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Somalia, June-December 1993 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

African Affairs-Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et.al.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Next Steps in Somalia (14 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Jennifer Ward to Anthony Lake, re: [ANC] (1 page)	08/18/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	William Itoh to Marc Grossman, re: [ANC] (1 page)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. memo	Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake, re: [ANC] (1 page)	08/16/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Authority to Assistance to Peace Accord (2 pages)	08/13/1993	P1/b(1)
004. memo	[Draft of 005] (4 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)
005. memo	To the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (5 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	08/04/1993	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: Isolating Aideed (5 pages)	08/05/1993	P1/b(1)
008a. memo	To Mr. Wisner, re: Somalia - Forecast for UNOSOM (1 page)	07/21/1993	P1/b(1)
008b. report	Re: [UNOSOM] (6 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
009a. memo	Rand Beers to Samuel Berger, re: Somalia - Deputies Committee (3 pages)	08/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F

kc4096

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. memo	George Moose to Mr. Tarnoff, re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (3 pages)	07/13/1993	P1/b(1)
009c. paper	Recommendations for Consideration by Deputies Committee2 (2 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)
009d. paper	Issues to be Raised with the UN in New York (3 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)
009e. cable	President Meles on Where We Go From Here in Somalia (4 pages)	07/30/1993	P1/b(1)

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STATE	DAVID SHANN	AF/E		617-9742

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Barry McConnell

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② Unclass
file

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Box 432
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, PA 17013
4 August 1993

Jennifer
Dear Madame Ambassador:

It was suggested to me that you might be interested in seeing a recent report I wrote for the Commandant here at the U.S. Army War College. As you may be aware, I recently returned from spending four exciting, if not particularly comfortable, months in Mogadishu. I enclose a copy of a letter to George Moose in which I communicate my report to the Department.

As I explain to George, the commentary is more or less in the form of a trip report. The War College likes to know what its faculty is up to when traveling, and I use the trip report as a vehicle to lay out some of my concerns about the Somali operations of USLO, UNITAF and UNOSOM. It is not written to be a public document, and the views in the paper are not necessarily those of Bob Gosende (although I think he essentially agrees).

I hate to think that Mohammed Farah Hassan "Aideed" might win in Mogadishu. It would be an ignominious happening and not a very glorious signal of the role the U.S. is ready to play in the New World Order. But the record of UNOSOM in defending the interests of the sane world is singularly inept. This is not necessarily meant to be a specific criticism of Admiral Howe, although he shows very little interest in politics, but is more founded in despair at seeing the missed opportunities and realization that our U.N. friends *fear* to take the initiative in Somalia. As you see in my letter to George, I have a number of projects relating to Somalia; the Army is deeply interested because there are a number of lessons learned that can directly affect its mission and force structure. If there is anything I can do for you, I will be here for the coming school year.

Sincerely,

Walter Clarke

The Honorable
Ambassador Jennifer Ward
National Security Council Advisor on African Affairs
White House
Washington, DC 20506



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Box 432
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, PA 17013
4 August 1993

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Needless to say, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, is a far nicer place to work than Mogadishu, Somalia, but it is difficult to put down the concerns and anxieties from a four-month experience of working in USLO. I worry about Bob Gosende and his valiant team; if anything, life has gotten even more dangerous than when I left at the end of June. In Carlisle, I have been working on several matters related to my stay in Somalia.

I enclose a report on some of the political issues affecting the U.S. diplomatic role in Somalia, looking particularly at some of the more important discrepancies in the political roles of UNITAF and UNOSOM. The document began as a Trip Report for the Commandant, an old tradition here for faculty members on TDY, and I blend the narrative of some of the more interesting personal experiences with an analysis of policies and events. Although unclassified, it is not a public document; obviously, I have no control over what the Commandant may decide to do with it. I suspect that he will send copies to the Army Staff. It is prudent to warn you that my views would not be universally welcomed throughout the Pentagon.

While I was in Mogadishu, I collected a lot of background material on the tactics of Mohamed Farah Hassan "Aideed." I am now using it for an academic study of the responses of the Somali "warlords" to Operation Restore Hope. The paper provides an opportunity to analyze in detail the kinds of tactics that may be used by local potentates against other U.N. peacemaking operations. This focus fits in with current War College examinations of "U.S. military operations less than war" and issues pertaining to U.N. peacekeeping operations in general. The Somali case shows tactical errors on all sides. I want the study to show the importance of our being in Somalia. In the post Cold War world, more than ever the United States must believe in something. When ready, I will send a copy to the Department for pre-publication clearance.

The Honorable
George Moose
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520-3430

It is not easy to keep up with events on the ground in Somalia from this distance. We receive a daily summary of activities derived from the joint U.S. military intelligence group operating in Mogadishu, which is helpful. I deduce from this and the media that UNOSOM still has no game plan to regain the political initiative from Aideed and his allies. As you can see from my "trip report," I fault UNOSOM very strongly for its inability to articulate any kind of tactical plan, so that the suffering Somalis could have some notion why they should support the United Nations.

In my view, Admiral Howe should renew U.N. efforts to organize local political institutions (already begun in the Northeast) and focus on a quick national conference, with representatives invited from all over the former Somalia. I would exclude anyone who has not turned in *all* weapons in his or her possession. I would arbitrarily exclude anyone generally viewed as a warlord or war criminal. Handled carefully, this could be a self-regulating process, with delegates being permitted to challenge the veracity of disarmament claims by other delegates. The United Nations should act like it is in charge for a change and be prepared to lead the national conference, turning it over to representatives selected by the delegates to the national conference when the right moment arrives.

I have studied a number of national conferences held in West and Central Africa. The largely free form conference held in Niger appears to me to be the most applicable model for Somalia at this point in its history. In Niger, there were minimal qualifications required for becoming a delegate to the National Conference (I recall that it was 500 signatures with a certain amount of geographical dispersion). Delegates, in effect, nominated themselves. The agenda for the Niger conference was determined before the conference by a multi-ethnic committee of men and women from a list of communal and other complaints received from anyone. Reports were made on each complaint, and every complaint was discussed during the National Conference. The conference probably could not be held in southern Mogadishu. If held in north Mogadishu, there would be many security issues, but it would provide an opportunity for many Habr Gedir to make their break with Aideed. Such a conference would be expensive, but it would be far cheaper than the military actions now taking place in Aideed country. With best wishes to you and the AF team,

Sincerely,

Walter Clarke

**U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania**

4 August 1993

TO: Major General Stofft
Commandant, U.S. Army War College

THROUGH: DNSS - Dr. Gary Guertner
DCIA - Ambassador Daniel Simpson

FROM: DNSS - Walter Clarke

SUBJECT: **Trip Report - Mogadishu, Somalia - 4 March - 26 June, 1993**

Introduction

During the four-month period noted above, I was detailed by the State Department to Mogadishu, Somalia, serving as Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO).¹ In this position I worked very closely with the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF), and with both the civilian and military components of the reconstituted United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which took over from UNITAF on 4 May. For over five weeks of my detail, I was in direct charge of the U.S. diplomatic mission to Somalia. While serving as Chargé d'Affaires of USLO, I was obliged to negotiate the move of our diplomatic establishment in a very unfriendly security environment in early June. The resulting change in location threw us into very close proximity to the UNOSOM civilian operation, which also took refuge on the former American School property on the edge of the former U.S. Embassy compound, now U.N. force command headquarters. These moves took place after the militia forces of Warlord Mohamed Farah "Aideed" attacked Pakistani units of UNOSOM on 5 June. Working with a 42-man U.S. Marine Fleet Anti-terrorist Support Team (FAST), assigned in May to USLO for its protection, we set up a temporary diplomatic mission with its own sniper posts, cleared fields of fire, and secured perimeter. This was a very unusual diplomatic assignment, but perhaps it provided a view of the future.

The United Nations similarly has never embarked on such an operation as that in Somalia; indeed, it is the first United Nations deployment authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The significance of a Chapter VII exercise is that the deployed force is given the mandate to use force, if necessary, in the interest of

¹ In principle, the State Department places a "Liaison Office" in a country with which we have no diplomatic relations (i.e., Angola, before recent recognition, or Cuba) or, in the case of Somalia, where there is no central government to which an Embassy can be accredited.

"defending global peace," i.e., to fulfill the goals of the United Nations as defined by the Security Council. As you are aware, a considerable amount of force has now been employed in the process of Restore Hope. I am not prepared to comment on the military tactics of either UNITAF or UNOSOM; there are other people far better equipped than I to make those kinds of judgments. In this trip report, however, I will comment extensively on deficiencies in the political tactics of both UNITAF and UNOSOM. One of the great tragedies of the Somali Restore Hope humanitarian operation is that neither UNITAF nor UNOSOM ever articulated publicly their political objectives in Somalia, and that, even now, force is being employed by UNOSOM in a virtual political vacuum. UNITAF professed to have no political objectives and was certainly inhibited by its narrow mandate from becoming involved in Somali politics. UNOSOM II has no such inhibitions but appears rudderless. Although the Somali political/military situation remains unstable, and success appears almost beyond reach, it is possible to make some preliminary judgments about the political/military lessons learned in Somalia. My experiences in Somalia may provide useful insights into problems associated with both present and future U.S. participation in U.N. peacemaking operations, and I conclude the paper with lessons learned and the recommendation that the U.S. Army develop a special force better equipped for deployment in international peacemaking operations.

Narrow UNITAF Objectives Complicate Current U.N. Efforts

Somalia presented a very special range of challenges to both the U.S. military and diplomatic establishments. At the end of 1992, Somalia had no central government, and virtually all forms of local civil government had been destroyed. U.S. plans to intervene in Somalia followed a two-year civil war in which hundreds of thousands of Somalis died of starvation and hostile actions, and many more thousands appeared at risk. The only authorities were war chiefs (or warlords), who reigned over clan or subclan groups by fear and the gun, maintaining the loyalty of their irregular force units by encouraging rape and pillage. After months of relentless publicity highlighting the starving and suffering of Somalia in the international media, a decision was made to send U.S. forces to Somalia, and the first elements arrived in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. Under UNITAF, the U.S. committed itself to a very narrow list of humanitarian goals: assuring the safe storage and delivery of relief goods. The original U.S. intervention was designed to be temporary, to await the installation of a U.N. force. The Somali deployment was a matter of great debate during the last year of the Bush Administration.² The shape of the proposed

² Former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs "Hank" Cohen told an interviewer that he is "particularly proud of the leadership role," he played, "in persuading the national security system to accept the concept of a strong military intervention in Somalia. Between January

force changed several times. From participants in the DOD force planning process, I learned that at one point UNITAF included a significant civil affairs component. This critical tool was evidently eliminated sometime between Thanksgiving and President Bush's address to the American people on Restore Hope on 4 December 1992. We understand that UNITAF landed with more than one MP company; but they were returned to the U.S. in January. The lack of civil affairs and military police units were immediately apparent to us in early March, when General Aideed turned his thugs against international relief organizations operating in Mogadishu. UNITAF was deeply concerned about "mission creep" and was anxious to maintain a lead shape to the force to ensure that there was no temptation to broaden its mandate.

Because of lengthy Security Council debate over the Chapter VII terms for UNOSOM II, the U.S. Marine force under General Johnston spent nearly five months on the ground, a period well beyond that originally planned. On the positive side, during the UNITAF period, relative calm prevailed throughout its AOR (with the exception of Kismayu, which remains a cockpit of inter-clan rivalry); in Mogadishu, there was a substantial increase in trade and other community activity. No warlord was prepared to counter openly the U.S. Marines. Interpreting its mandate to protect storage and delivery of relief supplies very strictly, UNITAF abstained from otherwise imposing its will on the communities where it maintained troops. On the negative side, under UNITAF, intrinsic Somali political problems were left untouched. The rule of civil engagement under UNITAF was to ignore anything which could be interpreted as "Somali-on-Somali" violence or confrontation. This policy provided nearly total tolerance to criminal activity which did not directly affect UNITAF. We were informed that during the course of its mandate, UNITAF only arrested 20 people, most of these for multiple murders and assassinations. None of these criminals was still being held when UNITAF left town on 4 May.

The bottom-line instructions received by USLO from the State Department were to do everything in its power to ensure the success of the U.N. operation in Somalia. This was not an easy task. When, in our judgment, UNITAF or UNOSOM appeared to be moving in directions which were contrary to a successful outcome, we let them know what we thought; it was pretty clear that both felt that USLO should mind its own business. The ultimate technique we used to communicate with either UNITAF or UNOSOM was first to discuss, then to show them a draft cable to the Department, and (if nothing worked), then communicate our concerns to the Department and through it, to the Washington community. It seemed peculiar to us at the time, but

and August 1992, my colleagues who cover East Africa and I were lonely voices calling for an activist policy..." See "An Exit Interview with 'Hank' Cohen," **CSIS Africa Notes** no 147 (April 1993), p 2.

one of USLO's most enduring challenges was to get the outgoing UNITAF leadership together with the incoming UNOSOM command. We succeeded in getting General Johnston and Admiral Howe to have regular weekly meetings, but USLO remained a necessary intermediary between the two commands right up to handover. We found then that the overall goal of fostering a U.N. success proved to be a very difficult task, complicated by the U.N.'s endemic bureaucratic torpor and considerable ambiguity on the policy side.

Uncertain Policy Direction Within UNOSOM

When UNITAF handed over to UNOSOM on 4 May, USLO had great expectations for improvement in the administration of law and order in central-south Somalia. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) number 814, passed after weeks of agonizing debate, on 26 March 1993, gave teeth to the U.N. mandate in Somalia and removed some of the ambiguities that persisted during throughout the UNITAF deployment. Largely through the efforts of USLO, which provided the newly-appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Admiral Howe, with a study³ outlining steps for re-introduction of the pre-Siad Barre legal system, the 1962/3 Somali Penal Code was declared the law of the land when Howe took charge. Bringing law and order to Somalia was fully consonant with the overall peacemaking role assigned to UNOSOM II and with the original intent of the United Nations Charter writers in San Francisco in 1945. UNITAF had begun the critical job of standing up Somalia's well-respected former National Police Force (on a regional basis), and we believed that UNOSOM would quickly move to introduce the needed retraining to bring this force into a more credible instrument. Overall, the U.N. had what appeared to be a fairly straightforward task of bringing peace to a country in anarchy and to bring some calm to the unsettled Horn of Africa.

The first week of the new U.N. mandate saw a series of decisive actions by the UNOSOM military side to demonstrate that it had the situation under control. Show of force operations were initiated on 5 May in all areas of operations. On the following day, a number of warning letters were delivered to various troublesome factional leaders, including General Mohamed Hersi "Morgan," the infamous son-in-law of former dictator Siad Barre, three of his confederates causing troubles in Kismayu, and, for balance, to Osman "Atto," General Aideed's principal financier,

³ This April 1993 study, financed by USAID, was written by Martin Ganzglas, a Washington attorney, who served as advisor to the Somali Police while a Peace Corps Volunteer in the 1960's. He is the author of the only English-language study of the Somali Penal Code, **The Penal Code of the Somali Democratic Republic, With Cases, Commentary and Examples** (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971).

armorers and deputies. The warlord most interested in challenging the new U.N. mandate was General Aideed, whose forces were most affected by the original UNITAF deployment. Favored themes for Aideed and his senior lieutenants were their unhappiness that despite their "invitation" to UNITAF to come to Somalia, a patently false proposition⁴ and that UNITAF's AOR inhibited their lines of communications and not those of their enemies. Each time this was raised, we would carefully explain that the reason why the world sent troops to Somalia was the horror at the starvation and mis-administration taking place in areas principally under the control of Aideed or his allies.

Background to the Split with Aideed

When UNITAF first deployed, it was natural to ensure that the beachhead would be secured without bloodshed. It was necessary and prudent to deal with General Aideed and his militia to be certain that there were no unnecessary confrontations. Nonetheless, it was not a secret that, among a very unsavory lot, Aideed was the warlord whose hands would have to be removed from the throats of his fellow countrymen if there was any chance to bring peace and political development to Somalia. Human Rights organizations had long condemned his various sordid roles as local dictator, who permitted hundreds of thousands of Somalis to die of starvation, as a military leader without conscience, whose indiscriminate cannon fire killed thousands of innocent people during the fight for Mogadishu, and as bandit chief, whose ruthless bands of extortioners and killers terrorized the international humanitarian relief community prior to Restore Hope.⁵ What the media never seems to capture is the sense of desperation among the majority, decent Somalis who, unless the world helps them get rid of the warlords, are condemned to more years of being terrorized by them.

The turning point in the political situation that eventually led to open conflict between Aideed and U.N. forces began innocently enough. On 13 May, only nine days after UNOSOM took over military responsibilities, Aideed sent a letter to UNOSOM headquarters requesting U.N. support for a conference to disengage forces in the central region, immediately north of the UNITAF-established theater of control. The conference would, ostensibly, settle the political issues opposing the Aideed's Habr

⁴ General Aideed was the most vigorous opponent of U.N. intervention. His decision "to welcome" UNITAF came immediately after President Bush's announcement on 4 December that we were on the way.

⁵ See especially Ben Penglas and Juan E. Méndez, "Somalia: Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses," **Africa Watch** vol V, no 2 (7 March 1993), 28 pages, for a comprehensive account of Aideed's outrages against his people.

Gedir clan, predominant in the south central zones of Somalia and the Mijertain clan, who control the northeast. This was an attractive initiative. The militia forces ranged around the town of Galcayo in the central region controlled the largest collection of heavy weapons remaining outside U.N. cantonment sites. Disarmament of Galcayo would permit UNOSOM to extend its AOR from the Kenya frontier through the central region to Bosaso, the capital of the northeast, nearly doubling the size of the AOR. Because it still pursued the policy of accommodation to the warlords developed under UNITAF, UNOSOM hastened to reply affirmatively to Aideed's offer. Within a week, UNOSOM and Aideed were quarreling openly about the rules for the conference. UNOSOM had assumed that it would lead what became known as the "Galcayo Conference." Aideed insisted that because it was his idea, he should be in charge. At first, he did not agree even to a U.N. presence. His propaganda organs augmented their usually vituperative condemnations of Howe and UNOSOM. The United Nations belatedly realized that it had been duped; in fact, the organization had agreed to sponsor a conference designed to raise the political silhouette of its primary antagonist, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, and to degrade its own authority. In the end, there were two conferences on Galcayo; Aideed's rump conference moved around town, from site to site, hoping to evade any hint of U.N. supervision. The United Nations' Conference on Galcayo literally never got off the ground; at one point, Aideed's supporters stole the tables and chairs from the U.N. site and frightened most UNOSOM supporters among the Somalis away. The Aideed-sponsored conference concluded on 4 June, the day before the attack on the Pakistanis that killed 24 peacekeepers and severely wounded another 50.⁶ Some observers theorize that the whole Galcayo conference exercise represented an effort by Aideed to mobilize allies for a military confrontation with the United Nations.

Ambiguity in Handling Aideed Left Unresolved

It remains unclear whether the series of uncertain tactics and awkward missteps by UNOSOM after it took over on 4 May were caused by micro-management from the New York U.N. Headquarters or were simply miscalculations based on faulty reading of Somali politics on the ground in Mogadishu; what is now apparent is that the U.N. had no game plan for handling the warlords. Aideed astutely held on to the political initiative and continually threw UNOSOM off balance. Even after the public disagreement between Aideed's people and the United Nations had reached a fever pitch, Admiral Howe paid a well-publicized call on Aideed at his headquarters on 22

⁶ "U.N. Mission in Somalia is Also Military," Letter to the Editor, **New York Times** (26 July 1993), signed by Kofi Annan, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, dated 14 July 1993.

May. He hoped to reach a last minute accommodation with Aideed. For those Somalis hoping that the U.N. would finally stand up to Aideed, the SRSG call on Aideed was the low point of U.N. diplomacy. Obviously, Aideed believed that he had no particular reason to cooperate with the United Nations. He saw U.N. efforts to accommodate him as weakness; he hoped to strengthen waning support in his own faction and to draw followers from other clan groups by making his anti-UNOSOM campaign into an xenophobic, "anti-colonial" and "anti-Islamic" crusade. These remain his primary themes as he evades the UNOSOM effort to arrest him.

As for the National Police, the U.N. has not employed them in the search for Aideed. In fact, the police complain that they have not been paid since May; the U.N. appears to believe them wholly untrustworthy. This flies in the face of expert investigation of the police and may fall into the category of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Despite the many provocations, it was not until local warlord Mohammed Farah Hassan "Aideed" initiated a series of ambushes of UNOSOM military personnel on 5 June that U.N. policy about using force became clear. The UNOSOM II civilian and military force now appears to be coming apart at the seams, as national interests take precedence over unclear U.N. goals. Three national forces in UNOSOM (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Italy) are openly defying the UNOSOM command. In the cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, there may be fear of compromising their Islamic ties within the volatile Middle East. On the part of Italy, there is a long history of collaboration with Aideed and his principals which apparently causes Italy to be reluctant to cut all ties with the man who dominates the southern part of Mogadishu.

Political Force Projection Pitfalls

There was a fundamental error made in the final design of our intervention in Somalia. According to some people involved with the planning for Restore Hope, a civil affairs component was part of the original configuration of Restore Hope. For reasons that are obscure, that resource was eliminated in the last two weeks before UNITAF deployment on 9 December. By neutralizing any potential law enforcement (i.e., political) role before we got on the ground, the intervention perversely provided an umbrella for the warlords.

In mid-December, I received a phone call from a military representative on the State Department Policy Planning Staff, who asked my view of what would constitute "victory" in Somalia. My view remains the same as I told him then: for the United Nations (and, for most of the world, read the *United States*), the only lasting judgment that history will make of the operation is the health of the political situation left behind once the U.S., the U.N. and the world move on. We knew that the

Somali warlords resented all signs of "creeping normalcy" beginning to be seen in the country at the end of UNITAF's mandate; in fact, USLO finally recommended a change in the policy of accommodating Aideed. We called for his arrest two weeks before Aideed's attacks on the Pakistanis. His cunning and ominous presence on the Somali political landscape had too long blocked development of rational and representative governance in Somalia. Aideed, after all, made a substantial fortune through blatant extortion, theft and re-allocation of humanitarian supplies prior to UNITAF's December deployment. Although he considered himself the "George Washington" of Somalia (or so his followers encouraged us to believe), Aideed's power derives from the maintenance of chaos, not the imposition of order. Many Somalis, including members of his Habr Gedir subclan, fault the U.S. and UNITAF for working with the warlords, especially Aideed, after the 9 December deployment.

No one will ever know how many millions of dollars were made by Aideed and his allies during the chaos that followed the fall of Siad Barre. Estimates of the innocent lives lost to starvation and civil war during that period indicate that probably 30,000 people died in Mogadishu and over ten times that number in the central region occupied primarily by General Aideed's irregular forces in 1991-1992. Originally in opposition to an international force in Mogadishu, General Aideed agreed at the last minute to the UNITAF deployment. After the arrival of the original American force, he was unwilling to take on UNITAF (and vice versa), but, with the advent of UNOSOM II, he decided to act to safeguard his political pre-eminence among the warlords and to be assured that no other actors might show themselves on the political scene. First, he exploited the evident lack of clear UNOSOM political goals. On 5 June, he laid several ambushes for UNOSOM troops, effectively declaring war on the world. His tactics were relatively simple: he judged that by hitting them very hard, he could diminish Pakistani morale and gain mobility within his home area. The Pakistanis are currently the largest national unit deployed in UNOSOM and the military force responsible for maintaining order in southern Mogadishu. Aideed judged that an armed attack would likely create divisions in UNOSOM II's force structure; he might also benefit from negative world public opinion to the sight of military confrontations between the United Nations and a local "resistance leader" (himself). In discussions with some of Aideed's closest supporters after the attacks on the Pakistanis, I pointed out that it is just not smart to get yourself condemned by the U.N. Security Council, and that Aideed must work out a way of permitting the political process to continue. Nevertheless, he continues to pursue his guerrilla actions against the United Nations. Aideed's skillful use of the international media has still not been countered effectively by UNOSOM. Unfortunately, in the current conflict with Aideed, Somalia's most notorious warlord, and his allies, there is no certainty that the United Nations will succeed. United Nations' failure in Somalia would be the failure of all of us and might make future Chapter VII operations impossible.

The Shape of the Intervention Force?

The initial deployment of UNITAF was virtually flawless. Through the use of effective diplomacy and presentation of overwhelming force, the warlords were forced to remove their heavy weapons from view in the cities where UNITAF deployed. A decision was made not to press widespread light weapon disarmament, because such efforts could have led to costly confrontations. As noted, UNITAF's rules of engagement prevented it from playing any constructive law and order (or political) role. Despite unquestioned control of ground, sea and air, there was a conscious decision to put off any confrontation with the political and military power of the warlords. As much as anything else, this probably reflected the realities of the force deployed. If the warlords were pushed to confrontation, the extraordinary inventory of heavy weapons, stockpiled but in their possession, would have provided a formidable enemy, as the U.N. is now finding out. Despite their superior command and control capabilities, infinitely better training and extraordinary mobility, the Marine units were probably too light in terms of armaments to pursue the needs of a wide scale disarmament program. In my view, the Marines should have been replaced by an Army force sometime in early January.

"Jointness" in International Military/Political Operations.

By the time I arrived in Mogadishu in early March, UNITAF was well advanced in its departure planning. My boss in USLO, Special Envoy Bob Gosende (who replaced Bob Oakley in early March), and I saw General Johnston just about every day; however, there were very few opportunities for USLO to provide "political" advice. This was unfortunate, because UNITAF sometimes complicated its own operations because it simply took very little account of what the Somalis thought. My very first crisis in Somalia led me to suggest to General Johnston to arrest Aideed-sponsored extortioners who in early March directly menaced the lives of the expatriate managers for the World Food for Peace (WFP), CARE and the ICRC, then the principal donor organizations in Somalia. This bald extortion effort nearly caused the ongoing donors' conference in Addis Ababa to collapse. UNITAF's policy was not to provide protection to individual humanitarian organizations, for lack of manpower (there were probably 500 Humanitarian Relief Organization [HRO] sites around Mogadishu, including all feeding sites). The Marines had long since sent the various Army MP companies home. They had no intention of stirring up Aideed's supporters by arresting his most faithful extortioners. Pakistani units were eventually placed on the premises of the WFP and CARE. The ICRC maintained its corporate policy of non-association with military organizations and made its own accommodation with the Aideed thugs. Without sounding overly parochial, it is probably true that, had the Army become that lead service in UNITAF, there would probably have been greater possibilities for constructive military-civilian interaction. The Army could have

provided some of the needed services of an occupying force, including civil affairs and police units. The fact that the U.S. Army currently provides the critical intelligence support services to UNOSOM II is symptomatic of the wider mission support capabilities of the Army in Somalia-type situations.

Relations with the U.N. civilian and military structure are even more complicated. Upon the advice of UNOSOM Deputy Force Commander, Major General Tom Montgomery, we were forced to change the location of the USLO offices from the Continental Oil Company compound, located in the middle of Aideed's urban stronghold, to the old U.S. Embassy compound after the beginning of Aideed-UNOSOM hostilities on 5 June. UNOSOM began immediately to send the majority of its expatriate staff out of the country on 6 June, without alerting either the HRO's or us. When I called Admiral Howe on 6 June to inform him of my decision to evacuate over half of the USLO staff beginning on 7 June, and to move to the American school site, he said nothing of the UNOSOM evacuation and relocation plans. We immediately ran into a series of awkward problems with the UNOSOM civilian command that installed itself next to us two days later in the former U.S. school premises; oddly, after seeing no special security measures being undertaken by UNOSOM, we learned that the United Nations has no civilian security standards, no personal security manuals and certainly no security discipline. The rag-tag U.N. security team attached to UNOSOM II (mostly untrained security guards from the New York Headquarters building police force) reacted to their first night on the premises, under threat of attack in early June, by having a boozy party. Using the 42 FAST Marines provided USLO for protection of our diplomatic personnel by CENTCOM, we quickly established a security perimeter unequalled elsewhere in the UNOSOM Force Command (former U.S. Embassy) compound area. The 80 or so UNOSOM civilian personnel on the compound benefitted directly from our security efforts and resented every bit of it.

Flaws in the United Nations Effort

UNOSOMs I & II never developed clear political objectives; as a consequence, the roles of the international military units assigned to it remain ambiguous and unclear. Because no lines were drawn in the sand when UNOSOM II took over, the warlords were virtually encouraged to test the resolve of the world community in Somalia. It should have been made clear at the outset that a Chapter VII mandate not only provides for the use of force to achieve the objectives of the U.N. participants; in truth, if force is required to carry out the desires of the world as expressed by the U.N. Security Council, then it must be used. Otherwise, the U.N. is nothing more than a paper tiger.

The United Nations civilian leadership in Somalia continues to suffer from the lack of well-articulated, cohesive goals. A great deal of time and money was wasted holding U.N.-sponsored conferences in January and March in Addis Ababa whose only result was validation of the illegitimate political roles of the leaders of the warring factions, few of whom have any standing as political leaders or roles in Somalia's future. It is not a mystery what the United Nations was looking for in sponsoring peace conferences in which the warlords predominated. Accommodation was far easier than developing meaningful policy to empower the people of Somalia. One may legitimately wonder what the reason (and the cost) was for the purchase of suits and other clothing for each of the 400+ male delegates and observers in the March Addis Ababa reconciliation conference. I am told that the overall conference cost \$2.5 million, including the cost of shuttling people back and forth between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

The United Nations military command is very well led, but it is clear that the US-led Quick Reaction Force (QRF) is now becoming the mainstay deterrent force in Mogadishu. This may be as it should be; however, it goes against our stated policy. In my view, the QRF should be enhanced with ground armor support, and the enhancement should be announced. The urban guerrilla war now being waged by General Aideed against UNOSOM cannot be thwarted by helicopter gunships alone.

An additional problem causing concerns within the coalition of military forces that make up UNOSOM II is the perception that the U.S. is using UNOSOM for its own purposes, based on the fact that both the military and civilian sides of UNOSOM II are dominated by U.S. citizens seconded to the U.N. Although USLO itself benefitted from only modest access to UNOSOM policy deliberations, it is my strong impression that very little distinction is made either by Somalis or our allies between the U.S. and the U.N. in Somalia.

The U.S. policy silhouette in UNOSOM II is too high. A greater effort must be made to internationalize the decision-making capacity of the civilian UNOSOM administration, consistent with a U.S. end-game begun on 4 May with the formal handover to the U.N. There is an American at the top, and his deputy is the Guinean Ambassador to the United Nations. The head of the Political Department is from Zimbabwe. The director of the Humanitarian Affairs unit is a Jamaican. Each of these people has sterling qualities. But, at least for the current period, there seems little top-level policy direction to them. There is the unfortunate perception that Admiral Howe prefers to look to his American staff for policy guidance.

There are many other countries in the world -- especially in Africa -- where the U.S. may be again called upon to exercise its world community responsibilities. The Somali case may not be entirely valid for comparison in every case. Some of these

countries do not have direct and useful access to the sea and may not lend themselves to intervention by a Marine Expeditionary Force. This trip report is not meant to be an appeal to become world globocop. In the end, we may not have a great deal of choice about where the U.S. military is deployed; as in the case of Somalia, the media will help us pick and choose those areas where there are real or perceived U.S. national interests and where U.S. force may be needed. Whatever our critical instincts may tell us -- no more Somalias! -- we cannot summarily rule out all future Somali-type humanitarian intervention situations. A world leader must either be prepared to demonstrate its leadership or step aside and let the thugs take over.

Lessons Learned:

-- One cannot deploy 28,000 troops without becoming a major actor in the domestic political situation of the country where deployed. It is not realistic to plan a humanitarian operation that includes such a force without a well-defined political agenda. In the case of Somalia, nearly all Somalis we met, including Somalis not necessarily sympathetic to the U.S. deployment, were incredulous that we seemed to have such limited objectives.

-- When there is no central government, the occupying force becomes the *de facto* government. The strongest criticism leveled at the U.S. intervention is that we did not disarm the warlords and establish law and order, i.e., in handling relationships between local authorities, and between everyday citizens and those authorities.

-- We assume that the UNITAF decision to avoid confrontations with the warlords was based on a decision to avoid casualties and was not driven by the fact that the force itself did not have much heavy equipment. As we saw later, in the case of Pakistanis, who were cut to pieces by Aideed's RPGs and heavy machine guns, an occupying force must have the capability of countering heavier weapons in the hands of prospective insurgents.

-- Restore Hope represented an experiment for the U.S., as well as the U.N., and it is understandable that it was easier to sell the original concept to Congress and the American people by having a large U.S. component in both the civilian and military United Nations commands. As the largest U.S. military force deployment since "Desert Storm," Operation Restore Hope presented "overwhelming force" which kept the warlords in their place.

-- In the future, when U.S. military forces are involved in a joint international operation, the U.S. need not dominate the political side of the operation. This would have been the preferable track for the Somali operation.

-- It is hard to escape the conclusion now that the U.S. portion of the Restore Hope operation left a serious law and order situation with which the U.N. still has little capability to deal. One should not necessarily fault the U.S. for the defects of the U.N., but we should have taken the limitations of the U.N. into account when planning our initial role.

-- There are certain common sense rules of politics which are universal. One does not have to be an expert on Somalia, to see that, if the U.N. offers to sponsor a conference held under the auspices of one or another of the contenders in a dispute, neither the U.N. nor the sponsor will be perceived to be neutral. In the case of the Galkayo conference, the U.N. civilian command in Somalia was distressingly naive and Aideed too clever by half.

-- The lack of a comprehensive program for the re-establishment of the national police is probably one of the most serious errors being made by UNOSOM.

-- The U.N. must assure itself that component national units are in essential agreement with the basic goals of the mission. This is as much a function of credible leadership in New York as it is in the area where units are deployed.

-- "Victory" in Somalia will be defined by the political situation we, the United Nations (and, by direct implication, the United States, because we dominate the operation), leave behind.

-- The five-month UNITAF occupation of south-central Somalia created an appearance of normalcy: In retrospect, it appears that the warlords simply decided to wait the Americans out. As soon as the Marines left, the warlords returned to their bullying and extortion of fellow Somalis and international assistance agencies.

-- In terms of command and control, the U.N. operation in Somalia is very much more complicated than it was for UNITAF. For many U.N. military forces, the chain of command runs through their respective capitals.

-- The Army has the civil affairs capabilities (even if they are found primarily in the Reserves), the Military Police and the heavy equipment that were needed to restore civil society in Somalia. The use of these resources required National Command Authority recognition that one cannot become involved in a large humanitarian operation without a local political agenda and the means and the will to carry it out.

-- Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation. A narrow mandate can be pursued, but in the end someone must pay the price of success in

achieving that. To belabor a point already made, one cannot embark upon a substantial military intervention in a foreign area without having a clear political agenda.

-- Restore Hope, if anything, has taught us that an armed humanitarian intervention is far closer to a combined military/civilian occupation situation than anything we have seen since Viet Nam.

Recommendation:

-- The U.S. Army should begin now to examine the range of potential missions and the various shapes required for a multipurpose force with capabilities for cooperating in Chapter VII operations with the United Nations in everything from effective small arms disarmament, to urban anti-guerrilla warfare, to working with international agencies on the care and feeding of small children.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Jennifer Ward to Anthony Lake, re: [ANC] (1 page)	08/18/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	William Itoh to Marc Grossman, re: [ANC] (1 page)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memo	Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake, re: [ANC] (1 page)	08/16/1993	P1/b(1)

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003. cable	Re: Authority to Assistance to Peace Accord (2 pages)	08/13/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
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004. memo	[Draft of 005] (4 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	To the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (5 pages)	08/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: GONZALEZ, HENRY B

DOC DATE: 03 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM REP GONZALEZ RE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US TROOPS FM
SOMALIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 16 AUG 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: WARD

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

CLARKE

FOR CONCURRENCE

ROSNER

WARD

FOR INFO

GROSS

INDYK

ITOH

KENNEY

Free Somalia

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJMA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

HENRY B. GONZALEZ
20TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

2413 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4320
202-225-3236

HOME OFFICE:
B-124 FEDERAL BUILDING
727 E. DURANGO STREET
SAN ANTONIO, TX 78208-1286
210-229-6195

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4320

August 3, 1993

6089
COMMITTEE:
BANKING, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEES
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN
CONSUMER CREDIT AND INSURANCE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FINANCE,
TRADE AND MONETARY POLICY
AUG 4 5:38 PM '93

FILE REF:

B06AF
jcs

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President
United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to request immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Somalia. When I wrote to you in March, you responded March 31st that "we expect the bulk of our military presence to be withdrawn in the very near future" because "the current phase of operation is almost at an end." Mr. President, nothing has ended in Somalia, and in fact matters have grown worse.


Our mission has mutated and become muddled and very risky for American personnel. Ten years ago, I warned for a year in speech after speech on the House floor of imminent catastrophe when our troops were sent to Lebanon as "peacekeepers," and look what happened there. Without a clearly defined military role, we are subjecting our troops to grave danger and are calling on them to be something that they are not.

Mr. President, I also wrote to you in March about Bosnia, and you indicated that you would remain in close consultation with key members of Congress. I am writing to remind you of that pledge, as clearly the situation has escalated with the possibility that U.S. airstrikes will be ordered. Airstrikes have not been authorized by Congress, and I hope you will not do what President Bush did in the case of the Persian Gulf War and wait until Congress has recessed for a month, a recess which this year will begin at the end of this week. I called in August 1990 for Congress to reconvene to address the impending war in the Persian Gulf, but the House and Senate leadership did not heed my calls.

The Honorable William J. Clinton -- Page 2

Time has proven the wisdom of my call. If matters progress with regard to Bosnia, I will reiterate my call this year and hope that the congressional leadership responds so that the will of the people regarding war in Europe can be expressed through their elected representatives in Congress.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Henry B. Gonzalez". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Henry" being more prominent and the last name "Gonzalez" written in a more compact, cursive style.


Henry B. Gonzalez
Member of Congress

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: WALDEHRA, B L

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: INDIA



PERSONS: AIDEED, FARRAH

SUBJECT: LTR FM WALDEHRA FO SUPREME COURT OF INDIA RE SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA
GEN MOHAMMED FARRAH AIDEED

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 13 AUG 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: INDYK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

INDYK

FOR CONCURRENCE

CLARKE
RIEDEL
WARD

FOR INFO

SATTERFIELD
WAGUESPACK

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

NSC

5977

DR. B.L.WADEHRA, ADVOCATE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA,
' THE WHITE HOUSE ',
M - 131, GREATER KAILASH PART II,
NEW DELHI - 110 048.

Ph.Nos. 6477111, 6431867,
6465171, 6461652.

FAX NO: (011) 6468362
Telex : 031-70014 ANU IN

Dt. 05-07-1993.

FOR : MR BILL CLINTON, PRESIDENT,
WASHINGTON, U.S.A.

FAX NO : 2024561121

Your Excellency

The case of Somalia's General Mohammed Farrah Aideed falls in the second category. Take my word for it, your Excellency, even-though I am a non-entity, that Aideed is a gentle and loveable man. He is fighting his break-away rebellion-partner, who fought under his Joint Command to oust Ex-President Barre, whose regime was stinkingly corrupt. During this power struggle some aberrations have occurred, involving killing of Somali citizens, followed by killing of Pakistani, Italian and German Armed Personnel and some foreign Journalists and destruction of sizeable part of Mogadishu, through UN Air and Ground strikes on Aideed's establishments. The U.N. mistakingly interprets these incidents as Aideed's War on the U.N. So the U.N. resolve to liquidate Aideed.

Your Excellency, liquidation or trial of General Aideed for alleged War Crimes would help no one. Instead it will hurt the U.N. objective of bringing stable peace to Somalia. He is a popular and celebrated leader of the overwhelming majority of Somali population. Firstly his capture and liquidation may prove very difficult, well nigh impossible because of his popular support. Secondly, even if that happens, it will, give rise to new Aideeds one after the other and in the process, destruction and innocent blood-letting, may continue, intractably. And I say so because I know General Aideed and Somalia, a little more than the U.S. and the U.N. administrations. I was General Aideed's Adviser and Legal Counsel for over four years till 1989 when he left India after he was dismissed by the President Barre from his position of Somali Ambassador to India. I had also visited Somalia, on Somali Government's invitation. So my claim that I know what I am talking about.


Your Excellency, while it is true that the issue now, is between the U.N. and General Aideed, but the entire world of today, knows that you hold the key. So my humble request, which I am sure is shared widely all over the globe, that the collective strength of the World Community need not be directed against General Aideed. Instead the Somali problem needs to be viewed flexibly and solved through resumption of dialogue. I am sure, that Aideed, as I know him, would co-operate fully and would be reasonable and respectful for the U.N. and U.S. when he comes to hold interim power he will give Somalia a clean administration preceding Democratic Electoral Process to instal popular Govt. which I am sure he will, on popular vote.

And how long will the World Community continue spending around about \$1.5 Billion dollars already spent on U.N. Peacekeeping operations in

... spent on U.N. peacekeeping operations in
Somalia where for every one dollar spent on humanitarian aid,
military expenditure is ten dollars?

with highest regards,

Yours Faithfully,


(DR. B.L. WADEHRA)

~~SECRET~~

20882

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 10, 1993

File SOMALIA

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: RAND BEERS

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Somalia,
August 4, 1993

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Somalia.

Concurrence by: Jennifer Ward

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A and
authorize Will Itoh to transmit the memorandum at Tab I to his
agency counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 12/22/16

2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BG MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

MR. DAVID MEIN
Acting Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Somalia, August 4, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Somalia, Wednesday, August 4, 1993. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 12/12/16
2012-0659-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (2 pages)	08/04/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	Re: Isolating Aideed (5 pages)	08/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. memo	To Mr. Wisner, re: Somalia - Forecast for UNOSOM (1 page)	07/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
kc4096

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. report	Re: [UNOSOM] (6 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. memo	Rand Beers to Samuel Berger, re: Somalia - Deputies Committee (3 pages)	08/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. memo	George Moose to Mr. Tarnoff, re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (3 pages)	07/13/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009c. paper	Recommendations for Consideration by Deputies Committee2 (2 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009d. paper	Issues to be Raised with the UN in New York (3 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009e. cable	President Meles on Where We Go From Here in Somalia (4 pages)	07/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, June - December 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F
ke4096

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HEYLE, HAJI-MOHAMMED

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES OF UNITED SOMALI SALVATION

*File
Somalia*

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 04 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE

INDYK

SATTERFIELD

WARD

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

5706



THE EMBASSY OF THE SOMALI
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

60 Portland Place
London W1N 3DG

Tel: 01-580 7148

سفارة جمهورية
الصومال الديمقراطية
لندن

NSC
747
20 May 1993
Cl

H.E. Mr.F Mitterand,
President,
Republic of France,
Paris.


Mr.President,


This is to wish you and the people of France a Happy and prosperous year. As you are aware, Things are at the going for the better in Somalia and we hope that recovery will continue until Somalia is once again a respected nation among the nations.

We would like to inform that His Excellency Haji Mohamed Hashi Haile, president of Somalia would be paying a three days visit to your beautiful country to further promote the relationship of the two countries and peoples.

We hope that this Visit of His Excellency would pave the way for further advancement in the cordial relation of both our nations.

Yours sincerely,


A M Mohamed Musse
Ambassador.





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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(PRESIDENT UNITED SOMALI SALVATION)

Date The 4th June 1993

AT Mogadishu

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LETTER

TO THE ATTENTION OF :

- THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OF DEN-HAAG-DE-AIA-

AND AT THE SAME TIME TO THE ATTENTION OF :

- HIS HONORABLE EXCELLENCE : THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON ;- HIS EXCELLENCE THE PRESIDENT OF THE NEW EASTERN REPUBLICS :
BORIS YELTSIN.

- TO THE AMERICAN STATE DEPARTMENT

- HIS EXCELLENCE THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC :
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.- TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE STATE DEPARTMENT MINISTRY :
MR ALAIN JUPPE.- TO THE UNITED KINGDOM PRIME MINISTER HIS EXCELLENCE
JONH MAJOR.- TO HIS EXCELLENCE THE PRINCE OF SAUDI ARABIA :
FAD-IBIN-ABDUL-AZIZ.- TO HIS EXCELLENCE THE MINISTRY OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE STATE
DEPARTMENT : SAUD FAISAL.- TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION HIS EXCELLENCE :
BOUTROS GHALI.- TO HIS EXCELLENCE THE ARAB LEAGUE PRESIDENT :
MR ISMAT-ABDUL-MAGID.- TO HIS EXCELLENCE THE PRESIDENT OF THE O.A.U. :
(UNITED AFRICA ORGANISATION) : NELSON MANDELA.

.../...



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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(PRESIDENT UNITED SOMALI SALVATION)

Date the 4th June 1993

AT Mogadishu

'CONFIDENTIAL LETTER'

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN :

I, HAJI-MOHAMED-HASHI-HEYLE, PRESIDENT OF THE STATE OF SOMALIA, KINDLY DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE NEXT OCCURENCES :

- THAT DURING THE CIVIL WAR IN MY COUNTRY THERE HAVE BEEN 2.195.000 DEAD PEOPLE AMONG INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN, AS WELL AS AN IMPROBABLE NUMBER OF DEAD ANIMALS.

- THE DESTRUCTION OF MANY HOUSES AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURES.

- AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE MENTIONED ABOVE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOMALI AGRICULTURE.

- MANY WOMEN HAVE BEEN RAVISHED PHYSICALLY AND MORALLY.

- WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FRIEND GOVERNMENTS, WE HAVE ASSEMBLED 350 LAWYERS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IS TO INFORM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ABOUT THE OFFENCES AS WELL AS OF THE OFFENDERS.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF THIS INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF LAWYERS CONSISTS IN MAINTAINING THE ORDER IN MY COUNTRY AS WELL AS :

- TO PREPARE THE "REFERENDUM" IN THE SOMALI STATE.

- TO ORGANIZE THE POLITICAL ELECTIONS.

- TO CONTACT THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE RESTITUTION OF ALL THE TERRITORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY EXPROPRIATED FROM THE SOMALI COUNTRY, TO KNOW :

- THE STATE OF KENYA WHO RETAINS IN ITS POSSESSION THE TERRITORIES OF N F D.

- THE STATE OF ETHIOPIA WHO RETAINS IN ITS POSSESSION THE TERRITORY OF OGADEN.

- THE YEMEN STATE WHO RETAINS IN ITS POSSESSION THE SOGADORA SOMALI ISLAND.

WITH REGARD TO THE POLITICAL PROJECT, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WILL EXCLUDE THE WAR CRIMINALS TO TAKE PART IN THE POLITICAL ELECTIONS REFERENDUM, AS STATED IN THE NUREMBERG TREATY.

.../...



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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(PRESIDENT UNITED SOMALI SALVATION)

Date The 4th June 1993

AT Mogadishu

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LETTER

FURTHERMORE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WILL ACCUSE IN JUSTICE ALL THE EMBASSIES WHO DURING THE CIVIL WAR HAVE COLLABORATED GIVING FALSE DOCUMENTS TO THE TERRORISTS, TO THE CRIMINALS AND TO THE SABOTEURS WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISORDERS WITHIN AND OUT OF THE LIMITS OF OUR TERRITORY.

THE LAWYERS WILL CHARGE IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE THE AMBASSADORS AND ALL THE GUILTY PEOPLE WHO DURING THE REVOLUTION WERE RESPONSIBLE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOMALI STATE AND WHO HAVE DRAWN PROFITS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES AND OF THE FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS.

THE LAWYERS ACCUSE AGAINST THE COURT OF JUSTICE ALL THOSE WHO DURING THE CIVIL WAR HAVE EXPORTED THE ANIMALS OUT OF THE SOMALI TERRITORY TOWARDS THE ARABIAN GULF AND TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

THEY WILL ACCUSE THE BAD MERCHANTS WHO HAVE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE POVERTY OF SOMALIA.

THE LAWYERS WILL ALSO MENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ALL THOSE WHO DURING THE CIVIL WAR PROFITED TO FISH ILLEGALLY WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL SOMALIAN SEA AND THUS TAKING A GREAT BENEFIT TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE SOMALI MARINE FAUNE WHICH HAS BEEN COMPLETELY DESTROYED.

THE LAWYERS WILL ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND ALL THE SOMALI TERRITORY, INCLUDING THE EXPROPRIATED TERRITORIES WHERE AT THE MOMENT LIVE 26.000.000 PEOPLE

THE LAWYERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONTACT AND TO TALK WITH THE STATE OF KENYA, YEMEN AND ETHIOPIA FOR THE RESTITUTION OF THE EXPROPRIATED SOMALI TERRITORIES.



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(PRESIDENT UNITED SOMALI SALVATION)

Date The 4th June 1993

AT Mogadishu

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LETTER

DEAR MR, PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,

REFERRING TO THE WIENNE CONVENTION, I AM CONFIDENT THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING TO ASSIST THE 350 INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WHO HAVE THE INTENTION TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTY WITH JUSTICE AND ENGAGEMENT.

WE HOPE YOU WILL KINDLY BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THEM.

YOURS FAITHFULLY.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Haji-Mohammed-Hashi-Heyle'.

MR HAJI-MOHAMMED-HASHI-HEYLE

PRESIDENT OF SOMALIA