

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Somalia, 1993 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Global Affairs-Rice, Susan

Original OA/ID Number:

277

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	5	1	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	03/26/1993	P3/b(3)
001b. list	Support for Restore Hope (7 pages)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Somalia: Problems foreseen from the Somali Peace Conference Agreement (7 pages)	03/31/1993	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Changes for Page 4 (1 page)	03/30/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Salaries for Auxiliary Police (2 pages)	02/27/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	US Policy Toward Somalia (8 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. report	Somalia: Weekly Update (7 pages)	03/10/1993	P1/b(1)
007. chart	[Forces in Somalia] (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [1]

2012-0659-F

ke4131

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages ~~208~~ 9FRC - H SIDMAN. PM/ISO 6474059 7428
(Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION RESTORE HOPE CONTRIBUTIONS**EXPEDITE**

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>DICK CLARKE</u>	<u>3955066</u>	<u>302</u>
<u>OSD/ISA</u>	<u>LTCOL D. JOHNSON</u>	<u>6979753</u>	<u>4B746</u>
<u>JCS/J5</u>	<u>MAJ P. DAVIS</u>	<u>6149406</u>	<u>2B885</u>
	<u>ADRIER</u>	<u>4950483</u>	<u>2E977</u>

(b)(3)

[001a]

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

URGENT**PLEASE PASS TO
CENTCOM CAT**S/S Officer: W. H. H.DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006By VDE NARA, Date 10/29/16

2012-0659-6

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STATUS OF UNITAF MILITARY FORCES

Country	UNITAF Forces	Type of Forces
Australia	1121	Infantry
Belgium	834	Airborne/Infantry
Botswana	206	Infantry
Canada	1209	Mechanized Infantry/Logistics
Egypt	235	Mechanized Infantry
France	1576	Mechanized Infantry
Germany	0	Logistics
Greece	110	Medical/Logistics
India	174	Infantry/Logistics
Italy	3183	Airborne/Infantry
Kuwait	138	Infantry
Morocco	1081	Mechanized Infantry
New Zealand	67	Air Transport
Nigeria	565	Reconnaissance Infantry
Pakistan	880	Infantry
Saudi Arabia	680	Infantry
Sweden	180	Medical
Tunisia	133	Infantry/Medical
Turkey	300	Infantry
United Kingdom	0	Air Transportation
UAE	640	Infantry
Zimbabwe	160	Infantry
 Total Foreign	 13472	
 United States	 12578	 Composite
 TOTAL UNITAF	 26050	

Information current as of 3-24-93

STATUS OF
UNOSOM II MILITARY FORCES
March 26, 1993

Country	UNOSOM Forces	Expected UNOSOM Forces	UNOSOM Forces w/UNITAF	Type of Forces	Degree/Likelihood of Commitment
Algeria	0	0	0	Med	Unlikely
Argentina	0	177	0	Log/Med	Firm
Australia	0	45	45	Inf	Firm
Belgium	0	875	834	Abn/Inf	Firm through Dec. 93
Botswana	0	160	160	Inf	Firm
Canada	0	0	0	Mech Inf	Unlikely
Chile	0	0	0	TBD	Uncertain
Djibouti	0	250	0	Inf	Expressed Interest
Egypt	0	600	235	Mech Inf	Firm
France	0	1000	1000	Mech Inf	Firm
Germany	0	1500	0	Log	Likely, Const. reform required
Ghana	0	200	0	Inf	Serious consideration
Greece	0	110	110	Med/Log	Firm
Hungary	0	50	0	Med	Firm
India	0	4000	174	Inf/Log	Uncertain
Indonesia	0	850	0	Inf	Firm
Ireland	0	60	0	Trans	Firm
Italy	0	2500	2500	Abn/Inf	Firm
Jamaica	0	50	0	Eng	Uncertain
Jordan	0	900	0	Mech Inf	Firm
Kuwait	0	138	138	Inf	Uncertain
Malaysia	0	800	0	Arm/Inf	Firm
Mali	0	20	0	Med	Uncertain
Morocco	0	1264	1081	Mech Inf	Likely
Namibia	0	196	0	Inf	Firm
Nepal	0	150	0	Inf	Firm
New Zealand	0	67	67	Air Trans	Firm through June
Nigeria	0	565	565	Recon Inf	Firm
Norway	78	78	0	HQs	Firm
Pakistan	750	4000	880	Inf	Firm
Russia	0	0	0	TBD	Uncertain
Saudi Arabia	0	680	680	Inf	Firm
South Korea	0	200	0	Med/Eng	Likely
Sweden	0	180	180	Med	Firm through June 30
Tunisia	0	133	133	Inf/Med	Likely
Turkey	0	300	300	Inf	Firm
Uganda	0	300	0	Inf	Firm
UAE	0	700	640	Inf	Firm
United States	0	4000	4000	Log	Firm
Zambia	0	500	0	Inf	Firm
Zimbabwe	0	1000	165	Inf	Firm on 165, rest likely
TOTAL	828	28598	13887		14,715 UNOSOM designated troops in-country

Whereas the Congress expressed its support for a greater United Nations role in addressing the political and humanitarian situation in Somalia through Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 and House Concurrent Resolution 370 of the 102d Congress;

Whereas the United Nations Secretary General and United States officials concluded that intervention in Somalia would be necessary to avert further massive starvation;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council on December 3, 1992, adopted Resolution 794, authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia";

Whereas President Bush on December 8, 1992, began deploying United States Armed Forces in Somalia in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 794;

Whereas on December 10, 1992, President Bush formally reported to the Congress on the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Somalia;

Whereas on January 15, 1993, the Department of Defense announced the beginning of the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Somalia;

Whereas as of mid-March 1993, more than 13,000 American servicemen and women remain in Somalia as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and have been joined by some 14,000 troops from many other nations;

Whereas President Bush emphasized that United States Armed Forces would be withdrawn from Somalia and that the security mission would be assumed by a new United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM II) as

soon as a "secure environment" was created for the delivery of food and other humanitarian assistance;

Whereas the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Somalia, together with those from other countries, has led to a substantial increase in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and has opened up access to more remote areas of the country;

Whereas further starvation on a massive scale has been averted in Somalia, but there remains a need for continuing humanitarian efforts under UNOSOM II;

Whereas in a report dated March 3, 1993, the United Nations Secretary General proposed that the transfer of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II take place on May 1, 1993;

Whereas as outlined in the Secretary General's report, it is expected that United States Armed Forces will play a key role in the UNOSOM II operation;

Whereas United States Armed Forces in UNOSOM II will be under the command of a United Nations official;

Whereas United States Armed Forces in UNOSOM II will be asked to fulfill a mission in Somalia that is much broader and more open-ended than the mission originally outlined by President Bush;

Whereas United States Armed Forces in Somalia are not now in a situation of hostilities or a situation in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution, nor is it contemplated that they will be in such a situation while participating in UNOSOM II; and

Whereas the Congress has not been adequately consulted on the new United Nations mission in Somalia and has not

had an opportunity to debate and consider what United States policy should be in the context of a broadened United Nations mandate for that country: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
 3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This joint resolution may be cited as the “Authoriza-
 5 tion for Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia
 6 Resolution”.

7 **SEC. 2. PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES ARMED**
 8 **FORCES IN UNOSOM II.**

9 (a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized to
 10 deploy United States Armed Forces in Somalia in order
 11 to participate in UNOSOM II, subject to subsection (b).

12 (b) EXPIRATION.—The authorization provided in
 13 subsection (a) shall expire 6 months after the date of en-
 14 actment of this joint resolution, unless Congress extends
 15 such authorization.

16 **SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY STATEMENTS.**

17 (a) TRANSITION TO UNOSOM II.—It is the sense of
 18 the Congress that the President, in close consultation with
 19 the Secretary General of the United Nations and the other
 20 members of the United Nations Security Council, should
 21 ensure that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II

1 occurs not later than May 1, 1993, as proposed by the
2 Secretary General.

3 (b) RESTORATION OF SOMALI SELF-GOVERNMENT
4 AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES.—It
5 is the sense of the Congress that—

6 (1) the restoration of self-government to Soma-
7 lia and the withdrawal of all foreign military forces
8 from Somalia at the earliest date consistent with the
9 humanitarian situation in that country are fun-
10 damental objectives of the international community;

11 (2) to achieve these objectives, the United Na-
12 tions should foster the establishment of competent
13 local authorities in Somalia that will enable the So-
14 mali people to reclaim control of their country; and

15 (3) the size and scope of UNOSOM II should
16 be reduced as quickly as local institutions and the
17 humanitarian situation will permit.

18 (c) WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED
19 FORCES.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

20 (1) United States Armed Forces have per-
21 formed a humanitarian service in Somalia that the
22 armed forces of very few other countries could have
23 performed;

1 (2) increasingly, however, the security needs of
 2 Somalia can be handled by the armed forces of other
 3 countries; and

4 (3) the mission of UNOSOM II as set forth in
 5 the Secretary General's report of March 3, 1993, is
 6 considerably broader than the original United States
 7 objective of creating a secure environment for the
 8 delivery of humanitarian assistance.

9 For these reasons, and consistent with the objectives of
 10 promptly restoring Somali self-government and withdraw-
 11 ing foreign military forces from Somalia, the Congress de-
 12 clares that all United States Armed Forces should be with-
 13 drawn from Somalia not later than 6 months after the
 14 date of enactment of this joint resolution and their func-
 15 tions assumed by UNOSOM II forces from other countries
 16 to the extent required after that date.

17 (d) REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS INCURRED BY THE
 18 UNITED STATES IN SOMALIA.—It is the sense of the Con-
 19 gress that the President should seek to ensure that incre-
 20 mental costs incurred by the United States in connection
 21 with UNITAF and in connection with UNOSOM II are
 22 reimbursed to the maximum extent possible by the United
 23 Nations and other members of the international commu-
 24 nity.

1 **SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.**

2 Not later than 2 months after the date of enactment
 3 of this joint resolution and at least once every 2 months
 4 thereafter until 2 months after all United States Armed
 5 Forces have been withdrawn from Somalia, the President
 6 shall submit to the Congress a report on developments re-
 7 lated to Somalia. Each such report shall include—

8 (1) a statement of United States policy objec-
 9 tives in Somalia and an assessment of the progress
 10 that has been made in achieving those objectives;

11 (2) an assessment of the progress that has been
 12 made in fostering the establishment of competent
 13 local authorities in Somalia;

14 (3) the projected date for withdrawal of all
 15 United States Armed Forces from Somalia and an
 16 assessment of the progress that has been made to-
 17 ward completing that withdrawal;

18 (4) a full accounting of all United States incre-
 X 19 mental costs in connection with UNITAF and
 20 UNOSOM II;

21 (5) a full accounting of the estimated incremen-
 Y 22 tal costs of other countries in connection with
 23 UNITAF and UNOSOM II;

24 (6) a full accounting of all contributions that
 X 25 have been made to the United Nations Somalia

1 Trust Fund, and all disbursements from the Fund;
2 and

3 (7) a statement of the steps that have been
4 taken and assessment of the progress that has been
5 achieved in obtaining reimbursement of the incre-
6 mental costs incurred by the United States in con-
7 nection with UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

8 ~~SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.~~ ~~UNITAF shall mean the United States policy, objec-~~

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
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
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Somalia: Regions by Clan Competition



Unclassified

Transitional Government: Levers of Control



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
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Transitional Government of Somalia - 27 March 1993 Agreement



UNITAF/UNOSOM II FORCES IN SOMALIA

	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>UNITAF</u> <u>Troops</u> <u>On Station</u>	<u>Troops</u> <u>Expected</u> <u>UNOSOM II</u>	<u>Troops</u> <u>On-station</u> <u>UNOSOM II</u>	<u>TYPE OF</u> <u>FORCES</u>	<u>TYPE OF PARTIC.</u> <u>UNITAF</u> <u>UNOSOM</u>		<u>WHERE</u> <u>LOCATED</u>
1	Australia*	926	45	45	900 INF until mid-May	YES	YES	BAIDOA
2	Belgium	789 (741)	875	761	ABN/INF	YES	YES	KISMAYU
3	Botswana	206	160	160	INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
4	Canada*	1209	TBD	?	MECH INF (until Jun)	YES	TBD	BELET UEN
5	Egypt	235	600	235	MECH INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
6	France	1550	1000	1000	MECH INF	YES	YES	ODDUR
7	Germany**	0	TBD	?	ENG/LOG	NO	TBD	MOMBASA,KE
8	Greece	110	105	105	MED/LOG	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
9	India***	5	TBD	?	1500 INF/2500 LOG POSS	YES	TBD	MOGADISHU
10	Italy	2558	2500	2500	ABN/INF	YES	YES	GIALALASI
11	Kuwait	138	0	0	INF	YES	UND	MOGADISHU
12	Morocco	1081	1250	1250	MECH INF	YES	YES	BALEDOGLE
13	N.Z.	67	67	67	AIR TRANS	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
14	Nigeria	562 (565)	600	562	RECON	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
15	Norway	0	78	78	HQS	NO	YES	MOGADISHU
16	Pakistan	880	4000	1680	INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
17	S. Arabia	680	669	669	INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
18	Sweden	162	150	150	MED	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
19	Tunisia	133	133	133	INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
20	Turkey	300	300	300	INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
21	U.S.A.	8631 (9539)	5000	5000	LOG FORCE & QRF	YES	YES	VARIOUS
22	U.A.E.	640	700	640	INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU
23	Zimbabwe	160	160	160	INF	YES	YES	MOGADISHU

TOTAL: 21022 (21435) 18392 15495

As of: 010700L ^{file} Mar 93

* Considering extending participation of UNITAF forces to UNOSOM II.

** If UNOSOM II is a chapter 7 action, unlikely to participate.

*** Decision to participate is on track but awaiting Cabinet level nod.

cc's
not
in
mex

COUNTRIES CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION IN UNOSOM II

	PROJECTED FORCES		TYPE OF FORCES	SCHEDULED LOCATION	MAIN BODY ARRIVES
	Country:	Proj Force			
1	Algeria	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
2	Argentina	177	LOG/MED UNIT	TBD	TBD
3	Brazil	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
4	Chile	TBD	INF BN	TBD	TBD
5	Djibouti	250	INF	TBD	TBD
6	El Salvador	TBD	HELO UNIT	TBD	TBD
7	Ghana	200	INF	TBD	TBD
8	Hungary	50	MED TM	TBD	TBD
9	Indonesia	850	INF BN	TBD	TBD
10	Ireland	60	TRANS	TBD	TBD
11	Jamaica	50	ENG UNIT	TBD	TBD
12	Jordan	900	INF/SOF	MOGADISHU	TBD
13	Latvia	TBD	INF BN	TBD	TBD
14	Malaysia	800	INF BN	TBD	TBD
15	Mali	TBD	MED	TBD	TBD
16	Namibia	196	INF	TBD	TBD
17	Nepal	300	INF CO	TBD	TBD
18	Russia	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
19	S. Korea	200	MP or MED	TBD	TBD
20	Thailand	TBD	MED or TRANS	TBD	TBD
21	Uganda	300	300-3000 INF	TBD	TBD
22	Yemen	TBD	LINGUIST	TBD	TBD
23	Zambia	500	INF	TBD	TBD

TOTAL: 4833

As of: 010700L Mar 93

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Re: Salaries for Auxiliary Police (2 pages)	02/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [1]

2012-0659-F
ke4131

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE DEVELOPMENT GROUP FOR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, INC.

The Development GAP

1400 I Street, N.W. • Suite 520 • Washington, DC 20005

Telephone: (202) 898-1566

SUSAN
FY

for E.J.W.

COMMENTS ON EXTENDING U.N. PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS TO NORTHERN SOMALIA

Compared to Southern Somalia, the security situation in Northern Somalia has been relatively stable and thus may not warrant the introduction of U.N. peacekeeping troops. In addition, such a deployment would weaken troop strength in Southern Somalia (particularly the area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers) where famine and inter-clan fighting has been the most intense and where the bulk of any future agricultural production will come from.

The introduction of U.N. peacekeeping troops into the self-declared Republic of Somaliland will widely be seen in the region as an effort to forcibly reunite Northern and Southern Somalia. Given the tradition of independence and resistance among Northerners, it is extremely likely that there would be military resistance to such a deployment, thus jeopardizing future possibilities for reconciliation between the regions. Additionally, although there are divisions within the Somali National Movement (SNM), they are clearly a force to be dealt with and thus must be consulted on such a move.

Finally, there are grave concerns among both indigenous and international NGOs working in Northern Somalia that the resultant violence that such a deployment would most likely bring would disrupt the relief and rehabilitation efforts currently underway in the North.

--Ross Hammond
25 February 1993

SHOW
TO

PIO

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Clinton Library Transfer Form

Case #, if applicable	2012-0659-F	Accession #	
Collection/Record Group	Clinton Presidential Records	Series/Staff Name	Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs
Subgroup/Office of Origin	National Security Council	Subseries	Rice, Susan
Folder Title	Somalia, 1993 [1]	OA Number	277
		Box Number	
Description of Item(s)	Map of Somalia		

Donor Information			
Last Name:	First Name:	Middle Name:	Title:
Affiliation:	Phone (Wk):	Phone (Hm):	
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	US Policy Toward Somalia (8 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [1]

2012-0659-F
ke4131

RESTRICTION CODES

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**SOMALIA:
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION
AS A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY**

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4 March 1993

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PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

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PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

**SOMALIA:
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION
AS A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY**

RECOMMENDATIONS ON A SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK

After more than two decades of autocratic rule and political strife, Somalia has ceased to function or exist as a state. A three-step transition to democracy is proposed as a framework for resolving both the political stalemate and Somalia's future.

Step I: Convening of a meeting of representatives of northern and southern Somalia.

The conference would be a consultative forum of representatives of the principal factions and structured to ensure representation of the rival wings of the existing principal factions. The purpose of the consultations would be to identify a framework for UN mediation that would help eliminate Somali apprehensions about the United Nations peace-keeping operations. The proposed approach to the conference, as a north-south consultative forum of the principal factions, will diminish the saliency of clan affiliation and focuses the reconciliation process on the interim constitutional relations of the two territories. A broad spectrum of leaders in northern Somalia and one of the main factions in the south have endorsed such consultations.

Step II: Initiating separate broad-based northern and southern reconciliation conferences.

These parallel conferences would allow for greater participation of all leadership groups than the current inter-factional meeting. Parallel reconciliation processes would also circumvent the procedural disputes among factions by shifting disputes over representation to the provincial levels where they can be resolved. This would have the additional advantage of producing representative delegations. Each of the conferences would seek agreement on provincial security arrangements and administrative framework for organizing the basic services essential for economic and social reconstruction. Northern Somalia initiated such a process. The pre-conference consultation has significantly lowered tensions in the north. A similar approach to southern reconciliation is likely to be more successful than the current follow-up meetings of the factions which met in Addis Ababa, in January 1993. These meeting can however be used to stimulate southern process of reconciliation.

Step III: Convening of a conference of northern and southern representatives accredited through the parallel conferences in step two.

The conference would seek agreement on steps and procedures leadinging to transition to democracy. Such an agreement would foster agreement on the establishment of joint interim institutions that would coordinate the transitional process and act as repositories of Somali sovereignty as well.

The conferences in step one and two would entrench the accountability of factional leaders to broad-based processes of reconciliations. The three-step transition would enable the United Nations to monitor the settlement process but allow it to navigate around Somalia's faction-ridden politics.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council has since early 1992 adopted numerous resolutions on Somalia in which the Council ordered cease-fires, imposed an arms embargo and called for national reconciliation. The Council also endorsed the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General and the partition of the country into four operational zones. In its last resolution, the Council determined that the conditions in Somalia posed a threat to international peace and security and authorized, under chapter seven of the United Nations charter, an American-led multinational force. The force was mandated to use all necessary measures to ensure delivery of humanitarian supplies.

The American-led operation has facilitated the delivery of relief supplies to famine affected areas but its total impact on security conditions is unclear. The expanded new United Nations operation in Somalia, negotiated between American and United Nations officials, will in effect have the United Nations Security Council endorse an open-ended peace-keeping operation. In the absence of an agreement on a settlement framework on Somalia's future political order, the United Nations will be faced with the daunting prospect of assuming responsibility for disarming all political factions, restoring law and order, organizing local police forces and, through the international nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations agencies, managing humanitarian and economic assistance to Somalia.

Such an open-ended operation would make the United Nations assume responsibility for Somalia's internal security, a task for which the United Nations peace-keeping operation is neither suited nor effective. An open-ended operation would also establish the United Nations bureaucracy as

the de facto administering authority and generate hostility to the United Nations operations and, thus, diminish its capacity to act as a neutral mediator.

The United Nations would then be faced with two choices: it must either establish a formal trusteeship over Somalia or, as a less costly venture, impose a settlement framework and coopt those endorsing its proposals to form an interim government. Both options are likely to be backed by merchants and political entrepreneurs positioning themselves to benefit from the United Nations operations. An interim government established under these circumstances would be challenged and face serious opposition from a reconfiguration of the political factions. The many Islamic groups now subordinate to the secular but clan-based factions could then emerge as a potent political force. All of these factors could add to Somalia's tragedy.

II. GENERATING AN AGREEMENT ON A SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK: ISSUES AND APPROACHES

A settlement framework must help create the conditions for security and governance at provincial levels, promote reconciliation within northern and southern Somalia and foster agreement on the establishment of joint interim institutions that would serve as repositories of Somali sovereignty. Such an approach to political settlement would center the agenda of the reconciliation and mediation on the immediate requirements of domestic tranquility essential to the implementation of humanitarian and reconstruction operations and on the prerequisites for the future stability of Somalia.

A. Strategies for restoring domestic tranquility

All of Somalia's political factions draw their support from clan-based constituencies concentrated in core provinces. But in almost every instance, the core clan territories contain significant minorities from other clans in contiguous provinces. Moreover, rural migration to provincial urban centres led to the evolution of provincial settlement patterns in which the urban

population of the provincial administrative centres are representative of subclans within the provinces. While each of the subclans constitutes a decisive majority of the population of the largely rural districts in the province, nomadic population in their seasonal migration cross district as well provincial administrative boundaries. All of the active violence is concentrated in provinces where settlements of the constituencies of rival leadership cliques overlap.

The core leadership of the political factions consist of provincial leadership cliques that compete within themselves and with others in adjacent provinces. The partition of the country into four operational zones by the United Nations has further reinforced territorial claims of clans and intra-factional competition for control of the ports in the four zones- Berbera in the north-west, Bosasso in the north-east and Mogadishu and Kismayu in central and southern zones. The ports are not only the entry points of international humanitarian supplies but the sources of local revenues. Each of the four ports changed hands several times. In three of the four ports, the conflict is between provincial cliques within a faction. In the fourth, the conflict stems from both levels of conflict.

The restoration of domestic tranquility would require specific inter-factional agreements on security arrangements in the provincial urban administrative centres and the four ports. Such agreements would also enable the leadership of provincial communities to reinforce reconciliation among provincial rural communities. The agreements should hold the leadership of provincial communities and factions accountable to violations occurring or initiated from their respective core areas of influence. In addition, provincial police units should also be organized and authorized to enforce provincial security arrangements. These interrelated measures would help reduce opportunistic gang lootings that also fuel the cycle of urban violence and provincial lawlessness.

B. Strategies for promoting reconciliation

The political stalemate over the past two years as well as factional violence were the outcome of competition among clan-based factions and leadership feuds within factions. Four factors that subverted past reconciliation efforts should be borne in mind and avoided. First, the main political faction in northern Somalia perceive reconciliation conference as tactical maneuvers to reverse or delegitimize their right to abrogate the Act of Union. Second, almost all of the factions lack formal structures for resolving internal leadership rivalries or entering or ratifying reconciliation agreements. Third, participation in United Nations sponsored or other meetings tended to be used by rival leadership cliques, many of them based outside the country and without credible domestic followings, as a means of gaining internal political legitimacy. Fourth, past mediations efforts sought to achieve agreements on interim government and therefore heightened dispute over power sharing arrangements among the factions.

The mediation process could only succeed if it starts with building the foundation for agreement on security arrangements. Such an approach would also decouple factional competition within provinces from inter-factional competition and encourage the evolution of multi-clan provincial leadership groups. Strategies of reconciliation within provinces can create the conditions for an agreement on administrative framework for the management of relief and reconstruction and restoring domestic tranquility in northern and southern provinces. In contrast, intra-factional reconciliations, while essential to reducing levels of conflict, tend to stimulate competition and violence among clan-based factions. Similarly, inter-factional reconciliation that seek to eclipse rival leadership within clan-based factions stimulate intra-clan conflict which in turn deepens the political stalemate by widening mistrust between and within factions.

The proposed strategies for provincial security and reconciliation can only be effective if they establish mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of the leadership of the principal factions in northern and southern Somalia. The strategies would also be subverted if seen or implemented as deliberate attempts to marginalize the principal factions. Multi-clan Ad hoc committees of provincial leaders need to be encouraged to participate in process of northern and southern reconciliation. Leadership cliques based on support from a single subclan should also be included in provincial arrangements on security and the management of relief and reconstruction operation. On the otherhand, both groups are unlikely to be effective partners in generating agreement on constitutional or political framework for settlement. Indeed, political settlements arrived through inter-clan fora quickly degenerate and delegitimize leaders elected and appointed to political offices. The leaders of northern Somalia's self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland and the interim government in southern Somalia were selected through inter-clan consultation. The political difficulties of the northern and southern presidents and leaders of the political factions are inherent in their selection through clan and inter-clan fora that make political leaders continually seek firm support from their clan constituencies instead of the less certain support from a broader constituency.

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

For all practical purposes, Somalia is unlikely to be restored as a centralized unitary state, despite its ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Transition to democracy establishing multi-tier electoral rolls can be an effective framework for ensuring the future political stability of Somalia. The implementation of the transitional process would, however, require agreement on the establishment of joint interim institutions.

A. Interim joint institutions

The leadership of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland while abrogating the 1960 Act of Union recognize the need for joint interim institutions to deal with the difficult economic and international problems that confront Somalia. Some of the leaders of the principal southern factions would prefer the restoration of Somalia as a confederation of northern and southern Somalia while others would prefer a federation of provinces with substantial political autonomy. The incorporation of separate referenda in provisions of the transitional settlement coupled with substantial political autonomy of both the North and South during the transitional period could foster agreement on the establishment of joint interim institutions.

B. Basic principles of a political settlement

The transitional process must entrench broad participation of representative leadership factions in the reconciliation. Four principles are proposed as a framework for a transitional settlement. First, the future constitutional relations of northern and southern Somalia should be left to the outcome of a democratic transitional process. Second, consensus among the principal political factions is essential to restoring domestic tranquility. Third, separate process of northern and southern reconciliation is the most effective approach to rebuilding a consensus on a political settlement and ensuring broad-based and effective participation of provincial leadership groups in the transitional process. Fourth, a devolution of authority to provincial government should be linked to creating a framework for reconstruction. Strategies of devolution must be implemented to empower territorial communities.

A transitional process settlement incorporating these principles would minimize the devolution of authority into clan-based provincial enclaves. The

strategies for transition, but enhance accountability of leaders to provincial communities while also promoting the establishment of national constituencies that can be the nucleus for an enduring democratic consensus.

The prospects of free and fair competitive elections to local, provincial and national offices would help moderate the effectiveness of clan-appeal in winning appointment or election to national offices and thus reduce the risks of political fragmentation. A multi-tier electoral rolls would further create competitive leadership centres that would encourage political parties to seek support from grass-roots as well as provincial and national constituencies.

Studies on alternatives strategies for devolution of authority would help focus processes of national reconciliation on strategies of transition rather than on the establishment of an interim government. Expert panels should be established to evaluate Somali experience with democratic elections during the 1960s. These panels should be established in the country and provided with adequate financial support and technical assistance by international experts. The finding and recommendations of the proposed panels could help accelerate consensus on principles of the transitional strategies. The expert panels would also elaborate guidelines for the organization and management of relief and reconstruction operations. In addition, the findings and recommendations of these panels would help define reconstruction priorities and identify effective implementation strategies which can be the basis of guidelines for coordinated international assistance.

C. Guidelines for a United Nations operation

The United Nations operation in Somalia should not seek to establish the basic institutions of a Somali state or define the procedures to be followed in reconciliation. Instead, the United Nations operation should be structured to facilitate a settlement process acceptable to the Somali

parties. Such an approach to its operations will enable the United Nations to pursue a less intrusive and, therefore, less costly operation and allow it to navigate around Somalia's intricate and faction-ridden politics.

The challenge to the United Nations is to put together a framework for mediation that would strengthen its peace-keeping activities and separate the deployment of the force from competitive strategies of the rival factions. In order to avoid risks inherent in an intrusive operation, the United Nations mediation effort should be structured to make the principal factions active partners in restoring domestic tranquility and taking part in formulating strategies for reconciliation. This would enhance overall confidence in the neutrality of the United Nations operation, break the vicious cycle of political stalemate and violence and, thus, create the conditions for an effective demobilization of the armed militias of the faction and public support for disarmament of civilians.

The peace-keeping operations should be available for flexible and strategic deployment in critical situations but largely deployed to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of all militia factions. The force should also support provincial security arrangements. The mission of the force should be reviewed and structured to include significant number of experienced police units capable of assisting in the reorganization and training of a national police force. The operation should also include adequate technical and financial support to provincial administration.

Such an approach to the United Nations peace-keeping operation would increase the effectiveness of its mediation and improve the prospect of an enduring political settlement as well.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	Somalia: Weekly Update (7 pages)	03/10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs (Rice, Susan)
OA/Box Number: 277

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, 1993 [1]

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IO/UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES -6- DATE 3/8/93FROM IO/UNP: LWEINTRAUB TELEPHONE _____TO OFFICE: OSD/ISA +JCS/J-5 FAX TEL NUMBER _____
NSCSDISTRIBUTE TO: OSD/ISA/AF - Col. M. Johnson TEL 703-697-9753 FAX 703-695-4620
JCS/J-5: Col. P. Baltimore TEL 703-614-9406 FAX 703-697-0255NSCS: Dick Clarke TEL 395-3393
NSCS Susan Rice FAX 395-1199 TEL 395-3736SUBJECT SOMALIA/UNOSOM II DRAFT RESOLUTIONREMARKS UN version with a few changes to US draft
sent in STATE 67709; more changes may be
proposed.
pls call with any reactions. lew

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP FAX NUMBER 202-647-0039
TELEPHONE 202-647-2392

Draft Resolution on Expansion of UNOSOM 2

The security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, and 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992.

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and the rebuilding of a civil society in Somalia,

Welcomes the convening of a Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and calls upon Governments to contribute generously to the 1993 Programme for Relief and Rehabilitation for Somalia;

- 2 -

Considering the restoration of law and order in Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, and the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Stressing the desire to assist the people of Somalia to participate in free and fair elections when conditions permit,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation held in Addis Ababa January 4-15, 1993, including in particular the conclusion of the three agreements by the Somali parties, movements and factions, as reported by the Secretary-General (S/25168, including annexes),

Noting the reports of states concerned (S/) and of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 (S/24992) and 26 January 1993 (S/25168) and 3 March 1993 (S/25354) on the implementation of resolution 794 and the attainment of the objective of establishment of a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/) and endorses the recommendations contained therein;

- 3 -

2. Demands that the parties, movements and factions in Somalia comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the Addis Ababa informal preparatory meeting, and in particular with their agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (S/25168, Annex III);

3. Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in providing humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation;

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to use all means as necessary to realize the objectives set upon this mandate, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General (S/ , paras, 56-58 and 67-75);

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to direct UNOSOM forces, incidental to but without undermining its other functions, to monitor and enforce from within Somalia the arms embargo established by Security Council resolution 733 (23 January 1992) and to provide security, as appropriate, within Somalia to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced persons;

6. Reiterates its demand that all parties, movements, and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law and reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

- 4 -

7. Calls upon the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to direct the Commander of UNOSOM to assume responsibility for the maintenance of a secure environment in Somalia on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report (S/ , paragraph 76 (a));

8. Calls upon the Secretary-General, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report (S/);

a) to provide for the relief and economic rehabilitation of Somalia, including the return to their homes of refugees and internally displaced persons, and attention to the need for jobs and work for unemployed (paras 25-26);

b) to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation and the reestablishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration (paras 27-30 and 43-45);

c) to provide for the establishment of an indigenous police force for the maintenance of law and order, and to assist in the restoration of peace, stability and law and order, including the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law (paras 46-50);

d) to assist the people of Somalia in removing mines throughout Somalia, including the establishment of a coherent and integrated program for the removal of such mines (paras 34-40);

(e) to support the activities of the United Nations in Somalia through the use of appropriate public information activities (paras 51-53).

- 5 -

6

9. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 for the purpose of receiving contributions for maintenance of the expanded UNOSOM forces following the departure of UNITAF forces;
10. Endorses the efforts of the Secretary-General to convene a National Reconciliation Conference taking into account the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 1993, and his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somali movements, factions, community leaders, women, intellectuals, elders and other groups are suitably represented at that Conference;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement this resolution and on the progress achieved in accomplishing the purposes set out in it: ✓
12. Requests United Nations agencies, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to extend, in coordination with the Secretary-General, financial, material and technical support to the people of Somalia;
13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. chart	[Forces in Somalia] (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE
OF PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19 OF RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 in which the Security Council:

"Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

"Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;"

2. Section I of the present report contains a factual description of the further action taken since my report of 26 January 1993 to implement resolution 794 (1992). Humanitarian activities are covered in section II, political reconciliation in section III, establishment of a Somali police force in section IV and public information activities in section V. Section VI sets out my current thinking on the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to what will become UNOSOM II. Financial aspects are covered in section VII and my observations are contained in section VIII.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 (1992)
(26 January-28 February 1993)

3. The specific terms of reference entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concern:

(a) The operations and further deployment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (para. 6);

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(b) Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (para. 10);

(c) The establishment of mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and UNITAF (para. 13), including the attachment of UNOSOM liaison staff to the headquarters of UNITAF (para. 15);

(d) Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (para. 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

A. The operations of UNOSOM

4. In my report of 26 January 1993 to the Security Council (S/25168), I indicated that a major preoccupation for UNOSOM at that juncture was the planning for the arrangements for the transition of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning included present plans for deployment of troops to northern Somalia, proposals for mine clearance, creation of a Somali police force and gradual strengthening of the UNOSOM headquarters military component.

5. The military component of UNOSOM currently has a strength of 715 all ranks, composed mainly of an infantry battalion of 500 all ranks, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements and a small headquarters company and staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia, which had been authorized under Security Council resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, I am continuing to strengthen UNOSOM headquarters. I have also appointed a Force Commander who will manage the transition process and command UNOSOM II when it is established.

B. Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

6. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) UNITAF has deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia. No troops have been deployed in the north and in border areas. The overall security situation in the sectors under the control of UNITAF has slowly improved, although incidents of violence continue to occur in the major population centres and in some rural areas. The UNITAF Commander has declared that "all areas are stable or relatively stable". However, UNITAF forces have continued to be the target of sniper fire and harassment, and, especially in recent weeks, major incidents of resumed fighting or rioting have been reported from Kismayo and Mogadishu. While most major clans and factions have welcomed the deployment of UNITAF and have cooperated, the positions of some of the faction leaders have not always remained consistent. UNITAF's presence in key areas of the country has reduced the influence of those whose power was based on their heavy weapons. A number of disarmament forays have been carried out on a limited scale, both in Mogadishu and in other locations

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within the designated sectors. It should be noted that the area under UNITAF control comprises only 40 per cent of the country's territory. No systematic attempt has been made to establish a secure environment outside this area.

C. Mechanisms for coordination

7. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

(a) At United Nations Headquarters:

- (i) A policy group on Somalia is chaired by the Secretary-General and meets regularly with senior representatives of the United States Government. It reviews the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding and planning for the future role of UNOSOM;
- (ii) An operational task force (chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations), comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned and representatives of the United States, meets weekly;
- (iii) A liaison team composed of United States officers has been attached to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations since early January;
- (iv) A UNOSOM planning team is now in place in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

(b) At UNOSOM headquarters, Mogadishu, the UNOSOM Force Commander and the Commander of UNITAF are working closely in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two Forces. Much of the detailed planning of the transition will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose. A UNOSOM liaison staff has been working with UNITAF headquarters.

8. Several of the Member States that are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have asked to be consulted on the current operations of the Force and progress on planning for the transition. I have initiated regular meetings to which all States participating in the Force are invited.

D. Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

9. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cessation of hostilities and the observance of the cease-fire as well as the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have, in accordance with the mandate given to me by the Security Council, continued to promote efforts for national reconciliation and unity in the country, in cooperation with regional organizations, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

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10. In my last report (S/25168), I informed the Security Council about the outcome of the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Somalia which I convened at the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa (4-15 January 1993). I noted in particular that the following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting:

(a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993;

(b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and modalities of disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement);

(c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help to resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference as well as other issues pending from the informal meeting.

11. I also reported that, as stipulated in the latter Agreement, the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee was scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 to submit recommendations to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993 on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference. Regrettably, the Committee was unable to meet because the Somali National Alliance (SNA) refused to participate, alleging that the Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) had violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking its forces in and around Kismayo.

12. A further meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, scheduled for the beginning of February in Mogadishu, could not be convened because of the position taken by SNA that its representatives would not attend as long as SNF and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) forces continued to violate the cease-fire around Kismayo. As a result, the broad agreement reached in consultation with the individual Committee members on the agenda, the rules of procedures and the list of international observers to be invited to the Conference could not be formally endorsed by the Committee.

13. Subsequent consultations with SNA on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference have helped to clear the way for convening a formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. SNA has agreed not to insist on the exclusion of the smaller parties from participation at the Conference. It was also agreed that the participants should include politicians, community leaders, women and military representatives of the warring parties.

14. The only aspect of participation which has yet to be resolved is the size of the respective delegations of the parties. The parties have requested the United Nations to devise a formula for a fair allocation of delegates to each party.

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15. Following these encouraging developments, my Special Representative issued invitations to the parties to attend a formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee in Mogadishu. The Committee held its first formal meeting on 23 February 1993 and completed its work when it resumed its meeting on 27 February following three days of interruption owing to rioting and fighting in Mogadishu (24-26 February). All Committee members, except the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), were represented at the meeting. In addition to the United Nations, representatives of the Horn of Africa Committee and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries were also present at the meeting.

16. On the first day of the meeting, the Committee adopted a report on participation, the draft agenda and procedures for reaching decisions. When the meeting resumed on 27 February, SNA submitted written reservations notably on the criteria for participation. The Committee agreed to circulate immediately its report to all political movements since time constraints would not allow the reconvening of the informal preparatory meeting of the whole to which it was expected to submit its report.

17. The progress achieved by the Committee has cleared the way for proceeding with arrangements for a meeting on national reconciliation. It is my intention to invite a broad cross-section of Somalis, representing political movements, community, religious and women's groups, civic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as elders and eminent persons to a Conference on National Reconciliation, to be held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 19 March 1993. The categories of participants have been agreed to by the Ad Hoc Committee. In addition to national reconciliation, the meeting will also consider organizational matters.

18. I have stressed that my efforts and those of my Special Representative will continue to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia in accordance with the mandate given to me by the Security Council. UNOSOM will therefore continue to promote and facilitate dialogue and communication between the various Somali parties, movements and factions in order to help to keep lines of communication open between them and to promote confidence-building measures so essential to the success of the efforts deployed for national reconciliation.

II. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

19. As mentioned in my progress report of 26 January 1993, the deployment of UNITAF forces has facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia at a quickly increased rate. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation has fallen dramatically in many areas.

20. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is bound to be affected by the security situation, which has tended to vary at times from week to week and from region to region.

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even though during the early period of the deployment of UNITAF the security situation had improved. Many of the "technical" vehicles were reported to have been withdrawn or placed in cantonment and large-scale looting decreased substantially. Commercial and market activities appeared to be picking up and some schools were reopened. Agricultural activities have been on the increase. However, in recent weeks the security situation has deteriorated.

21. As of the time of writing of the present report, the situation in many parts of the country remains complex and tense. Especially in rural areas and along Somalia's borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, security conditions remain unstable. The murders in January and February 1993 of United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relief workers highlight the extreme fragility of the security situation in spite of the presence of large numbers of military forces. This also highlights again the importance of a secure environment for the effective delivery of emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance.

22. It is in this context that the United Nations, in close cooperation with relevant organizations of the United Nations system and international NGOs as well as Somali representatives, is in the process of preparing a relief and rehabilitation programme for 1993.

23. The needs of Somalia are immense and urgent. In the southern and central parts of the country, large numbers of people remain destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. Measles, diarrhoea and other infections continue to take a heavy toll, particularly on small children. Lack of access to clean water sources and poor sanitation present major health threats. With the present security arrangements enabling areas hitherto inaccessible to be reached, some for the first time in many months, it has been confirmed that increased and expanded emergency programmes will be needed through most - if not all - of 1993.

24. It has become apparent that a substantial portion of Somalis are ready to rebuild their lives and their society. The first steps towards recovery and normalcy must be rapidly and judiciously supported to prevent further social and economic deterioration or a lapse into a new cycle of internecine killing and brutality.

25. Two major challenges in 1993 will be to facilitate the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees, according to figures provided by Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and internally displaced persons as well as providing jobs and work for the many millions of Somalis who are presently unemployed. Among these groups are the many thousands of crews of "technicals", armed gangs, militias and private armies of the various factions. While channelling these people into lawful pursuits may be difficult, the creation of work through large-scale labour forces carrying out activities such as road repairs, canal clearing and sanitation is essential if Somalia is ever to become stable. Alongside such endeavours, vocational training programmes and adult literacy courses must also be explored.

26. As regards refugees and displaced persons, some have already spontaneously returned to their home areas in recent months. These groups will need assistance to return to agricultural and/or livestock pursuits. However, many refugees and displaced people have indicated they are not yet willing to return home because of uncertain security in their areas of origin. These groups require continued relief assistance. For others who have lost their homes and their land, or where other families now occupy these areas, new alternative sites must be found. Given the current situation on the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya and political pressures for the Somali refugees to return to their own country, it is also imperative that contingency plans and stocks of household goods, food and other commodities are in hand to cope with sudden mass influxes back to Somalia.

27. A third major challenge concerns national capacity-building. National and regional Somali institutions and civil administration have virtually ceased to exist. None the less there remains considerable institutional memory and expertise on the part of former civil servants and local leaders. Programmes planned in 1993 must utilize these resources to the fullest extent possible, particularly in the consultative process of project identification and subsequent implementation. Somali women have assumed a stronger economic and political role as a result of civil strife. This trend will be encouraged in 1993 through the close involvement of Somali women's groups in both the planning and the delivery of assistance.

28. Countrywide, Somalis are calling for assistance in re-establishing education facilities. Most youngsters have no access to schools and the education of former students in the 15-25 age group has been totally disrupted. For want of alternatives, many of them have joined the bands of armed gangs roaming the streets and the countryside. The reopening of schools countrywide will be of vital importance to the process of returning to peace and stability.

29. The 100-day accelerated and expanded programme of assistance for Somalia, which ended on 19 January 1993, was launched at the height of the crisis in 1992 at a time when the focus was rightly on saving lives. At the Addis Ababa follow-up conference on the 100-day programme in early December 1992, participants agreed that efforts in 1993 should focus on beginning to return Somalia to normalcy. While the present relief and recovery programme for 1993 recognizes the need for continued large-scale relief assistance, it has been designed to go beyond the ongoing relief effort to pave the way for large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction.

30. The cost of restoring Somalia as a nation and society will be enormous. It will take many years even to reach pre-war levels. As prospects for peace and stability improve, the international community will undoubtedly be called upon to assist the people of Somalia in supporting long-term national reconstruction and development. In the interim, much can be done immediately through the joint efforts of the international community and the Somali people. A main objective of the 1993 programme is thus to set the stage for such initiatives by enhancing the absorptive capacity of Somalia's human and institutional resources.

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31. Underlying the programming process is a sectoral core group structure to assess needs and devise projects for the 1993 programme. Ten core groups, comprising representatives of local and international NGOs, Somali organizations, donor Governments, ICRC and United Nations agencies, have been formed to cover the following priority sectors: health, water, food, security, nutrition, sanitation, employment, administrative rehabilitation, police forces, agriculture and livestock. These core groups will serve as the focal points for sectoral monitoring and reviews, leading to periodic updates. Simultaneously with this process, a regional input was sought through the established relief communities in the nine regional centres in the southern and central parts of the country. Inputs from the north-east and the north-west, primarily for rehabilitation, are put together through the UNOSOM regional offices in those areas. Their inputs have also been reflected in the present document.

32. A United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the relief and rehabilitation programme and receive pledges from donors. The active involvement of a wide spectrum of Somalis is indispensable to the effective implementation of the programme. Every effort will therefore be made to achieve broad Somali participation in the conference. A positive outcome of the humanitarian conference could provide added incentives for the national reconciliation process.

33. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the programme, particularly the coordination of relief efforts and the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be provided in the context of UNOSOM II with the necessary support in order to enable him to discharge his responsibilities.

Mine-clearance

34. The mine-clearance problems facing Somalia have not yet been seriously addressed. According to a report issued by Physicians for Human Rights, an NGO, much of northern Somalia remains contaminated by mines. Most of the mines lie scattered across pastoral lands or hidden near wells or water holes. Others have been laid on secondary roads or in former military installations. They are considered to be more prevalent in the countryside surrounding two of Somalia's principal cities, Hargeisa and Burao, and in the pastoral and agricultural lands west of Burao. The victims of the mines have been mainly civilians, of whom many are women and children.

35. No estimate has been made of the total number of mines laid, but some relief agencies have reported that many hundreds of thousands may still be in the ground. Some of these are in minefields, but many have been used as weapons of terror for denying access to homes, villages and water. There are an estimated 1,200 kilometres of roads to be demined in the Hargeisa area alone.

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36. Some limited mine clearance has been undertaken by the Somali National Movement (SNM) when it reoccupied northern Somalia but out of its team of 60, some 40 per cent became mine casualties. A United Kingdom company, RIMFIRE, has been operating under contract from Médecins sans Frontières and UNHCR. It is reported that it has lifted some 25,000 mines in the Hargeisa area and enabled the repopulation of the town. This has probably only scratched the surface of the problem.

37. The UNOSOM military component will not have clearance of minefields as a mission objective although some clearance effort will be needed if any logistic base is set up in the Hargeisa region, because the airport area is still mined. There may well be a requirement for route clearance since mines may be used in a harassing role by some of the factions.

38. The humanitarian relief efforts will be more severely hampered, especially when they spread into the north. The humanitarian problems will become acute when large-scale attempts are made to rehabilitate the land and re-establish the rural economy. Much of the grazing land used by nomadic tribesmen will be unusable, and villages for returning refugees will require complete clearing before they can be restored to use.

39. It will therefore be necessary to establish a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines in Somalia. As a start, it is my intention to send the United Nations demining team of experts to Somalia to establish the extent of the problem. Following this visit, a mine-clearing plan should be drawn up, using the models at present in use or being built up in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The main components of the plan will include a proper minefield survey and extended contract mine clearance. If it becomes clear that the mines number millions rather than thousands, a mine-clearance training facility will have to be established, and a force of Somali mine clearers will have to be trained, as in Cambodia, to undertake the major part of the mine-clearance task, in a plan lasting years rather than months.

40. In a separate programme, a mine awareness programme will have to be established among refugees and displaced persons and known mined areas will have to be fenced or marked off to prevent nomadic tribesmen from using mined areas for grazing.

III. POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

41. Ultimately, all the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia are directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance. The absence of a central Government has aggravated the social, economic and political difficulties in the country. In fact, the non-existence of a Government in Somalia is one of the main reasons for the now more robust role of the Organization in the country.

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42. Various avenues have been actively explored to enhance Somalia's capability to govern itself. In this connection, my Special Representative and other senior officials have been consulting with elders, leaders, warring factions and women's professional groups on how best to create a broad-based Government.

43. I and my Special Representative have encountered difficulties in our efforts aimed at promoting national reconciliation in Somalia. National reconciliation is a difficult process in the best of circumstances; it is particularly difficult in Somalia because of the multiplicity of parties, factions and other leaders and the total absence of law and order in all parts of the country. The primary initiative for national reconciliation must be left to the Somalis themselves. While this may be the ideal approach, the experience thus far has clearly shown the need for the United Nations to be given a broader mandate, not only in organizing, but also in promoting and advancing, the cause of national reconciliation.

44. As reported to the Security Council in my progress report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I convened an informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The participants reached agreement on three major documents (see para. 10 above).

45. As indicated in paragraph 32 above, a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance is to be held in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993, to be followed immediately by the Conference on National Reconciliation. These meetings are expected to provide an opportunity for all segments of Somali society, including the political factions, movements, community leaders, women, intellectuals and others to meet under one roof and discuss the problems of political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance as well as programmes for viable rehabilitation and reconstruction.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOMALI POLICE FORCE

46. I had indicated in my previous reports to the Council (S/24992, para. 30 and S/25168, para. 23) that I considered the establishment of a Somali police force as a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia. With that in mind, I had sent an expert team which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, would prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia.

47. The team was requested to study the feasibility of establishing such a national police force, make recommendations and develop a strategy for implementation.

48. The expert team was also requested to outline the appropriate modalities for training Somali personnel in the maintenance of law and order as well as the discharge of police responsibilities, while adhering to internationally accepted principles and practices for the protection of human rights.

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49. As mentioned in paragraph 23 of my report of 26 January 1993, UNITAF, under its supervision and in close consultation with my Special Representative, has now constituted an interim auxiliary force composed of former police officers. This auxiliary force will, as a temporary arrangement, oversee road traffic control and undertake the protection of feeding centres, thus relieving United Nations agencies and NGOs from the dependency on locally hired guards and freeing UNOSOM soldiers for more demanding and urgent tasks. I have requested the expert team to study the arrangements established for the auxiliary force with a view eventually to integrating some of its elements into a new civilian police force.

50. Bearing the above in mind, I consider it a matter of expediency to include an international civilian police component in the future UNOSOM II, but would refrain from making any specific recommendations at this time pending the receipt of the expert team's recommendations. I will therefore shortly bring to the attention of the Council a more detailed assessment on the establishment of this civilian police force.

V. PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

51. To support the execution of the new mandate for UNOSOM II, an intensive and expanded information campaign will be required. Transitional arrangements from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will have to be conveyed to the general public. The new mandate under which UNOSOM II will be operating must be translated into vernacular languages and broadcast at large. In addition and as the political climate changes, new information inputs will have to be designed in order to support every aspect of the operation and stimulate a stable social climate. It is also my intention to use public information activities in Somalia as an educational tool to strengthen the peace process, human rights and overall productive economic integration.

52. The information component in UNOSOM II will absorb themes developed on a day-to-day basis from the different highlights of the United Nations presence in Somalia such as transitional arrangements, cease-fire observances, disarmament, demobilization of armed groups, training of civilian police, refugee resettlement, safety, health and hygiene, just to mention the most important. The collaboration of United Nations specialized agencies and programmes will be sought in the elaboration of some of these broadcast elements.

53. The Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat has secured an agreement with Radio Cairo as of 15 January 1993, by which Radio Cairo's External Services Network translates and broadcasts in Somalia United Nations-produced material. This arrangement is expected to be in place for approximately three months, after which time the United Nations will be in a position to evaluate the service in the light of internal developments and the evolving requirements of the UNOSOM II information programme. Similar arrangements with radio stations in the neighbouring countries will be explored. In the meantime the United Nations is arranging the modalities for

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UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the operation of a daily newspaper and a radio station, which are currently managed by the United States under UNITAF.

VI. THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM II

The present situation

54. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, had authorized the Secretary-General and certain Member States to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

55. There is no doubt that the presence and operations of UNITAF have had, especially during the initial period of its deployment, a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, as indicated in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, this improvement cannot yet be regarded as irreversible and conditions are still volatile. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. As mentioned above, UNITAF has deployed only in the central and southern parts of the country. Disarmament is far from complete.

The new mandate

56. The Council will now have to consider whether to authorize an enlargement of UNOSOM and redefine its mandate to include operations under Chapter VII of the Charter. The consequence of such a decision would be far-reaching for political, legal and logistical reasons and would entail a major financial commitment. The view which I have conveyed to the Security Council during the last two months is still current and valid: without improved security all over the country the political process cannot prosper and humanitarian operations will remain vulnerable to disruption. I have, therefore, devoted a great deal of my efforts to ensure that parallel steps are taken: cease-fire and reconciliation mechanisms, disarmament and creation of a civilian police force, rehabilitation alongside political dialogue. I have insisted with all the factions and elders that it is up to them to change the course of violence towards peace and I have assured them that the international community stands ready to support their efforts in this direction.

57. My firm view, as stated in my letter to President Bush of 8 December 1992, remains that the mandate of UNOSOM II must cover the whole territory of Somalia and include disarmament. Moreover, as indicated in my report of 19 December 1992 (S/24992), UNOSOM II's mandate will include the following military tasks:

(a) To monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed, particularly the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993;

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(b) To prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities;

(c) To maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army;

(d) To seize the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and to assist in the registration and security of such arms;

(e) To secure or maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

(f) To protect, as required, the personnel, installations and equipments of United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements that attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;

(g) To continue the programme for mine-clearing in the most afflicted areas;

(h) To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

(i) To carry out such other functions as may be authorized by the Security Council.

58. It is clear to me that the effort undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment in Somalia is far from complete and in any case has not attempted to address the situation throughout all of Somalia. Moreover, there have been, especially recently, some disheartening reverses. Accordingly, the threat to international peace and security which the Security Council ascertained in the third preambular paragraph of resolution 794 (1992) is still in existence. Consequently UNOSOM II will not be able to implement the above mandate unless it is endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Cease-fire and disarmament concept

59. In my report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I informed the Council of the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity held in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993. Annex III to that report, "Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament", concluded that it would enter into force on 15 January 1993. Paragraph 1.2 stipulates that the militias of all political movements shall be encamped and disarmed simultaneously throughout Somalia and that the international community "will be requested to

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provide the encamped militias with upkeep". Paragraph 1.3 requires that the future of the encamped militias shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia.

60. On the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, a combined planning committee composed of senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM has developed a Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept.

61. Under this concept, the disarmament process would be continuous and irreversible. It would continue as long as required or until a Somali Government was functioning effectively. A standardized and simple process would be used to disarm all factions. Once a faction had committed itself to disarmament by placing its heavy weapons in cantonment sites or relinquishing its small arms at a transition site, it would not be entitled to reclaim those weapons.

62. Throughout the process, it would be useful to keep the major faction leaders informed about progress in disarming all the factions. This would place political pressure on factions that seek to delay or fail to comply with the disarmament process and would provide a sense of security for the factions complying with that process.

63. To be effective the disarmament process should be enforceable. Those factions or personnel who fail to comply with timetables or other modalities of the process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

64. As called for in the Addis Ababa agreements, both the cease-fire and the disarmament process should be carried out under modalities agreed to by the Somalis themselves under the supervision and with the cooperation of UNOSOM II.

65. The concept outlined above would require the establishment of cantonment and transition sites. A cantonment is defined as a location where heavy weapons, including all crew-served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, would be stored. A transition site is defined as a location where factional forces would be given temporary accommodation while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received guidance and training for their eventual reintegration in civilian life.

66. Cantonment sites should be designated in the vicinity of current force locations. Transition sites should be selected by the United Nations after consultation with the Somali factions. Cantonment and transition sites should be separated from each other to prevent any temptation by factions or groups to seize the heavy weapons.

67. A committee composed of United Nations and faction representatives should jointly determine those heavy weapons which would be an asset to a new Somali national army and which would be retained in the cantonments and the rest would be destroyed. The heavy weapons should be delivered to cantonment sites

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by faction personnel before they proceed to the transition sites. Cantonment site security would be the responsibility of UNOSOM II.

68. Some personnel in the transition sites should be allowed to retain a limited number of small arms for security purposes. Accommodation in the new sites should be temporary, pending relocation and reintegration in civilian society. The transition sites should at all times be open for verification by UNOSOM. Limited assistance would be offered by the United Nations in transporting faction personnel to the transition sites. Transition sites within each region/geographical area would be occupied simultaneously, in order to provide a sense of security for all participants.

69. The operational concept outlined above is based on the assumption that UNOSOM will assist in implementing the Addis Ababa agreements. Both UNITAF and my staff are aware of the administrative and financial problems that will arise in the storage of heavy weapons and in the accommodation and upkeep of demobilized militias for an indeterminate period of time. I consider however that alternative methods, such as material or financial incentives for disarmament, should be considered an option to be kept under review in the light of the experience that will be gathered in this process.

Military concept of operations

70. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate would have to be substantial in the early stage in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security conditions and to ensure a secure environment as quickly as possible both in those areas covered by UNITAF and in those that are not. It could be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new police force becomes operational.

71. It is estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support required. The logistic contingent, the bulk of which would initially come from UNITAF, will constitute an integral part of UNOSOM. I have also received an understanding from the United States Government that a tactical quick reaction force would be available in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II; a memorandum of understanding will be concluded between the United States and UNOSOM during the transfer phase.

72. To put the proposed strength in perspective, it is useful to bear in mind that UNITAF, with an initial strength of 37,000, is deployed in 40 per cent of the territory. It might be asked why in that case the recommendation is for a total military component of only 28,000 for deployment in the entire territory of Somalia.

73. At the beginning of the operation, UNITAF introduced into the theatre a large force of approximately 37,000, including approximately 8,000 at sea, in order to break down resistance and take control of the situation. Once this was done and organized fighting with heavy weapons had largely ceased, the

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requirements were scaled down. At present there are approximately 28,400 UNITAF forces ashore, including heavy construction forces. The task at hand now is to control sporadic and localized fighting and can therefore be dealt with by fewer troops. Secondly, intelligence-gathering capabilities that have been developed on the ground will give UNOSOM warning of violent situations developing and allow the Force Commander to readjust his troop deployment. Thirdly, it is believed that the establishment of an auxiliary police force should help in improving law and order and in releasing UNOSOM soldiers from guard duties for other more demanding tasks. Lastly, a tactical quick reaction force will be available at the request of the Force Commander.

74. In the light of the above, I am prepared to accept the above-mentioned recommendations at this stage, given the need for maximum economy and efficiency and my constant endeavour to keep the size of the United Nations presence in any situation to the minimum. However, I should like to emphasize that I must reserve my right to revert to the Council in case I feel the need for additional troops to increase the strength of UNOSOM II, depending on the progress made in establishing a secure environment throughout the country. In conclusion I must point out that the security conditions in Somalia might compel me periodically to review the troop strength required to implement the mandate of UNOSOM II.

75. The force mentioned in paragraph 71 above will include:

- (a) A Force headquarters;
- (b) Five brigades;
- (c) A logistic support group.

76. The logistic support group would, in the first and second phases, be provided mainly by the UNITAF logistics forces, until UNOSOM II can establish the necessary logistic support through organic forces or by contract. I would like to stress however that the ability of UNOSOM to carry out its mandate will depend on critical logistical and other support from the United States, including a tactical quick reaction force.

77. The combat forces would need the following capabilities:

- (a) Patrolling and close-combat;
- (b) Information-gathering and interpretation;
- (c) Indirect fire;
- (d) Anti-armour fire;
- (e) All-weather night and day operations;
- (f) Casualty evacuation;

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(g) Tactical communications;

(h) Air support (fire power and transport).

78. The UNOSOM Force Commander would report directly to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. Areas of operations would be allocated to brigade commanders who would report directly to the UNOSOM II Force Commander. These commanders would be responsible for conducting military operations and assisting in the implementation of cease-fire/disarmament agreements in their respective areas of operations. A tactical quick reaction force of at least battalion strength to be provided by the United States will be available in support of UNOSOM II.

79. UNOSOM military operations would be conducted in four phases:

Phase I - Transition from UNITAF;

Phase II - Consolidation and expansion of security;

Phase III - Transfer to civilian institutions;

Phase IV - Redeployment.

These phases are not meant to be applied rigidly or uniformly throughout Somalia, but merely describe a general sequence. For example, some areas of operations might be implementing phase III while in another area phase I or II would still be in effect. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase would be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programmes. The Force Commander may shift forces within country to meet these changing requirements.

Phase I

80. In this phase, military operations would concentrate on the transition of operational control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Military support to relief activity and the disarming of factions would continue throughout the transition.

81. Prior to the UNOSOM II Force Commander's formal assumption of operational responsibility from UNITAF, certain preparatory steps would be required. The expansion of UNOSOM II Force headquarters would have to continue until it was operationally capable. UNITAF would have to ensure that subordinate elements that would remain in Somalia under UNOSOM II were given appropriate command and control structures. The United States Government would be asked to form a tactical quick reaction force to support UNOSOM II's Force Commander.

82. Upon receipt of a joint recommendation by the Commander of UNITAF and the UNOSOM II Force Commander, I would approve UNOSOM II's assumption of operational responsibility for the unit or units concerned. At the appropriate stage the UNOSOM II Force Commander would also take over the

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logistic support forces previously controlled by UNITAF. In all phases, the United States tactical quick reaction force would be placed in support of the UNOSOM II Force Commander.

83. When the UNOSOM II Force Commander has assumed operational responsibility within an area of operation, UNITAF personnel in that area of operation will be redeployed to their countries of origin at the discretion of their Government(s) and under the protection of UNOSOM II troops.

84. This phase would be complete when all UNITAF forces participating in UNOSOM, as well as other forces provided by other troop-contributing countries, have been placed under operational control of the UNOSOM II Force Commander.

Phase II

85. Military operations in phase II would be designed to consolidate United Nations operational control over all assigned elements and designated activity. Continued efforts to assist relief activity and participate in the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements would involve all military forces. Operations would be extended into northern Somalia, based on the port cities of Berbera and Bossasso, and moving to Hargeisa and Garoe. UNOSOM II military forces would assist any new humanitarian initiatives started in this region, particularly mine-clearance projects as addressed above. Phase II would conclude when UNOSOM II was deployed and operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions.

Phase III

86. In this period, major efforts would be made to reduce military activity and assist civil authorities to exercise greater responsibility, according to their ability to do so. National rehabilitation and reconciliation initiatives under Somali leadership would be encouraged and supported by United Nations representatives. Military presence might be scaled down in the more stable areas and the tempo of military operations reduced as circumstances allow. Phase III would end when a Somali national police force was operational and major United Nations military operations were no longer required.

Phase IV

87. At an appropriate stage, I would make a recommendation to the Council to redeploy or reduce the forces.

Rules of engagement

88. The rules of engagement would be defined by the UNOSOM II Force Commander. They would authorize and direct commanders to take certain specific actions if they were judged necessary to fulfil the mandate.

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VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

89. The concept outlined in the present report would require a substantial input of financial resources. I shall circulate shortly an addendum to the present report that will contain the preliminary cost estimate for UNOSOM II for a period of 12 months. Overall operations will require 20,000 military personnel of all ranks plus 8,000 logistical support staff, as well as a considerably strengthened civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council agree to the deployment of UNOSOM II, that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account to be established for this purpose. It would further be my intention to maintain the United Nations fund for operations in Somalia authorized by paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992). I appeal to all Member States that are in a position to do so to contribute generously to that fund. Such voluntary contributions would reduce the burden that Member States would have to bear under the assessment scheme. With this in mind, I intend to send emissaries to certain heads of State or Government to explain the operations and to encourage them to make generous donations to the fund.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

90. As the members of the Council are aware, the mission of UNITAF was originally envisaged as a short-term police action. I believe that UNITAF has made an important contribution in the international effort to stop the lawlessness and disarm the warring factions in its area of operations. However, events in Kismayo and Mogadishu during the week of 21 February 1993 have demonstrated the volatile situation that still exists. They underscore the fact, which I have indicated in the present report, that a secure environment has not yet been established. Moreover, there has been no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security is a matter of grave concern. I believe, therefore, that, if the Council determines that the time has come to move to another stage in its operations in Somalia, it should be prepared to ensure that UNOSOM II is fully in a position to carry out its tasks.

91. The mandate of UNOSOM II, as conceived in the present report, would confer authority for appropriate action, including enforcement action as necessary, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

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92. Notwithstanding the compelling necessity for authority to use enforcement measures as appropriate, I continue to hold to my conviction that the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace must spring from the Somalis themselves. Even if it is authorized to resort to forceful action in certain circumstances, UNOSOM II cannot and must not be expected to substitute itself for the Somali people. Nor can or should it use its authority to impose one or another system of governmental organization. It may and should, however, be in a position to press for the observance of United Nations standards of human rights and justice.

93. UNOSOM II will continue to assist the factions in completing the total disarmament and demobilization process called for in the Addis Ababa accords, to ensure that the secure environment is established on a country-wide basis, and to monitor the strict observance of the cease-fire.

94. A secure environment continues to be essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the reconstruction of the country. The deployment of UNITAF forces has permitted a substantial increase in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and opened up access to more remote areas. Emergency relief assistance will continue to be required throughout 1993. There is also an urgent need for the international community to accelerate its efforts to assist the Somalis to rebuild their society, rehabilitate the decayed infrastructure and pave the way for a secure return of all refugees. To achieve these objectives, the United Nations is putting together a humanitarian programme for 1993 with the active participation of the Somalis, United Nations organizations, ICRC and NGOs. I look forward to the support of donors for this programme at the United Nations Humanitarian Conference to be convened in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993.

95. There must be a smooth transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II without any hiatus that could be exploited by factions or gangs. UNOSOM II will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over seamlessly from UNITAF in each area from which it withdraws and to deploy troops in the north and along the boundary with Kenya. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area, when adequate troops, command and control and logistics are available to UNOSOM II in a given area.

96. A number of the Member States that are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have expressed willingness to have their contingents serve eventually in UNOSOM II. It is my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in UNOSOM II as many contingents as possible that are already in Somalia serving under the command of UNITAF. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of UNITAF to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to above. While it is difficult to determine when this transfer will be completed, for budgetary and administrative purposes, the formal date of transfer of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will be 1 May 1993.

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major concern has been with the existence of large amounts of armaments in the hands of the factions and guerrilla bands. The operations launched by UNITAF, especially in the past few weeks, have undoubtedly succeeded in getting some of these stocks of weaponry confiscated and destroyed. It is, however, obvious that we have only scratched the surface of the problem so far. Disarming the factions and placing their heavy weaponry under international control for eventual destruction or placement at the disposal of the new national army of Somalia is, in my view, the most urgent and pressing task for UNOSOM II.

101. UNOSOM II would be the first operation of its kind to be authorized by the international community. It would be an expression of the international community's determination not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own. It would also be an answer of the international community to the universally shared concern that the situation in Somalia, though primarily of a domestic nature, could affect the peace and stability of the entire region of which Somalia forms an integral part, unless energetic and timely action is taken to avert a major humanitarian and security disaster. The task ahead would not be easy. UNOSOM II might frequently come under criticism for acts of omission or commission. It is also difficult to anticipate, with any degree of certainty, the duration of UNOSOM II'S mandate. None the less, I am satisfied that the recommendations I have made in the present report are a necessary, indeed inescapable response of the international community to the tragedy in Somalia.

102. As the mission of UNITAF nears completion, I wish to express my profound appreciation to the Government of the United States for its timely initiative in offering its assistance to the United Nations at a crucial stage of its operation in Somalia, and for the skill and efficiency with which UNITAF has carried out its mandate. I also wish to express my gratitude to all the other Governments that have contributed contingents to UNITAF, and to their soldiers for their dedicated service to this operation.

103. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Kittani, my Special Representative, and to Brigadier-General Shaheen, the Force Commander, and the staff of UNOSOM, as well as the staff of ICRC and NGOs, for the devotion, skill and leadership that they have demonstrated, often in extremely trying circumstances, in the service of the United Nations in Somalia.

104. Lastly, I wish to express my sincere condolences to the Government of the United States upon the death of members of its contingent while serving with UNITAF in Somalia. I should also like to pay a heartfelt tribute to the staff members who died in the performance of their duties in Somalia as well as the members of the relief community, including those of UNICEF, ICRC and NGOs who sacrificed their lives while assisting the Somali people.
