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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	09/00/1995	P3/b(3)
001b. memo	Richard Clarke to Somalia Special CSG (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1)
002. note	Handwritten notes from Somalia Meeting (1 page)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1)
003. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. email	From MacArthur DeShazer, re: [Daily Wrap-up Memo] (1 page)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	09/00/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. note	Handwritten note from Bruce Pease to Susan Rice (1 page)	03/22/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. talking points	[Talking Points for Weekly Meeting] (2 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (BHR)
OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (OFDA)

Somalia

SOMALIA - Complex Emergency

Situation Report #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 1996

November 29, 1995

Note: The last situation report was dated July 7, 1995

Background

Somalia, consumed by civil war since 1988, self-destructed in January 1991 following the overthrow of the repressive military regime of President Mohammed Siad Barre. As armed clan groups fought for control of territory, food production and distribution systems ceased. The resulting anarchy forced an estimated 800,000 Somalis into exile in neighboring countries, while more than 1 million displaced persons swarmed into urban areas where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) struggled to provide food and other humanitarian assistance. An estimated 4.5 million Somalis were in need of external food aid, including approximately 1.5 million at severe risk of starvation. In August 1992, the U.S. Government (USG) launched a military airlift to deliver food to Somalia. In early December 1992, the U.N. Security Council approved the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to intervene militarily in order to secure the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Once relief organizations were able to deliver food aid to vulnerable populations without interference, mortality and malnutrition rates dramatically declined and the famine ended in early 1993. On May 4, 1993, UNITAF officially transferred its authority to the U.N. Operations for Somalia (UNOSOM). The absence of progress toward political reconciliation and the danger and cost of working in Somalia eventually led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in March 1994. Due to frustration regarding the slow pace of political reconciliation, a reduction in UNOSOM force levels began in October 1994 and the final withdrawal was completed on March 2, 1995.

Numbers Affected

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are more than 1,000,000 Somalis who remain dependent on emergency food aid. This includes approximately 600,000 who have recently returned to their homes, 240,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), and an additional 500,000 who are refugees in neighboring countries.

Total USAID Assistance for FY 1995 \$22,402,591

Current Situation

Interfactional fighting and the continued efforts of General Mohammed Farah Aidede to expand his control in southern Somalia have broken the tenuous peace that existed in Somalia in the wake of the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces. On September 17, Aidede's militia captured Baidoa in the Bay Region, causing approximately two-thirds of Baidoa's population to flee. Twenty international relief workers and one journalist were detained in the UNICEF and CARE compounds by Aidede's militia during the takeover, but were released and safely evacuated to Nairobi within a week, following the interventions of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), the heads of UNICEF and U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and visiting former U.S. Ambassador Frank Grigler. Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) leader Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Osman Hassan Ali Atto, current chairman of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Aidede's former ally and

financier, have both condemned the forceful takeover of Baidoa and various clan forces have regrouped outside Baidoa and launched attacks on Aidede's forces occupying the town.

Interfactional fighting has also continued to plague the capital. In late August, heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu between forces loyal to Aidede and Ali Mahdi. The fighting, which was heaviest in the Medina and Bermuda districts, has displaced many people and resulted in the looting of property by the military. Fighting intensified in Mogadishu in early October following Aidede's takeover of Baidoa, disrupting port operations in Mogadishu -- the primary southern Somalia entry/exit point for food and commercial supplies. Aidede and Ali Mahdi's forces clashed near the seaport after militia loyal to Ali Mahdi fired on two banana exporting ships for violating Ali Mahdi's prohibition on all ships from docking in the main ports of Mogadishu

and Merca. Following pleas from the banana companies, Ali Mahdi and Osman Atto lifted the ban. General commodity prices have increased sharply in Mogadishu and outlying regions as a result of sporadic port closures since the March departure of UNOSOM. The main international airport in Mogadishu remains closed.

On November 5, heavy rains and flooding caused extensive damage in Mogadishu and killed at least 20 people. Many of Mogadishu's displaced persons camps were located in areas most affected by the flooding. A concurrent measles outbreak in the capital poses additional challenges to the relief community.

In the Northwest, continued fighting between forces loyal to the self-declared president of "Somaliland" Mohammed Ibrahim Egal and opposition forces has resulted in the displacement of an estimated 200,000 people. The situation in Burao remains tense although the town is all but empty of civilians. The port town of Bosasso has remained relatively calm despite a few disturbing incidents, including an assault of the UNDP Officer in Charge in late September.

According to the results of the comprehensive crop assessments conducted by the World Food Program's (WFP's) Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), this year's main "Gu" harvest produced a much lower than expected yield totaling an estimated 171,900 MT, which is only 45% of last year's "Gu" harvest. This reduction in crop yield is attributed to the decision by many farmers to decrease their planted land area due to low market prices and large carryover stocks from the previous harvests, as well as insufficient and scattered rains and damage caused by birds and insects. FSAU estimates that this low harvest may result in a serious food shortage in March/April after stocks from the short "Dehr" harvest are depleted, particularly if the political and security situation continues to worsen.

Political/Military Situation

General Aideed has aggressively stepped up his efforts to strengthen his political and military control in Somalia since he established a rival government in southern Mogadishu and declared himself president of Somalia following his ouster from the leadership of the SNA by Osman Atto in June. In September, factional leaders opposed to General Aideed met in Saudi Arabia. The meeting resulted in a joint memorandum calling for the

formation of a coordination committee responsible for promoting inter-clan reconciliation and ensuring peace and security. The committee was also tasked with appointing a preparatory committee which would organize a new national conference. Aideed's takeover of Baidoa occurred while the meeting in Saudi Arabia was taking place.

On October 11, Osman Atto announced that his militia had captured the Baledogle Airport near Mogadishu, but the claim was later found to be unsubstantiated. On the same day, members of the Leisan clan attacked Aideed's militia in Baidoa in an unsuccessful effort to recapture the city. The attack led to several deaths and injuries and brought commercial activity in the city to a standstill. In mid-October, many others were killed and wounded in heavy fighting between Aideed's militia and troops of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Baidoa.

In October, four gunmen shot and killed a female Italian doctor working for the Caritas/Italy aid agency and seriously wounded her colleague near the town of Merca. The attack occurred while the two doctors were visiting a hospital along with four other Italian aid workers. Many residents of Merca took to the streets to protest the attack. General Aideed, whose forces control this port town 60 miles southwest of Mogadishu, is reportedly investigating the incident. In light of the nature of the attack, the Italian government has indicated that it may stop funding of the project.

Also in October, 12 Pakistani fishermen, who were detained by General Aideed in June for violating Somalia's territorial waters, were granted amnesty after being sentenced to five years in prison.

Relief Efforts

In October, General Aideed announced that all aid agencies operating in Somalia must register with his self-proclaimed government and report their objectives and plans of action. Previously, Aideed's administration had announced that all foreign journalists in Mogadishu must register and pay a fee, or risk having their equipment confiscated. Similarly in the Northwest, the Egal government, which is facing rapidly rising inflation and commodity prices, announced that NGOs must report any activities in the region and deposit their funds in the "Somaliland" Central Bank. The SACB is currently conducting discussions with the Egal administration on this issue.

Mogadishu: UNICEF and several NGOs are preparing to launch a measles immunization campaign for children in Mogadishu this month. The number of measles cases has risen in recent months and this action is being taken as a preventative measure in preparation for an anticipated food gap and resulting rise in malnutrition starting in March/April 1996. BHR/OFDA has modified its UNICEF and Comitato Internazionale Per Lo Sviluppo Dei Popoli (CISP) health projects to participate in the campaign.

Following concerns regarding the availability of water in the capital, UNICEF completed a survey of the water situation in Mogadishu. The survey results indicate that the existing network of wells provides more than the daily requirement for the city's estimated 1.2 million people, though the quality of water remains poor. It is estimated that 550,000 residents get their water directly from water sources and the other 650,000 people get water through vendors (such as tankers and donkey carts). BHR/OFDA funds a project with Action Internationale Contre La Faim (AICF) to rehabilitate wells, install handpumps and construct latrines. UNICEF is appealing to other donors to rehabilitate more wells in Mogadishu in an effort to improve the city's water quality.

Interfactional fighting, port closures, and rising food prices have resulted in declining nutritional conditions among residents and displaced populations in Mogadishu. A June nutritional assessment conducted by AICF in the city indicated a global malnutrition rate of 25.1%, which is more than double the rate found in a November 1994 survey. The problem is even worse among populations in outlying areas where factional fighting has limited the free movement of people. AICF is currently responding to the problem through therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers for children under five and UNICEF has continued funding several similar supplementary feeding centers in the city.

Bay Region: All rehabilitation and recovery activities were suspended in the Bay Region following the military capture of Baidoa by Aideed in September and the consequent looting of essential equipment from the U.N. and NGO compounds. Continued insecurity throughout the region has prevented efforts to fully assess the impact of the conflict and the status of the displaced. Many farmers have been forced to

abandon planting for the upcoming agricultural season as a result of the conflict. This, coupled with the poor "Gu" harvest, is expected to have far-reaching implications on the food security situation of the whole country, as the Bay Region is an important agricultural zone.

Other Southern Regions: Despite the general insecurity, many UN agencies and NGOs have continued efforts to address pockets of malnutrition in Kismayo and the Lower Juba Valley. In July, assessments conducted in Kismayo by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)/Belgium and UNICEF revealed a 14.1 percent global malnutrition rate among the town population and 7.6 percent global malnutrition among the displaced. The higher malnutrition rate among the town population was due to the fact that Kismayo hosts thousands of recent arrivals from refugee camps in Kenya, while the displaced persons camps are well established. Furthermore, the survey found that 50 percent of the children attending feeding centers were not classified as malnourished, but almost 75 percent of the children in Kismayo town determined to be malnourished were not provided food through the feeding centers. Therefore, while the malnutrition rates in Kismayo town were not alarming, better targeting of food distribution is warranted. Food distribution in the Juba valley should help stem the flow of people into Kismayo. The nutritional situation in Marere, north of Jilib, has significantly improved since ICRC began its program in that area.

Northwest: ICRC is also responding to the relief needs of the population affected by fighting in the Northwest, along with MSF/Holland, Save the Children/United Kingdom (SCF/UK) and the "Somaliland's" Ministry of Health. WFP is also planning to conduct food distribution programs to some 57,000 IDPs in the Burao area. Continued fighting has discouraged the repatriation of some 200,000 persons that were displaced after heavy fighting broke out in March in Burao.

Somali Refugees and DPs: Currently, UNHCR is supporting about 100,000 returnees from Kenya and hopes to repatriate one-third of the 158,000 Somalis remaining in Kenya soon. In 1995, UNHCR supported more than 28,000 returnees from Kenya in the Juba Valley, Kismayo and northeast Somalia, and is hoping to support the repatriation of an additional 10,000 from Kenya to the Juba Valley in conjunction with UNICEF. There are currently an estimated 275,189 Somalis

remaining in Ethiopia, 50,000 in Yemen, 20,000 in Djibouti, and 867 in Eritrea. An estimated 400,000 Ethiopians currently reside in Somalia. UNHCR, in addition to the resettlement and reintegration efforts of voluntarily repatriated Somalis in the Kenyan camps, is currently assessing the situation and needs of several hundred Somalis who arrived at the port town of Bosasso after being deported from Yemen.

U.S. Government (USG) Assistance

On October 27, 1995, Ambassador Aurelia E. Brazeal re-declared a disaster in Somalia, citing that a complex emergency situation exists due to ongoing civil strife and population displacement.

The USAID/BHR/OFDA assistance program continues to be consistent with USG policy to remain active in Somalia. BHR/OFDA funded programs work to address the needs of vulnerable groups throughout Somalia through NGO health care, water and sanitation, food distribution and monetization activities.

USAID/BHR/OFDA Assistance

BHR/OFDA provided funds in FY 1995 to support the following activities:

AICF water and sanitation activities in Mogadishu \$870,930

CISP health care services in Mogadishu \$690,320

Food for the Hungry medical care program in Saco Uen \$24,343

International Medical Corps (IMC) community health care in the Bay region \$1,378,351

IRC Nairobi-based program support of two projects in the Gedo region \$18,863

MSF/Spain emergency medical and sanitary assistance in Jowhar region \$198,460

SCF/UK preventative health care for women and children in the Bardera district \$130,390

UNICEF essential drug support for emergency health programs countrywide \$1,965,000

USAID/Somalia Support \$118,312

WFP aircraft operations \$1,000,000

In addition, BHR/OFDA extended its multi-year \$2.8 million grant with CARE to conduct countrywide monetization activities.

Total BHR/OFDA FY 1995 \$6,394,969

USAID/BHR/FFP Assistance

In FY 1995, BHR's Office Food for Peace (FFP) provided 15,000 MT of Title II food commodities, valued at approximately \$10.7 million, to Somalia through WFP. This included 4,000 MT of wheat and 2,500 MT of vegetable oil for monetization.

Total BHR/FFP FY 1995 \$10,707,622

USAID/AFR Assistance

In FY 1995, USAID/Somalia obligated a total of \$5.3 million from the Development Fund for Africa for rehabilitation and recovery assistance projects through grants to CARE, WFP and UNICEF.

Total USAID/AFR FY 1995 \$5,300,000

State/PRM Assistance

In FY 1995, the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) contributed \$44 million to UNHCR's Africa General Program, \$38.5 million to ICRC's Africa Regional Appeal, and \$6.8 million to WFP for its programs, including Somalia.

Total BHR/OFDA \$6,394,969

Total BHR/FFP \$10,707,622

Total USAID/AFR \$5,300,000

Total FY 1995 \$22,402,591

Total USAID Assistance from FY 1991-FY 1995

FY 1991 \$29,627,127

FY 1992 \$95,119,889

FY 1993 \$174,308,121

FY 1994 \$39,044,663

FY 1995 \$22,402,591

***Total FY 1991-1995 \$360,502,391**

*Does not include U.S. military humanitarian aid.



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The Lessons of Somalia

Not Everything Went Wrong

Chester A. Crocker

Under the protection of a U.S. military umbrella, the United Nations extricated itself from Somalia in early March 1995. The exit went well and may serve as a model for pulling U.N. peacekeepers out of the former Yugoslavia and other places where they run into trouble. But what lessons is the United States drawing from the "failed" Somalia enterprise? Is "failure" the right term to describe the U.S. and U.N. military intervention? If so, what is it that failed?

Appraisals of the Somalia operation vary widely. Some disparage it as a media-driven spectacle of misguided internationalism that ignored the pitfalls of intervention in alien places lacking civil order and legitimate political institutions. Some see Somalia as an almost welcome inoculation against the temptation to intervene in places such as Rwanda, while others blame the Somalia operation for sapping U.S. political will and global standing and for inhibiting Americans

from doing the right thing in "more important" places like Bosnia. The lesson, in this view, is to refrain from applying global standards and to disengage from the world's strategic slums. Another school views Somalia as an epitaph for multilateralism and an object lesson on the United Nations' inadequacies and the need to limit the U.S. role in U.N. peacekeeping. Still others view Somalia as a laudable step toward a new era in American exceptionalism and humanitarian leadership, which turned sour because the United States became entangled in local politics. The actual lessons, however, are more subtle and more interesting than these one-liners suggest.

THE STANDARD OF SUCCESS

The intervention in Somalia was not a failure as measured by the standards first set by President Bush. Much has been accomplished in humanitarian terms, and a larger tragedy has been averted. How

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U.S. Marines leaving Mogadishu

large a tragedy it is impossible to know, but, judging by the Somali death toll of 1992, one could reasonably estimate that upwards of a quarter of a million Somali lives were saved. Some failure.

The Somali political landscape, moreover, has been changed forever. The apparent rejection of outside political initiatives by local parties should not obscure the fact that foreign intervention knocked a hideously costly, stalemated clan war off dead center and opened the field for local initiatives. This is a classic, if sometimes perverse, function of foreign intervention. Today large parts of the country are free of conflict and widespread human suffering. This is not to say that Somalia is a peaceful or hopeful place, but we left it better off than they found it.

Somalia had the ill fortune to experience firsthand the full effects of a U.S. political transition: the steep learning curve of an inexperienced administration in Washington, an idiosyncratic U.N. leadership bent on using leverage borrowed from member states to fix Somalia, and a prolonged, unresolved debate between New York and Washington over basic purposes in the field.

These tensions and disruptions were manifest in the various phases of the Somalia enterprise:

—U.N. Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), April–December 1992, which tried to reconcile warring Somali factions but collapsed from bureaucratic infighting and an inability to provide safety for relief operations;

—United Task Force (UNITAF), December 1992–April 1993, a multinational force led by the United States and approved by the United Nations, which quickly provided that safety, started a low-key political process, and maintained working relationships with all Somali factions and groups;

—U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), May 1993–March 1995, the U.N.-led operation that comprised an overreaching, “nation-building” phase (May–October 1993) and a scaled-back, accommodative phase (November 1993–March 1995) triggered by the October 3, 1993, firefight in Mogadishu.

As the initial intervention unfolded, Somalia was transformed from a famine-stricken backwater where heartless warlords and hopped-up teenage gangs reigned over helpless innocents into a laboratory for new theories of U.N. peacekeeping. Perhaps, ironically, the impressive leadership, coherence, and dramatic success of the U.S.-led UNITAF phase made it look too easy, facilitating the “mission creep” that produced UNOSOM II’s vast nation-building mandate. The sheer ease of intervention, combined with the mastery with which it was initially conducted in Washington and in the field, helped produce the slide toward a modern version of trusteeship over an ex-colonial territory, triggering a violent backlash mounted by a powerful Somali faction.

BAD BREAKS

Look more closely at what happened. The UNITAF mission was successful during its too-brief deployment through April 1993. Establishing safety for relief workers while keeping the warlords

somewhat placated and off balance; maintaining and demonstrating military primacy without making a permanent adversary or national hero of any local actor; pushing the military factions toward a locally led political process while opening up that process to civilian elites and eschewing precise formulas; removing heavy weapons from areas of conflict while fostering the restoration of police and government functions—these were undertakings of the highest order of delicacy in a militarized and fragmented society like Somalia’s. UNITAF’s accomplishments far exceeded the simple, publicly discussed goal of creating a “secure environment for humanitarian relief.” They required strong leadership and a well-oiled, quick-response military-civilian bureaucracy.

But the coordinated and politically astute operating strategy of U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and U.S. Marine General Robert Johnston (who both had outstanding access to Washington) would be interrupted, first by the U.S. presidential transition, and again during the handoff from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the entire field leadership of the U.S.-led intervention was replaced by a less united and coherent operation reporting to U.N. headquarters. Another discontinuity was the quick departure—before the new UNOSOM II management was even in place in Mogadishu—of not only the previous UNITAF management but many vital U.S. combat units.

Is it any wonder that things turned sour? Why expect a seamless transition to U.N.-led peacekeeping to flow from a rancorous argument between Washington and U.N. headquarters about whether the

The Lessons of Somalia

transfer should even take place and whether the United States had completed its initial task? Such changes of leadership, tradition, doctrine, personal chemistry, operating procedures, policy instincts, and bureaucratic systems were bound to disrupt the effectiveness and credibility of the military presence.

Another major discontinuity was, of course, the adoption of a sweepingly ambitious new "nation-building" resolution by the Security Council (Resolution 814), which authorized UNOSOM II at the very moment existing management, reporting channels, and capabilities were being transformed. The nation-building resolution aimed explicitly at reestablishing Somalia's political institutions and rehabilitating its economy as well as assuring security throughout the country, not merely in the famine-afflicted south and central zones. The changes raised Somali doubts about the operation's objectives while creating opportunities to test its will. Between May 1993, when the United Nations took over, and the October 3, 1993, debacle when U.S. forces, under U.S. command, suffered 18 dead in a Mogadishu firefight, many of UNITAF's accomplishments were lost. Also lost was the shallow and fragile U.S. consensus on U.N. peace operations.

WHAT SOMALIA PROVED

Somalia, having experienced several types of intervention and peacekeeping, is hardly an ideal test case for judging U.N. peace operations. Like a barometer, it has both shaped and reflected shifting U.S. and international opinion about them.

Arguably, Somalia does not offer an ideal test of either the Bush concept of

limited humanitarian intervention or the evolving concepts of expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement based on the use-of-force authority provided in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Somalia "failure" was less a failure of either humanitarian intervention or muscular peacekeeping than a failure to apply them steadily and wisely. The failure was of another order: strategic confusion followed by a collapse of political will when the confusion led to combat casualties.

In Cambodia, Central America, Namibia, and now Mozambique, U.N. operations have unquestionably given war-torn lands a chance to get on their feet. These were complex operations conducted successfully under wide-ranging mandates. But the United Nations' attempt at a militarily challenging "peace enforcement" operation shows that it cannot manage complex political-military operations when its own structure is an undisciplined and often chaotic set of rival fiefdoms that resist unified command and control in the field at both the civilian and military levels. Basic change is needed on the issues of delegation to the field, unity of command in the field, and professional military backstopping and oversight from U.N. headquarters. We already knew these things about U.N. reform. After Somalia, we know them even better.

Equally important, Somalia underscores the need for improvement in the way the United States—the United Nations' leading member—defines missions, reviews and approves peacekeeping mandates, and approves U.N. force levels and budgets. The United States and the United Nations overreached in Somalia when they expanded the initial mandate

without providing the means to carry it out. They failed to resolve a raging debate over whether and how to disarm the Somali factions. In the end, of course, the United States refused to take on that task before handing it off to the U.N. command. UNITAF probably could have done much more to demilitarize and disarm Somalia if the United States had been prepared to make the necessary forces available for a longer period and had maintained effective working relationships with the Somalis.

But realizing the more open-ended time frame, the additional resources required to disarm the Somali factions, and the possible negative fallout on the home front, both U.S. administrations strongly opposed it. The ball was simply dropped by Washington, the U.N. secretary general, and the Security Council in New York. As a result, the United Nations received a bolder mandate than the one Bush had given UNITAF (and which Oakley and Johnston later expanded on the ground) but was given woefully inadequate means for carrying it out. These things should never have been permitted to happen. Either the nation-building mandate should have been drastically scaled down or the means to implement it should have been mobilized.

THE LESSONS

The Somalia episode suggests several lessons. It is obvious that the United States and other leading nations (within or outside the United Nations) should act through diplomacy (whether preventive, coercive, or mediatory) before states fail and societies implode. Once men with

guns seize the initiative, it becomes more complex to accommodate the interests of their peculiar hierarchies in addition to those of the broader society and political system, and it becomes more costly for external peacemakers to apply their will.

Somalia reinforces the point that the linkage between U.N. peacekeeping mandates and the resources made available by member states must be better understood by Security Council members so that they do not approve missions that will expose U.N. peacekeepers to severe risk and the United Nations itself to ridicule. At the same time, there is no excuse for underfunding and undermanning missions that warrant U.S. support. We must remember that the Security Council is a mirror of the actions, inactions, fudges, and fantasies of its leading members, who can veto anything they do not like.

The clear shortcomings in the United Nations' capacity to manage peacekeeping and especially peace enforcement argue strongly for several approaches: U.N. institutional reform to end bureaucratic fiefdoms in the field, create genuine unity of command, and beef up U.N. headquarters' ability to manage and control military operations; restraint and selectivity in undertaking missions that cross the line between traditional, consensual peacekeeping and enforcement; and creativity in supporting their management. Historically, U.N. operations have prospered when they enjoyed the dedicated, attentive backing of one or more major powers. This was the case with the far-reaching but successful Congo operation of the 1960s and the intricate, multipurpose U.N. operations in Namibia, Cambodia, and Mozam-

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bique more recently. By contrast, UNOSOM II demonstrates how a U.N. operation can fail if it is orphaned by leading members.

Responsibility for making these operations succeed must be given to the most experienced and imaginative people available. It is equally imperative to conduct basic reviews if operations turn sour. Peacekeeping initiatives should not be launched without some assurances of stability of leadership in the field, some hope for continuity of backstopping in key capitals and New York, and a clear hierarchy of accountability for the whole business. Changes in either resources made available, including key combat components, or leadership relationships and reporting channels between the field and key capitals must be minimized.

IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

At the strategic level, the Somalia case raises the question of limits to and criteria for U.S. and U.N. involvement in humanitarian operations, political transitions from protracted civil conflicts, and efforts to restore failed states. Can and should the United States insist on a carefully worded "national interest" standard for support of and participation in such operations? Can humanitarian action be sealed off from the politics of peacemaking and the military implications of peace enforcement? Somalia cannot answer these questions, but it highlights the need for debate.

By overreaching as dramatically as it did, the Security Council's March 1993 nation-building resolution caused a backlash at two levels. The sweep of the mandate and the way it was implemented changed the Somali political posture

from humiliated acceptance of a helping hand to polarization and nationalist martyrdom. In the United States, support for an initially popular undertaking collapsed amid confusion about American purposes. Was this a humanitarian mission, a manhunt for a wily warlord, or a nation-building program? After Somalia, it is getting harder for Western leaders to rally their constituents to go to war for a new world order.

That said, President Bush was right—politically, strategically, and ethically—to launch Operation Restore Hope, and President Clinton was right to support his decision. The judgment that U.S. forces could and should stop humanitarian disaster in Somalia was a proper assertion of global leadership, as evidenced by the long list of nations who pressed to join during the initial phase of UNITAF. As the end of the century nears, it is surely wise that we and others broaden our understanding of national interest to include consideration of interests related to global order (sanctity of borders, extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) and global standards (avoiding genocide, mass humanitarian catastrophe).

Operation Restore Hope was an act of human solidarity without regard to race, religion, or region. That is why the Congress and the American people supported it—just as they supported the 1991 effort to protect Iraqi Kurds. And that is why no one is especially proud of the U.S. role in inhibiting U.N. action in Rwanda, the first victim of the post-Somalia backlash. Just as it cannot be U.S. policy to protect oil supplies but ignore genocide, it cannot be U.S. policy to protect Kurds but ignore Tutsis.

THE TEST FOR INTERVENTION

If the criteria for initiating U.N. peace operations and humanitarian intervention are not primarily geographic, then what are they? Some say that the United States should not have intervened (or encouraged the United Nations to do so) in Somalia unless it was also prepared to do so in Sudan, Tibet, and Tajikistan. But we cannot view all disorders as equally threatening to our global interests. The quest for consistency leads to a false choice between doing nothing and indiscriminate interventionism.

No one realistically expects or wants the United States to act in every scenario where action is possible. Americans are relative newcomers to U.N. peace operations; many other nations play responsible, leading roles in them and will continue to provide the bulk of the financing and manpower that make them possible. Somalia was an exception both in the prominence of the roles the United States played and in its dramatic impact on events. The question is whether Americans will learn from Somalia or recoil from the experience—and from peace operations generally.

The basic criterion that the United States should apply in essentially humanitarian cases is not obscure: Is a proposed operation likely to be effective at an acceptable cost to those who will bear the burden of intervention? Clearly, a wide range of factors must be examined: logistics, terrain, the likelihood and nature of armed opposition to the intervention, the role of humanitarian aid organizations, and the impact of intervention on their operations.

The final lesson of Somalia may be the most humbling. Just as humanitarian

relief may disrupt a local economy, changing the stakes of conflict and even, perversely, fueling it, military intervention may alter the local balance of power. Operation Restore Hope was no exception. It temporarily strengthened Somalia's vestigial civil society and challenged the warlords' political monopoly. By freezing in place the factional strife, it also checked the stronger factions and protected the weaker ones. But what is there to replace this new status quo so that the old one does not return?

Somalia, in other words, suggests that there is no such thing as a purely humanitarian operation. It calls attention to the question of how intervention can translate into peacemaking so that something emerges to replace the temporary status quo created by intervention. The Bush and Clinton administrations insisted on a quick handoff to the United Nations, effectively begging the question. (For a brief period, the UNITAF leaders improvised a political settlement strategy that appeared promising, but it collapsed when UNOSOM II soured.) It is hard to escape the conclusion that an appeal for outside force must be accompanied by a political strategy for leashing the dogs—while healing the wounds—of war. ☪

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001a. fax	Fax Coversheet [partial] (1 page)	09/00/1995	P3/b(3)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Steinberg, Donald/Rice, Susan/DeShazer, MacArthur/McCormick, Shawn)
OA/Box Number: 872

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia 1995

2012-0659-F
ke4102

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASE: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 2

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE 456-9351 302, OEOB
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

CSG - Counterterrorism SVTS MEETING - Friday, Sept. 15, 3:00 p.m.,**TO (Agency) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. PHONE NUMBER**

State David Shinn 647-9742

State Phil Wilcox 647-9892

State Michael Arietti 736-7733

AID Dick McCall 736-4447

OSD/ISA Vince Kern 703-697-8824 [001a]

(b)(3)

USUN Tom Donlon 647-5548

JCS David McIlvoy 703-695-6585

NSC Susan Rice (HANDCARRIED) 69261

NSC Steven Simon (HANDCARRIED) 69361

REMARKS:

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the Somalia meeting which was held September 19, 1995.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 2/05/00

2012-0659-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Richard Clarke to Somalia Special CSG (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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Somalia 1995

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. note	Handwritten notes from Somalia Meeting (1 page)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1)

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African Affairs (Steinberg, Donald/Rice, Susan/DeShazer, MacArthur/McCormick, Shawn)
OA/Box Number: 872

FOLDER TITLE:

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Battenfield, Pat A.

From: Rice, Susan E.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Beers, Rand R; Lorin, Matthew E.; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs;
@AFRICA - African Affairs
Subject: ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~ Somali Detainees
Date: Friday, September 22, 1995 2:10PM

Embassy Nairobi reports all of the 14 remaining ex-pat detainees in Baidoa have been released and returned safely to Nairobi.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 12/05/16

2012-0659-F

Battenfield, Pat A.

From: DeShazer, MacArthur
To: @PRESS - Public Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; @AFRICA - African Affairs
Subject: Foreign Affairs Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, September 22, 1995 10:25AM
Priority: High

< <File Attachment: SEP21GUI.DOC> >

We have updated the Somalia piece reflecting the latest developments. Please call if you have questions.

SOMALIA: AIDEED SEIZES BAIDOA

Q: What is the status of the aid workers who were rounded up and detained by Aideed's forces?

A: **Seven of the 20 aid workers, all women, were released yesterday. The UNDP/Somalia Rep Erling Dessau was successful in gaining the release of remaining detainees today. Presently, they are enroute from Baidoa to Nairobi. We understand that they were well treated and are in good spirits.**

Q: What is the situation on the ground in Baidoa now?

A: **According to available information, on September 22 the fighting touched off by General Aideed and his militia's seizure of Baidoa has ended for now. We understand that Osman Hassan Ali Atto and other warlords have indicated agreement to consolidate the terms of their August 17 Nairobi Declaration in which they pledged to work towards a new national reconciliation conference and to counter "anti-peace forces."**

The United States is concerned that these recent developments could portend a significant setback to political reconciliation in Somalia.

Q: Does Aideed's seizing of Baidoa signal the beginning of a new offensive and a return to violence in Somalia? What does this forebode for the humanitarian and political situation in Somalia?

A: We hope that there will be no further violence in Somalia and that the Somali people will return to peaceful negotiations.

Political reconciliation at the local level was beginning to return in Somalia. This, in turn, permitted the movement of both locally grown and imported food supplies.

It is too early to predict if this development forebodes a return to increased violence, but it is not a good sign.

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003. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
African Affairs (Steinberg, Donald/Rice, Susan/DeShazer, MacArthur/McCormick, Shawn)
OA/Box Number: 872

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia 1995

2012-0659-F
kc4102

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004a. email	From MacArthur DeShazer, re: [Daily Wrap-up Memo] (1 page)	09/19/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Steinberg, Donald/Rice, Susan/DeShazer, MacArthur/McCormick, Shawn)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	09/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Steinberg, Donald/Rice, Susan/DeShazer, MacArthur/McCormick, Shawn)
OA/Box Number: 872

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia 1995

2012-0659-F
ke4102

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Battenfield, Pat A.

From: DeShazer, MacArthur
To: @PRESS - Public Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Battenfield, Pat A.; Rice, Susan E.
Subject: September 18 Guidance [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
Date: Tuesday, September 19, 1995 10:49AM

<<File Attachment: SEP18GUI.DOC>>

Natalie: Our changes are for Somalia in bold. Sorry for being tardy.

Mac

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VDE NARA, Date 02/05/16
2012-0659-F

SOMALIA: AIDEED SEIZES BAIDOA

Q: What is the situation on the ground in Baidoa now?

A: According to available information, on September 19, THE FIGHTING TOUCHED OFF BY General Aideed and his militia'S seizURE OF the southwestern city of Baidoa HAS CONTINUED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE INCREASED FIGHTING AND LOOTING HAVE CAUSED THE SITUATION TO DETERIORATE. We have no further details of the fighting or casualties.

The United States views this as a significant setback to political reconciliation in Somalia.

Q: What will be the fate of aid workers who have been rounded up by Aideed's forces? Are any Americans being held hostage?

A: We understand that approximately 18 aid workers, working for UN agencies and non-governmental relief organizations (NGOs) are being held at a compound in Baidoa by Aideed's forces.

Our immediate goal is to work for the immediate and safe release of all personnel WHO ARE NOW SAID TO BE "UNDER HOUSE ARREST." WE HAVE ASKED AIDEED TO GUARANTEE THEIR SAFE RELEASE.

(If Asked): We understand that five American citizens are among those detained. We are in close contact with the UN and NGO community in Nairobi, Kenya, which serves as a base for the organizations which employ these persons.

Q: Does Aideed's seizing of Baidoa signal the beginning of a new offensive and a return to violence in Somalia? What does this forebode for the humanitarian and political situation in Somalia?

A: We hope that there will be no further violence in Somalia and that the Somali people will return to peaceful negotiations.

Political reconciliation at the local level was beginning to return in Somalia. This, in turn, permitted the movement of both locally grown and imported food supplies.

It is too early to predict if this development forebodes a return to increased violence, but it is not a good sign.

Battenfield, Pat A.

From: Battenfield, Pat A.
To: @PRESS - Public Affairs
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1; @AFRICA - African Affairs
Subject: Press Guidance on Somalia [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, September 18, 1995 11:22AM

<< File Attachment: SOMALIA.DOC >>

SOMALIA: AIDEED SEIZES BAIDOA

Q: What is the situation on the ground in Baidoa now?

A: -- According to available information, on September 17, General Aideed and about 600 members of his militia seized the southwestern city of Baidoa. We have no further details of the fighting that took place or casualties. We understand that the town is quiet today.

-- The United States views this as a significant setback to political reconciliation in Somalia.

Q: What will be the fate of aid workers who have been rounded up by Aideed's forces? Are any Americans being held hostage?

A: -- We understand that approximately 18 aid workers, working for UN agencies and non-governmental relief organizations (NGOs) are being held at a compound in Baidoa by Aideed's forces.

-- Our immediate goal is to work for the immediate and safe release of all these personnel.

-- (If Asked): We understand that five American citizens are among those detained. We are in close contact with the UN and NGO community in Nairobi, Kenya, which serves as a base for the organizations which employ these persons.

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Battenfield, Pat A.

From: Simon, Steven N.
To: Rice, Susan E.; @AFRICA - African Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Sheehan, Michael A.
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED]Somalia Developments.
Date: Monday, August 14, 1995 8:14AM

Susan--

Got called yesterday by Tom Farer. Says there's been progress toward coalition/unity gov't in Somalia. May include Ali Mahdi. Somalis have designated ambassadors-at-large in US to get Admin support. Want to move fast; fear that there will be fighting over new aid if it is not dispensed by legitimate gov't.

Farer is advising (in some capacity) the Somali players. Wants the ambas-at-large to see someone at NSC. I suggested you, promised to pass the word and urge you to get in touch. Farer's home number is 301 493 9430.

Pls let me know what if anything you intend to do and, of course, if you have any questions.
Thanks, SS

Operational Restraints. (Conf @ Princeton 4/21/95)

Assessments

Weiss

- Says U.S. prevented Africans from acting after genocide in Rwanda
- PDD-25 massive flip-flop from campaign.
- Almost as if Clinton had read PDD-25
- Elections → HR7, SS ^{glamor}
- "now PDD-25 looks forward looking"
- Concerned that U.S. will retreat + prevent others from using UNSC
- Weir joined lessons of success in Northern Iraq

Carabassat

- 1) UN not capable of managing the UN enforcement unit
- SG says UN must turn its side
 - Unilateral is w/ UNSC good seal of approval → make most of this.
 - "Bengis Realpolitik"
 - separates UN + SG as use of force. UN can focus on PKC + police work.

Gershkoff

Senegal died in 1991 after Sadi Bane - when IV chapters = pulled

- No int'l support any more
- State - dead (1960-1991)

Lessons of 20th c

- viter failure of external solutions for internal disputes
- death of notion of sovereignty?

Rothberg

- what if we encounter failed states → Tuesday's Council?

Fundamental Problems in Africa: Conflict btw. Western colonial ^{ration-} state & African civil society.

Spencer has long history of a nation but not any basis for statehood

Intervention - should be "charity-centered" - we should not import

Western values/structures - recreating

something we think shd. exist

Leidenberger

- multitude of ethnic, internal conflicts

- After 9/11, dream we could go past sovereignty to people, intervene when int'l pressure/humanitarian crisis prevails

• issue of sovereignty = very real

- PK - sovereignty makes no difference

- unint = uncertain

- Model: of sovereign state ^{if we're blessing} intentions + then UN takes over.

• Why not? ⇒ Seeking consensus in UN

(Roth, Dugorip = high)

May not be consensus for humanity

} fragile + may not last as a model.

XX

Military Aspect

Flourish

Lessons Learned

1) PDD-25 criteria for U.S. involvement in PKO

- interests-based approach should limit U.S. involvement in certain hum. ops.
- requirements-based approach...

2) Need integrated pol-mil-hum-econ coherent strategy

- all actors need to be included in planning process $\rightarrow$ diff. functional approaches
- clear division of labor & overlap among various functions
- POL/MIL PLAN ✓

$\rightarrow$ challenge: keep strategy integrated in implementation.

3) Importance of Adequate Resources - in all elements, not just military

4) UN - not capable of managing fully Ch. VI operations - given current commitment & capabilities

- when U.S. commits large # of troops/resources $\rightarrow$ US must play > supporting role, not be willing to take a major role

5) Transition UNCTAF $\rightarrow$ UNOSOM II $\rightarrow$ must work for transition from Day 1


- Haiti ✓

- careful crafting of resolutions governing handoff
- J3 Advance Team planning for begin
- committed significant resources $\rightarrow$ planning @ UN

~~US never stopped receiving effort~~ - US never stopped receiving effort MAF $\rightarrow$ UNMIL

6) Irreplaceable Role played by certain TYPES of Forces

- Psyops, Civ Affairs, SF, Engineering



7/6) Importance of Continuum Policy Review + Mission quality is

- continues oversight review

Stanley John Whedden

- one of 3-4 civil affairs people on ground in UNDPOM (arrived in June)
- May 30 civil affairs people in Somalia; 600 in Haiti, several hundred in Kuwait/Harb

Gerald Rumsfeld

- Rumsfeld vision = very different from U.S. Didn't take it seriously
- intervention = political thing → military only supports or accompanies
- FR had interviewed in AF but → OBSCURED = unclear

14 x in post-war years.

FR has special AF office in Pres. office.

- FR had to participate for reasons of world standing; FR office is wanted FR in; Xmas, major = destruction

- FR planned to get out asap (quietly). FR may did not want in saw it as doomed to failure b/c US didn't know what it was doing.
- FR decided to go to Somalia (land) = easy, near Djibouti etc. But BISG said no.

In FR's view:

Fighting = due to lack of political understanding

- Went to Bakool - wanted to do quiet civil affairs - schools, hospitals
- lived in small groups on foot in bush. Moved @ night to scare Somalis
- after 6 weeks told FR not to carry guns
- FR tried NOT to be involved in Mog. fighting in June + enter helicopters
- Moroccans killed in point-blank range, or narrow street battles - got slaughtered

Used Foreign Strategy

Dupdale

Issues

- Single man hunt can lead to war
- Don't use CIVIL to bring individuals to justice
- Art. 42 of CN VII needs re-drafting $\uparrow$ to ensure not used vs. individuals

Col. Wahlquist

5 considerations for peace agreement

- 1) Political will $\rightarrow$ involves use of force
- 2) Low-profile, minor casualty approach = done
- 3) Competing national objectives
- 3) Redefinition of mission = wide
- 4) Diverse capabilities in a mission
- 5) UN C²
- 6) Over-reliance on U.S.

US shd. be prepared to act initially or possibly not at all.

Hummer US became clear; got out; now superpowers

- Clinton should not have flattened Mogadishu.

beneath him Good but not (enough) to leave.

- "Problem of Americans = they don't know how to manipulate us like the Italians."

- Persian didn't, but not the clay

US lacks
cooperation advantage
in understanding O/C in
colonial legacy

UN shd. have
avoided being part
of problems after
June 5

Primer

"Americans are always
looking for technical
solutions to cultural
problems."

$\therefore$ US needs to go NATIVE

fly into

JAW US
 60-70 BUREAU
 1 low Power
 available free?

POMS
 • VN
 • Saigon
 • Popul
 • backing
 • demand

Decision Making
 Have
 Lessons

Product
 of War Industry

Haven't
 talked
 success

- ③ * JUNE 5
- HAD TO
HAPPEN...
* PULLING PND TO NATL RECONCILIATION
* RUSH TO GET OUT
- ① ← * CLINTON'S engagement
- summer of '93
- ② * CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT
AFTER TRANSITION
- IMPR
- LOST INTEREST
- ⑥ * HORRIBLE JOB ON
KILL + PUBLIC AFFAIRS
- Success not / Chris.
- Blame Congress.
Admin stages
- ⑦ * US Retreat in support
for PK - involvement (Woods)
- not the
→ Technical assistance to VN
→ Doctr C², Plans, Intell. Training, Logistics
hands

- UN = inherently weak ag. for peace enforcement + to same extent for PK
- UN needs major strategy review - radical surgery
- have to ensure adequate means; integrated resources
- Somalia = missed opportunity to do so for Somalia, not failure of US-UN relations

Woods

- A lot of policy process
- High marks → DC under Howe + Berger
- Key weaknesses - relationship of Hill = deflection in explaining objectives, costs, risks.
- Even worse - public affairs strategy
- Bad job of Hill briefing: J-3 ops briefs not substantive discussion of goals, means
- Clinton not deeply, personally engaged until Oct. 3
- First retreat of Clinton Admin. for PK + thum. involvement

WOL = screaming up.

Democrat enlargement

Tolson

- Congress probably largely responsible for intervention + for collapse of US mission
- Hearings by Dec. 1992. Caucus involved in Aug. '92
- Congress became very concerned, worried ability. Dec 17 - Hamilton called hearing on war powers
- 1992 election Congress = much more conservative
- 12 hearings on War Powers (Feb - Nov)

Polls ↓; Opposition ↑

Bapd = concerned constitutionally + fiscally
 S. Res. 45 to limit combat

- Bpd reappeared . Fastenides to go to Hq.
- Oct 3 = Pearl Harbor . Congress jumped in.
CND master

- Pres. isolationism

- 2nd resolution -> March 31

Congress = now asserting itself in Foreign Policy . 535 Sec. states

- very bad . Most ineffectual since Vietnam

- May have made POTUS leave Duck

104th Congress

Congress Contract = written by Rockefeller

241-181
* H.R. 7 - most thing ever passed by House

Virtual isolationism

10% cut on state

AID = get your resume out

20% on foreign assistance

USIA - last layer

- cuts Africa + Plc ; also away w/ DFA

Budget
Cuts.

- Pop. control zeroed out

- 60P Africanists in pool of blood - went to Korick

} direct result
of Sanctions

Other casualties of Sanctions

- Angola, Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi

Criticism

- Administration has not articulated successes of Sanctions

30 US troops killed in 18 months in Liberia -> WUNTA

250,000 saved

for TRIP
+ TRIP

- Rwand 3,000 - stop cholera in GOMA

success in Rwanda - not long hand

DOD + Admin - must redefine role of DOD in post CW era
- don't know what their role is.

⊗ Democrats don't want to spend any \$ for DOD + want to commit US troops everywhere
Republicans want to give DOD tons of \$ + commit US military nowhere.

Continuum FT or Gallup polls

Failure - scapegoating VP for Oct 3,

* Smaller force in Burundi - end of Powell doctrine

* Foreign Legion

- \$ response from AF
Public ahead.

- Redef. Foreign Assist → AF

- Trade/Dev/Econ. Links

- Nigeria, Angola,

\$ spent by
AF per district

Abou
Neider

TRUSTEESHIP

McLaney

- need graduated response . . . low intensity interventions

- permanent standing force - too early for US/FR legis

Measures • professional military command @ UN (experienced etc.)

• national units made up of volunteers → legis on volunteers

• common training (pol-mil)

• greater use of CIVPOL

- Better coordination btw UN + NGOs

- US needs to define realm of reaction to non-vital NATI interests

- "We need to get serious about UN" - Don't let it stand for cash. Don't take on

• great deal of public support for UN // Take seriously + go home. Don't scapegoat!

• have to do better job of articulating rationale.

Hussein

- Saudis feel real gratitude to U.S.

- War has become almost a way of life

- DISCOURSE of RABF

- > on Premier's influence

Capit the US/UN agency "it's
money at hand" "US-Saudi"
view of "it's all we have"



IO/UNP

Somalia

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE

FLASH

TEL. 847-0042

FAX: 847-0039

COVER + 3

FROM:

GREG STANTON

TO:

✓ David Shinn	AF	70810 ✓
Susan Rice	NSC	456-9260 ✓
Balbeer Sihra	IO/PHO	74006
Lt. Col. Brundage	OSD/PKPE/SR	703-693-0519
✓ Col. Al Piotter	JCS	703-697-0255 ✓
✓ Chuck Ikins	OSD/ISA/AFR	703-695-4620
Jean Donoghue	6/AF	67115 ✓
George Taft		
✓ Leslie Bassett	P/AF	74780 ✓

SUBJECT: Somalia

FYI

URGENT

04. 20. 95

02:05 PM

* U. S.

MISSOURI



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

18 April 1995

Dear Mr. President,

In my report to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia of 28 March 1995 (S/1995/231), submitted in pursuance of resolution 954 (1994), I indicated that I expected to be in a position to take a decision by mid-April 1995 about the level and mandate of a continued United Nations political presence in Mogadishu. I further indicated that the size and mandate of that presence would depend on whether the Somali parties wanted the United Nations to play a facilitating or mediating role and were ready to cooperate with it and that its location should be in Mogadishu, the security situation there permitting.

In the Presidential statement of 6 April (S/PRST/1995/15), the Security Council welcomed my intention to continue a small political mission, should the Somali parties so wish, to assist them in coming together in national reconciliation. In this connection, the members of the Council may wish to take note of the enclosed press release which was issued by the Somali National Alliance on 11 April 1995. I shall stay in touch with the parties with a view to overcoming reservations such as those expressed therein.

His Excellency
Mr. Karel Kovanda
President of the Security Council
New York

04.20.95

02:05 PM

*U. S.

MISSION

In order to determine whether the present situation in Mogadishu is sufficiently secure to allow for the establishment of an office in that location, I recently dispatched a security assessment mission there. That mission's report is currently under preparation and the Council will be appraised of its findings as soon as they are available.

Meanwhile, I have concluded that the retention of a full-time Special Representative at the USG level cannot be justified at the present time in view of the limited possibilities for United Nations political efforts related to Somalia. Mr. Victor Gbeho is therefore preparing to return to his home country. Instead, I have decided to establish a small political office, headed by a representative at the D-2 level and assisted by two Professional Officers and a limited number of support staff. The Office will monitor the situation in Somalia and keep contact with the parties concerned to the extent possible. The Office will operate temporarily from Nairobi but will be relocated to Mogadishu as soon as circumstances permit.

I should be grateful if you could bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

04. 20. 95 02:05 PM

D R A F T

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 18 April 1995 concerning a continued United Nations political presence in Somalia and the establishment of a small political Office to monitor the situation there has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They note the information contained in the letter and welcome the decision contained therein.

Accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Karel Kovanda
President of the Security Council

His Excellency
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, BEERS, CLARKER, CRESSEY, DARRAGH, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SEATON, STEINBERG

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED DTG:070213Z APR 95

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3836

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0504
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEIBS/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0477
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1610
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2483
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1254
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0500
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0636
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0286
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1383

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001307

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE; OSD FOR SEWALL;
STATE FOR AF/E, IO/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-SIHRA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PASS TO SOMALIA LIAISON OFFICE

E.O.12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - COUNCIL ISSUES PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT, 6 APR

REF: USUN 1192

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT ON SOMALIA AT A FORMAL SESSION ON 6
APRIL. THE STATEMENT WAS IN RESPONSE TO THE SYG'S
REPORT ON THE CONCLUSION OF UNOSOM II (REFTEL).
THE STATEMENT NOTES UNOSOM'S SUCCESSFUL WITHDRAWAL
AND CONGRATULATES THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH
PARTICIPATED IN THE MULTINATIONAL OPERATION. THE
COUNCIL WELCOMES THE INTENTION OF THE SYG TO
CONTINUE A SMALL POLITICAL MISSION, IF THE SOMALIS
SO WISH. THE SYG IS TO REPORT LATER IN APRIL ON
THE DETAILS OF THIS SMALL MISSION. TEXT OF THE

STATEMENT FOLLOWS AT PARA 2.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED CAREFULLY THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA DATED 28 MARCH, 1995 (S/1995/231) AND NOTES THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNOSOM II FORCES FROM SOMALIA. IT EXPRESSES ITS APPRECIATION TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND AGENCIES THAT HAVE PROVIDED THE PERSONNEL, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND OTHER SUPPORT TO THE PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN SOMALIA, INCLUDING THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE MULTINATIONAL OPERATION FOR UNOSOM'S WITHDRAWAL. IT PAYS TRIBUTE IN PARTICULAR TO ALL PERSONNEL WHO SACRIFICED THEIR LIVES IN THIS SERVICES.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDERLINES THAT THE TIMELY INTERVENTION OF UNOSOM II AND THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO SOMALIA HELPED TO SAVE MANY LIVES AND MUCH PROPERTY, MITIGATE GENERAL SUFFERING AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN SOMALIA. THE COUNCIL NOTES THAT OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY AND TO FACILITATE THE RE-EMERGENCE OF A CIVIL SOCIETY. HOWEVER, THE CONTINUING LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, IN PARTICULAR THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT COOPERATION FROM THE SOMALI PARTIES OVER SECURITY ISSUES, UNDERMINED THE UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVES IN SOMALIA AND PREVENTED THE CONTINUATION OF UNOSOM II MANDATE BEYOND 31 MARCH, 1995.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL BELIEVES THAT THE SOMALIA OPERATION PROVIDES IMPORTANT LESSONS FOR THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PEACE-MAKING, PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REMAINS CONVINCED THAT ONLY A GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE AND BROAD-BASED APPROACH TO RECONCILIATION WILL BRING ABOUT A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND ALLOW FOR THE RE-EMERGENCE OF A CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOMALIA. THE COUNCIL REAFFIRMS, BASED ON ITS EXPERIENCE IN UNOSOM II, THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA BEAR THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RESTORING PEACE TO SOMALIA. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN ONLY FACILITATE, ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST THE PROCESS, BUT NOT TRY TO IMPOSE ANY PARTICULAR SOLUTION TO IT. THE COUNCIL, THEREFORE, CALLS UPON THE SOMALI PARTIES

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TO PURSUE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, REHABILITATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE,
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOTES THE RECENT AGREEMENTS
REACHED BETWEEN THE FACTIONS IN MOGADISHU,
ESPECIALLY ON THE CONTROL OF SEA AND AIRPORT
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001307

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE; OSD FOR SEWALL;
STATE FOR AF/E, IO/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-SIHRA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PASS TO SOMALIA LIAISON OFFICE

E.O.12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - COUNCIL ISSUES PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT, 6 APR

FACILITIES. IT EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THIS
ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT IS INDICATIVE OF A NEW
SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AMONG THE FACTIONS AND THAT
IT WILL LEAD TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE SEARCH FOR
A LASTING PEACE IN SOMALIA.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORTS THE VIEW OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT SOMALIA SHOULD NOT BE
ABANDONED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH WILL
CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE SOMALI PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE A
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN
AND OTHER SUPPORT SERVICES PROVIDED THAT THE
SOMALIS THEMSELVES DEMONSTRATE A DISPOSITION TO
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT AND TO
COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT
WELCOMES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INTENTION TO
CONTINUE A SMALL POLITICAL MISSION, SHOULD THE
SOMALI PARTIES SO WISH, TO ASSIST THEM IN COMING
TOGETHER IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, AND LOOKS
FORWARD TO THE REPORT WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
HAS INDICATED HE WILL FORWARD ON THIS MATTER.
THE COUNCIL URGES CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, IN
PARTICULAR THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
(OAU), THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC), AS WELL AS THE
GOVERNMENTS OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES IN THESE
EFFORTS. THE COUNCIL CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT
THE SOMALI PARTIES CLEARLY EXPRESS THEIR
ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE AND THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL RECOGNIZES THAT HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE IN SOMALIA IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN
THE EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE
COUNTRY. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO SUSTAIN

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UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA AND TO ENCOURAGE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO DO LIKEWISE. HOWEVER, THEIR ABILITY TO DO SO WILL DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION AND SECURITY OFFERED BY THE SOMALI PARTIES. THE COUNCIL WELCOMES THE WILLINGNESS EXPRESSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND NGOS TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE IN AREAS WHERE SECURITY IS GUARANTEED BY THE SOMALIS. THE COUNCIL STRESSES THAT THE CREATION OF A LONG-LASTING, STABLE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IS VITAL FOR THE RESUMPTION OF LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITY IN THESE FIELDS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE EMBARGO ON ALL DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SOMALIA, IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 5 OF RESOLUTION 733 (1992), AND CALLS ON STATES, ESPECIALLY NEIGHBOURING STATES, TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS CAPABLE OF EXACERBATING THE CONFLICT SITUATION IN SOMALIA.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AND TO KEEP IT INFORMED ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. THE COUNCIL WILL REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

ALBRIGHT

BT

#1307

NNNN

<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SSN> 1307

<^TOR> 950406222112 M1606854

<^SECT> SECTION: 02 OF 02

<^SSN> 1307

<^TOR> 950406222112 M1606855

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San Diego**IO/UNP****UNCLASSIFIED FAX**

ROUTINE

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TEL. 847-0042

FAX: 847-0039

COVER + *23***FROM:**

GREG STANTON

TO:

David Shinn	AF	70810 ✓
Susan Rice	NSC	456-9260 ✓
Balbeer Sihra	IO/PHO	74006
Lt. Col. Brundage	OSD/PKPE/SR	703-693-0519 ✓
Col. Al Piotter	JCS	703-697-0255 ✓
Chuck Ikins	OSD/ISA/AFR	703-695-4620 ✓
Jean Donoghue	L/AF	67115 ✓
George Taft		
Leslie Bassett	P/AF	74780 ✓

SUBJECT: Somalia: Please comment by 5 PM today**URGENT**

Draft Presidential Statement on Somalia

The Security Council has considered carefully the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia dated 28 March, 1995 (S/1995/231) and notes the successful conclusion of the withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces from Somalia. It expresses its appreciation to those Governments and agencies that have provided the personnel, humanitarian assistance and other support to the peace-keeping operation in Somalia, including those Governments who participated in the multinational operation for UNOSOM's withdrawal. It pays tribute in particular to all personnel who sacrificed their lives in this services.

The Security Council underlines the timely intervention of UNOSOM II and the humanitarian assistance which helped to save lives and property, mitigate general suffering and contribute to the search for peace in Somalia. The Council notes that over the past three years, the United Nations and the international community have made significant efforts to restore peace and stability, facilitate the re-emergence of a civil society and re-establish central governmental structures and services. However, the continuing lack of progress in the peace process and in national reconciliation, in particular the lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia and the continuation of UNOSOM II mandate beyond 31 March, 1995.

The Security Council remains convinced that only a genuinely inclusive and broad-based approach to political reconciliation will bring about a lasting political settlement and re-emergence of a civil society in Somalia. The Council reaffirms, based on its experience in UNOSOM II, that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and bringing peace to Somalia. The international community can only facilitate, prod, encourage and assist the process. The Council therefore encourages the Somali parties to pursue national reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the higher interest of peace, security and development.

The Security Council notes the recent agreements reached between the factions in Mogadishu, especially on the control of sea and airport facilities. It expresses the hope that this encouraging sign of cooperation between the factions will lead them to pursue a more productive peace process.

- 2 -

The Security Council is determined not to abandon Somalia but to continue to assist the Somali people to achieve a political settlement and to provide humanitarian and other support services on condition that the Somalis themselves demonstrate a disposition to peaceful resolution of the conflict and cooperation with the international community. It, therefore, welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to continue a small political mission to assist the Somali parties to come together in national reconciliation and looks forward to the report which the Secretary-General has indicated he will forward on the matter. The Council urges close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as the Governments of neighbouring countries in these efforts. The Council considers it essential that the Somali parties clearly express their acceptance of such assistance and their willingness to cooperate with the United Nations.

The Security Council recognizes that humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort to restore international peace and security in the country. It is therefore important to sustain United Nations humanitarian activities in Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations to do likewise, but their ability to do so will depend on the degree of cooperation and security offered by the Somali parties. The Council welcomes the willingness expressed by the international humanitarian agencies and NGOs to continue to provide rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in areas where security is guaranteed by the Somalis. The Council stresses that the creation of a long-lasting, stable and secure environment throughout the country would be vital for the resumption of large-scale activity in these fields.

The Security Council reaffirms the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), and calls on States, especially neighbouring States, to refrain from actions capable of exacerbating the conflict situation in Somalia.

The Council requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in Somalia and to keep it informed about developments. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

Somalia**IO/UNP****UNCLASSIFIED FAX**

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TEL. 847-0042

FAX: 847-0039

COVER + *3***FROM:** GREG STANTON

TO:

David Shinn	AF	70810 ✓
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Chuck Ikins	OSD/ISA/AFR	703-695-4620
Jean Donoghue	L/AF	67115 ✓
George Taft		
Leslie Bassett	P/AF	74780 ✓

SUBJECT: Somalia**URGENT**

UNITED
NATIONS

S



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1995/231
28 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA
SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 13 OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 954 (1994)

03:48 PM 29.03.1995

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of resolution 954 (1994) of 4 November 1994, by which the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for a final period until 31 March 1995. In paragraph 13 of the resolution, the Council requested me to report to it before 31 March 1995 on the situation in Somalia and to submit suggestions concerning the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond that date.

2. The present report covers the political developments since my last report (S/1994/1166) dated 14 October 1994. It includes a general assessment of what has been achieved by the United Nations in Somalia in political, humanitarian, military and security matters and the police and justice programme, as well as financial aspects, followed by a section on the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. The report also presents some thoughts on the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond the conclusion of UNOSOM II's mandate on 31 March 1995.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST REPORT

3. On 14 October 1994, 12 factions and organizations associated with the Somali National Alliance (SNA) announced in a memorandum their decision to convene a national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu on 27 October 1994. They appealed to the leaders of four of the signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement (S/26317) aligned with the Group of 12, namely the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Party (USP), to join them in that conference and, inter alia, requested UNOSOM II to extend invitations for the conference to the Chairmen of 16 factions and organizations listed in the memorandum. These 16 factions included splinter groups from the Somali African Muki Organisation (SAMO), the Somali National Union (SNU) and the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), which have no official standing within the context of either the Addis Ababa agreement or the Nairobi declaration (S/1994/814, annex I).

95-07447 (S) 280395

290395

/...

S/1995/231

English

Page 2

4. Following the publication of the memorandum of 14 October 1994, my Special Representative urged all Somali leaders to intensify their consultations in order to facilitate the convening of a broad-based or all-inclusive national reconciliation conference, which would include the representatives of all the recognized factions from the two sides, namely the SNA and the Group of 12.
5. On 17 October 1994, the Group of 12 addressed an appeal to the SNA for the two sides to come together in a broad-based conference with the participation of all signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement and the SNM. The Group of 12 adopted a charter on 23 October 1994 by which it officially reconstituted itself into the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), an umbrella organization of 14 factions and organizations originally formed in February 1994. Mr. Ali Mahdi was elected Chairman of the Alliance.
6. Despite the intensive contacts and informal consultations that followed, the two sides did not succeed in reaching agreement on the convening of an all-inclusive conference. Consequently, my Special Representative appealed to the SNA factions to postpone the convening of their conference in order to allow more time for consultations with the SSA. On 26 October 1994, the SNA factions announced the postponement of the convening of their conference to 1 November 1994 in deference to the impending visit of the Security Council mission to Somalia.
7. The Security Council mission, led by H.E. Mr. Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand, visited Somalia from 26 to 27 October 1994 and met with the leaders of the SSA and the SNA factions and organizations respectively to convey to them the special message from the Security Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there (see S/1994/1245, annex II).
8. On 1 November 1994, however, the SNA factions convened their unilateral conference in south Mogadishu with a view to establishing an interim Government within 45 days. On the same day, my Special Representative issued a statement in which he pointed out that the unilateral decision of the SNA factions to hold their own conference was contrary to the understanding reached between them and all other concerned factions that invitations for a national reconciliation conference would be extended by UNOSOM II to the leaders of recognized factions, after the completion of the necessary consultations. On this basis, my Special Representative declined an invitation to attend the SNA-sponsored unilateral conference in an observer capacity. From that point on, there was a rift between General Aidid and my Special Representative, who continued to take the position that the national reconciliation conference must be all-inclusive and that the United Nations would not be in a position to support a partisan Government.
9. Mr. Ali Mahdi, on his part, convened a parallel meeting of SSA leaders in north Mogadishu to prepare their response to the anticipated announcement of an interim Government by the SNA-sponsored conference. On 3 November 1994, the SSA leaders informed my Special Representative that they had completed contingency plans to establish their own national Government in the event that the SNA-sponsored conference unilaterally announced an interim Government. They also expressed the view that the SNA-sponsored conference contravened all

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agreements previously reached among the recognized factions and reiterated their position that the solution to the Somali crisis could come only from a national reconciliation conference with the participation of all recognized political organizations and all strata of Somali society, including traditional chiefs and elders, religious leaders, intellectuals, and women.

10. My Special Representative continued to emphasize to both sides the need to have a genuine all-inclusive and broad-based conference, and offered facilities at UNOSOM II headquarters for the SSA and the SNA factions to hold further consultations aimed at reaching agreement to this end. He warned both sides that UNOSOM II would extend the necessary assistance only for such a conference.

11. The SSA and the SNA factions eventually appointed six representatives each, who held a series of meetings in south Mogadishu from 4 to 8 November 1994 to discuss substantive issues relating to the convening of a national reconciliation conference, including the question of a preparatory meeting. The meetings, however, resulted in a stalemate. Subsequently, in further efforts to break this deadlock, UNOSOM II facilitated two meetings at its headquarters between Mr. Ali Mahdi and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), who had been mandated by the SNA factions and organizations to discuss on their behalf the convening of an all-inclusive conference with the SSA. At the request of both the SNA and the SSA, UNOSOM II also arranged for General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan", Vice-Chairman of SPM/SSA, to travel from Kismayo to Mogadishu for consultations. While in Mogadishu, General Morgan met separately with Mr. Ali Mahdi and the SSA factions and with Col. Abdullahi Yusuf in an effort to reconcile the SSA and the SNA factions. Other faction leaders from the two sides held meetings at UNOSOM II headquarters with a view to facilitating agreement between them.

12. These efforts did not yield any further progress and, by the beginning of December 1994, the parallel SNA conference and the SSA meeting were indicating their intentions to announce their separate Governments. These potentially destabilizing moves have not so far materialized and the SNA conference and the SSA meeting are still in session. Their discussions have reportedly focused on the nature of a federal system of government, the powers of the central Government vis-à-vis regional authorities, the distribution of government posts and the drafting of a transitional charter. It was also reported that the four committees established at the opening of the SNA-sponsored conference to deal with reconciliation, rehabilitation, security and drafting of a charter respectively had completed their work.

13. My Special Representative visited Addis Ababa on 29 December 1994 to meet with President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and discuss ways of bringing Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid together to resolve their differences over the convening of a genuine national reconciliation conference. President Meles Zenawi has been acting under the mandate of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Following these discussions, the President of Ethiopia sent a fact-finding mission to Somalia at the beginning of January 1995, which maintained close contact with my Special Representative. Subsequently, at the beginning of March 1995, President Meles Zenawi dispatched to Somalia a delegation of ethnic Somali leaders from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti in order to persuade political

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and traditional leaders throughout the country to come together and work for national reconciliation.

14. Also in December 1994, a delegation of the League of Arab States (LAS) visited Somalia and met with the SSA and the SNA factions to assist in expediting the process of national reconciliation. Subsequently, LAS, jointly with OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), held a meeting on Somalia in Cairo on 22 and 23 February 1995 at which the United Nations participated as an observer. The participating organizations agreed on the need to continue and intensify joint efforts to assist the Somalis in reaching national reconciliation as soon as possible. To that end, they decided to send a joint mission to Addis Ababa to hold consultations with the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at a date to be determined.

15. Meanwhile, contacts between the SSA and the SNA factions continued through January and February 1995 to discuss new initiatives offered by both sides to break the political impasse. On 6 February, the SSA formally presented its plan of action, which is a proposal for national reconciliation in Somalia. The proposal called for the convening of a unified and all-inclusive national reconciliation conference on 28 February 1995 or any other agreed date, which would include representatives from the SSA, SNA, SNM and Mr. Bgal's alliance from the north-west, as well as traditional chiefs and elders, religious leaders, intellectuals and women. The United Nations would play a mediatory and supportive role in the preparation and convening of the conference. In a press conference on that occasion, Mr. Ali Mahdi stressed that the SSA plan of action was merely a proposal that was subject to modification. Expressing the hope that the SNA would react favourably to the proposal, he stressed that no one political faction or alliance could form a Government of national unity.

16. In the weeks preceding the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, my Special Representative held discussions, initiated in January 1994 and continued since then, with the SNA and the SSA to urge them to form joint committees to manage the operations of the Mogadishu seaport and airport. In January 1995, the SSA and the SNA succeeded in establishing a negotiating committee. Following the announcement of the SSA plan of action, the SNA-SSA negotiating committee was given a wider mandate to coordinate political and economic matters relating to reconciliation among the Habr Gedir and Mudulood clans, work out modalities for bringing General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi together and merge the two separate conferences/meetings on national reconciliation sponsored by the SNA and the SSA respectively.

17. On 19 February 1995, Mr. Ali Mahdi and Mr. Osman Hassan Ali "Atto", a high-ranking official of the SNA, had a meeting that led to significant political developments during the last two weeks of UNOSOM II's withdrawal. On 21 February 1995, a peace agreement was signed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi on behalf of the SNA and the SSA respectively to promote national reconciliation and a peaceful settlement. In that agreement, the two sides, inter alia, accepted the principle of power-sharing; pledged not to seek the presidency through military means but through democratic elections; agreed to the resolution of disputes through dialogue and peaceful means; and agreed on a common platform for tackling problems. It also included provisions for the

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confinement of "technicals" to designated areas and discouraged the open carrying of arms in the streets of Mogadishu. In addition, it called for the removal of roadblocks and the reopening of the main markets in the city.

18. In another significant development, on 23 February 1995, the two sides reached agreement on the establishment of two joint committees to manage the operations of the Mogadishu airport and seaport. This agreement was endorsed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi. It provides a basis for cooperation between the Somali parties and organisations within the United Nations system. UNOSOM II and the United Nations agencies have committed themselves to provide assistance to the two committees. The Mogadishu seaport was reopened to civilian traffic on 9 March under the administration of the joint committees of the SNA and the SSA. The reopening of the seaport resulted from the signing of a third agreement between Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid on 5 March 1995. This agreement allowed for the resumption of operations at the seaport in view of the need to offload ships and dhows carrying badly needed commodities. On 8 March, the two leaders initialled a fourth agreement to establish a security committee comprising militia and police officers from both sides. The security committee would ensure the exclusion of unauthorized "technicals" from the airport and seaport and arrange for the police force to provide security inside these facilities, while joint militias with specially marked "technicals" would secure the outer perimeters as well as the routes used to deliver commodities to the markets.

19. My Special Representative has extended an invitation to the chairman of the two committees to visit Nairobi for consultations with the United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT) (see para. 35 below) in order to discuss arrangements for reactivating civilian operations at the airport and seaport. One subject to be discussed is the return to Mogadishu of the equipment for operating the seaport and airport facilities, without which only small ships can be serviced. This equipment, currently stored in the United Nations logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, will be returned to Mogadishu when conditions permit. In the meantime, I agreed provisionally with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) that it would continue to act in civil aviation matters with regard to Somalia, pending further guidance from the Council and/or the re-establishment of governmental authority in Somalia.

20. The signing of these agreements has had a salutary effect on the political process as a whole, with both the SNA and the SSA emphasizing that there will be no more war between them. My Special Representative has reported that, on the basis of the agreements reached, the SNA and the SSA militias are presently collaborating in providing security at the Mogadishu airport and seaport in cooperation with the Somali police force. As a result of these agreements and arrangements, the situation in Mogadishu has improved, and it is understood that both sides have now settled down to serious discussions on the convening of a broad-based national reconciliation conference. Also on their agenda are the establishment of a regional council and the appointment of a governor for the Benadir region (Mogadishu).

21. During the reporting period, UNOSOM II continued to encourage and assist the Somali people to establish district councils. On 20 November 1994, it certified the district council for the city of Kismayo, bringing the number of

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district councils to 58 out of a total of approximately 92. In addition, 8 out of a total of 18 regional councils have also been established. There is continued interest in the formation of district and regional councils. In recognition of their importance, I authorized UNOSOM II, during its withdrawal phase, to donate to them some essential equipment, including generators, water pumps, office equipment and furniture. In Mogadishu, I also approved the donation of four generators in order to facilitate the continued provision of potable water to the city and its surrounding villages. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has agreed in principle to support institution-building in Somalia in the post-UNOSOM II era and to extend necessary assistance to the regional and district councils to strengthen their capacity for local government and administration. UNDP is currently discussing funding arrangements in regard to assistance to these councils with interested donors, including the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden.

III. ASSESSMENT OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN SOMALIA

A. Political aspects

22. From the beginning of the United Nations involvement in Somalia, the attainment of cease-fires and the promotion of national reconciliation have been among the Organization's major goals. To help to achieve national reconciliation, two major conferences were held with the assistance and support of the United Nations, namely the National Reconciliation Conference in March 1993, which yielded the Addis Ababa agreement, and the consultations in Nairobi in March 1994, which led to the Nairobi declaration. There was significant representation of the civil society of Somalia at each of these major conferences. More than 250 representatives of community organizations, elders, scholars, as well as women's groups, participated in the Addis Ababa Conference, while a significant number of elders was present at the consultations in Nairobi. Although the implementation of these agreements has been forestalled by subsequent developments, the two agreements continue to serve as the major frame of reference in the Somali parties' discussions of a political settlement.

23. The United Nations has also sponsored interclan reconciliation meetings at the local level. These include the Jubaland Peace Conference in June and August 1993, the Garowe Peace and Cooperation Conference in December 1993, the Digil/Merifle-Rahanweyn-Aulihaan Conference in Bardera in February 1994, the Lower Juba Region Reconciliation Conference in June 1994 and the Absame Reconciliation Conference from June to July 1994. These conferences, and the agreements that resulted from them, have significantly contributed to the prevention of interclan fighting, largely limiting the area of conflict to south Mogadishu.

24. The United Nations has also helped to arrange a series of cease-fires, starting in February 1992, when the consultations that I had convened with the representatives of Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid yielded the first cease-fire agreement in Mogadishu. That cease-fire was expanded into a nationwide cease-fire in January 1993. When a resumption of fighting in Kismayo threatened

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the relative peace in the Lower Juba area in February 1994, my Acting Special Representative was instrumental in re-establishing the cease-fire. He also used the occasion to bring the numerous parties concerned to intensive consultations in Nairobi, which led to the Nairobi declaration in March 1994. More recently, my Special Representative has worked closely with prominent elders to mitigate the sporadic, but at times intense, interclan fighting that resumed in south Mogadishu in June 1994. Combined with the stabilizing effect of the peace-keeping force, these efforts have contributed greatly to the achievement and maintenance of relative peace in Somalia as a whole.

25. As already mentioned, UNOSOM II has certified 58 district councils to date, including the 2 district councils in the Sanaag region in the north-west, which were formed in response to the wishes of the people there. It has also certified 8 regional councils out of a total of 18. UNOSOM II, in collaboration with the Life and Peace Institute, has given assistance to district and regional councils by refurbishing or rebuilding their offices and providing them with administrative kits and equipment, as well as by organizing seminars for district and regional councillors in administration and management. In addition, the Life and Peace Institute has assisted district and regional councils through food-for-work projects. The SNA's opposition to the formation of these councils, however, has prevented the creation of the Transitional National Council (TNC), which the Addis Ababa agreement envisaged would be formed from the representatives of the district and regional councils. It is hoped that these councils will be able to function as partners of the international community in rehabilitation and development when security permits.

B. Humanitarian aspects

26. By 1992 Somalia was a devastated country. The magnitude of human suffering was overwhelming as hundreds of thousands of lives were lost as a result of civil war, drought and famine. In the famine zones, approximately one third of all Somali children under the age of five died from starvation and diseases related to malnutrition. Out of a total estimated population of 8 million Somalis, 4.5 million lives were at risk, including 1 million children. Farms were destroyed, livestock killed, food harvests burned and homes razed to the ground. Some 2 million persons had been violently displaced from their home areas and fled either to neighbouring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. Towns and cities were plunged into a nightmare of insecurity. All institutions of governance, and at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure, had disintegrated.

27. Despite these conditions of anarchy and extreme insecurity, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) determinedly maintained a continuous presence in the country, providing humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands of Somalis. Although the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) - already present in the north of Somalia - recommenced operations in Mogadishu in December 1991 and was joined three months later by the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations involvement in the delivery of humanitarian assistance began in earnest in mid-1992. Through the combined efforts of the United Nations, ICRC and NGOs, humanitarian assistance programmes expanded and over a quarter of a million

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lives are estimated to have been saved during the famine emergency, while millions of Somalis were able to benefit from humanitarian relief.

28. Since then, the humanitarian situation in Somalia has changed dramatically in a number of respects. Drought conditions, which were particularly acute in 1992 and 1993, have improved considerably. In 1994, the April-June *Gu* (short rain) season harvest was very successful and reached close to 75 per cent of pre-war production of basic cereals, while the September-January *Dag* (long rain) harvest exceeded pre-war levels. The timely provision of food and non-food relief through the humanitarian assistance programme also contributed significantly to the prevention of a new famine emergency. At the height of the famine between 1992 and 1993, WFP delivered an average of 35,000 tons of food per month to approximately 1.5 million Somalis. By the end of 1994, food-for-work schemes had replaced free distribution as the main mode for delivery of food assistance, and the number of direct recipients of relief assistance from WFP dropped to around 21,000 people per month, with a further 280,000 Somalis benefiting from food-for-work schemes. By December 1994, WFP was delivering up to 5,000 tons of food monthly and in 1995 it plans to channel around 10,000 tons of food into Somalia each month. WFP intends to use its food resources as an incentive to encourage Somalis to participate in a variety of institutional rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, while continuing to provide supplementary feeding assistance and food to vulnerable groups when necessary.

29. Since the start of the relief and emergency programmes of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 1992, vegetable and cereal seeds, farm tools and pesticides have been successfully distributed to around 300,000 destitute farmers and their families. More recently, the efforts of humanitarian organizations in the areas of agriculture and fisheries have focused mostly on sustainable agricultural and rural development under the direction of FAO. United Nations agencies and NGOs have worked to resuscitate Somalia's agricultural production by assisting in the rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and capacity-building. A UNICEF-supported project in southern Somalia provided seeds and tools to support the resettlement of 60,000 displaced farmers. In 1994, FAO provided targeted community assistance in agriculture and livestock to approximately 80,000 farming families, moving away from large-scale distribution of seeds and tools. The provision of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals by FAO and NGOs has led to a reactivation of exports, with an estimated total of around 500,000 livestock having been exported since 1993.

30. Up to 1.5 million Somalis, or roughly 25 per cent of the total population, were displaced inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries between 1991 and mid-1993. Of this number, a total of 121,630 refugees and 45,327 internally displaced persons have been successfully reintegrated into their home areas with the assistance of the United Nations agencies, national and international NGOs, ICRC and the Intergovernmental Organization for Migration (IOM). As conditions in their home areas improved, a further 80,430 refugees have returned to Somalia spontaneously. Approximately 500,000 Somali refugees remain in neighbouring countries. While the numbers of internally displaced persons registering to return home doubled from 71,000 in June 1994 to over 150,000 in December 1994,

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there are still 350,000 internally displaced persons, almost half of whom are in Mogadishu.

31. Between 1992 and 1995, UNICEF and its NGO partners vaccinated well over 1 million Somali children and women against diseases such as measles, tuberculosis and tetanus. Since 1992, UNICEF has provided supplementary food and other assistance for approximately 600,000 beneficiaries. These include, since May 1993, an average of 65,000 vulnerable children and women per month, as compared to 168,000 in January 1993. These figures, considerably lower than those prior to May 1993, reflect generally improved food availability in much of central and southern Somalia. Access by the Somali population to health services and facilities has improved greatly. The factors contributing to this development include the continuing distribution by the World Health Organization (WHO) of essential drugs and medical supplies to cover the needs of some 2.2 million Somalis since 1992, as well as the availability, under the auspices of UNICEF and WHO, of the skilled services of an additional 1,800 professional health workers who have been trained and technically supervised in emergency and medical equipment to the national and international NGOs working in the health sector. Logistical support and other assistance is being provided by UNICEF for the rehabilitation of the public health infrastructure, including some 450 health posts, centres and hospitals.

32. Between 1991 and 1992 the lack of access to potable water resulted in devastatingly high rates of mortality and morbidity from diarrhoeal diseases. Since June 1992, UNDP has operated the Afgoy well-field which provides piped water to over 1 million residents of Mogadishu and which has been rehabilitated to 40 per cent of its pre-war efficiency, a factor that has contributed greatly to preventing the spread of large-scale epidemics caused by contaminated water from shallow wells. Agencies estimate that the cholera epidemic that struck various parts of Somalia during the early months of 1994 caused 1,349 deaths out of a reported total of 34,789 cases. This epidemic would have wrought much greater devastation in the absence of a functioning water supply system. WHO has established laboratories in Somalia for water-testing and for the diagnosis of cholera and other epidemics. Over the past three years, UNICEF has assisted in the reactivation of 8 urban water supply systems, the chlorination of more than 1,200 water sources daily during the cholera epidemic and the construction of 380 wells and 12 boreholes, thereby increasing access to potable water to over 1.5 million people in Somalia.

33. Similar developments have taken place in the field of education. Since January 1993, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has catered for the educational needs of more than 250,000 children through the reintroduction of a standardized curriculum, the provision of more than 1 million textbooks and teacher guides. UNESCO has also provided teacher training for 267 schools with a total student population of over 1 million and in refugee and internally displaced person camps where school buildings do not exist or are in a state of disrepair. UNESCO also continues to carry out

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workshops and refresher courses for headmasters and teachers in Somalia, and has carried out a mine-awareness campaign for 30,000 Somali refugees in camps in Kenya. To date, more than 500,000 Somalis have received basic education and training through UNESCO programmes. Since 1993, UNICEF has helped to form school committees in 115 communities, provided material and rehabilitation assistance to around 450 schools, including community-based Koranic schools and undertaken activities that have benefited over 150,000 pupils in Somalia.

34. In the light of these developments, the humanitarian assistance programme in Somalia has shifted its focus towards a consolidation of its achievements. The challenge for the United Nations and its humanitarian partners is to sustain this progress in Somalia's conflict-ridden environment and, concomitantly, to move forward to rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, without prejudice to emergency relief where this is necessary.

35. To meet this challenge in a post-UNOSOM II era, a United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT) was established under the chairmanship of the UNDP Resident Representative, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator. With the assurances provided by the donor consortium for Somalia, i.e. the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, that it will maintain support to humanitarian programmes in Somalia, UNCT is, among other things, interacting with national and international NGOs as well as with the donor community in an effort to harmonize and ensure coherence among the activities of operational partners. The Humanitarian Coordinator also intends to formalize a coordinated relationship with recognised district and regional councils to ensure that the task of rebuilding Somalia also lies in the hands of dedicated and capable Somalis.

36. The United Nations agencies and organizations will monitor and report on the humanitarian situation in Somalia through the continued presence of national and international humanitarian staff working throughout the country. To improve the coordination of activities and programmes of the humanitarian partners, the active linkages established by UNCT with the donor and NGO communities will be intensified at the field level to maximize the use of available resources among the humanitarian partners.

37. The humanitarian agencies expect that for the foreseeable future they will continue to operate in a context of political unrest and against a background of uncertainty. Their commitment to remain in Somalia depends on the demonstration of good will and cooperation by the Somali people and leaders. Without the active support of the Somali people, it is unlikely that future humanitarian programmes will meet with much success, and more than likely that the gains, made through the combined efforts of international agencies and committed Somali partners, will be undone.

38. In the absence of national institutions capable of coping even with minor emergencies, Somalia will remain vulnerable to future disasters. Humanitarian relief needs will almost certainly continue for a while, requiring targeted interventions on the part of the humanitarian agencies so as to ensure that the country does not revert to another crisis. To this end, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat launched a United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for Somalia, covering a period of six months beginning in January 1995. The agencies requested a total of US\$ 70 million for

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their activities during the first half of 1995. Most of the activities will be community-based and will thus rely fully on the involvement of the Somali people. United Nations agencies will provide support to capacity-building programmes, while assisting local NGOs as well as community-based organizations in the areas of relief and initial rehabilitation. The focus will encompass assistance in the areas of agriculture, fishing and reconstruction. At present, UNDP continues with the implementation of integrated, community-based rehabilitation that includes schools and water systems. It has also launched credit schemes for women, as well as activities aimed at income generation. The ongoing implementation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of quick impact programmes is providing the stability required for the return in 1995 of some of the over 500,000 Somalis who remain refugees. Its renovation and rehabilitation of essential facilities complements the activities of IOM with internally displaced persons.

39. One of the critical issues for Somalia will be the need to provide jobs for the large numbers of unemployed and thus to contribute to the revitalization of the economy and stimulate the productive capacities of communities devastated by war. The United Nations agencies have factored this consideration into their planning for 1995. Another critical issue for the humanitarian agencies and for the Somali people is that of demobilization. In 1994, around 25,000 demobilized militia were assisted by UNDP and other United Nations agencies. The success of the demobilization programmes planned by the agencies in 1995, through the provision of skills training and food-for-work incentives, will have far-reaching effects for the peace and reconciliation process and for the stability of the country.

40. It is essential that the progress made by the United Nations agencies, international organizations and national and international NGOs over the past three years should not be reversed. To date the United Nations appeal for Somalia has received less than 10 per cent of the resources requested. I urge the international donor community to provide funding for the activities planned by United Nations agencies and other relief organizations. Such funding is urgently needed not only for the achievement of these objectives, but also to ensure that Somalis are in a position to rebuild their society and break the cycle of despair.

C. Deployment of military personnel

41. Following the introduction in mid-1992 of 50 unarmed military observers and 500 security personnel, the United Nations deployed up to 30,000 military and logistic personnel after the withdrawal of the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) in early May 1993. In addition to the mandate approved by the Security Council for the establishment of a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance could be delivered and distributed safely, the UNOSOM forces undertook activities ranging from providing security escorts for humanitarian convoys to conducting specialized courses for the Somali police. They also assisted in the implementation of community development projects and in the provision of medical aid to Somali civilians.

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D. Police programme

42. It will be recalled that UNOSOM II was mandated to assist Somalia in the re-establishment of a 10,000-strong Somali police force by the end of 1994. However, financial constraints made it necessary to reduce the contemplated force strength to 8,500. As of 1 March 1995, this number was operational in Somalia, 2,000 of them being deployed in the north-west region.

43. The police training programme was actively pursued and, by the end of 1994, a total of 2,179 policemen of all ranks had attended refresher courses to revitalize lost or waned police skills resulting from years of absence from work as a result of the collapse of the Somali State machinery four years ago.

44. At the end of January 1995, Somali police were operational in 82 district stations. The police officers had a visible presence on the roads and in various communities. They engaged in foot or mobile patrols and other forms of static and fixed-point duties, receiving complaints from the public and conducting investigations into criminal cases. Under the programme, vehicles, communication equipment, typewriters, stationery, fuel and lubricants were supplied to the police to assist them in the discharge of their duties. Substantial quantities of police uniforms were also received from donors. Following the commencement of the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, vehicles and military equipment in stock from supplies provided by the donor community were shipped out of Somalia at the request of donor Governments.

45. The police programme administered by UNOSOM II was funded from voluntary contributions in cash and in kind by the donor community. International support for the programme, which included payment of salaries for the Somali police, will cease on 31 March 1995 with the expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate and the exhaustion of resources in the Trust Fund established for this purpose. Unless resources are made available to continue the programme beyond that date, the whole police programme will be jeopardized and security conditions in a number of areas might deteriorate. I appeal to the donor community for additional voluntary contributions for the Somali police programme that could be channelled through appropriate agencies operating in Somalia.

E. Justice programme

46. During the reporting period, training was provided by UNOSOM II for judicial personnel in judicial administration and ethics, juvenile justice, sentencing practices and attitudes, human rights and the rule of law. Currently, there are 11 appeal courts, 11 regional courts and 46 district courts functioning in all regions and 46 districts of Somalia, with a total staff of 374. All of these courts have been supported by UNOSOM II, including through the repair/refurbishment of some of the court and prison facilities. In addition, some vehicles were supplied.

47. UNOSOM II also provided support to 12 prisons, including food, water and medical services for inmates. Six hundred and seventy two custodial guards were certified and paid by UNOSOM II. WFP supplied dry rations and vegetables to all the prisons.

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48. Arrangements have been concluded with UNESCO to begin educational and vocational training programmes at the prisons, starting with Mogadishu Central Prison. UNESCO also expressed interest in taking over and continuing these components of the project after the departure of UNOSOM II.

F. Financial aspects

49. The total cost of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II (1 May 1992-28 February 1995) was estimated at \$21.5 million, consisting of \$21.5 million for the re-establishment of the Somali police force and judicial system and \$0.1 million for the support of UNOSOM II forces. Expenditures from the Fund for the re-establishment of the Somali police force and judicial system were authorized in the amount of \$15.2 million.

50. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/229 of 23 December 1994, provided an amount of \$253,704,400 gross (\$250,495,600 net) for the maintenance of UNOSOM II for the period from 1 October 1994 to 28 February 1995. The revised cost estimate for the final mandate period from 1 October 1994 to 31 March 1995 will be submitted to the resumed forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

51. It should be noted that the cash-flow situation of the special account of UNOSOM II remains precarious. As of 10 March 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the account since the inception of the Operation totalled \$387.2 million (\$15.0 for UNOSOM I and \$372.2 for UNOSOM II). Consequently, reimbursement of troop costs has been made only up to the period ending 30 September 1994. In addition, amounts are outstanding for contingent-owned equipment. The total unpaid contributions to all peace-keeping operations as at 10 March 1995 totalled \$1,679 million.

IV. WITHDRAWAL OF UNOSOM II

52. The initial phase of withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces, following the Security Council's decision to that effect, entailed redeploying troops to Mogadishu from Baidoa, Baledogle, Afgoye and Kismayo. The pull-back from Kismayo was supported by an Indian naval task force, comprising two frigates, one logistic ship and six helicopters. Between 28 December 1994 and 5 January 1995, the Zimbabwean and Malaysian contingents were repatriated. The personnel of the Pakistani hospital was repatriated on 11 January 1995. Force headquarters staff was reduced by 50 per cent by 15 January 1995 and relocated from the Embassy Compound to the airport.

53. By 2 February 1995, with the repatriation of the Indian, Zimbabwean and Malaysian contingents, some force headquarters personnel and those of the Pakistani hospital, UNOSOM II troop strength was reduced to 7,956, comprising Pakistani, Egyptian and Bangladeshi contingents and the remaining force headquarters personnel. As the withdrawal accelerated, military support provided by UNOSOM troops to United Nations agencies, human rights organizations and NGOs still engaged in humanitarian activities was greatly reduced. With the

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major reductions starting in mid-February, it was no longer possible for UNOSOM II troops to extend the necessary protection to humanitarian agencies within the city of Mogadishu. Accordingly, agencies were advised to evacuate their international staff to Nairobi by 14 February 1995.

54. The Humanitarian and Southern Compounds were vacated on 30 January 1995, leaving one platoon of the Pakistani Brigade to secure those buildings in the Southern Compound that were required for the tactical defence of the airport. The UNOSOM II administration moved ahead of schedule in vacating the University and Embassy Compounds and completed the task by 31 January 1995. Consequently, the Pakistani Brigade and all troops located in the area were relocated to the airport on 2 February 1995. Thereafter, all troops were concentrated in the airport, new seaport complex and the old seaport area.

55. From 8 to 10 February, Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, went to Somalia to review preparations for the complex final phase of the operation, in which a combined task force, commanded by Lt. General Anthony C. Sinni (United States of America) and composed of forces from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States, was to assist the withdrawal. Mr. Annan met with my Special Representative, the Force Commander and civilian and military personnel from UNOSOM II, representatives of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and the NGOs and the Commander of the combined task force. He also examined possible arrangements for the continued United Nations presence in Somalia.

56. The withdrawal of UNOSOM II proceeded with minimal interruption. Under the plans elaborated by UNOSOM II in consultation with the combined task force, it was decided that the withdrawal would be completed by 6 March 1995, three weeks ahead of the time-limit set by the Security Council.

57. The final phase of the troop withdrawal started with the repatriation of approximately 1,750 Pakistani personnel from 12 to 15 February. This was followed by the repatriation of the Egyptian brigade, comprising 1,150 personnel, from 17 to 20 February. From 23 to 27 February, an additional 2,600 personnel from the Pakistani contingent and force headquarters staff were repatriated, leaving a balance of approximately 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi military personnel, which constituted the UNOSOM II rearguard.

58. The Mogadishu seaport was handed over to the combined task force and closed to commercial traffic on 28 February. My Special Representative and his staff, as well as the Force Commander and the last remaining staff of the force headquarters, left Mogadishu by air on 28 February 1995. The withdrawal of the rearguard of UNOSOM II commenced on 27 February 1995 and was successfully completed on 2 March 1995. The combined task force forces that had landed in Mogadishu on 28 February 1995 to cover the withdrawal of UNOSOM II also departed from Mogadishu on 3 March without any casualty, thereby bringing operation "United Shield" to a successful conclusion.

59. The withdrawal of all international staff from Somalia was completed on 28 February 1995 with the exception of 25 United Nations civilian personnel and 11 contractual logistic staff plus 1 shipping representative. This group supervised the shipment of the last consignments of UNOSOM II assets committed

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to the mission's rearguard. They were removed from Mogadishu with the UNOSOM II military rearguard on 3 March 1995. In addition to contingent-owned equipment, over 156,000 cubic metres of United Nations-owned and United Nations-leased assets valued at about US\$ 120 million were shipped out of Somalia by sea and air during the last two months of UNOSOM II's presence. The UNOSOM II offices have been temporarily relocated to Nairobi. Force headquarters closed its operations in Nairobi on 8 March 1995. The withdrawal from Somalia was thus successfully completed well ahead of schedule in an orderly and organized manner, with all the soldiers and international staff of UNOSOM II, as well as the troops of the combined task force, able to leave Somalia safely.

60. Equipment worth US\$ 235,761, which was vital for the support of local communities, was donated to Somali district councils. United Nations agencies operating in Somalia requested that some of UNOSOM II's residual assets be transferred to them, in order to facilitate the continuation of their humanitarian assistance and development projects after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. Arrangements were made to sell some of these assets to them at depreciated cost.

61. Special arrangements were also made for the custody of UNOSOM II's communications equipment (estimated value US\$ 500,000), which was moved to Nairobi. As soon as conditions allow the return of the United Nations political and agency offices to Mogadishu, the communications equipment will be brought back to Somalia to serve the needs of these offices.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

62. The present report marks a point of transition in the efforts of the United Nations to succour a people and a country caught in the throes of famine, civil war and the collapse of all institutions of government. It has been a difficult mission that did not attain all the objectives that the Security Council set for it. Nevertheless, as the preceding sections of the present report have shown, the United Nations Operation in Somalia can claim major accomplishments, especially when one recalls that in late 1992 3,000 men, women and children were dying daily of starvation and this tragedy was ended by the international relief effort. As far as national reconciliation is concerned, the international community, through the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II, strove to create an environment conducive for the Somali leaders to achieve this goal. The most the international community could do for the Somali parties was to afford every opportunity for them to agree among themselves on the modalities to re-establish their political and administrative structures based on a broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of their country. If the political will to achieve a durable compromise was lacking, the responsibility lies with the Somali leadership.

63. Against this background, the Security Council took the decision under resolution 954 (1994) to withdraw UNOSOM II from Somalia by the end of March 1995. The Council had been prepared to pursue its peace-keeping efforts as long as it felt that the United Nations presence was receiving the cooperation of the Somali factions, thus enabling it to make a significant contribution. However, over the last few months, it was concluded that the

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United Nations presence in Somalia was no longer promoting national reconciliation. There was no clear evidence of political will on the part of the parties involved to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution. Agreements

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United Nations presence in Somalia was no longer promoting national reconciliation. There was no clear evidence of political will on the part of the warring parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution. Agreements reached under United Nations auspices unravelled and security continued to deteriorate, especially in Mogadishu. United Nations peace-keepers and humanitarian convoys were threatened and, in a number of instances, viciously attacked. The Somali leaders did not heed repeated warnings, including from the Council's own special mission in October 1994, that if they did not show a minimum of political will the United Nations presence would have to be reconsidered. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM II could no longer be justified.

64. The experience of UNOSOM II has thus confirmed the validity of the point that the Security Council has consistently stressed in its resolutions on Somalia, namely that the responsibility for political compromise and national reconciliation must be borne by the leaders and people concerned. It is they who bear the main responsibility for creating the political and security conditions in which peacemaking and peace-keeping can be effective. The international community can only facilitate, prod, encourage and assist. It can neither impose peace nor coerce unwilling parties into accepting it.

65. There are also important lessons to be learned about the theory and practice of multifunctional peace-keeping operations in conditions of civil war and chaos and especially about the clear line that needs to be drawn between peace-keeping and enforcement action. The world has changed and so has the nature of the conflict situations which the United Nations is asked to deal with. There is a need for careful and creative rethinking about peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building in the context of the Somali operation. Some of my initial conclusions may be found in my recent position paper, the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (S/1995/1).

66. On numerous occasions, I have stated that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II does not mean that the United Nations is abandoning Somalia. The United Nations agencies and organizations, as well as NGOs, have voiced their determination to continue humanitarian operations in Somalia. In 1994, they worked at introducing primary rehabilitation as the protective measure for sustaining the success achieved in the emergency relief phase. Their focus in the post-UNOSOM II era will be on rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, without prejudice to emergency relief where that is necessary. The fulfilment of this objective will also, however, depend primarily on the willingness of the Somali people to cooperate effectively and reliably with the agencies and NGOs. In view of the current security situation, all their international staff left Mogadishu on 14 February for other parts of Somalia and Nairobi. As of 20 March 1995, 30 international staff continue to operate in the country. As soon as the security situation permits, the international staff will return to Mogadishu where the agencies have retained skeleton offices run by Somali staff. Elsewhere in the present report, I have referred to the critical funding needs for the activities planned by United Nations agencies and for the police and justice programmes.

67. The experience of UNOSOM II has demonstrated the vital link between humanitarian assistance, which is geared towards the immediate amelioration of

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emergency situations, and assistance in achieving national reconciliation, which is necessary to ensure stability in the long term so that the positive results of humanitarian assistance can be preserved and a recurrence of the tragedy avoided. The two must go together; one cannot be a substitute for the other. With this in mind, I will continue to make available my good offices to assist the Somali factions to arrive at a political settlement and I will maintain a political presence in the area for this purpose. The size and mandate of that presence will depend on whether the Somali factions want the United Nations to play a facilitating or mediating role and are ready to cooperate with it. Its location should be in Mogadishu but this will depend, initially at any rate, on security considerations. It was because of the lack of security in Mogadishu that I directed my Special Representative to move temporarily to Nairobi at the end of February; but it remains my intention to re-establish a United Nations political presence in Mogadishu as soon as practicable.

68. For the time being, I have instructed my Special Representative to remain in Nairobi, pending further instructions, in order to monitor the situation in Somalia and coordinate United Nations humanitarian activities there. I expect to be in a position to take decisions about the level and mandate of the United Nations political presence in Mogadishu by mid-April 1995, at which time I shall report my intentions to the Security Council. My present inclination is to maintain a small political office there consisting of a representative with a small support staff.

69. During the past few weeks, there have been some signs that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II may have triggered among Somali leaders an enhanced awareness of their responsibilities. If some Somali leaders perceived the presence of a large number of peace-keeping troops as a hindrance, this has now been removed, possibly encouraging them to restart a political process in their country. I am encouraged by the fact that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II has coincided with the signing of agreements that have so far helped to avert fighting over the sea and airports in Mogadishu and allowed the reopening of the Mogadishu seaport. During the last four weeks, Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid concluded four political agreements which the SNA and the SSA are implementing in a joint effort. It is the first time since the Nairobi declaration of March 1994 that the two leaders have put their signatures to any peace agreement. These indications of a possible rapprochement between them may justify the hope that the Somali leaders will find the strength and the courage to pursue a more productive peace process in the coming weeks. While the recent history of Somalia suggests that such signs must be examined with caution, they could develop into an encouraging trend.

70. Elsewhere in the present report, I have given an account of the successful withdrawal of UNOSOM II with the generous support of the combined task force's "United Shield" operation. This was a complex exercise that required a sophisticated planning effort. It was implemented in a skilful and coordinated manner. I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Member States that joined together to support the United Nations in this way. It was an inspiring instance of international cooperation and mutual assistance.

71. In conclusion, I should like to record my appreciation to my Special Representative, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, and the UNOSOM II Force

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Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar, as well as to their predecessors, all of whom have demonstrated high qualities of leadership in difficult circumstances. My gratitude also goes to all the UNOSOM II civilian staff, international and Somali, and to the soldiers of all ranks from many countries who devoted themselves to translating into reality the commitments of the United Nations to the people of Somalia. This expression of appreciation applies equally to the personnel of the combined task force. Above all, I wish to pay a profound tribute to the UNOSOM II military and civilian staff, to the officials of United Nations agencies and programmes and to the staff of NGOs who made the supreme sacrifice to help Somalia in its hour of need. Finally, I should like to express my deep sympathy to the families of those who lost their lives as a result of the tragedies that befell Somalia over the past few years.

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005b. talking points	[Talking Points for Weekly Meeting] (2 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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SUBJECT: ~~RUSSIA~~ Somalia - draft statement

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REMARKS: The Italians drafted this & would
like our reaction before they finally
put it on the table. The Somalia report
has not been signed or cleared by the 546
yet.

PAGE NUMBER 1 OF 3 PAGES

The Security Council has considered carefully the report of the Secretary-General dated 16 March on the situation in Somalia (S/1995/), and welcomes the proposals and observations it contains.

Since the beginning of the international intervention, many efforts have been made to restore peace and stability, facilitate the re-emergence of a civil society, re-establish central governmental structures and services, and rescue Somalia from humanitarian catastrophe. The Security Council notes that the lack of progress in the peace process, in particular insufficient cooperation from the Somali parties, has fundamentally undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia and that, in these circumstances, it has seen no justification in the continuation of Unosom mandate beyond March 1995.

The Security Council wishes to pay tribute to all personnel, humanitarian and military, who served in Somalia, and honour those who sacrificed their lives in this service. It recalls that many Somali lives were also lost. The Council expresses appreciation to the Governments that contributed troops, and to those who participated in the successful joint multinational operation for the withdrawal of the Unosom contingent.

The Security Council remains convinced that only a genuinely inclusive and broad approach to political reconciliation will provide for a lasting political settlement. In this respect, the leaders and people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for finally bringing peace to their Country. The Council, taking note of the recent agreements between the factions in Mogadishu, especially on the control of port and airport facilities, expresses the hope that they will open the way to further, broader, political understandings.

The Security Council shares the view of the Secretary-General that Somalia must not be abandoned to itself. It takes note of the Secretary-General's intention to formulate proposals in order to

continue to provide his good offices in Somalia, including indications on the modalities and objectives of such an initiative. The Council deems it essential that the Somali parties clearly express their support for such critical action, and their intention to fully collaborate with it. In this perspective, the Security Council believes that the prosecution of a facilitating role should be promoted in close cooperation with the regional Organizations, in particular the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as the Governments of neighbouring Countries.

The Council takes note of the willingness expressed by the international humanitarian agencies and NGO's to continue to provide rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in areas where security is guaranteed. The Council stresses that the creation of a long-lasting stable and secure environment throughout the entire territory should be a prerequisite for the resumption of any large-scale activity in these fields.

The Security Council reiterates the need for strict observance and monitoring of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. Any violation could fatally undermine any renewed effort towards the achievement of peace and stability in the Country. [In this respect, it requests the Committee established by resolution 751 (1992) to continue to seek the full cooperation of neighbouring States, in order to implement effectively this embargo.]

The Security Council strongly appeals to all the factions, religious leaders, representatives of the Somali civil society, and to the people of Somalia, to resume the negotiation process, by giving priority to the general interests of the Country and the well-being of its people, restoring unity of intent, and striving for peace and stability.