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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	Re: Somalia (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. paper	Somalia Policy: Near-Term Decisions (8 pages)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. map	Status of Forces (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. chart	Forces Currently In Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. chart	Other Forces Planning to Participate in Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)
002e. cable	Re: Where We Are and Where Do We Go From Here (6 pages)	01/25/1993	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 page)	01/25/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	[Duplicate of 002e] (3 pages)	01/24/1993	P1/b(1)
005. letter	PJ Keating, Prime Minister of Australia, to President Bush (2 pages)	01/20/1993	P1/b(1)

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Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
kc4092

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Date: 28 Jan 93

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: LTG Johnston's "Commander's Assessment
of Operation Restore Hope"

Just received from Joint Staff, which just got it from CENTCOM, faxed in from Mogadishu. Note the final paragraph on page 14: "War is over, we won; time to come home." Presumably, this is the document to be shared with the UN next week, to put pressure on them to speed up the hand-off.

It came in unclassified but Joint Staff agrees we should handle it as OUO at this time.

A couple of pages are skewed, and CENTCOM is trying to get Mog to resend. We will send you the new pages when we get them.

Jim Woods

DISTRIBUTION:

Mr Wisner
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Commander's Assessment of Operation Restore Hope

1. INTRODUCTION. This assessment is presented in three sections. The first section is an overview of the situation in Somalia immediately prior to D-Day and the conditions today compared to that initial state. The second section describes the concept of operations undertaken by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia with rationale for the approach and courses of action. The third section is the transition plan UNITAF proposes for turning the operation over to United Nations Command under UNOSOM II.

2. SITUATION. On 9 December Restore Hope forces landed on Somali territory. Virtually all institutions of modern society and government had ceased to exist in an atmosphere of widespread violence and total lawlessness. Clan and factional warfare, extortion, banditry, individual acts of armed theft, and indiscriminate shooting had displaced millions of people and destroyed the economy, the security, and the health services throughout southern Somalia. Approximately 4.5 million of a total Somali population of 6 million had been affected by the war, factional conflicts, and drought. Countrywide, more than 2 million were displaced. Over half a million displaced people were without food and shelter in Mogadishu alone. Relief organizations estimated children's malnutrition rates as high as 95%, and held 1.5 million at risk of death from starvation.

The abysmal political situation grew from the civil war that began in 1988. Despite Siad Barre's final defeat and exile in May 1992, warfare continued as numerous factions splintered and fought for control. The widespread fighting combined with the effects of drought to impoverish most of the southern part of the country and make food very scarce.

Mogadishu, including the port and the airfield, was divided, paralyzed, and virtually destroyed by the conflict between the two major factions of the United Somali Congress, one led by Mohammed Farrah Aideed and the other by Ali Mahdi. A "no man's land" roughly six blocks wide extended from north to south through the city. This "green line" separated the territories controlled by Aideed and Mahdi. It was well known to all residents, and could be crossed only with much difficulty and payment of tribute. The port and airfield were controlled by Aideed, but both could be, and were, frequently taken under fire from Mahdi's territory. This crippled relief efforts. Aideed would not share the port with Mahdi, so Mahdi drove ships away. Only one ship was able to dock between September and November. It delivered 12,000 metric tons of relief supplies, but could not move them outside of the immediate port area. Two relief ships were fired upon and had to turn away.

The other southern Somalia major port of entry, Kisumu, was

was controlled by another faction led by Omar Jess. Jess controlled access to the port, and charged usurious rates for access and services. He had ample supplies in the city, and no concern for the welfare of any Somalis in the interior. Inland, other factions fought for control of territory, and routinely sustained themselves by raiding the countryside, and by stealing or extorting resources from the relief agencies.

The warring factions, combined with the cultural lack of concern by any clan for any but their own, produced stalemate. The economy and all other societal institutions shut down. Looting, banditry, and thievery became necessary to ward off starvation and death. As many as 14 major clans fought for turf and influence, areas shown at enclosure (1), with many smaller, lesser known groups, fighting within those clan areas.

As the political stalemate continued, the leaders of the various clans were unable or unwilling to establish control within their various clan areas, and began encouraging their groups to resort to theft and extortion to maintain their weapons and supplies. Compromise and political settlement, absent external coercion, was impossible.

This political stalemate produced conditions of scarcity. The resulting combination of political stalemate and scarcity of life-sustaining goods and services produced total insecurity throughout the area. Personal security was established through individual arms, and alliances within the clan and sub-clan structure. Weapons of all calibers were visible everywhere, and readily used everywhere. Possessing weapons meant one could acquire food. Possession of a lot of food, in turn, meant one had the power to acquire more arms. Having neither meant starvation. The Mogadishu daily violent death toll was estimated to be above 150 per day, at the hospitals. Others may never be known.

Relief agencies tried to deliver food and medical supplies to the stricken population, but armed gangs, either associated with Somali factions or operating independently stole, extorted, and hoarded the supplies. Food became a weapon, to be acquired for one's own survival and power, and denied to all others. The relief agencies were manipulated, forced to buy protection, and in many cases became targets of the very people they were trying to help. In a typical episode, only four trucks, of a food convoy of 25, completed a journey from Mogadishu to Baidoa and Oddur and back. Five were given away for permission to leave Mogadishu. 12 were hijacked enroute. Eight reached their destination, only to be looted there. No food reached the intended people.

In August of 1992 Provide Relief, based out of Mombasa, began to airlift supplies to disaster centers in the interior of Somalia. Provide Relief forces were able to deliver supplies when a permissive environment existed at the delivery

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sites. Provide Relief delivered approximately 2,700 metric tons of supplies a week, which equates to about 770,000 meals per day. This was an impressive, and expensive, effort that saved many lives, but the magnitude of the pending disaster, and the warlord's continued truculence, made it only a partial success. Continuing efforts by armed elements, and the magnitude of the supplies needed, called for additional measures. The subsequent UN deployment to Mogadishu proved too little and too late. The small UN battalion at the airport, with rules of engagement better suited to traditional peacekeeping, emboldened the lawless elements, and added to the security problems of the international relief agencies.

The Somali infrastructure that had survived the civil war was destroyed as everything of value was stolen, and sold or bartered for cash or services. Electrical wire was removed for its copper. Pipes, sewer and fresh water, were pulled from the earth and sold. Roads were purposefully holed and damaged to slow vehicles, making them vulnerable to extortion and theft. Everything else left standing was thoroughly trashed. The first use of our firetrucks unloaded from the MPS ships was forcefully hosing out a warehouse to make it habitable. All forms of public transportation and communication had ceased. All forms of commerce, save hidden black market bartering, had ceased. Only two distribution systems worked, khat (a shelf life of 24-48 hours, not grown yet widespread in Somalia) and arms supplies. There was no employment except that offered by and for those with weapons.

Praying on foreigners working with relief agencies and the international media was especially profitable. Extortion and theft produced hard currency directly. The security needs created by Somali extortion and theft produced employment opportunities for weapons-bearing Somali's, thus producing hard currency indirectly. A National Public Radio reporter covering the famine was relieved of US \$3,000 by the driver and security guard she had hired as protection. The United Nations, for the year 1992, had over 150 vehicles hijacked, almost one every other day. These vehicles, 4-wheel drive Toyota pickups, were especially prized as "technical vehicles." The universal use of that term is itself an acknowledgment of the pervasive lawlessness and extortion. It originated with the line in the United Nations and relief agency expense vouchers justifying expenditure of funds for "technical assistance" - resources devoted to protection bought by paying hired thugs. These were resources that never reached the beleaguered famine population.

The situation on 28 January, D + 50, has changed. The factions that paralyzed and virtually destroyed Somalia have been largely neutralized. This has been done through negotiation from strength, backed by a willingness to use force in response to unacceptable acts. Within our security framework and with our strong encouragement, the factional political and military leaders are negotiating and working out

points of agreement. Most often this is done through a combined committee, composed of members of all major factions. Meanwhile, long-suppressed community leaders are emerging, and asking for our help in regaining control of their neighborhoods from the independent lawless elements. Throughout Somalia, long dormant public institutions are struggling to regain their role.

Early in the operation, we forced passage of the green line areas through strong combat patrols. Now, through the combined efforts of UNITAF combat arms and related political efforts, crossing the green line is almost routine. Many local citizens walk and shop now in those areas.

The port is available to all shipping. Since 10 December, 16 ships have unloaded here, free from fire and usurious port user fees formerly collected by port "officials" - those with the biggest guns in the area. This made over 42,000 metric tons of relief supplies available. The new port security situation also permitted the distribution of the 12,000 tons previously trapped in storage.

Major weapons systems have been reduced through an aggressive search and destroy program coupled with opportunities for voluntary cantonment. Those not placed in cantonments have been or will be destroyed or forced into the hinterland. Technical vehicles were once commonplace in Mogadishu. Now they are rare. The same is true in all other areas where we have been able to establish a presence. Those weapons that retreated into the hinterland will present a capability for mischief and local insecurity for a short time. Soon they will become useless through lack of support and maintenance. Their crews and soldiers will lose their morale and allegiance when they must forego their previous standard of living.

Lighter weapons, including personal arms, are being reduced through enforcement plans based on the security considerations in each area. Stability is rewarded, instability is punished. Consequently, only occasionally are weapons sighted in public, and often they are confiscated as a result. Arms will always be present in Somalia, just as they are in many countries around the world, but rules must govern their display and use.

Total weapons confiscated by Restore Hope forces include over 1500 rifles and pistols, 30 large-caliber machine guns, over 60 rocket launchers, 5 tanks, 50 fighting vehicles, nearly 150 crew served weapons, 39 artillery pieces, including U.S. made M-198 towed howitzers, and nearly 100 mortars of all calibers. Captured ammunition quantities are so large they defy accurate accounting. Many more weapons and vehicles have been destroyed in combat.

The neutralization of the major factions brought the security environment to a condition more nearly normal. The threat of banditry and lawlessness remains, but the mere presence of alert security forces serves to maintain peace. The almost immediate emergence of local markets and commerce in areas of UNITAF operations, and the absence of visibly carried weapons, attests to the new environment.

Humanitarian aid now flows throughout the area of operations. The vast majority of the food and medicine gets through. Over 94 million meals have been delivered to grateful recipients since the beginning of Restore Hope. Entire communities have been vaccinated against disease after being secured by UNITAF forces. Minor pilferage still occurs, but wholesale theft and hijacking, and the use of food and medicine as instruments of warfare, is over.

Much, if not virtually all, of the current minor pilferage is perpetrated by orphaned children. These unfortunate creatures lack any means of support, so they must live by their wits and steal to survive. One young boy was recently caught at the port. He was told that we would release him if he promised not to steal any more. He replied, through our interpreter, that he had no other way to make a living, and nobody to support him. Rapid involvement of agencies, other than the military, equipped to start schools and orphanages is necessary if his generation is to be saved.

Major infrastructure rebuilding efforts are underway to restore the roads, airfields, and seaports, and public utilities destroyed by the fighting and looting. Electricity has been restored to a large part of Mogadishu, as has water services. Roads are being restored, and in some cases flood-proofed, among the major population centers. Plans for further development are completed and available for further development by civilian agencies and indigenous labor.

UNITAF engineers have identified ten main supply routes that connect the major southern Somalia population centers for improvement. Although only 30% complete, we have already cut the time from Baidoa to Oddur by 50%. The goal on all roads is unimpeded two-way traffic. Roads will be passable in both the dry and the monsoon seasons. Mogadishu to Baidoa used to take eleven hours. It will soon take less than six. This will greatly aid nation-building efforts by stitching together previously isolated sections, and cut costs for relief agencies and contractors. A major part of this effort was the installation of two bridges. These now provide unimpeded access to Kisamaayo, spanning water gaps that previously isolated the port from lines of communication. One bridge, recently dedicated by Ambassador Oakley and UNICEF officials, was christened the "Sean Devereaux Bridge" after the main Kisamaayo UNICEF official.

Mine clearing efforts are running concurrently with the road improvement projects. Over 371 kilometers have been cleared thus far. The population has demonstrated their support by showing us many mines, and physically delivering many more to us - a personal service we did not request.

UNITAF engineers and maritime forces continue to improve the port infrastructure. Sunken objects have been removed to ease access at both Mogadishu and Kisamaayo. Warehouses and hardstands have been repaired. ISO containers, previously blocking port roads for security reasons, have been removed as the situation has improved.

The runways, parking ramps and taxiways at all eight airstrips served by UNITAF flights have been improved and weatherproofed by UNITAF "Red Horse" engineer squadrons. These efforts reduce the hazards to both aircraft and crews, and improve the flow of supplies and traffic through the airstrips.

UNITAF efforts have created the first working Somali airspace control system since before the revolution. Initially, the UNITAF Airspace Control Authority (ACA) focused on airspace management issues for military applications alone. Very quickly, however, it became apparent that airspace management was more than a question of controlling the airspace for military aircraft. In mid-January UNITAF airplanners held our first meeting with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to begin planning for opening up Somali airspace to international air traffic. While numerous details are yet to be developed, (customs, contraband procedures, etc.) this event helps Somalia on the road back to membership in the international community. Perhaps as a result, on January 25th, two former Somali air traffic controllers approached UNITAF forces and offered to return to work.

Medical help has been provided by UNITAF in cooperation with the international medical relief agencies. All of our medical organizations have become involved. We have provided help with teaching, equipment repair, limited medical supplies, specialty consultation, immunization, and preventive medicine assistance. Through these associations we learned many interesting things.

The daily violent death toll in Mogadishu before our arrival was as high as 150. Gunshot wounds exceeded all other forms of trauma by as much as 10 to 1. Now the daily violent death toll is between 5 and 15. In Kisamaayo it has gone from 25 to 1. Armed squatters used to occupy the beds in many hospitals. Now they are empty or filled with patients who used to feel it was too dangerous, due to muggers on the way or at the destination, to go to the hospital. Pharmaceutical availability has increased with the increased security.

The most gratifying impression is that the Somali medical and welfare establishment remains competent. Our most useful contribution is the peacemaking. A sheriff is needed more than specific medical help.

As security improves local citizens are trying to regain control of their security. Many of the police forces in the cities UNITAF controls have begun to work in support of their communities. Cities that currently have operational police forces include Kisamaayo, Bardera, Baidoa, Belet Uen and Oddur.

These forces are composed of former police officers who are either working for free or for food provided by relief agencies. They are chosen by village elders and work for them enforcing local laws. Most conduct combined patrols with UNITAF forces.

In Mogadishu, individual officers have been reporting for work. The combined political committee has appointed officials to implement a force of about 3,000 policemen.

In summary, the military forces of UNITAF have done much to change the situation on the ground in the assigned area of responsibility. UNITAF provided the shock and the power to force rapid change. Forward momentum is established. Now the stage is set for rapid political, social and cultural advancement if the proper agencies can be put in place.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. UNITAF MISSION. To conduct military operations in Somalia in order to secure the major airfields, seaports, key installations and relief distribution sites. At the same time ensure the free passage of relief supplies through security of relief convoys and relief organization operations. Finally, assist the United Nations and Non-Government Organizations in providing humanitarian relief under United Nations auspices.

b. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(1) Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSS). The HRSSs in southern Somalia were initially developed by taking into consideration the eight major distribution sites/cities and major road junctions as guidelines. These distribution sites consisted of the following cities: Mogadishu, Baledogle, Baidoa, Gialalassi, Belet Uen, Oddur, Bardera, and Kismayo. Each HRS has its own character, set of problems, strengths, weaknesses, etc. As Operation Restore Hope progressed, it was discovered that sector boundaries had to be adjusted to accommodate the realities of the most promising authority structure/clan in each area. Different leadership entities were identified and given stature and credibility based on what

best worked in each area. These modifications eventually led to the creation of a ninth HRS, HRS MARKA.

(2) UNITAF Objectives. UNITAF objectives were designated to be the operational airfields located at the major distribution site in each HRS. Following the successful seizure and securing of the first two UNITAF Objectives, a policy was developed by which all future UNITAF Objectives would be secured. First, on D-2 a psychological operation would be conducted using a leaflet drop. This drop would inform the Somali inhabitants in the vicinity of the objective that friendly UNITAF Forces were about to arrive and assist in solving the food shortage problem. Second, on D-1, Ambassador Oakley would arrive at the UNITAF Objective to reinforce the previous days leaflet drop and personally reassure the Somalis of the UNITAF's honest intentions. Finally, on D-Day the UNITAF Forces would arrive to initially secure the objective in a military fashion and then commence humanitarian relief operations. As part of the commencement of humanitarian relief operations, a food shipment was scheduled to arrive at each UNITAF objective on D-Day either by air or convoy.

(3) Phases. UNITAF conducted a multi-national joint/combined operation in four event dependant phases to establish security conditions necessary for the continuation of humanitarian relief operations in Somalia; stabilize the security and famine relief situation throughout the assigned area and transition the operation to UN or other international organization control.

(a) Phase I was initiated with the seizure and securing of UNITAF Objective 1 (Mogadishu Airport) on 9 December 1992 by SPMAGTF CENT(SOC). UNITAF Objective 2 (Baledogle Airfield) was secured by U.S. Marine Forces to include SPMAGTF CENT(SOC) on 13 December. Phase I officially ended with the securing of UNITAF Objective 3 (Baidoa Airfield) on 16 December again by U.S. Marine Forces to include SPMAGTF CENT(SOC).

(b) Phase II commenced with an amphibious landing to secure UNITAF Objective 4 (Kismayo Port and Airfield) on 20 December by a combined Belgian, U.S. Marine and U.S. Navy Force. The commander of U.S. Naval Forces was designated Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the commander of Belgian Forces was designated Commander Landing Force (CLF). The second UNITAF Objective secured during Phase II was Objective 5 (Bardera Airfield) on 24 December. Objective 5 was secured by U.S. Marine Forces. Simultaneous with U.S. Marine Forces securing Objective 5, a combined French and U.S. Marine Force under French command commenced operations to secure UNITAF Objective 4 (Oddur Airfield) on 24 December. UNITAF Objective 4 was secured on Christmas Day. UNITAF Objective 6

(Gialalassi Airfield) was the next objective to be secured. Objective 6 was secured by Italian Forces with U.S. Marine Air support on 27 December. The last UNITAF Objective to be secured during Phase II was UNITAF Objective 8 (Belet Uen Airfield) on 28 December. This operation consisted of an air assault by a combined U.S. Army and Canadian Force under U.S. Army command.

(c) Phase III of Operation Restore Hope commenced on 28 December by UNITAF Forces with the aim to expand the security and humanitarian relief operations beyond the UNITAF Objectives throughout each HRS. In an attempt to open up an additional port facility, the city of Marka was designated UNITAF Objective 10 and secured on 28 December. A combined U.S. Army and Italian Force under U.S. Army command conducted the operation. Although limited in its port facilities and capabilities, Marka enabled the off loading of many smaller intra-coastal freighters with food for relief organizations.

(4) Logistics. The logistics concept included receiving theater support through the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the C5/C-141 capable airfields at Mogadishu, Baledogle and Kismayo. The logistics concept was further refined as four cities were designated to be the theater logistics hubs from which all logistical support would be provided. The designated UNITAF logistics hubs were Mogadishu, Baledogle, Baidoa and Kismayo. From D-Day (9 December 1992) until D+50 (28 January 1993) U.S. Marine Forces provided the logistical command, control and support to UNITAF extending its support to at least four times greater than its doctrinal capabilities. On D+50 the command, control and support responsibilities were transferred to the Joint Task Force Support Command a U.S. Army commanded organization.

(5) Engineer Tasks. The UNITAF engineers immediately upon arrival in theater conducted an engineer survey to determine the engineer projects required to be accomplished in support of the UNITAF mission. The engineer projects were prioritized in the following manner: airfield/port/helipad construction and improvements, main supply routes (MSRs) improvement and HRS base camp construction. All engineer assets and personnel were then task organized into two Engineer Task Forces; one consisting of U.S. Army assets and one consisting of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps assets. The engineer projects which have been accomplished or are currently being conducted with a 28 February 1993 target completion date are:

(a) All airfields have been cleared of overgrown vegetation and are capable of receiving at a minimum C-130 aircraft. These airfields are being maintained on a daily basis to retain their C-130 capability.

(b) Nine MSRs have been identified and are currently being upgraded to a all-weather two lane capability.

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(c) All nine MSRs have been cleared of mines and are continually being inspected.

(d) The power plant for the Mogadishu city water authority is now 33% operational.

d. FORCE COMPOSITION. UNITAF's current task organization is as follows with force locations depicted in Enclosure (2):

CTF SOMALIA

LTGEN JOHNSTON

CANADIAN FORCES COL LABBE
FRENCH BDE MGEN DELHOME
INDIAN NAVAL SQUADRON SOMALIA COMO PILLAI
ITALIAN FORCES MGEN ROSSI
FOLGARE AIRBORNE BDE
SAN MARCO TACTICAL GROUP

JCSE

JOINT TASK FORCE SUPPORT COMMAND BGEN SOLOMON
TUNISIAN FORCES

TF PROVIDE RELIEF BGEN FRATARANGELO
DET, I MEF

DET, JCSE

DET, CENTCOM

US AFFOR MGEN MIKOLAJCIK

GERMAN AIR FORCE, C-160 DET

ROYAL AIR FORCE, C-130 DET

US ARFOR MGEN ARNOLD

10TH MTN DIV (-)

1ST BELGIAN PARACHUTE BN (-)

1ST ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT

MOROCCAN FORCES

TF KISMAYO

ENGINEER TASK FORCE 36

US MARFOR MGEN WILHELM

RCT-7 (-)

3D MAW (-)

1ST FSSG (-)

ENGINEER TASK FORCE 30

BOTSWANAN FORCES

EGYPTIAN FORCES

KUWAITI FORCES

NIGERIAN FORCES

PAKISTANI FORCES

SAUDI ARABIAN FORCES

TURKISH FORCES

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FORCES

ZIMBABWE FORCES

US NAVFOR COMO PETERSON

PHIBRON THREE, CTF 156

CTF 155

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SPMAGTF CENT (SOC)
 HMCS PRESERVER
 DET, NAV LOG SUP
 US SOFOR LTC FAISTENHAMMER

e. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). In order to ensure that a constant line of communication was maintained between UNITAF and the numerous relief organizations operating in southern Somalia, a CMOC was established as a model coordination body. This was established at the Headquarters, United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) and is being improved so that it can continue under U.N. direction with no diminution of effectiveness. The same structure has been established for all the centers of HRSS. The CMOCs have set in place the mechanisms to achieve a parallel direction in political development and humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

(2) Psychological Operations. Psychological operations have been conducted by UNITAF to keep the people informed, encourage them and counter anti-UNITAF propaganda toward them. The success and positive reception of the UNITAF radio and newspaper media, both named RAJO, which means Hope in English, should be continued under the U.N. as a positive avenue of communications with the people. Their focus is on military operations, humanitarian relief efforts and reestablishment of basic public services (police, schools, etc). The radio station broadcasts four daily programs of forty-five minutes duration covering newspaper articles, Somali short stories and poems from local poets and "man in the street" interviews. The newspaper is a one page, front and back, daily paper which is distributed free of charge to each city secured by UNITAF. UNITAF is currently printing 20,000 copies daily with the intention of increasing to 25,000 to 30,000 within the next week.

(3) Civil Affairs. The three, four man Civil Affairs teams have been tasked organized to each of the Humanitarian Operations Centers and have served as the critical point for the interaction between Humanitarian Organizations, the Somali populace and the military. Despite a void created by the lack of United Nations personnel, these teams have worked with Somali elders and have organized grass roots level local non-partisan institutions that will form the basis for the emerging government. They have also been instrumental in coordinating the distribution efforts of the 36 Non-Governmental Organizations that operate in country. Serving as the Operations Center for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies, Civil Affairs Teams have coordinated the military support and security necessary for relief supplies to safely reach the civilian populace. Since their arrival, the child mortality rate has dropped in some

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areas from a daily high of 50 children a day to less than 10 a week.

(4) Convoys. The convoy system, which is for providing food to relief organization warehouses and food distribution centers, is the single most important aspect in the food distribution process. If the convoy system is working efficiently, food will get into the mouths of starving Somalis, the cost for food for sale on the open market will decrease, the decrease in the cost of food on the open market will decrease the basic reason why food convoys are robbed and hijacked and violence across Somalia will decrease. Since their arrival, UNITAF Forces have aggressively increased and enforced convoy escort in order to distribute the current endless supply of food to starving Somalis. With the arrival of each UNITAF Force in Somalia, convoy escorts have increased with the end result of food distribution increasing. U.S. Army Forces are currently escorting food convoys on a regular basis to Baidoa. Italian and Canadian Forces are currently working hand in hand to provide convoy escorts to Gialalassi and Belet Uen. In addition there are two major convoy security and escort operations that are in their final stages of planning.

(a) The first project which is to commence in early February 1993, entails the daily mass distribution of food to thirty-five food distribution centers for ninety straight days in Mogadishu. This program requires the daily arrival of a truck with ten tons of food at each of the thirty-five distribution centers between 0700 and 0900. U.S. Marine and Italian Forces are currently planning the escort and security of these convoys to ensure that all of the food dedicated to this program arrives on time.

(b) The second program deals with conducting food convoys from Mogadishu to Baidoa, Oddur, and Bardera. The intent of the NGO's is to run super convoys in order to fill up the warehouses as quickly as possible at each of these three locations. U.S. Army forces will be responsible for security and convoy escort from Mogadishu to Baidoa. At Baidoa, Australian Forces will assume security of the food convoys still handed off to either U.S. Marine or French Forces. U.S. Marine Forces will provide security and convoy escort from Baidoa to Bardera, and French Forces will provide security and convoy escort from Baidoa to Oddur.

(5) Airspace Control. Control of Somali airspace was nonexistent prior to the arrival of UNITAF Forces. Initially, UNAF Airspace Control Authority (ACA) focused on airspace management issues for military applications alone. Very quickly, however, it became apparent that airspace management was more than a question of controlling the airspace for military aircraft. On 14 January UNITAF air planners held their first meeting with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to begin planning for opening up Somali

airspace to international air traffic. While there are numerous details yet to be worked out (customs, procedures for contraband, etc.), this event opens the door for Somalia to become a full-fledged member of the international community.

4. Transition to UNOSOM II

a. Concept. The concept for transition of command and control of forces from UNITAF to UNOSOM II is an incremental process that is event driven. The first step is to stand up a UNOSOM II staff with the capability to command, control and coordinate activities of subordinate forces. When the UNOSOM II staff has the capability, to include communications assets, command of Humanitarian Relief Sectors is passed, sector by sector, from UNITAF control to UNOSOM II control. Transfer of each HRS is predicated by agreement of all commanders concerned that the sector is ready to switch from a Peace Enforcement to UNOSOM control, they can be consolidated from the current total of 9 HRSS to five HRSS, each under a brigade size command element as displayed in enclosure (3). When all RS's are transferred to UNOSOM II control, UNITAF's Peace Enforcement Mission is complete.

b. Transfer of Control. Pending the final approval of each HRS commander, it is currently felt that all HRSS could immediately be transferred to a Peacekeeping Mission.

(1) Resistance. The visibility of technicals and crew served weapons outside of Authorized Weapons Storage Areas is actually nonexistent. Individual weapons exist, but, are not only displayed in public as they were prior to UNITAF's arrival on 9 December 1992. Limited check points and road blocks also exist, but, are decreasing in number as UNITAF's forces expand the number and frequency of patrols and convoy operations throughout southern Somalia. Actions against UNITAF continue, however, they do not appear to be organized and are tied to isolated banditry incidents.

(2) Humanitarian Relief. Escorted convoys continue to food uncontested and with confidence throughout the country. As a result of the successful convoy escort program, GOs are currently planning on increasing the scope and of the convoys as explained in paragraph 3e(4). The unity for relief organization warehouses continues to rise as there have been no major warehouse thefts reported in the last two weeks.

(3) Infrastructure. UNITAF's two Engineer Task Forces are making superior progress towards their mission to establish target date referred to in paragraph 3b(5). At over fifty percent of the targeted MSRs have been added to an all-weather two lane capability. Most recently, as stated above, all of the MSRs have been

cleared of mines. It was also reported today by the J-4 that UNITAF has reported the most water stockpiled since its arrival, and with the assistance of ROWPU assets and new wells will commence to restock some of Mogadishu's water reservoirs.

(4) Populace. Local civilian councils and CMOCs have either been established or are being established in all HRSS to ensure both the Somali and UNITAF long term goals are interoperable. Relief food warehouses are currently filling up and larger ones are being built in some of the HRSS in anticipation of the increased food convoy program. In addition every HRS has either an ongoing local security program or is in the planning stages of initiating one.


5. The final assessment of the situation in southern Somalia is that the Peace Enforcement Mission is completed and UNITAF is ready to commence the Peacekeeping Mission by moving into Phase IV, transition of command and control to UNOSOM II. Over twenty nations are now participating in the operation with more indicating a willingness to join. The vast majority of these will remain for UNOSOM II and those already here are in assigned areas they could retain under the UN phase. This greatly facilitates the turnover as many of these forces will simply continue operating successfully in known regions.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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CLAN/FACTIONS AREAS OF INFLUENCE

SLIDE 1



USF - ABDULLAH
SDA - ROBILE
SNM - TUR/DEGEWEYNE/EGAL/KAHIN
USP - DIR
SIU - WARSAME
SSDF - ABSHIR/YUSUF
SNF - MORGAN/GANNI/HASHI
USC - AIDEED/MAHDI
SDM - ALILU


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P.02



UNITAF SOMALIA PHASE IV

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SLIDE 2


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UNITAF SOMALIA

CURRENT SITUATION





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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 29, 1993


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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Paper on Somalia for the Secretary's Meeting
with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, February 1

The attached briefing paper for the Secretary's February 1 meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was prepared following the Principals' meeting of January 28.


Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Briefing Paper on Somalia.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 11/29/16
2012-0659-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

URGENT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	Re: Somalia (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Somalia

Somalia: AF Comments on L's Informal Paper on a Joint
Resolution on Somalia

- L's informal paper (attached) notes several legal objections to the form and language of the draft Joint Resolution introduced by Senator Mitchell.
- AF agrees that, in the best of worlds, the Joint Resolution should be amended so as to be a non-binding endorsement of what the Executive Branch has done and intends to do.
- Congress, however, is unlikely to agree. Long at odds with a succession of Presidents over the constitutionality and interpretation of the War Powers Resolution, Congress will insist on a Joint Resolution that validates its view of its own role with respect to the deployment of U.S. forces.
- AF does not oppose working with members of Congress to seek appropriate changes in the Resolution but would caution against fighting a last ditch battle against a resolution that does not meet all our desiderata. If necessary, the President could address objectionable language in a statement following passage of the Resolution. The outcome would be to leave unchanged the agreement to disagree that characterizes the longstanding Executive-Congressional debate over the War Powers Resolution.

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Jan. 28, 1993
135 PM

Joint Resolution on Somalia

- o The attached draft Joint Resolution on Somalia would (1) authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to implement Security Council Resolution 794 on Somalia and (2) constitute specific statutory authorization for purposes of the War Powers Resolution's provision on troops introduced into hostilities.
- o The Resolution is objectionable on several grounds:
 - The United States is already in Somalia implementing the Security Council Resolution. The Joint Resolution implies that the President does not have the authority to be doing what the Armed Forces have been doing in Somalia since December 8.
 - The War Powers language is highly objectionable because it is based on the premise that US troops have been introduced into hostilities, which triggers the 60 day clock in the War Powers Resolution. President Bush's letter to Congress ("consistent with the War Powers Resolution") was based on the fact that troops equipped for combat were deployed, not because of hostilities.
- o Such a resolution could easily become a vehicle for further legal restrictions on our Somalia operations, such as on the number or role of US forces or the duration of their commitment.
- o If some Congressional resolution is desired or politically necessary, a much preferable alternative would be a sense-of-the Congress Resolution supporting what the US has done and intends to do. Much of the language of the current resolution could be retained.

Drafted: L/PM:ERCummings;

Cleared: L:MMatheson

SELPM 3133 Ext. 77838

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S.L.C.

103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**S. J. RES.**

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. MITCHELL (for himself, Mr. DOLE, Mr. PELL, and Mr. HELMS) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

JOINT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the use of United States Armed Forces in
Somalia.

Whereas an estimated 300,000 Somalis reportedly have died of hunger or as casualties of widespread violence since the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991;

Whereas international relief agencies had been unable to deliver adequate assistance to those most in need due to increasingly difficult and dangerous security conditions, including pervasive banditry and looting;

Whereas Congress has expressed its support for a greater United Nations role in addressing the political and humanitarian situation in Somalia through Senate Resolutions 258 and 132 and House of Representatives Resolu-

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S.L.C.

2

Whereas the United Nations Secretary General and United States officials had concluded that massive intervention in Somalia would be necessary to avert further starvation on this scale;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council on December 3, 1992, enacted Resolution 794, authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia";

Whereas President Bush began deploying United States armed forces on December 8, 1992, in response to United Nations Resolution 794;

Whereas more than 20,000 American servicemen and women are now in Somalia under Operation Restore Hope and have been joined by troops from many other nations;

Whereas President Bush has emphasized that United States Armed Forces will be withdrawn and that the security mission will be assumed by the United Nations' UNOSOM operation as soon as a "secure environment" for the delivery of food has been created; and

Whereas, on December 10, 1992, President Bush formally reported to Congress on the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Somalia: Now, therefore, be it

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
- 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

- 4 This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authoriza-
- 5 tion for Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia".

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S.L.C.

3

1 SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES
2 ARMED FORCES.

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized to
4 use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Na-
5 tions Security Council Resolution 794 in order to imple-
6 ment the Resolution, which authorizes the use of "all nec-
7 essary means to establish as soon as possible a secure en-
8 vironment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".

9 (b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.—
10 Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolu-
11 tion, the Congress declares that this section is intended
12 to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
13 meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0141

January 28, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY  RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal with Philip Johnston, President,
CARE

Philip Johnston, the President of CARE U.S., has been serving with the UN in Somalia since last fall as the head of their humanitarian operation. A highly capable and respected relief executive, he is the one bright light in an otherwise dull UN operation. He will be in the U.S. next week, and has asked to meet with the President on February 5 or February 9. He met with President Bush last December.

We recommend strongly that the President see Mr. Johnston briefly if at all possible. It would provide the President an opportunity to hear first-hand about the humanitarian situation in Somalia from a man who is working effectively on the issues President Clinton has expressed the most concern about. In addition, it sends an important signal of U.S. commitment to the humanitarian aspect of the operation, and our strong desire to see capable Americans involved on the ground. We have pushed the UN, in particular, to accept secondments of USG personnel to fill operational and management posts in Somalia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Schedule Proposal

T
A
B

I

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: MARCIA HALE, Assistant to the President and
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

REQUEST: Brief meeting with Philip Johnston

PURPOSE: To show support for strong UN humanitarian
operations in Somalia.

BACKGROUND: Johnston, the head of CARE U.S., has been
temporarily seconded to the UN to head their
humanitarian operation in Somalia. He will
be in the U.S. only briefly. Johnston is
about the only strong performer in an
otherwise dismal UN effort. We want the UN
to strengthen their operation in Somalia as
U.S. forces leave, seeking out qualified
people like Johnston. A meeting could
underscore our commitment on the humanitarian
side and emphasize the need for a strong,
qualified UN staff in Somalia, and give the
President first-hand insights into current
relief operations.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None

DATE & TIME: February 5 or February 9
DURATION: 5-10 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, the Vice President, the Chief
of Staff, Anthony Lake, John M. Ordway

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo op followed by a brief chat.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo, writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None



**Agency for International Development
Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)**



DATE: 01/26/93

**NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING
THIS COVER SHEET:** 15

PLEASE DELIVER THIS FAX TO

Name: John Ordway

Office: NSC

Telephone:

Fax: 395-3380

THIS FAX IS FROM

Name: Valerie Newsom


Office: OFDA

Telephone: 647-7558

Fax: (202) 647-5269

NOTE: fyi

January 11, 1993

TO: STATE/T: Frank Wisner
FROM: AID/AA/FHA: Andrew Natsios 
SUBJECT: Update on Relief Activities in Somalia

UNITAF operations in Somalia, which began just over four weeks ago, have already had a significant impact on the international relief community's ability to reach the most vulnerable populations. While random violence continues in many parts of Somalia, there is no doubt that the UNITAF troops have dramatically improved the security climate for relief operations and that more relief supplies are getting to those in need.

Below is an update on relief activities by sector - food arrivals and distribution in Mogadishu; food convoys outside of Mogadishu; monetization programs; health and nutritional status of at-risk populations; water programs; and agricultural and livestock activities.

I should note at the outset that it is too early to give in-depth assessments of the impact of UNITAF forces on all these sectors. We expect a fuller picture to emerge over the course of the next few weeks.

Food arrivals and distribution in Mogadishu

Approximately 30,000 MT of relief supplies carried on a total of 9 ships have come into Somalia through the Mogadishu port since the arrival of UNITAF forces. This is a dramatic improvement over pre-UNITAF conditions, when only one or two ships a month might be allowed to dock. Port shipments have been complemented by the DOD airlift out of Mombasa, which flew 3,000 MT of food into the country during the month of December.

Most important, those relief supplies moved in by ship are being moved more rapidly out of the port for distribution in Mogadishu and the rural areas. Within Mogadishu a total of 30 relief convoys have been escorted carrying 3,729 MT of supplies (including 3,459 MT of food, 100 MT of medicines and 170 MT of miscellaneous items). Some food is also moving to the nearby town of Afgoi.

Because of the troop presence, CARE is no longer forced to organize its food distribution programs in the city through the warlords - who took a disproportionate share for themselves. CARE is now in the process of establishing a food distribution system that allows for a streamlined, targeted distribution to reach the truly needy. CARE anticipates the establishment of 35 food distribution centers established by various NGOs and run with the participation of local women's groups who will help to

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set parameters for access to the center and actually distribute the food.

Food distributions outside of Mogadishu

The first corridor opened by UNITAF forces was the Mogadishu-Baidoa road. About 1,700 MT of food were escorted to Baidoa and surrounding villages during the month of December. These are the first successful road convoys to Baidoa since October. A convoy carrying about 300 MT of food departs Mogadishu port for Baidoa every 3 days now. Smaller quantities are beginning to flow from Baidoa to Bardera by road.

There are also reports of convoys from Mogadishu south to Merca and Qorioley and north from Mogadishu to Gialalassi (escorted by the Italians). Tonnages moved to date to these areas are in the 100-300 MT range. The Canadians have indicated that they will be prepared to escort food from Mogadishu to Belet Huen on January 14/15.

The PVO community is working hard, with UNITAF support, to move food from the inland hubs out to the surrounding villages. However, in some cases, poor roads and heavy rains are preventing onward movement of food. UNITAF helicopters were used on January 8 to assist CARE in distributing food to five villages outside of Baidoa which were in urgent need.

Near Bardera, food has also been moved by helicopter to villages that are cut off by land mines. CARE recently used helicopters to move 35 bags of wheat to Whelow, 15 kilometers south of Bardera. CARE found villagers there to be in precarious condition, with clearly malnourished children and the small stock of locally available food running out. Three additional villages have been targeted for helicopter drops because mines prevent road convoys to them.

On December 31, CARE moved 450 bags of wheat by road to two villages north of Bardera that had not received a distribution since October 12. UNITAF provided mine clearing and escort.

There are currently no dry ration distributions from Belet Huen into the surrounding villages. ICRC is managing 24 kitchens in the area. PVOs are currently looking at transitioning to a dry ration program. Save the Children/UK will most likely be the implementor.

Monetization

Food distributors are keen to better target dry ration distributions to the truly needy and to use cash-for-work, food-for-work and food monetization programs to reach the rest of the population.

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The first ship carrying 350 MT of wheat flour for monetization arrived in Mogadishu on Jan 9. CARE has announced the sale of food in newspapers and on the local radio. The response has been good with 22 tenders received so far. Bidding will close on January 11 and the sale will be conducted on January 14. AID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) staff are working with UNITAF and CARE to establish the security procedures for handling the money generated from the sales. As relief supplies on the black market become less available, CARE plans to move away from selling such specialized commodities as wheat flour and sugar and concentrate on sale of bulk grains and oil.

CARE still plans to initiate labor-intensive projects through the PVO community once local currency is generated from the monetization programs. In the meantime, AID has already initiated funding for some labor-intensive programs. AID has just approved funding for labor intensive projects in Merca/Qorioley (17,000 workers to be hired through SCF/UK to help with the repair of irrigation canals), Mogadishu (1,000 sweepers and rubbish collectors to be hired through UNDP) and Baidoa (68 persons to work on reconstruction of a district health center and orphanage through the International Medical Corps). We expect more projects of this type to be submitted for funding.

Health and nutritional status

The most significant study on health in Somalia was conducted by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Afgoi and Baidoa in November/December. The CDC study revealed that 70 percent of the under-five displaced population had died between April 1 and November 30, 1992. Death rates were found to be among the highest ever documented in a famine situation.

Anecdotal reports indicate that the death rate in Baidoa during the December period was about 60 persons/day. The rate was similar in Bardera.

Death rates appeared to level off in some areas late in the year for a number of reasons, including population shifts, the fact that many vulnerables had already died, and the fact that the U.S. airlift was providing a more constant source of food for some.

We do not expect to see immediate significant changes in the health and nutritional status of at-risk populations. We expect that the impact of a regular source of food supply, now possible because of UNITAF security, as well as the relief programs complementary to the food distributions, will take another 4-6 weeks to show results.

Water

Contaminated water has been a major killer in Somalia. Insecurity has often prevented the repair of wells as hand pumps were stolen as soon as they were in place. In Bardera, the AID DART team recently airlifted in a water pump to replace a stolen pump (that looters offered to sell back to the relief community at an exorbitant price). The presence of coalition forces should help assure the new pump is not stolen.

AID also recently flew in spare parts for the Mogadishu water system. UNICEF and UNDP are working together to help repair portions of that system, which is now providing water to an estimated 60 percent of the Mogadishu population.

PVOs are submitting additional water proposals now to A.I.D. to cover needs in the south/central areas.

Agriculture and Livestock Activities

Satellite images and field observations indicate that rains, although late in arriving, were abundant in November. (November rains are crucial in determining crop yields from the October-December growing season.)

Sorghum has been planted in the Bay (near Baldoa) and Gedo (near Bardera) regions and maize in the lower Shabelle area. Good rains should mean a fairly good harvest FOR FARMERS WHO WERE ABLE TO PLANT A CROP. Much of the fertile land in the south/central area remains fallow because of displacement of farmers and lack of seed. PVOs estimate that the yield will be somewhere around 15 percent of what is normally produced in the December harvest. A WFP/FAO crop/food assessment is scheduled for late January and should provide a clearer picture of overall agricultural activities in the country.

The relief community is working to distribute more seed for the March/April planting season. Seed replication activities are ongoing in northern Kenya. In addition, a good harvest now will yield additional seeds for the next planting season.

ICRC is still the lead agency in the livestock sector and is focusing on livestock vaccination. Its coverage is quite extensive. For example, in Belet Huen it has vaccinated 140,000 head of cattle of an estimated population of 200,000. Its program also extends into the northeast and northwest.

It is critical that the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) initiate its livestock certification program to allow for more expansive exports of livestock from Somalia. AID's DART team is reviewing FAO's draft proposal now.

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Coordination

The UNOSOM Coordination Center in Mogadishu continues to be the primary coordinating body to bring the UN, the PVO community and the US military together. It is staffed primarily by representatives of the AID DART team and the US military. The UN presence at the center is still disappointingly thin.

The Coordination Center is replicated in the field. Inland towns targeted by UNITAF as well as Kismayo all have Coordination Centers staffed by the UN, the US military and the AID DART team. In most towns, the DART member substitutes for a UN staff person.

Representatives of the Coordination Centers meet regularly with local elders and other town leaders, including women's groups. All international relief agencies are being urged to join up with local Somali groups to implement their expanded relief and rehabilitation programs. PVO proposals under review by the DART indicate that the international agencies are in fact now organizing to work more through Somali community groups.

AID is also in the process of providing equipment for the UNOSOM Coordination Center in Mogadishu. We will provide an information system that will include an expanded HF network, six computers built into a Local Area Network (LAN), enhanced satellite communications and a generator. We will also provide staff to install the information system and salaries for local hire employees to provide technical support.

6

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Drafted: AID/FHA/OFDA: DEsposito; 1/11/93
Cleared: AID/FHA: ANatsios
AID/FHA/OFDA: JKunder

cc:

State/AF/E:MCheshes
State/IO: MKimble
State/HA: JKauffman
State/RP: ANelson
State/P: HThomas
State/S: GAbercrombie-Winstanley
AID/AFR: RGold
DOD/GA: RWolthuis
JCS:
OSD:
TF001:

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE
(OFDA)

SITUATION REPORT NO. 18

January 18, 1993

SOMALIA - Civil Strife

NOTE: Information since last situation report, dated December 17, is underlined.

Area Affected: All of Somalia, neighboring areas of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.


No. Dead: The total death toll is unknown, but the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies estimates that up to 500,000 people may have already died as a result of famine and civil strife. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that more than 25 percent of Somali children under age 5 have died.

No. Affected: ICRC estimates that 1.5 million people in Somalia face starvation due to the effects of civil strife; as many as three times that number will need some kind of assistance (the total population of Somalia is approx. 6.5 million). Current estimates of refugees are as follows: in Ethiopia - 375,000; in Kenya - over 330,000; in Djibouti - 20,000, (6,000-10,000 are in camps along the southern border); in Yemen - 70,000 (many of whom are ethnic Yemeni-Somalis); in Saudi Arabia - 150,000. There are also hundreds of thousands of people internally displaced within Somalia.

Total U.S. Government Assistance

FY 1991-1993: \$248,670,733

(this figure does not include funds expended to support Operation Restore Hope)



Overview

U.S. led coalition forces under Operation Restore Hope are working to establish a secure environment in eight humanitarian relief zones in southern and central Somalia that have been besieged by insecurity since the eruption of civil war in early 1991. The eight zones include Mogadishu (and nearby Merca), Baidoa, Bardera, Kismayo, Hoddur, Belet Weyne, Gialalassi and Baledoogle. This has allowed food and other relief commodities to flow into previously dangerous ports and relief convoys to travel via land to meet the needs of the vulnerable populations. Coalition forces will also prepare the way for the subsequent U.N. peacekeeping force. Operation Restore Hope is being conducted under U.N. auspices and is in response to sentiment expressed by the United Nations, non-

governmental organizations, U.S. Government representatives and others involved in the relief effort that insecurity in Somalia had rendered relief methods inadequate to meet the needs of the desperate population.

As of Jan. 7, the U.S. had deployed approximately 21,000 military personnel in support of Operation Restore Hope. Coalition forces are made up of troops from Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Kingdom. (Australia, India, Nigeria, Sweden, Tunisia and Zimbabwe have deployed advance parties which are currently in country.) Since the deployment of coalition forces, over 3,000 MT of relief food has been transported by

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guarded truck convoy from the Mogadishu port to other areas in Mogadishu and over 2,200 MT has been transported by guarded convoy from Mogadishu to Baidoa, Gialalassi, Belet Weyne and Merca/Oorioley. Food is also beginning to flow from Mogadishu through Baidoa to Bardera due to successful demining operations conducted by coalition forces. Additional demining and road repairs that will take place in January and February will allow for the opening of other major southern routes. The opening of the route from Kismayo to Bardera is a high priority as it will allow for food movement from the Kismayo port to inland areas. At the Kismayo port, U.S. Naval officers have undertaken the clearance of sunken ships and underwater debris in the port area. WFP expects the arrival of a relief ship in Kismayo in January.

With the increased security provided through Operation Restore Hope, relief organizations will soon be able to expand their programs into previously inaccessible areas. Current surveys are being conducted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the lower Shabelle region between Merca and Brava. This is significant as there have been no relief operations in Brava for the past 30 days due to insecurity. Utilizing U.S. military air capacity, relief organizations are also attempting to assess needs in the area between Bardera and Kismayo. Their efforts will be greatly facilitated by the opening of the main road by coalition forces.

There are signs of reconciliation between two of Somalia's reigning warlords, General Aideed and interim president Ali-Mahdi, both representatives of rival Hawiye faction of the United Somali Congress. On Dec. 11, U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia Robert Oakley along with U.N. special representative to Somalia Ismat Kittani played an integral role in negotiating peace talks between the two warlords. The United Nations also sponsored a conference of Somali leaders in Addis Ababa to discuss Somalia reconciliation the first week of January and brokered an agreement for a follow-on national reconciliation conference in March. The factions represented at the January meeting agreed on a ceasefire and agreed to turn over heavy weapons to the multinational forces.

Relief Efforts

On August 28, the U.S. began a military airlift of emergency food supplies into Somalia from Mombasa, Kenya. This airlift was facilitated by Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) dispatched by A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

(OFDA) to coordinate the military airlift with relief organizations in Somalia and to fund relief programs targeted at vulnerable populations in Somalia and Kenya. Since the U.S. Government airlift started on August 21, the Department of Defense (DOD) has transported over 20,000 metric tons (MT) of relief goods into Belet Weyne, Baidoa, Bardera, Gialalassi, Hoddur, Wajit and Mogadishu in Somalia and into Garissa and Wajir in northern Kenya. The establishment of security by coalition forces in these areas has reduced the threat of insecurity that, in the past, plagued the airlift operation and hampered distribution of airlifted supplies. The German, Canadian, Belgian and United Kingdom Air Forces have also contributed aircraft and personnel towards the relief airlift effort. German and U.K. relief aircraft are currently being managed by the U.S. Joint Task Force Provide Relief in Mombasa. OFDA is also funding four civilian aircraft transporting relief commodities for WFP and ICRC. OFDA-funded civilian aircraft have transported over 14,000 MT of relief supplies into Somalia. Utilizing German, Canadian and civilian aircraft, WFP has airdropped an additional 600 MT into otherwise inaccessible areas. Once transport routes through Somalia are secured, the airlift operation will be scaled back; however, it is likely that an OFDA-funded civilian airlift operation will be required until at least March 1993.

ICRC remains the primary organization distributing relief food and supplies throughout the country. The ICRC estimates that it currently serves an estimated one million people two meals each day through its community kitchens, and that it provides another one million people with dry rations. ICRC also provides medical supplies for 10 hospitals, administers 50 dispensaries run by local staff, distributes seed to farmers and vaccinates and provides veterinary care to livestock. The ICRC employs 1,500 local staff and 80 expatriates to carry out its programs.

Along with providing support to NGO relief efforts, the United Nations has attempted to broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Mogadishu and to secure the transportation of relief convoys. Fifty unarmed U.N. ceasefire monitors were stationed in Mogadishu, and were joined by a unit composed of 500 Pakistani U.N. security guards. Although the Pakistani troops were able to gain a tenuous control of the Mogadishu International Airport, frequent attacks by armed militia continued to cause diversions of relief aircraft. The U.N. was unable to secure approval from reigning warlords in Somalia for the deployment of additional U.N. troops in central and southern Somalia.

In recognition that further military intervention was required to secure the receipt and transport of humanitarian convoys, on Dec. 3 the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously in favor of President Bush's offer of a U.S.-led multinational force that would be deployed under U.N. auspices to achieve a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. The U.S. Government and the U.N. encouraged other nations to participate by providing troops and/or money towards Operation Restore Hope.

The U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs has also convened two international conferences, one held in October in Geneva and the other held in December in Addis Ababa to discuss the relief effort in Somalia and to develop better coordination mechanisms. The conferences were attended by U.S. delegations and representatives from the international community. The United Nations is also currently revising its Somalia humanitarian relief action plan and plans to present it to donors in February.

A. U.N. Somalia (UNOSOM) Coordination Center called the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) has been established in Mogadishu and includes representation from the United Nations, OFDA's DART team, the U.S. military, the ICRC and the NGO community. The HOC is tasked with coordinating U.S. military activities with the relief community. U.N. appointee Philip Johnston, President and CEO of CARE USA, serves as HOC chairperson.

Situation by Region

Mogadishu Area

Coalition forces arrived in Mogadishu on Dec. 9 and secured the international airport and the Mogadishu port, enabling the arrival and offloading of relief ships. The troops have also escorted food convoys to north Mogadishu and to inland areas; as of Jan. 5, WFP reports that 3,420 MT have moved from the Mogadishu port within the city and 2,200 MT have moved from the Mogadishu port to Baidoa, Gialalassi, Belet Weyne and Merca/Qorioley. Security in Mogadishu, although vastly improved from before troop arrival, appears to have deteriorated in the past few weeks as local thugs grow accustomed to the presence of foreign troops and consistently test their boundaries. The humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, where an estimated one million people require relief assistance and 350,000 - 400,000 displaced people are completely reliant on ICRC feeding kitchens, remains grim. The Mogadishu water system was recently revived with the help of the U.S. military and the provision of spare parts through OFDA.

NGO monetization efforts in Mogadishu are taking off with the arrival of 350 MT of wheat flour from Mombasa. CARE and WFP, with close coordination through DART, have secured bids from Somali merchants and the monetized food will be sold soon. Security will be provided for the Somali shillings generated and the profits will be used to fund labor-intensive cash-for-work projects implemented by the relief community. As relief supplies on the black market become less available, CARE plans to move away from selling such specialized commodities as wheat flour and sugar and concentrate on sales of bulk grains and oil.

Southern and Central Regions

Coalition forces arrived in Kismayo on Dec. 20 and have provided security for relief activities targeted at the population of 160,000, of whom 60,000 are displaced. A relief ship carrying 3,000 MT of WFP sorghum is scheduled to arrive this month. Relief ships have been unable to berth in the Kismayo port since early October and the added security provided by coalition forces along with military activity to clear debris in the port area will facilitate the arrival of the relief ship. The opening of the main roads from Mogadishu to Baidoa to Bardera to Kismayo will also facilitate relief activity. Food needs in Kismayo continue to be addressed by the relief airlift operation.

Despite troop arrival, security in Kismayo, remains tenuous. Two days prior to the arrival of coalition forces, relief workers report that an estimated 150 Somalis were murdered by forces loyal to Colonel Jess. The head of UNICEF operations in Kismayo, a British citizen, was killed on Jan. 2. As a result of the shooting, the U.N. temporarily ceased operations in Kismayo and Medecins sans Frontieres, Belgium (MSF) reduced the number of expatriate staff. WFP representatives returned on Jan. 6. Through the turmoil, ICRC feeding kitchens continued to operate.

Coalition forces arrived in Belet Weyne on Dec. 28. Canadian forces will remain in Belet Weyne to provide security for relief operations. An OFDA DART representative will be deployed to Belet Weyne to work with coalition forces and the relief community. Coalition forces also secured nearby Gialalassi (population 10,000) on Dec. 27.

Belet Weyne has a population of 110,000, of which 50,000 are displaced. ICRC continues to receive relief airlifts and is operating 24 kitchens in Belet Weyne and the surrounding villages. There is, however, no dry distribution program from Belet Weyne to the surrounding villages and relief organizations are

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planning to transition from feeding kitchens to a dry ration program. Along with running two health posts and distributing seeds in the area, ICRC is also conducting a livestock rehabilitation program in Belet Weyne and has vaccinated 140,000 of the total cattle population of about 200,000.

Baidoa, the first inland area secured by coalition forces, has received over 1,770 MT of food via truck convoy from Mogadishu since the beginning of Operation Restore Hope. Prior to troop arrival on Dec. 16, attempts to deliver food by land to Baidoa and the surrounding areas were largely thwarted by looting. The Baidoa community includes an estimated 110,000 of which about 50,000 are displaced. In December, a Center for Disease Control (CDC) rapid assessment team reported that an estimated 39.3% of the displaced population living in camps in Baidoa had died since the beginning of April 1992. CDC also reported that an estimated 70% of the under-five population in Baidoa had perished between April and November of 1992. Recent reports by World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD) indicate that the numbers of deaths per day has fallen from 250 per day in September to 40 per day in December. Irish CONCERN reports that for the week ending Dec. 12, an average of 60 people in Baidoa were dying each day.

The inadequate and polluted water supply in Baidoa has been stretched by the huge influx of people into the area since the commencement of civil strife in Somalia. Measles vaccination coverage for the population is reportedly inadequate. The high mortality rate in Baidoa has been largely due to preventable and treatable illnesses such as measles and dysentery, which are complicated by malnutrition. With improved security allowing for the transport of urgently needed medicines, a massive inoculation program is being planned. A DART representative is in place in Baidoa and will assist in coordinating military activity with the relief community as well as identify areas for expanded humanitarian intervention in Baidoa and Bardera.

Coalition forces arrived in Bardera on Dec. 23 to provide security for agencies providing relief to an indigenous population of approximately 4,000 and an additional 20,000 displaced persons residing at the displaced camp ("Italian camp"). Since troop arrival, CARE has deployed a convoy carrying 35 MT of wheat to six villages west of Bardera for the first time. Their success was due to mine clearing activities by coalition forces that preceded the convoy. CARE also utilized U.S. military helicopters to deliver 30 bags of

wheat to Whelow, 15 km south of Bardera, and has targeted additional villages for delivery of relief food via helicopter. The crude mortality rate in Bardera has also decreased since the high numbers recorded shortly after General Morgan's takeover of Bardera on Oct. 13. At that time, an estimated 250 to 300 people were dying daily among the displaced populations. Relief workers now estimate that, in the month of December, the number of deaths each day had reduced to 64.

Relief agencies continue to address the critical water problems in Bardera. Most residents of Bardera draw their drinking and washing water from the Juba river which is severely contaminated as well as poisoned by decomposing bodies buried in shallow graves on the river's banks. Water available in the few wells in town is too saline to be potable. A water pump installed by Oxfam in the Italian camp in November was looted in mid-December, leaving thousands of displaced without drinking water for several weeks. DART's purchase of a replacement pump that was installed in Bardera on Jan. 7 has allowed for the provision of clean water to the camp population.

On Jan. 14, a Swiss ICRC delegate in Bardera was shot and killed, reportedly as a result of a wage dispute.

On Dec. 25, coalition forces arrived in Hoddur, a town which hosts 20,000 - 25,000 residents with an unknown number of displaced temporarily settled in the region. Irish Concern, Medecins sans Frontieres, France, ICRC and UNICEF are currently operational in Hoddur and receive food and other supplies via the international airlift from Mombasa. Updated reports from MSF/France indicate that in December an estimated 124 of the participants in the supplementary feeding centers were dying each day. A Centers for Disease Control (CDC) rapid assessment team visited Hoddur in late October and reported that the high mortality rate in Hoddur was attributable to measles, diarrhea and malnutrition. The CDC doctors reported that most deaths were occurring in people from outside Hoddur, suggesting that relief efforts should concentrate on more rural areas. Food distributions in Hoddur have not yet expanded. CONCERN will require double the food currently available through airlift operations before expansion is possible. Rations should also be diversified as currently the food needs are being met solely with wheat. WFP is planning the first overland convoy to Hoddur in the near future. An expanded medical program through MSF/France or additional NGOs is required in the surrounding villages. Water availability remains a problem in

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Hoddur, both for the population and for the French troops who will remain in Hoddur.

Coalition forces arrived in the coastal town of Merca, located in the lower Shabelle region, on December 31 and have facilitated the landing of food barges and the deployment of convoys to outlying areas. Despite the continued looting of some food before the barges land and while the food is leaving the port, relief workers report that the security situation has vastly improved since troop arrival. At least 300 MT of food was successfully delivered to nearby Oorioley from Mogadishu via guarded truck convoy after insecurity had prevented the village from receiving food for weeks prior to troop arrival. Brava remains inaccessible due to continued looting problems but current surveys are being conducted by NGOs in the area between Merca and Brava.

The lower Shabelle region is an important agricultural area and efforts focused there will help improve crop production this year in Somalia. OFDA has funded a Save the Children, U.S. (SCF) project which will utilize up to 17,000 local workers to rehabilitate the irrigation system in Oorioley. In some other areas of southern and central Somalia, relief workers are hopeful that earlier crops planted for the October-December growing season will yield good harvests. Sorghum was planted in the Bay and Gedo regions and maize in the lower Shabelle area, and the good rains received in November should mean a fairly good harvest for farmers who were able to plant a crop. In Hoddur, however, harvest prospects are not very good although they appear to be better in nearby Wajit. Relief workers are planning seed distribution for the larger March/April planting season but crop yields will be reliant on continued security and the return of Somali refugees to their home lands in time for the planting season. CONCERN plans to distribute rehabilitation packages to 9,000 families in or near Hoddur who plan to return home to plant.

There are approximately 330,000 Somali refugees currently in Kenya. The refugees in Kenya have brought Somalia's factional fighting with them, complicating relief efforts both in northern Kenya--where the combination of a severe drought and hundreds of thousands of refugees has produced a desperate situation--and in southern Somalia. Despite efforts by relief workers to address the needs of these refugees, insecurity in the camps has made the refugees anxious to return home. UNHCR and DART members are concerned that as security improves in Somalia, there will be a rapid influx of refugees attempting to return to their home villages. To date,

UNHCR reports that an estimated 3,200 Somali refugees have returned to Somalia. Relief methods to address the needs of these returnees are currently being discussed. UNHCR is planning to open offices in Mogadishu and Bardera.

Northwestern Region

In the midst of the chaos consuming southern Somalia, northwestern Somalia offers hope for a return to normal life. The local economy in the northwest is still relatively vibrant, livestock production appears to be in good shape, and progress has been made in repairing some of the severe infrastructural damage sustained during the last years of Siad Barre's regime. In addition, northwestern Somalia has benefitted from relief food leaking over the border from Somali refugee camps in Ethiopia. However, Somalis from the region complain that the government is unable to provide basic services or maintain law and order. Reports by a team of U.N. Development Program (UNDP) sponsored mine consultants indicate that there may be 1-1.2 million mines in the northwest. The British company Rimfire has been working in Hargeisa to clear mines in the city and the surrounding area. As of Dec. 1, Rimfire had destroyed over 15,000 mines and unexploded ordnance. In Hargeisa, relief workers report that looting and banditry remain a serious obstacle to relief efforts. Hostilities among the clans and sub-clans of the Issak group have also repeatedly disrupted commerce and prevented development activities in the northwest, but there are signs that the clans may be settling their differences.

Northeastern Region

Conditions are generally better in the northeast than in the southern and central regions, although tensions between Islamic fundamentalists and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) continue. The principal port in the region, Bosaso, is functioning, and is one of the few Somali cities where electricity is regularly provided to the residents. UNICEF is planning to start a vaccination campaign in the northeast soon.

Requests from leaders in the northern regions for coalition forces to move into the area to stabilize the security situation have been made. At this time, however, there are no plans for UNITAF troops to move into the north.

Assistance Provided by the U.S. Government (USG)

The U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission were forced

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to evacuate their personnel from Somalia in early January 1991. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Herman J. Cohen has declared civil strife disasters in Somalia on March 25, 1991 for FY 1991, on Nov. 19, 1991 for FY 1992, and in light of the ongoing crisis in Somalia, on Oct. 2, 1992 for FY 1993.

OFDA's DART arrived in Nairobi on August 21 and meets regularly with DOD, representatives of other governments, NGOs and U.N. agencies to coordinate the airlift and to expedite funding for relief operations in northern Kenya and Somalia. A DART team in Mombasa works closely with DOD, Somalia based international organizations and NGOs to coordinate the relief airlift. On December 6, OFDA deployed additional personnel to Mogadishu as part of the newly formed UNOSOM Operations Center. The Operations Center is coordinating U.S. military activities with the U.N., ICRC and NGOs in Somalia.

In addition to the contributions listed below, the U.S. government is currently expending significant funds on the DOD airlift into northern Kenya and Somalia, which is estimated to have cost approximately \$10 million as of September 11. Funds listed below do not include funds expended by DOD to support Operation Restore Hope.

OFDA Assistance

FY 1991

Total OFDA FY 1991 - \$4,383,427

FY 1992

In FY 1992, OFDA funded food distribution, medical, emergency water, agricultural, monetization and airlift activities conducted by the following relief agencies: United Nations, ICRC, International Medical Corps (IMC), SCF/U.K., Medecins sans Frontieres, France and Belgium (MSF/France, MSF/Belgium), World Concern, Action Internationale contre la Faim (AICF), WVRD, Lutheran World Relief, Irish Concern, CARE, GOAL and the International Rescue Committee (IRC).

Total OFDA FY 1992 - \$34,811,614

FY 1993

Funding for DART members \$95,491

Funding for Southern Air Transport to provide emergency airlift services and reimbursement to WFP for fuel for airlift \$7,732,892

Procurement of spare parts for Mogadishu water system \$260,135

Funds for monetization programs to be implemented by NGOs \$150,000

Procurement of SATCOMM for DART \$29,328

Grant to CISP (Italian NGO) to provide health facilities and assistance in Adale, El-Dor, and Mogadishu \$332,250

Grant to Food for the Hungry International (FHI) to provide food assistance in Marsebit District, Northern Kenya \$91,020

Funding to IMC for air transport supporting NGO emergency medical and surgical program \$307,731

Grant to IRC for cross-border food monetization \$250,000

Grant to MSF/Holland for mine clearing program in Somalia \$154,976

Grant to MSF/Spain for health care activities in Aden Yabal and Jowhar \$200,000

Grant to SCF/US for an agricultural revitalization program in the Lower Shabelle Region \$990,000

Grant to SCF/US for health initiatives in the Lower Shabelle Region \$132,831

Funds to W. Giertsen to purchase six Rubb Hall tents \$129,000

Purchase of water pump for Bardera ... \$1,338

FY 1993 OFDA contributions to date - \$10,856,992

To date, OFDA has contributed a total of \$50,052,033 towards the Somalia relief effort in FY 1991 - FY 1993.

U.S. Government food donations

FY 1991

In FY 1991, a total of 12,210 MT of PL 480 Title II food, valued at \$5,743,700 was programmed for Somalia and channelled through WFP and CARE.

Total food donations FY 1991 - 12,210 MT valued at \$5,743,700

FY 1992

In FY 1992, FFP and USDA programmed 79,900 MT of grains (corn, rice, wheat and sorghum), beans, vegetable oil and high-protein supplementary food for Somalia. The estimated value of this contribution is \$42,373,700.

Total food donations FY 1992 - 79,900 MT valued at \$42,373,700

FY 1993

125,000 MT of Section 416(b) corn
to WFP \$31,130,000

44,521 MT of PL 480 Title II rice, lentils,
bulgur wheat and vegetable
oil to ICRC \$31,803,400

50,010 MT of PL 480 Title II sorghum and
beans to CRS \$34,610,800

1,296 MT of PL 480 Title II wheat soy blend
to WFP \$780,200

14,000 MT of PL 480 Title II food
to WFP and CARE \$5,616,000

2,584 MT of PL 480 Title II food to
WVRD \$960,900

**FY 1993 food donations to date - 237,411 MT
valued at \$104,901,300**

**To date, FFP and USDA have contributed a total of
329,521 MT valued at \$153,018,700 towards the
Somalia relief effort in FY 1991-1993.**

Department of State Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP)

Total RP FY 1991 - \$19,500,000

Total RP FY 1992 - \$23,300,000

FY 1993

RP's FY 1993 contribution includes \$1.3 million contributed to MSF/Belgium and France in Kenya for medical programs for Somali refugees. RP also contributed \$40 million to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) Africa-wide program, a portion of which will be applied towards programs for Somali refugees. This figure is not

included in the total RP contribution listed below.

RP FY 1993 contribution to date - \$2,800,000

**To date, RP has provided a total of \$45,600,000
towards the Somalia relief effort in FY 1991-1993.**

Total USG Assistance

for FY 1991-1993 \$248,670,733

Assistance Provided by the International Community

International Organizations (see text for more information)

EC - Has provided \$160,880,000 in relief assistance, including pledges for a total of 206,386 MT of food. For FY 1993 the EC has pledged an additional 80,000 MT of rice to ICRC. Further contributions are anticipated. (EC contribution may overlap with some country donations listed below)

ICRC - ICRC has been involved in the following relief activities: conducting airlift; delivering food by boat; running feeding kitchens; providing emergency medical assistance; distributing seeds, tools and veterinary drugs throughout the country; and providing logistical assistance to NGOs. ICRC is also conducting tracing activities and exchange of Red Cross messages.

OPEC - has granted \$120,000 to Somalia to purchase food, clothing and medical supplies for displaced persons to be distributed through UNICEF.

UNICEF - supporting airlifts to Mogadishu; supplying health kits to MCH centers in the northwest, Mogadishu and Kismayo; working with displaced in southern Somalia.

WFP - conducting airlift; delivering food by boat.

WHO - provided \$1.2 million worth of surgical equipment, drug kits, UNIMIX and tuberculosis and anti-malarial drugs to NGOs in the first half of 1992.

U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations (For more information on U.S. NGO activity, consult Interaction, 202-667-8227):

Africare - provided International Medical Corps (IMC) in Baidoa with nutrition recuperation program supplies for the IMC hospital; provided 2,000 bowls

and cups to Somali refugees on Ethiopian border.

Air Serv - conducting relief flights for the U.N. and NGOs in north eastern Kenya for Somali refugee programs.

American Friends of Action Internationale Contre la Faim - providing support for therapeutic and supplemental feeding centers, primary health care, well rehabilitation and latrine building in Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle and Bardera.

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)- in Mogadishu, AFSC channels food aid to a communal kitchen for approximately 3,500 Ethiopian refugees; In Afgoi, AFSC provides food, bedding, medical care, mosquito nets, fuel and other relief supplies to two orphanages. In Lower Shabelle region, AFSC provides food aid, development assistance, seeds, tools, livestock and training to local agricultural cooperative.

American Red Cross - contributed \$326,000 cash and medical supplies valued at \$208,550 to ICRC program.

AmeriCares - sent medicine and medical supplies to hospitals in Mogadishu and Baidoa.

Baptist World Alliance - provided \$30,000 for food distribution in Somalia refugee camps in northeast Kenya and gave \$10,000 to CARE for ongoing feeding programs in Somalia.

CARE - food distribution programs and supplemental feeding in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bardera; seed distribution in Baidoa, Hoddur and Bardera; health centers in Baidoa and Bardera; monetization program in northern region and in Mogadishu.

Catholic Relief Services - cross-border operation from Mandera and El Wak to Somalia; contributed \$3,000 towards relief effort; airlift operation utilizing U.S. military and Lutheran World Federation aircraft; feeding center and food distribution in outlying villages of Baidoa; nutrition and health assessments, agricultural rehabilitation program and water rehabilitation project in the Bay region.

Church World Service - donated \$30,000 to assist with airlift of food and medicine to children's feeding centers in Somalia.

Direct Relief International - provided medicine and medical supplies valued at \$70,000 to IMC.

Food for the Hungry (FHI) - provided food aid and

medical supplies to World Concern, ICRC and other programs. Seconded medical staff to World Concern and other organizations. Value of commodities and personnel services provided to date is approximately \$460,000.

INMED - provided medical supplies for relief organizations in Somalia.

IMC - operates one hospital and one surgical team in Mogadishu; one hospital and surgical team in Baidoa; one hospital and medical outreach program in Belet Weyne.

International Rescue Committee - cross border operations from Mandera and El Wak into Somalia; public health and sanitation programs in El Wak refugee camp; health and sanitation program in Bardera; monetization project in Somalia.

Map International - provided medical supplies valued at \$200,000 to FHI.

Operation USA - sent shipments to ICRC and IMC.

SCF/U.S. - agricultural rehabilitation and community health training in Qorioley.

World Concern - feeding programs and medical care for approximately 20 villages near Kismayo; eight supplemental feeding centers in Mogadishu.

World Relief - provided \$10,000 to SIM International to provide clean water in villages along Kenya/Somalia border.

World Vision - provided \$150,000 to World Concern; provided medicine and medical supplies to health care workers in Mogadishu; supplementary feeding programs and distribution of agricultural packs in Baidoa.

Non-Governmental Organizations

AICF - runs supplementary feeding centers, therapeutic feeding centers and water activities in Mogadishu; therapeutic feeding centers in Bardera

CISP (Italian NGO) - runs six maternal child health (MCH) clinics and supplementary feeding centers in north Mogadishu.

Irish Concern - one supplementary feeding center, one school and an ORS center in Mogadishu; supplementary feeding and therapeutic feeding centers in Baidoa; feeding kitchens and general food

distribution in Baidoa; supplementary feeding centers in Afgoi, supplementary feeding centers in Uanie Uen, dry food distribution in Wajit and sanitation projects in northern Kenya.

GOAL - support to an orphanage; supplementary feeding and seed distribution in Baidoa; supplemental feeding centers and medical program in Merca.

MSF/Belgium - one hospital and supplemental feeding centers in Kismayo; feeding centers in Gelib; supplementary feeding centers in northern Kenya.

MSF/France - provides medical supplies to hospitals and clinics in Mogadishu; supplementary feeding centers, water/sanitation projects and ORS centers in Merca; supplemental feeding centers and water/sanitation projects in Brava; supplemental feeding centers, measles vaccination program and water projects in Hoddur, outpatient clinic/dispensary and feeding centers in Qorioley, feeding centers measles vaccination and water project in Wajit.

MSF/Holland - supplemental feeding centers and medical program in Baidoa; funding Rimfire for mine-clearing operation in Hargeisa.

MSF/Spain - health, water and medical projects in Middle Shabelle.

Oxfam/U.K. - water projects in Baidoa; supplemental feeding and agricultural projects in Kismayo; seed program in Merca; seed/tools program in Brava; agricultural rehabilitation in Qorioley.

SCF/UK - supplementary feeding centers, therapeutic feeding centers, primary health care training and water projects in Mogadishu; water projects in Baidoa; therapeutic feeding centers, supplementary feeding centers and water projects in Belet Weyne; therapeutic feeding and water projects in Gialalassi.

SOS International (Austrian NGO) - maintains a pediatric hospital and runs an orphanage in Mogadishu.

SAS (local NGO) - works on garbage collection with UNDP in Mogadishu.

SWEDERELIEF - supplementary feeding centers in Mogadishu; latrine construction in Bardera.

TROCAIRE - seeds distribution, water project, supplementary feeding and schools in northern Kenya

Governments

(cash and food donations towards relief operations only)

Australia - contributed \$6.1 million, including 4,000 MT of wheat.

Austria - donated \$1.2 million

Belgium - donated \$10.22 million, including 1,460 MT of wheat

Botswana - donated \$272,000

Canada -- donated \$14.9 million, including 2,600 MT of food

Denmark - \$7.9 million

Finland - donated \$6 million, including 3,133 MT of food

France - donated \$3 million and 6,105 MT of food assistance

Germany - contributed \$79.4 million

Greece- donated \$80,000 and 16 MT of food

Ireland - donated \$1.2 million

Italy - contributed \$1 million

Japan - contributed \$27.14 million

Libya - donated 7,662 MT of wheat flour

Licchtenstein - contributed \$14,500

Luxembourg - donated \$2 million

Malaysia - contributed \$94,250

Netherlands - donated \$17.6 million

New Zealand - donated \$270,000

Norway - donated \$2 million

Oman - donated \$3.8 million, including 3,417

Qatar - donated \$279,000

Saudi Arabia - contributed \$10 million and 2,500 MT of food

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Sudan - donated 10 MT of food


Sweden - donated \$22 million

Switzerland - donated \$3.6 million

Turkey - provided 162 MT of food

United Arab Emirates - donated 1,342 MT of food

United Kingdom - donated over \$41.5 million including over 34,000 MT of food. In addition the U.K. has contributed over \$3,125,000 towards the cost of U.N. guards to protect relief supplies; \$3,125,000 towards the UNHCR appeal for refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia; and \$78,125 to assist Somali refugees in Yemen.


Jim Kunder
Director
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 27, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY/RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Revised Somalia Paper for Principals Meeting

We have re-drafted the paper based on your comments, and those from State and JCS. In the case of JCS the paper, with their revisions, has been cleared by Colin Powell and Dave Jeremiah. At State, the clearances have been at the Assistant Secretary/bureau level.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to transmit the paper to his counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Somalia Paper
Tab 1 Map
Tab 2 Forces
Tab 3 Oakley Report

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 11/29/16
2012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20039

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: January 28 Principals Meeting (S)

In addition to the previously transmitted memorandum on another subject, attached is a paper for the Principals Meeting on Somalia, January 28, 1993, at 2:00 pm. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Somalia Paper
Tab 1 Map
Tab 2 Forces
Tab 3 Oakley Report

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 11/29/16
0012-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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B

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. paper	Somalia Policy: Near-Term Decisions (8 pages)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. map	Status of Forces (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. chart	Forces Currently In Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. chart	Other Forces Planning to Participate in Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. cable	Re: Where We Are and Where Do We Go From Here (6 pages)	01/25/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY/^QRICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee
Meeting on Somalia, January 25, 1993

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the DC meeting on Somalia held in the White House Situation Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to forward the transmittal memo to his Counterparts at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 11/29/16
2012-0659-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (S)

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia, January 25, 1993. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 11/29/16
2012-0059-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 page)	01/25/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	[Duplicate of 002e] (3 pages)	01/24/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. letter	PJ Keating, Prime Minister of Australia, to President Bush (2 pages)	01/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [7]

2012-0659-F
ke4092

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 21, 1993



TO: NSC SECRETARIAT
FROM: ASIAN AFFAIRS

The attached letter should be logged into the NSC system. Please staff to Patterson for action with Ordway for info.

Thanks.

Attachment

