conditions risk US constitutional problems and both US and international legal problems. Indeed, no sovereign state will accept any thing less.

✓ The UN cannot in good conscience argue with the conditions because they are legally, morally and practically proper.

✓ That being said, there is no intent to use the conditions to subvert the UN chain of command or UN authority.

✓ This intent is borne out in practice. US personnel cooperate fully in the UN operations in which they are participating: UNIKOM, MINURSO, UNTAC, UNTSO, UNOSOM, UNPROFOR.

✓ Furthermore, we are acutely aware of the problems that result when a member state actively interferes with the conduct of an operation.

✓ The US conditions protect against obvious and clear-cut actions, which if allowed to proceed unquestioned, would cause tremendous damage to the UN.

⊙ ✓ For example: If the UN commander in Macedonia, with no authority from the UN or UNSC were to order the US contingent to move across the border into Kosovo, the US commander would be expected to immediately consult with higher US authority before complying.

✓ For example, if a UN commander directed a US commander to execute prisoners, the US commander would be expected to refuse the order and immediately consult with higher US authorities.

✓ For example, if a UN commander, ordered the US hospital unit stationed in Zagreb to move to Sarajevo, the US commander would be expected to first consult with higher US authority.

✓ For example, if the UN ordered US observers serving with UNIKOM to redeploy to another UN peacekeeping operation such as Mozambique, the senior US observer would be expected to consult with higher US authority before moving to the new operation. (Note that this actually happened. The UN actually redeployed US observers from the Middle East and UNIKOM to Mozambique without US consent. This was a minor incident and no harm was done, but it is a clear example of the UN giving inappropriate orders.)

The responsibilities placed on a US commander under the operational command of the UN are the same as those placed on US commanders serving in US commands.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

✓ The act of placing a US unit under UN operational command does not relieve the US commander of his US constitutional and legal responsibilities.

✓ The UN cannot argue in favor of commanders issuing or obeying illegal orders. The fundamental basis of the UN is international law and the sovereign rights of states. Commission of a war crime, for example, does not constitute a defense unless the accused did not know or could not reasonably have been expected to know it was a crime.

✓ The UN cannot favor UN commanders taking actions clearly outside the mandate of the operation as specified by the UN Security Council, except perhaps under the most extreme conditions.

The most difficult and sensitive issue is the one of clearly militarily unsound and imprudent orders. In this instance the burden is fully on the shoulders of the subordinate commander receiving the orders. If he refuses or disobeys the order, he opens himself to possible courts-martial. If he obeys the order, knowing it will lead to disaster, he equally opens himself to charges, albeit mitigated by the fact he was complying with an order.

For a US officer, the accomplishment of the mission comes before the welfare of the troops. There can be no quibbling or complaining over the routine risks of war. At the same time, a US officer cannot allow wanton reckless disregard military fundamentals to cause the unnecessary destruction of his command for no good end.

We are not saying that in the heat of battle a US commander should stop the war, disrupt a UN commander's plan, and put other UN troops at risk so that he can phone home to complain about common hardships and risks of war, or to question abstruse aspects of the UN commander's plan or engage in debate on arcane military theory. We are talking about consulting with higher US authority on orders which, if carried out, promise disaster.

✓ A basic element of all this is that the US commander would always be expected to first discuss his concerns with the UN commander. Only if the problem could not be resolved and the US commander continued to believe complying with the order would bring disaster, would he phone home.

Additional Points for Use with Congress

✓ PDD-13 makes an unequivocal statement that the US retains ~~ultimate~~ command authority over all US units which the US agrees to place under the temporary operational control of the United Nations for a given UN operation authorized by the UN Security Council.

✓ This means the chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander remains inviolate.

✓ While our public diplomacy should assure the UN we will be full team members in UN operations, there can be no question of our constitutional responsibility to recognize and insist that the sole source of legitimacy for US military commanders flows from the Constitution of the United States and is codified in US federal law and the US Code of Military Justice.

✓ US military personnel have served with the UN almost since its inception. US military observers and support personnel have served with the UN Truce Supervision Organization since 1948. In 1962 a US unit served under loose UN operational control in the UN operation in New Guinea. US military observers are also assigned to UN operations in the Western Sahara, Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Iraq-Kuwait-DMZ. US military units have been placed under the operational control of the UN in Croatia, Macedonia, and Somalia. A field hospital in Croatia, a reinforced rifle company in Macedonia, and support personnel in Somalia.

✓ Although the phrase "under UN command" has been loosely used in the press, it is inaccurate. The actual specific arrangement with the UN has been for the UN to have temporary operational control of US forces. The US has never relinquished ultimate command of US forces to a UN commander. Such arrangements have been limited in time and scope by the mandate of the mission as voted by the UN Security Council, in which the US has a veto.

* Operational control is the authority delegated to the UN commander to perform those functions of command over subordinate US forces involving the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON should be exercised through the commander of the assigned US forces, thereby giving the US commander control of his entire force. OPCON may be limited by time, function, or location. In the UN context, the US controls these variables through its vote on the UN Security Council. By voting for the UN operation, the US accepts the mandate, length and location of the UN operation. OPCON does not, of itself, include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training.

Additional Points for Use With US Officials and Congress

✓ Our public diplomacy must reassure UN officials US remains a reliable and trustworthy partner and can be counted on to support a strong, viable chain of command and command responsibility in all UN operations.

✓ Fully recognize sensitivity of this issue, however can be no question that sole source of legitimacy for US commanders flows from the the Constitution of the United States, US federal law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Chain of command from President to lowest US commander in the field must remain inviolate.

Agree with concept that commanders should forward concerns over reckless or irrational orders to higher US authority and agree we do not want commanders questioning orders in the heat of battle. However, judgment call on what to do and when to do it rests with commanders. Cannot detract from this responsibility.

UN officials appreciate US emphasis that US is not the problem when it comes to respecting prerogatives of UN commanders in the field and that the US fully supports a strong, viable UN chain of command. However, UN officials are concerned that conditions on US participation as contained in the draft PDD-13 would be twisted by some nations and used as a pretext to refuse to obey legitimate orders given by UN commanders.

Let me talk to you about command and control - something everybody from the Washington Post to my great aunt has been expounding on at great length and at high volume.

Here's the deal.

When it comes to the UN operations, I ask you from here on out, outside this room, to talk only about two terms: command; and operational control. Anything else - administrative control, tactical control, whatever - will only complicate the issue. Neither the UN nor Congress nor the American people can handle more than two terms.

Here are the rules of the road when we talk command:

- ☐ The President will never relinquish command of US forces.
- ☐ The sole source of legitimacy for US commanders flows from the Constitution of the United States, US Federal law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- ☐ The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field must remain inviolate.

When you talk command, stick to the basics. Don't get sidetracked into convoluted explanations. It won't get you anywhere. I know - from personal experience. Keep it simple and say once more after me: The President will never ...

Now for rules of the road for operational control:

The President will consider on a case-by-case basis placing US forces and personnel under the operational control of a UN commander for specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council. In making this decision, the President will take into account such factors as the size of the proposed US force, the risk to US personnel, the proposed duration of the mission, the rules of engagement, and the nature and mandate of the operations including whether it is Chapter VI or Chapter VII. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the US will allow a UN commander to exercise operational control over US forces.

When US forces are under the operational control of a UN commander in a UN operation:

- ☐ The US reserves the right to terminate US participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect them if they are endangered
- ☐ US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to a higher US commander; and
- ☐ US commanders will refer to higher US authorities, orders that are illegal under US or international law, or are outside the mandate of the UN mission to which the US agreed with the UN - IF they are unable to resolve the problem with the UN commander.

Col Bob Garner
Chief Joint Ops
Curtis St Rm
693 5661/2/3

(THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MAY BE ADDED TO THE ANNEX ON LOCATION AND FUNCTIONS OF U.S. FORCES IN SOMALIA:)

As of Oct 11

U.S. FORCES IN SOMALIA

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

COMMAND

IN PLACE FORCES	SIZE (approx)	LOCATION	MISSION	UN	US
LOGISTICS SUPPORT COMMAND	2800 2968	MOGADISHU	PROVIDE LOGISTICAL AND HEADQUARTERS STAFF SUPPORT TO UNOSOM II FORCE COMMAND	UN	US
QUICK REACTION FORCE (QRF)	1200 1200 1300	MOGADISHU	PROVIDE US COMBAT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF UNOSOM II TO COUNTER SPECIFIC THREATS THAT EXCEED THE CAPABILITY OF UNOSOM II FORCE COMMAND UNITS	US	US
RANGER TASK FORCE	600 966 + Special Op + Rangers 500 1000	MOGADISHU	TO SUPPORT US FORCES SOMALIA	US	US

TOTAL
7,980

DEPLOYING FORCES	SIZE (approx)	LOCATION	MISSION	UN	US
ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES 210 Army 4 H-1 + 14 Bradley's (sent)	1930 Army (86 H-1 + light Inf. + Heavy Batt. units) 1900	MOGADISHU	TO REINFORCE AND ENHANCE US FORCE PROTECTION CAPABILITY	US	US
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS (2)	2600	OFFSHORE	(SAME AS ABOVE)	US	US
CARRIER STRIKE FORCE Lincoln + escort (300)	5000 6,100	OFFSHORE	(SAME AS ABOVE)	US	US
TOTAL ON SHORE	6,600				

TOTAL OFF SHORE
(Mar) + Eng Battalions Minis ≈ 500 Army

(Sat) 340 Army

14 Tanks, Artillery battery, helicopter, PSYOPS/civ.
(22 cabt personnel)

Aden

Guadalcanal 1800 Navy
MEU/MAR 1811 Marines

(New Orleans)

New Orleans 2000 Navy
1870 Marines

7,481

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

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Deploying Augmentation Forces
(as of 8 October 1993)

- an additional light infantry battalion
- an armor battalion task force
- 4 AC-130H gunships
- an additional Ranger element
- two Marine Expeditionary Units
- a carrier strike force
- a self-propelled artillery battery
- 9 additional helicopters
- special operations personnel, including PSYOPs, civil affairs and others
- a ~~heavy~~ heavy combat engineer battalion