

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Rwanda 1993

Staff Office-Individual:

African Affairs-Ordway/Jett/Ward/Steinberg, et.al.

Original OA/ID Number:

502

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
29	4	8	3	V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	POTUS to Francois Mitterand; re: Situation in Rwanda (2 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Reply to President Mitterand's Letter on Peacekeeping in Rwanda [partial] (1 page)	10/02/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001c. letter	POTUS to Francois Mitterand; re: Situation in Rwanda (1 page)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001d. letter	Francois Mitterand to POTUS; re: Rwandan Crisis (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001e. memo	Richard Clarke & Jennifer Ward to Anthony Lake; re: Draft Message from the President to Francois Mitterand on Rwanda Peacekeeping (1 page)	10/02/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002a. memo	re: New Reports [partial] (1 page)	10/06/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) RDS 5/18/2015
002b. report	re: Assessment - Rwanda's Regional Relations & Relevance [partial] (2 pages)	10/06/1993	P3/b(3)
002c. chart	re: UN Peacekeeping Missions (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
003. memo	From Susan Rice; re: Rwanda Update (1 page)	10/02/1993	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/2015
004. report	re: Assessment - Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda [partial] (4 pages)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) RDS 5/18/2015
005a. memo	Nick Rasmussen to Samuel Berger; re: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation [partial] (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 National Security Council  
 Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
 OA/Box Number: 502

**FOLDER TITLE:**

Rwanda, 1993 [1]

2006-0218-F  
ip865

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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005b. letter	Francois Mitterand to POTUS; re: Rwandan Crisis (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(+) RDS 5/18/2015
005c. letter	POTUS to Francois Mitterand; re: Situation in Rwanda (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(+) RDS 5/18/2015
005d. cable	U.S. Mission, New York to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: Rwanda & Criteria for New UN Peacekeeping Operations (4 pages)	09/28/1993	P1/b(+) RDS 5/18/2015
006. memo	Arlene Bender to Susan Rice; re: Backgrounder - UN Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda (13 pages)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
007. memo	Susan Rice & Nick Rasmussen to Samuel Berger; re: Deputies Committee Meeting on African Peacekeeping Issues [partial] (1 page)	09/20/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
008. letter	Francois Mitterand to POTUS; re: Rwandan Crisis (in French) (1 page)	09/28/1993	P1/b(+) RDS 5/18/2015

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TO: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 05 OCT 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RWANDA

PEACEKEEPING

PERSONS: QUESNOT, PIERRE

SUBJECT: REPLY TO PRES MITTERRAND RE PEACEKEEPING IN RWANDA

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE

DUE DATE: 04 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE  
NSC CHRON  
WARD

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: JGP Date: 1/10/08  
2006-0218-F

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9307511

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
003

Z 93100119 FOR DECISION  
Z 93100217 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 93100510 PRES APPROVED CABLE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 931005 MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER COMM COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG  
WWING

SIT: FILE HOTLINE OUT SIGLER SUM2

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 050021Z OCT 93

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO  
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. I  
AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO  
SUPPORT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS SO THAT EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO  
RWANDA ARE NOT COMPROMISED.

TO THAT END, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION  
ESTABLISHING A UN MISSION IN RWANDA, ASSUMING OF COURSE THAT  
OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE OPERATION AS  
WELL AS ITS COST CAN BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED. AS I STATED  
BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, I THINK IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT  
WE CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF AN OPERATION BEFORE WE MOVE TO A  
FINAL VOTE. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S  
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A SHORT DELAY IN THE COUNCIL'S VOTE ON  
THIS MATTER SO THAT WE CAN ADDRESS THE ISSUES THAT CONCERN  
THE U.S.

ON A SEPARATE MATTER, AS YOU KNOW, WE THINK IT VITAL THAT THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS IN SOMALIA RECEIVE THE CONTINUING  
STRONG SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I DO HOPE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2010-0639-M-1  
5/1/15 M

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THAT FRANCE WILL BE ABLE TO EXTEND ITS PARTICIPATION IN UNOSOM II BEYOND DECEMBER TO HELP ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS IMPORTANT UN MISSION. LET ME CLOSE BY THANKING YOU FOR YOUR HELP IN MAINTAINING THE STRONG COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE U.S. ON PEACEKEEPING MATTERS AROUND THE WORLD.

WITH BEST WISHES.

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT

\*1823

NNNN

<MSGID> M0641922

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Reply to President Mitterand's Letter on Peacekeeping in Rwanda [partial] (1 page)	10/02/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 502

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, 1993 [1]

2006-0218-F  
jp865

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7511

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Reply to President Mitterrand's Letter on  
Peacekeeping in Rwanda

Purpose

To respond to President Mitterrand's letter asking that you support a UNSC resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.

Background

President Mitterrand has written to ask your support for a UNSC resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda. The resolution is pending before the Council; a final vote is likely to take place by Tuesday, October 5. The French have a keen interest in this operation because deployment of UN troops to Kigali, the Rwandan capital, would permit Paris to withdraw 400 French troops who are currently there to provide security for the expatriate community. Our mission at the UN also reports that, when the French voted for the UN resolutions on Liberia and Haiti, they indicated an expectation that their support would be reciprocated by a U.S. vote for a Rwanda operation.

The UN and the parties to the conflict clearly understand that the U.S. will not participate in this mission. But the U.S. share of the cost of this operation is estimated to be as much as \$80 million over two years. While JCS and OSD have some concerns about the military concept for this operation, the agencies agree that given the seemingly strong will of the parties for a lasting settlement, this mission has a good chance of success. We will work with the French and with the UN to address our operational concerns and ask that the costs be examined more closely.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Given our desire to draw down the U.S. presence in Somalia, we would clearly like to see the French remain. We will express this hope to the French in New York and in Paris.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The attached message from you to Mitterrand indicates our willingness to support the Rwanda mission assuming that the cost and operational details are satisfactorily addressed. It also makes mention of our hope that French troops will remain in Somalia past December.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmittal of the message at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*President has approved  
per Shawni Wagner  
10/4 18'*

Attachments

- Tab A Response to President Mitterrand
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

*Shawni*

TAB  
B

VIA BLUE CHANNEL

Dear Francois:

Thank you for your letter on the situation in Rwanda. I agree with you that the international community needs to support the Arusha accords so that efforts to bring peace to Rwanda are not compromised.

To that end, the U.S. is prepared to support a resolution establishing a UN mission in Rwanda, assuming of course that our concerns about the nature and scope of the operation as well as its cost can be adequately addressed. As I stated before the UN General Assembly, I think it is essential that we consider all aspects of an operation before we move to a final vote. I greatly appreciate your government's willingness to accept a short delay in the Council's vote on this matter so that we can address the issues that concern the U.S.

On a separate matter, as you know, we think it vital that the Secretary-General's efforts in Somalia receive the continuing strong support of the international community. I do hope that France will be able to extend its participation in UNOSOM II beyond December to help ensure the success of this important UN mission. Let me close by thanking you for your help in maintaining the strong cooperation between France and the U.S. on peacekeeping matters around the world.

With best wishes,

His Excellency  
Francois Mitterrand  
President of the French Republic  
Paris

Mr. President, Dear Bill:

You know how much importance France places on the resolution of the Rwandan crisis.

The signature of the peace accords on August 4 in Arusha marked the conclusion of long negotiations which the U.S., like France, actively encouraged. However, the implementation of these accords depends integrally on the deployment of a UN force to Rwanda.

A resolution to create this force is under active discussion at the Security Council now. It seems essential to me that it be adopted rapidly.

In fact, the situation in Rwanda is deteriorating because of the disintegration of political forces, the decline in the economy and military tensions which remain alive. If the international community does not react rapidly, the peace efforts which the U.S. and France have pursued vigorously, along with the countries in the region, risk being compromised.

Therefore I hope, Mr. President, that in light of these considerations, and in the logic of the position which the U.S. has adopted with regard to the conflict, you can actively support a prompt Security Council decision in favor of sending a UN force.

I ask that you accept, Mr. President, this expression of my high consideration and my cordial regards.

Signed: Francois Mitterand

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7511.redo2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD

SUBJECT: Draft Message from the President to Francois Mitterrand on Rwanda Peacekeeping

President Mitterrand has written to the President to urge that he support a UNSC resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. **A final Security Council vote on the matter has been postponed once at our behest and will likely take place on or before Tuesday, October 5.** We have drafted a reply indicating that we are prepared to support such a resolution assuming that our concerns on cost and the operational aspects of the mission can be adequately addressed. The reply also expresses the hope that France will leave its troops in Somalia beyond the end of this year.

Concurrences by: Jennifer Walker

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President  
Tab A Draft Reply to President Mitterrand  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2018-0639-M-1 M  
5/16/15

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002a. memo	re: New Reports [partial] (1 page)	10/06/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
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2006-0218-F  
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RWANDA

~~SECRET~~



**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE  
OFFICER  
for  
AFRICA**

06 OCT 93

**MEMO FOR**           DISTRO          

SUBJ: NEW REPORTS, COURTESY COPIES FOR YOUR INFO

1. A RWANDAN FOREIGN RELATIONS PAPER DONE FOR WISNER AND A  
E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) IN AFRICA (JUST RECEIVED) ARE ATTACHED  
FOR INFO, CONSIDERING OUR COMMON INTERESTS.

2. IF WE CAN BE OF ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE, PLS DON'T HESITATE  
TO CALL

(b)(3)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF ATTACHMENTS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

~~SECRET~~  
CENTON LIL

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002b. report	re: Assessment - Rwanda's Regional Relations & Relevance [partial] (2 pages)	10/06/1993	P3/b(3)

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National Security Council  
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(b)(3)  
06 OCT 93

ASSESSMENT:  
RWANDA'S REGIONAL RELATIONS AND RELEVANCE

F. (U) KEY JUDGEMENTS

(C) Rwanda's bilateral relations with its neighbors have never led to interstate conflict, despite the 1990 invasion by ethnic Tutsis resident in Uganda. However, internal and regional stability are closely related to ethnic conflict endemic to the central Africa area.

(C) Any Hutu-Tutsi societal conflict in Rwanda has profound political and social implications for Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire. Other ethnic groups, especially those in Zaire, could also be affected.

(C) State to state relations have survived past ethnic strife. However, as the region's governments become more democratic and responsive to the will of their citizens, they may be more compelled to become involved in ethnic conflict that crosses national boundaries.

(C) A United Nations failure to provide a peacekeeping force to Rwanda would probably lead to a breakdown of the peacekeeping process, and increased regional instability adverse to US interests.

II. (C) BACKGROUND. Rwanda's historically peaceful relations with its neighbors belies the political, cultural, and ethnic volatility and conflict that exists. The modern state of Rwanda has never militarily attacked, or been attacked by any adjoining state. However, hundreds of thousands of persons have died in societal conflict that reaches across internationally recognized boundaries, and taints relations between the governments of Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. Most of the conflict is ethnic, but strong currents of political struggle at the state level will continue to foster intrastate conflict in each of the central African countries.

III. (U) BILATERAL RELATIONS.

(S/NF/WN) Tanzania. Rwanda has good bilateral relations with Tanzania. Hutu/Tutsi ethnic groups are a distinct minority in Tanzania, and ethnic conflict spill-over from Rwanda is of little concern to the Tanzanian government. The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Tutsi community occasionally used Tanzanian territory for transit, basing, and staging during the current civil war. However, periodic Tanzanian military patrols were sufficient to maintain good bilateral relations with the Rwandan government. Tanzania host the talks in Arusha that brought about the peace accords signed in August 1993. Both countries will probably maintain good bilateral relations, regardless of ethnic conflict in

~~SECRET NOFORN WMINTEL~~

Rwanda. However, relations could sour if the RPF seizes power in Rwanda, or the Rwandan government reneges on the Arusha accords.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Burundi. Bilateral relations with Burundi have always been cool and correct. Unlike Rwanda, the Hutu majority in Burundi was unable to free itself of the Tutsi monarchy at independence. Hutu/Tutsi bloodbaths in Rwanda have historically spawned similar activity in Burundi, and vice versa. This conflict never manifested itself at the interstate level, but suspicion, anxiety, and apprehension have always run high between the two nations. Burundi managed to stay out of the recent Rwandan civil war, despite the strong ethnic nature of the conflict. However, the RPF recruited actively in Burundi, and received a good deal of private financial support from the Tutsi community. The Hutu victory in the recent Burundi Presidential elections may have heightened, rather than alleviated ethnic tensions in Rwanda and the region. For the first time the Hutu control the government of Burundi. A Hutu slaughter of Tutsi in Rwanda could more easily manifest itself in Burundi now that the Hutu community has less fear of (Tutsi) Burundi government reprisals. While bilateral relations between the two newly democratic governments will probably improve dramatically, the potential for wide-spread ethnic societal violence in both countries has increased.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Zaire. Rwanda enjoyed good relations with Zaire until the Rwandan civil war began in October 1990. Zaire quickly responded with troops to aid the Rwandan government. Although those troops did help stem the Tutsi invasion, they also unabashedly robbed and looted all Rwandans, government and rebel alike. The troops were quickly withdrawn. Meanwhile, the RPF recruited heavily in the Tutsi community of eastern Zaire, and occasionally staged attacks from that haven, unimpeded by the inept Zaire army. In addition, President Mobutu's recent political misfortunes have caused him to encourage ethnic conflict in Eastern Zaire against Hutu and Tutsi, in the hope this will deflect attention from his own misgovernance and ethnic chauvinism. Thousands of Kinyarwanda-speaking (Tutsi/Hutu) people have died at the hands of the Zairian Army and other ethnic groups. Bilateral relations will continue to deteriorate as long as Mobutu is in power, regardless of the leadership in the Rwandan government. More importantly, any further Tutsi/Hutu conflict in Rwanda or Zaire will only provide Mobutu with more opportunities to encourage the ethnic conflict he needs to maintain his position.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Uganda. Bilateral relations between Uganda and Rwanda have always been cool. President Museveni's unabashed physical and moral support of the RPF, and the Tutsi community, will not be soon forgotten by any Rwandan government controlled by the Hutu ethnic group. More importantly, a large societal ethnic clash in Rwanda could escalate into interstate war between Uganda and Rwanda, especially if Museveni's political position is weakened, the size of the Ugandan army decreases or is engaged elsewhere, a significant number of Tutsi in Rwanda are threatened, or Museveni overplays his hand in an RPF power play in circumvention of the Arusha accords. Regardless, the prospects for good bilateral relations remain dim.

~~SECRET NOFORN WMINTEL~~

IV. (U) OUTLOOK.

~~(S/NF)~~ Rwanda is important to the stability of Central Africa, where internal security is precarious at best. Failure of the UN peace process in Rwanda, for any reason, would greatly increase the likelihood of increased regional ethnic violence. Tutsi-Hutu conflict could quickly spread to Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda. Other ethnic groups could and would retaliate, compounding social and political instability, generating internal political crises in Burundi and Uganda, ethnic slaughter in Zaire, and continued civil war in Rwanda. None of these developments will serve any US interest or goal, and probably require evacuation of US and allied citizens from all these areas. In the long term, more scarce United Nations peacekeeping efforts and resources would have to go into the region.

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3)

ATTACHMENTS:  
UNAMIR Assessment

# Sub-Saharan Africa: Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Missions as of September 1993

(Unclassified)

	UN Operations	Deployment Date	Combat Forces	Military Observers	Civil Police	Fatalities	Significant Contributions	Comments
Botswana	UNOMOZ	1993	749	14			Contingent armed and equipped	Will deploy an additional 6 officers.
	UNOSOM II	1992	255				6 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and	Contingent noted to be effective and professional.
Cameroon	UNTAC	1992		14	71	01	16 armored fighting vehicles--	UN declined offer of unequipped battalion, accepted more limited contingent.
Cape Verde	UNOMOZ	1992		15			3 with weapons capabilities	Several officers assigned to UNOMOZ HQ staff in Mozambique.
Congo	UNAVEM II	1991		05		01		
Ghana	UNTAC	1992	892	20	218			1st-12th October, Ghanaian combat battalion will depart from Cambodia.
	UNIFIL	1987	781			17		
	UNIKOM	1991		06				Mission commanded by Maj. Gen. Timothy Dibuama of Ghana.
	UNPROFOR	1992		17				
	MINURSO	1990		01				
Guinea	MINURSO	1990		01				
Guinea-Bissau	UNAVEM II	1991		02				Officers assigned to UNAVEM HQ staff in Angola.
	UNOMOZ	1993		20				Officers assigned to UNOMOZ HQ staff in Mozambique.
Kenya	UNTAC	1992			100			
	UNIKOM	1991		06				
	UNPROFOR	1992	946	35	49	02		Southern Knin sector HQ commanded by Kenyan Brig. Gen. J.K. Arap Rob.
	MINURSO	1990		10				
Namibia	UNTAC	1992	43				15 APCs	Mine-hardened APCs considered of critical value to UN officials.
Nigeria	UNTAC	1992			149			
	UNIKOM	1991		06				
	UNPROFOR	1992		06	29	05		Contingent to be withdrawn.
	UNOSOM II	1992	561			06	Has provided 34 light armored reconnaissance vehicles, 9 mowag-type trucks	35 officers assigned to UNOSOM HQ staff in Somalia.
	UNAVEM II	1991		02				Mission commanded by Maj. Gen. Christ Abutu Garuba of Nigeria.
	MINURSO	1990		01				
Senegal	UNIKOM	1993		06				
	UNTAC	1992		02				
Togo	MINURSO	1990			05			
	UNTAC	1992			35			
Zambia	UNOMOZ	1992	866			01	Providing armed soldiers,	Contingent noted to be effective and professional.
Zimbabwe	UNOSOM II	1993	928				6 armored reconnaissance vehicles,	Offering law enforcement officials to assist rebuilding Somali Police Force.
	UNAVEM II	1991		05	04	01	15 troop carriers, 11 light APCs, 7 cargo trucks	

**UNPROFOR**  
UN Protection Force  
Created in 1992 as a buffer to separate the Serbs and Croats.  
Personnel: 24,334  
Est. 1993 Cost: \$450 million

**MINURSO**  
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara  
Established in 1990 for buffer, cease-fire supervision, and election monitoring.  
Personnel: 365  
Estimated 1993 Cost: \$80 million

**UNOMIL**  
UN Military Observers in Liberia  
Established in September 1993 with a seven month mandate to monitor peace accord ending the 4-year old civil war.  
Personnel: 500 proposed  
Estimated 7-month Cost: \$42.6 million

**UNAVEM II**  
UN Angola Verification Mission  
Established in 1991 as a buffer, police, and monitoring force.  
Personnel: 105  
Estimated 1993 Cost: \$107 million

**UNOMOZ**  
UN Operation in Mozambique  
Observer force established in 1992 to supervise cease-fire and monitor election.  
Personnel: Over 5,500  
Estimated 1993 Cost: \$330 million

**UNOMUR**  
UN Observer Mission in Uganda/Rwanda  
Established in August 1993 to monitor Uganda-Rwanda border.  
Personnel: 81 observers proposed.  
Botswana, Senegal, and Zimbabwe expected to contribute.

**UNOSOM II**  
UN Operation in Somalia  
Peacekeeping and humanitarian relief-escort operation; successor to UNITAF peacekeeping operation begun in 1992.  
Personnel: 16,644 of the 28,000 proposed

**UNIFIL**  
UN Interim Force in Lebanon  
Created in 1978 to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from the south and assist Lebanese Government in regaining control of region.  
Personnel: 5,241  
Est. 1993 Cost: \$153 million

**UNITAF**  
UN Transition Assistance Authority in Cambodia  
Established in 1992 as a buffer between Cambodia and Thailand.  
Personnel: 21,100  
Total Estimated Cost: \$2 billion

**UNIKOM**  
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission  
Buffer force established in 1991 to monitor DMZ between Iraq and Kuwait.  
Personnel: 318 of the 3,500 proposed



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RWANDA

30 september 1993 - 9 p.m.

The Security CouncilReaffirming its resolution 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993,Reaffirming also its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 concerning the security of United Nations personnel,Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 24 September 1993 (S/26488 and Add.1),Welcoming the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement on 4 August 1993 and urging the parties to continue to comply fully with them,Stressing the urgency of the deployment of an International Neutral Force in Rwanda, as underlined both by the government of the Republic of Rwanda and by the Rwandese Patriotic Front and as reaffirmed by their joint delegation in New York,Praying tribute to the role played by the Organization of African Unity and by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in the conclusion of the Arusha agreements,Resolved that the United Nations should, at the request of the parties, make its full contribution to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/26488 and Add.1) ;

2. Decides to establish the United Nations assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a period of six months subject to the proviso that it will be extended beyond the initial ninety days only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General as to whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

3. Decides that UNAMIR shall have the mandate as set out in paragraphs 21 to 26) and 39 to 43) of the report of the Secretary-General, which include in particular to : *below*

*Confidante to*  
a) Assist in ensuring the security of the city of Kigali inter alia through a weapons secure area in and around the city;

b) Monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, *which calls for* including the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and others demilitarizations procedures;

c) Monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections;

d) Assist with mine clearance, *train* including training programs;

e) Investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration

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of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the responsible parties and to report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary General;

f) Assist in providing security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons; *refuse*

g) Ensure appropriate escort and protection for humanitarian activities until relieved by the new Rwandese defence forces and gendarmerie; *to assist*

h) Monitor the activities of the gendarmerie and police; *to report on & investigate*

4. Also approves the Secretary-General's proposal that the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) as established in resolution 846 (1992) should be integrated within UNAMIR.

5. Welcomes the efforts and the cooperation of the OAU in helping to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement, in particular the integration of the Neutral Military observers Group (NMOG II) in UNAMIR;

6. Further approves the Secretary-General's proposal that the deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR, whose mandate will end, i.e. in principle, in October 1995 should be carried out in stages;

7. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in this context, to deploy a first battalion *contingent* to Kigali for an initial period of six months, in the shortest possible time, which, when fully in place, will permit the establishment of the transitional institutions and implementation of the other relevant provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

8. Invites the Secretary-General, in the context of the report referred to in paragraph 2 above, also to report on the progress of the mission following its initial deployment, and resolves to review as appropriate, on the basis of that report and as part of the review referred to in paragraph 2 above, the requirement for further deployments in the scale and composition recommended by the Secretary-General in his report (S/26488);

9. Invites the Secretary General to consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR, in particular, through phased deployment without thereby affecting the capacity of the force to carry out its mandate and requests the Secretary-General in planning and executing the phased deployment of UNAMIR to seek economies and to report regularly on what is achieved in this regard.

10. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint his Special Representative who would lead the Mission in the field and exercise authority over all its elements.

11. Urges the parties to implement the Arusha agreements in good faith;

12. Also invites the Secretary-General to conclude forthwith expeditiously, and no later than 60 days after its installation, a status of mission agreement for UNAMIR with the

12. Also invites the Secretary-General to conclude forthwith expeditiously, and no later than 60 days after its installation, a status of mission agreement for UNAMIR with the Rwandese authorities;

1. Can we craft resolution to go forward
  2. - UNSC to discuss a deployment of force. —
- unarmed observers
  - armed observers
  - two battalions

Free RWANDA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Oct-1993 13:17 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice  
(RICE)

SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE

Sandy--

I have sent up to you a revised version of the President's letter to Mitterand taking into account the concerns that I understand you expressed to Dick.

I am assuming that we still plan to support the Rwanda mission, despite a rumor that Frank Wisner was reconsidering after looking more closely at the latest French resolution. Please let us know if our position has changed.

Late yesterday afternoon we had a working level interagency videoconference to try to respond to widespread concerns about the military concept of operations for the Rwanda mission and to reach consensus on a U.S. position on the draft resolution. While much common ground was found on the outline of the resolution, you should know that JCS and to a somewhat lesser extent OSD have very serious concerns about the mission as currently conceived.

In particular, they believe that since the mission is a traditional CH. VI in a supposedly completely permissive environment, the operation should be conducted by unarmed military observers (or at most very lightly armed observers) rather than the planned 2 infantry battalions. As the mission now stands, they "non-concur", and remain adamantly opposed for this reason.

State supports the 2 infantry battalions. I tend to agree with JCS that there is considerable dissonance between the concept of operations and the supposed permissive environment. We ought to be able to achieve the same goals with observers if the parties truly want peace. However, it will be difficult to move the French, the UN and the Rwandan parties in the short time we have before a vote. JCS and/or OSD may raise this at your level.

I think we ought to talk to the French and the UN in New York to address these issues, preferably before a vote, if JCS insists.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0619-1-1  
5/16/18

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	re: Assessment - Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda [partial] (4 pages)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 502

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

Rwanda, 1993 [1]

2006-0218-F  
jp865

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**RESTRICTION CODES****Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Re: RWANDA

~~SECRET NOFORN MNINTEL ORCON~~

(b)(3)  
30 SEP 93

ASSESSMENT:  
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN RWANDA

I. (U) KEY JUDGEMENTS

(G) The military, political, social, economic, and operational conditions in Rwanda favor an economical and easily executed peacekeeping operation.

(G) The United Nations peacekeeping plan for Rwanda is sound with room for some economies.

(G) If adopted and properly executed, the United Nations peacekeeping plan for Rwanda has excellent prospects for success.

(G) United Nations failure to provide a peacekeeping force to Rwanda will probably lead to a breakdown of the peacekeeping process, and increased regional instability adverse to US interests.

II. (U) BACKGROUND

(G) Historical Roots. The conflict in Rwanda is an historical and ethnic struggle between the Hutu (85% of the population) and the Tutsi (14%). Traditional Tutsi subjugation of the Hutu majority was sustained during Belgian colonial rule. However, a bloody but successful Hutu uprising at independence in 1959 brought down the Rwandan Tutsi monarchy and forced hundreds of thousands of Tutsi into exile into Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi. Periodic regional Hutu-Tutsi bloodbaths have occurred since, killing more hundreds of thousands from both ethnic groups, and sustaining Rwandan Tutsi expatriate covenants to return to Rwanda.

(S/NF/WN) The Current War. The Rwandan Civil War began in earnest on 1 October 1990. A large conventional military force, composed almost entirely of expatriate Rwandan Tutsi, attacked Rwanda from Uganda with the intention of militarily seizing the country from the single party control of the Hutu-led National Movement for the Development of the Republic (MRND). The invasion was stopped short of the capital of Kigali by a combination of Rwandan Army (FAR) counterattack, and reenforcement of Rwandan national defense by Zairian, Belgian, and French troops. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was subsequently pushed back into Uganda by the FAR. For the next two years the RPF, supported logistically by the Ugandan government and National Army (NRA), conducted periodic conventional military incursions into Rwandan territory. In 1992 the RPF seized a measurable portion of land in the north (see attachment A), displacing almost a million Rwandan citizens. After this limited success the RPF sued for peace.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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PER E. O. 13526

~~SECRET NOFORN WMINTEL ORCON~~

(G) The Peace Accords. Internationally supervised peace talks concluded in Arusha, Tanzania on 4 August 1993 with the signing of a peace accord between the government of Rwanda and the RPF. The accords call for the cessation of hostilities, establishment of democratic government, demobilization and reorganization of the armed forces, voluntary repatriation of all Rwandan expatriates, and neutral international supervision of the process. The United Nations sent a peacekeeping assessment mission to Rwanda in August 1993, and on 24 September that mission rendered its report recommending the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).

(S/NF/WN) The Present Situation. Currently a cease fire is in effect and all offensive military operations in Rwanda have ended. The 20,000-man RPA controls 4% of Rwandan territory in the north, although the bulk of the RPA is in Uganda. (20,000 is a UN figure; E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) RPA troop strength as closer to 6-8,000.) The combat zone has clearly defined front lines, separated by a neutral zone all along the front except at the Byumba salient. Rwandan defense forces consist of the 23,000 man FAR and 6,000 man Gendarmerie deployed throughout the country, but concentrated along the front. Approximately 350 French paratroops, advisors, and trainers secure the Kigali airport and provide security assistance to the FAR. Both the FAR and the RPA are conventional, light infantry forces; adequately supplied and equipped. Morale and discipline are good. Although both armies started the conflict with exceptionally well-trained forces, rapid wartime expansion has diluted some of that capability. The FAR still has very good basic military infrastructure, to include a remarkably competent officer military academy. Extraordinary operational security and deception characterize RPA operations, which otherwise are conventional in nature.

### III. (U) PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

(G/NF/WN) Operations Support and Logistics. Several factors will facilitate peacekeeping operations in Rwanda. The country is geographically small, and the country's road system is adequate to support vehicular deployment from Kigali to almost anywhere with only a few hours travel time, reducing transportation requirements and expenses considerably over other PKOs in Africa. The climate is mild and pleasant; well suited to troops from almost any country, although the altitude may pose some initial problems. Food, basic services and logistics are readily available. Adequate troop training areas, facilities, billets, and bases already exist or require only minimal upgrade. International and internal telephone and postal communications are excellent. The Kigali airport is very modern and fully capable of receiving strategic deployment of peacekeepers. All other airports are adequate for PKO. In short, support of UN operations should be inexpensive, uncomplicated, and far less demanding than the PKOs in Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, and elsewhere in Africa.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~(S/NF/WN/OC)~~ The Political Environment. The population welcomes United Nations presence. Ethnic tensions are high and sometimes explosive, but the people respond well to military and police intervention. Only one or two very small ethnic organizations propound civil disobedience, usually in the form of small (5-25 person) sit-ins or demonstrations, and usually directed against the occasional inefficiency of UN relief agencies. Although in transition, the country is politically stable and the government has the support of the vast majority of the people; portending almost no civil disturbance problems. There is no terrorist threat. The majority of the military leadership in the RPA and FAR support the peace agreements, and will enforce respect for the security of UNAMIR troops. Furthermore, the leaders of both armies expect to surrender a certain amount of autonomy and authority to the UNAMIR commander. If the UNAMIR commander cultivates his actual and perceived authority and leadership position, the RPA and FAR will defer to him beyond that which is required under the Arusha accords, further enhancing PKO effectiveness. Members of both forces have the expectation of unequivocal UN military response to any military violations, to include consequence of arrest or use of military action, giving psychological advantage to UNAMIR.

~~(C/WN)~~ Peacekeeping Operations. The actual conduct of peacekeeping operations should be easier than elsewhere in Africa. Rwandan terrain is hilly with low cultivated vegetation and only occasional forest, with excellent long-range observation from hill tops. Fewer observers are needed than in typical flat, African savannah. Infiltration routes from Uganda are predictable and accessible, and the small geographic area involved lends itself well to unattended sensor surveillance. In addition, the dense population makes covert or surprise military movement difficult. The conventional military situation is much easier to monitor than an unconventional war. Combatants are all uniformed, well organized, controlled, and disciplined. Front lines and unit positions are well defined and easily accessible.

~~(C)~~ Mines. Mines were used during the war, but the problem is nowhere near that which of other African conflicts. Most mine fields, although unmarked, are known and placed in front of existing fixed defensive positions; easily recoverable. There are a few mines scattered in the countryside, but the number probably does not warrant a systematic search except in a few very small areas of past, intense conflict. Unexpended ordnance is a greater problem. The country, especially in the north, is littered with unexploded mortar rounds, hand grenades, and unexpended ammunition of all types. Casualties are a daily occurrence, especially among children.

~~SECRET NOFORN WINTTEL ORCON~~

(S/NF/WN) Refugees. 600,000 of the 900,000 persons internally displaced by the war spontaneously returned to their homes after the signing of the peace accords. The remainder represent mostly those whose farms are in RPF territory. These persons will probably stay in their current locations until SEP 94, when the RPF has left the zone and the approach of the rainy season predicates planting. Tutsi and other refugees located outside the country will not begin repatriation in any numbers until the military and political processes have been nearly completed, and there is a reasonable security situation. The current United Nations representative for refugee affairs in Rwanda is generally regarded as incompetent by all parties in country, and ill-suited for supervising the resolution of the difficult refugee situation.

(U) The UN Plan. The UNAMIR mission includes security of Kigali, monitoring the cease fire and security situation country-wide during the entire process, mine-clearing and training, investigation of accord violations, and security of refugees and displaced persons during repatriation. The operational concept specifies a phased deployment of approximately 2,500 peacekeepers, to include a mobile infantry battalion in Kigali, and another in the neutral zone. Besides support elements, UNAMIR would include an observer force (to include the small Neutral Military Observer Group, NMOG, currently in Rwanda) and police observers to monitor the security situation elsewhere in the country

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

(C) Assessment of the UN Plan. The proposed UNAMIR structure and operational plan is technically sound and is likely to succeed. The force structure is economical. The 800-man figure for infantry battalions is probably a round number. 650-man infantry units would fulfill mission requirements as long as the units had four maneuver companies and all support elements. Rwandan terrain favors the use of light infantry (to include airborne, air assault, and commando). The battalions should have enough wheeled, armored troop carriers for one or two companies. Light wheeled vehicles, cargo trucks, and buses would suffice for the balance of the transport. The addition of a military police platoon to the Kigali-based battalion would greatly enhance the unit's urban operational capability. The police observer group is an excellent proposal, and will help liaison with the government in general. The air transport unit could consist of 2 (vice 4) utility helicopters and one small fixed wing aircraft, and an aero-medevac helicopter. This would reduce air transport costs at least 30%, and give UNAMIR an air-medical capability. If needed, additional air assets could be obtained from the FAR. The civilian support component of UNAMIR is entirely too large for the mission, which could be easily done with half (70) the number proposed.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The UN operational plan is very good and reflects the realities of the peacekeeping situation there. The proposal of an enforceable weapons control zone around Kigali is essential to avoid spontaneous violence between the RPF and FAR battalions based in the city. The exchange of liaison officers, not practiced at other UN operations in the region, will extend the UNAMIR commander's influence and help reduce communication problems. The plan has no provision for intelligence collection/processing, a major weakness considering the RPF's deception capabilities. Addition of a S5 Civic Affairs Officer, responsible for compiling operational information (from both external and internal sources), and a counterpart Operations Coordinator Officer in the S3, can fulfill the same role with no political ramification. In addition, the plan only glosses military-civil affairs, a crucial aspect of peacekeeping in the Africa region. Finally, the UNAMIR plan calls for support of 26 assembly and cantonment points and training centers (of 48 proposed by the belligerents. This number is far greater than needed or feasible. The same mission can be accomplished far more efficiently and economically (in terms of manpower, resources, and money) with around 10-12 points: 3 RPF points (one in each RPF command zone), and 7-8 FAR points (one at each major garrison).

~~(S/NF/WN/OC)~~ Threats and Pitfalls. Should the United Nations fail to provide a peacekeeping force, or provide an ineffective force, the peace process will probably break down. While leaders of both sides want to end the war, they also realize that the underlying ethnic tensions are very volatile, and suspicions run deep. Revenge, retaliation, and reprisals are culturally embedded. The Tutsi culture dictates a continued struggle to rule the Hutu peasant, one they will not give up despite the pronouncements of the leadership. Similarly, the Hutu will never accept Tutsi rule. The intellectual desire to end the war is insufficient to overcome these emotions. An authoritative arbitrator, with power to enforce, is essential for any plan of reconciliation. Many of the leaders of both elements privately admit that they do not have the discipline to execute the peace accords themselves, and that they will exploit any weakness in the peace accords, or the authority of peacekeeping operation commander, to exact whatever retribution is still due the other side.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ UNAMIR composition cannot include certain nationalities without risking the viability of the force. The RPF will not accept French troops as peacekeepers under any circumstances. The FAR will not accept Ugandan peacekeepers. Both France and Uganda played key supporting roles in the war, and as a result lack neutrality. Neither force will accept Zairi troops, who fought against the RPF while looting the Rwandan countryside. Similarly, both sides feel that Tanzanian and Burundi units cannot be neutral because both armies have members of Tutsi and Hutu ethnicity.

(S/NF/WN) The US has ~~no~~ E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) capability in Rwanda, a serious shortcoming given the nature of the conflict. The US embassy in Kigali is too small and lacks qualified personnel to properly monitor and participate in the process. There is no resident military attache. A military TDY augmentation to the embassy staff, to support peacekeeping operational requirements for the duration of UNAMIR, will help fill the personnel void, E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) to round out country team efforts, and provide maximum effectiveness in liaison between UNAMIR, host country military units, and the US government.

IV. (U) OUTLOOK.

(S/NF) Rwanda is important to the stability of Central Africa, where internal security is precarious at best. Failure of the peace process in Rwanda, for any reason, would greatly increase the likelihood of increased regional ethnic violence. Tutsi-Hutu conflict could quickly spread to Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda. Other ethnic groups could and would retaliate, compounding social and political instability, generating international political crises in Burundi and Uganda, ethnic slaughter in Zaire, and continued civil war in Rwanda. None of these developments will serve any US interest or goal, and probably require evacuation of US and allied citizens from all these areas. In the end far more scarce United Nations peacekeeping efforts and resources would have to go into the region.

(S) The UNAMIR plan has an excellent probability of success. Competent execution of the plan will greatly enhance Rwandan stability over the next 3-4 years. This will further enhance political and social stability in the region, and facilitate international efforts to restore stability and effective government in Uganda and Zaire, and nurture the fledgling democracy in Burundi.

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)



Annex II

Deployment schedule and strengths by phase - military component

BIRTH	PHASE 1 Preparatory			PHASE 2 Broad-based Transitional Government			PHASE 3 Demobilization/Integration						PHASE 4 Electoral						E-95									
	10. 95	11. 95	12. 95	1. 96	2. 96	3. 96	4. 96	5. 96	6. 96	7. 96	8. 96	9. 96	10. 96	11. 96	12. 96	1. 95	2. 95	3. 95		4. 95	5. 95	6. 95	7. 95	8. 95	9. 95	10. 95	11. 95	
	P-DUT			D-DUT																								
FORCE NO	43	54													60												95	
ARMY I SECTOR BR	15													0														95
ARMY I INF BR		300	800																									95
ARMY I LOGIC	15	78							42					0														95
ARMY SECTOR BR	18								15						0													95
ARMY INF BR					500	800									700	300												95
ARMY PL	08														0													95
ARMY SERVICES	36								18						0													95
ARMY GROUP NO	20														80													95
ARMY SECTOR	77														0													95
ARMY SECTOR					66	87								51	15	0												95
GOVT. SECTOR					51	87								51	15	0												95
ARMY OUT		100			203									0														95
LINE OUT		180			208										80	0												95
FED PL		50													0													95
ROY CTI	20															10												95
TOTAL	304	928	1 420	1 748	2 268	2 548								2 433		2 214	1 840	1 268	930									95

2/ Of total, 191 are already in Rwanda and Uganda with UNOC II and UNOPUR.

UNCLASSIFIED

P. 01  
RWANDA

# IO / UNP

NUMBER OF PAGES \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 30 SEPT 93

FROM IO/UNP: SUSAN ZELLE TELEPHONE 647-0042

TO OFFICE: NSC FAX TEL NUMBER (202) 395-5673

DISTRIBUTE TO: JENNIFER WARD

NSC  
phone (202) 395-3391

SUBJECT FINANCIAL INFO - RWANDA

REMARKS \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED

IO/UNP FAX NUMBER 202-647-0039  
TELEPHONE 202-647-2392

NATIONS



## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/26488/Add.1  
29 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

### REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RWANDA

#### Addendum

1. In my report of 24 September 1993 to the Security Council (S/26488), I recommended, in paragraph 66, that the Council authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR, with the mandate of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of a transitional government in Rwanda. This operation would be deployed according to the schedule described in section III, paragraphs 39 to 43, of my main report.
2. Based on the operational plan and general assumptions outlined in my main report, it is estimated that an amount of \$62.6 million would be required for a period of six months. This amount includes the costs of start-up and acquisition of capital equipment. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.
3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that, should the Security Council agree to the establishment and deployment of UNAMIR, the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account to be established for that purpose.

S/26488/Add.1  
 English  
 Page 2

3

Annex

Cost estimates by objects of expenditure  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

<u>Objects of expenditure</u>	<u>Initial six months</u>
1. Military component	
(a) Observers	4 682
(b) Contingent personnel	13 147
(c) Other costs pertaining to contingents	1 836
2. Civilian police	851
3. Civilian staff costs <sup>a/</sup>	6 956
4. Premises/accommodation	2 700
5. Infrastructure repairs	1 036
6. Transport operations	8 988
7. Air operations	2 530
8. Communications	2 998
9. Miscellaneous equipment	6 868
10. Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	7 844
11. Mine-clearing programme	810
12. Programme related to former combatants in the assembly areas	<u>2 002</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b><u>62 618</u></b>

<sup>a/</sup> Provides for 127 international staff and 68 locally recruited staff.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Nick Rasmussen to Samuel Berger; re: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation [partial] (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 502

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, 1993 [1]

2006-0218-F  
jp865

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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7451

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD

FROM: NICK RASMUSSEN *NR*

SUBJECT: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation

*\$200 Million*  
*\$60 million -  
US over  
2 years*

If approved, a UN peacekeeping operation for Rwanda stands a good chance of being a success. Both parties to the conflict want UN involvement and believe it is necessary for continued progress in implementing the Arusha peace accord (which we helped broker). The ceasefire has held for several months; its durability attests to a strong desire on both sides for a political solution. OAU and UN observers have been in country for several months and have not been harmed or threatened in any way.

The PRD-13 Factors. There are satisfactory answers to a number of the PRD factors that we have developed to guide our decisions on support for new UN operations.

- o There is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis. USUN reports that at least 10 UNSC members will vote in favor of a resolution.
- o There are clear objectives and a clear understanding that this a peacekeeping, not peace enforcement mission.
- o A ceasefire is in place; both parties want the UN to come in.
- o An end point to UN involvement has been identified. When an integrated armed force is created and elections produce a new government, the UN will leave. The UN estimates this will take ~~22-25~~ months.

Looking at some of the other guidelines, however, the picture is less favorable:

- o It is not clear that there are means available to support this mission. There is consensus that the OAU is overburdened and cannot take on the mission. While some UN member states have indicated that they are willing to consider stepping forward, we are a long way from having firm troop commitments. We can also assume that this operation would add to our UN arrearages.

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Declassify on:

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PER E. O. 13526

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

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- o The first guideline, that there be a threat to international peace and security, is met, but just barely. The most compelling rationale for UN involvement is to bring an end to a conflict which has displaced almost 1 million people, not to halt aggression.

Demobilization: Ambitious and Expensive. Beyond the PRD guidelines, we have some concerns which center around the UN's concept of operations. In the early stages of the mission, the UN would do what we know it can do successfully -- oversee a ceasefire so that a transitional government can take office in a climate of security. Later, however, the mission would be responsible for organizing demobilization of the two armed forces so that an integrated, national army could be created. Demobilization of two large armed forces (30,000 on one side, 20,000 on the other) is a complex and ambitious undertaking, made much more so by the UN's relative inexperience with disarmament. If there is any point at which this operation could break down, this would be it.


A demobilization component to the mission has significant cost implications as well. At its peak, the number of UN peacekeepers will climb to almost 2600. Though the UN has not yet provided cost estimates, we expect that it will be quite expensive. There have already been several attempts to scale down the size of the proposed operation, but given the ambitious mandate, this has not been possible.

Next Steps. If we are inclined to support this mission in the Security Council, we should nonetheless take the time to make sure our concerns about mission scope and costs are given a fair hearing and to scrub the text of the resolution. Given the President's clear statement on Monday, Security Council members and Boutros-Ghali should expect no less. Even if we end up supporting the mission in its current form, we will have established that we will exercise our right to scrutinize an operation in advance of a decision, regardless of time pressures from other members.

We understand that Secretary Christopher informed French PM Juppe in New York today that we want to delay the Security Council vote scheduled for Thursday. Ambassador Albright is following up through UN channels. State has also begun putting together comments on the draft resolution offered by the French. Most of the changes will involve being more precise about the mandate and end points. We will have their input early on Thursday.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) We have developed a preliminary draft of a response.

We believe that State will support a Rwanda resolution (USUN has already weighed in favor -- see Tab C). OSD and JCS would have to be convinced, but their concerns appear seem more tied up in the process (a hurried vote without good information) than with the substance. If we can slow the process down and demonstrate to them that we are faithfully applying the PRD guidelines, they will likely support a yes vote.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to schedule this week either a Deputies meeting or conference call involving State, DOD and NSC to develop a USG position on a Rwanda resolution.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove mb

Attachments

Tab A Mitterand's Letter  
Tab B Draft Letter of Response  
Tab C USUN Cable

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Mr. President, Dear Bill:

You know how much importance France places on the resolution of the Rwandan crisis.

The signature of the peace accords on August 4 in Arusha marked the conclusion of long negotiations which the U.S., like France, actively encouraged. However, the implementation of these accords depends integrally on the deployment of a UN force to Rwanda.

A resolution to create this force is under active discussion at the Security Council now. It seems essential to me that it be adopted rapidly.

In fact, the situation in Rwanda is deteriorating because of the disintegration of political forces, the decline in the economy and military tensions which remain alive. If the international community does not react rapidly, the peace efforts which the U.S. and France have pursued vigorously, along with the countries in the region, risk being compromised.

Therefore I hope, Mr. President, that in light of these considerations, and in the logic of the position which the U.S. has adopted with regard to the conflict, you can actively support a prompt Security Council decision in favor of sending a UN force.

I ask that you accept, Mr. President, this expression of my high consideration and my cordial regards.

Signed: Francois Mitterand

# DRAFT

Dear Francois:

Thank you for writing to share with me your views on the situation in Rwanda. I agree with you that the international community needs to support the Arusha accords so that our efforts to bring peace to Rwanda are not compromised.

To that end, the U.S. is considering supporting a resolution establishing a UN force in Rwanda, provided ~~(of course)~~ that our concerns about the mission's mandate and cost are resolved in a satisfactory manner. As I made clear in my remarks to the UNGA last week, I think it is imperative that we consider all aspects of an operation before we move to a final vote. I greatly appreciate your government's willingness to accept a short delay in the Council's final vote on this matter so that we can address the issues that concern the U.S.

*exp. costs + mandate*

I understand that deployment of a UN force will permit France to withdraw its forces from Rwanda. I hope ~~you can tell the UN that~~ the creation of a UN force in Rwanda can permit some French forces to remain in Somalia beyond the end of the year. As you know, I think it is vital that the Secretary-General's efforts in Somalia receive the continuing strong support of the

*your govt  
to commit*

# DRAFT

**DRAFT**

international community. Let me close by thanking you for your help in ensuring that cooperation between France and the U.S. on peacekeeping matters around the world remains strong.

With Best Wishes,

**DRAFT**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Sep-1993 19:28 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX\_MAIL@OEOB  
RICE@A1@OEOB  
RAGLE@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room  
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

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SIT: RAGLE RICE VAX

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INFO RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0090

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1466

<SUBJ>

RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004735

STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S DELEGATION

STATE FOR AF-MOOSE, IO-BENNET, EUR-OXMAN,

ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, L/UNA, L/AF

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5, J3

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

REF: A) USUN 4653, B) USUN 4690, C) USUN 4720

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE, SEE  
PARA 4.

2. SUMMARY: FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE MAY RAISE WITH THE

*(see para 5 onward)*

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2018-0639- m1 m  
5/18/15

SECRETARY TOMORROW THE QUESTION OF A UN PKO IN RWANDA. THE FRENCH PLAN TO CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30 ON THE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE RWANDA PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. FOLLOWING IN PARAS 5 THROUGH 11 IS AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA (REFTELS) IN RELATION TO THE PRD-13 CRITERIA CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION, AND TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SEPTEMBER 27 SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN OUR ANALYSIS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PROPOSED PKO FOR RWANDA MEETS THE DRAFT CRITERIA SUBJECT TO FINAL SUBMISSION OF A FINANCIAL STATEMENT WHICH IS EXPECTED IMMINENTLY. END SUMMARY.

3. FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE WARNED USUN DEPUTY PERMREP WALKER THAT FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF A NEW UN PKO (REFTELS) WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SEPTEMBER 29. THE FRENCH WANT TO CONSIDER THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (REFTEL B) TUESDAY, REFINE THE TEXT WEDNESDAY, PUT IT INTO ITS FINAL DRAFT VERSION WEDNESDAY NIGHT, AND VOTE THURSDAY. MERIMEE WANTS TO CONCLUDE THIS MATTER DURING SEPTEMBER, SO AS TO AVOID THE DELAYS THAT ARE INEVITABLE WHEN A NEW PERSON ASSUMES THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY ON THE FIRST OF OCTOBER. THE FRENCH KNOW THEY HAVE AT LEAST TEN POSITIVE VOTES (ONE MORE THAN NEEDED TO PASS A RESOLUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A VETO). THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE RWANDA OPERATION MEETS THE CRITERIA SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNGA. MERIMEE POINTED OUT THAT THE FRENCH COOPERATED ON THE RECENT LIBERIA AND HAITI RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING NEW PKO'S. USUN HAS NEVER INDICATED THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGE A LINKAGE. COMMENT: IF WE TAKE THE STEP OF VETOING THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION, THEREBY FORCING THE FRENCH TO MAINTAIN THEIR BATTALION IN KIGALI, WE CAN ALMOST CERTAINLY WRITE OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH TROOPS REMAINING IN SOMALIA. END COMMENT.

4. THE ONLY WAY WE COULD STOP THE RWANDA PKO IS BY THREATENING TO VETO A RESOLUTION THURSDAY. WE MUST, THEREFORE, RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO EITHER VOTE YES, ABSTAIN, OR VETO BY 10 AM THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WILL HAVE THE MOST EFFECT ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE TEXT IF RECEIVED BY OOB WEDNESDAY. IF INSTRUCTED TO VETO, USUN WILL REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE (EOV) FROM THE DEPARTMENT.

5. DURING THE PROCESS OF DEFINING USG FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE VOTING ON NEW UN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, SIX FACTORS HAVE EMERGED AS PART OF THE LATEST PRD-13 DRAFT. TO AID THE USG REVIEW PROCESS, WE WILL APPLY THESE STANDARDS TO THE PROPOSED OPERATION FOR RWANDA.

6. IS THERE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY? YES. INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION OCCURRED WHEN RPF TROOPS INVADED RWANDA FROM UGANDAN TERRITORY IN 1990. ALSO, ALMOST 1 MILLION DISPLACED PERSONS AND

REFUGEES FLED THEIR FARMS DURING THE FIGHTING, CONSTITUTING A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER REQUIRING URGENT ACTION, COUPLED WITH VIOLENCE.

7. IS THERE AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS? YES. AT LEAST TEN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS HAVE VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE PKO PROPOSED BY THE SYG. THE OAU AND THE OBSERVERS TO THE PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA ALSO FAVOR THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH CALLED FOR IN THE PEACE AGREEMENT.

8. ARE THERE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THE MISSION FITS ON THE SPECTRUM BETWEEN TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT? YES. THIS WOULD BE A CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING OPERATION OPERATING UNDER CHAPTER VI WHERE THE CEASEFIRE,

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004735

STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S DELGATION

STATE FOR AF-MOOSE, IO-BENNET, EUR-OXMAN,

ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, L/UNA, L/AF

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5, J3

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

DEMOBILIZATION AND OTHER AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WOULD BE MONITORED BY THE UN. NO PEACE ENFORCEMENT POWERS WOULD BE INVOLVED, ALTHOUGH THE FORCE WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF ACTING IN SELF-DEFENSE IF NEED BE. THE OPERATION HAS A CLEAR 22-25 MONTH PERIOD FOR EXECUTION, WITH PRECISE MILEPOSTS ON THE WAY, AT THE END OF WHICH TIME THE MANDATE AND MISSION EXPIRES. THIS IS ONE OF THE BETTER-ORGANIZED AND PLANNED PKO'S WE HAVE SEEN.

9. FOR CHAPTER VI PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, IS A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE AND HAVE THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT CONSENTED BEFORE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES TO DEPLOY THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION. YES. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN HOLDING WELL FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT SIGNED AN AGREEMENT IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA IN WHICH THE REQUESTED THAT A PEACEKEEPING MISSION BE DEPLOYED AS PART OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS TO PEACEFUL ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY.

10. ARE THE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION AVAILABLE, INCLUDING (A) FORCES (REGIONAL OR UN) APPROPRIATE TO THE MISSION? YES. THE UN HAS INFORMALLY CONTACTED SEVERAL FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PRELIMINARILY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING THE TWO BATTALIONS RECOMMENDED FOR THE RWANDA PKO. THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WILL VARY BETWEEN APPROXIMATELY 700 AND 2,500 DEPENDING ON THE NEEDS AT ANY GIVEN TIME IN ORDER TO SAVE ON COSTS. (B) MANDATE: THE MANDATE WOULD BE TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT, CONTRIBUTING TO THE DISENGAGEMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION

PHASE, WHILE PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF SECURITY. SOME OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE MANDATE, AS SPELLED OUT IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WOULD BE TO: A) CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TOWN OF KIGALI, B) SUPERVISE THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE DEFINING OF DEMILITARIZATION PROCEDURES, C) OVERSEE THE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY DURING THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MANDATE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS, D) CONTRIBUTE TO MINE CLEARING EFFORTS RELATED TO THE OPERATION, IN PARTICULAR BY MEANS OF TRAINING PROGRAMS, E) EXAMINE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, INSTANCES OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DETERMINE THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE, F) OVERSEE THE SECURITY OF THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, G) SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE. (C) FINANCE: THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARIAT AND THE COUNCIL WILL NOT ACT UNTIL IT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED. THE COUNCIL HAS ACTED, HOWEVER, AS IN THE CASE OF HAITI, IMMEDIATELY ON PUBLICATION OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT.

11. FINALLY, CAN AN END-POINT TO UN INVOLVEMENT BE IDENTIFIED? YES. THE INSTALLATION OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION AND ELECTORAL PROCESS (APPROXIMATELY 22-25 MONTHS AFTER ADOPTION OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION).

ALBRIGHT

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RWANDA

*Ambassade de France*  
*aux Etats-Unis*  
September 28, 1993

*L' Ambassadeur*

N° 153/AA

Dear Mr. Lake:


Please find herewith the text of a message from President François Mitterrand, that I was asked to forward to you.

The original letter will be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

With my best regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

Jacques Andréani



The Honorable  
Anthony LAKE  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Tel : 456 2255

Copy : French Desk  
The Department of State  
tel : 647 2633 R. 5226



# Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/26488  
24 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

## REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RWANDA

### INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993. By paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Council urged the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement. Paragraph 11 of the same resolution requested me to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the implementation of such an agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decided that such a contribution was needed.
2. In my last report on Rwanda (S/26350), I informed the Security Council that the peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and RPF had been signed at Arusha (United Republic of Tanzania) on 4 August 1993. I indicated that the Government of Rwanda and RPF had called for the establishment of a neutral international force to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. I informed the Security Council that I had decided to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, in order to examine the functions that such a force could perform and to assess the human and financial resources that would be needed to carry them out. I stated that, in addition to Rwanda, the mission would also visit Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa for consultations with the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Secretary-General of OAU.
3. The reconnaissance mission, comprising officials of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) visited Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993. Its senior officials visited Dar-es-Salaam on 1 and 2 September and Addis Ababa on 3 September.

### I. THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

4. The Council's attention is drawn to the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement and to those of its six protocols that are relevant to the Council's consideration of the contribution the United Nations could make towards the implementation of the agreement (see S/26350, para. 20).

5. The Protocols of Agreement on Power-sharing provides that the institutions for the transitional period, up to the elections for a democratically elected Government, will comprise a broad-based transitional Government with the participation of all main political parties. The major parties identified in the Agreements are the Mouvement républicain pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND), RPF, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), the Parti social démocrate (PSD), the Parti libéral (PL) and the Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC). The Transitional Assembly will be composed of members appointed by the various political parties.
6. Article 7 of the Agreement provides that the transitional institutions will be set up in Kigali 37 days after the signing of the Agreement, i.e. on 10 September 1993. However, this was based on the assumption that a neutral international force would be deployed by that date and that, with the arrival of that force, foreign troops stationed in Rwanda would withdraw. At that point, in accordance with the Agreement, RPF would deploy a battalion in Kigali to ensure the protection of its political leaders and to enable them to participate fully in the transitional institutions.
7. The Protocol of Agreement on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions states that the duration of the transitional period will be 22 months, with the possibility of one extension, which would have to be approved by a majority of 60 per cent of the Transitional Assembly.
8. The Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, including the Gendarmerie, specifically requests the assistance of a neutral international force led by the United Nations in the disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and retaining of the military personnel of the parties to be integrated in the national army. It also calls on the establishment of such a force to ensure the overall security of the country, especially the capital city of Kigali, as well as the protection of the expatriate community, and security of the continued distribution of humanitarian assistance.
9. The Protocol defines the neutral international force as a United Nations-led force, integrating as necessary the current OAU Neutral military observer Group (NMOG II) and made up of countries representing a cross-section of the international community. The NMOG I force, made up of 50 personnel from OAU countries, monitored the cease-fire from July 1992 to July 1993. In early August 1993, the force was replaced by the NMOG II force, which is currently made up of 132 personnel from OAU member countries.
10. The Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons calls for the involvement of the United Nations in the repatriation of refugees and is elaborated upon below (see sect. III C).

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION

11. During its visit to Rwanda, the mission was led by Brigadier General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). Between 19 and 31 August 1993, the mission held consultations with the President of Rwanda, General Juvénal Habyarimana, and with the Chairman of RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarukwe.

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as well as with other senior members of the Government and RPF, including Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, current Prime Minister, Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, Prime Minister designate of the broad-based transitional Government, and Mr. Paul Kagame, Vice-Chairman of RPF and Commanding Officer of its armed forces. The mission also met with members of the diplomatic community accredited to Rwanda, with representatives of United Nations agencies and programmes and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) executing humanitarian projects in the country. The reconnaissance mission also met with the OAU representative in Rwanda and the Commanding Officer of NMOG II.

12. During their visit to Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa, the senior officials of the reconnaissance mission were joined by Mr. Macaire Pédanou, my Special Representative at the Arusha peace talks. They held consultations with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and other high officials of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and, in Addis Ababa, with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of OAU, and his senior staff.

13. One of the major points raised by all those with whom the mission met related to the deployment of a neutral international force by 10 September, the date set in the peace agreement for the installation of the transitional institutions in Kigali. The concern of all parties was that, should the neutral international force not be deployed in a timely manner, a political vacuum might occur if the transitional government was not established in Kigali. The mission responded by clarifying the decision-making process at the United Nations and by stressing that the dispatch of a peace-keeping force to Rwanda would depend on a final determination by the Security Council. President Habyarimana felt that it would be dangerous and hazardous to set up the transitional government before the arrival of the neutral international force and emphasized that such a force should be strong enough to be credible. For his part, Colonel Kanyarengwa, Chairman of RPF, stated that it was imperative that the security of RPF be ensured by the United Nations and expressed his concern that the vacuum caused by the absence of a United Nations peace-keeping mission might be filled by paramilitary groups in the country.

14. After the reconnaissance mission explained that it would not be realistic to expect the deployment of the proposed neutral international force by 10 September, a number of alternative measures were put forward by the parties and OAU. In addition, the role that an enlarged NMOG might play in the implementation of the agreements was discussed. In this connection, it should be noted that the OAU Secretary-General explained to the mission that he was planning to enlarge NMOG II to a total of approximately 240 all ranks, and that OAU did not have the resources to sustain a larger force. Mr. Salim pointed out that, even for the enlargement of NMOG II to the size of a company, OAU would have to rely, for logistic support, on the contributions of the donor countries which had assisted in the establishment of NMOG I. Most importantly, Mr. Salim informed the mission that the mandate of NMOG II would necessarily be confined to monitoring the cease-fire.

15. Mr. Salim recalled that the mandate of NMOG II would expire on 31 October 1993, adding that if the Security Council authorized United Nations involvement in the implementation of the peace agreement, the expeditious deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force would be essential. With regard to the possible integration of NMOG II into such a force, Mr. Salim

expressed the view that the United Nations would have to work out arrangements directly with troop-contributing countries.

16. It was also suggested that, since it was not feasible to meet the expectations of the two parties with regard to the deadline of 10 September for the installation of the transitional institutions, the United Nations should reassure the Rwandese people by giving a positive signal regarding its willingness to contribute to the restoration of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda. In this connection, in a statement issued on 10 September 1993 (S/26425), the President of the Security Council pointed out that the Council was aware of the hopes the Rwandese parties entertained regarding the assistance that the international community would provide for the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. The President of the Council in his statement also urged the parties to continue to honour the Arusha agreement in accordance with their commitments.

17. Many of those with whom the reconnaissance mission held consultations, including representatives of the diplomatic community, felt that the Arusha accords constituted the best way for the Rwandese people to work together towards peace and stability. They also stressed the urgency of implementing those accords so that the people of Rwanda could proceed with the challenging tasks of reconstruction and economic development. The mission reported that most Governments represented in Rwanda also anxious to see a sound economic recovery programme instituted expressed their willingness to assist the Rwandese people in carrying out the task of economic recovery.

18. During its stay in Rwanda, the reconnaissance mission visited the areas controlled by RPF in the north, as well as government military positions and outposts. It carried out a detailed survey of the forces of the parties, including their respective structures and equipment, troop dispositions and topography, by land and by air. It received detailed briefings from the NMOG II Commander on the present status and role of NMOG II in Rwanda.

19. The mission discussed with the parties the tasks envisaged for the neutral international force in the Arusha agreement in order to determine the contribution that could be made by the United Nations. In particular, the mission undertook an assessment of the essential requirements that would enable the proposed force to execute its monitoring functions in Rwanda. This included an assessment of the following areas: cease-fire compliance in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), establishment of cantonment and assembly areas for weapons and personnel, mineclearance, security of humanitarian aid efforts, return of the refugees and displaced persons, disarming and demobilization of armed personnel and restructuring of the Rwandese Defence Forces and the Gendarmerie.

20. In regard to relief assistance, the mission worked out arrangements that could enhance the various aspects of ongoing humanitarian activities described below (see sect. III C).

### III. UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTION

#### A. MILITARY ASPECTS

21. The main provisions of the Arusha peace agreement relevant to the proposed United Nations peace-keeping mission (herein referred to as "the Mission") are contained in the protocol on the integration of the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie. The principal functions of the Mission could be grouped in four categories: (a) to assist in ensuring the security of the city of Kigali, (b) to monitor the cease-fire agreement, including establishment of an expanded DMZ and demobilization procedures, (c) to continue to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading up to the elections, and (d) to assist with mine-clearance, including training and mine-awareness programmes.

22. Under article 64 of the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Mission would also be charged with the task of undertaking investigations either on complaints from the parties or on its own, of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to the agreement. In addition, the Mission would be called upon to provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons.

23. To ensure the effective conduct of the Mission's responsibilities, the Protocol calls for close cooperation and continuing consultations between the Force Commander, or his representative, the new Rwandese Defence Forces High Command Council and the "Conseil de Commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale". This will be ensured through the holding of regular joint working sessions at all relevant command levels.

#### 1. Concept of operations

24. The Mission would be based on the concept of operations described below.

25. Owing to the presence of several battalions of government forces in Kigali and the introduction into the city of the RPF leadership with a fully equipped RPF battalion, the Mission would establish a weapons secure area in and around Kigali. This zone would be defined as an area of approximately 10 kilometres in radius from the centre of Kigali within which the military units would be required to store their weapons and ammunition, except in those cases previously agreed to by all parties. The security of the city would be accomplished in four ways. First, the Mission would deploy an infantry battalion throughout the Kigali area with the aim of providing security for the international airport, the RPF battalion compound and government buildings and to assist in the recovery of arms from civilians. The battalion would require a wheeled armoured personnel carrier (APC) company for emergency deployment both in Kigali and in the expanded DMZ. Secondly, the Mission would monitor and verify the securing of weapons and the movement of all forces from both parties in the Kigali sector through the use of infantry and military observers. Thirdly, in monitoring the activities involved in the establishment of the new Integrated Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie, the Mission would deploy liaison officers to the headquarters of these new forces. Fourthly, the Mission would take appropriate

measures, as necessary, to assist in providing security for members of the transitional Government.

26. The Mission would monitor the cease-fire agreement through verification and control of the expanded DMZ and by the concentration, disarming, demobilization and integration of troops of both the parties and the Gendarmerie. This would be achieved by the deployment of military observers and a second infantry battalion (in addition to the two existing infantry platoons of NMOG II) in the DMZ and at the assembly points, cantonment points and integrated training centres. In accordance with the peace agreement, the responsibility for the identification of assembly zones, and thus the demarcation of the new DMZ, would rest with the Mission. A key task for the Force Commander would therefore be to confirm the proposed assembly zones, assembly points, cantonment points, integrated training centres and the demarcation of a new DMZ, in accordance with the agreement. From a total of 48 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres proposed by the two parties, the reconnaissance mission recommended that the number be reduced, subject to review by the Force Commander, to approximately 26 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres.

27. The reconnaissance mission conducted a survey of all armed forces in the country. The Rwandese Government declared it had an effective strength of 23,100 personnel deployed essentially in the northern part of the country and in the Kigali area. The RPF forces declared a strength of approximately 20,000 personnel concentrated north of the current DMZ. It was reported that the government Gendarmerie is made up of 6,000 personnel deployed essentially in the front lines. RPF does not have a gendarmerie. According to the Protocol, the process of demobilization of all of the forces and the Gendarmerie, and the subsequent training and integration of up to 13,000 personnel for the new National Army and 6,000 personnel for the new National Gendarmerie, is to be completed over a 7 to 9 month period. This process would commence on a date agreed to by the Mission and the transitional Government. The possible need to assist the parties with transporting their personnel, constructing shelters to accommodate the assembled troops and resupplying and/or feeding them would require special attention.

28. The approximately 35,000 (31,000 soldiers and 4,000 Gendarmerie) demobilized personnel who would not form part of the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie would benefit from vocational retraining and employment, in accordance with the Agreement, under the auspices of the Rwandese Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration and with the assistance of the United Nations programmes and agencies and NGOs.

29. The reconnaissance mission recommended that the Mission should have the capacity to provide escort and protection for humanitarian activities, as required, until relieved by the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie. It was also recommended that the Mission conduct essential force-related mine clearance. An overall mine-clearance programme is described in section III C below.

30. The effective execution of the Mission's tasks, as well as the rate at which they can proceed, depends not only upon the timely availability of resources, but also on the capacity of the local infrastructure (roads, fuel

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supply, power supply, communications, warehousing space and personnel accommodation), as well as the Mission's repair and maintenance capabilities. Taking into account the state of the existing infrastructure in Rwanda, it would be essential for an engineer company to be deployed expeditiously to assist in restoring basic infrastructure, including roads and bridges necessary for the work of the Mission.

## 2. Proposed Force structure

31. The military observers of UNOMUR, established under Security Council resolution 846 (1993), would come under the command of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda, while maintaining their monitoring tasks on the Uganda/Rwanda border. The Mission would incorporate elements of the NMOG II forces already in place in the current DMZ (see annex I) under its command at the earliest opportunity.

32. The Mission's operations would be divided into five sectors. There would be a Kigali sector and a DMZ sector. Two other sectors would be located with the government forces and RPF forces respectively. UNOMUR would constitute the fifth sector. The Mission would be supported by engineer, aviation, communications and medical units, as well as by the necessary logistic and administrative staff. The Mission's Force headquarters would be located in Kigali.

33. A Military Observer Group headquarters would be responsible for command and control of the Military Observer Sectors and for administering all military observers in theatre. It would consist of a total of 20 military observers and would be comprised of the traditional branches of military staff.

34. The Government forces, RPF forces and UNOMUR Sectors would be composed entirely of United Nations military observers. These three sectors, through their military observer teams, would be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the two parties. The military observer Sectors would be responsible for, inter alia, the following tasks: monitoring the observance by the two parties of modalities for the definite cessation of hostilities as provided for in the peace Agreement; monitoring the assembly zones and the preparation and maintenance of assembly and cantonment points; verifying the disengagement of forces, the movement of troops to assembly points and of heavy weapons to cantonment points; monitoring discipline of troops inside and outside assembly points; verifying inventories of weapons and ammunition of the two parties and monitoring operations for the separation of military personnel in the assembly points; verifying the identification of military personnel in the assembly points; verifying the distribution of non-lethal supplies to troops in assembly points; monitoring the security of troops in the integrated training centres and monitoring the operations for the demobilization of servicemen and gendarmes.

35. The Kigali and the DMZ sectors would each consist of an infantry battalion and military observers, who would perform tasks similar to those described in paragraph 34, as well as assist in arms recovery and verification through the use of checkpoints and patrols and in providing security at assembly and

cantonment points. The DMZ Sector would also take under its command the two NMOG II platoons currently serving in Rwanda.

36. The two infantry battalions (800 all ranks each) must be capable of supporting themselves for at least 60 days. They would each consist of a heavy logistics company and four rifle companies.

37. The Mission would also need an engineer company consisting of 203 personnel which would be responsible, inter alia, for supervising the rehabilitation and repair of basic infrastructure to meet the Mission's operational requirements and for undertaking essential demining tasks, including explosive ordnance disposal.

38. The Mission's support elements would consist of a helicopter unit of 40 personnel and 4 utility helicopters and a light twin-engine aircraft, a movement control section of 20 personnel, a logistics company of 200 personnel and a medical platoon of 50 personnel.

### 3. Deployment schedule

39. The military personnel of the Mission would be deployed progressively as shown in Annex II and would conduct the operation in four phases.

40. Phase 1 would commence on the day on which the Security Council adopts the enabling resolution and would end on D-Day, the day on which the transitional Government is installed in Kigali. Given the time required to establish and deploy the proposed Mission, it is estimated that the transitional Government may not be installed until the end of 1993. The objective of this phase would be to establish the essential conditions needed to permit the secure installation of the transitional Government. The necessary command and control, service support, infrastructure and equipment would be put in place. This would require the immediate deployment of the military planning staff of the Mission headquarters (including approximately 25 military, 3 civilian police and 18 civilians). This phase would also see elements of the expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR observers continuing their respective mandates in the DMZ and on the Uganda-Rwanda border, but under command of the Mission. By the end of phase 1, the strength of the Mission would number a total of 1,428 military personnel, of whom 1,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 211 would be military observers (including 77 military observers from UNOMUR and 54 from NMOG II).

41. Phase 2 would commence on D-Day and last until D-Day+90 or when the process of disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Forces and Gendarmerie begins. This phase would see the continued build up of the Mission to its peak strength. The expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR would be fully integrated as entities into the Mission and would continue to discharge their mandates. The major activities during this phase would be to continue monitoring the DMZ and the Uganda-Rwanda border and assisting in providing security in Kigali, the demarcation of the assembly zones, monitoring the modification of the DMZ and ensuring that all preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration process are in place. While the agreement did not specify a date for the start of the demobilization process, it did estimate that one month would be required to set up the support elements needed to conduct this

operation. However, the reconnaissance mission's estimate is that two to three months would be required to ensure that the infrastructure needed for demobilization is in place. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would include a total of 2,548 military personnel, of whom 2,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 331 would be military observers.

42. Phase 3 would commence on D-Day+90, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process begins, and would last until D-Day+360, or when the process is completed. During this phase, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor the new DMZ with a second infantry battalion, and would continue to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border. It would establish approximately 26 assembly/cantonment points and integrated training centres, monitor the movement of large bodies of military personnel in and through the DMZ and assist in maintaining general security in the country. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would be in the process of reduction to approximately 1,240 all ranks.

43. Phase 4 would commence on D-Day+360, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process is completed. This phase would last about 10 months. It would see the further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level needed to assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections. During this phase, the monitoring of the DMZ and of the Uganda-Rwanda border would cease. The residual strength of the Mission would amount to approximately 930 military personnel, of whom 850 would be staff officers and formed troops and 80 would be military observers.

#### B. Civilian police

44. The Arusha peace agreement calls on the United Nations to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and Communal Police.

45. The law and order situation during the transitional phase would be dependent on several internal security considerations: possible political and ethnic tensions; the potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry after the demobilization of the forces of the parties; the easy availability of weapons; the possible disruption of the humanitarian aid effort; and the inability of local agencies to cope effectively with rising crime in the country, particularly in Kigali.

46. In accordance with the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie would be reduced from a strength of approximately 6,000 to a strength of 1,800 during the demobilization phase. All members of the Gendarmerie would be screened, along with RPF candidates, for positions in the new Gendarmerie or for complete demobilization into the community. The Gendarmerie would subsequently be reconstituted with a maximum force level of 6,000 all ranks.

47. In order to verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, a small United Nations civilian police unit, headed by a Police

Commissioner, would be deployed in Kigali and the nine prefecture capitals and in specific police installations. It is estimated that a total of 60 police officers would be required. The police unit would consist of a headquarters of 10 officers, including a special investigation team; a Kigali district consisting of 20 personnel; and a provincial district consisting of monitoring teams for each of the prefectures (except Kigali), requiring a total of 30 personnel.

### C. Humanitarian assistance

48. In addition to the provisions of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons, both the Government and RPF have indicated that international assistance will be essential in bringing about the successful implementation of the peace agreement. Humanitarian agencies will continue to provide assistance based on the principle of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

49. By March 1993, a total of 900,000 people, or approximately 13 per cent of the nation's population, had been displaced. The Secretary-General launched a consolidated appeal in April 1993 to meet the emergency needs of these displaced people. The international community has made cash and in-kind contributions of up to US\$ 100 million since January 1993. With the signing of the peace agreement, it is estimated that some 600,000 individuals have already returned to their homes. With their return, the emergency situation that arose earlier in the year has eased. For the estimated 300,000 people who remain displaced and continue to rely on emergency assistance in the camps, such assistance will continue to be provided.

50. If a United Nations operation is deployed in Rwanda, humanitarian assistance would need to be coordinated with the Mission's activities. Currently, the United Nations Resident Coordinator ensures coordination among United Nations agencies, and with the donor community and NGOs. He will continue to do so during the transitional period.

51. As a result of the decision of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in February 1993 on its programme for Rwanda, UNDP and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs will hold a Round-table Meeting on humanitarian assistance, which will include aspects of demobilization and reconstruction, in early 1994. In addition to local fund-raising efforts, the meeting will provide an excellent opportunity to solicit support from a larger number of donors and to inform them of the latest situation in the country. I hope that the donor community will continue to respond favourably to the financial needs in the humanitarian sector.

52. Regarding assistance to demobilized soldiers, a comprehensive programme catering to their needs is being studied using previous United Nations peace-keeping experience in other regions. The United Nations is encouraging the donor community to examine the possibility of pooling resources for the preparation and implementation of such a programme.

53. Finally, regarding the Rwandese who have taken refuge in neighbouring countries, the starting point of the implementation of the activities envisaged for the repatriation and reintegration of the returnees is the establishment of

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of personnel, finance, procurement, communications, travel, compensation, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing, etc. In order to provide information to the general public on the activities of the mission, the Mission would seek access to an established radio station.

60. It is estimated that a total of 127 international staff (26 Professional and 101 Field and General Service staff) and 68 locally recruited staff would be required. These figures include the 17 international staff and 7 locally recruited staff currently working in Uganda with UNOMUR. The 26 Professional staff would include 4 political officers, 3 public information officers, 1 human rights officer and humanitarian assistance officers.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

61. In my report of 24 August (S/26350), I stated that the signing of the Arusha peace agreement had provided the Government of Rwanda and RPF with a political and democratic framework for resolving their conflict. The agreement gives the international community an opportunity to contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process. In this connection, I should like to acknowledge, with deep gratitude, the continuing efforts of the Facilitator, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Mwinyi, and of the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, to encourage the parties to abide by the commitments they freely entered into when they concluded the Arusha agreement.

62. The Rwandese people face extensive hardship and a critical economic situation. There is a strong grass-roots desire to see an end to the destruction and suffering brought about by a protracted conflict. Both sides seem determined to achieve a durable peace through disarmament, demobilization and national reconciliation. At the same time, there is serious concern over the possibility that any inordinate delay in establishing the transitional Government may endanger the peace process. These concerns have been expressed to my reconnaissance mission by the leadership of both sides, the resident diplomatic community in Rwanda, NGOs and, especially, the Secretary General of OAU. I therefore consider that the United Nations should respond positively to the appeal of the parties for assistance in the implementation of the peace agreement, especially since the mandate of the OAU NMOG II force will terminate by 31 October 1993.

63. The proposed United Nations Mission in Rwanda should be deployed without delay following Security Council authorization in order to allow for the prompt establishment of the transitional institutions. The immediate deployment of an advance party, including the Force Commander, would underscore the determination of the United Nations for the rapid build-up of the military presence needed in Kigali and of the logistic base for deployment of the force. The subsequent introduction of observers and formed units would enable the force to contribute to the implementation of the disengagement, demobilization and integration phase, while providing an adequate level of security and a credible United Nations presence. Finally, the reduction of the military and civilian police components should ensure that the operation is carried out in a cost-effective manner while contributing, at the same time, to the maintenance of the stability required for the period culminating with the elections.

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the transitional Government. UNHCR has been coordinating refugee activities and has been making advance preparations in the countries of asylum. The return of refugees will be regulated through tripartite agreements among country of origin, country of asylum and UNHCR. The establishment of national committees for repatriation and local integration is also foreseen, as is the establishment of a Commission for Repatriation under the transitional Government.

54. It has been recommended that an information campaign be launched both in the countries of asylum and in Rwanda to promote the provisions of the peace agreement. Information relating to refugees and the options offered to them (repatriation, naturalization or to remain as aliens), should also be part of this information campaign.

55. Mine-clearance has been earmarked as a priority to ease the constant threat to the lives of the displaced persons. It has also been pointed out that, with their removal, a more direct access by humanitarian agencies to areas needing assistance would be possible. This requirement is specifically addressed in article 40 of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons.

56. It has been estimated that a mine-clearance programme would be confined to a small area of the northern part of the country. The most serious mine problem however, would be the location and detection of mines in tea and banana plantations, as well as on open grassland and on tracks. At present, land mines already pose a serious threat to the local population. This threat will continue to increase as displaced persons return to their villages.

57. The reconnaissance mission recommended that the United Nations initiate a mine-clearance programme, including a survey of existing locations, a mine-awareness campaign for displaced persons and refugees and a training programme in mine deactivation for the government and RPF engineer forces. An engineer element should be included within the military component to provide a local mine-clearance capability on routes necessary to the Mission's operations. In addition, should the training programme for both parties be deemed unworkable or unsafe, a professional mine clearance company would be subcontracted as has been the practice in other peace-keeping missions.

58. There will be a need to continue substantial humanitarian assistance activities in the future. The United Nations Resident Coordinator will continue to serve as the coordinator for these activities, working in close cooperation with all relevant organizations of the United Nations system. It is anticipated that a capacity would be established in the Mission for liaison and coordination with the humanitarian assistance programme, in particular with respect to adequate security as may be necessary for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and the process of demobilization and reintegration of armed forces into society.

#### D. Administrative aspects

59. The Mission would require an administrative component based in Kigali, with two regional offices. One regional office would be located in the northern city of Nyumba. The second would be in Kabale, which is the present headquarters of UNOMUR. The administrative component would provide necessary support in areas

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64. The UNOMUR observers currently deployed on the Uganda side of the Uganda-Rwanda border remain a necessary stabilizing factor. It is therefore considered that UNOMUR must continue to monitor that border until the end of the demobilization process. However, UNOMUR's chain of command and future logistics would be integrated into the proposed Mission.

65. I am encouraged by the restraint and desire for a lasting peace and national reconciliation shown by the parties since the signature of the Arusha peace agreement. They have demonstrated their goodwill by holding a number of joint informal working groups and by the support they provided to the reconnaissance mission in all of its fact-finding activities. The two parties also sent a joint delegation to the United Nations, which I met on 15 September. The joint delegation stressed to me the urgency of the establishment of a United Nations force, since the successful implementation of the Arusha agreement was predicated on its deployment. The delegation emphasized that, unless immediate action was taken to deploy the force, the implementation of the peace agreement would be seriously compromised as a result of the vacuum that would be created. I explained to the joint delegation that the decision regarding the establishment of such a force rested with the Security Council and that, even with the approval of the Council, it could take up to three months for such a force to be fully deployed. Under the circumstances, I urged the parties, in the interim, to respect the commitments they had undertaken in Arusha to work together for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country and to strictly adhere to the cease-fire.

66. In the light of the above, I recommend that the Security Council authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR, with the mandate of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government. This operation would be deployed according to the schedule described in section III of the present report.

67. I further recommend that the Security Council urge Member States to support the current United Nations aid effort in Rwanda. UNAMIR and the United Nations Resident Coordinator would closely coordinate their respective activities in this regard.


68. Should the Security Council authorize the establishment of UNAMIR, it would be my intention to appoint a Special Representative who would lead the Mission in the field and exercise authority over all its elements. The military component of the Mission would be headed by a Force Commander. The Mission would operate under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. I would report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of UNAMIR. All matters that might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Mission would be referred to the Security Council for its decision.

69. In accordance with established practice, UNAMIR would need to have freedom of movement, communications and inspection and to enjoy the other rights that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks in Rwanda. UNAMIR and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Should the Security Council decide to establish UNAMIR, it would be my

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intention to initiate consultations with the transitional Government with a view to promptly concluding a status-of-forces agreement along the usual lines.

70. In conclusion, I wish to stress that two essential conditions must be met to enable the United Nations to carry out its recommended role in Rwanda successfully and effectively. First, the parties must cooperate fully with one another and the United Nations in carrying out their commitments under the Arusha agreement. Secondly, the United Nations must be provided in a timely manner with the necessary human and financial resources. At a time of unprecedented financial constraints facing the United Nations, it is imperative that Member States be prepared to assume the obligations resulting from the new mandates they entrust to the Organization.



MAP NO. 3807.1 UNITED NATIONS  
SEPTEMBER 1993

Annex II

Deployment schedule and strengths by month - military component

MONTH	PHASE 1 Preparatory			PHASE 2 Broad-based Transitional Government			PHASE 3 Demobilization/integration										PHASE 4 Electoral										E-B	
	10. 93	11. 93	12. 93	1. 94	2. 94	3. 94	4. 94	5. 94	6. 94	7. 94	8. 94	9. 94	10. 94	11. 94	12. 94	1. 95	2. 95	3. 95	4. 95	5. 95	6. 95	7. 95	8. 95	9. 95	10. 95	11. 95		
	N-DAY			D-DAY																								
FORCE HQ	43	54													40													30
KIGALI SECTOR HQ	15													0														675
KIGALI INF BN		300	800											0														
KIGALI UNBOS	15	78				42								0														
DNZ SECTOR HQ	18					15								0														
DNZ INF BN					500	800								700	300													
DNZ PL	60													0														
DNZ UNBOS	36					18								0														80
UNBOS GROUP HQ	20														80													
UNBOSR SECTOR	77														0													
RPF SECTOR				66		87								51	15	0												
GOVT. SECTOR				51		87								51	15	0												
ENGR COY		100		203							88			0														
LOG COY		100		200										89	0													
MED PL			50													0												
MOV CTL	20															10												5
TOTAL	306 a/	928	1 428	1 748	2 248	2 548						2 433		2 216	1 840	1 240	930										795	

a/ Of total, 191 are already in Rwanda and Uganda with UNBOS II and UNOPUR.

ID:202-647-1726 SEP 28 '93 16:31 No.009 P.20

RUSANDA

September 22, 1993

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

DECL: OADR

TO: NSC - Susan Rice

FROM: AF/C - Arlene Render

SUBJECT: Backgrounder: UN Peacekeeping Operation in Rwanda

**ISSUE:** To what extent should the U.S. support deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda in order to assist implementation of the August 4 peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front.

I. ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

The Peace Accord and the NIF. On August 4, 1993, after over one year of negotiations, the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed a final peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, putting a formal end to nearly three years of war. The agreement provides that a Neutral International Force (NIF) will ensure implementation of the peace accords, and both sides have requested that the UN provide this force. The parties expect the NIF to create the necessary climate of security for creation of a coalition government in Kigali and to oversee disengagement of troops, disarmament, and force integration, and demobilization.

The Humanitarian Costs. The war, which had its roots in ethnic conflict between majority Hutu and minority Tutsi groups, displaced approximately one million people, about one-seventh of the country's population, and produced thousands of military and civilian casualties. Humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone has already reached \$100 million, with the U.S. government having committed to provide over \$34 million. Although the majority of the displaced have begun to return to their homes, approximately 350,000 cannot return until the RPF gives up the territory it holds and enters into encampments as part of the process of force integration.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By VZ NARA, Date 8/4/2023

2010-0639-M-1 (1.14)



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The Transition Government. The peace accord provides for a coalition government which will oversee a 22-month transition period ending in multiparty democratic national elections. The government was supposed to come into being on September 10. However, the deadline could not be met, given the non-deployment of the NIF, which is expected to provide the necessary climate of security to allow the RPF to come to Kigali to join the government.

The Military Picture. The GOR has roughly 30,000 troops and the RPF has approximately 20,000. The two sides remain in defensive positions on either side of a Demilitarized Zone in the northern part of the country, and an effective ceasefire has been in place since March. The ceasefire is monitored by the OAU's 130-man Neutral Military Observers Group ("NMOG"), currently composed of 30 Senegalese, 25 Congolese, 60 Tunisians and representatives from the GOR and RPF. In June, the UN Security Council approved an 81-person observer mission to monitor the Rwanda/Uganda border for cross-border arms shipments. The French have 300 troops deployed in the Kigali area to protect the expatriate community. Under the peace accords, RPF officials can bring a security force of up to 600 lightly armed troops to Kigali, but the officials and their security force will not enter the capital until the NIF has been deployed and the French have withdrawn their troops.

II. THE RWANDAN REQUEST FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Both the GOR and RPF have requested deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to help implement the peace accord. They consider the matter to be of the utmost urgency and recently sent a joint delegation to the UN and Washington seeking support for deployment of a NIF. The delegation emphasized the urgent need to put the broad-based transitional government in place and begin the power-sharing process that is at the core of the political solution to the conflict. The Rwandans consider the current political situation fragile and have warned that delay threatens the peace process because:

- o the parties' mutual goodwill might be undermined if the new government is not put in place quickly.

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- o the 50,000 soldiers dug into their positions could become restless unless there is movement on implementing the accords.
- o the delay could be politically manipulated, possibly imperiling the democratization process.

In addition to the political pressures for deployment of a NIF, the delegation outlined the principal humanitarian justifications for rapid deployment of a nif:

- o The NIF will provide security which will allow hundreds of thousands of displaced to return home.
- o Without the NIF, the displaced will be without shelter during the rainy season, which begins this month. this would increase their misery and could endanger their health.
- o The displaced must return to their farms before the end of the current planting season, or famine may ensue.
- o The repatriation of Rwandan refugees (which number at least 500,000) can only occur after a NIF has been deployed.

### III. THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL

#### 1. The Basic Four-Phase Plan

The UN sent a reconnaissance team to Rwanda in August to evaluate the need for a peacekeeping force in Rwanda. Based on the team's findings, the Secretary General issued a report, dated September 24, recommending phased deployment of a force of (on average) 1600 personnel over 25 months. The proposed operation, to be known as "UNAMIR" (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) would start small, increase to a peak of approximately 2500 for a period of four months, and then decrease in subsequent phases. The UN has not yet released a projected cost for this operation, although it is expected to cost from \$XXX to \$XXX. The operation would include the following four phases:

Phase 1 - Preparatory (first three months): Headquarters advance team and other advance contingents arrive, followed by deployment of one battalion to Kigali to assure security so that the transitional government can form; UN border force and portions of the NMOG placed under UNAMIR command.

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Phase 2 - Transition Government Set Up (next three months): Transitional government begins working; additional battalion deployed to DMZ by end of Phase 2; Spartan assembly points established in DMZ. Border force and NMOG fully integrated into UNAMIR mission.

Phase 3: demobilization/force integration (next seven to nine months): Mission oversees integration of two forces, demobilization. When integration completed, second battalion withdraws from DMZ.

Phase 4: electoral process (10 Months): Termination of border force; DMZ abolished.

## 2. Force Size and Duration of Deployment.

The force will be comprised (at different times) of two light battalions (800 troops), 320 military observers (including the 81 UN border monitors and the 115 non-Rwandan NMOG observers), 60 civilian police monitors, elements for logistics, engineering, medical, and civilian support staff. The peak size will be 2,548 for a period of four months. At the low point, the force size will be 800. The average size, in "man-years", would be about 1,600 per year.

First Battalion for Security in Kigali. The NIF would establish Kigali as a weapons-secure zone. Military units in the zone would be required to store their weapons and ammunition in designated areas. A light infantry battalion of four companies would be deployed to secure a 10-km radius around Kigali for the entry of the RPF. One company will secure the airport, one company will secure the RPF compound, one company will secure government offices such as the ministries, parliament, etc., and one company will be held in reserve, ready to deploy quickly into the DMZ in case of trouble. Although the Arusha accords call for a 22-month transition, the Secretary General's report recommends that the duration of the mission be extended to 25 months, to allow for set-up time.

Second Battalion for Troop Assembly and Demobilization. A second battalion would monitor the DMZ and oversee demobilization and force integration. The UN would establish nine assembly points per side within the DMZ, which would be enlarged. The UN will also establish one cantonment site per side, where heavy weapons will be placed. Once the assembly

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and cantonment sites are set up, and the transitional government is functioning, the UN will establish with the government a date for demobilization. The demobilization date will be a maximum of seven days. On that date, soldiers will move from their current positions directly to the assembly points within the DMZ, where they will spend one month. From there they will either be demobilized, or sent for two months of training in one of four "integrated training centers" where they will be trained to enter the new, 13,000 man, combined army. An integrated police force of 6,000 will also be established, with one assembly point and one cantonment site per side, as well as one integrated training center.

Observers and Support Personnel: Observers would be deployed in five sectors: Kigali, the DMZ, GOR force positions, RPF force positions, and the UN border monitor zone. In essence, the observers would monitor the activities within their sector and verify that the operations in that sector were proceeding as planned and both sides were respecting the process. The mission would also include an engineering company of 200 to perform demining tasks and support the mission's operational needs, a logistics company of 200, 50 medical personnel, and a 40-person helicopter unit. A small civilian police unit of 60 would also be deployed to verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially.

### 3. Mandate

UNAMIR would not have any peace enforcement duties. The force would not fight, but would be strong enough to overwhelm a challenge in a localized situation, such as from armed bandits. UNAMIR would not contain an electoral component, or electoral observers. Any UN assistance to the electoral process will be provided through UNDP technical assistance channels.

### 4. The Rwandan Position

The joint GOR/RPF delegation has endorsed the UN proposal in general terms, although they believe that the deployment timetable should be accelerated so that the transition government can come into being as soon as possible. (The UN report envisions formation of the new government at the end of the year.)

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#### 5. The French Proposal and Draft UN Resolution

Prior to the release of the UN report, the French proposed a force of approximately 1,000 peacekeepers for Rwanda, with 500-600 to be deployed in Kigali and the remainder elsewhere in the country. The French insist on UN troops in Kigali, and they must be deployed all at once. The purpose of the Kigali unit is to allow the French to withdraw and the RPF to come to Kigali so that the broad-based transitional government can get underway. The French see the rapid deployment of a UN contingent to Kigali as the key to the success of the peacekeeping mission. They said they are willing to be flexible on other issues, such as total force size and the use of OAU NMOG forces and phased deployment outside the capital. The estimated cost of this force would be \$50 million over a year, assuming immediate deployment of the full force of 1,000. A phased deployment along the lines of the UN proposal would reduce the cost to some extent.

This earlier proposal is similar to force proposed by the Secretary General, although more modest in size. The French have now proposed a draft UN resolution authorizing a peacekeeping in Rwanda "in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General".

#### IV. THE CASE FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR A UN PKO IN RWANDA

##### 1. Deployment of a UN NIF Would Advance Key U.S. Interests.

The U.S. has both political and humanitarian interests in Rwanda. Politically, the U.S. seeks to promote the fundamental foreign policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization. Deployment of a NIF will create the necessary climate of security and confidence to allow the multiparty coalition government to form and thus begin the transition to multiparty democratic elections. Without a NIF, the GOR will not ask the French to withdraw their troops, the RPF will not join the government, and the transition to democracy cannot begin.

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The U.S. also has a strong interest in ending the humanitarian crisis that the conflict engendered. Several hundred thousand Rwandans remain displaced and cannot return to their homes until the RPF vacates its stronghold in the North and enters encampments as part of the demobilization process. However, the RPF will not move to assembly points and begin demobilization until a NIF has been deployed. Thus, until peacekeepers arrive, the displaced will remain in their camps and will require continued massive humanitarian assistance, with the U.S. the principal humanitarian aid donor.

Without a NIF, the parties face a political and military stalemate that cannot last indefinitely. The current interim government, which does not include the RPF, is merely a caretaker, without the power or the mandate to pursue the transition to full democracy or to address the country's post-war problems of reconstruction, demobilization, and return of refugees. Although the two military forces have respected the ceasefire for six months, they cannot remain in defensive positions indefinitely, no matter how strong their political will to make peace. Unless peacekeepers are deployed to enable the transition to begin, the peace process may ultimately unravel, leading to renewed fighting and continued massive humanitarian aid.

## 2. The U.S. Has Already Invested a Great Deal in Rwanda.

The U.S. was instrumental in persuading the two sides to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict. We initiated the dialogue between the GOR and the RPF, and our government sent active observers to the year-long peace talks in Arusha, and we provided \$1 million to the OAU to assist it in fielding the NMOG ceasefire monitors. We have pushed publicly for democratization throughout the region. The two sides have taken up the challenge, and after long and arduous negotiations, have reached a peace agreement that includes a detailed blueprint for transition to multiparty democracy through free elections. They have asked the international community to make this transition possible by deploying troops to keep the peace during the transition and force integration process. If the U.S. decides now to oppose deployment of UN peacekeepers, we could be seen as blocking the peace process and preventing the transition to democracy. This could affect our credibility throughout the region.

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3. A Rwandan Peacekeeping Operation Is a Potential Winner.

Despite longstanding ethnic resentments, the Rwandan Government and the RPF showed real willingness to compromise during their year-long negotiations. The two sides, and the Rwandan people, are war-weary and want peace. A political settlement has already been negotiated. The two sides have been meeting regularly at all levels since the signing of the peace accord and, as a sign of their commitment to the peace process, they sent a joint delegation to the UN and Security Council member capitals to push for rapid deployment of a NIF so that the transitional government can get underway. President Habyarimana held a conciliatory meeting in the DMZ with RPF Chariman Kanyarengwe on September 13 and plans to visit the U.S. in early October to press for support for a UN peacekeeping mission. All the two sides need now is deployment of international peacekeepers to provide a confidence building measure to proceed with implementation of the peace accords. These circumstances significantly increase the likelihood of success of a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda.

Unlike in other recent operations, the peacekeeping force in Rwanda is not likely to face serious danger or resistance. Both sides, as well as the general population, want the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force so that the peace process can proceed. As a cultural matter, Rwandans have a great deal of respect for Westerners and are unlikely to support hostile actions against a UN force. The experience of the OAU's NMOG is also instructive. In the twelve months that the OAU troops have been deployed in Rwanda, they have never come under attack or suffered a casualty.

4. Deployment of an NIF Is Cost Effective In the Long Run.

The international community has already provided \$100 million in humanitarian aid to the displaced this year alone, with the U.S. having already pledged or committed to provide \$35 million. These displaced cannot return until the RPF evacuates the area it holds and relative security is restored to the Northern portions of the country. Deployment of a NIF would allow the RPF to move into assembly points and would bring the necessary security required for return of the displaced. This would mitigate the need for humanitarian assistance. Once the displaced have all returned, humanitarian aid would no longer be necessary, saving tens of millions of dollars in assistance and essentially offsetting the peacekeeping costs incurred by the U.S. and the international community.

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5. Support for a NIF in Rwanda Could Bolster French Support for U.S. Foreign Policy Goals Elsewhere in Africa

The French strongly support a NIF in Rwanda and they are pushing the U.S. and the UN to support rapid deployment. They have a strong interest in seeing a NIF deployed because it will allow their 300 troops to pull out without endangering the French or expatriate community or threatening the stability of Rwanda. If the U.S. blocks a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, it could damage prospects for cooperation with Paris on a whole range of key African issues.

6. The Proposed NIF Meets Most of the Criteria of PRD-13

As demonstrated in the attached Joint State-OSD Memorandum, dated July 26, 1993, the proposed NIF meets most of the criteria of PRD-13, which sets forth the conditions under which the U.S. will support a peacekeeping operation.

- o The presence of several hundred thousand war-displaced presents a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action.
- o Renewed fighting would exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and could destabilize the region, which is rife with ethnic rivalries.
- o The international community has addressed the Rwandan problem on a multilateral basis, through wide participation in the peace talks and deployment of an OAU ceasefire monitoring force and UN Rwanda/Uganda border force.
- o The NIF is a classic peacekeeping operation: both sides have requested the force, a ceasefire has held for 6 months, and the NIF is merely needed to provide confidence and keep the parties apart during the transition.
- o The objectives of the mission are clear: help assure security to allow the formation of the broad-based transitional government, oversee force integration and demobilization, and monitor security through the end of the 22-month transition period.

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- o The Secretary Generals' proposal contains a detailed timetable with well-defined phases and a clear termination point for the mission: then end of the transition period, which culminates in multiparty democratic national elections.

The last criterion, available resources and forces, has not yet been established (see below). However, in proposing a phased deployment, the Secretary General has shown his sensitivity to cost concerns. His Report attempts to identify the minimum credible peacekeeping force, without jeopardizing the success of the operation. If the operation is paid for by increasing our UN arrears, savings in humanitarian aid could be viewed as an offset.

#### V. THE CONCERNS ABOUT A PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA

##### 1. The U.S. and UN Lack the Necessary Funding Resources

Both the U.S. and UN peacekeeping budgets are running large deficits, and the U.S. has been unable to identify sufficient resources to pay its share of a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, which could cost from \$50 million per year (for the French option) to \$XXX (for the UN proposal). Assuming an assessed UN operation, the U.S. would be responsible for funding 30 percent of the operation's cost, or roughly \$15 million for the French option and as much as \$XXX for the UN option. Our only option would be to add these costs to our arrears.

We might try to fund the operation in whole or in part through voluntary contributions. However, the French have stated that they do not favor voluntary contributions. As a matter of principle, the French contend that peacekeeping is a responsibility of the entire international community and, as such, should be financed through the normal UN assessment process. As a practical matter, the French have indicated that certain internal budgetary rules make voluntary contributions difficult. The Belgians, who have a special interest in Rwanda as the former colonial rulers, have indicated a willingness to assist financially and might contribute to a voluntary fund, but it is unlikely that they or any other country would step forward and contribute enough to finance the operation entirely

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through voluntary contributions. If a voluntary fund were established, State AF has identified \$1.8 million in reprogrammed ESF that could be used as a contribution, but this money is vulnerable to the current Congressionally-mandated rescission and, in any event, it would only cover a fraction of the operation's total cost.

The only apparent feasible way to finance the operation would be through an assessed operation, with the U.S. assessment added to our arrears. A voluntary fund could also be established, which would allow the UN to accept supplemental contributions from those countries with a special interest in Rwanda (e.g., Belgium, and possibly the French, if they can be persuaded to accept the principle of at least partial voluntary funding). Voluntary contributions would lower the overall cost of the assessed operation, thereby reducing the overall increase in U.S. arrears.

2. Adequate Troop Commitments May Be Difficult to Assemble.

With the number of peacekeeping missions on the rise, the UN and the international community are stretched very thin and it is becoming more and more difficult to identify countries willing to contribute troops to new peacekeeping operations. Although UN officials have informally contacted various countries to determine whether they would be inclined to participate in a mission in Rwanda (e.g., Canada, Belgium, Senegal, Morocco, Togo), there is still work to be done before all the necessary troops are identified.

That said, it should be noted that the Belgians have recently indicated that they may contribute 300 troops, and they also plan to assist in training the integrated Rwandan police force. The Egyptians have said they could supply a battalion (provided it was under UN command), and the 200 or so NMOG and UN border monitors can be fairly easily incorporated into the proposed UN NIF. Although the Canadians are stretched thin in this area, they have expressed a willingness to contribute troops to a Rwandan peacekeeping mission and other countries could be expected to come forward once a Security Council resolution authorizing a NIF has been adopted. There is no plan to offer U.S. troops to a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, and we have informally indicated as much to the Rwandans on several occasions.

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3. The Mission of the NIF May Be Too Broad  
and May Spill Over Into Peace Enforcement

There is some concern that the UN force will be required to act as a police force and provide security in Kigali and throughout Rwanda. Indeed, one of the principal mission's of the NIF will be to create a climate of security in Kigali so that the RPF will willingly come to the capital and the broad-based transitional government can be established. This may go beyond the mandate of traditional peacekeeping and could put the UN in the difficult position of enforcing the peace.

If the situation deteriorated and peace enforcement became necessary, it is not clear that the UN would have the will or resources to respond adequately. However, unlike in other conflicts where peacekeepers have been requested, the Rwandans have negotiated and agreed on a very detailed, specific, and comprehensive peace agreement. Because the parties have already considered the key areas of possible dispute and addressed them in the accords after lengthy negotiations, they are more likely to respect the terms of the peace agreement.

In addition, the UN report tries to make clear that the NIF would not enforce security; rather, it would "assist in ensuring security" through overseeing the movement of troops and weapons and monitoring the local enforcement of the law. If fighting were to break out, the Rwandans themselves have said that the UN force would not be expected to intervene, but instead could withdraw.

4. The OAU or Other Regional Bodies Should Have a Larger Role.

With the UN and U.S. stretched to the limit on peacekeeping, it might be preferable to shift all or part of the peacekeeping job in Rwanda to the OAU or some other regional organization. This would relieve the UN (and derivatively, the U.S.) of the substantial financial burden and would have the added benefit of developing the peacekeeping capabilities of regional organizations, a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy.

Unfortunately, there is little likelihood that the OAU or some group other than the UN could mount a credible peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. The Secretary General of the

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OAU has already indicated that the OAU lacks the resources to expand the NMOG or to mount a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, and the OAU has made it clear that it wishes to turn the job over to the UN as soon as possible. In addition, the GOR has been unimpressed with the performance of the NMOG and considers the NMOG to be pro-RPF. As a result, the Rwandan Government insists on a UN force and will not ask the French forces to leave if only OAU troops are on the ground. As long as the French forces stay, the RPF will not come to Kigali, the transitional government cannot form, and the peace implementation process would probably never get off the ground.

5. Accommodating the French May Not Be Appropriate or Effective

It may not be good policy to support a NIF in Rwanda just to accommodate the French. The proposed peacekeeping operation in Rwanda should be examined on its own merits, without regard to the desires or interests of the French or any other countries. Given budgetary constraints, we should try to ensure that the French show some flexibility in their position, for instance by agreeing to make voluntary contributions to any peacekeeping mission, above and beyond their modest UN peacekeeping assessment. Finally, even if we support a NIF in Rwanda, there is no guarantee that the French will be cooperative in other areas where they would not otherwise have been supportive of the U.S. position.

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SECC 3070, 09/27/93, X73139

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	Susan Rice & Nick Rasmussen to Samuel Berger; re: Deputies Committee Meeting on African Peacekeeping Issues [partial] (1 page)	09/20/1993	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, 1993 [1]

2006-0218-F  
jp865

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON DC 20506

**CHRON FILE**

September 20, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD

FROM: SUSAN RICE/NICK BRASMUSSEN

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on African Peacekeeping Issues

The Peacekeeping Core Group met September 9 to discuss proposed operations in Rwanda and Liberia. It was clear from that meeting that there are issues that warrant Deputies' attention. As a next step, we suggest that you convene a DC meeting possibly as soon as this week, to consider the proposed Rwanda operation. We would also use the meeting to tie up a few loose ends relating to Liberia. Global Affairs will draft a paper for the DC on the Rwanda operation.

Rwanda

A UN resolution is likely to be voted on within the next couple of weeks. The USG has never addressed at a senior level the question of whether or not we should support a Rwanda operation or whether such an operation is consistent with the guidelines set out in PRD-13. This issue may fuel concern on the Hill that we can't say no. It's yet another operation that we cannot pay for. On the other hand, we must consider the implications of failing to support the Rwanda peace plan, which the U.S. helped broker.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Liberia

Though the Deputies agreed some weeks ago to support in principle a UN observer mission in Liberia, they left a key issue unresolved: the question of participation by U.S. military observers. Since the last DC, the UN has informally requested 15-20 U.S. military observers. Deputies should decide how to answer that request. In addition, there is the question of placing U.S. logisticians on the ground. One of the key prerequisites for the participation of the potential new ECOMOG contributors is that the U.S. provide sustaining logistical support in Liberia for the duration of the operation. This would

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require U.S. military personnel to facilitate operations in Monrovia, at Roberts Field, and at two major ports.

You should also be aware that Jennifer Ward, with support from Global Affairs is working closely with State and Defense to resolve a number of related Liberia issues before a UNSC vote. A EUCOM assessment team has just returned from Liberia. Their report, plus a State-drafted Progress Report, will address all of these issues, including:

- Level of Support for ECOMOG Forces: Although we have expressed a willingness in principle to help ECOMOG stand up and sustain 4 additional battalions, there are unanswered questions about specific requirements. Lift, equipment, personnel costs, ongoing logistical support.
- Costs: We need a better handle on what the entire spectrum of our involvement could cost. At present, we have no sense of total cost. Presumably, there will be a need also to fund demobilization and resettlement of the combatants, as well as an election process and humanitarian support.
- Timeframe: Is the 7 month period for elections overly ambitious? Should we push for an extension of the UN mandate?
- Humanitarian Requirements: We need to get OFDA's view of the humanitarian assistance requirements needed to make a peacekeeping operation viable, as well as post-PKO requirements.
- ECOMOG Viability: There are concerns about the availability of sufficient African troops to augment ECOMOG. The OAU has not taken steps to accelerate recruitment. There are no countries committed to participate at this stage and deployment could take several months. There is also some concern that Nigeria may reduce its participation in peacekeeping, including in Liberia.
- The French Problem: We need to manage effectively the French attempt to link Liberia and Rwanda.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to convene a meeting of the Deputies in the near future as soon as papers have been prepared to discuss Rwanda and tie up loose ends related to Liberia.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Free Rwanda

' 'MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, CHER BILL,

VOUS SAVEZ TOUTE L'IMPORTANCE QUE LA FRANCE ATTACHE AU  
REGLEMENT DE LA CRISE RWANDAISE.

LA CONCLUSION, LE 4 AOUT A ARUSHA, DES ACCORDS DE PAIX A  
MARQUE L'ABOUTISSEMENT DES LONGUES NEGOCIATIONS QUE LES ETATS.  
UNIS COMME LA FRANCE, ONT ACTIVEMENT ENCOURAGEES. CEPENDANT LA  
MISE EN OEUVRE DE CES ACCORDS REPOSE INTEGRALEMENT SUR LE  
DEPLOIEMENT D'UNE FORCE DES NATIONS UNIES AU RWANDA.

UN PROJET DE RESOLUTION PORTANT CREATION DE CETTE FORCE EST  
ACTUELLEMENT DISCUTE AU CONSEIL DE SECURITE. IL ME PARAIT  
ESSENTIEL QU'IL SOIT ADOPTE RAPIDEMENT.

EN EFFET, LA SITUATION AU RWANDA SE DETERIORE EN RAISON DE  
LA DESAGREGATION DES FORCES POLITIQUES, DE LA DECOMPOSITION DE  
L'ECONOMIE ET DES TENSIONS MILITAIRES QUI RESTENT VIVES. SI LA  
COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE NE REAGIT PAS RAPIDEMENT, LES EFFORTS  
DE PAIX QUE LES ETATS UNIS ET LA FRANCE ONT, AVEC LES PAYS DE LA  
REGION, FERMEMENT APPUYES, RISQUENT D'ETRE COMPROMIS.

JE SOUHAITE DONC, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, QU'A LA LUMIERE DE  
CES CONSIDERATIONS, ET DANS LA LOGIQUE DE LA POSITION QU'ILS ONT  
ADOPTEE A L'EGARD DU CONFLIT, LES ETATS-UNIS PUISSENT APPORTER  
LEUR SOUTIEN ACTIF A UNE PROMPTE DECISION DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE  
EN FAVEUR DE L'ENVOI D'UNE FORCE DES NATIONS UNIES.

JE VOUS PRIE DE RECEVOIR, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,  
L'EXPRESSION DE MA HAUTE CONSIDERATION ET DE MON BIEN CORDIAL  
SOUVENIR.

SIGNE : FRANCOIS MITTERRAND''