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002a. paper	Somalia Policy: Near-Term Decisions (8 pages)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. map	Status of Forces (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. chart	Forces Currently In Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. chart	Other Forces Planning to Participate in Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)
002e. cable	Re: Where Are We And Where Do We Go From Here (3 pages)	01/25/1993	P1/b(1)

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Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of
operative paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 (1992)
(UNOSOM)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of operative paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 of 3 December 1992. In these paragraphs, the Security Council:

Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of

this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;"

2. Part I of this report contains a factual description of the action taken up to 8 February 1993 to implement resolution 794 (1992). Part II sets out my current thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force, to UNOSOM. My observations are contained in Part III.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

3. The specific mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concerned:

- the operations of UNOSOM (operative paragraph 6);
- implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (operative paragraph 10);
- the establishment of mechanisms for coordination (operative paragraph 12), including the attachment of a UNOSOM liaison staff to the Headquarters of the Unified Task Force (operative paragraph 15);

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- continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (operative paragraph 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

The Operations of UNOSOM

4. UNOSOM's military component currently has a strength of 715 all ranks composed mainly of a 500 strong Infantry battalion, 30 military observers, movement and logistics elements and a small headquarters' company and staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, on the advice of my Special Representative and the Force Commander, I authorized the deployment of 250 additional personnel to strengthen the Infantry Battalion and 30 officers to be included in UNOSOM Headquarters. These deployments will be completed in the near future.

Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

5. Military operations by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) of Member States Under Security Council Resolution 794 have deployed approximately 17,000 troops in Southern and Central Somalia. These forces have been establishing security throughout the nine

designated humanitarian relief sectors. Security operations are now expanding into all UNITAF areas of operations. Although isolated incidences of violence continue to occur in the major population centers and in some rural areas, the overall security situation has continued to improve. The UNITAF Commander now states all areas are stable or relatively stable except in Mogadishu. Although UNITAF forces have been the subject of sniper fire and harassment, the opposition now appears to be primarily from bandits. Most major clans and factions have welcomed the UNITAF deployment and are cooperating. UNITAF's presence in key areas of the country have greatly reduced those whose power was based on their heavy weapons. Increased disarmament measures have largely neutralized the militant warlords and their followers and considerable progress has been made in reducing the number of major weapons threatening the Somali people. However, outside of the area of UNITAF control a secure environment has not been established at all and factional fighting continues.

Mechanisms for coordination

4. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

At United Nations Headquarters:

Special Envoy, Ambassador Oakley, in order to ensure

Much of

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(a) a policy group on Somalia, is chaired by the Secretary-General and meets regularly with senior representatives of the United States Government. It reviews the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding, and planning for the future role of UNOSOM;

(b) an operational task force (chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations) comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned, and representatives of the United States meets weekly;

(c) a liaison team composed of US forces officers has been attached to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations since early January;

(d) a UNOSOM planning team is now in place in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

At UNOSOM Headquarters, Mogadishu:

(a) My Special Representative, Mr. Kittani, and the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Shaheen, are working closely with the Commander of the Unified Task Force, Lieutenant-General Johnson, and with the United States Special Envy, Ambassador Oakley, in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two Forces. Much of

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the detailed planning of the transition will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM Headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose; a UNOSOM liaison staff has been working with Unified Task Force Headquarters.

7. Several of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have asked to participate in discussions with myself and my staff about the current operations of the Force and planning for the transition to continue United Nations peace-keeping operations. I have initiated regular meetings to which all states participating in the Force are invited.

Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

8. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cessation of hostilities and the observance of the cease-fire as well as the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have throughout continued to promote efforts for national reconciliation and unity in the country, in cooperation with the LAS, OAU and OIC.

9. In my last report (S/25168), I informed the Security Council about the outcome of the informal preparatory meeting for a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia which I convened at United Nations Headquarters in Addis Ababa (4 to

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15 January 1993). I noted in particular that the following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and modalities of disarmament (Supplement to General Agreement); and (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad-hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the national reconciliation conference as well as other issues pending from the informal meeting.

10. I also reported that as stipulated in the latter Agreement, the first meeting of the ad-hoc committee was scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 to submit recommendations to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993 on the criteria for participation at the national reconciliation conference. Regrettably, the committee was unable to meet because the Somali National Alliance (SNA) refused to participate alleging that the Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) had violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking its forces in and around Kismayo.

11. A further meeting of the ad-hoc committee, scheduled for the beginning of February in Mogadishu, could not, once again, be convened because of the position taken by SNA that its representatives will not attend as long as SNF and SPN forces continued to violate the cease-fire around Kismayo. As a result, the broad agreement reached in consultation with the individual

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committee members on the agenda, the rules of procedures and the list of international observers to be invited to the conference could not be formally endorsed by the Committee. The issue of criteria for participation at the conference was not discussed during the consultations with the individual members of the committee.

12. I have stressed that my efforts and those of my Special Representative will continue to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia. UNOSOM will therefore continue to facilitate dialogue and communication between the various Somali parties, movements and factions in order to help keep lines of communication open between them and to promote confidence-building measures so essential to the success of the efforts deployed for national reconciliation.

II. THE FUTURE MANDATE OF UNOSOM AND THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSITION TO CONTINUED PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

The present mandate

13. Operative paragraph 1 of resolution 794 (1992) encapsulates the mandate which the Security Council has entrusted to the Secretary-General since it adopted resolution 733 on 23 January 1992. This mandate has been to help the parties

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establish and maintain a cease-fire, to distribute humanitarian relief and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement. In resolution 751 of 24 April 1992 the Council took the further step of agreeing in principle to establish a security force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu. In resolution 775 of 28 August 1992 the Council decided to extend this mandate to cover other areas in Somalia. It was to be implemented, as originally stipulated in operative paragraph 5 of resolution 751 (1992), in consultation with the parties concerned. In practice fulfilment of this condition proved to be impossible. The agreement of "the parties" could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations forces in areas where the protection of humanitarian operations was most desperately needed; when agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in Mogadishu was agreed was not large enough to control the increasingly violent and lawless situation in that city.

14. The Council finally adopted resolution 794 (1992) in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In the same resolution the Council stated the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable it to take the necessary

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decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

15. The present position is thus that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, has entrusted to certain Member States, on a temporary basis, the responsibility of creating a secure environment for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is the wish of the Security Council that the transition back to peace-keeping operations should be achieved promptly. [^] It is therefore of great importance that the

conditions for such a transition should be achieved as soon as possible, and I have already laid emphasis on these conditions,

recognising the need for an interim period where an expanded Chapter VII mandate would be required as outlined in para. 19.

The conditions for (transition) *from Chapt 7 -> 6 upon it*

Resuming Chapter VII mandate

16. The first condition is that the Unified Task Force, ^{*and subsequently UP*} should take effective action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralised and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed before the Unified Task Force withdraws. This condition has not yet been completely met in UNITAF area of responsibility.

17. The second, and equally essential, condition is that the authority entrusted to the international community should be exercised throughout Somalia. Operative paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992) imposes no geographical limitation, other

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than "in Somalia", on the mandate it confers. This condition has not yet been met.

18. A third, if somewhat longer-term, factor is the need to create a new, professional police force. I am studying how this might be done, both politically and technically. A team of three experts is presently assessing the situation in Somalia. The terms of reference of this team are detailed in this report.

The new mandate

19. The Council will now have to consider whether it is in a position to authorize an enlargement or a redefinition of the UNOSOM mandate to include peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. As pointed out in my previous report the consequences of such a decision will be far reaching for both political and logistical reasons, not to forget the financial commitments involved. I find that the views which I have conveyed to you during the last two months are still current and valid: without improved security the political process cannot prosper. I have, therefore, devoted a great deal of my efforts to secure that parallel steps are taken, cease-fire and reconciliation mechanisms, disarmament and creation of a civilian police force, rehabilitation alongside political dialogue. I have insisted with all the factions and elders that it is up to them to change the course of violence toward peace, that the

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international community stands ready to support such efforts in this direction. Ultimately, however, the conviction and will to reconcile must come from the Somalis themselves.

20. My view remains that the mandate of UNOSOM, to include peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter, must cover the whole territory of Somalia and must include the following tasks,

(a) to monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed, particularly the Addis-Ababa Agreement of January 1993.

(b) to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against a faction which violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities;

(c) to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly-constituted national army;

(d) to secure or maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for delivery of humanitarian assistance;

(a) to protect, as required, personnel, installations and equipments of United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements which attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;

(g) to provide, as requested, advice on, and technical assistance to, the formation of a police force;

(1) to assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

Case-file significant concepts

21. Utilising the Addis-Ababa Agreement as a guideline and the scheduled conference on 15 March 1993 as a target date, a

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All bandits are subject to having their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

(C) The cease-fire and disarmament will be conducted by Somalis. It is a Somali solution and will restore some pride amongst the Somalis that they are solving their own problems.

(d) UNOSOM will assist the Somalis in the disarmament process.

23. A cantonment is defined as a place where only heavy weapons, which include all crew served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, are to be stored. It is the intent to designate cantonment sites in the vicinity of current force locations.

(a) I recommend that a committee composed of United Nations and factional representatives mutually determine those heavy weapons which would be an asset to a new Somali national army. Those weapons would be retained and secured in cantonments. Those weapons which were mutually decided upon that could not be supported or maintained would be destroyed immediately.

(b) All heavy weapons are to be delivered to the cantonment sites by each respective faction.

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(c) All heavy weapons must be turned in prior to factional forces moving to transition sites.

(d) Due to logistical constraints, all unserviceable and inoperable heavy weapons will be destroyed on site.

(e) All heavy weapons which are not delivered as required by a specified deadline will be declared illegal and subject to immediate seizure and destruction.

(f) Cantonment sites will be separated from transition sites to prevent any temptation by factions or groups to reclaim or seize the heavy weapons located there.

(g) Cantonment site security will be the responsibility of the United Nations.

(h) In order to support stabilization of the weapon situation in Somalia, the United Nations will continue to enforce its ban on the introduction of weapons into Somalia.

24. A transition site is a location where the factional forces will temporarily reside in order to turn in their small arms, register for future governmental and non-governmental support and potentially receive some retraining or information for reentering the civilian community. Transition site locations will be

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recommended to the United Nations by factions and the United Nations will select the final site locations. Some guidelines which will be used in selecting and developing transition sites are:

(a) Factions are to provide recommended transition sites to UNOSOM no later than 22 February 1993.

(b) Recommended transition sites are to be:

1. Located near a water source and outside of cities or towns.
2. Separate from cantonment sites and each other
3. Accessible for verification
4. Self-secured in that the inhabitants of each transition site will be allowed to retain a limited number of small arms for their own security force.
5. Of temporary nature providing the minimum of food, water and medical support while encouraging its inhabitants to locate and pursue a different profession.

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c. Each faction will attempt to transport its forces to transition sites, however, the United Nations will provide limited transportation in specially requested circumstances.

d. The occupation of transitions sites within the same region/geographical area will be conducted simultaneously. This action will provide a sense of security for all participants knowing that rival factions are performing the same action.

Military concept of operations

25. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate has to be substantial in the early stage, in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security established by the Unified Task Force and to ensure a secured environment, as quickly as possible in those areas not covered by UNITAF. It should be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new police force becomes operational.

26. Based on information obtained from UNOSOM and UNITAF commanders, my recommendation is that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of about 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and additional personnel to conduct the logistic support required.

27. This force includes:

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- (a) a Force Headquarters;
- (b) five Brigades;
- (c) a logistic support Group.

28. The logistic support group will be, in the first phase, provided mainly by the US logistic command from UNITAF, until UNOSOM can establish its capabilities to support by organic forces and by contract. All formed military units must have an integral first line and second line support in all respects.

29. The combat forces must have the following capabilities:

- (a) Patrolling and close-combat
- (b) Information gathering and interpretation
- (c) Indirect fire
- (d) Anti-armour fire
- (e) All weather night and day operations
- (f) Casualty evacuation
- (g) Tactical communications
- (h) Air support (fire power and transport).

30. The UNOSOM Force Commander will report directly to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. There will be areas of operations allocated to brigade commanders who will report directly to the UNOSOM Force Commander. These commanders will be responsible for conducting military operations and assisting in

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the implementation of the terms of cease-fire/disarmament agreements in their respective areas of operations.

11. UNOSOM military operations will be conducted in four phases: Phase I - Transition from UNITAF, Phase II - Expansion of Security, Phase III - Transfer to civilian institutions; Phase IV - Redeployment. These phases are not meant to be applied rigidly or uniformly throughout Somalia, but merely describe a general sequence. For example, some areas may primarily be conducting Phase III operations while in another area the military forces are conducting Phase I or II operations. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase will be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programs. The Force Commander will shift forces within country to meet these changing requirements.

(a) Phase I. During this phase security operations will transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM.

1. Operations will continue to focus on providing expanded security for the major population centers and those areas necessary to ensure the continued flow of humanitarian relief as well as monitoring the terms of the Addis-Ababa agreement. Disarmament measures will focus on controlling heavy or crew-served weapons, weapons belonging to factions, and removing all weapons

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from areas essential to the humanitarian relief effort. The transition will be a sequential transfer of responsibility for relatively secure areas from UNITAF control to UNOSOM control.

2. Prior to the formal assumption of operational responsibility from UNITAF, by the UNOSOM Force Commander, there are a few broad activities which must be concluded. We have already begun to expand Force Headquarters and will continue to do so until it is operationally capable. Concurrently, UNITAF will be invited to ensure that subordinate elements remaining under UNOSOM are structured with appropriate command and control arrangements, conducive to an effective handover. I will ask the United States Government to consider forming the tactical quick reaction force that will support UNOSOM during this phase.

3. When jointly agreed to and recommended by Commander UNITAF and UNOSOM Force Commander, I will approve the assumption of operational responsibility over the designated element. Upon being responsible for a preponderance of the forces in place, the UNOSOM Force Commander would also assume responsibility for logistic support forces previously controlled by UNITAF. In this phase too, the United States tactical

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quick reaction force would be placed in support of the UNOSOM Force Commander.

4. When the UNOSOM Force Commander has assumed complete operational responsibility, UNITAF forces may redeploy at the discretion of their government and under the protection of UNOSOM troops.

5. This phase will be complete when all UNITAF forces participating in UNOSOM are placed under operational control of UNOSOM Force Commander.

(b) During Phase II the focus will be on assisting for the maintenance of security in those areas already under the control of UNOSOM forces and expanding these secure areas to areas not currently secured by UNITAF forces.

1. With the most urgent need of stopping large scale starvation, UNOSOM forces can concentrate on reducing the level of lawlessness and violence so that conditions can be created which will foster the development of Somali institutions. Close coordination with civilian components of UNOSOM and other rehabilitation efforts are vital in this phase. Supporting the provision of security for the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons will

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also assume more importance in Phase II. Wide-scale disarmament measures will be implemented during this phase to reduce the threat to citizens and to enhance the ability of the police forces to deal with acts of lawlessness.

2. A major effort will be made during this phase to expand military operations to Northern Somalia. The first goal will be to provide a base of operations for expanding south to link up with sectors that were transferred from UNITAF to UNOSOM control. The focus in the north will be on disarming and demining as necessary to maintain or restore a peaceful environment, and supporting the humanitarian assistance in areas that have not been explored.

3. Phase II will be complete when a significant UNOSOM presence is established in all sectors, the heavy weapons of all major factions are under control, and Somali police forces in the major cities and towns are organized and training has begun.

(c) Phase III military operations will focus on assisting in the transfer of responsibility to Somali institutions. Military forces will be working in support of nation-building efforts to provide security and assistance where required. The

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responsibility for managing major aspects of the infrastructure will shift from military to civilian control with oversight responsibility within UNOSOM also shifting to the civilian side. Major efforts to resettle refugees and displaced persons to secure areas will occur in this phase as the focus shifts from humanitarian assistance to self-sufficiency. This phase will be complete when Somali civilian institutions have assumed responsibility for security and infrastructure management in all major cities and towns.

(d) During Phase IV military force can begin to redeploy as responsibility for security is shifted to police forces and vital infrastructure elements become operational. This phase will be complete when all UNOSOM forces redeploy.

Rules of engagement

32. The rules of engagement, based on Chapter VII of the Charter, will be proposed by the UNOSOM Force Commander. They will be guidance to commanders authorizing them to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to fulfil the mandate.

Pemining

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33. The demining problems facing Somalia have not yet been seriously addressed. According to a report issued by Physicians for Human Rights, much of northern Somalia remains contaminated by mines. Most of the mines lie scattered across pastoral lands or hidden near wells or water holes. Others have been laid on secondary roads or in former military installations. They are considered to be more prevalent in the countryside surrounding two of Somalia's principal cities, Hargeisa and Burao, and in the pastoral and agricultural lands west of Burao. Now that the war has ended, the victims of the mines have been mainly civilians, of whom many are women and children.

34. No estimate has been made of the total number of mines laid, but some relief agencies pretend that many hundreds of thousands may still be in the ground. Some of these are in minefields, but many have been used as weapons of terror for denying access to homes, villages and water. There are an estimated 1,200km of roads to be demined in the Hargeisa area alone.

35. Some limited mine clearance has been undertaken by the SNM when they re-occupied northern Somalia, but out of their team of 60, some 40 became mine casualties. A UK company, RIMFIRE, have been operating under contract from Médacins sans Frontières and UNHCR. They claim to have lifted some 25,000 mines in the Hargeisa area, and allowed the repopulation of the town. This has probably only scratched the surface of the problem.

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36. The military component of UNOSOM will probably have little requirement for minefield clearance, although some clearance effort will be needed if any logistic base is set up in the Hargeisa region, because the airport area is still mined. There may well be a requirement for route clearance, and mines may be used in a harassing role by any of the current factions fighting in Somalia. Vehicles will need to be fitted with precautionary sand-bagging or purpose-built mine blast protection in footwells or under passenger seating. Engineer units will have to be briefed on the types of mines likely to be found, and the procedures for their removal or destruction.

37. The humanitarian relief efforts will be more severely hampered, especially when they spread into the northern areas. The humanitarian problems will become acute when large-scale attempts are made to rehabilitate the land and re-establish the rural economy. Much of the grazing land used by nomadic tribesmen will be unusable, and villages for returning refugees will require complete cleansing before they can be restored to use.

38. Political life could well be severely hampered by the inability of electoral teams to reach major areas of Somalia due to route mining. It has been found in Cambodia and Mozambique that the effect of mines on the establishment of political life

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has been radically under-estimated in the political programme and the funding allocated for that programme.

39. It will be therefore necessary to establish a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines in Somalia. As a start, the UN Demining Expert should visit the country, to establish the extent of the problem. Following his visit, a mined-clearing plan should be drawn up, using the models at present in use or being built up in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The main components of the plan will include a proper minefield survey, and extended contract mine clearance. If it becomes clear that the mines number millions rather than thousands, a mine clearance training facility will have to be established, and a force of Somali mine clearers will have to be trained up to undertake the major part of the mine clearance task, in a plan lasting years rather than months.

40. In a separate programme, a mine awareness programme will have to be established among refugees and displaced persons, and known mined areas will have to be fenced or marked off to prevent nomadic tribesmen from using mined areas for grazing.

Somali Police Force

41. I had indicated in my previous reports to the Council (paragraph 10 of my report of 19 December 1992, S/24992, and

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paragraph 23 of my report of 26 January 1993, S/25168) that I considered the establishment of a Somali police force as a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia. With that in mind, I had decided to send an expert team which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, would prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia.

42. I wish to inform the Council that the expert team is currently in Somalia. The team has been requested to study the feasibility of establishing such a national police force, make recommendations and develop a strategy for implementation.

43. The expert team has also been requested to outline the appropriate modalities for training Somali personnel in the maintenance of law-and-order as well as the discharge of police responsibilities while adhering to internationally accepted principles and practices for the protection of human rights.

44. As mentioned in my report of 26 January 1993, paragraph 23, UNITAF, under its supervision and in close consultation with my Special Representative, has now constituted an auxiliary force composed of former police officers. This auxiliary force will oversee, on a temporary arrangement, the road traffic control and undertake the protection of feeding centres relieving United Nations agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations from the

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dependency on locally hired guards and freeing UNOSOM soldiers for more demanding and urgent tasks. I have requested the expert team to study the arrangements established for the auxiliary force with the view to eventually integrating some of its elements into a new civilian police force.

43. Bearing the above in mind, I consider it a matter of expediency to include a civilian police component in the future UNOSOM, but would hesitate to make any specific recommendations at this time pending the receipt of the expert team's recommendations. I will therefore bring to the attention of the Council a more detailed assessment on the establishment of a civilian police force in Somalia by the end of February.

Cantonment of troops

44. In my report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I informed the Council of the agreements reached at the Informal Preparatory Meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity held in Addis Ababa on 4-15 January 1993. (The humanitarian aspects of these agreements are discussed under chapter ...)

47. Annex III of this report, Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament, concluded that it would enter into force on 15 January 1993. Paragraph 1.2 stipulates that the militias of all political movements shall be

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encamped and disarmed simultaneously throughout Somalia and that the international community "will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep". Paragraph 1.3 requires that the future of the encamped militias shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia.

48. My staff and I have discussed this matter with UNITAF, particularly in regard to the transitional arrangements. Both UNITAF and my staff see specific problems arising in the cantonment of militias for an indeterminate number of months, especially when it has been impossible to quantify the total number of militias as different from irregular gangs. From an administrative point of view, cantonment of personnel would impose an additional logistic burden on an already complex operational structure. Our purpose should be to move away from fostering a dependency encampment situation which would not be conducive to a stable and rapid integration into nation building activities.

49. The prospects of offering material or financial incentives for disarmament is, in my opinion and that of my staff, a more suitable option for demobilized militias and UNOSOM, when correlated with cease-fire monitoring nationally. I have included this option within the draft budget for UNOSOM.

Public information programs for UNOSOM

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30. The extraordinary circumstances under which the United Nations will reenter Somalia require an intensive and expanded information campaign. Transitional arrangements from UNITAF to UNOSOM will have to be conveyed to the general public. The new mandate under which UNOSOM will be operating must be translated in vernacular languages and broadcast at large. In addition and as the political climate changes new information inputs will have to be designed in order to support every aspect of the operation and stimulate a stable social climate. It is also my intension to use public information activities in Somalia as an educational tool to strengthen the peace process, human rights and overall productive economic integration.

31. The information component in UNOSOM will absorb themes developed on a day by day basis from the different highlights of the United Nations presence in Somalia such as transitional arrangements, cease-fire observances, disarmament, demobilization of armed groups, training of civilian police, refugee resettlement, safety, health (with an angle on consumption of psychotropic substances), hygiene, just to mention the most important. The collaboration of United Nations specialized agencies and Programmes will be sought in the elaboration of some of these broadcast elements.

32. The United Nations Department of Public Information has secured an agreement with radio Cairo as of 15 January 1993, by

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which Radio Cairo's External Services Network translates and broadcasts into Somalia United Nations produced material. This arrangement is expected to be in place for approximately three months, after which time the United Nations will be in a position to evaluate the service in light of internal developments and the evolving requirements of UNOSOM information programme. In the meantime the United Nations is considering a proposal for UNOSOM to assume responsibility for the operation of a daily newspaper and a radio station which are currently managed by the United States under UNITAF.

III. OBSERVATIONS

General

53. I urge all the Somali movements to do their utmost to honour the agreement they have reached to convene a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 18 March 1993. The United Nations, in cooperation with the regional organizations, will continue to support their efforts and to provide the necessary assistance to facilitate the convening of the conference.

54. There must be a smooth transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM without any hiatus which could be exploited by factions or gangs to compromise the secure environment created by

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the Unified Task Force. UNOSOM will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over instantly from the Unified Task Force in each area from which it withdraws. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area; without creating a void or a break in the secure environment, and when adequate troops, command and control and logistics are available to UNOSOM in a given area.

Military concept

55. A number of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have expressed a willingness for their contingents to serve eventually in UNOSOM. I will present recommendations to the Security Council on the national composition of the new UNOSOM as soon as the offers have been confirmed and it is possible to determine the detailed requirements. In formulating such recommendations I shall take into account the established criteria which the Security Council has endorsed in the past, including the necessary regional and political balance, military capacity and previous peace-keeping experience. Subject to these criteria, it will be my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in the new UNOSOM as many contingents as possible which will already be in Somalia serving under the command of the Unified Task Force. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments'

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concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of the Unified Task Force to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to in the preceding paragraph.

56. Any resources required by the new UNOSOM, which cannot be made available from units already serving with the Unified Task Force, will need to be deployed to Somalia in good time for the planned transition. It is my understanding that the bulk of the logistic support for UNOSOM will initially be provided by UNITAF. I have requested the United States authorities to keep logistic units in Somalia in support of UNOSOM for some while after the main body of their troops has been withdrawn. I intend to extend similar invitations to other major contributors.

Training unit in Somalia

57. The experiences from a number of peace-keeping operations indicate that incoming contingents need to have additional training in order to obtain a common level and a standardisation of the operational technique as well as personal code of conduct. Since the units rotate every six months the need will remain. Once in situ the units have to be constantly in shape and well prepared to meet the various operational demands that might occur.

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58. However, since the Somalia operation also includes considerable elements of civilians, Newly recruited and recently arrived staff must be briefed and familiarized with the objectives and the task of the mission as well as the environment in which they have to execute their functions. For both the military units, military observers, election monitors and other civilian components involved in the operation this training has to be prepared in order to ensure the effectiveness in every stage of the operation.

59. A civilian and military training unit integrated in HQs should be able to provide necessary training and adequate planning. It should consist of a head (Chief Training Section), military and civilian training officers and a support staff. The Section will design programmes, after a need assessment, train trainers and make the necessary evaluation related of already executed programmes.

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
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Geography

Total area: 637,660 km²; land area: 627,340 km²

Comparative area: slightly smaller than Texas

Land boundaries: 2,340 km total; Djibouti 58 km, Ethiopia 1,600 km, Kenya 682 km

Coastline: 3,025 km

Maritime claims:

Territorial sea: 200 nm

Disputes: southern half of boundary with Ethiopia is a Provisional Administrative Line; territorial dispute with Ethiopia over the Ogaden; possible claims to Djibouti and parts of Ethiopia and Kenya based on unification of ethnic Somalis

Climate: desert; northeast monsoon (December to February), cooler southwest monsoon (May to October); irregular rainfall; hot, humid periods (tangambili) between monsoons

Terrain: mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north

Natural resources: uranium, and largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt

Land use: arable land 2%; permanent crops NEGL%; meadows and pastures 46%; forest and woodland 14%; other 38%; includes irrigated 3%

Environment: recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification

Note: strategic location on Horn of Africa along southern approaches to Bab el Mandeb and route through Red Sea and Suez Canal

People

Population: 6,709,161 (July 1991), growth rate 3.3% (1991)

Birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1991)

Death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1991)

Net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1991)

Infant mortality rate: 116 deaths/1,000 live births (1991)

Life expectancy at birth: 56 years male, 56 years female (1991)

Total fertility rate: 7.2 children born/woman (1991)

Nationality: noun—Somali(s); adjective—Somali

Ethnic divisions: Somali 85%, rest mainly Bantu; Arabs 30,000, Europeans 3,000, Asians 800

Religion: almost entirely Sunni Muslim

Language: Somali (official); Arabic, Italian, English

Literacy: 24% (male 36%, female 14%) age 15 and over can read and write (1990 est.)

Labor force: 2,200,000; very few are skilled laborers; pastoral nomad 70%, agriculture, government, trading, fishing, handicrafts, and other 30%; 53% of population of working age (1985)

Organized labor: General Federation of Somali Trade Unions is controlled by the government

Government

Long-form name: Somali Democratic Republic

Type: republic

Capital: Mogadishu

Administrative divisions: 16 regions (plural—NA, singular—gobolka); Bakool, Banaadir, Bari, Bay, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiiraan, Jubbada Dhexe, Jubbada Hoose, Mudug, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha Dhexe, Shabeellaha Hoose, Togdheer, Woqooyi Galbeed

Independence: 1 July 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the UK on 26 June 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on 1 July 1960, to form the Somali Republic)

Constitution: 25 August 1979, presidential approval 23 September 1979

National holiday: Anniversary of the Revolution, 21 October (1969)

Executive branch: president, two vice presidents, prime minister, Council of Ministers (cabinet)

Legislative branch: unicameral People's Assembly (Golaha Shacbiga)

Judicial branch: Supreme Court

Political parties and leaders: the United Somali Congress (USC) ousted the former regime on 27 January 1991; note—formerly the only party was the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), headed by former President and Commander in Chief of the Army Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad BARRE

Suffrage: universal at age 18

Elections:

President—last held 23 December 1986 (next to be held NA); results—President Siad was reelected without opposition;

People's Assembly—last held 31 December 1984 (next to be held NA); results—SRSP was the only party; seats—(177 total, 171 elected) SRSP 171; note—the United Somali Congress (USC) ousted the regime of Maj. Gen. Mohamed SIAD Barre on 27 January 1991; the provisional government has promised that a democratically elected government will be established

Communists: probably some Communist sympathizers in the government hierarchy
Member of: ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AL, AMF, CAEU, ECA, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IGADD, ILO, IMF, IMO, INTELSTAT, INTERPOL, IOC, IOM (observer), ITU, LORCS, NAM, OAU, OIC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO

Flag: light blue with a large white five-pointed star in the center; design based on the flag of the UN (Italian Somaliland was a UN trust territory)

Economy

Overview: One of the world's poorest and least developed countries, Somalia has few resources. Agriculture is the most important sector of the economy, with the livestock sector accounting for about 40% of GDP and about 65% of export earnings. Nomads and seminomads who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihoods make up more than half of the population. Crop production generates only 10% of GDP and employs about 20% of the work force. The main export crop is bananas; sugar, sorghum, and corn are grown for the domestic market. The small industrial sector is based on the processing of agricultural products

and accounts for less than 10% of GDP. Serious economic problems facing the nation are the external debt of \$1.9 billion and double-digit inflation.

GDP: \$1.7 billion, per capita \$210; real growth rate -1.4% (1988)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 81.7% (1988 est.)

Unemployment rate: NA%

Budget: revenues \$190 million; expenditures \$195 million, including capital expenditures of \$111 million (1989 est.)

Exports: \$58.0 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities—livestock, hides, skins, bananas, fish;

partners—US 0.5%, Saudi Arabia, Italy, FRG (1986)

Imports: \$354.0 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities—textiles, petroleum products, foodstuffs, construction materials; partners—US 13%, Italy, FRG, Kenya, UK, Saudi Arabia (1986)

External debt: \$1.9 billion (1989)

Industrial production: growth rate -5.0% (1988); accounts for 5% of GDP

Electricity: 72,000 kW capacity; 60 million kWh produced, 7 kWh per capita (1990)

Industries: a few small industries, including sugar refining, textiles, petroleum refining
Agriculture: dominant sector, led by livestock raising (cattle, sheep, goats); crops—bananas, sorghum, corn, mangoes, sugarcane; not self-sufficient in food; fishing potential largely unexploited

Economic aid: US commitments, including Ex-Im (FY70-89), \$639 million; Western (non-US) countries, ODA and OOF bilateral commitments (1970-87), \$3.2 billion; OPEC bilateral aid (1979-89), \$1.1 billion; Communist countries (1970-89), \$336 million

Currency: Somali shilling (plural—shillings); 1 Somali shilling (So.Sh.) = 100 centesimi

Exchange rates: Somali shillings (So. Sh.) per US\$1—3,800.00 (December 1990), 490.7 (1989), 170.45 (1988), 105.18 (1987), 72.00 (1986), 39.49 (1985)

Fiscal year: calendar year

Communications

Highways: 15,215 km total; including 2,335 km bituminous surface, 2,880 km gravel, and 10,000 km improved earth or stabilized soil (1983)

Pipelines: 15 km crude oil

Ports: Mogadishu, Berbera, Chisimayu

Merchant marine: 3 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 6,913 GRT/9,457 DWT; includes 2 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo

Civil air: 2 major transport aircraft

Airports: 61 total, 46 usable; 8 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 5 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 22 with runways 1,220-2,439 m

Telecommunications: minimal telephone and telegraph service; radio relay and troposcatter system centered on Mogadishu connects a few towns; 6,000 telephones; stations—2 AM, no FM, 1 TV; 1 Indian Ocean INTELSAT earth station; scheduled to receive an ARABSAT station

Defense Forces

Branches: Somali National Army (including Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Force), National Police Force, National Security Service

Manpower availability: males 15-49, 1,601,690; 902,732 fit for military service
Defense expenditures: \$NA, NA% of GDP



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/24880*

3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992,

Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response,

Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Noting the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and in particular the proposal made by its Chairman at the forty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly for the organization of an international conference on Somalia, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other regional agencies and arrangements to promote reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to address the humanitarian needs of the people of that country,

Commending the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations and of non-governmental organizations and of States to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

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Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including reports of violence and threats of violence against personnel participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief consignments and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities; and impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population,

Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing in humanitarian relief supplies, and attacks on the Pakistani UNOSOM contingent in Mogadishu,

Taking note with appreciation of the letters of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1992 (S/24859) and of 29 November 1992 (S/24868),

Sharing the Secretary-General's assessment that the situation in Somalia is intolerable and that it has become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia, and that UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the tragedy in Somalia,

Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992),

Noting the offer by Member States aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible,

Determined further to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote these objectives,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country,

1. Reaffirms its demand that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities, maintain a cease-fire throughout the country, and cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below in order to promote the process of relief distribution, reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

/...

2. Demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia;

3. Also demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below;

4. Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law including from actions such as those described above;

5. Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

6. Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests him to keep the Council informed and to make such recommendations as may be appropriate for the fulfilment of its mandate where conditions permit;

7. Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;

8. Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment;

9. Welcomes also offers by other Member States to participate in that operation;

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;

/...

11. Calls on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with paragraph 10 above and requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to the States or operations concerned;

12. Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above;

13. Requests the Secretary-General and the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces;

14. Decides to appoint an ad hoc commission composed of members of the Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution;

15. Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the Field Headquarters of the unified command;

16. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, calls upon States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

17. Requests all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions;

18. Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;

20. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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BC-TEXT-BUSH/SOMALIA

PRESIDENT BUSH ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE UNITED STATES'
MILITARY ROLE IN SOMALIA

Time: 12:30 p.m.

December 4, 1992

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The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric Beech, Peter Ramjug and Paul Schomer also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898- 8355; outside D.C., call 1-800-537-9755.

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PRESIDENT BUSH: I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia, and about a mission that can ease suffering and save lives. Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia, the scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already, over a quarter million people, as many people as live in Buffalo, New York, have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead, five times that number, 1.5 million people could starve to death.

For many months now, the United States has been actively engaged in the massive international relief effort to ease Somalia's suffering. All told America has sent Somalia 200,000 tons of food, more than half the world total. This summer, the distribution system broke down. Truck convoys from Somalia's ports were blocked. Sufficient food failed to reach the starving in the interior of Somalia.

And so in August we took additional action in concert with the United Nations. We sent in the U.S. Air Force to help fly food to the towns. To date, American pilots have flown over 1400 flights, delivering over 17,000 tons of food aid. And when the U.N. authorized 3500 U.N. guards to protect the relief operation, we flew in the first of them, 500 soldiers from Pakistan.

But in the months since then, the security situation has grown worse. The U.N. has been prevented from deploying its initial commitment of troops. In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing. Food convoys have been hijacked, AID workers assaulted, ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them from docking.

There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down. Anarchy prevails. One image tells the story. Imagine 7,000 tons of food aid literally bursting out of a warehouse on a dock in Mogadishu while Somalis starve less than a kilometer away because relief workers cannot run the gauntlet of armed gangs roving the city.

Confronted with these conditions, relief groups called for outside troops to provide security so they could feed people. It's now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive.

It was this situation which led us to tell the United Nations that the United States would be willing to provide more help to enable relief to be delivered. Last night the United Nations Security Council, by unanimous vote and after the tireless efforts of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, welcomed the United States' offer to lead a coalition to get the food through.

After consulting with my advisers, with world leaders and the congressional leadership, I have today told Secretary General Boutros-Ghali that America will answer the call. I have given the order to Secretary Cheney to move a substantial American force into Somalia. As I speak, a Marine amphibious ready group, which we maintain at sea, is offshore Mogadishu. These troops will be joined by elements of the First Marine Expeditionary Force based out of Camp Pendleton, California and by the Army's 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York.

These are other American forces will assist in Operation Restore Hope. They are America's finest. They will perform this mission with courage and compassion and they will succeed.

The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must them live. We must give them hope. America must act.

In taking this action I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement. That American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement in the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place, quickly and efficiently, and thus save thousands of innocents from death. We will not, however, be acting alone.

I expect forces from about a dozen countries to join us in this mission. When we see Somalia's children starving, all of America hurts.

We've tried to help in many ways, and make no mistake about it--now we and our allies will ensure that aid gets through.

And here is what we and our coalition partners will do.

First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia, so that food can move from ships over land to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation.

And second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular U.N. peacekeeping force.

Our mission has a limited objective--to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving.

This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary. And let me be very clear. Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation.

General Hoar and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia's people.

The outlaw elements in Somalia must understand this is serious business. We will accomplish our mission. We have no intent to remain in Somalia with fighting forces, but we are determined to do

it right, to secure an environment that will allow food to get to the starving people of Somalia. To the people of Somalia I promise this: we do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence.

Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence we come to your country for one reason only: to enable the starving to be fed.

And let me say to the men and women of our armed forces, we're asking you to do a difficult and dangerous job.

As commander in chief, I assure you you will have our full support to get the job done. And we will bring you home as soon as possible.

And finally, let me close with a message to the families of the men and women who take part in this mission.

I understand it is difficult to see your loved ones go, to send them off knowing they will not be home for the holidays. But the humanitarian mission they undertake is in the finest traditions of service.

And so to every sailor, soldier, airmen, and Marine who is involved in this mission, let me say, you're doing God's work. We will not fail.

Thank you and may God bless the United States of America.

END BUSH REMARKS

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+++++

The Reuter Transcript

President Bush remarks/Somalia

December 4, 1992

REUTER Reut12:53 12-04



UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

Tel. 212-416-4050
FAX 212-416-4058

PRESS RELEASE

**FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
CHECK TEXT AGAINST DELIVERY**

**Press Release USUN 166-(92)
December 8, 1992**

Statement by Ambassador Edward J. Perkins, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, in Explanation of Vote, Upon Adoption of a Resolution on Somalia, December 8, 1992

.....

Mr. President, the vote of the United States for the resolution before us expresses our commitment to resolving the human tragedy in Somalia -- a crisis of immense, almost indescribable proportions. The measures authorized by the resolution, and supported by my government, have one objective: to achieve a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief to the Somali people in areas of greatest need. While the resolution authorizes the use of "all necessary means," one point should be clear: our mission is essentially a peaceful one, and we will endorse the use of force only if and when we decide it is necessary to accomplish our objective.

By acting in response to the tragic events in Somalia, the international community is also taking an important step in developing a strategy for dealing with the potential disorder and conflicts of the post-Cold War world. This step must entail unprecedented levels of cooperation amongst the international community in response to urgent humanitarian needs and to peacekeeping, utilizing our respective military forces if necessary to do so. Cooperation will have to occur on a case-by-case basis, given the complexity of the post-Cold War order.

Such a step will also entail unambiguous support of the United Nations in enabling it to confront challenges to international peace and stability.

In offering to contribute to the effort authorized by this resolution, the United States has no other objective. Once deployed, our military forces will remain in Somalia no longer than is necessary. We look forward to the early transition to an effective United Nations peacekeeping force. The sooner outside military forces can develop a secure environment, the sooner the Somali people can begin to reconstruct their own society. Military intervention is no substitute for political reconciliation, and that task belongs firmly in the hands of Somalis.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, the various specialized United Nations agencies working in Somalia, and United Nations Special Representative for Somalia Ambassador Ismat Kittani -- now in Addis Ababa meeting with Somali representatives -- have been working with tremendous dedication to provide relief to those in need. The international relief agencies and a multitude of private voluntary organizations have been in the forefront of a truly international effort to help the inhabitants of a country being ripped asunder by violence. We pay tribute to them all. We want to be at their side as partners in a humanitarian effort.

The task before the world community is challenging. Relief must be followed closely by rehabilitation and by reconstruction. The international community needs to be generous in its contributions -- military, logistic, and financial -- to this great humanitarian enterprise.

The United Nations and the world community may offer advice or assistance to the Somalis as they heal the wounds from years of bitter conflict. But it is for the Somali people to decide their own future. The secure environment that we will establish -- and this endeavor must and will succeed -- will allow Somalis to devise their own formula for reconciliation.

By acting today to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia, the Council has once again taken an essential step to restore international peace and security. Much else remains to be done by the Somali people, with the assistance of many agencies. The most obvious beneficiaries will be the innocent victims of anarchy and famine. Moreover, this courageous decision by the Security Council strengthens the United Nations and affirms the ideals upon which it is based.

Mr. President, the international community in the post-Cold War era is already being confronted with problems which are distinctly different from the threat that hung over us for the past 45 years. There can be no simple solution to these problems.

But in the case of Somalia, and in other cases we are sure to face in the future, it is important that we send this unambiguous message. The international community has the intent, and will, to act decisively regarding peacekeeping problems that threaten international stability.

The post-Cold War world is likely to hold other Somalias in store for us. The world will seek solutions that can be found only by nations banding together, led by the United Nations. In these endeavors, you will be able to count on the support of the United States. We must be prepared to respond -- together -- to solve the great moral and humanitarian challenges that lie ahead. Thank you, Mr. President.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0507

February 17, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: DENNIS C. JETT *DJ*

SUBJECT: State Views Re: SJR-45 -- Authorization for Use
of U.S. Forces in Somalia

OMB requested concurrence on the above subject. The NSC staff has no objections with State views and responded telephonically to met the required suspense date.

Concurrences by: *76* Dick Clarke, *72* Don Gross, *34* Robert Bell

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Ron Peterson at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Peterson
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0507

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: State Views re: SJR-45 -- Authorization for Use
of U.S. Forces in Somalia

The NSC staff has reviewed and has no objections with the above subject.

0507

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

URGENT

February 11, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #I-36

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

DEFENSE - Samuel T. Brick, Jr. - (703) 697-1305 - 325

JUSTICE - Faith Burton - (202) 514-2141 - 217

NSC - William H. Itoh - (202) 456-6534 - 249

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Annette ROONEY (395-7300)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: State Views RE: SJR 45, Authorization for Use
of United States Forces in Somalia

DEADLINE: 3:00, FRIDAY February 12, 1993

COMMENTS: The State Department advises that the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee is planning an oversight hearing on Somalia for Wednesday, Feb. 17th. State has requested clearance of the attached views letter on SJR 45, should an Administration position be requested at the hearing.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

T. Davis
B. Sasser
P. DuSault
D. Gessaman
B. Damus
M. Foley
J. Murr
G. Adams
W. Dellinger
H. Paster

URGENT

PJ



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 11 1993

Dear Mr. Panetta:

This letter is to respond to your request for views on S.J. Res. 45, adopted by the Senate on February 4, 1993. The Administration has already noted that it welcomed the Senate's support for the United States humanitarian effort in Somalia, as expressed in the resolution, although we do not believe that specific statutory authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia is necessary.

We understand that, before acting, the House leadership may await further action by the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution establishing UNOSOM II, the follow-on UN operation to UNOSOM I and UNITAF. We will, of course, carefully consider whether to seek changes to the resolution, for the purpose of facilitating U.S. support for the next phase of UN operations in Somalia.

For example, we would want any Joint Resolution to endorse U.S. support not only for operations authorized by UNSC Resolution 794, as S.J. Resolution 45 does, but also for operations authorized by the next UNSC resolution. Furthermore, we may wish to propose that the reporting requirement in section 4 of S.J. Resolution 45 be modified to delete some of the more hypothetical factors and other considerations presently listed, while still providing Congress with information on the activities of U.S. armed forces in Somalia.

In any event, we will be looking at how we can best work with both Houses to ensure bipartisan support for U.S. policy in Somalia.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Bradtko
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

The Honorable
Leon E. Panetta, Director,
Office of Management and Budget.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1993

MEMO FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR

Attached are additional materials for our
informal principals meeting at 2:00 p.m.
on Thursday, January 28 in the White House
Situation Room.

*signature
obtained*
1/27
Wong

Anthony Lake

TO: AGENCIES

CHRON FILE

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 27 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 28 JAN PC MTG ON SOMALIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 30 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTIONFOR CONCURRENCEFOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ORDWAY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VOE NARA, Date 10/28/16
2012-0659-FCOMMENTS: _____

_____DISPATCHED BY ✓ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

January 27, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY/RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Revised Somalia Paper for Principals Meeting

We have re-drafted the paper based on your comments, and those from State and JCS. In the case of JCS the paper, with their revisions, has been cleared by Colin Powell and Dave Jeremiah. At State, the clearances have been at the Assistant Secretary/bureau level.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to transmit the paper to his counterparts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Somalia Paper
Tab 1 Map
Tab 2 Forces
Tab 3 Oakley Report

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KOL NARA, Date 11/23/16

Q612-0659-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. paper	Somalia Policy: Near-Term Decisions (8 pages)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4090

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. map	Status of Forces (1 page)	01/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4090

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. chart	Forces Currently In Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4090

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. chart	Other Forces Planning to Participate in Somalia (1 page)	01/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4090

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. cable	Re: Where Are We And Where Do We Go From Here (3 pages)	01/25/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [5]

2012-0659-F
ke4090

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