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Folder Title:

Somalia, January-May 1993 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

African Affairs-Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et.al.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Presidential Review Directive/NSC - 5 (2 pages)	02/08/1993	P1/b(1)
002. report	Key Somali Warlords (3 pages)	12/00/1992	P1/b(1)
003. map	Distribution of Somali Clan Families (1 page)	10/00/1990	P1/b(1)
004. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	08/00/1992	P1/b(1)
005a. paper	Interagency Working Group Meeting on Somalia (3 pages)	02/27/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. report	Somalia: Searching for a Political Solution - the Next 24 Months (9 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
005c. paper	U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in Somalia (9 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006a. paper	UNOSOM (10 pages)	03/04/1993	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	Equipping the Pakistanis (and others) (2 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006c. cable	Re: US Support for Pakistani Forces in UNITAF and UNISOM II (2 pages)	02/21/1993	P1/b(1)
006d. paper	Quick Reaction Force (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
006e. paper	Re: [QRF] (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
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Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F

kc4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006f. paper	Command of Headquarters Support Forces in Somalia During UNOSOM II (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
007a. paper	Presidential Review Directive/NSC-5 (2 pages)	02/08/1993	P1/b(1)
007b. memo	From Samuel Berger, re: Somalia Core Group (2 pages)	02/08/1993	P1/b(1)
007c. memo	Frank Wisner to Mr. Tarnoff, re: Long Range Strategy for Somalia (3 pages)	03/03/1993	P1/b(1)
008. memo	[Duplicate of 006c] (4 pages)	03/03/1993	P1/b(1)
009. paper	Strategy for Somalia (6 pages)	10/16/1992	P1/b(1)
010. report	Somali Clans, Armed Factions, and Alignments (6 pages)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia

Resolution 733 (January 23, 1992)

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia and commending the initiative taken by him in the humanitarian field,

Gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its consequences on the stability and peace in the region,

Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General, a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its appreciation to the international and regional organizations that have provided assistance to the populations affected by the conflict and deploring that personnel of these organizations have lost their lives in the exercise of their humanitarian tasks,

Taking note of the appeals addressed to the parties by the Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic

Conference on 16 December 1991, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on 18 December 1991 (S/23469) and the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992 (S/23448),

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia and expresses its concern with the situation prevailing in that country;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to undertake the necessary actions to increase humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the affected population in all parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international humanitarian organizations and to this end to appoint a coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of this assistance;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, immediately to contact all parties involved in the conflict, to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities to permit the humanitarian assistance to be distributed, to promote a cease-fire and compliance therewith, and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia;

4. *Strongly urges* all parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in Somalia;

5. *Decides*, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in

Somalia immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise;

6. *Calls on* all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Somalia, which would permit all Somalis to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;

7. *Call upon* all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to this end and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator;

8. *Urges* all parties to take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent to provide humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks and to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international law regarding the protection of civilian populations;

9. *Calls upon* all States and international organizations to contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance to the population in Somalia;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on this matter;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).



**Resolution 746
(March 17, 1992)**

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/23693),

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements in Mogadiscio on 3 March 1992, including agreements for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Deeply regretting that the factions have not yet abided by their commitment to implement the cease-fire and thus have still not permitted the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the people in need in Somalia,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the factors described in paragraph 76 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23693) must be taken into account,

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General;

2. *Urges* the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

3. *Urges* all the Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population in Somalia;

5. *Appeals* to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to and to cooperate with these humanitarian relief efforts;

6. *Strongly supports* the Secretary-General's decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, accompanied by the coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of his report (S/23693) and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter;

7. *Requests* that the technical team also develop a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8. *Calls* on all parties, movements and factions in Mogadiscio in particular, and in Somalia in general, to respect fully the security and safety of the technical team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadiscio and other parts of Somalia;

9. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference for national reconciliation and unity in Somalia;

10. *Calls upon* all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).

**Resolution 751
(April 24, 1992)**

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/23829 and Add.1 and 2),

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, including agreements for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Taking note also of the signing of letters of agreement in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Kismayo on the mechanism for monitoring the cease-fire and arrangements for the equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadishu,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. *Takes note* with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 April 1992 (S/23829) and Add.1 and Add.2);

2. *Decides* to establish under its authority, and in support of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 7 below, a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM);

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu in accordance with paragraphs 24 to 26 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23829);

4. *Agrees*, in principle, also to establish under the overall direction of the Secretary-General's Special Representative a United Nations security force to be deployed as soon as possible to perform the functions described in paragraphs 27-29 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23829);

5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu regarding the proposed United Nations security force and, in light of those consultations, to submit his further recommendations to the Security Council for its decision as soon as possible;

6. *Welcomes* the intention expressed by the Secretary-General in paragraph 64 of his report (S/23829) to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in Somalia and to assist him in his endeavours to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Somalia;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General as part of his continuing mission in Somalia to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance;

8. *Welcomes* the cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in resolving the problem in Somalia;

9. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue as a matter of priority his consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

11. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) to seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

(b) to consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) to recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

12. *Notes with appreciation* the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, particularly to Mogadishu;

13. *Calls upon* the international community to support, with financial and other resources, the implementation of the 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia;

14. *Urges* all parties concerned in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its call for the full respect of the security and safety of the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

15. *Calls upon* all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the Implementation of this resolution;

16. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).

Resolution 767 (July 27, 1992)

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992 and 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/24343),

Considering the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing him that all the parties in Mogadishu have agreed to the deployment of the fifty military observers, and that the advance party of the observers arrived in Mogadishu on 5 July 1992 and that the rest of the observers arrived in the mission area on 23 July 1992 (S/24179),

Deeply concerned about the availability of arms and ammunition in the hands of civilians and the proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia,

Alarmed by the sporadic outbreak of hostilities in several parts of Somalia leading to continued loss of life and destruction of property, and putting at risk the personnel of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and other international humanitarian organizations, as well as disrupting their operations,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Recognizing that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort of the Council to restore international peace and security in the area,

Responding to the urgent calls by the parties in Somalia for the international community to take measures in Somalia to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Noting the Secretary-General's proposals for a comprehensive decentralized zonal approach in the United Nations involvement in Somalia,

Cognizant that the success of such an approach requires the cooperation of all parties, movements and factions in Somalia,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 July 1992 (S/24343);

2. Requests the Secretary-General to make full use of all available means and arrangements, including the mounting of an urgent airlift operation, with a view to facilitating the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations in accelerating the provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia, threatened by mass starvation;

3. Urges all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected

population in Somalia and reiterates its call for the full respect of the security and safety of the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

4. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with a view to the urgent development of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its resolution 751 (1992), and otherwise assist in the general stabilization of the situation in Somalia. In the absence of such cooperation, the Security Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia;

5. Reiterates its appeal to the international community to provide adequate financial and other resources for humanitarian efforts in Somalia;

6. Encourages the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to all regions of Somalia;

7. Appeals to all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to extend full cooperation to the military observers and to take measures to ensure their security;

8. Requests the Secretary-General, as part of his continuing efforts in Somalia, to promote an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

9. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire throughout the country;

10. Stresses the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the general and complete embargo of all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992);

11. Welcomes the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in resolving the situation in Somalia;

12. Approves the Secretary-General's proposal to establish four operational zones in Somalia as part of the consolidated United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM);

13. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that his Special Representative for Somalia is provided with all the necessary support services to enable him to effectively carry out his mandate;

14. Strongly supports the Secretary-General's decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, under the overall direction of the Special Representative, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraph 64 of his report (S/24343) and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter;

15. Affirms that all officials of the United Nations and all experts on mission for the United Nations in Somalia enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946 and in any other relevant instruments and that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia are required to allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to continue urgently his consultations with all parties, movements and factions in Somalia towards the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

17. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

18. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)

**Resolution 775
(August 28, 1992)**

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 and 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/24480),

Deeply concerned about the availability of arms and ammunition and the proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia,

Alarmed by the continued sporadic outbreak of hostilities in several parts of Somalia leading to continued loss of life and destruction of property, and putting at risk the personnel of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and other international humanitarian organizations, as well as disrupting their operations,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts by the United Nations organizations as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), non-governmental organizations and States to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia,

Welcoming in particular the initiatives to provide relief through airlift operations,

Convinced that no durable progress will be achieved in the absence of an overall political solution in Somalia,

Taking note in particular of paragraph 24 of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Takes note* with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General of 24 August 1992 (S/24480) on the findings of the technical team and the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained therein;

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to establish four zone headquarters as proposed in paragraph 31 of the Secretary-General's report;

3. *Authorizes* the increase in strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the subsequent deployment as recommended in paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General's report;

4. *Welcomes* the decision of the Secretary-General to increase substantially the airlift operation to areas of priority attention;

5. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with a view to the urgent deployment of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its resolution 751 (1992) and as recommended in paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Welcomes* also the material and logistical support from a number of States and urges that the airlift operation be effectively coordinated by the United Nations as described in paragraphs 17 to 21 of the report of the Secretary-General;

7. *Urges* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its call for the full respect of the security and safety of the personnel of these organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

8. *Reiterates* its appeal to the international community to provide adequate financial and other resources for humanitarian efforts in Somalia;

9. *Encourages* ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations including the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-

governmental organizations to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to all regions of Somalia and underlines the importance of coordination between these efforts;

10. *Requests* also the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his efforts to seek a comprehensive political solution to the crisis in Somalia;

11. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire throughout the country;

12. *Stresses* the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992);

13. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).

**Resolution 794
(December 3, 1992)**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992,

Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response,

Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Noting the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and in particular the proposal made by its Chairman at the forty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly for the organization of an international conference on Somalia, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other regional agencies and arrangements to promote reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to address the humanitarian needs of the people of that country,

Commending the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations and of non-governmental organizations and of States to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including reports of violence and threats of violence against personnel participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief consignments and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities; and impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population,

Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing in humanitarian relief supplies, and attacks on the Pakistani UNOSOM contingent in Mogadishu,

Taking note with appreciation of the letters of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1992 (S/24859) and of 29 November 1992 (S/24868),

Sharing the Secretary-General's assessment that the situation in Somalia is intolerable and that it has become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia, and that UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the tragedy in Somalia,

Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992),

Noting the offer by Member States aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible,

Determined further to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote these objectives,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country,

1. *Reaffirms* its demand that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities, maintain a cease-fire throughout the country, and cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below in order to promote the process of relief distribution, reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

2. *Demands* that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations,

its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia;

3. *Also demands* that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below;

4. *Further demands* that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law including from actions such as those described above;

5. *Strongly condemns* all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

6. *Decides* that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests him to keep the Council informed and to make such recommendations as may be appropriate for the fulfillment of its mandate where conditions permit;

7. *Endorses* the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;

8. Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment;

9. Welcomes also offers by other Member States to participate in that operation;

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;

11. Calls on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with paragraph 10 above and requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to the States or operations concerned;

12. Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make the necessary

arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above;

13. Requests the Secretary-General and the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces;

14. Decides to appoint an ad hoc commission composed of members of the Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution;

15. Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the Field Headquarters of the unified command;

16. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, calls upon States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

17. Requests all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by States, nationally or

through regional agencies or arrangements, pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions;

18. Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;

20. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). ■

Update on Progress in Somalia

Robert Houdek, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Washington, DC, February 17, 1993

Thank you, Mr. Chairman [Harry Johnstone, D., Fla.] for this opportunity to testify before your subcommittee on the progress we are making in Somalia. But first, let me offer congratulations as you take up your duties as chairman. Your committee historically has played a vital and constructive role in US-African relations. This is a period of dramatic change in Africa offering both new opportunities and some daunting challenges. We look forward to working closely with you, the members, and your staffs.

Mr. Chairman, exactly 2 months ago, Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs Herman J.] Cohen came before this committee and discussed the horrific humanitarian crisis in Somalia. At that time, Ambassador Cohen explained that the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under UN auspices had a clearly defined and do-able mission: establishing a secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid in Somalia. Once sufficient order was established, the mission would be handed over to an expanded UN peace-keeping operation.

UNITAF has made remarkable progress toward achieving that goal. The 32,000 UNITAF troops presently in Somalia, of which approximately 18,000 are American, have performed with great professionalism and devotion. Their discipline has minimized casualties on both sides and won the admiration and support of the vast majority of Somalis.

Security Assessment

I want to share with you our assessment of the current security and political environment.

UNITAF forces have secured nine key areas in southern Somalia, including airports and the ports of Mogadishu and Kismaayo. Daily surface convoys deliver supplies to relief organizations around these key points. Relief corridors are open, and regular convoys are sent to Baidoa, which is being used as a staging site for humanitarian distribution into the Somali interior.

Death rates are falling dramatically. In Baidoa, one relief agency estimates that death rates for children under 5 [years] have dropped from 50 to 15 per 10,000 per day (mostly from disease rather than starvation). More needs to be done, but we are seeing a dramatic impact.

Circumstances have dictated that UNITAF forces be increasingly active in disarming armed Somalis to help ensure the sustainability of a secure environment and to protect the lives of UNITAF forces. In Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and Bardera, technicals [vehicles used by warring factions] and heavy weapons have been moved to cantonment areas under UNITAF supervision. The so-called green line in Mogadishu dividing previously warring factions is no more. The agreement of factional leaders Ali Mahdi and Aideed to get their technicals and heavy weapons out of Mogadishu and dismantle the "green line" was a major achievement.

Further, in Addis Ababa [Ethiopia] last month, leaders of 15 Somali factions agreed to a cease-fire and to turn over all heavy weaponry to UNITAF and UN troops. The accords also called for creation of a committee

of representatives of Somali factions to work with the United Nations and UNITAF. Somali factional leaders have been asked to inventory their weapons and have been invited by UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani to discuss [the] next steps in disarmament and monitoring the cease-fire.

We view this as a promising initiative which should further bolster the security environment. But it would be misleading to leave the impression that southern Somalia is now a safe place. Many former militiamen and gang members, denied the opportunity to extort from relief agencies or steal relief shipments, have turned to preying on less lucrative, unprotected targets.

To counter the upsurge in common crime and banditry and to relieve UNITAF troops from routine security duties, priority is being given to the establishment of Somali police forces. The United Nations will help fund auxiliary, interim police forces in Mogadishu and other population centers. These units, which UNITAF helped to establish, will report to local combined committees of elders [and] community and religious leaders. Local police began operating in Mogadishu on February 6.

We expect that interim police forces will be followed by establishment of trained, professional, [and] neutral regional or national police. International police experts are now in Somalia developing recommendations for the United Nations as to how this can be best accomplished. This is a difficult but central task.

Political Appraisal

The vast majority of the Somali people have welcomed UNITAF forces not only because UNITAF brought an end to anarchy and starvation but also because UNITAF made it clear [that] it came in peace to help, not to impose a settlement.

We have supported the UN's previously articulated strategy of building political reconciliation from the grassroots up. We have seen broad, if somewhat uneven, progress in

the Somali political situation. The improved security climate and reduced threats by warlords have encouraged establishment of representative local committees of Somalis to discuss security and relief issues among themselves and with UNITAF and UN leaders, US liaison officers, and USAID/OFDA representatives. While the process of rebuilding community organizations is in its early stages, the re-emergence of the influence of elders, religious leaders, intellectuals, and women's groups in local affairs is encouraging.

Last month's UN-sponsored Addis Ababa conference of factional leaders was a significant first step in the dialogue of old-time enemies. A successful followup on implementing the cease-fire and disarmament accords will be crucial.

Progress on the security and political fronts are closely interrelated. UNITAF and UNOSOM [UN Operation in Somalia] are working together to maintain the momentum in implementing the Addis [Ababa] cease-fire and disarmament accords. We are continuing to give full backing to the UN's political reconciliation efforts. But we should not expect quick results. Lasting reconciliation will require further control of arms and broad participation of the Somali people—local and regional involvement—not just a deal at the top at the national level. This political process will take time.

Transition From UNITAF To UNOSOM

We anticipate a smooth, phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II; in fact, parts of the transition have already occurred. Some US forces have returned home, replaced by non-American UNITAF troops, some of whom will become part of UNOSOM II.

US military planners are working with their UN counterparts on the transition. Secretary of State Christopher has assured UN Secretary

General Boutros-Ghali that the United States is prepared to aid UNOSOM II with logistics and other support, as well as with a quick reaction force, if necessary. The United States will also provide an officer to be the deputy commander of UNOSOM II.

Neither the exact number of American personnel nor the total number of UNOSOM forces has been decided at this point. Those decisions must await issuance of the Secretary General's report, the subsequent Security Council resolution authorizing formation of UNOSOM II, and final discussions among UNOSOM II participants, the United Nations and contributing countries' military experts. However, I can assure you that the vast majority of UNOSOM II forces will not be American.

The UN Secretary General is expected to present his latest report on Somalia to the UN Security Council this week, opening the way for prompt Security Council debate on a new resolution. We anticipate that the report will reflect the close consultations in New York and Somalia between the United Nations, the United States, and the UNITAF coalition. From our consultations, we believe that the Secretary General's report will coincide with much that is in our own general approach: most importantly that the new UNOSOM should have sufficient size, capabilities, and rules of engagement to enable it to enforce the peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter throughout all of Somalia.

We share the view that without improved security the political process cannot prosper. We also agree that the new mandate must include prevention of the resumption of violence; control of heavy weapons; maintenance of the cease-fire; and the building of a new professional police force to ensure that the UN's efforts to promote political reconciliation and rehabilitation can progress.

While the elements of UNOSOM's new mandate are important, equally important is international support for UNOSOM. The earlier UN Operation

in Somalia has been criticized; but, in a real sense, the success of UNOSOM's future operations depends on widespread international support.

We have assured the Secretary General of our military backing for UNOSOM's peace enforcement operations. We are heartened by the offers of many UNITAF troop contingents to remain in Somalia under UNOSOM, as well as the offers of other countries to send troops to be part of UNOSOM. We are confident that the United Nations will field a force that will accomplish its mission. Additionally, we have told the United Nations [that] we are willing to assist on the civilian side, with some staff if needed, to contribute to progress on the rehabilitation and reconciliation fronts. We also are urging our friends to help.

This is not a time for self-congratulation; the starving and the suffering continue in areas of Somalia. But I would be remiss if I did not highlight the superb cooperative work of [Head of US Command in Somalia Lieutenant] General Johnston and [US Special envoy] Ambassador Oakley. They, and the men and women who work with them, have made an incredibly difficult job look deceptively easy. Here I would like to emphasize the essential contributions of our coalition partners. International cooperation has worked under harsh conditions and in an unprecedented state of anarchy.

We are moving to a new phase of our efforts in Somalia—from UNITAF to UNOSOM; from the job of re-establishing a secure environment to get relief to the most needy to the challenge of consolidating security gains and promoting political reconciliation and rehabilitation.

While progress has been swift under UNITAF, patience and endurance will now be needed, because there are no shortcuts to restoring trust and rebuilding a civil society.

Television images of starving Somalis, which moved the American conscience last fall, are now replaced by those of suffering peoples elsewhere. The Somalis are a resilient people. They are returning to their villages and are planting crops. Markets are coming alive; children are leaving feeding kitchens, some to return to school.

But this picture of normalcy is deceptive. A tremendous amount needs to be done before Somalia is a normal society. The essential work of UNOSOM may well take place without great public pressure for international involvement. But if we are to avoid the risk of forfeiting the gains of Operation Restore Hope, continued American and allied assistance will be essential. This Administration is committed to such a course and looks forward to Congress' continued cooperation and support.

In this spirit, we welcome congressional support—as expressed in S. J. [Senate Joint] Resolution 45, for the efforts we have been making in creating a secure environment for provision of humanitarian relief alleviating the massive suffering of the Somali people. The dual catastrophes of famine and merciless civil strife have been devastating to Somalia. Although the Administration does not believe specific statutory authorization for the deployment of US forces to Somalia is necessary, we are immensely gratified that the Hill and the Administration have cooperated so well in delivering an appropriate and urgent response. ■

Department Statements

Cuban Crackdown on Labor Union Leaders

Statement released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, DC, February 16, 1993.

The United States is concerned about the Cuban Government's treatment of Cuba's nascent free trade unions. Free trade union leaders Juan Guarino, Javier Troncoso, Jorge Bonet, Eduardo Rois, Roberto Trobajo, Leonardo Varo, Omar Fernandez, and Lazaro Corp were detained by police on February 5 while they met to discuss details of the merger of the unions they represent. Police reportedly threatened them if they continued their free union activities. All were issued a written warning and released at 3 am the following day.

On February 6, Rafael Gutierrez Santos, head of the Labor Union of Cuban Workers, was arrested by plainclothes security agents. He is being held incommunicado, in violation of Cuban law, at state security headquarters.

Cuba has ignored International Labor Organization (ILO) criticisms of its abuse of worker rights. The ILO reminded Cuba in 1992 that arresting trade unionists without a warrant or when no grounds for conviction exist is a violation of trade union rights; concluded that Cuba violates ILO norms on freedom of association and the right to organize; and found that Cuban Government restrictions on the freedom to choose or change employment are incompatible with ILO conventions prohibiting forced labor.

We call on the Cuban Government to release Mr. Gutierrez without delay, to comply with the conclusions of the ILO, and to permit free trade unions to register legally and operate freely and independently for the benefit of Cuban workers.

Support for Colombian Democracy

Statement by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, February 17, 1993, Washington, DC.

Colombian democracy, one of the oldest and most stable in our hemisphere, is under attack from a vicious combination of narcotics traffickers and guerrillas. We condemn the recent series of bombings against innocent civilians as well as civil and police officials who are the true heroes of Colombia's struggle to preserve its democratic institutions. We extend our sympathy to the families of these people.

We admire the Colombian Government and people who continue to defend and develop Colombia's democratic institutions and its economy despite the terrible violence. We support the Colombian Government's condemnation of all terrorist acts. We strongly support Colombia's efforts, under the leadership of President Gaviria, to improve law enforcement measures against major drug traffickers, to bring about significant judicial reform, and to achieve greater economic prosperity. ■

Fact Sheet: Cuba

PEOPLE

Cuba is a multi-racial society with a population of mainly Spanish and African origins. The largest organized religion is the Roman Catholic Church. Officially, Cuba has been an atheist state for most of the Castro era. However, a constitutional amendment adopted on July 12, 1992, changed the nature of the Cuban state from atheist to secular, enabling religious believers to belong to the Cuban Communist Party (PCC).

HISTORY

Before the arrival of Columbus in 1492, Cuba was inhabited by three groups—Siboneys, Guanahabibes, and Tainos—the last of which introduced agriculture, including maize and tobacco, to the island. As Spain developed its colonial empire in the Western Hemisphere, Havana became an important commercial port. Settlers eventually moved inland, devoting themselves mainly to sugar cane and tobacco. As the native Indian population died out, African slaves were imported to work the plantations. A 1774 census in Cuba recorded 96,000 whites, 31,000 free blacks, and 44,000 slaves. Slavery was abolished in 1886.

Cuba was the last major Spanish colony to gain independence in a movement which began in 1850, when Cuban planters financed and led several expeditions against Spanish garrisons. In 1868, the Ten Years' War for independence began under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, whom the Cubans consider to be the father of their country. Jose Martí, Cuba's greatest national hero, initiated plans for a general uprising 24 years later. In 1895, Martí announced the *Grito de Baire*, heralding the beginning of Cuba's final struggle for independence. Shortly after, he died in battle.

The United States entered the conflict on the side of the revolutionaries when the *USS Maine*, anchored in

Havana Harbor to protect US citizens, was sunk by an explosion of unknown origin on February 15, 1898. On December 10, 1898, Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, ending the Spanish-American War and relinquishing control of Cuba to the United States. The United States administered the island for 3 years. Independence was proclaimed May 20, 1902, although the United States retained the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and stability under the Platt Amendment, which established conditions mandated by Congress for the withdrawal of US troops from Cuba.

In 1934, the amendment was repealed in keeping with the Roosevelt Administration's "Good Neighbor" policy. Later the same year, the United States and Cuba reaffirmed by treaty the 1903 agreement which leased the Guantanamo Bay naval base to the United States. This agreement remains in force today and can only be terminated by mutual agreement or abandonment by the United States.

Cubans elected General Gerardo Machado as president in 1924, but he forcibly extended his rule until a popular uprising deposed him in 1933. Army Sergeant Fulgencio Batista led the revolt and established himself as Cuba's dominant leader for more than 25 years. He ruled through a series of presidents and was himself elected in 1940 for 4 years. In March 1952, shortly before regularly scheduled elections, Batista seized the presidency in a bloodless coup.

On July 26, 1953, an armed opposition group led by Fidel Castro attacked the Moncada army barracks at Santiago de Cuba. The attack was unsuccessful, and many, including Castro, were captured and imprisoned. Castro, released by Batista under a May 1955 amnesty, went into exile in Mexico, where he formed a revolutionary group, the "26th of July Movement."

On December 2, 1956, Castro and 81 of his followers landed in eastern Cuba aboard the yacht *Granma*. All

but 12 were soon captured, killed, or dispersed. From this nucleus, Castro's forces eventually grew to several thousand. While other groups also actively opposed Batista, Castro's "26th of July" forces became predominant when Batista fled on January 1, 1959. Castro's assumption of power was acclaimed in Cuba and abroad because he seemed to embody the hopes of most Cubans for a return to democratic government and an end to graft and corruption.

Within months, Castro moved to consolidate his power and to set up an authoritarian government. Many leaders of the opposition to Batista were executed or sentenced to lengthy prison terms for opposing Castro's policies. Moderates were forced out of the government, and hundreds of thousands of Cubans fled the island.

During an April 1959 visit to Washington, Castro addressed concerns about a reported leftist tilt to his regime by saying, "We are against all kinds of dictators, whether of a man, or a country, or a class, or an oligarchy, or by the military. That is why we are against communism."

On December 2, 1961, Castro publicly declared himself a Marxist-Leninist. Representative democracy was abolished, effective freedom of expression ended, and all opposition political activity was soon terminated.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the East-West conflict.

Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment, and to drum up opposition to US policy toward Cuba, especially the trade embargo and the Cuban Democracy Act. Support for revolutionary movements, once an article of faith for the regime, is largely a thing of the past. Cuba has relations with nearly 140 countries and has civilian assistance workers—principally medical—in more than 20 nations.

When it first came to power, the Castro Government supported the spread of revolution by aiming to re-

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Presidential Review Directive/NSC - 5 (2 pages)	02/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F

kc4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	Key Somali Warlords (3 pages)	12/00/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. map	Distribution of Somali Clan Families (1 page)	10/00/1990	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Re: [Somalia] (1 page)	08/00/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
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
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Relief Transport Network, October 1992





United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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
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March 5, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Conclusions Reached at the February 26 Interagency
Working Group Meeting on Somalia

The attached papers responding to PRD/NSC-5 and the summary of the conclusions of the IWG meeting on Somalia held on February 26, 1993, are being forwarded for review and submission to the NSC Deputies Committee.



Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

(~~SECRET~~) Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Summary of Conclusions of IWG on Somalia
- Tab 2 - Prospects for Political Reconciliation
- Tab 3 - U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in Somalia
- Tab 4 - Humanitarian Relief and National Reconstruction
- Tab 5 - Funding for U.S. Operations in Somalia

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 11/28/16
202-0659-F

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005a. paper	Interagency Working Group Meeting on Somalia (3 pages)	02/27/1993	P1/b(1)
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Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005b. report	Somalia: Searching for a Political Solution - the Next 24 Months (9 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
kc4088

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. paper	U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in Somalia (9 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

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Humanitarian Relief and National Reconstruction in Somalia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Before considering the next steps in relief and reconstruction for Somalia, it is important to consider some of its economic realities. **Somalia has never moved beyond a nomadic subsistence economy** dictated primarily by the limited natural resources and harsh environment of the country. **Even during "normal" times, Somalia was dependent on donor assistance** for much of its food requirements, all of its investment and development funding, and a significant part of its recurrent and foreign exchange budget. It is not at all clear that Somalia could ever achieve economic self-sufficiency.

An unprecedented international humanitarian intervention now is underway in Somalia which must be transformed into a cost-effective international rehabilitation and recovery effort. Establishing and maintaining security will allow the Somali people to continue efforts to find peaceful ways of reuniting and governing their country. **US financial and political commitments must be carefully constrained and linked to harshly realistic objectives** and analysis of the type of interventions which are likely to be sustainable.

The United States has taken a highly visible lead position on Somalia over the past four months. **We must concentrate over the remainder of 1993 on facilitating a transition to a strong United Nations led international effort** in Somalia, where primary support comes from traditional bilateral donors and the multi-lateral donor community.

Essential conditions for an effective long term food supply and distribution system in Somalia include: movement toward increased food security, focused primarily on livestock; a secure environment for herders and farmers; increased donor participation and coordination in providing necessary inputs; and **participation of the Somali private sector** in marketing agricultural outputs.

Because of the frequency and severity of drought, **farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology**. With improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could perhaps in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption, but since the country's apparent comparative advantage is livestock production, a robust trade in livestock commodities appears to be a much sounder development and food security strategy than a goal of cereal self-sufficiency.

Similarly, we do not yet have comprehensive information on the cost of physical reconstruction for Somalia. Estimates range from \$500 million to \$1 billion. We understand that the World Bank and UNDP currently are working to refine these

estimates. We recommend a multi-donor assessment to identify both appropriate interventions and funding mechanisms. **The donor community may want to delay major reconstruction projects** until regional governments or other authorities are in place to protect and sustain them.

Assuming the present security situation does not deteriorate, we anticipate that the U.S. humanitarian program will continue to **focus primarily on emergency activities** in 1993 with a gradual move toward rehabilitation programs. The current US strategy is to focus on **rehabilitation programs in the agriculture and health sectors** as well as **employment generation activities and refugee repatriation**. The strategy assumes that **other donors** will take responsibility for rehabilitation efforts in key sectors such as education. If the security situation remains stable, we estimate the funding requirements for this strategy to be \$191 million in FY 1993 and \$137 million in FY 1994. Funding sources include A.I.D., State Department, USIS and Department of Agriculture.

Current US policy in Somalia emphasizes the need to strengthen and rebuild local institutions as the basis for stabilizing relief programs, establishing local security and ultimately bringing about national reconciliation. Experience with the national government in Somalia over the last two decades argues against recreating most of its institutions in their earlier form. **There are, however, some functions which normally are carried out by national level structures.** Multi-lateral lending institutions normally require the existence of a national government to deal with. Regional governments or authorities may be used for many of these purposes, but delaying national reconciliation may have some consequences.

Social services and economic production activities can most effectively be carried out at the local and regional level. Although it is extremely management intensive, this decentralized approach can take advantage of local participatory and national reconciliation initiatives implemented by NGO's. **The international community must work with the Somalis to identify a minimum set of policies and guidelines for the operation of this system.**

There is no compelling historical evidence that a unified Somalia state will succeed; however, in many communities in Somalia, the establishment of security has allowed for the re-emergence of basic civil society. We believe that visible US assistance to civic organizations will reinforce their prestige and help to undercut the armed factions which currently dominate southern Somalia.

A fundamental question is whether development of civic organizations will create or support a social and political environment that will respect individual rights. The events of the past several decades would indicate that an active civil society can be an important contributing element to political openness, but by itself is insufficient to prevent authoritarian patterns of rule.

Introduction

The international military intervention in Somalia over the past two months, led by the United States, has now created a situation where it is possible to provide basic relief assistance to most of the famine stricken population in the south and central parts of Somalia. Next steps to be taken by the international community, including the United States, will be affected by the realities of Somalia.

The three-quarters of Somalia's roughly 7 million people who were in rural areas before 1991 have never, for the most part, moved beyond a largely nomadic subsistence economy well suited to the limited natural resources of the country. In the "good" years of the mid 1980's, the last "normal" period, Somalia depended on a combination of food imports and donor assistance to meet one third of its staple grain requirements. The national economy relied on donor assistance for almost all of its investment and development funding, and for much of its recurrent and foreign exchange budgets. There were an estimated 1200 - 1500 expatriates providing technical assistance in the mid-80s. The country was falling into increasing arrears on its international debt. The government was virtually bankrupt.

Since the fall of Siad Barre, two years of civil war followed by factional fighting and the breakdown of law and order created extensive social upheaval and mass displacements of populations. Destruction of the country's infrastructure and services has been widespread. Formal leadership and administration are non-existent. In the last year alone, it is estimated that 500,000 Somalis have starved or died of famine related diseases, most of these young children.

Three months after the arrival of UNITAF forces, food is flowing into the neediest areas at a greatly increased rate. Most of the heavily armed gangs have fled and large-scale looting has substantially decreased. In order to keep Somalia from sliding back into total chaos and famine, we now must move toward a cost-effective international rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. As a next step, the U.S. will expand the ongoing relief operation and focus on rehabilitation of the agriculture and health systems, as well as employment creation and refugee repatriation. This strategy acknowledges that Somalia requires a coordinated, multi-donor commitment so that other key sectors such as education are addressed.

It is very problematic whether Somalia will ever achieve complete economic self-sufficiency, even if political, cultural and historical obstacles to national reconciliation can be overcome. The best that can be hoped for in the near term -- with the United States bolstering the United Nations' efforts -- is the restoration of security, essential services and infrastructure; over the medium to long term, Somalia probably will continue to need outside subsidies, depending on the productivity of the Somalis themselves and how much local and foreign private investment occurs. US financial and political commitments must be carefully

allocated and linked to harshly realistic objectives. Establishing and maintaining peace and security will allow the Somali people to continue efforts to find peaceful ways of reuniting and governing their own country. The unity of the territory that was Somalia should not be considered as a necessary or achievable objective; nor should it be a prerequisite for continued assistance.

1. Requirements for a Long-term Food Supply and Distribution System:

Essential conditions for a long term food supply and distribution system to operate in Somalia include: movement toward increased food security; a secure environment for farmers and herders; donor coordination; and responsible participation of the Somali private sector.

Toward Food Security: Somalia's economy is based on agriculture - livestock production, subsistence grain production, and relatively new export oriented horticulture. Prior to the current disruptions, agriculture accounted for almost two-thirds of domestic output, over 90 percent of exports, and provided employment for the vast majority of the population. In 1989, 75 percent of Somalia's population lived in rural areas, with one-third in settled agriculture and two-thirds in nomadic and semi-nomadic bands. Livestock production was the major economic activity.

An estimated 700,000 MT of cereal grain is needed annually, of which some 500,000 MT could be produced in Somalia in years of good rains (three out over every ten years). Historically, the shortfall has been met by international relief shipments (20% of total need) and commercial imports (10% of total). As in many parts of Africa, the country's urban population has increasingly moved away from coarse grains and prefers rice, wheat and pasta, all largely imported. With a growing urban population, serious production and marketing constraints, variable and poorly distributed rainfall, and a large proportion of the country not suited to crop production, Somalia is unlikely to become food self sufficient.

The donor community should assume for the current year that the estimated national cereal grain requirements of 700,000 MT will come in equal amounts from local production, relief distributions and commercial imports or monetized donor food. Since the balance between free and monetized donor food varies by area and over time, systems to monitor production and marketing must be strengthened so that food aid does not become a disincentive to local production or private trade.

The livestock sector provides the primary source of calories for most Somalis; its current capacity is unclear. Despite the large numbers of animals stolen, slaughtered and/or dead due to drought large herds of all categories of

livestock are observed in the south and central rangelands and appear in relatively good condition because of good pasture resulting from better than average rains. Significant exports of livestock are taking place, suggesting that commercial trade in livestock is continuing. Livestock health looms as the biggest issue in the sector and should be a focus of donor attention.

Several field assessments of the current crop and livestock situation are planned by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP). Together with information from NGOs providing basic production packages (seeds and tools) for grain production and assistance to herders, it should be possible to refine needs estimates for the rest of 1993 in the next several months.

Security: Since the present conflict began, crop production has been devastated by drought, looting, and the resulting displacement of large numbers of settled farmers. Preceding military intervention in December 1992, cultivation of food crops had declined to a tiny fraction of the approximately one million hectares of arable land. Seed stocks were consumed for food.

Because of favorable 1992/93 "der" rains, resettlement of some agricultural households and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided agricultural inputs, there was significant planting in some areas. Preliminary estimates are that cereal production may be up to one third of normal for the short rain season. Continued improvement will depend heavily on security, good rainfall in April-May 1993, and expanded distribution of agricultural inputs, before the "gu" planting season this fall.

Donor Coordination: Reviving domestic agriculture while meeting the emergency and relief food import requirements is a major challenge. It is important not to create disincentives for Somali farmers and commercial traders through the free distribution of large amounts of food. At the same time, farmers, like private traders and importers, face a relatively weak demand for agricultural commodities because of low purchasing power of the general population which is impoverished, largely unemployed and presently dependent on outside food aid. This precarious situation calls for careful monitoring by the international community and effective donor coordination on the types and levels of food assistance needed.

Responsible Private Sector Participation: Restoring a sustainable food delivery system will depend ultimately on the private sector, including farmers, herders, merchants and commercial importers. The elements of this system are currently in place and only need encouragement, sound policies and a secure operating environment in the towns and countryside. There should not be donor support for trucking fleets and other forms of transportation services, warehousing for grain

or similar public sector-type interventions.

2. What is required to achieve various levels of indigenous production?

Crop production in Somalia is primarily rainfed. Nonetheless, there is substantial scope to restore cereal production in Somalia, even beyond historic high levels of the mid to late 1980's. However, because of the frequency and severity of drought, farmers quite sensibly employ low-input, low-risk agricultural technology, even in irrigated areas.

Irrigation: Irrigation is limited to the Shebelle and Juba river valley areas. Improved technological packages, inputs and better water management are needed to increase yields in these areas. These and expanded irrigated production are results of long-term development which are not appropriate to a recovery program.

Inputs: Draft animal usage is practically unknown despite the large numbers of livestock. Tillage is almost exclusively with hand tools using family labor. This level of technology limits areas of cultivation per household.

Crop production programs should emphasize the multiplication, procurement, and distribution of seeds. Care must be taken to select only those varieties suitable for the unique conditions in Somalia.

Fertilizer usage is very limited so that average crop yields are therefore very low. Significant donor investment in fertilizer would not be effective in the short term because farmers are not accustomed to using it, traditional practices of agronomy will not respond to it, and there are no mechanisms for warehousing and distribution.

In sum, with improved technology and ample rain, Somalia could in time produce adequate cereals for minimum national consumption. But, since the country's apparent comparative advantage is livestock production, a robust trade in livestock commodities appears to be a much sounder long-run strategy than a goal of cereal self-sufficiency.

Funding Levels

Short term: The only possible avenue for spurring agricultural rehabilitation in the short-term (the remainder of 1993 and into 1994) is by expanding support to NGOs currently working in the sector. NGO implementation capacity already is severely stretched. Additional funding of some \$30 million could support the following programs:

- continued provision of seeds and tools
- expanded irrigation rehabilitation
- tool making/employment generation for blacksmiths
- livestock health programs
- expanded monitoring capability/data collection

Medium term: Expansion of agricultural production in the medium term would assume a secure environment and increased capacity of our operating partners, particularly Somalis. It would require strong U.N. leadership and donor coordination. Given the uncertainties, it is difficult to predict a time frame and a funding level for these interventions. Activities could include:

- importation of basic seed
- survey of canal potential and reservoirs
- increased number of veterinary clinics
- livestock market assessment and promotion

Longer term: In the long term we would envision World Bank/IMF as lead agencies. It is not possible to estimate funding levels at this time, however, World Bank and UNDP assessments may provide a clearer picture in the near future. Activities could include:

- expansion of irrigation system
- privatization of veterinary services
- rehabilitation of watering points
- increased use of fertilizer

4. What are the reconstruction assistance requirements, their costs, and possible funding sources?

There have not yet been any comprehensive estimates of the cost of physical reconstruction for Somalia. Most types of infrastructure have been rendered inoperable, stripped of all salvageable parts or destroyed. Estimates by the UNDP for physical reconstruction in Hargeisa and Burao made in the late 1980's were as high as \$800 million. A.I.D.'s regional office in Nairobi prepared a notional estimate of some \$500 million for the rehabilitation of major urban and rural infrastructure, including roads and telecommunications. REDSO/EA notes that this could easily rise to \$1 billion as more detailed information becomes available.

A World Bank Task Force is preparing a multi-sectoral rehabilitation paper for Somalia that will provide estimates for restoring critical services and facilities. Informal discussions indicate that their initial estimates will probably be below \$500 million for high priority projects over the next several years. UNDP will

prepare a multi-year rehabilitation plan for Somalia over the next nine months. This plan focuses on economic, social and institutional infrastructure, but is unlikely to include technically credible estimates for physical infrastructure.

It would be appropriate for the USG to propose that development of an overall reconstruction plan for Somalia be initiated by a multi-donor group within the next six months. Because the World Bank is generally better equipped than the UN to deal with long-term investment issues, this survey and planning effort should be led by the Bank and include staff from other involved donors and institutions. A Bank led, multi-donor effort is more likely to produce a document that could be acceptable as a common reference and planning instrument by interested donors.

Funding Sources

The United States should not assume responsibility for financing the reconstruction costs of physical infrastructure in Somalia. But U.S. assistance in planning for this effort and U.S. funding of feasibility, survey and design studies are entirely appropriate, particularly if they lead to equal, or privileged, access for U.S. firms bidding on potential reconstruction projects.

Funding for the significant costs of reconstruction should be possible from the IBRD, AFDB, EEC and hopefully Arab aid organizations and from community and some private Somali sources. It is not realistic to expect any regional or national government financing of significant infrastructure costs. The only contributions might be donations of land or other resources in kind, or schemes under which future revenue streams can be used to repay initial external financing. One of the major advantages of a comprehensive, multi-donor, infrastructure study on Somalia is the opportunity it would present to explore and identify appropriate funding methods. This will be particularly critical in Somalia, where risks are likely to be high and assured returns on investments quite low for the foreseeable future.

5. What are the requirements and sources for U.S. assistance funding?

Funding requirements for U.S. civilian assistance to Somalia are projected for the remainder of FY 93 and for FY 94. During FY 92 and FY 93 most of the USG's support for relief and humanitarian assistance has been channeled through Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) working in Somalia. We expect this will remain true for the rest of FY 93 and FY 94. While the overall costs that the international community will face in Somalia will be substantial, the U.S. share of overall civilian assistance should begin to fall as Somalia's more traditional donors become more active.

SUMMARY OF U.S. FUNDING FOR SOMALIA RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Organization	Actual FY 93	Projected FY 94	Funding Source
A.I.D. (& USDA) - Food	\$102.8 m	\$67. m	PL 480 Title II, Section 416 allocations.
A.I.D. - Disaster	\$50 m	\$20 m	African Disaster Assistance Funds, (or IDA, or "borrowing")
A.I.D. - Relief and Rehabilitation	\$12 m	\$25 m	Disaster Funds or DFA
STATE/Refugee Programs	\$26 m	\$25 m	Migration and Refugee Assistance Account
TOTAL	\$190.8 m	\$137 m	

A.I.D., State Department and U.S.I.S. resources will be drawn on to fund the projected assistance needs for FY 93 and FY 94 in Somalia. In 1993, most funds will continue to go to support of on-going and expanded relief operations, with some rehabilitation activities. Planning and initial organization for reconstruction may take place during the last half of the year, but will require very little funding. Assuming a reasonable transition to UNOSOM II, conditions during 1994, should allow for planning and initiating of more serious reconstruction activities in most areas of Somalia.

If there is a reasonably smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, without major setbacks, most funding levels estimated below can be met from planned or reallocated budget allotments. The exception would be the need for some additional FY 94 funds to "replace" the FY 93 African Disaster Assistance Funds.

Agency for International Development

Food aid contributions are provided under the legislative authority of PL 480 and Sec. 416 (b), by A.I.D. and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In FY 1992 and so far in FY 1993, the USG contributed a total of 317,311 MT valued at \$145.2 million. A.I.D. is considering additional P.L. 480 allocations in FY 93 to support direct feeding programs and market intervention initiatives. Actual commitments will depend on security conditions, other donor contributions, updated needs assessments and indigenous food production.

FY 93 contingency planning for repatriation of Somali refugees now in Kenya will include 20,000 MT, and \$8.3 million. Programming of food for repatriated refugees will be done on the basis of re-directing existing resources from Kenya to Somalia as needed.

FY 94 food assistance requirements from PL 480 and other sources are estimated at \$67.1 million. This excludes possible needs for returning refugees. Depending on actual refugee movements, State/RP and A.I.D. will determine if funding may continue by redirecting existing resources or providing additional resources.

A.I.D. expects to spend at least \$50 million from the \$100 million Sub-Saharan African Disaster Assistance Fund in FY 93 for **relief and rehabilitation activities** in Somalia. This funding level assumes that security conditions do not deteriorate to the extent that airlifts are necessary again, and that they do not radically improve to the extent that widespread rehabilitation is possible.

Program Funds	\$29 million
Civ. Airlift	\$17 million
DOD Airlift	\$ 3.2 million

Total ADA to date	\$49.2 million
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Based on the proposal prepared in January 1993 by the Regional Office in Nairobi, A.I.D. is prepared to program up to **\$32 million** in funds from the African Disaster Assistance (ADA) Fund and the Development Fund for Africa for rehabilitation activities and recovery preparation in 1993. Actual budgetary impact, the amount of funds required beyond ADA Funds, is estimated at \$12 million.

If requirements for Somalia exceed this level, it will be necessary to seek other funding sources, either IDA funds, borrowing authority from other A.I.D. accounts, or a supplemental.

In FY 94 A.I.D. is currently budgeting \$20 million for emergency relief (and rehabilitation) activities in Somalia. These funds would come from the FY 94 disaster appropriations. This projected budget level assumes that emergency relief needs will decrease, and that rehabilitation funding would come primarily from other (non-disaster) A.I.D. funds.

A.I.D. has made a initial estimate of \$25 million in DFA and other funds for rehabilitation and recovery, to be spent under the special authorities of the Horn of Africa Act and other appropriate authorities for FY 94. This assumes that rehabilitation activities will expand, and that some recovery efforts and reconstruction planning is well along. This level would not permit significant USG funding of infrastructure reconstruction, Commodity Import Programs or other such forms of assistance. There will be an additional cost to A.I.D. of seconded direct hire and contract staff working with the United Nations, and possibly with other international assistance efforts for Somalia. The cost of seconded staff members is not currently known.

State, Bureau for Refugee Programs

In FY 1993 the Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) will continue to support UN and NGO activities for Somali refugees in the neighboring countries as well as the ICRC efforts inside Somalia itself. While most of the funds contributed from the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account (MRA) will be unearmarked, it is anticipated that at least \$26 million of RP's FY 1993 support could eventually be attributed to addressing the Somali crisis. Additional funding could be available from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund under a Presidential determination to address Somalia cross-border needs and requirements resulting from an organized repatriation program.

As UNTAF forces have asserted control in southern Somalia and the provision of relief supplies has been expanded, the numbers of refugees fleeing Somalia has decreased. To date, only a few thousand refugees have spontaneously returned. However, UNHCR is planning for the relatively quick return of 85 % of the refugees in Kenya contingent on two conditions: 1) assurance of physical security, or minimum assurances against inter-clan fighting and generalized banditry and 2) assurance of material security, or predictability of food supplies up until the next harvest and the presence of a network of humanitarian rehabilitation agencies. UNHCR planning for the repatriation of remaining "Somali-land" refugees in Ethiopia and Djibouti is far less advanced. Given the mobility of Somalis and the interconnectedness of the Horn's pastoralist economy, it is critical to see Somalia as part of a larger catchment area.

In FY 1994, RP will continue to support UNHCR's repatriation program as well as care and maintenance programs in asylum countries for those refugees

unable or unwilling to return home. Assuming that there is relative stability under UNOSOM II, by 1994 it is anticipated that funding for ICRC will be decreased as their operations will most likely be scaled back as UN agencies and NGOs fund relief and rehabilitation programs. Any decrease in RP funding for ICRC is likely to be offset by an increase in the funding for UNHCR's repatriation program. Therefore, RP anticipates that roughly \$25 million will be needed to address the ongoing Somalia situation in FY 1994.

United States Information Agency

FY 93 - \$124,000

FY 94 - Estimated \$470,000

6. What feasibly can be done to build functioning national and local administrative structures, including police?

Current U.S. policies in Somalia emphasize the need to strengthen and rebuild local institutions and capabilities both as the basis for stabilizing relief programs and for establishing local security. The same basic process would provide the organizational base for supporting local security forces (auxiliary police, etc.), undertaking local rehabilitation and recovery, and is a major step toward building a new national political system. This policy is consistent with the regionally based approach developed by the previous UN Special Representative in Somalia.

National Government

Experience with the national government in Somalia over the past two decades argues strongly against rushing to recreate most of its institutions. There are, however, some functions which may be difficult to organize at the regional and local level, and the lack of a national government may delay access of Somalia to multi-lateral funding under the current rules of institutions such as the World Bank.

In the coming year, while the dialogue on national reconciliation continues and local and regional rebuilding continues and strengthens, interim, internationally mandated authorities are needed to carry out critical functions. These functions could include coordination among regional police forces, establishing a monetary authority, and operating postal telecommunications and air traffic control services. Such authorities could be based on consortia of donors, NGOs and Somalis, or by more regional (Horn of Africa) groupings where appropriate, operating under United Nations mandate.

Regional and Local Structures

For other areas of social services and economic production, most of the required activities can be carried out at the regional and local level probably with more efficiency than under national structures. Keeping service delivery and administrative structures decentralized would result in a reconstituted bureaucracy more directly linked to local control and financial support. The system which Somalia will be reconstituting on a local basis will be similar to the administrative and service structures which neighboring Ethiopia is in the process of creating through decentralizing previous national structures.

This decentralized approach can help avoid a violent winner take all struggle for power and resources at the national level. It can also effectively capture the advantages of participatory, locally controlled initiatives supported by NGOs. It should be noted that this decentralized approach will be relatively manpower intensive for donors and their operating partners.

Regional administrative and service delivery mechanisms also permit postponing dealing with the status of the northern areas of Somalia where certain factions support complete independence. Since the UN seems prepared to initiate rehabilitation programs in the north, and incorporate the northeast and northwest into UNOSOM II, these areas could be included in a loose "federation" at least for the next several years of critical recovery.

Need for Uniform Policies and Guidelines

While there is much to recommend a highly decentralized approach to rebuilding Somalia, there is also a strong argument for establishing key policy and operating guidelines in technical and economic areas for regional governments and the evolving nation. This would ensure greater efficiency and a common framework in key areas, such as tariffs, taxation, banking policies and practices. It would also lay the basis for the possible linking of local administrations at a later date. Such an agreement among the key donors, NGOs and emerging Somali organizations and authorities will help avoid the evolution of seriously flawed, even if well intended, economic and administrative policies and practices. An international conference or working group, perhaps operating under a UN mandate, could endorse and discuss implementation of a decentralized reconstruction approach and identify a basic set of administrative and economic policies and operating guidelines for a new Somalia. Such a conference should be held in the near future, so that locally initiated efforts do not move too far into dissonant patterns of operation. Once a basic approach and set of policies and guidelines is developed that major donors agree with and will enforce, this will

provide an extremely sound basis within which to develop local systems.

7. What can be done to build a civil society in Somalia that respects political and individual rights?

Since it was given its independence thirty years ago, Somalia has been under various forms of authoritarian rule for most of its brief history. In the place of the relatively unified regime under Barre, there is now an undesirable combination of fragmented and warring regimes, most of which are authoritarian. The imposition of order by outside military forces is clearly an extraordinarily undesirable way to enforce a modest level of stability, and only buys time for Somalis to attempt to work out a new basis for a nation. The current attempt at moving toward a single nation-state, based on some system of federation, may or may not succeed.

In some communities and towns in Somalia, the establishment of peace has allowed for the re-emergence of basic forms of civil society -- governance, the maintenance of security, the provision of basic services and various forms of social, cultural and religious activities. The objective of international efforts to strengthen the basis of a peaceful and productive Somalia must be to encourage and spread locally initiated and valued patterns of interaction.

Efforts are underway to encourage and support the establishment of local security forces. These must be paralleled by the establishment of functioning judicial systems and locally relevant legal structures. There is a widespread need to train judicial authorities in the impartial administration of justice. International support is being sought for this effort (Italy), and future A.I.D. and other U.S. Government support will be available as part of broader support for the development of civil society, systems of governance and human rights monitoring groups, including support to the UNHRC. Most locally based and organized relief and rehabilitation projects will also serve to strengthen local authorities and institutions.

USIA already has been able to initiate a number of successful efforts to identify and encourage professional, civic, sports and cultural groups in Mogadishu and other stabilized towns. These efforts have demonstrated that there is a strong and long pent-up desire for civil society to be built on.

There are a number of approaches to supporting and encouraging various institutions and activities that will strengthen civil society in Somalia, if security can be maintained. Although management intensive, we can accomplish two goals with relatively small grants to Somali civic organizations. First, all groups require some material help to function and small project grants are an efficient way to assist them. Secondly, visible American assistance to these groups will

reinforce their prestige and undercut the armed factions which currently dominate Somalia. However, care must be taken to avoid creating dependency on U.S. funding. Self sufficiency and voluntarism must be overarching values in our assistance approach. The empowerment of Somali civic organizations and Somali civil society generally will weaken the current perverse incentive system which rewards the gunmen and ignores the healthy elements of society.

According to USLO Mogadishu reporting, many intellectuals and other potential civil sector leaders remained in Somalia despite opportunities to leave and defended the remnants of civic order at the risk of their own lives, a risk that continues today. Somalis are ready to begin the restoration of a normal society, but need assistance to be successful.

We will need to send in Americans and U.S. trained Somali's (whether or not they are U.S. citizens) for short and medium term visits to run seminars in conjunction with Somali host organizations and advise civil sector groups. Sending Somalis to the United States as participants in exchange programs is probably premature. Assistance must be carefully gauged to avoid overwhelming local groups or threatening their independence. Help to the civil sector should be disbursed through a series of small grants, much like the A.I.D. program in South Africa.

USIS has identified what they consider to be immediate needs in the areas of education, support to the local press, justice, women's groups and sports activities. These types of activities are illustrative of the broader range of activities that will emerge as more of the country becomes secure. Beyond pursuing its own core programs, USIS will manage self-help and other USG-funded small projects which would promote the development of a civil society in Somalia.

The more fundamental question is whether the development of cross-cutting forms of civic, cultural, professional and religious activity in Somalia will necessarily create or support a social and political environment that will respect political and individual rights, or lead to political systems that will promote the peaceful maintenance and transfer of power. The events of the past several decades in Somalia would indicate that an active level of civil society can be an important contributing element to political openness, but by itself is insufficient to prevent authoritarian patterns of rule from being established.

A Strategy for U.S. Economic and Technical Assistance to Somalia

The United States has taken a prominent and visible role in the UN mandated intervention in Somalia. We cannot realistically abandon the precedent setting international effort now underway, without running the risk of Somalia

returning to the chaos of the past two years, further discrediting the United Nations as an effective force for international mediation and problem solving. We need to pursue a strategy which will strongly support the United Nations' efforts in Somalia and will shift the leadership and financial burden to other donor nations.

We must strengthen **the civilian side of UNOSOM II** so that an invigorated and expanded UN presence in Somalia can assume a more aggressive and effective role in relief and rehabilitation efforts. USG agencies have supported UN operations by providing funds, personnel and material resources. We currently are looking at ways to supplement UN staffing for the UNOSOM II phase so it can become an effective and credible force in Somalia.

UNDP has already initiated plans to carry out a multi-year planning exercise for the rehabilitation of Somalia to be completed primarily by outside experts and consultants by the end of 1993. The detailed scope of this effort is still not available, but it appears to focus on restoring basic services and institutions, rather than long term reconstruction.

Longer term physical and institutional reconstruction efforts will be the most costly item, other than ongoing military expenditures, in the international community's efforts to rebuild Somalia. The best way to achieve a credible and realistic plan for this effort, that will attract as much international financial support as possible, is for the World Bank to be asked to organize an **International Consortium for the Reconstruction of Somalia**. The first stage of such an effort would involve two parallel steps. One is to convene a working group, including Somali experts, to recommend the basic policy framework for a reconstructed Somali economy.

The second step is to prepare a detailed technical and financial plan for the physical reconstruction of Somalia. This effort should be led by the World Bank, staffed by consultants and experts (including Somalis) jointly funded by participating donors, and produce a comprehensive plan for the medium term (5 year) reconstruction of Somali infrastructure. As conditions and political reconciliation permit, this would be used as the basis for international funding of the gradual rebuilding of Somalia. Much of this effort would initially focus on regional reconstruction rather than work at the national level.

The third element is to promote the reconstruction of Somalia is the vitalization and strengthening of the group of neighboring Horn of Africa Group of countries which have been involved in political reconciliation and peace efforts in Somalia. This organization should be provided with support, and encouraged to maintain ongoing consultations with Somalia, the international reconstruction consortia and the UN. This organization represents a critical force in ensuring

that potential problems and conflicts are discussed and peacefully mediated by the involved countries in the region. It will be critical for the political reconciliation process to ensure that pressures and interventions from neighboring countries are carefully managed. Such an organization would also have the longer term value of providing a venue for actions on regional issues of common concern and interest, and ultimately as a basis for regional economic and political cooperation.

March 4, 1993

U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA OPERATIONS

Funding Requirements

- The estimated U.S. funding requirement to support peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia is \$174 million for the rest of FY 1993 (March-September) and \$366 million for FY 1994. The funds to support these requirements are included in agencies' FY 1993 budgets and FY 1994 budget requests. (Detailed table attached.)
- Support for peacekeeping operations includes State Department funding for the U.S. assessed share (31 percent) of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II): remaining FY 1993 funds totalling \$121 million and FY 1994 request of \$223 million.

Defense Department funding for the U.S. troop contribution to UNOSOM II (i.e., incremental military personnel costs, including hazardous duty and family separation pay): remaining FY 1993 funds of \$6 million and FY 1994 request of \$6 million.
- Peacekeeping funding estimates do not credit Defense troop contribution costs against the U.S. assessed payment. The UN has not agreed to this approach. A high level State/USUN/UN consultation would be required to pursue this idea.

State staff believe that if countries with large peacekeeping assessments credit their in-kind contributions to reduce their assessed payments it would result in UN cash shortages and hinder peacekeeping operations world-wide.
- Support for humanitarian assistance totals \$35 million for the rest of FY 1993 and \$112 million for FY 1994. This includes food aid, disaster relief and refugee assistance funding provided by State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Defense Department to support bilateral and multilateral (e.g., international organizations and private voluntary organizations) assistance.

Uncertainty of Funding Requirements

- The situation in Somalia is very fluid creating a large degree of uncertainty in the funding estimates. Planning assumptions, such as the DOD troop strength levels, are subject to changes that cannot be foreseen.
- The exact timing of the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II also cannot be predicted with certainty.
- The funding requirement for U.S. support for operations in Somalia could exceed the current estimate considerably if the U.S. decides to provide logistical support or maintain a larger troop strength in UNOSOM II. For example, if the U.S. were to provide logistical support for UNOSOM II troops the estimated requirement could increase to \$100 million in FY 1993 and \$115 in FY 1994.
- Also, the scope and costs of political reconciliation (e.g., UN administration of Somali institutions, creation of city/regional civil administrations, etc.) are not currently known.

Attachment

March 4, 1993

U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA OPERATION

Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement
(\$ in millions)

Activity	Remaining FY 1993 Req'mnt ¹	FY 1994 Req'mnt	Description	Funding Source/Availability
<u>UN Operation in Somalia I</u> (UNOSOM I) (U.S. assessed payment)	\$ 11	\$0	Estimated U.S. 31 percent assessment of actual UN expenses for Somalia from 5/92 to 3/93. Decreased from original estimate of \$33 million because UNOSOM I was never fully deployed.	State/Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. Enacted in FY 1993 CIPA appropriation.
<u>UN Operation in Somalia</u> <u>II</u> (UNOSOM II) (U.S. assessed payment)	110 ²	223 ²	Estimated U.S. 31 percent assessment. <u>FY 1993</u> assumes 20,000 UN troops for six months (4/93- 9/93). <u>FY 1994</u> estimate assumes 20,000 UN troops for first six months with a drawdown to 10,000 for the second six months.	State/Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. <u>FY 1993</u> - \$22 million enacted in CIPA appropriation for UNOSOM II. <u>FY 1994</u> - \$159 million included in the CIPA budget request for Somalia. Another \$175 million is budgeted for contingency requirements which could be used to cover additional need.

Activity	Remaining FY 1993 Req'ment ¹	FY 1994 Req'ment	Description	Funding Source/Availability
<u>U.S. Troop Contribution to UNOSOM II²</u>	6 ⁴	6 ⁴	<u>FY 1993</u> assumes 5,000 U.S. troops deployed for five months (May-Sept '93) at a cost of \$240/troop/month for incremental military personnel costs. Includes these incremental costs for a Quick Reaction Force of 1,000. <u>FY 1994</u> assumes 4,000 U.S. troops deployed for three months (Oct-Dec '93); would be reduced to 1,400 by January 1994 for nine months (Jan-Sept '94) at a cost of \$240/troop/month for incremental military personnel costs.	<u>FY 1993</u> will be funded from existing Defense authorities and appropriations. <u>FY 1994</u> requirements will be included in the Defense budget request to Congress.
TOTAL, Peacekeeping	\$127	\$229		

¹ Remaining (March-September) FY 1993 requirement.

² There is no UN budget estimate for UNOSOM II. The estimated U.S. requirement for UNOSOM II is based on the UN Secretary General's draft report on UNOSOM II. The U.S. requirement could increase if the final UNOSOM II budget is larger than currently estimated. Whether additional UN costs for non-military assistance/relief would be funded from UNOSOM II or from separate humanitarian accounts remains at issue.

³ Defense costs related to Operation Restore Hope and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), currently estimated at \$583 million, are planned to be covered by internal DOD reprogrammings.

⁴ Estimate of DOD incremental cost for U.S. troops in UNOSOM II assumes the UN will provide full logistical support to these troops. If the U.S. is required to provide the logistical support the estimated requirement could increase to \$100 million in FY 1993 and \$115 million in FY 1994.

March 2, 1993

U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA OPERATION

Humanitarian Assistance
(\$ in millions)

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Remaining FY 1993 Req'mnt</u>	<u>FY 1994 Req'mnt</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Funding Source/Availability</u>
Food Aid	\$0	\$ 67	Direct food aid (i.e., agricultural commodities and ancillary costs of transport) and market intervention (e.g., monetization).	USDA/State/AID/P.L. 480 Title II of the Foreign Assistance Act. Section 416 of the Agriculture Act of 1949 may provide additional available authority. <u>FY 1993</u> U.S. has provided \$103 million in food aid (approx. 237 thousand metric tons of food) from these sources. <u>FY 1994</u> budget request assumes \$67 million in food aid for Somalia.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Remaining FY 1993 Req'mnt</u>	<u>FY 1994 Req'mnt</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Funding Source/Availability</u>
Disaster Relief	20	20	Disaster and relief assistance; assumes no resumption of airlifts. Includes a small number of rehabilitation projects.	AID/African Disaster Assistance (ADA), International Disaster Assistance (IDA) or other, i.e., AID "borrowing" authorities. <u>FY 1993</u> U.S. has already provided \$30 million in disaster relief. The additional \$20 million will be funded from the Africa Disaster Assistance and International Disaster Assistance accounts. <u>FY 1994</u> \$20 million for Somalia included in disaster assistance budget request.
DOD Disaster Assistance	10	0	Military assistance, in-kind goods and services, to help support emergency humanitarian assistance operations of UNOSOM I.	Defense/Disaster Assistance funding for global disaster relief. FY 1993 DOD Appropriation makes \$50 million available for global disasters. \$10.3 million committed to Somalia leaving \$39.7 million available.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Remaining FY 1993 Req'ment¹</u>	<u>FY 1994 Req'ment</u>
Refugee Assistance	5	25
TOTAL, Humanitarian Relief	\$ 35	\$112

Description

Provides the projected U.S. share of the budgets of international organizations (e.g., UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Committee of the Red Cross) caring for Somali refugees and displaced persons. Assumes 85 percent repatriation of Kenya-based refugees back to Somalia.

Funding Source/Availability

State/Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts.

FY 1993: \$21 million contributed from the MRA account and another \$5 million planned.

FY 1994 budget request assumes \$25 million in MRA to support programs for Somali refugees. In addition, there is currently an unobligated balance of \$50.9 million in the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund; an FY 1994 budget request for \$49.2 million would increase the total balance to \$100.1 million.

¹ Remaining (March-September) FY 1993 requirement.

March 2, 1993

U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA OPERATION

Rehabilitation
(\$ in millions)

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Remaining FY 1993 Req'ment¹</u>	<u>FY 1994 Req'ment</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Funding Source/Availability</u>
Rehabilitation	12	25	Funds limited rehabilitation and recovery projects (e.g., road construction). Assumes rehabilitation projects will expand and other donor countries will make significant contributions to this effort.	AID/Development Fund for Africa has budgeted FY 1993 resources to cover this requirement. Funding for FY 1994 is included in the budget request for the Development Fund for Africa and Disaster Assistance accounts.

¹ Remaining (March-September) FY 1993 requirement.

Attachment
March 2, 1992

Potential Additional Funding Sources for Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Assistance
(\$ in millions)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount Available</u>	<u>Comment</u>
<u>DOD Sources of Humanitarian Assistance:</u>	<u>87.2</u>	(DOD estimates as of 2/26/93.)
<u>Disaster Assistance</u>	(21.5)	<u>Sources:</u> FY 92 DOD Appropriation Sec. 8105A allows DOD to use \$25 million for unanticipated costs of DOD disaster relief activities. \$3.5 million used to date was for Somalia.
<u>Disaster Assistance</u>	(39.7)	<u>Sources:</u> FY 93 DOD Appropriation makes \$50 million available under the "Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies" heading for DOD global disaster relief activities. Another \$39.7 million available after the Somali commitment.
<u>Contingencies</u>	(14.0)	<u>Sources:</u> FY 93 DOD Appropriation allows DOD to support global contingencies/emergencies with \$25 million from the CINC initiatives account. Amounts committed to date were used for requirements other than Somalia.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount Available</u>	<u>Comment</u>
<u>Humanitarian Assistance</u>	(12.0)	<u>Sources:</u> FY 93 DOD Appropriation and FY 93 National Defense Authorization Act, Sec. 304 make \$28 million available for DOD humanitarian assistance efforts. \$13 million has been used for global relief, including Somalia and \$3 million is set aside for Kurdish relief. DOD says remainder needed for other relief operations (e.g., Bosnia).
<u>Other State/AID Authorities Sources of Assistance:</u>	<u>140.0</u>	(There may be other claims on the resources listed below.)
<u>Disaster Relief</u>	(25.0)	<u>Sources:</u> Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Sec. 451 allows the President to use up to \$25 million in already enacted appropriations under the FAA for "unanticipated contingencies." Full \$25 million available.
<u>Disaster Relief and Refugee Assistance</u>	(75.0)	<u>Sources:</u> FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) permits the President to draw down up to \$75 million worth of DOD goods and services for disaster relief and refugee assistance. Full \$75 million available.
<u>UN Peacekeeping</u>	(40.0)	<u>Sources:</u> FAA Sec. 552(c) allows transfer of \$15 million in cash from other FAA accounts and \$25 million in kind from any USG agency for peacekeeping. Full \$40 million available.
TOTAL, Potential Additional Funding Sources	227.2	

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. paper	UNOSOM (10 pages)	03/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. paper	Equipping the Pakistanis (and others) (2 pages)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006c. cable	Re: US Support for Pakistani Forces in UNITAF and UNISOM II (2 pages)	02/21/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Feb. 16, 1993

Pakistan/UNITAF

Q: If Pakistan were made part of UNITAF, could the UN be billed for the furnishing of goods and services directly to Pakistan under the current US-UN 607 Agreement and the UN Fund?

A: Yes.

Q: What agreements must be negotiated in order to authorize the furnishing of the goods and services directly to Pakistan if we want to do so under the existing UN 607 Agreement?

A: -- From a strictly legal standpoint, no agreement has to be negotiated at this time. DOD will be billing the UN for goods and services furnished to other countries since early December even in the absence of bilateral agreements.

-- We are, however, negotiating bilateral agreements through military channels with the eligible UNITAF countries in order to obtain good procedures, appropriate end use assurances, etc. These are sound housekeeping agreements, but do not appear to be required by law.

-- We should negotiate such an agreement with Pakistan also if we provide support to them under UNITAF, but it does not have to be negotiated in advance.

Q: Is a 614 waiver required to furnish goods and services to Pakistan under the UN 607 Agreement?

A: A waiver is not required if we furnish traditional services (e.g., logistics, transportation) and non-Munitions List items (e.g., food, water, petrol). A waiver would be needed if we wanted to provide Munitions List articles (guns, bullets) or technical data under the ITAR.

Q: What has to be done to get things moving to authorize support to Pakistan as part of UNITAF and pursuant to the current 607 Agreement?

A: A cable from Washington that has been properly cleared. If the cable directs USCINCCENT to furnish goods and services to Pakistan as part of UNITAF and if no Munitions List articles/technical data are involved, it could go out as soon as the policy clearances are obtained.

Q: Are there any monetary limits on reimbursable support that can be provided under the 607 Agreement?

A: The Agreement and accompanying guidelines preserve at least 85% of Fund proceeds for reimbursement to DOD (approximately \$86 million based on donations to date). We do not know how much of this limit has been exhausted by DOD's provision of support to date.

SELPM 3358

APPENDIX B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. paper	Quick Reaction Force (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
kc4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006e. paper	Re: [QRF] (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006f. paper	Command of Headquarters Support Forces in Somalia During UNOSOM II (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007a. paper	Presidential Review Directive/NSC-5 (2 pages)	02/08/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007b. memo	From Samuel Berger, re: Somalia Core Group (2 pages)	02/08/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007c. memo	Frank Wisner to Mr. Tarnoff, re: Long Range Strategy for Somalia (3 pages)	03/03/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 9, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR STATE - ASSISTANT SECRETARY HANK COHEN
DEFENSE - ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES WOODS
JCS - ADMIRAL FRANK BOWMAN
CIA - MR. VAUGHN BISHOP
OMB - MR. GORDAN ADAMS

FROM: NSC - RICHARD A. CLARKE
SUBJECT: Somalia - Preparation for Deputies Committee

There will be a meeting (principals only) to review the Core Group and IWG papers on Somalia in preparation for a Deputies Committee.

The meeting will be Wednesday, 10 March at 10:30 a.m., in the White House Situation Room. Please inform Ms. Lindsey (395-3393) of planned attendance.

cc: STATE/PM - COLONEL PIAZZA
STATE/IO - MS. KIMBLE
NSC - RANDY BEERS
NSC - DENNIS JETT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 11/28/16
2012-0659-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	[Duplicate of 006c] (4 pages)	03/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. paper	Strategy for Somalia (6 pages)	10/16/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

FOLDER TITLE:

Somalia, January - May 1993 [3]

2012-0659-F
ke4088

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. report	Somali Clans, Armed Factions, and Alignments (6 pages)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
African Affairs (Ordway, John/Jett, Dennis/Ward, Jennifer/Steinberg, Donald, et al.)
OA/Box Number: 502

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