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Folder Title:

Somalia, January-May 1993 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

African Affairs-Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et.al.

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502

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29	4	8	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	Meeting with Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (11 pages)	02/23/1993	P1/b(1)
002. report	Somalia: Searching for a Political Solution (13 pages)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, re: Somalia -Update (1 page)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)
004. report	Somalia: Searching for a Political Solution - the Next 24 Months (8 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in Somalia (9 pages)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake, re: War Powers Considerations in Somalia (2 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [4]

2012-0659-F

ke4089

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

1003

file Somalia

February 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE
FROM: MICHAEL SHEEHAN
SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the United Nations (U)

Attached at Tab I is the Boutros-Ghali Memcon.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be approved and filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation (U)
Tab A Boutros-Ghali Documents to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 11/23/16

2012-0659-F

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Declassify on: OADR

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Financing an Effective United Nations

A Report of the Independent Advisory Group on U.N. Financing

Shijuro Ogata, Co-Chairman
Paul Volcker, Co-Chairman

Abdul Aziz Al-Quraishi
Raymond Barre
Pehr Gyllenhammar
Olusegun Obasanjo
I. G. Patel
Karl Otto Pöhl
David Scholey
Stanislav Shatalin
Jesus Silva Herzog

A Project of
The Ford Foundation
February 1993

United States of America
Status of Contributions to the United Nations Budget
As at 22 February 1993

I. Regular Budget:

1993 rate of assessments:	25%
1993 Assessment:	\$ 309.9 million
Outstanding contributions from prior years:	<u>\$ 239.5 million</u>
Amount Outstanding	\$ 549.4 million

II. Peace-keeping Operations:

1993 Assessments	\$ 215.9 million
Outstanding contributions from prior years	<u>81.1 million</u>
Amount Outstanding	\$ 297.0 million
Total Amount Outstanding	\$ 846.4 million

Fact Sheet: Operation Restore Hope

- The U.S. has offered to lead a coalition of forces under UN auspices in an effort to establish a secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid in Somalia.
- The events leading up to this decision are as follows:
- Although the U.S. and other international donors had made available enough food to end the famine in Somalia, widespread looting, fighting between competing groups and the total collapse of government at every level prevented food from reaching at least half the population.
- We estimate that over 250,000 people have already starved to death or died from hunger-related diseases. The Center for Disease Control now estimates that 3000 people are dying every day in Somalia. One and one-half million people are at risk.
- Over the past 18 months, the U.S. has committed \$200 million for relief in Somalia, providing more food than any other country.
- This amount includes \$125 million for food aid, \$40 million for medical assistance, supplemental feeding, rehabilitation and support for our emergency airlift, and \$34 million for direct refugee assistance.
- In August, the U.S. and others mounted a major food airlift effort designed to reach the most needy areas of the country. Since airlift could only move enough food to reach about 20 percent of the population at risk, it was designed as an interim measure until a high-volume road convoy systems could be developed.
- To date, this airlift effort of 1400 flights has delivered over 2100 metric tons of food.
- In order to protect road convoys, the UN conceived a plan to send 3500 peacekeeping troops to Somalia to serve as guards. The U.S. airlifted the first 500 troops Pakistani into Mogadishu in late September, but they have been essentially pinned down by the superior forces of local groups since arrival, and have been unable to carry out their mission.
- Both we and the UN came to the realization that the 3500 man force, deployed under peacekeeping rules of operation, could not ensure the distribution of food.

- Given these facts, the President decided to propose sending a much larger military force to Somalia. Since the U.S. was well suited to lead such a mission, he decided to propose to the UN that the U.S. lead a military coalition of concerned nations into Somalia to ensure the delivery of food and other relief supplies to people in need.
- The mission of the coalition is limited and specific: to create the security environment necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to the Somali people and provide a breathing space for the work of UN peacekeeping and political reconciliation to begin.
- The military objectives to accomplish this mission derive from the immediate obstacles to the relief effort: the need to secure ports, airports, and delivery routes, and to protect storage and distribution of humanitarian supplies.
- These objectives can, and should, be met in the near term. As soon as they are, the coalition force can depart from Somalia, transferring its security function to a fully staffed UN peacekeeping force.
- In offering to contribute to the effort authorized by the resolution, the US has no other objective. Once deployed, US military forces will remain in Somalia no longer than is necessary.
- The U.S. has contacted numerous potential contributors to this coalition, and already we have received significant pledges of troops and financial support.
- We look forward to an early transition to an effective UN peacekeeping force.
- The sooner outside military forces can develop a secure environment, the sooner the Somali people can begin to reconstruct their own society.
- We fully understand that military intervention is no substitute for political reconciliation, and that this task belongs firmly in the hands of the Somali people.
- The President is well aware of the risk to U.S. troops in any potential combat situation, but has decided that the risks were acceptable in light of the nature and goals of the mission. Again, our overwhelming motivation is and will remain to bring an end to the mass starvation in Somalia.

- Apart from the purely humanitarian aspect of the coalition effort, it also demonstrates unambiguous support of the UN in its effort to confront challenges to international peace and stability.
- It would be desirable to accomplish this in all instances of severe depredation, but as the war in the former Yugoslavia shows, this is not possible.
- In Somalia, we have a clearly defined objective -- securing ports and interior distribution centers and convoying food between them -- which we believe can be accomplished with acceptable risk and in a finite period of time.
- Although in the future we may well face humanitarian crises similar to that in Somalia, we must evaluate each situation according to its own merits. We are confident that we have made the right decision in Somalia.

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003. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, re: Somalia -Update (1 page)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)
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African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
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RECORD ID: 9320178
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 93 07

TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 25 FEB 93
SOURCE REF: 9303600

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

IWG

file Somalia
DFA
12 191 93
>25 137 94

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF IWG MTG FEB 26 ON SOMALIA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 02 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JETT

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 11/28/16

2012-0659-F

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

9303600
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

By KDE NARA, Date 11/28/16
2012-0659-R

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DECL:OADR

February 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO:

MR. ANTHONY LAKE
National Security Advisor
The White House

COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD, USA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff


MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
United States Information
Agency

MR. PAUL MEIN
Acting Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MR. GORDAN ADAMS
Associate Director
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Subject: IWG Meeting on Somalia
February 26, 1993, at 2:00 p.m., Room 3519
Department of State

Please transmit the attached meeting notification and discussion papers to principals of the Interagency Working Group for Africa.


Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

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004. report	Somalia: Searching for a Political Solution - the Next 24 Months (8 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
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Humanitarian Relief and National Reconstruction in Somalia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Before considering the next steps in relief and reconstruction for Somalia, it is important to consider some of its economic realities. Somalia has never moved beyond a nomadic subsistence economy dictated primarily by the limited natural resources and harsh environment of the country. Even during "normal" times, Somalia was dependent on donor assistance for much of its food requirements, all of its investment and development funding, and a significant part of its recurrent and foreign exchange budget. It is not at all clear that Somalia could ever achieve economic self-sufficiency.

An unprecedented international humanitarian intervention now is underway in Somalia which must be transformed into a cost-effective international rehabilitation and recovery effort. Establishing and maintaining security will allow the Somali people to continue efforts to find peaceful ways of reuniting and governing their country. US financial and political commitments must be carefully constrained and linked to harshly realistic objectives and analysis of the type of interventions which are likely to be sustainable.

Essential conditions for an effective long term food supply and distribution system in Somalia include: movement toward increased food security, focused primarily on livestock; increased use and production in rain-fed and irrigated cropping areas; a secure environment for herders and farmers; increased donor participation and coordination in providing necessary inputs; and responsible participation of the Somali private sector in marketing agricultural outputs.

Because of the frequency and severity of drought, farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology. With improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could perhaps in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption, but since the country's apparent comparative advantage is livestock production, a robust trade in livestock commodities appears to be a much sounder development and food security strategy than a goal of cereal self-sufficiency.

Similarly, we do not yet have comprehensive information on the cost of physical reconstruction for Somalia. Estimates range from \$500 million to \$1 billion. We understand that the World Bank and UNDP currently are working to refine these estimates. We recommend a multi-donor assessment to identify both appropriate interventions and funding mechanisms. The donor community may want to delay major reconstruction projects until regional governments or other authorities are in place to protect and sustain them.

Assuming the present security situation does not deteriorate, we anticipate that the U.S. humanitarian program will continue to focus primarily on emergency activities in 1993 with a gradual move

toward rehabilitation programs. The current US strategy is to focus on rehabilitation programs in the agriculture and health sectors as well as employment generation activities and refugee repatriation. The strategy assumes that other donors will take responsibility for rehabilitation efforts in key sectors such as education. If the security situation remains stable, we estimate the funding requirements for this strategy to be \$--- million in FY 1993 and \$--- million in FY 1994. Funding sources include A.I.D., State Department, USIS and Department of Agriculture.

Current US policy in Somalia emphasizes the need to strengthen and rebuild local institutions as the basis for stabilizing relief programs, establishing local security and ultimately bringing about national reconciliation. Experience with the national government in Somalia over the last two decades argues against recreating most of its institutions in their earlier form. There are, however, some functions which normally are carried out by national level structures. Multi-lateral lending institutions also normally require the existence of a national government to deal with. Regional governments or authorities may be used for many of these purposes, but delaying national reconciliation may have some consequences.

Social services and economic production activities can most effectively be carried out at the local and regional level. Although it is extremely management intensive, this decentralized approach can take advantage of local participatory and national reconciliation initiatives implemented by NGO's. The international community must work with the Somalis to identify a minimum set of policies and guidelines for the operation of this system.

There is no compelling historical evidence that a unified Somalia state must or will succeed; however, in many communities in Somalia, the establishment of security has allowed for the re-emergence of basic forms of civil society. We believe that visible US assistance to civic organizations will reinforce their prestige and help to undercut the armed factions which currently dominate southern Somalia.

A fundamental question is whether development of civic organizations will create or support a social and political environment that will respect individual rights. The events of the past several decades would indicate that an active civil society can be an important contributing element to political openness, but by itself is insufficient to prevent authoritarian patterns of rule.

Introduction

The international military intervention in Somalia over the past two months, led by the United States, has now created a situation where it is possible to provide basic relief assistance to most of the famine stricken population in the south and central parts of Somalia. Next steps to be taken by the international community, including the United States, will be affected by the realities of Somalia.

The three-quarters of Somalia's roughly 7 million people who were in rural areas before 1991 have never, for the most part, moved beyond a largely nomadic subsistence economy well suited to the limited natural resources of the country. In the "good" years of the mid 1980's, the last "normal" period, Somalia depended on a combination of food imports and donor relief assistance to meet one third of its staple grain requirements. The national economy relied on donor assistance for almost all of its investment and development funding, and for much of its recurrent and foreign exchange budgets. There were an estimated 1200 - 1500 expatriates providing technical assistance in the mid-80s. The country was falling into increasing arrears on its international debt. The government was virtually bankrupt.

Since the fall of Siad Barre, two years of civil war followed by factional fighting and the breakdown of law and order created extensive social upheaval and mass displacements of populations. Destruction of the country's infrastructure and services has been widespread. Formal leadership and administration are non-existent. In the last year alone, it is estimated that 500,000 Somalis have starved or died of famine related diseases, most of these young children.

Three months after the arrival of UNITAF forces, food is flowing into the neediest areas at a greatly increased rate. Most of the heavily armed gangs have fled and large-scale looting has substantially decreased. In order to keep Somalia from sliding back into total chaos and famine, we now must move toward a cost-effective international rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. As a next step, the U.S. will expand the ongoing relief operation and focus on rehabilitation of the agriculture and health systems, as well as employment creation and refugee repatriation. This strategy acknowledges that in Somalia requires a coordinated, multi-donor commitment so that other key sectors such as education are addressed.

It is very problematic whether Somalia will ever achieve complete economic self-sufficiency, even if political, cultural and historical obstacles to national reconciliation can be overcome. The best that can be hoped for in the near term -- with the United States bolstering the United Nations' efforts --

is the restoration of security, essential services and infrastructure, and to bring about national reconciliation; over the medium to long term, Somalia probably will continue to need outside subsidies, depending on the productivity of the Somalis themselves and how much local and foreign private investment occurs. US financial and political commitments must be carefully allocated and linked to harshly realistic objectives. Establishing and maintaining peace and security will allow the Somali people to continue efforts to find peaceful ways of reuniting and governing their own country. The unity of the territory that was Somalia should not be considered as a necessary or achievable objective; nor should it be a prerequisite for continued assistance.

1. Requirements for a Long-term Food Supply and Distribution System:

Essential conditions for a long term food supply and distribution system to operate in Somalia include: movement toward increased food security; a secure environment for farmers and herders; donor coordination; and responsible participation of the Somali private sector.

Toward Food Security: Somalia's economy is based on agriculture - livestock production, subsistence grain production, and relatively new export oriented horticulture. Prior to the current disruptions, agriculture accounted for almost two-thirds of domestic output, over 90 percent of exports, and provided employment for the vast majority of the population. In 1989, 75 percent of Somalia's population lived in rural areas, with one-third in settled agriculture and two-thirds in nomadic and semi-nomadic bands. Livestock production was the major economic activity.

An estimated 700,000 MT of cereal grain is needed annually, of which some 500,000 MT could be produced in Somalia in three of every ten years of good rains. Historically, the shortfall has been met by international relief shipments (20% of total need) and commercial imports (10% of total). As in many parts of Africa, the country's urban population has increasingly moved away from coarse grains and prefers rice, wheat and pasta, all largely imported. With a growing urban population, serious production and marketing constraints, variable and poorly distributed rainfall, and a large proportion of the country not suited to crop production, Somalia is unlikely to become food self sufficient.

The donor community should assume for the current year that the estimated national cereal grain requirements of 700,000 MT will come in equal amounts from local production, relief distributions and commercial imports or monetized donor food. Since the balance between free and monetized donor food varies by

area and over time, systems to monitor production and marketing must be strengthened so that food aid does not become a disincentive to local production or private trade.

The livestock sector provides the primary source of calories for most Somalis; its current capacity is unclear. Despite the large numbers of animals stolen, slaughtered and/or dead due to drought large herds of all categories of livestock are observed in the south and central rangelands and appear in relatively good condition because of good pasture resulting from better than average rains. Significant exports of livestock are taking place, suggesting that commercial trade in livestock is continuing. Livestock health looms as the biggest issue in the sector and should be a focus of donor attention.

Several field assessments of the current crop and livestock situation are planned by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP). Together with information from NGOs providing basic production packages (seeds and tools) for grain production and assistance to herders, it should be possible to refine needs estimates for the rest of 1993 in the next several months.

Security: Since the present conflict began, crop production has been devastated by drought, looting, and the resulting displacement of large numbers of settled farmers. Preceding military intervention in December 1992, cultivation of food crops had declined to a tiny fraction of the approximately one million hectares of arable land. Seed stocks were consumed for food.

Because of favorable 1992/93 "der" rains, resettlement of some agricultural households and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided agricultural inputs, there was significant planting in some areas. Preliminary estimates are that cereal production may be up to one third of normal for the short rain season. Continued improvement will depend heavily on security, good rainfall in April-May 1993, and expanded distribution of agricultural inputs, before the "gu" planting season this fall.

Donor Coordination: Reviving domestic agriculture while meeting the emergency and relief food import requirements is a major challenge. It is important not to create disincentives for Somali farmers and commercial traders through the free distribution of large amounts of food. At the same time, farmers, like private traders and importers, face a relatively weak demand for agricultural commodities because of low purchasing power of the general population which is impoverished, largely unemployed and presently dependent on outside food aid. This precarious situation calls for careful monitoring by the international community and effective donor coordination on the types and levels of food assistance needed.

Responsible Private Sector Participation: Restoring a sustainable food delivery system will depend ultimately on the private sector, including farmers, herders, merchants and commercial importers. The elements of this system are currently in place and only need encouragement, sound policies and a secure operating environment in the towns and countryside. There should not be donor support for trucking fleets and other forms of transportation services, warehousing for grain or similar public sector-type interventions.

2. What is required to achieve various levels of indigenous production?

Crop production in Somalia is primarily rainfed. Nonetheless, there is substantial scope to restore cereal production in Somalia, even beyond historic high levels of the mid to late 1980's. However, because of the frequency and severity of drought, farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology, even in irrigated areas.

Irrigation: Irrigation is limited to the Shebelle and Juba river valley areas. Improved technological packages, inputs and better water management are needed to increase yields in these areas. These and expanded irrigated production are results of long-term development which are not appropriate to a recovery program.

Inputs: Draft animal usage is practically unknown despite the large numbers of livestock. Tillage is almost exclusively with hand tools using family labor. This level of technology limits areas of cultivation per household.

Crop production programs should emphasize the multiplication, procurement, and distribution of seeds. Care must be taken to select only those varieties suitable for the unique conditions in Somalia.

Fertilizer usage is very limited so that average crop yields are therefore very low. Significant donor investment in fertilizer would not be effective in the short term because farmers are not accustomed to using it, traditional practices of agronomy will not respond to it, and there are no mechanisms for warehousing and distribution.

In sum, with improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption. But, since the country's apparent comparative advantage is livestock production, a robust trade in livestock commodities appears to be a much sounder long-run strategy than a goal of cereal self-sufficiency.

FUNDING LEVELS

Short term: The only possible avenue for spurring agricultural recovery in the short-term (the remainder of 1993 and into 1994) is by expanding support to NGOs currently working in the sector. NGO implementation capacity already is severely stretched. Total additional funding of up to \$-- million could support the following programs:

- continued provision of seeds and tools
- expanded irrigation rehabilitation
- tool making/employment generation for blacksmiths
- livestock health programs

Medium term: Expansion of agricultural production in the medium term would assume a secure environment and increased capacity of our operating partners, particularly Somalis. It would require strong U.N. leadership and donor coordination. It is difficult to predict a timeframe for these interventions, however, at a funding level in the range of \$--- million, activities could include:

- importation of basic seed
- expansion of livestock health programs
- livestock market assessment and promotion

Longer term: In the long term we would envision World Bank/IMF as lead agencies. It is not possible to estimate funding levels at this time, however, World Bank and UNDP assessments may provide a clearer picture in the near future. Activities could include:

- irrigation system development
- livestock redistribution
- rehabilitation of watering points
- increased use of fertilizer

4. What are the reconstruction assistance requirements, their costs, and possible funding sources?

There have not yet been any comprehensive estimates of the cost of physical reconstruction for Somalia. Most types of infrastructure have been rendered inoperable, stripped of all salvageable parts or destroyed. Estimates by the UNDP for physical reconstruction in Hargeisa and Burao made in the late 1980's were as high as \$800 million. A.I.D.'s regional office in Nairobi prepared a notional estimate of some \$500 million for the rehabilitation of major urban and rural infrastructure, including roads and telecommunications. REDSO/EA notes that this could easily rise to \$1 billion as more detailed information becomes available.

A World Bank Task Force is preparing a multi-sectoral rehabilitation paper for Somalia that will provide estimates for

restoring critical services and facilities. Informal discussions indicate that their initial estimates will probably be below \$500 million for high priority projects over the next several years. UNDP will prepare a multi-year rehabilitation plan for Somalia over the next nine months. This plan focuses on economic, social and institutional infrastructure, but is unlikely to include technically credible estimates for physical infrastructure.

It would be appropriate for the USG to propose that a multi-donors carry out a comprehensive survey and develop an overall reconstruction plan for Somalia within the next six months. Because the World Bank is generally better equipped than the UN to deal with long-term investment issues, the survey and planning effort should be led by the Bank and include staff from other involved donors and institutions. A Bank led, multi-donor effort is more likely to produce a document that could be acceptable as a common reference and planning instrument by interested donors.

Funding Sources

The United States should not assume responsibility for financing the reconstruction costs of physical infrastructure in Somalia. But U.S. assistance in planning for this effort and U.S. funding of feasibility, survey and design studies are entirely appropriate, particularly if they lead to equal, or privileged, access for U.S. firms bidding on potential reconstruction projects.

Funding for the significant costs of reconstruction should be possible from the IBRD, AFDB, EEC and hopefully Arab aid organizations and from community and some private Somali. It is not realistic to expect any regional or national government financing of significant infrastructure costs. The only contributions might be donations of land or other resources in kind, or schemes under which future revenue streams can be used to repay initial external financing. One of the major advantages of a comprehensive, multi-donor, infrastructure study on Somalia is the opportunity it would present to explore and identify appropriate funding methods. This will be particularly critical in Somalia, where risks are likely to be high and assured returns on investments quite low for the foreseeable future.

5. What are the requirements and sources for U.S. assistance funding?

Funding requirements for U.S. civilian assistance to Somalia are projected for the remainder of FY 93 and for FY 94. During FY 92 and FY 93 most of A.I.D.'s support for relief and humanitarian assistance has been channeled through Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) working in Somalia. We expect this will remain true for the rest of FY 93 and FY 94. It is generally assumed here that

while the overall costs that the international community will face in Somalia will be substantial, the U.S. share of overall civilian assistance should be kept to a modest level.

A.I.D., State Department and U.S.I.S. resources will be drawn on to fund the projected assistance needs for FY 93 and FY 94 in Somalia. 1993 is assumed to be a year in which most funds will continue to go to relief, with increasing levels of rehabilitation. Planning and initial organization for reconstruction will take place during the last half of the year, but very little reconstruction funding. Conditions during 1994, assuming a reasonable transition to UNOSOM II, should allow the planning and initiation of more serious reconstruction activities in most urban and rural areas of Somalia.

If there is a reasonably orderly transition from relief, through rehabilitation, to reconstruction takes place, most funding levels estimated below can be met from planned or reallocated budget allotments. The exception would be the need for some additional FY 94 funds to "replace" the African Disaster Assistance Funds from FY 93.

A.I.D., Food Assistance

Food aid contributions have been made through under the Legislative Authority of PL 480 and Sec. 416 (b), by A.I.D. and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In FY 1992 and so far in FY 1993, the USG contributed a total of 317,311 MT valued at \$145.2 million. A.I.D. is considering additional P.L. 480 allocations in FY 93 to support direct feeding programs and market intervention initiatives. Actual commitments will depend on security conditions, other donor contributions, updated needs assessments and indigenous food production.

FY 93 contingency planning for repatriation of Somali refugees now in Kenya will include 20,000 MT, and \$8.3 million. Programming of food for repatriated refugees will be done on the basis of re-directing existing resources from Kenya to Somalia as needed. FY 94 planning now excludes the feeding of repatriated refugees, with changes to be determined as repatriation takes place.

FY 94 estimate (not provided by 2/22/93)

A.I.D. expects to spend at least \$50 million in funds from the \$100 million Sub-Saharan African Disaster Assistance Fund in Somalia in FY 93. This funding level assumes that security conditions do not deteriorate to the extent that airlifts are necessary again, and that they do not radically improve to the extent that widespread rehabilitation is possible.

Program Funds	\$29 million
Civ. Airlift	\$17 million
DOD Airlift	\$3.2 million

Total ADA to date \$49.2 million

Based on the proposal prepared in January 1993 by the Regional Office in Nairobi, the A.I.D. is prepared to program up to \$32 million in funds from the African Disaster Assistance (ADA) Fund and the Development Fund for Africa for rehabilitation activities and recovery preparation in 1993. Actual budgetary impact, the amount of funds required beyond ADA Funds, is therefore estimated at \$12.

If requirements for Somalia exceed this level, it will be necessary to seek other funding sources, either IDA funds, borrowing authority from other A.I.D. accounts, or a supplemental.

In FY 94 A.I.D. is currently budgeting a level of \$20 million for disaster relief (and rehabilitation) grants in Somalia. These funds would come from the FY 94 disaster appropriations. This projected budget level assumes that emergency relief needs have been considerably reduced from this year, and that USG rehabilitation funding would come primarily from other A.I.D. funds.

A.I.D. has made a initial estimate of \$25 million in DFA and other funds for rehabilitation and recovery, to be spent under the special authorities of the Horn of Africa Act and other appropriate authorities for FY 94. This assumes that rehabilitation activities will expand, and that some recovery efforts and reconstruction planning is well along. This level would not permit significant USG funding of infrastructure reconstruction, Commodity Import Programs or other such forms of assistance.

There will be an additional cost to A.I.D. of seconded direct hire and contract staff working with the United Nations, and possibly with other international assistance efforts for Somalia. The cost of seconded staff members is not currently known.

State, Bureau for International Organization Affairs

The United Nations General Assembly approved a total level of \$110 million for assessed costs of the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia through April 30, 1993. An additional \$84 million was projected for the following six months. This would result in a U.S. assessed costs for UN peacekeeping in Somalia in FY 1993 of some \$59 million (30.387 percent of total UN costs). It is not

clear to IO where this level of funding will come from.

Discussions are now in advanced stages on the details of the UNOSOM II phase of UN operations in Somalia. These operations could start as early as the beginning of March. The budget implications of the considerably expanded military operations and the civilian rehabilitation efforts under UNOSOM II are, as yet, unknown.

There may also be costs associated with the secondment of staff from the USG to the UN in Somalia and in New York.

State, Bureau for Refugee Programs

In FY 1993 the Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) will continue to support UN and NGO activities for Somali refugees in the neighboring countries as well as the ICRC efforts inside Somalia itself. While most of the funds contributed from the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account (MRA) will be unearmarked, it is anticipated that at least \$26 million of RP's FY 1993 support could eventually be attributed to addressing the Somali crisis. Additional funding could be available from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund under a Presidential determination to address Somalia cross-border needs and requirements resulting from an organized repatriation program.

As UNITAF forces have asserted control in southern Somalia and the provision of relief supplies has been expanded, the numbers of refugees fleeing Somalia has decreased to less than 100 per day. To date, only a few thousand refugees have spontaneously returned. However, UNHCR is planning for the relatively quick return of 85 % of the refugees in Kenya contingent on two conditions: 1) assurance of physical security, or minimum assurances against inter-clan fighting and generalized banditry and 2) assurance of material security, or predictability of food supplies up until the next harvest and the presence of a network of humanitarian rehabilitation agencies.

In FY 1994, RP will continue to support UNHCR's repatriation program as well as care and maintenance programs in asylum countries for those refugees unable or unwilling to return home. Assuming that there is relative stability under UNOSOM II, by 1994 it is anticipated that funding for ICRC will be decreased as their operations will most likely be scaled back as UN agencies and NGOs fund relief and rehabilitation programs. Any decrease in RP funding for ICRC is likely to be offset by an increase in the funding for UNHCR's repatriation program. Therefore, RP anticipates that roughly \$25 million will be needed to address the ongoing Somalia situation in FY 1994.

United States Information Agency

FY 93 estimates

FY 94 estimates

SUMMARY OF U.S. FUNDING FOR SOMALIA RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Organization	FY 93	FY 94	Funding Source
A.I.D. (& USDA) - Food	\$102.8 m	\$67.1 m	PL 480 Title II, Section 416 allocations.
A.I.D. - Disaster	\$50 m	\$20 m	African Disaster Assistance Funds, (or IDA, or "borrowing")
A.I.D. - Relief and Rehabilitation	\$12 m	\$25 m	ADA or DFA
STATE/IO	\$59 m+		
STATE/RP	\$26 m	\$25 m	Migration and Refugee Assistance Account
TOTAL	\$224 m		

6. What feasibly can be done to build functioning national and local administrative structures, including police?

Current U.S. policies in Somalia emphasize the need to strengthen and rebuild local institutions and capabilities both as the basis for stabilizing relief programs and for establishing local security. The same basic process would provide the organizational base for supporting local security forces (auxiliary police, etc.), undertaking local rehabilitation and recovery, and is a major step toward building a new national political system. This policy is consistent with the regionally based approach developed by the previous UN Special Representative in Somalia.

National Government

Experience with the national government in Somalia over the past two decades argues strongly against rushing to recreate most of its institutions. There are, however, some functions which may be difficult to organize at the regional and local level, and the lack of a national government may delay access of Somalia to

multi-lateral funding under the current rules of institutions such as the World Bank.

In the coming year, while the dialogue on national reconciliation continues and local and regional rebuilding continues and strengthens, an interim, internationally mandated, authority is needed to carry out critical functions. Such functions could include coordination among regional police forces, establishing a monetary authority, and operating postal telecommunications and air traffic control services. Such authorities could be based on consortia of donors, NGOs and Somalis, or by more regional (Horn of Africa) groupings where appropriate, operating under United Nations mandate.

Regional and Local Structures

For other areas of social services and economic production, most of the required activities can be carried out at the regional and local level probably with more efficiency than under national structures. Keeping service delivery and administrative structures decentralized would keep the reconstituted bureaucracy more directly linked to local control and financial support. The system which Somalia will be reconstituting on a local basis will be similar to the administrative and service structures which neighboring Ethiopia is in the process of creating through decentralizing previous national structures.

This decentralized approach can help avoid a violent winner take all struggle for power and resources at the national level. It can also effectively capture the advantages of participatory, locally controlled initiatives supported by NGOs. This decentralized approach will be relatively manpower intensive for donors and their operating partners.

Regional administrative and service delivery mechanisms also permits postponing dealing with the status of the northern areas of Somalia where certain factions support complete independence. Since the UN seems prepared to initiate rehabilitation programs in the north, and incorporate the northeast and northwest into UNOSOM II, these areas could be included in a loose "federation" at least for the next several years of critical recovery.

Need for Uniform Policies and Guidelines

While there is much to recommend a highly decentralized approach to rebuilding Somalia, there is also need for setting some critical policy and operating standards for regional governments and the evolving nation. This would ensure greater efficiency, a common legal framework in key areas (e.g., traffic and commercial laws), and lay the basis for the possible linking of local administrations at a later date. An international conference or working group, perhaps operating under a UN

mandate, could endorse this decentralized reconstruction approach and identify a basic set of administrative and economic policies and operating guidelines for a new Somalia. Such a conference should be held in the near future, so that locally initiated efforts do not move too far into dissonant patterns of operation. Once a basic approach and set of policies and guidelines is developed that major donors agree with and will enforce, this will provide an extremely sound basis within which to develop local systems.

7. What can be done to build a civil society in Somalia that respects political and individual rights?

Since it was given its independence thirty years ago, Somalia has been under various forms of authoritarian rule for most of its brief history. In the place of the relatively unified regime under Barre, there is now an undesirable combination of fragmented and warring regimes, most of which are authoritarian. The imposition of order by outside military forces is clearly an extraordinarily extremely undesirable way to enforce a modest level of stability, and only buys time for Somalis to attempt to work out a new basis for a nation. The current attempt at moving toward a single nation-state, based on some system of federation, may or may not succeed.

In some communities and towns in Somalia, the establishment of peace has allowed for the re-emergence of basic forms of civil society -- governance, the maintenance of security, the provision of basic services and various forms of social, cultural and religious activities. The objective of international efforts to strengthen the basis of a peaceful and productive Somalia must be to encourage and spread locally initiated and valued patterns of interaction. USIA already has been able to initiate a number of successful efforts to identify and encourage professional, civic, sports and cultural groups in Mogadishu and other stabilized towns. These efforts have demonstrated that there is a strong and long pent-up desire for civil society to be built on.

There are a number of approaches to supporting and encouraging various institutions and activities that will strengthen civil society in Somalia, if security can be maintained. Although management intensive, we can accomplish two goals with relatively small grants to Somali civic organizations. First, all groups require some material help to function and small project grants are an efficient way to assist them. Secondly, visible American assistance to these groups will reinforce their prestige and undercut the armed factions which currently dominate Somalia. However, care must be used to avoid creating dependency on U.S. funding. Self sufficiency and voluntarism must be overarching values in our assistance approach. The empowerment of Somali civic organizations and Somali civil society generally will weaken the current perverse

incentive system which rewards the gunmen and ignores the healthy elements of society.

According to USLO Mogadishu reporting, many intellectuals and other potential civil sector leaders remained in Somalia despite opportunities to leave and defended the remnants of civic order at the risk of their own lives, a risk that continues today. Somalis are ready to begin the restoration of a normal society, but need assistance to be successful.

We will need to send in Americans and U.S. trained Somali's (whether or not they are U.S. citizens) for short and medium term visits to run seminars in conjunction with Somali host organizations and advise civil sector groups. Plans to send Somalis to the United States as participants in exchange programs are clearly premature. Assistance must be carefully gauged to avoid overwhelming local groups or threatening their independence. Help to the civil sector should be disbursed through a series of small grants, much like the A.I.D. program in South Africa.

USIS has identified what they consider to be immediate needs in the areas of education, support to the local press, justice, women's groups and sports activities. These types of activities are illustrative of the broader range of activities that will emerge as more of the country becomes secure. Beyond pursuing its own core programs, USIS will manage self-help and other USG-funded small projects which would promote the development of a civil society in Somalia.

The more fundamental question is whether the development of cross-cutting forms of civic, cultural, professional and religious activity in Somalia will necessarily create or support a social and political environment that will respect political and individual rights, or to political systems that will promote the peaceful maintenance and transfer of power. The events of the past several decades in Somalia would indicate that an active level of civil society can be an important contributing element to political openness, but by itself is insufficient to prevent authoritarian patterns of rule from being established.

A Strategy for U.S. Economic and Technical Assistance to Somalia

The United States has taken a prominent and visible role in the UN mandated intervention in Somalia. We cannot realistically abandon the precedent setting international effort now underway, without running the risk of Somalia returning to the chaos of the past two years, further discrediting the United Nations as an effective force for international mediation and problem solving. We need to pursue a strategy which will strongly support United Nations efforts in Somalia, and increasing their chances of success, while constantly attempting to shift the leadership and

financial burden of the effort to other nations.

Efforts need to go ahead to strengthen the civilian side of the UNOSOM II resolution so that the invigorated and expanded UN presence in Somalia can assume a more aggressive and effective role in relief and rehabilitation efforts. USG agencies have pursued a common strategy of supporting the UN, attempting to provide interim support for UN operations (particularly through the A.I.D. DART), and look at ways to supplement UN staffing for the UNOSOM II phase so they can become an effective and credible force in Somalia.

UNDP has already initiated plans to carry out a multi-year planning exercise for the rehabilitation of Somalia to be completed primarily by outside experts and consultants by the end of 1993. The detailed scope of this effort is still uncertain, and it is not apparent that this will deal with comprehensive reconstruction as much as restoring basic services and institutions.

Longer term physical and institutional reconstruction efforts will be the most costly item, other than ongoing military expenditures, in the international communities efforts to rebuild Somalia. The best way to achieve a credible and realistic plan for this effort, that will attract as much international financial support as possible, is for the World Bank to be asked to organize an International Consortium for the Reconstruction of Somalia. The first stage of such an effort would involve two parallel steps. One is to convene a working group, including Somali experts, to recommend the basic policy framework for a reconstructed Somali economy.

The second step is to prepare a detailed technical and financial plan for the physical reconstruction of Somalia. This effort should be led by the World Bank, staffed by consultants and experts (including Somalis) jointly funded by participating donors, and produce a comprehensive plan for the medium term (5 year) reconstruction of Somali infrastructure. As conditions and political reconciliation permits, this would be used as the basis for international funding of the gradual rebuilding of Somalia. Much of this effort would initially focus on regional reconstruction rather than work at the national level.

The third element of the proposed international effort to promote the reconstruction of Somalia is the vitalization and strengthening of the group of neighboring Horn of Africa Group of countries that have been involved in political reconciliation and peace efforts in Somalia. This organization should be provided with support, and encouraged to maintain ongoing consultations with Somalia, the international reconstruction consortia and the UN. This organization represents a critical force in ensuring that potential problems and conflicts are discussed and

peacefully mediated by the involved countries in the region. It will be critical for the political reconciliation process to ensure that pressures and interventions from neighboring countries are carefully managed. Such an organization would also have the longer term value of providing a venue for actions on regional issues of common concern and interest, and ultimately as a basis for regional economic and political cooperation.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake, re: War Powers Considerations in Somalia (2 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)

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Somalia

Operation Restore Hope

President Bush: Humanitarian Mission to Somalia

Fact Sheet: Operation Restore Hope

Chronology: Background to Operation Restore Hope,
1991–December 8, 1992

Country Profile: Somalia

UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia

US Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication

President Bush

Humanitarian Mission to Somalia

Address

*Address to the nation, Washington, DC,
December 4, 1992*

I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia and about a mission that can ease suffering and save lives. Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already, over a quarter of a million people—as many people as live in Buffalo, New York—have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead, five times that number, 1.5 million people could starve to death.

For many months now, the United States has been actively engaged in the massive international relief effort to ease Somalia's suffering. All told, America has sent Somalia 200,000 tons of food, more than half the world total. This summer, the distribution system broke down. Truck convoys from Somalia's ports were blocked. Sufficient food failed to reach the starving in the interior of Somalia.

And so in August, we took additional action. In concert with the United Nations, we sent in the US Air Force to help fly food to the towns. To date, American pilots have flown over 1,400 flights, delivering over 17,000 tons of food aid. And when the UN authorized 3,500 UN guards to protect the relief operation, we flew in the first of them—500 soldiers from Pakistan.

But in the months since then, the security situation has grown worse. The United Nations has been prevented from deploying its initial commitment of troops. In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon

landing, food convoys have been hijacked, aid workers assaulted, [and] ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them from docking.

There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down— anarchy prevails. One image tells the story. Imagine 7,000 tons of food aid literally bursting out of a warehouse on a dock in Mogadishu, while Somalis starve less than a kilometer away, because relief workers cannot run the gauntlet of armed gangs roving the city.

Confronted with these conditions, relief groups called for outside troops to provide security so they could feed people. It's now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive.

It was this situation which led us to tell the United Nations that the United States would be willing to provide more help to enable relief to be delivered. Last night, the UN Security Council, by unanimous vote and after the tireless efforts of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, welcomed the United States' offer to lead a coalition to get the food through.

After consulting with my advisers, with world leaders, and the congressional leadership, I have today told Secretary General Boutros-Ghali that America will answer the call. I have given the order to [Defense] Secretary Cheney to move a substantial American force into Somalia. As I speak, a Marine amphibious ready group, which we maintain at sea, is offshore Mogadishu. These troops will be joined by elements of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, based out of Camp

Pendleton, California, and by the Army's 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York.

These and other American forces will assist in Operation Restore Hope. They are America's finest. They will perform this mission with courage and compassion, and they will succeed.

The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act.

In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.

We will not, however, be acting alone. I expect forces from about a dozen countries to join us in this mission. When we see Somalia's children starving, all of America hurts. We've tried to help in many ways. And make no mistake about it, now we and our allies will ensure that aid gets through.

And here is what we and our coalition partners will do. **First**, we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that food can move from ships over land to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And **sec-**



ond, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops handing the security mission back to a regular UN peace-keeping force. Our mission has a limited objective—to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peace-keeping force to keep it moving.

This operation is not open ended. We will not stay 1 day longer than is absolutely necessary. Let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation. [Marine] General Hoar [Commander in Chief of US Central Command] and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia's people.

The outlaw elements in Somalia must understand [that] this is serious business. We will accomplish our mission. We have no intent to remain in Somalia with fighting forces, but we are determined to do it right, to secure an environment that will allow food to get to the starving people of Somalia.

To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence. Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence: We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed.

Let me say to the men and women of our armed forces, we are asking you to do a difficult and dangerous job. As commander in chief, I assure you, you will have our full support to get the job done, and we will bring you home as soon as possible.

Finally, let me close with a message to the families of the men and women who take part in this mission. I understand it is difficult to see your loved ones go, to send them off knowing they will not be home for the holidays, but the humanitarian mission they undertake is in the finest traditions of service. So, to every sailor, soldier, airman, and marine who is involved in this mission, let me say, you're doing God's work. We will not fail.

Letter to Congress

Text of a letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, DC, December 10, 1992.

*Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. President:)*

Beginning in January of this year with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 733, the United Nations has been actively addressing the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The United States has been assisting the U.N. effort to deal with a human catastrophe. Over 300,000 Somalis have died of starvation. Five times that number remain at risk, beyond the reach of international relief efforts in large part because of the security situation. As a result, voluntary relief organizations from the United States and other countries have appealed for assistance from outside security forces.

On November 29, 1992, the Secretary General of the United Nations reported to the Security Council that the deteriorating security conditions in Somalia had severely disrupted international relief efforts and that an immediate military operation under U.N. authority was urgently required. On December 3, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794, which determined that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security, and, invoking Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, authorized Member States to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In my judgment, the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces under U.S. command to Somalia as part of this multilateral response to the Resolution is necessary to address a major humanitarian calamity, avert related threats to international peace and security, and protect the safety of Americans and others engaged in relief operations.

In the evening, Eastern Standard Time, on December 8, 1992, U.S. Armed Forces entered Somalia to

secure the airfield and port facility of Mogadishu. Other elements of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of other Members of the United Nations are being introduced onto Somalia to achieve the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. No organized resistance has been encountered to date.

U.S. Armed Forces will remain in Somalia only as long as necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and will then turn over the responsibility of maintaining this environment to a U.N. peacekeeping force assigned to Somalia. Over 15 nations have already offered to deploy troops. While it is not possible to estimate precisely how long the transfer of responsibility may take, we believe that prolonged operations will not be necessary.

We do not intend that U.S. Armed Forces deployed to Somalia become involved in hostilities. Nonetheless, these forces are equipped and ready to take such measures as may be needed to accomplish their humanitarian mission and defend themselves, if necessary; they also will have the support of any additional U.S. Armed Forces necessary to ensure their safety and the accomplishment of their mission.

I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct our foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, and in accordance with applicable treaties and laws. In doing so, I have taken into account the views expressed in H. Con. Res. 370, S. Con. Res. 132, and the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act, Public Law 102-274, on the urgent need for action in Somalia.

I am providing this report in accordance with my desire that Congress be fully informed and consistent with the War Powers Resolution. I look forward to cooperating with Congress in the effort to relieve human suffering and to restore peace and stability in the region.

Sincerely,
GEORGE BUSH ■

Somalia: Operation Restore Hope

Working with other concerned nations under UN auspices, the United States is acting to ease the suffering of millions of Somalis through Operation Restore Hope. In the face of a human tragedy of "almost indescribable proportions," the United States has sent a military force of up to 30,000 to achieve a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. As President Bush explained:

In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement; that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.

Speaking before the United Nations after the adoption of Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992, Ambassador Edward J. Perkins assured the international community that the United States has no other objective and will begin the transition to a UN peace-keeping force as soon as possible. "Military intervention is no substitute for political reconciliation, and that task belongs firmly in the hands of Somalis," he said.

Citing the magnitude of the human tragedy in Somalia, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 794, welcoming the US offer of assistance and encouraging other states to participate. To date, 35 member states have responded.

Operation Restore Hope will serve another important function as well.

Ambassador Perkins told the Security Council:

By acting in response to the tragic events in Somalia, the international community is also taking an important step in developing a strategy for dealing with the potential disorder and conflicts of the post-Cold War world. This step must entail unprecedented levels of cooperation amongst the international community in response to urgent humanitarian needs and to peacekeeping, utilizing our respective military forces if necessary to do so.

Operation Restore Hope

The mission of the US-led coalition to Somalia is specific and limited: to create the security environment necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to the Somali people. The US military force will secure ports, airports, and delivery routes and will protect storage and distribution of humanitarian supplies. US forces will remain in Somalia only as long as they are needed. Once the objectives are met, the coalition force will depart, transferring its security function to UN peace-keepers.

US Relief Efforts

The United States has been at the forefront of humanitarian assistance efforts and, so far, has provided about \$200 million and more than 300,000 tons of food. This humanitarian relief effort began in February 1991, when the United States coordinated its assistance effort with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN agencies, and private voluntary organizations. The Department of State declared that a civil strife disaster existed in Somalia for fiscal years 1991, 1992, and 1993, opening the way for disaster assistance.

Operation Restore Hope

United States: Up to 30,000 troops, including:

- 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Camp Pendleton, CA)
- US Army 10th Mountain Division (Fort Drum, NY)
- Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40 (Port Hueneme, CA)
- Naval Beach Group 1 (Coronado, CA)
- Elements of the 30th Naval Construction Regiment (Pearl Harbor, HI) □

During the past 18 months, the United States committed:

- More than \$125 million for food aid;
- \$40 million for medical assistance, supplemental feeding, rehabilitation, and support for our emergency airlift; and
- More than \$45 million for direct refugee assistance.

In August 1992, President Bush appointed a special coordinator for Somali relief and authorized the use of Defense Department aircraft to deliver food to inaccessible locations in northern Kenya and Somalia. The airlift, which was designed as a short-term, emergency measure, also uses civilian aircraft funded by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Planners expect that once ports are open and overland transport becomes feasible, airlift operations will be terminated.



Background: Famine, War, and Refugees

Somalia is the site of Africa's worst famine disaster, and up to 3,000 people could be dying each week. Although the exact total is unknown, the United Nations estimates that more than 300,000 Somalis already have died. In addition, Somalia has the worst refugee problem in Africa, exacerbated by drought, famine, and almost constant warfare. About 900,000 Somalis have fled to Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Hundreds of thousands of others are displaced internally.


The ICRC estimates that 1.5 million Somalis—out of a population of 6.5 million—now face starvation, and as many as 4.5 million will require some type of assistance.

The government has virtually ceased to exist, the political future is uncertain, and warring clans control large chunks of the capital of Mogadishu and the countryside. In Mogadishu, two rival factions of the United Somali Congress—one loyal to Ali Mahdi and the other siding with General Aideed—are locked in a bitter power struggle. Conditions are somewhat better in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the country where local authorities retain some control and food shortages are less severe.

Because of the political instability, the US embassy and the USAID mission were evacuated in early January 1991. A US liaison office headed by Ambassador Robert Oakley, Special Envoy for Somalia, has been established in Mogadishu.

The Situation Deteriorates

Before the deployment of coalition forces, security conditions had deteriorated in almost every area in central and southern Somalia where UN agencies and non-governmental organizations are working. Ships had been shelled, warehouses and convoys looted, and relief workers injured or subjected to numerous death threats. Because of the growing instability in these areas, UN officials inside Somalia concluded that current relief methods



were inadequate. At latest report before coalition forces were deployed, conditions across the country were varied:

Mogadishu. Out of a total population of 1 million, the capital houses between 350,000 and 400,000 refugees, who are virtually without resources and completely dependent on the ICRC for food. Northern Mogadishu is controlled by Ali Mahdi, the Interim President of Somalia, while the southern sector is held by General Aideed.

Southern and Central Regions. Relief workers report extremely high levels of acute malnutrition, with the highest mortality rates in the country. In the city of Baidoa, for example, the

UN estimates that 39% of the displaced population has died since April, primarily from preventable and treatable illnesses like measles and dysentery.

Northwestern Region. Northwestern Somalia offers hope for a return to normal life, with relatively vibrant livestock production and progress in repairing structural damage. Relief workers have reported that the northwest needs rehabilitation assistance rather than emergency aid.

Northeastern Region. Conditions are generally better than in the southern and central regions, but political tensions remain. The principal port of Bender Cassim (Boosaaso) is functioning, and the city is one of few in Somalia with regular electricity. ■

Background to Operation Restore Hope

January 1991–December 8, 1992

1991

January 27—President Siad Barre is overthrown and forced to flee to his homeland in southwestern Somalia.

February 21—US provides funding to coordinate US Government assistance with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations.

March 25—Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, declares that a civil strife disaster exists in Somalia.

June 12—US authorizes an emergency food commitment (1,016 metric tons) to Save the Children Fund/US-UK.

July 1—US begins funding a *Medecins Sans Frontieres*/Holland land mine clearing project in northwestern Somalia.

August 27—US provides a grant of \$256,000 to Save the Children Fund/UK to fund maternal child health and therapeutic feeding centers in Mogadishu.

September 10—US provides a grant of \$463,846 to Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) for emergency food distribution in Mogadishu and northwestern Somalia.

September 27—US provides \$3 million to UNICEF for supplementary feeding and health programs in Somalia and rehabilitation of the water supply system in Hargeysa.

US authorizes emergency food commitment (12,210 metric tons) to the World Food Program for free distribution.

October—US begins funding the International Medical Corps to operate an emergency medical program in Mogadishu.

The United States gives a grant of \$245,630 to World Concern to operate a 6-month health program in Chisimayu (Kismaayo) and the Jubbada Hoose (Lower Juba) region.

US purchases \$56,240 in spare parts for rehabilitation of the Mogadishu water system.

US contributes \$5 million to UN High Commissioner for Refugees for repatriation of Somali refugees and \$2 million to the UN Children's Fund for activities in northern Somalia, including \$990,000 for rehabilitation of the Hargeysa water system.

November 15—US pledges 24,270 metric tons of rice, lentils, and oil for the ICRC's feeding programs in Somalia.

1992

January—US provides \$161,132 to the International Medical Corps to charter emergency relief flights of medical supplies into Mogadishu.

US gives \$221,008 to Save the Children Fund/UK to fund relief flights of food and medicine into Mogadishu.

January 23—UN Security Council passes Resolution 733, voting unanimously to urge an increase in humanitarian aid to Somalia and for the appointment of a coordinator to oversee delivery. The resolution urges the Secretary-General and other organizations to work with the warring factions in Somalia to permit aid to be delivered.

March—US provides a grant of \$383,500 to *Medecins Sans Frontieres*/France for an emergency medical program in Mogadishu.

March 17—UN Security Council passes Resolution 746, voting unanimously to urge the Somali factions to honor their commitments under the cease-fire agreements of March 3, 1992.

March 20—US signs an agreement with the ICRC to provide 24,270 metric tons of food aid.

April—US announces a pledge of 20,000 metric tons of sorghum to be given to the World Food Program for Somalia.

April 24—UN Security Council passes Resolution 751 by unanimous vote, establishing a UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and asking the Secretary-General to deploy 50 UN observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. The resolution also approves the deployment of a UN security force in Somalia.

May—US provides a grant of \$2.2 million to the ICRC to support emergency airlifts of food into Beledweyne in central Somalia.

June—US gives a grant for \$1.4 million to the UN Development Program to provide air support for emergency operations.

US provides an additional grant for \$1.23 million to the International Medical Corps to expand its emergency medical programs in Mogadishu, Beledweyne, and other areas.

June 15—US authorizes an additional 10,000 metric tons of food aid for the ICRC, increasing the overall US commitment to 34,270 metric tons.



July—US gives a grant to the *Medecins Sans Frontieres/France* to operate a supplementary feeding program in Merca, south of Mogadishu.

US provides \$274,000 to Save the Children/UK to continue its supplementary feeding program in Mogadishu for 6 months and provides \$312,500 to start a feeding program in Beledweyne.

July 23—50 UN cease-fire observers complete their deployment to Mogadishu as authorized by UNSC Resolution 751.

July 27—The UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 767 urging the Secretary General to mount an airlift of food supplies, to dispatch a technical team to determine how UN security guards can be used to protect relief workers, and to convene a conference to work for political reconciliation.

July 29—US provides Catholic Relief Services with \$915,000 to move 3,000 metric tons of commodities from Kenya to southwestern Somalia.

July 31—US authorizes an emergency food commitment of 18,395 metric tons of wheat and 3,240 metric tons of corn soy blend to the World Food Program for free distribution and sales.

August—US gives a grant of \$640,700 to *Action Internationale Contre la Faim* to initiate food and water projects in Mogadishu.

August 12—Somali leaders agree to the deployment of UN security personnel under the direction of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Somali Ambassador Mohamed Sahnun.

August 13—President Bush authorizes the Department of Defense to offer a US military airlift to transport a UN guard force of 500 and its associated equipment to Somalia.

US pledges an additional 40,000 metric tons of sorghum.

August 14—US authorizes 105,000 metric tons of emergency food assistance worth \$46.6 million.

The United States announces an additional pledge of \$3 million to the ICRC to support food airlifts and veterinary programs, and to purchase agricultural implements and blankets.

August 16—President Bush appoints Andrew Natsios as Special Coordinator for Somali Relief. He is the Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance at the US Agency for International Development. The President also announces an additional 145,000 metric tons of food aid for Somalia.

August 18—US Central Command establishes Joint Task Force Provide Relief in Mombasa, Kenya, to conduct emergency airlift of food supplies in northeastern Kenya and Somalia.

August 21—The US and Kenya announce the formation of a coordinating committee for "Operation Provide Relief" to deliver food to Somali refugees.

US begins airlift of emergency food supplies to refugees in Kenya.

August 25—President Bush authorizes release of \$15.2 million from the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to respond to the urgent needs of displaced persons in Somalia.

August 28—The US begins a military airlift of emergency food supplies into Somalia from Mombasa, Kenya.

August 28—The UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 775 endorsing the Secretary General's request for a security force of 3,500 to protect humanitarian relief efforts.

Ambassador Peter Jon de Vos is appointed US Special Envoy for Somalia to coordinate US support of UN efforts to achieve a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Somalia conflict leading to national reconciliation.

September 14—An advance UN contingent of Pakistani troops arrives in Mogadishu to help protect relief supplies. United Nations authorizes 3,000 additional troops.

September 28—Final contingent of 500-man Pakistani infantry unit arrives in Mogadishu.

November 24—UN relief ship carrying 10,000 tons of food is shelled while trying to enter Mogadishu's harbor and returns to sea.

November 25—US offers troops to secure distribution of food and aid as part of a multinational force.

December 3—UN Security Council passes Resolution 794, voting unanimously for a US-led force to enter Somalia to safeguard relief work.

December 3-4—The UN Relief Coordination Conference for Somalia, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, begins process of relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation in Somalia.

December 4—Ambassador Robert Oakley succeeds Ambassador Peter Jon de Vos as Special Envoy for Somalia. A US liaison office is established in Mogadishu.

December 4—President Bush announces that US troops will be sent to Somalia under Operation Restore Hope.

December 8—First contingent of US forces arrives in Somalia. ■

Somalia



Official Name:
Somali Democratic Republic

► Geography

Total area: 637,600 km; slightly smaller than Texas.

Climate: Hot and dry with seasonal monsoons.

Terrain: Central and southern Somalia are flat; northern Somalia is hilly.

Natural resources: Uranium and largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt.

Land use: Arable land 2%; meadows and pastures 46%; forest and woodland 14%; other 38%.

Environment: Recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification. Famine is centered in southern half of country.

► People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*—Somali(s).

Population (1991): 6.7 million.

Ethnic groups: Somali 85%, rest mainly Bantu; Arabs 30,000, Europeans 3,000, Asians 800.

Religion: Almost entirely Sunni Muslim.

Language: Somali (official); Arabic, Italian, English.

Health (1991 est.): *Infant mortality rate*—116/1,000. (According to the Centers for Disease Control, about 25% of children under age five have died since January 1991 because of the effects of war, disease, and drought.) *Life expectancy*—56 yrs.

► Government

Capital: Mogadishu.

Independence: July 1, 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the UK on June 26, 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on July 1, 1960, to form the Somali Republic).

Constitution: August 1979.

Administrative divisions: 16 regions.

Warring leaders: *General Mohamed Farah Aided* (one of the most powerful factional warlord leaders; belongs to Hawiye clan; controls much of famine zone through fragile alliances; has amassed forces to retake Baardheere, a city near the Kenya border); interim *President Ali Mahdi Mohamed* (Aided's erstwhile arch-rival, was once his ally in fight to oust Siad Barre; belongs to Hawiye clan. Aided and Ali Mahdi signed an agreement on December 11, 1992, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities between their forces and the merging of their political organizations; final implementation was scheduled for December 19); *General Morgan* (recently wrested control of Baardheere from Aided; son-in-law of former dictator Siad Barre and member of the Darod clan; allegedly backed by Kenya); and *Colonel Jess* (allied with Aided despite being a member of the Darod clan; control over key port of Chisimayu (Kismaayo) is tenuous).

Flag: Light blue with a large white five-pointed star in the center.

► Economy

Overview as of December 1992:

One of the world's poorest and least developed countries, Somalia has few resources. Before the drought, agriculture was the most important sector of the economy, with the livestock sector accounting for about 40% of GDP and about 65% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-nomads dependent upon herding make up more than half of the population. Crop production generated only 10% of GDP and employed about 20% of the work force. The main export crop was bananas; sugar, sorghum, and corn were grown for the domestic market.

► Communications

Highways: 15,215 km. total; including 2,335 km. hard surface, 2,880 km. gravel, and 10,000 km. improved earth or stabilized soil.

Pipelines: 15 km. crude oil.

Ports: Mogadishu, Chisimayu (Kismaayo), Berbera.

Merchant marine: Consisted of 3 ships; 2 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo.

Civil air: There were 2 major transport aircraft.

Airports: 61 total, 46 usable; 8 with permanent surface runways; 2 with runways longer than 3,659 meters; 5 with runways of 2,400-3,659 meters; 22 with runways of 1,220-2,439 meters.

Telecommunications: Virtually no telephone or telegraph service; radio relay and troposcatter system centered on Mogadishu connects a few towns; 6,000 telephones; stations—2 AM, no FM, 1 TV; 1 Indian Ocean INTELSAT earth station; schedules to receive an ARABSAT station. ■

