

Uganda

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The Economist Intelligence Unit
15 Regent Street, London SW1Y 4LR
United Kingdom

Uganda

Our quarterly Country Report on Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi analyses current trends. This annual Country Profile provides background political and economic information on Uganda.

Political background

Historical background

Early history

In the absence of written records, much of the history of this region, as of other parts of Africa, is an uncertain story leaning heavily on the interpretation of cultural and archaeological evidence. Little is known of the earliest inhabitants and their migrations. By the 18th century the area now identified as Uganda was occupied by representatives of two main ethnic groups: Bantu tribes (mainly cultivators) in the south and Nilotic tribes (mainly herders) in the north. The Bantu were culturally more sophisticated and extremely well organised into tribal kingdoms, the most important of which was Buganda (from which the modern name derives).

The 19th century

The early 19th century brought Arab traders (and Islam) into the region, attracted by ivory and slaves. Later in the century the dawning of European interest was marked by the vigorous activity of Christian missionaries. Penetration by British commercial and political interests followed Anglo-German agreements in 1886 and 1890 which defined mutual spheres of interest in East Africa. The administration of the British sphere was carried out initially by the Imperial British East Africa Company, established in 1888. The company made protective treaties with the Bantu kingdoms, but handed its responsibilities to the British government in 1894, when all its territory between the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria became a British protectorate. The establishment of political control proved to be a lengthy process marked by numerous wars with indigenous groups. The division of British East Africa into two separate units, eventually to become Uganda and Kenya, was formalised by a boundary in 1902.

The early 20th century

The first half of the 20th century saw the growth of a classic colonial economy based on the export of agricultural cash crops, notably cotton and coffee, and supported by food crops and subsistence farming. Unlike Kenya, there was no large-scale development of European settler farms mainly because indigenous small-scale peasant cultivation was so successful. There was a significant immigration of Asians (mainly from India), who were brought in by the British to build the railway, and who gradually built up a large share of commercial, and

subsequently industrial, activities. The post-war years of the colonial period were fairly trouble-free and Uganda became independent in 1962.

The causes of post-independence instability

Since independence Uganda has had a very unsettled political history. There have been seven changes of government during the intervening 33 years, four of them achieved by force of arms, and a degree of violence against the civilian population almost without parallel in Africa. The causes of this instability have been ascribed to ethnic and religious divisions in Ugandan society or to the socially divisive politics followed by the British during the colonial period. Both explanations contain a measure of truth. Uganda has some 28 ethnic groups, and the major ethnic division is between the Nilotic people of the north (such as the Acholi and the Langi) and the Bantu of the south (including the Baganda). The British capitalised on this distinction by recruiting their security forces mainly from the northern ethnic groups, thereby initiating a military dominance of the south by the north which continued into the post-colonial period until the seizure of power in 1986 by the predominantly Bantu-based National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni (see below).

British efforts to prevent the country splitting into smaller units after independence led to the imposition of a complex federal constitution. The first government of independent Uganda was formed by an alliance of southern and northern political parties which secured the election of the traditional kabaka (king) of Buganda (a southern Bantu) as president and Milton Obote (a northern Langi) as prime minister. Dr Obote's aim of forming a one-party state brought about an acute conflict with the Baganda. In 1966, with the support of the army, he suspended the constitution and declared himself executive president. The federal constitution, which allowed considerable autonomy to the various kingdoms and districts, was thus destroyed. The violence which broke out in Buganda following this development was put down by the army under the control of the chief-of-staff, General Idi Amin.

Idi Amin

Dr Obote had become a dictator, dependent on the army. In an attempt to achieve political legitimacy, he announced a move to the left in a scheme modelled on the Tanzanian system which sought to eliminate ethnic divisions in a one-party state. His efforts to secure popular support were not successful, and he was deposed in 1971 in an army coup led by General Amin. General Amin's government was popular at first and his mass deportation of Asians was widely welcomed by the African population, but he soon began to lose support. He played on tribalism to maintain himself in power with a small military elite drawn mainly from his own northern Kakwa group, and he carried out murderous attacks on the Langi (Dr Obote's tribe) and their Acholi neighbours. Indiscriminate killings of prominent people also lost him support in the Bantu south. A Muslim himself, he persecuted Christians, who make up as much as 80% of Uganda's population. An estimated 300,000 people were killed in a succession of purges lasting seven years. General Amin's fall in 1979 came as a result of conflict with Tanzania, which had given shelter to Dr Obote and never recognised the new regime in Kampala. Tanzanian forces, backed up by an army of Ugandan emigrés, invaded Uganda following a territorial dispute, and General Amin fled abroad.

The 1980 elections

The Tanzanians installed a new government, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), made up of previously exiled Ugandan politicians under the leadership of a former academic, Yusufu Lule. There followed a period of considerable confusion lasting for just over a year when all the ethnic and other frictions which had plagued Uganda in the past resurfaced. The main influence on the shaping of events, however, was the north's leadership of the new Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), which was determined to remain in control and to arrange for the return of Dr Obote to power. Professor Lule and his successor, Godfrey Binaisa, were both deposed by the army. A military commission then assumed power under the leadership of Paulo Muwanga, a staunch ally of Dr Obote. Elections were held in December 1980 and Dr Obote was returned to power. The elections were declared satisfactory by a Commonwealth monitoring team, but in retrospect there seems little doubt that the vigorous accusations of irregularities made by the losing parties were justified. The Democratic Party (DP) decided to fight on as a parliamentary opposition, but one of the other losing parties, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), in a move ultimately of great significance, chose to go into the bush and operate as a guerrilla opposition under its leader, Yoweri Museveni.

The 1985 coup

Dr Obote's second presidency, like his first, depended ultimately on the support of the army (now the UNLA). As before, he signally failed to unite the numerous factions within Ugandan society and Mr Museveni's NRA increasingly became a focus for opposition. The UNLA mounted a series of offensives against the NRA, in which the civilian Baganda, notably in the Luwero region, received savage treatment. The numbers of people killed, by either the army or the police, are said by some observers to have exceeded those killed during the Amin era. Dissent grew between the Langi and the Acholi factions within the army. The end came in July 1985 when the Acholi, dissatisfied with Dr Obote's leadership and resentful of the level of their exposure to the guerrilla war, marched on Kampala and mounted a successful military coup. Dr Obote fled to Zambia, where he still lives.

The establishment of the National Resistance Council

Dr Obote's government was replaced by a Military Council under the leadership of General Tito Okello (an Acholi), who also became head of state. During the latter half of 1985 a series of meetings was held in Nairobi, under the chairmanship of Kenya's president, Daniel arap Moi, between representatives of the Military Council and the NRA. The NRA, however, had made it clear that it would not cooperate with supporters of the previous Obote government, whom it regarded as criminals. It became increasingly apparent that a military confrontation was imminent. In January 1986 the NRA marched on Kampala, which was taken after a bitter battle, and Mr Museveni was sworn in as president. Within two months the NRA was in effective control of most regions of the country. The Military Council was dissolved and a National Resistance Council (NRC) was formed to take charge of government, consisting mainly of senior members of the NRA and its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). The NRC is now the effective seat of power in Uganda.

Constitution and institutions

The federal constitution imposed by the UK in 1962 was a mirror of the diverse ethnic structure of Ugandan society. It recognised four traditional Bantu kingdoms, and 24 other ethnic groupings organised into a further ten districts. There was insufficient cohesion, however, to withstand the ambitions of Dr Obote when he assumed power in 1966. He proclaimed a new constitution in which executive power was vested in an elected president, assisted by a cabinet of ministers appointed from a National Assembly elected every five years. His attempt to solve Uganda's political and ethnic problems by imposing a one-party system came to an abrupt end in 1971 when General Amin seized power. After his removal in 1979, the elections which brought Dr Obote back to power represented an apparent, although flawed, return to constitutional rule.

Local representation through resistance councils

The NRM government, under Mr Museveni, has established a system of elected resistance councils (RCs) at the local level in a determined effort to promote grass-roots democracy. There is also an elected hierarchy of district and regional resistance councils. Each district has an administrator (DA) appointed by the president. Elections for some seats in the NRC were held in 1989. All regions of the country are represented, together with official women's, youth and worker groups. Other members are nominated by the NRM, the NRA and the president. The present NRC numbers 278, of whom 210 are elected.

Some agreement on a new constitution

The draft of a new constitution, drawn up following wide public consultation, was considered by the Constituent Assembly (CA), elected specifically for that purpose in March 1994. The government, and especially Mr Museveni, favours a "movement" (no-party) system based on the RCs; however, the pluralist voice, powerful among the old political parties, continues to draw strength from the democratisation in eastern Europe and elsewhere in Africa.

The crucial issue—whether the current NRM system should be replaced by a multiparty system—was at last resolved by the CA in July 1995. After four days of impassioned debate, the status quo in the form of the movement system (NRM) triumphed, by 199 votes against 68 with 2 abstentions. Neither the combined forces of the DP and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), nor a Baganda-led pro-federal grouping, could match the NRM's dominance over the CA. The movement system will therefore be retained in the new constitution for at least five more years.

Political forces

The political parties which emerged during the decade before independence were to a great extent a reflection of the ethnic and religious structure of Ugandan society. The Christian missionary movements represented both Protestant and Roman Catholic persuasions, and membership of religious communities often cuts across ethnic divisions, producing a complex web of personal allegiances, part-ethnic, part-religious. Ugandans tend to be highly politicised, and the various political affiliations represent yet another series of fault lines in Ugandan society.

Party allegiances

At independence, the main parties were the Kabaka Yekka (KY), which was mainly Protestant and Bagandan; the UPC, Protestant but non-Bagandan; and the DP, which was Bagandan but mainly Roman Catholic. Thirty years on, the UPC and the DP still exist, but both parties are experiencing a period of transition in which the traditional leadership is facing internal opposition from radical factions. The KY has disappeared, although its Baganda royalist appeal has now passed to the minority Conservative Party (CP).

The three decades of instability saw the emergence of several new political groupings. The UPM was a left-wing movement formed to fight the general election in 1980. It won one seat, but, after the manipulation of the results by the UPC which brought Dr Obote back to power, it chose to go into the bush and operate as a rebel opposition under Mr Museveni. This rebel faction became the NRA, and its political supporters formed the NRM which now holds power. Other rebel movements which set up in opposition to Dr Obote have declined in importance with his departure and have gradually thrown in their lot with the NRM, notably the Federal Democratic Movement (Fedemo) and the Uganda National Resistance Front (UNRF). Such switching of allegiance is symptomatic of the fluid state of Ugandan politics, as groups easily sacrifice principles for the sake of influence.

The shadow of Dr Obote

Even in exile, Dr Obote casts a long shadow over Ugandan politics and he continues to provide a focus for some groups opposed to the present government. He is still seen as the figurehead of the UPC, although some members of the party would like to distance themselves from him. There are pro-Obote factions abroad, especially in Kenya and the USA, but the reintroduction of democratic elections under Mr Museveni has begun to rebuild the public's faith in the political system.

Mr Museveni has succeeded in including a wide range of political allegiances in his cabinet, although it is dominated by the NRM, and there is a strong regional bias towards the south and west of Uganda, which provided the core of the NRA during the bush war. The president blames the old political parties (with their ethnic and regional biases) for the savage events of recent decades, and party political activities have therefore been banned. Individuals, however, make no secret of their political affiliations, and recent elections have shown that the old parties continue to flourish and indeed reflect the regional and ethnic biases which gave them their origin. The NRM has not been able to impose itself (despite its privileged position in government) as the kind of national unifying force its leaders had hoped for. The main political challenge of the next few years will be to bring dissatisfied regional groups, especially those in the north and east, into the mainstream of political life.

The reawakening of monarchist sentiments

Uganda's traditional tribal monarchies have a long history in the Bantu south, where their associated territories provided the political framework before the colonial period. Recognised in the 1962 constitution, they were abolished by Dr Obote in 1966. They have, however, retained an important cultural significance as expressions of personal and group identity.

Main political figures

- Yoweri Museveni:** head of state and minister of defence
Specloza Kazibwe: vice-president and minister of gender and community development
Kintu Musoke: prime minister
Eriya Kategaya: first deputy prime minister and national political commissar
Eric Adriko: second deputy premier and minister of public services
Moses All: third deputy premier and minister for tourism, wildlife and antiquities
John Nasasira: minister for agriculture, animal industry and fisheries
Joshua Mayanja-Nkangi: minister for finance and economic planning
Ruhakana Rugunda: minister for foreign affairs
Crispus Kiyonga: minister for internal affairs
Henry Kajura: minister for natural resources
Richard Kaljuka: minister for trade and industry

When the NRM government permitted the restoration of the Buganda monarchy in 1993, it was stressed that the role of the *kabaka* was to be purely cultural. Monarchies have since been restored in Toro, Busoga and Bunyoro, and it is clear that many people wish to see their role given a constitutional basis. The pro-monarchist groups have also brought a new dimension to the current debate between the "movement" and "multiparty" arguments in the ongoing constitutional debate. Monarchist aspirations are especially powerful in Buganda, which was the largest, most populous and most powerful of the traditional kingdoms. There is no doubt that many supporters of the monarchies feel a stronger sense of attachment to their *kabaka* than to the rulers of the modern state of Uganda.

International relations and defence

Rebuilding relations with Kenya and Tanzania

The close colonial links which existed between the former British territories in East Africa were maintained in the period following independence and in 1963 there was a ~~declaration of intent between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (then Tanganyika) to create an East African federation.~~ In 1967 the three countries came together to form the East African Community (EAC) but it never attained its objectives, and political and economic strains caused its demise in 1977. The affairs of the defunct EAC were not fully wound up until 1985, and steps have recently been taken to re-establish cooperation, notably in transport and communications, commerce and industry, security and immigration, and regional investment. A permanent secretariat is to be established, based at Arusha in Tanzania. Relations with Kenya have not always been good, soured by mutual accusations of political destabilisation and by strong differences of personality between the two heads of state. The situation improved after 1993, when Daniel arap Moi became the first Kenyan head of state to make an official visit to Uganda, but further periods of diplomatic coolness may be expected from time to time.

Friction with Rwanda and Sudan

In the west and north, the movement of ethnic and rebel groups across the boundaries with Rwanda, Zaire and Sudan has at times been a source of friction and has resulted in a serious refugee problem. In October 1990 Uganda was the base from which the Front populaire rwandais (FPR) carried out an invasion of Rwanda. The FPR recruited heavily from Rwandan Tutsis serving in the NRA and suspicions of Uganda's complicity with the rebels have proved damaging to its image in the region. The civil war in Rwanda also brought instability to the border regions but the situation should improve following the installation of the FPR government in Kigali in July 1994, and prospects have improved for finding a solution to the longstanding refugee dispute between the two countries. In August 1995 Mr Museveni visited Kigali and confirmed an attitude of cooperation between the two countries, particularly on economic matters.

The most serious threat to security is in the north, where instability caused by the civil war in Sudan frequently spills across the border into Uganda, providing a fresh stimulus to old antagonisms. It is no secret that the Ugandan government gives help to the rebels, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the Sudanese authorities have likewise, in the past, supported rebel groups from Uganda. Relations between Kampala and Khartoum had been deteriorating over a period of years and the situation came to a head in April 1995, when Uganda broke off diplomatic relations. There is unlikely to be any improvement without a change of regime. Some observers, mostly outside the country, see the Uganda-Sudan confrontation as indicative of a wider trend towards Islamic expansionism.

Uganda is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) as well as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), of which Mr Museveni was nominated chairman in July 1990 for one year. All these bodies are discussed in the Appendix: regional organisations.

The National Resistance Army

The army has been a key political force throughout Uganda's recent history. Military backing has been essential to all political leaders since 1966, and the success of the new constitution will depend heavily upon whether or not it wins army support. The present army in Uganda is the National Resistance Army (NRA). When the NRA was first set up by Mr Museveni in 1981 it numbered only 27 men, but its strength grew to 14,000 in 1986, when it captured Kampala, and was estimated by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) at 50,000 in mid-1994. It has grown with the integration of former opposition guerrilla groups, many of which have taken advantage of a general amnesty offer, and some dilution of quality has resulted. The army consists mainly of infantry units, equipped with small arms. There is little in the way of heavy artillery or mobile armour, and air power is limited. During its years in the bush as a guerrilla force the NRA attracted support mainly from the Baganda, but in the final months before its victory over the northern-based UNLA it recruited heavily from ethnic groups in the south-west, especially Rwandan exiles. Many of these deserted to join the civil war in Rwanda. At the end of 1989 Mr Museveni reshuffled the leadership of the NRA, which reflected, in the promotions, a growing eastern influence in the army's personnel.

Military forces, mid-1994

National Resistance Army	48,800
Paramilitary Air Wing	800
Paramilitary Marine Unit	400
Total	50,000

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1994/95*.

Since January 1986 the internal security situation has much improved, especially in Kampala and the south, although many weapons remain in private hands and lawlessness is fairly rife. The NRA found it difficult to establish its authority in the north and east, where the civil war in Sudan and the perennially unsettled Karamoja border region encouraged rebel activity. Parts of the north still remain insecure because of the activities of small groups of "Holy Spirit" rebels (said by the IISS to number only 500 in mid-1994), supported by the Sudanese authorities.

The economy

Economic structure

Main economic indicators, 1994/95^a

GDP growth (%)	10.0
Consumer price inflation (%)	3.3
Current-account balance (\$ m)	-8
Foreign debt (\$ bn)	3.15 ^b
Exchange rate (NUSh:\$)	1,003
Population (m)	19

^a Fiscal year starting July 1. ^b End-December 1994.

Source: EIU.

The overwhelming importance of agriculture

Economic output is dominated by agriculture, which is responsible for about 50% of GDP including substantial non-monetary production. Most Ugandans owed their survival during the troubles of the 1970s and 1980s to the resilience of the informal agricultural sector, and most wage earners still need their small plots for domestic food supplies. Food crop production is by far the most important economic activity, accounting for almost one-third of GDP, compared with only 6% for cash crops. Manufacturing output contributes only about 6% of GDP. It has suffered badly from the decades of instability and has failed to recover the position it held in the economy at independence.

Most agricultural production takes place in the south, where the climatic conditions have always supported the densest rural populations and where the impact of colonialism set the framework for the growth in urban population. The economic situation in the north is much weaker, partly because of the devastation caused by the civil war and the unsettled border conditions.

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In the absence of written records, much of the history of this region, as of other parts of Africa, is an uncertain story leaning heavily on the interpretation of cultural and archaeological evidence. Little is known of the earliest inhabitants and their migrations. By the 18th century the area now identified as Uganda was occupied by representatives of two main ethnic groups: Bantu tribes (mainly cultivators) in the south and Nilotic tribes (mainly herders) in the north. The Bantu were culturally more sophisticated and extremely well organised into tribal kingdoms, the most important of which was Buganda (from which the modern name derives).

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The causes of post-independence instability

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Idi Amin

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The 1985 coup

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The shadow of Dr Obote

Even in exile, Dr Obote casts a long shadow over Ugandan politics and he continues to provide a focus for some groups opposed to the present government. He is still seen as the figurehead of the UPC, although some members of the party would like to distance themselves from him. There are pro-Obote factions abroad, especially in Kenya and the USA, but the reintroduction of democratic elections under Mr Museveni has begun to rebuild the public's faith in the political system.

Mr Museveni has succeeded in including a wide range of political allegiances in his cabinet, although it is dominated by the NRM, and there is a strong regional bias towards the south and west of Uganda, which provided the core of the NRA during the bush war. The president blames the old political parties (with their ethnic and regional biases) for the savage events of recent decades, and party political activities have therefore been banned. Individuals, however, make no secret of their political affiliations, and recent elections have shown that the old parties continue to flourish and indeed reflect the regional and ethnic biases which gave them their origin. The NRM has not been able to impose itself (despite its privileged position in government) as the kind of national unifying force its leaders had hoped for. The main political challenge of the next few years will be to bring dissatisfied regional groups, especially those in the north and east, into the mainstream of political life.

The reawakening of monarchist sentiments

Uganda's traditional tribal monarchies have a long history in the Bantu south, where their associated territories provided the political framework before the colonial period. Recognised in the 1962 constitution, they were abolished by Dr Obote in 1966. They have, however, retained an important cultural significance as expressions of personal and group identity.

Main political figures

Yoweri Museveni: head of state and minister of defence

Specloza Kazibwe: vice-president and minister of gender and community development

Kintu Musoke: prime minister

Eriya Kategaya: first deputy prime minister and national political commissar

Eric Adriko: second deputy premier and minister of public services

Moses All: third deputy premier and minister for tourism, wildlife and antiquities

John Nasasira: minister for agriculture, animal industry and fisheries

Joshua Mayanja-Nkangi: minister for finance and economic planning

Ruhakana Rugunda: minister for foreign affairs

Crispus Kiyonga: minister for internal affairs

Henry Kajura: minister for natural resources

Richard Kaljuka: minister for trade and industry

When the NRM government permitted the restoration of the Buganda monarchy in 1993, it was stressed that the role of the *kabaka* was to be purely cultural. Monarchies have since been restored in Toro, Busoga and Bunyoro, and it is clear that many people wish to see their role given a constitutional basis. The pro-monarchist groups have also brought a new dimension to the current debate between the "movement" and "multiparty" arguments in the ongoing constitutional debate. Monarchist aspirations are especially powerful in Buganda, which was the largest, most populous and most powerful of the traditional kingdoms. There is no doubt that many supporters of the monarchies feel a stronger sense of attachment to their *kabaka* than to the rulers of the modern state of Uganda.

International relations and defence

Rebuilding relations with Kenya and Tanzania

The close colonial links which existed between the former British territories in East Africa were maintained in the period following independence and in 1963 there was a declaration of intent between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (then Tanganyika) to create an East African federation. In 1967 the three countries came together to form the East African Community (EAC) but it never attained its objectives, and political and economic strains caused its demise in 1977. The affairs of the defunct EAC were not fully wound up until 1985, and steps have recently been taken to re-establish cooperation, notably in transport and communications, commerce and industry, security and immigration, and regional investment. A permanent secretariat is to be established, based at Arusha in Tanzania. Relations with Kenya have not always been good, soured by mutual accusations of political destabilisation and by strong differences of personality between the two heads of state. The situation improved after 1993, when Daniel arap Moi became the first Kenyan head of state to make an official visit to Uganda, but further periods of diplomatic coolness may be expected from time to time.

Friction with Rwanda and Sudan

In the west and north, the movement of ethnic and rebel groups across the boundaries with Rwanda, Zaire and Sudan has at times been a source of friction and has resulted in a serious refugee problem. In October 1990 Uganda was the base from which the Front populaire rwandais (FPR) carried out an invasion of Rwanda. The FPR recruited heavily from Rwandan Tutsis serving in the NRA and suspicions of Uganda's complicity with the rebels have proved damaging to its image in the region. The civil war in Rwanda also brought instability to the border regions but the situation should improve following the installation of the FPR government in Kigali in July 1994, and prospects have improved for finding a solution to the longstanding refugee dispute between the two countries. In August 1995 Mr Museveni visited Kigali and confirmed an attitude of cooperation between the two countries, particularly on economic matters.

The most serious threat to security is in the north, where instability caused by the civil war in Sudan frequently spills across the border into Uganda, providing a fresh stimulus to old antagonisms. It is no secret that the Ugandan government gives help to the rebels, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the Sudanese authorities have likewise, in the past, supported rebel groups from Uganda. Relations between Kampala and Khartoum had been deteriorating over a period of years and the situation came to a head in April 1995, when Uganda broke off diplomatic relations. There is unlikely to be any improvement without a change of regime. Some observers, mostly outside the country, see the Uganda-Sudan confrontation as indicative of a wider trend towards Islamic expansionism.

Uganda is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) as well as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), of which Mr Museveni was nominated chairman in July 1990 for one year. All these bodies are discussed in the Appendix: regional organisations.

The National Resistance Army

The army has been a key political force throughout Uganda's recent history. Military backing has been essential to all political leaders since 1966, and the success of the new constitution will depend heavily upon whether or not it wins army support. The present army in Uganda is the National Resistance Army (NRA). When the NRA was first set up by Mr Museveni in 1981 it numbered only 27 men, but its strength grew to 14,000 in 1986, when it captured Kampala, and was estimated by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) at 50,000 in mid-1994. It has grown with the integration of former opposition guerrilla groups, many of which have taken advantage of a general amnesty offer, and some dilution of quality has resulted. The army consists mainly of infantry units, equipped with small arms. There is little in the way of heavy artillery or mobile armour, and air power is limited. During its years in the bush as a guerrilla force the NRA attracted support mainly from the Baganda, but in the final months before its victory over the northern-based UNLA it recruited heavily from ethnic groups in the south-west, especially Rwandan exiles. Many of these deserted to join the civil war in Rwanda. At the end of 1989 Mr Museveni reshuffled the leadership of the NRA, which reflected, in the promotions, a growing eastern influence in the army's personnel.

Military forces, mid-1994

National Resistance Army	48,800
Paramilitary Air Wing	800
Paramilitary Marine Unit	400
Total	50,000

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1994/95*.

Since January 1986 the internal security situation has much improved, especially in Kampala and the south, although many weapons remain in private hands and lawlessness is fairly rife. The NRA found it difficult to establish its authority in the north and east, where the civil war in Sudan and the perennially unsettled Karamoja border region encouraged rebel activity. Parts of the north still remain insecure because of the activities of small groups of "Holy Spirit" rebels (said by the IISS to number only 500 in mid-1994), supported by the Sudanese authorities.

The economy

Economic structure

Main economic indicators, 1994/95^a

GDP growth (%)	10.0
Consumer price inflation (%)	3.3
Current-account balance (\$ m)	-8
Foreign debt (\$ bn)	3.15 ^b
Exchange rate (NUSh:\$)	1,003
Population (m)	19

^a Fiscal year starting July 1. ^b End-December 1994.

Source: EIU.

The overwhelming importance of agriculture

Economic output is dominated by agriculture, which is responsible for about 50% of GDP including substantial non-monetary production. Most Ugandans owed their survival during the troubles of the 1970s and 1980s to the resilience of the informal agricultural sector, and most wage earners still need their small plots for domestic food supplies. Food crop production is by far the most important economic activity, accounting for almost one-third of GDP, compared with only 6% for cash crops. Manufacturing output contributes only about 6% of GDP. It has suffered badly from the decades of instability and has failed to recover the position it held in the economy at independence.

Most agricultural production takes place in the south, where the climatic conditions have always supported the densest rural populations and where the impact of colonialism set the framework for the growth in urban population. The economic situation in the north is much weaker, partly because of the devastation caused by the civil war and the unsettled border conditions.

AFS203 06/27/95

(FS) YOWERI MUSEVENI

(Los Angeles Times 06/27/95 John Balzar article) (1300)

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

KAMPALA. Uganda -- Serious conversations in Africa usually get down to this: Why so much pain here?

Well, goes the answer, the gaping wounds of slavery, colonialism and the Cold War are horribly slow to heal.

OK, what can be done?

The ways of others do not work here, we Africans must find our own way.

And what might that be?

At this point, the answers become harder. Perhaps the person across from you will suggest a visit to Statehouse in Kampala to visit the balding, portly former guerrilla leader Yoweri Museveni, who is president of the Republic of Uganda.

Every few years, it seems, some African country changes leadership or direction and comes to represent new promise for the continent, perhaps becoming that elusive example of how to end Africa's cycle of suffering. For several years now, Uganda has held that place. Landlocked at the northern end of Lake Victoria in Central Africa, haunted by outrages of tyrants past, Uganda is in the 10th year of Museveni's presidency.

His achievement can be measured in different ways: Though poor, Uganda's 19 million people are gaining ground. Economic growth of 8% last year and 7% projected for this year contrasts sharply with some other African countries where economic growth lags behind population increases. Foreign investment in Uganda rose from \$136 million in 1993 to \$241 million last year, and the balance of payments was positive thanks to high returns in the coffee industry.

Tourism has grown faster than government projections for two straight years, and Uganda has actually added to its park system. The sullen, corrupt civil bureaucracy so typical of Africa, while not tamed, is at least discouraged here.

Propaganda broadcasts on government radio have yielded to music and lively deejays. The AIDS crisis is not hidden in

ame. Women hold places of power, not just in the family out in the fabric of government.

Or measure Uganda by this: All three larger neighbors -- Kenya, Sudan and Zaire -- have expressed their envy by stirring border tensions with Museveni.

In an interview in his garden gazebo at Statehouse, the 50-year-old president spoke about Uganda's next, maybe decisive, challenge: Can Uganda match its economic growth with progressive political leadership?

The question causes unease, both at home and in the developed nations that have invested money and prestige in Museveni.

This summer, Uganda is expected to endorse a new constitution. In December, it is scheduled to hold its first free elections in 15 years, perhaps the first fair ones since independence in 1962.

"Eighty-two percent of Ugandans are peasants, pre-capitalists, living a tribal form of life. When you in the West insist arrogantly that all societies in the world must be organized in exactly the same form, you are wrong. Multi-partyism is not a healthy basis for Uganda to build its democracy," the president said.

"Political parties inevitably are based on tribe. And they intensify friction. In some cases, they result in disaster."

Thus, Museveni says, individual candidates, but not political parties, can contest the upcoming elections. And for as many as five more years, Ugandan democracy will remain a "movement" and not a clash of organized interests. After that, perhaps Ugandans will be ready to disagree politically on something other than ethnicity and region.

"The power stays in the hands of the people. . . . I don't see what opponents are so panicky about."

For critics, even those who have long supported Museveni, his formula for a new and vigorous Africa sounds too much like the old and familiar African power grab. The United States last month went so far as to publicly warn Museveni against writing "a constitution that preserves monopoly power indefinitely."

Doubters could say this about Museveni: He is another rebel warrior who took power by the gun. He fixed himself in Statehouse as an authoritarian, and the whole country depends on him, for better or worse. The system is the emperor as he sees it; the daily life is as he decrees it; the mood on the streets is his mood.

But it so happens that Museveni is a gentler and more skillful leader than his two bloodthirsty predecessors -- Idi Amin and Milton Obote. Hundreds of thousands of Ugandans were believed killed by Amin and Obote as the two men sought to retain power from the time Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962 until Museveni's rebel army took Kampala in 1986.

It is a history so traumatic that the president says incremental democracy is not only what he wants but what most Ugandans want.

"Competition -- let's have it. But for these first elections, let's make it between the merits of individuals. That will give us sufficient time to undergo the metamorphosis -- like the butterfly -- into something that is beautiful when mature," he said.

Museveni argues that economic revitalization and competition will provide the basis for a more refined political debate in Uganda. In the 1960s, Uganda had the same per capita income as South Korea; today, per capita income is less than 1/20th that in Seoul. By establishing greater wealth in the country, he says, political differences will become economic rather than ethnic.

"We need to reach the point where there is competition between interests, not identities. Today you have (ethnic) Buganda against the Acholi. That is very unhealthy. But once you have employees struggling against employers, ah! There is no way an employer will want to massacre all his employees. There will be a struggle, yes, but neither side wants to get rid of the other."

Museveni learned guerrilla fighting in Mozambique, at the southern end of the continent. The young law student traveled there to join the war for independence against the colonial Portuguese regime. In 1970-71, he worked in the office of Obote.

In 1971, when Amin overthrew Obote, Museveni went into exile and waged war against Amin's brutal government. When Amin was deposed in 1979, Obote maneuvered himself back into the presidency and Museveni became a leader of the opposing rebel army. It was one of the bloodiest periods in the nation's history, and it subsided only when Obote went into exile in 1985 and, Museveni came to power the following year.

Amin now lives in Saudi Arabia, and Obote is in exile in Zambia.

Today, a gentleman cattle rancher with four children, Museveni sits at a simple desk where a Father's Day greeting card stands so that he can read it, "To the best dad ever. From your daughter."

USIA Wireless File

He wears sandals without socks and a simple gray safari suit. Outdoors, he prefers an oversized, floppy bush hat with a chin tie, which Ugandans say proves he has a sense of humor.

He is warm and easy in a crowd, approachable and avuncular in private. And he has charmed the international diplomatic and business corps so thoroughly that, when matters go awry in Uganda, a misguided underling is usually blamed.

And he has encouraged one change here that may be irreversible.

Women play a greater role in his administration than ever in the nation's history. The vice president is a woman, women run major ministries, and his inner circle is dubbed "all the president's women" by one European diplomat.

Museveni says it's a case of political imperatives overtaking tired African traditions.

"Women form more than half of our society, so you'd be hurting yourself if you left behind six of every 10 people. And women hold the central position in family life here -- they are the wife of someone, the mother of someone, the daughter of someone and the sister of someone, all of whom could be men. You influence this person, she influences four."

USAID CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION FY 1997

Following is a Web version of a document from USAID's 1997 Congressional Presentation. Please note that some formatting may have been lost in the automated conversion of the original file. This document is also available for download in its original WordPerfect 5.1 format.

UGANDA

FY 1997 Development Fund for Africa: \$48,030,357

FY 1997 P.L. 480 Title II: \$4,387,000

Introduction.

Uganda is in the midst of completing a remarkable transformation from 20 years of chaos and violence to stability, recovery and growth. Signs of progress abound. The economy grew by 10% over the past year while limiting inflation to 3.4%. A new democratic constitution has been promulgated, general elections were held in May 1996, investment exceeded \$200 million in the past year, and, significantly, the human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) infection rate appears to be declining. The USAID program has had a major impact by assisting Uganda in creating an environment which has made these achievements possible, and which has set the stage for completing the transition to constitutional democracy accompanied by sustained economic growth. Located in the Greater Horn of Africa, Uganda is a concrete example to other nations in the area of the benefits of free-market economics combined with democratic government. Uganda has been highly supportive of U.S. policy initiatives in the region, including humanitarian operations, peace-keeping and the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI).

The Development Challenge.

Stability and sound economic policies have brought growth which has set the stage for completing the transition to constitutional democracy. This environment is attracting large-scale private investment. Completing the transition remains an enormous challenge that will take several years, but both the government and people of Uganda are committed to finishing the job. Their achievements over the past five years strongly suggest they will fulfill their commitments.

Although economic growth has increased real per capita income by 20% since 1986, to \$180 in 1994, this is still 23% below the level of 25 years ago, placing Uganda among the poorest countries in the world. Life expectancy, estimated at 37 years, is the lowest in the world as the alarmingly high prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) -- perhaps as high as 20% of sexually-active women and men -- affects every aspect of the society. Only 48% of adults are literate -- well below levels in neighboring Kenya and Tanzania -- an indication of an education system where lack of access and poor quality limit the supply of basic skills within the economy. Inadequate physical infrastructure for energy, transportation, and telecommunications has severely limited Uganda's ability to meet the demands of a growing private sector. Despite the strong liberalization of the past five years, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) project that Uganda will continue to depend on substantial external assistance for at least the next decade. The proliferation of water hyacinth, a plant which chokes lakes and rivers, is a new environmental threat to the livelihoods of people throughout the region.

Uganda remains severely indebted; its \$3.2 billion debt at the end of 1994 is equivalent to about 60% of gross domestic product (GDP). Debt service payments represent 23% of government-financed expenditures, reducing productive investments. Multilateral debt accounts for three-quarters of the debt and two-thirds of projected debt service, severely limiting Uganda's access to relief under existing international arrangements. Illustrating the confidence the international community has in how the government manages the economy, Uganda became the first nation under the Paris Club to receive permission to write off \$71 million in debt; even so, the next three years' debt service will be 50% higher than Uganda has paid in the past three years. This is a staggering burden.

Effective implementation of sound economic policies has permitted Uganda to manage its debt while continuing to grow economically. A major factor in these achievements has been the leadership, technical assistance and financing which USAID has provided. Uganda's economy can point to the following noteworthy achievements as illustrative of what has been achieved with USAID assistance. The growth of non-traditional exports from a low base five years ago to over \$100 million in 1995, the improved management of natural resources contributing to the four-fold increase in tourism over the past four years, and the groundbreaking reduction in the incidence of HIV transmission are among the visible fruits of this program.

Other Donors.

Uganda's remarkable record of economic growth over the past five years has enabled the country to finance a higher percentage of its development program, but Uganda will still be dependent on external assistance for a number of years. Approximately one-third of public expenditure is externally financed. The World Bank is the largest and most influential donor. USAID is the fifth largest bilateral donor behind Denmark, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Japan. Donor coordination is good and USAID provides parallel financing for major reform programs in the health and education sectors with the World Bank. Donors collectively pledged \$800 million dollars for FYs 1995/96 at the annual meeting of donors convened by the World Bank meeting in July 1995.

FY 1997 Program.

The foundation for sustainable growth now exists, and USAID will continue to build on it through investments in primary education, health, environmental management and agricultural production.

U.S. intervention has been a key factor in stimulating Uganda's remarkable transformation. However, much remains to be done, and it is in the interest of the United States to apply continued engagement in selected sectors. American investors are already benefitting from the strikingly improved investment climate. Uganda is also becoming an American customer, and imports of U.S.-manufactured goods increased sixfold between 1985 and 1996. Equally important, it is in the U.S. interest that the principles underlying Uganda's positive transition, including free-market economics, constitutional democracy and public accountability, be spread to the several troubled countries in the region. This can happen if those principles continue to be practiced, bringing benefits to Uganda and to the region. Uganda is now part of the solution, but without continued support, there is significant risk it would become part of the problem. The failure of Uganda to maintain its march toward constitutional democracy would likely add to the pool of refugees and humanitarian crisis in the area.

A reduction in resources will result in the cancellation of activities in each of USAID's four strategic areas, hurting both American and Ugandan interests. In real terms, a reduction would mean training fewer primary teachers and health workers, canceling procurement of desperately-needed equipment for schools and health centers, reducing credit for poor rural business people, and scaling back support to

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in HIV testing and counseling. Because most planned activities are underway, we are already engaged with, and committed to, numerous partner organizations and communities. Resource cuts will jeopardize contracts and grants with our U.S. partners and undermine the development efforts and aspirations of the Ugandan people.

Four strategic objectives (SOs) and one specific objective comprise USAID's program of assistance to Uganda. While activities under each SO target specific development problems, the SOs are mutually reinforcing and in some cases contribute to the achievement of more than one Agency goal.

Agency Goal: Encouraging Broad-Based Economic Growth

Underlying sustainable development in Uganda is continuing political stability and broad-based economic progress. The benefits of growth will have broader impact if shared, especially among the majority rural population. Two of USAID's four strategic objectives address this pressing need.

SO 1 aims to increase income from on-farm activities, primarily by promoting non-traditional exports, and from off-farm activities by encouraging the growth of micro and small enterprises, and by improving the business environment. Increasing non-traditional agriculture exports can benefit thousands of marginalized farmers. Title II resources are an integral part of the Mission's strategic objective in economic growth. Title II is used to improve rural infrastructure and expand opportunities to grow and market traditional export crops including coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco. The Title II resource is also used to revitalize the Cooperative Bank, the only formal financial institution active in agricultural credit. A successful example is a pyrethrum activity promoted by a U.S. investor and financed under a USAID-supported venture capital fund in the remote southern part of the country has tripled income for over 3,000 producers, mostly women. The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), a U.S. NGO, has organized over 1,000 women into savings groups that have borrowed, and repaid, over \$400,000 during the last two years. This is a significant achievement in a country where rural credit programs have a reputation for failure.

SO 3 responds to the long-term need for literacy and other basic skills in order to boost productivity and provide an informed and responsible electorate. USAID's policy dialogue has strengthened the Government of Uganda's ability to adopt policies leading to wholesale reform of the primary education system. New policies have resulted in the construction of hundreds of classrooms, the removal of thousands of redundant, untrained teachers from the payrolls and a sixfold increase in teachers' salaries, in-service training for thousands of other teachers, and the purchase of 1.5 million textbooks. During the last year the percentage of untrained teachers in the classroom fell from 50% to 40%.

- Strategic Objective 1: Increase Rural Household Incomes
- Strategic Objective 3: Improve the Quality and Efficiency of Basic Education

Agency Goal: Protecting the Environment

USAID selected Uganda as a Biodiversity Priority Country containing unique, essential ecosystems critical to the conservation of globally-important biodiversity. Uganda's unique biodiversity has been placed at risk by intense and increasing population pressures, poverty, unsustainable natural-resource management practices, and a history of conflict. Therefore, this Strategic Objective addresses the challenge of biodiversity conservation by assisting Uganda to maintain the integrity of targeted biodiverse ecosystems.

USAID emphasizes natural-resource planning, strengthening management of protected areas and support to NGOs engaged in activities which integrate conservation and development in and around protected areas.

Uganda successfully completed a National Environmental Action Plan in May 1995 with the passage of landmark implementation legislation. The new legislation defines both needs and guidelines for biodiversity conservation. Management of Uganda's protected areas, USAID's target areas for biodiversity stabilization, by the Uganda Wildlife Authority has improved markedly through strengthened management capacity, improved infrastructure, and higher revenues from ecotourism. Finally, the incentives and ability of local communities to conserve biodiversity have grown due to new revenue-sharing policies, access to resources, and ongoing conservation education.

□ Strategic Objective 2: Stabilize Biodiversity in Target Areas

Agency Goal: Stabilizing World Population Growth and Protecting Human Health

Uganda was among the first countries in Africa to be hit hard by the HIV pandemic. Close to 10% of the total population may be infected, and cases are mostly among adults in the prime of their economic lives and those about to enter this age group. A large, and generally unattended, problem with sexually transmitted infections is probably a significant contributor to continuing HIV incidence.

With one of the highest fertility rates in Africa, Uganda has a serious population problem. At current rates, the population will double in 21 years. This has resulted in a disproportionately large number of children dependent upon a correspondingly small number of adults. In Uganda over 50% of the population is under 20 years old. Women have an average of 6.8 children each, so many that childbearing poses a significant health threat to both women and children. Although precise figures are not available, prevailing opinion is that maternal mortality is extremely high, and poor child-spacing contributes to poor nutrition, which in turn leads to sickness and physical and mental stunting. Infant mortality has been estimated at 81/1,000 live births, a surprising figure in that it is lower than most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Fertility has dropped since 1989, and it appears that Uganda is entering a period of significant fertility decline. While the causes for this decline are complex, USAID's support for family planning and use of modern contraceptives has played an important role. Contraceptive use has increased from 2.5% to 7.8% since 1991. USAID's social-marketing program has helped create a robust commercial market for family planning and maternal health services. It also appears that the incidence of new HIV infection has levelled off and actually started to decline. Constraints that USAID will address include poorly trained health workers, reluctance among many Ugandans to use modern health services.

□ Strategic Objective 4: Improve the Reproductive Health of Ugandans

Agency Goal: Building Democracy

Uganda has made encouraging progress toward becoming a constitutional democracy. Over the past three years, the first free and fair national elections were completed, a new democratic constitution promulgated, and human rights abuses almost eliminated. USAID leadership, technical assistance and financing made a major contribution to these achievements. USAID was actively involved with the preparations for the general elections for president and parliament, held in May 1996. Although there were a few allegations of election irregularities made primarily by the opposition, the election results were validated, and the first free, peaceful and democratically-elected president has been inaugurated. Building on the foundation of the 1995 constitution, and following the 1996 elections, USAID anticipates funding activities in civic education, judicial improvement and human rights defense. These activities are aimed at assisting Uganda to spread the benefits of democracy to the grass-roots level.

□ Specific Objective: Establish a Constitutional Democracy

UGANDA

FY 1997 PROGRAM SUMMARY

	Encouraging Broad-based Economic Growth	Stabilizing World Population Growth & Protecting Human Health	Protecting the Environment	Building Democracy	Providing Humanitarian Assistance	TOTALS
USAID Strategic Objectives						
1. Increase Rural Household Incomes - Dev. Fund for Africa - P.L. 480, Title II	11,847,316				4,387,000	11,847,316 4,387,000
2. Stabilize Biodiversity in Target Areas - Dev. Fund for Africa			8,306,527			8,306,527
3. Improve the Quality and Efficiency of Basic Education -Dev. Fund for Africa	11,691,760			643,597		12,335,357
4. Improve the Reproductive Health of Ugandans - Dev. Fund for Africa		15,541,157				15,541,157
Totals - Dev. Fund for Africa - P.L. 480, Title II	23,539,076	15,541,157	8,306,527	643,597	4,387,000	48,030,357 4,387,000

USAID Mission Director: Donald B. Clark

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE and NUMBER: Increase Rural Household Income, 617-S001

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997 \$11,847,316 DFA, \$4,387,000 P.L. 480, Title II

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 2001

Purpose: To increase rural household income. Increasing income will enhance food security, alleviate poverty and contribute to an improved quality of life for the majority of Ugandans.

Background: USAID's development efforts must result in a better life for the 80% of the people living in poor rural areas. This depends upon higher household income through increased on and off-farm production and better use of family resources. Four on-going activities, as well as the P.L. 480, Title II Program, work to increase household income. Two activities are aimed at expanding non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) in areas where Uganda has a natural comparative advantage. Title II resources are also integrated into the strategy by supporting rural infrastructure improvement and expanding opportunities to grow and market traditional exports crops including coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco. NTAEs can benefit thousands of small farmers. For example, an activity to cultivate pyrethrum, the foundation for natural insecticide, was promoted by a U.S. investor in the remote southern part of the country. It has tripled income for over 3,000, mostly women, producers. A third activity is expanding employment with off-farm activities with small amounts of credit to support agricultural-based businesses such as sunflower oil production. This credit is designed to respond to needs among small and micro enterprises. USAID is also working to build an appropriate business environment for small entrepreneurs in rural Uganda. The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), a U.S. non-governmental organization (NGO), has organized over 1,000 women into savings groups that have borrowed -- and repaid -- over \$400,000 during the last two years. This is a significant achievement in a country where rural credit programs have uniformly failed.

USAID Role and Achievements To Date: USAID acts as a facilitator and catalyst to create an enabling environment in which entrepreneurs can take advantage of Uganda's natural comparative advantages, and new market opportunities emerge. This entails many diverse activities, from working with farmers to improve farming, storage and handling, to helping business people put deals together, and rehabilitating long-impassable rural roads. Our program is working. NTAEs grew at an average annual rate of 35% between 1990 and 1994. Returns to rural labor associated with NTAE production increased at an average annual rate of 25% over the 1990-1993 period, well in excess of the growth of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). These achievements translate into a better quality of life for Ugandans. For example, women in one of the NTAE-producing areas confirmed increased incomes and stated that they are now better able to pay for school fees, medical care, and food.

Description: Accomplishing this effort relies on increasing rural business activity, including farm businesses. Actions funded under four principal activities lead to this result. The Cooperative Agriculture and Agribusiness Support (CAAS) activity increases agricultural productivity and rural incomes through an increased supply of inputs, liberalized marketing and assistance to agribusiness. Resources from a P.L. 480, Title II monetization program support these objectives. The Agriculture Non-Traditional Export

Promotion (ANEP) activity aims at alleviating public and private sector constraints to export of a range of NTAEs, in part by strengthening analytic and policy-making capacity. The Investment in Developing Agricultural Exports (IDEA) activity helps to diversify NTAEs by expanding food crop exports such as maize and beans to other countries of the Greater Horn, thereby enhancing regional food security, and meeting regional demands for basic food requirements. The Private Enterprise Support, Training and Organizational Development (PRESTO) activity is expanding rural credit through U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and local financial institutions and tackling policy and regulatory constraints to business development.

Host Country and Other Donors: Alleviating poverty is the Government of Uganda's (GOU) highest development priority. The GOU is committed to creating the proper enabling environment through disciplined adherence to structural reforms such as the abolition of marketing boards and liberalized trade and payments systems. Achievements realized under the SO require a primary role by the private sector. USAID's chief collaborators are the World Bank and the European Union, although most major donors address the problems under this SO with activities designed to raise income and alleviate poverty. To improve coordination, a private sector donor subgroup, chaired by USAID, meets monthly.

Beneficiaries: Fourteen million Ugandans living in rural areas are the target beneficiaries of this strategic objective.

Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: Activities contributing to the achievement of SO 1 are implemented by a number of U.S. contractors and PVOs. These include Chemonics International, Agricultural Cooperative Development International, the Foundation for International Community Assistance, Land O'Lakes, and Mississippi State University. A U.S. firm is currently being selected to implement the Private Enterprise Support, Training and Organizational Development activity.

Major Results Indicators:

Baseline Target

Average household expenditures 100 (1992) 137 (1998)^U
 Increase in NTAEs \$33.7 million (1990) \$138 million (1998)
 Increase in savers and repeat rural borrowers 1,000 (1995) 6,000(1998)
 in USAID-supported programs

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE AND NUMBER: Stabilize Biodiversity in Target Areas, 617-S002

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997: \$8,306,527 DFA

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 1997

Purpose: To maintain the integrity of globally-important biodiverse ecosystems.

Background: USAID has designated Uganda as a biodiversity priority country containing ecosystems critical to the conservation of globally-important biodiversity. However, this unique biodiversity is imperiled by unsustainable natural-resource management practices. USAID is assisting Uganda to maintain the integrity of targeted biodiverse ecosystems. USAID's Action Program for the Environment (APE) activity is the principal component of this strategic objective (SO).

USAID Role and Achievements to Date: At a national level, USAID supports activities designed to establish an appropriate policy and institutional framework for environmental management; and at the local (e.g., protected area) level APE activities assist the National Parks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to better manage protected areas. USAID's efforts have led to major improvements in Uganda's environmental policy and institutional framework. A National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) was adopted with landmark legislation signed into law. Six new national parks have been created since 1991, bringing to 10 the number of parks within Uganda's protected area system. These parks are USAID's target areas for biodiversity stabilization, including basic repositories for *in situ* conservation in Uganda. Important progress has also been made outside the policy arena. Tourism has increased fivefold since 1991, with a concomitant tenfold increase in park-user fees. Privatization of state-owned tourism concessions, and numerous ecotourism ventures launched by local communities intent on capitalizing on increasing numbers of tourists, have created significant employment. The parks system has adopted a policy of sharing revenue with local communities, and sustainable multiple-use practices have allowed buffer-zone communities continued access to park resources. Finally, local communities participate in park management. USAID is also assisting the Government of Uganda (GOU) to respond to the uncontrolled spread of destructive water hyacinth plants in the countries adjacent to Lake Victoria.

Description: At the national level, assistance focuses on the development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy to address environmental issues through policy, legislation and institutional reform--the NEAP. Technical assistance and training have resulted in the adoption and implementation of the plan. At the local level, USAID-funded U.S. and local NGOs strengthen management of protected areas by creating conservation incentives for local communities; promoting conservation through revenue sharing, and by increasing public awareness. USAID also supports research aimed at improving protected-area management and increasing environmental management capacity of GOU agencies, local NGOs and community-based organizations. A U.S. firm is assisting the GOU to contain the economic and environmental damage caused by the proliferation of water hyacinths on the region's lakes and rivers.

Host Country and Other Donors: USAID works most closely with the National Environment Management Authority on broad policy and institutional issues, and with the Uganda Wildlife Authority on protected-area management issues. USAID collaborates with other donors, including the World Bank, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, German Technical Cooperation, the European Community and Danish International Development Agency to ensure overall donor coordination in natural resource management.

Beneficiaries: Activities implemented under this SO benefit the nation as a whole through improved management of the country's natural resources and increased foreign exchange and employment from an expanding ecotourism industry. Activities implemented by NGOs in the buffer zones of protected areas benefit rural communities surrounding national parks. USAID efforts to control water hyacinth benefit riparian communities around Lake Victoria.

Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: Activities contributing to the achievement of SO 2 are implemented by U.S. contractors, private non-profit companies, and U.S. and host-country private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and NGOs. These include Tropical Research and Development, Aquatics Unlimited, Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance, Agricultural Cooperative Development International, Consortium for International Development, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), World Wide Fund for Nature, and African Wildlife Foundation.

Major Results Indicators:
Baseline Target

% current surface areas maintained^{2/} 40% (1986) 100% (1997)
 Annual park user fees revenues \$74,000 (1991) \$1 million (1997)
 Increase in buffer zone employment 0 (1989) 12,000 (1997)
 Increase in % park staff trained 0% (1989) 60% (1997)

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE AND NUMBER: Improve the Quality and Efficiency of Basic Education, 617-S003

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997: \$12,335,357 DFA

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 2001

Purpose: To improve the quality and efficiency of basic education.

Background: Basic education is fundamental to sustainable development, and is one of the essential elements in USAID's strategy of encouraging broad-based economic growth. Primary education has a decisive impact on all four of USAID's Strategic Objectives in Uganda. There is a strong correlation between investments in education and increased productivity and life expectancy, reduced fertility and poverty, improved income and distribution, and democracy. A recent study in Uganda demonstrated a strong correlation between education and the adoption of behaviors to avoid human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) infection.

One critical precondition for Uganda's long-term success in social and economic reforms is the availability of people with appropriate training and skills in a broad range of technical, professional and commercial areas. The skill level of primary school graduates must increase dramatically to provide the basis for this training. Uganda's education system is constrained by limited access, poor quality and dilapidated physical infrastructure. USAID assistance supports the Government of Uganda's (GOU) priority policy goals within a cohesive education reform program.

USAID Role and Achievements to Date: USAID finances key elements of the GOU's education reform program. After three years significant results have been achieved. Some 5,000 principals, teachers, and tutors, representing 7% of the primary teaching force, are currently enrolled in USAID-sponsored inservice training programs. As a result of policy dialogue, the GOU has committed itself to increasing teachers' salaries to a minimum living wage of \$70 per month. Since 1992, the GOU has increased teachers' salaries from the equivalent of \$8 per month to \$51 per month in 1995. For the first time in two decades, primary schools have been given a budget and permitted to select and order a total of 1.5 million textbooks. During the last two years, communities have been mobilized to build an additional 1,000 classrooms.

Description: USAID's education program targets four policy objectives as precursors to establishing an environment in which education can once again flourish. The first is to help re-establish teaching as a respected profession--by bettering salaries and working conditions, upgrading skills and certification through in-service training, and improving school management. The second is to work with the GOU to increase the level of resources available for primary education by improving resource allocation and budgeting. A related objective is to increase availability of instructional materials by allocating more resources and liberalizing the procurement process. Decentralization is an important principle in this activity. Prior to USAID's involvement, a corrupt and monopolized market for school supplies was in place. Finally, USAID's program is encouraging local communities to become more involved and

responsible for meeting students' educational needs. At the same time, the school systems are encouraged to become more accountable to parents and students.

Host Country and Other Donors: USAID's resources complement those of other donors in the education sector. USAID funds educational reform alongside the World Bank's efforts by financing agreed-upon activities from the GOU's reform agenda. Other participants in the primary education sector include the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and, on a smaller scale, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as World Vision, ActionAid, InterAid and the Aga Khan Foundation.

Beneficiaries: Two and a half million primary school pupils and 75,000 primary teachers directly benefit.

Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: Activities contributing to the achievement of SO 3 are implemented by a number of U.S. institutions. These include the Academy for Educational Development (AED), the Institute for International Research (IIR), Creative Associates, the University of Massachusetts, and the Research Triangle Institute.

Major Results Indicators:

Baseline Target

Increased efficiency of basic education: 72% (1990) 85% (2002)

% of pupils passing grade 7

Number of years of school provided 32 yrs+ (1990) 12 yrs+ (2002)

per primary school graduate^{3/}

Increased number of students using 1:6 (1990) 1:3 (2002)

relevant educational materials:

Book-pupil ratio increased to a minimum

of one set of four core books for every three

pupils

Increased number of effective teachers:

% of qualified Grade III teachers 49% (1990) 90% (2002)

Increased girls' persistence

% of girls enrolled in grade 7 as a % 24% (1990) 40% (2002)

of girls who start school

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE AND NUMBER: Improve the Reproductive Health of Ugandans, 617-S004

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997: \$15,541,157 DFA

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 1999

Purpose: To reduce fertility and the transmission of human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV).

Background: Uganda's current fertility of 6.8 is among the highest in Africa. Although 67% of married women either want no more children or want to delay their next pregnancy by at least two years, only 7.8% are currently using modern family planning. Estimates of maternal mortality range from 600 to 1,000/100,000 live births. Uganda also has one of the highest rates of HIV prevalence in the world.

Approximately 1.9 million Ugandans have been infected, and over 400,000 have died. Estimated prevalence is as high as 20% of the adult population of some urban populations. Poorly trained and paid health staff at insufficient health facilities, popular misconceptions about family planning and HIV, high prevalence of sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs), traditional sexual norms and the status of women, and low condom utilization are major constraints.

USAID Role and Achievements to Date: Since 1989, when USAID involvement in family planning and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) began with modest support, fertility has begun to drop and the use of modern family planning has more than tripled. A 1995 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) concluded that "...Uganda is witnessing a period of rapid fertility decline." The DHS also indicates that knowledge of AIDS is nearly universal and that knowledge that AIDS can be prevented is on the order of 90%. The country is witnessing a decline in the number of new HIV infections (measured among women who attend pre-natal clinics) after years of steady increases, with clear indications of important changes in sexual behavior and steadily increasing use of condoms. Evaluation data clearly indicate that USAID projects have been effective contributors to these trends. USAID project beneficiaries report reductions in multiple and casual partners and increased condom utilization.

Description: USAID-supported activities seek to reduce fertility and HIV transmission by increasing the utilization of basic reproductive health services (family planning and maternal health, STDs/HIV), improving the quality of those services and changing behaviors in selected areas of Uganda. The SO 4 portfolio includes six sets of activities intended to: (1) increase availability of good-quality services in health facilities; (2) increase availability of good-quality services at the community level; (3) provide the public with correct information and motivation to use available services and adopt preventive behaviors; (4) increase availability of contraceptives through the private sector; (5) increase revenue generation in health facilities; and (6) strengthen private-sector provider organizations.

Host Country and Other Donors: USAID is the largest bilateral donor in reproductive health, followed by the British Overseas Development Agency. Among the multilaterals, the World Bank is the largest donor, with substantial investments in controlling sexually transmitted infections and improving district-level health services. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is also a major actor in family planning. The Government of Uganda has encouraged these donors to work in different districts to spread resources evenly around the country and avoid overlap, with the Ministry of Health assuming an overall coordination role. USAID has closely coordinated with the World Bank in reproductive health, with the Bank agreeing to finance commodities to complement USAID's provision of technical assistance. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is a major source of funds for child survival activities. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) are significant sources of AIDS funding.

Beneficiaries: USAID-funded programs are active in 13 of Uganda's 39 districts, which include about 35% of Uganda's population of around 20,000,000. Thus, about 7 million people are potential beneficiaries of activities in the SO 4 portfolio. Women from 15 to 45 years of age in these districts total about 1,500,000 and are the direct beneficiaries of family planning and maternal health services. In addition, the social-marketing program has created commercial markets for condoms and oral contraceptives throughout the country.

Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: Pathfinder International, Johns Hopkins University, University of North Carolina, E. Petrich and Assoc., Futures Group, African Medical and Research Foundation, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, AIDS Information Center, AIDS Support Organization, Association for Voluntary Safe Contraception, and John Snow International.

Major Results Indicators:**Baseline^{4/} Targets^{5/}**

Total Fertility Rate 6.8 (1995) 6.0 (1999)

Contraceptive Distribution to be set 1996

HIV prevalence, 15 - 19 year 12.5% (1995) 3% decrease (1998)

old women

Condom Distribution TBD (1996) TBD

^{1/} Represents a 3.5% annual growth rate in average rural expenditures. Therefore, the baseline is taken as 100%.

^{2/} This measure assesses the area of national park protected by national wardens.

^{3/} This measure is the average number of years of instruction provided per primary school graduate, or completion of seventh grade.

^{4/} To be determined.

^{5/}



All in favor: A campaign rally sponsored by the ruling National Resistance Movement

UGANDA

'Don't Forget the Past'

Museveni wins after evoking the ghosts of his country's history. How will he use his mandate?

BY JOSHUA HAMMER
AND MARCUS MABRY

DOWN A DIRT ROAD A FEW MILES from the town of Luwero, a square concrete tomb bears testimony to Uganda's grisly past. Visible beneath a metal grate are 1,500 yellowing skulls, the remains of villagers killed by the Ugandan Army during a reign of terror that ran from 1981 to 1986. In 1982 Enosh Wagaba, 43, fled from Luwero and wandered homeless through back country until rebels led by Yoweri Museveni routed government forces and marched to the capital, Kampala. "So many people fled, homes were destroyed, people were raped and killed," says Wagaba. In the decade since Museveni's rise to power, Wagaba has seen Luwero's coffee fields restored, houses rebuilt and life return to nearly what it was before the Ugandan nightmare began. "Museveni has brought us peace," he says.

The question is, at what cost? While Museveni's reign has been marked by economic expansion and political stability, it has also grown increasingly autocratic. Case in point: last week's presidential election, in which Museveni was overwhelmingly chosen to lead Uganda for the next five years. The results were hardly surprising. Museveni's two opponents were forbidden to form political parties, a reflection of Museveni's belief that parties in Africa deepen tribal and regional divisions. The deck was

stacked against the opposition in other ways as well. They were given only 39 days to campaign—in contrast to Museveni, who has been touring the country for months—and they had to contend with both harassment of their supporters and alleged payoffs by the government to district leaders to bring out the pro-Museveni vote. "The rules of the election," said one Western diplomat in Kampala, "were not acceptable in a full-fledged democratic state."

The vast majority of Ugandans didn't seem to care. They were concerned less with Museveni's commitment to democracy than with his success in laying the ghosts of the past to rest. Uganda gained international



Peace at a price: The president savors his latest victory

notoriety in the 1970s under Idi Amin, whose paranoid regime murdered more than 300,000 people and plunged the once prosperous country into ruinous civil war. Amin was overthrown in 1979. His eventual successor, Milton Obote, allowed Uganda to disintegrate even further. During Obote's rule, hundreds of thousands more civilians were slaughtered by the army in revenge for their support of Museveni-led rebels.

Business class: Museveni's rule has reversed Uganda's long decline. After years of ethnic division, his National Resistance Movement—not a party, the president insists—united disparate tribes and regions into a broad-based political and military coalition. The resulting peace encouraged Western donors to give some \$800 million a year to rehabilitate the nation. Museveni encouraged the return of Uganda's Asians, the country's business class, who had been expelled by Amin in 1972. He embarked on an ambitious privatization and liberalization program that has produced the second fastest-growing economy in Africa—about 7.7 percent in 1995—along with single-digit inflation and increased foreign investment.

But Museveni went beyond touting his own accomplishments on the campaign trail. He used images of past slaughters to whip up fear. His target: the main opposition candidate, Paul Ssemogerere, who once served in Obote's government. A newspaper ad featured a photo of a pile of skulls from the Obote era above the message: "Think, don't forget the past. Over 1 million Ugandans ... lost their lives. Your vote could bring it back." The scare tactics struck many as gratuitous, since Museveni's victory seemed all but guaranteed.

Now that Museveni has won the popular mandate he sought, he'll have to deliver more than a general sense of security. The country's per capita income has climbed since the war years, but it remains only \$120 a year, one of the lowest in the world. About 200,000 civil servants have lost their jobs. "Our people are getting poorer and poorer," says Frank Nsubuga, 35, a Kampala shopkeeper who voted for the opposition.

Museveni's greatest challenge will be to lead Uganda toward true democracy. The continued banning of political parties, Western diplomats warn, could threaten the country's long-term stability. "Over time, people will want to exercise their rights," says one diplomat. "You can't keep that stuff locked up in a bottle." Museveni will ultimately be judged on whether he uses his new mandate to prepare Uganda for pluralism—or to solidify his own power. ■

You Can't Eat Peace

President Museveni has given Uganda security, but the restless population wants more prosperity

By ANDREW PURVIS KAMPALA

THE PAST IS NEVER FAR AWAY IN UGANDA, at least not if one listens to President Yoweri Museveni. In 1986 Museveni's guerrilla army stormed into the capital, Kampala, and brought an end to nearly two decades of terror under the murderous regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. Later this week, in Uganda's first general elections held in 16 years, Museveni finally must face the electorate. And he is not letting Ugandans forget where they came from or where they may be headed if they do not vote for him. On a whistle-stop tour of the country over the past month, he has accused his main opponent, veteran politician Paul Ssemogerere, of colluding with armed rebels in the north and of plotting to return Obote, in exile in Zambia, to Uganda. Ads in the government newspaper show piles of human skulls, victims of the Obote regime. "Think," they warn in bold type. "Don't forget the past. Over 1 million Ugandans lost their lives ... your vote could bring it back."

Perhaps. But 10 years is a long time—the longest tenure ever for a Ugandan President—and the prospect of another four years under the current regime is prompting many Ugandans to consider more than their troubled past. Few deny that Museveni has brought peace and economic growth, but an increasing number are finding fault with his authoritarian style. While he is likely to win the balloting, the race has been unexpectedly tight, underscoring ethnic, religious and political divisions that many observers believe can no longer be ignored. "These elections have been about the past, whereas they should be concentrating on the future," says Joseph Mulenga, a former Attorney General under Museveni who helped form an opposition coalition. "We are grateful for security. But as we say in Uganda, 'You can't eat security.'"

Museveni, whose economic-liberaliza-

tion policies have in the past made him the darling of Western donors, has drawn increasing fire for his reluctance to adopt a traditional democracy. Under the current regime, political parties are banned, and candidates are expected to run as individuals. The argument is that parties sow divisions that could return Uganda to chaos. Yet at the same time, Museveni's political organization, referred to as a "movement" in deference to its revolutionary roots, is itself increasingly taking on the appearance of a party. While older political organizations are denied the right to formulate a platform, open regional offices and raise

"Don't forget the past. Over 1 million Ugandans lost their lives ... your vote could bring it back."



FACING THE ELECTORATE: Museveni's ads in the government newspaper exhort voters to remember the victims of the murderous Obote regime

money for a candidate, Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) has capitalized on its incumbency to bring out the vote. "All the advantages are with Museveni," says U.S. Ambassador Michael Southwick, who has led calls for a more open political process.

Museveni's no-party democracy has shown a growing tendency to stifle debate. In the late 1980s, for example, his NRM-dominated legislature approved, with minimal discussion, an economic-austerity package advocated by the World Bank. While perhaps justifiable in the long term, the programs have cut social spending and triggered major layoffs from the civil sector.

More than 60,000 government employees have lost their jobs in recent years, many of them without compensation. The result has been considerable suffering and growing disaffection, particularly in urban areas like Kampala. "Museveni is a good man, but we need a change," says Livingston, 20, a used-clothes trader in Kampala who had to quit school for lack of money.

There are other sources of discontent. For the past 10 years, the government has been waging war with rebel groups in the north of the country, keeping that region from sharing in the economic development that has taken place elsewhere. In the south, many members of the Baganda tribe, Uganda's largest, are upset by the President's refusal to grant greater autonomy to their traditional monarch, the Kabaka. King Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II was restored to his throne by Museveni three years ago, but chiefly as a cultural figurehead. The Kabaka, barred from speaking out on political issues, said last week that

"the government has shown a willingness to be more responsive to the needs of the Baganda, though some of my people think that it has not gone far enough." One of the Kabaka's cabinet members, Duncan Kafeero, was less circumspect. He and others openly support the coalition opposing Museveni, which has promised the Baganda more power in exchange for their votes. "We have been given a King without a kingdom," says Kafeero. "If Museveni comes back to power we will have to seek our goals in other ways. These will be dark days for our country."

Placating such opponents will pose a growing challenge to Museveni in years ahead. Under a new constitution, the government is required briefly to legalize political parties in 1999 in preparation for a referendum on the future of Uganda's party system the next year. Four years should make it clear to voters whether the efforts of Museveni's movement are in the true interests of the people or toward cementing its own rule. Many Ugandans are simply praying for calm. "We fear war," says Juma Salabwa, a butcher in Kampala's Nakasero market, who lost two brothers to Obote's army. "We don't care who will lead, as long as there is peace." That is encouraging news for Museveni. But as this election campaign has shown, such good will is fragile.

Key for East Africa is Integration of Region's Economies

MICHAEL SOUTHWICK is the US Ambassador to Uganda. He talked to ELAINE ELLAH in Kampala on January 11.

How long have you been in Uganda?

Since September 1994. I was Deputy Chief of Mission in Nairobi for four years before coming here and this is my first ambassadorship. I have served in Rwanda, Burundi and Niger and I've had Africa-related assignments in Washington. I also served in Nepal and Switzerland and I was a member of the US trade delegation in Geneva in the mid-70s. I think of myself as a generalist rather than a specialist, but I have worked a lot on African affairs.

How will spending cutbacks in the State Department and USAid affect Africa?

It's more severe for USAid. I think the cutback on foreign assistance overall was about \$1.8 billion. Some changes will come to the State Department, but they're not as drastic. What we'll probably see is a curtailment of programmes in certain countries instead of thinning the soup across the board, i.e. Washington will leave programmes intact where development prospects seem to be good. I expect Uganda would be one of those favoured countries.

What about Kenya and Tanzania?

Kenya has already suffered a great many cuts, mainly on human rights grounds. I think in Kenya now, the annual figure is \$13 or \$14 million, mainly on humanitarian kinds of

million. Tanzania has not yet established itself as a country that is moving ahead dynamically. However, there is a new President and Cabinet and there is hope Tanzania will start to move more rapidly. That's a country that has been victimised by its past: A big government, slow-moving, a lot of corruption, not much of a work ethic, not much encouragement for the private sector.

It is very different here in Uganda. The stated policies of the government here are along the lines everybody would like to see: pro-private investment, pro-fiscal responsibility, good control of the money supply and the exchange rate and better revenue collection. Now I said "stated policies" — what happens at the nitty-gritty level is still a problem. That's why I tell any prospective American investor that Africa, including Uganda, is not for the faint-hearted. It's a real adventure to get a business going; there will be a lot of frustrations; bureaucracies do not work well.

Why are some big companies rushing to Eastern Europe?

Africa is a very small market and per capita income is very low. The key is going to be regional economic integration. That's what's happening all over the world. The European Union has led the way. The affluent countries of Southeast Asia have cooperated effectively. Countries in the most backward part of the planet, and that is Africa, must move ahead as well.

Which is the best East African country for investors?

Traditionally, Kenya has been the



major port at Mombasa, although Dar-es-Salaam is getting better all the time. But down there they've got some political problems, management problems and corruption on a massive scale. It has a macroeconomic effect. One reason Uganda has done well is that leadership is committed to doing something about those issues. Sometimes the performance isn't what everyone would like, but the commitment is there.

Kenya, on the economic side, has had some very good management over the last two years, but unless you get politics and economics working in tandem, investors are going to be deterred. As far as Uganda is concerned, I just read this morning that 40 shillings out of every 100 spent come from donors. This is still a donor economy and seems likely to remain so for some time to come.

You have adopted a strong po-

litical ban on political parties.

There is a basic problem: that the Constituent Assembly decided to curtail the human rights of the population for an indefinite period to come, the right of association and the right to assemble. This is at variance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with all the political reform that's been going on in the world since the fall of the Berlin wall. Is this what Uganda wants?

The country needs to build a climate of openness and toleration that can't come with Article 269 in place. Genuine democracy requires genuine political competition, otherwise voters do not have a choice. Individuals cannot effectively challenge the power of the state. What does it mean? That when people choose to organise or to demonstrate, they're going to confront police or army? Are they going to be arrested or shot?

It's not good enough for me or for any other western embassy to send a cable to our capital saying people have been shot on the streets, arrested on a mass scale for attempting to assert rights recognised practically everywhere. What this constitution did was lock in place this ban and then put a question mark in the form of a referendum about whether it would be changed. What we have argued for is an unambiguous transition toward democracy. That doesn't mean these bans have to be lifted this minute. We said in our May '95 statement that there should be an unambiguous transition, preferably at the end of this next phase of the constitution, with the new government that will be in place for five years. Even the American Bill of Rights took about four years to be added to the constitution. If people have the clear expectation that these rights would be given to them, there would be more willingness to go along with a ban. When it's indefinite, there is a more serious problem.

Could it be said that you don't

Key for East Africa is Integration of Economies – US Envoy

From Page 11

have a problem with the ban itself?

I am heartened by discussions with thoughtful Ugandans who recognise that Article 269 is problematic and potentially damaging. What may have seemed simple to some, turns out not to be so simple.

The consequences of Article 269 are serious. It's the indefinite nature of it. We have said that it should be lifted in the context of getting some rules and regulations about how political parties operate. These exist in every country and some of them are already in Uganda's constitution. These are leadership questions, management questions. It seems to me that a government that has been in power this much time, with the record of success it had, should have the confidence to look ahead and not look backwards at what happened in the past.

Is the United States prepared to leverage something to force this issue?

Linking this to aid trivialises the issue. We're here in Uganda for the long term. We're committed to Uganda. We think that by and large this government has done an excellent job about human rights and democratisation, and has one of the best records in Africa. As time

goes by, concerns will be addressed by Ugandans in their fashion. We are confident that they will come up with solutions which look to the future rather than perpetuate all of the fears of the past. For the time being, I think Washington is willing to give Uganda and its leadership the benefit of the doubt, as long as progress is being made.

As long as progress is being made?

This year, what we as a donor will be looking at is the conduct of the election. How well is it managed, whether the rules and regulations are uniformly applied, that people who favour the government position are not given an undue advantage and that the election takes place peacefully and properly. We'll be looking to what kinds of policies the new government pursues, what will be their attitude towards Article 269, and will they perhaps have a different stand than that taken by some of the political leadership so far.

What do you think of the affirmative action clauses in the new constitution?

That's one of the things I think this government has done really well on and as near as I can tell, there isn't much, if any, of a backlash. Women have been welcomed into government and positions have been mandated for

them. Women are taking this very seriously. They are doing their best to take advantage of the situation and showing they can do it.

What is the extent of US military involvement in Uganda?

We have a very modest military training programme where we send a few Ugandans to the US every year for training. We also have a joint training programme two times a year and upgrade skills of the Ugandan military. Uganda has a right to defend itself. Nothing that would irritate a neighbour is involved in any of this.

What of allegations from Sudan that the US is assisting the SPLA?

We have never given any military assistance to the SPLA and none is contemplated.

What is the US interest in Rwanda?

It's basically humanitarian. President Carter has been involved in this regional peace initiative. We're a major funder of the UNHCR. It's a serious, complicated problem that's not going to be solved tomorrow. The main thing is to keep the international community engaged in a constructive way and make the resources available.

What are the basics of US interest in

East Africa?

We would like to see an end to the humanitarian problems. We have spent billions of dollars dealing with symptoms, not causes. I would hope that there would be a more progressively successful effort. That means peace in Southern Sudan and a peaceful resolution of the refugee problem surrounding Rwanda and Burundi. East Africa is a land of potential. If East Africans can get these problems of governance straightened out, the problems of politics and human rights, responsible political leadership which is not looting the country or terrorising its own citizens, leadership that is providing conditions for economic activity, then we can see, over the long haul, progress in this region. What I tell Americans is, yes, Africa might be a disaster area in the eyes of an average American, but people used to say this about India 30 years ago. Now, there's an enormous middle class in India. Things can change. We should be on the side of hope, investment, economic growth and political stability to produce those conditions.

If we had an East Africa with a per capita income of \$1,000, \$2000 or \$3000, there would be opportunities for American companies and for African companies, too. We have to stay engaged, keep at it, don't be disappointed in the short term.

Uganda: U.S.-Ugandan Relations

The United States and Uganda enjoy excellent bilateral relations. A \$45-50 million assistance program underlines our commitment to economic reform, sustainable development, and democratization in Uganda, and we have fully endorsed Uganda's efforts to improve its climate for trade and investment as a means to promote economic growth.

Uganda has been a constructive U.S. partner on the African continent. The government contributed troops to peace-keeping operations in Liberia. It was extremely forthcoming in offering access to Ugandan facilities for the aborted multinational force for Rwanda and Zaire in late 1996 and was similarly cooperative in relief operations for Rwanda in 1994.

During President Museveni's visit to the United States in early February 1997, high-level U.S. Government officials expressed concern about events in Zaire and reports that Rwanda and Uganda were assisting the rebel Alliance Forces in eastern Zaire. We continue to urge Uganda to use its influence over the rebels to press for restraint, a cease-fire, and negotiation.

We were encouraged by Uganda's public statement at the time that it had no military forces in Zaire, would use its influence to encourage dialogue within Zaire, and stood ready to enter into discussions with the Government of Zaire concerning non-aggression agreements and other positive steps. Uganda played a positive role in encouraging recent contacts between the rebel Alliance Forces and the Government of Zaire.

The United States considers Uganda, along with Ethiopia and Eritrea, a Front Line State (FLS) against the Government of Sudan's destabilizing activities in the region. Sudan materially supports violent insurgencies operating in northern Uganda, including the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and West Nile Bank Front (WNBK). Uganda is receiving \$3.85 million in FY-96 non-lethal defensive military equipment from the United States to assist it in its efforts to deter this externally supported aggression. At the same time, we have encouraged the Government of Uganda to develop a political strategy for reaching out to the community leaders of northern Uganda. We have also noted that repeated incidents of human rights abuses by security forces operating in the north are both objectionable and counter-productive to the goal of internal reconciliation.

The United States continues to urge Uganda to adopt greater pluralism in governance, considering it essential to reintegrating disaffected regions and ethnic groups. We have suggested that the Government lead a transition towards multipartyism, amending constitutional prohibitions on activities by political parties. We have suggested to President Museveni and other leaders that this would be a more constructive approach than the national referendum now planned for the year 2000 on the role of political parties.

Uganda: Political Overview

In national elections held in May, 1996, President Yoweri Museveni was returned to office with 74 percent of the vote. The outcome appeared to reflect the will of the Ugandan people, but the elections could not be considered "free and fair" due to the substantial restrictions placed on political party activities (a feature of the 1995 Constitution). Both the presidential and the parliamentary elections that followed in June, 1996, were characterized by the Electoral Commission's technical successes in guaranteeing a secret ballot and intervening against some cases of fraudulent voter rolls. However, the Commission was unable to prevent completely the use of state resources on behalf of pro-government candidates and use of fraudulent voter ID's, practices which further tainted the polls. Supporters of President Museveni's de facto political party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), won a majority of seats in the new Parliament.

Uganda is in the process of establishing government institutions according to the terms of its 1995 Constitution. As at the national level, local governing councils are to be filled by elected officials running for office without the benefit of political party support. Local elections, planned for the spring of 1997, are especially important in light of the Government's ongoing efforts to devolve substantial control over spending to the local level.

In the National Parliament, the absence of party structures, even among the majority of pro-government parliamentarians, has produced an unwieldy institution. MP's and Committees have on occasion questioned government policy on issues such as the conflict in the north and corruption. A more important voice to date in challenging official policy has been the print media, by some accounts the real opposition in Uganda. Its focus on cases of corruption has caused the Government apparent discomfort.

Uganda is scheduled to hold a referendum on multipartyism in the year 2000. In the meantime, the rules of the game have constrained the development of an effective political opposition, and observers have noted the similarities between Uganda's "no-party" state and a "one-party" system. The limited space in the political arena is seen as a possible reason some alienated groups have "taken to the bush" to confront the government by non-peaceful means. Northern Uganda in particular has suffered under long-running insurgencies.

Two major groups, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), have received substantial assistance from the Government of Sudan and have been responsible for indiscriminate violence against civilian populations. While neither group appears to have significant popular support, the Government's effort to stem their campaigns has been weakened by the general disaffection of ethnic groups in northern Uganda. The region's population, which voted against Museveni in 1996, has come to perceive government indifference to its development and security, a perception exacerbated by occasional human rights abuses committed by government forces. In addition, Uganda's material support for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is seen by some northerners as having invited the Sudanese-sponsored depredations committed in northern Uganda.

Despite pressure in the media and from Members of Parliament, and suggestions from the USG, the GOU has to date not entered into serious dialogue with local leaders in northern Uganda. We are not advocating a dialogue with the LRA or WNBF, but with the people of northern Uganda.

The conflict in Gulu District, the hardest hit, has left almost half of the population of 400,000 internally displaced and unable to harvest crops. Our Embassy recently issued a disaster declaration for northern Uganda due to the threat of famine and disease resulting from these dislocations. Many of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) were encouraged to relocate by the Government.

Uganda: Economic Overview

The economy of Uganda has shown steady improvement since 1987 when the Government put into place an economic recovery plan with assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. As a result of the government's commitment to macroeconomic reform, including privatization of parastatals, liberalization of trade restrictions, and promotion of foreign investment, Uganda's annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged six percent during fiscal years 1986-1994, and eight percent over the past three years. Prospects for continued growth above 6 percent per year are good. Inflation is low (5.4 percent for the last fiscal year) and the exchange rate is stable. The result of this strong economic growth is that the Ugandan economy has almost doubled in size in the past ten years.

Uganda remains, however, one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita income of approximately \$220 per year and high rural poverty which has not been significantly reduced despite good growth figures. The country is favored with a good climate and fertile soil, but the civil war and chaos of the 1970s and early 1980s had a devastating effect on the economy. Per capita GDP declined by 40 percent between 1972 and 1986. The Government's program of economic reform has put the economy on the right track, but Uganda has a long way to go to provide an acceptable standard of living for its people.

The Government hopes to eradicate poverty primarily through policies conducive to balanced economic growth and through public expenditures increasingly focused on investment in roads and water supply, primary education, basic health services, and agricultural research and extension services. Uganda's greatest potential lies in export-oriented, high value-added agricultural crops. However, this suggests that the economy will remain vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity prices. Uganda's main export crop is coffee, a product prone to sharp price movements in recent years. At present, the country continues to rely heavily on foreign aid, which accounts for 51 percent of government spending.

Approximately 15 U.S. companies operate in Uganda, including AES/Nile Independent Power, which is developing a \$450 million hydroelectric project on the Nile River. Other investors include Coca-Cola, which is putting \$30 million into two new bottling plants, Caltex, which is investing \$10 million to upgrade its fuel distribution facilities, and StarCom, a telecommunications company offering mobile-trunk radio, pay telephone and internet services.

Uganda: Great Lakes Crisis

Uganda straddles the Great Lakes region and faces its own internal conflicts as well as those in neighboring states. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was formed by Rwandan refugees largely from Uganda, came to power after driving out the genocidal regime in Kigali in 1994. Uganda has a strong interest in the outcome of the war in Eastern Zaire because of Ugandan rebel cross-border operations from Zaire.

Zaire has accused Uganda (and Rwanda) of having invaded the eastern part of the country in support of Laurent Kabila's rebel alliance, which has cut a swath westwards along a 900-mile border stretch of Zaire. Ugandan President Museveni denies that Ugandan forces are involved in Zaire except for some skirmishes late last year against banditry and rebel activities. After his visit to the U.S. in early February 1997, Museveni issued a statement that Uganda did not have troops in Zaire and respected Zaire's territorial integrity.

The hostilities in Eastern Zaire stem from the destabilizing activities of the million plus, largely Rwandan Hutu refugee population that fled into border camps following the 1994 genocide, which exacerbated tensions already present in the region. In the fall of 1996, local Zairian Banyamulenge (Tutsi) rebels fought back against Hutu militias and Zairian forces when they were threatened with losing land, property and citizenship rights. As diverse groups joined the rebel alliance, it expanded its goal from creating a protective buffer zone to ousting the Mobutu Government.

Uganda is unequivocal that all foreigners should get out of Zaire, particularly the mercenaries which Kinshasa hired to bolster its flagging military. There have been many reports, however, that Uganda has offered more support to the Zairian rebels than it will admit to publicly. We have strongly pressed Museveni to desist, in that external involvement risks creating even more serious problems in Zaire and the region.

Museveni has played a constructive role in the peace process, both with his African neighbors and other western nations, and has offered strong cooperation with the U.S. generally and the U.S. military in particular in Entebbe-based relief activities for the crises in Rwanda and Zaire. Uganda also hosts refugees from Rwanda, Zaire and Sudan.

Continued active engagement and leadership by the international community, including the United States, will be vital to prevent famine and genocide from recurring in the Great Lakes region. While over a million Rwandan refugees have returned home from Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania, the security situation in Rwanda is fragile, and the high level of insecurity in Zaire and Burundi could trigger more refugee outflows. Over 120,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees and unknown numbers of Zairian civilians are caught in the war zone in Eastern Zaire, including several thousand unaccompanied minors, complicating humanitarian relief community efforts to assist or repatriate them. We are urging all parties involved to allow humanitarian agencies access to the refugees and displaced; to permit Rwandan refugees to return home if they so desire; and to assure the civilian character of refugee camps.

Uganda: The Status of Women

While Ugandan women, like women in most developing countries, labor long hours, have little control over reproduction, and have less education, less income, fewer legal guarantees, and poorer health than men, they are participants in the most progressive political affirmative action program in Africa. Uganda's new Constitution, promulgated in 1995, requires that at least 14 percent of parliamentary seats and one third of elected local government offices be filled by women. It also prohibits laws, customs, and traditions that undermine the welfare and status of women. Uganda's Vice-President and Deputy Speaker of Parliament are women. The challenge for Ugandan women politicians is to wield their new power to enact policies and programs that give women greater control over their lives.

In many areas of Uganda, women's access to land is limited by cultural traditions despite constitutional provisions to the contrary; credit without collateral is virtually non-existent. While 70-80 percent of the labor for food production is by women, they rarely control the use of the proceeds. Many customary laws discriminate against women in the areas of adoption, marriage, divorce, and child custody (for example, a married Ugandan woman needs to obtain her husband's signature on her passport application if children are travelling on the same passport).

Cultural norms and ignorance make it difficult for women to limit child-bearing and protect themselves from HIV infection. The typical Ugandan woman bears 6.9 children in her lifetime and has limited access to pre-natal care, leading to high maternal mortality. The rate of HIV infection is higher in women than men. Although statistics on violence are scarce, wife-beating, rape and sexual abuse of girls are common. Public opinion and law enforcement officials continue to view wife beating as a man's prerogative and rarely intervene in cases of domestic violence. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced by one ethnic group. No law yet prohibits this practice.

USAID's microenterprise finance and agricultural export programs put productive resources directly in the hands of Ugandan women. Since half of all microenterprises are women-owned, USAID's burgeoning micro-finance credit schemes should benefit tens of thousands of rural women during the next five years. Its agricultural export program combines extension services and marketing support to women's groups growing high-value crops. USAID's health program increases women's access to

information and family planning, pre-natal and HIV prevention services. The U.S. Embassy has provided funding to various women's rights organizations or economic cooperatives. In FY 95, it provided funding to the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) to carry out legal education seminars and para-legal training workshops in Kapchorwa District to combat the practice of FGM. Numerous women's cooperatives have received support through Special Self-Help project funds.

Uganda: Children's Issues

Children make up nearly half of Uganda's population of 20 million people. As Uganda has moved from relief towards sustainable development, children's welfare has improved: infant and child mortality rates have declined, nutrition has improved, and school enrollment has increased. In spite of recent gains, children in Uganda suffer inordinately from chronic poverty, the conflict in northern Uganda, and the AIDs pandemic. These three scourges have resulted in 11 percent of Ugandan children being orphaned.

Only about 40 percent of children stay in school past 4th grade due to poor quality of education, poverty, public insecurity, and lack of parental guidance.

Inadequate diets from pregnancy through breast feeding and weaning contribute to stunting among 44 percent of children under 5. Lack of vitamin A and iodine deficiency are high. Poor or inadequate parenting results in neglect of children's basic needs, failure to provide balanced nutritious diet, parental abuse (physical, mental and/or sexual). A disproportionately large number of children are orphaned. Lack of household access to safe drinking water and sanitation leads to child killer diseases like diarrhea, malaria and respiratory infections. Diseases which can be immunized against are also on the increase.

Despite recent growth, national per capita income per annum is \$220. Productive family members migrate to towns leaving the elderly and children to till the soil. In the towns there are insufficient job opportunities resulting in a growing problem of urban poor.

Children abandoned or neglected by their parents receive little or no education or adult supervision, are frequently sexually abused and exposed to HIV, and often turn to crime or prostitution. While still relatively small, the number of street children is growing.

A National Council of Children (NCC) was set up in 1992 to achieve the objectives of the 1991 UN Convention on the Rights of Children to which Uganda is a signatory. The Government of Uganda's Department of Child Care and Protection promotes the responsibility of the extended family to care for its members. Uganda has prepared a new child law statute to better protect children's rights. An NGO funded by USAID and others provides training to social workers. USAID's new strategy prioritizes children's needs through promoting basic education, reproductive health (which has a direct and immediate impact on the health of infants and children), and nutrition.

Uganda: Education

Uganda's education system has a 7-year primary cycle, 5 years of secondary school, and 3 years of university. Only about 35 percent of children complete primary school, 15 percent complete secondary school, and less than 2 percent complete accredited tertiary studies. Uganda boasts two public universities and seven fledgling private universities. Makerere University, East Africa's first, is beginning a transition from an urban elitist institution toward broader-based, self-financed mass education. Instruction is in one of 7 local languages for the first 4 years of school and in English thereafter. Uganda's school system fell into terrible disrepair during the 1970s and 1980s from which it is still recovering.

Uganda has launched a bold program of free education without first putting in place the administrative and financial policies and mechanisms required to safeguard public resources and basic educational quality standards. Although government financing for primary education has increased, it remains insufficient to provide good quality basic education for all of the nation's children. The national female enrollment rate in primary schools was 45% in 1995. The percentage is well below 40% in secondary schools. Uganda needs to build and furnish tens of thousands of classrooms in the coming years to achieve universal primary education. Most schools lack desks and books and many classes are held under trees. Teachers' salaries, although greatly improved, are still far below the pay of other professions, making it difficult to attract and retain qualified people, especially in rural areas.

A national primary education reform program, launched in 1993, has increased the availability of instructional materials and trained teachers. Teachers salaries have increased nine-fold, and thousands of classrooms have been built. With USAID'S assistance, a new system for training and supervising teachers has been put in place.

The Government of Uganda has encouraged universities to be self-sustaining and increase the intake of qualified first year students. In 1997, Uganda declared primary education to be free for up to four children from each family in order to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE). Enrollment is expected to increase from about 2.6 million children to over 4 million children.

Uganda: Involvement in UN Fourth World Conference on Women

Uganda was represented at the official conference by a high-level delegation of 67, led by Vice President Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe, who is also Minister of Gender and Community Development, and the First Lady, Mrs. Janet Museveni. Mr. Kazibwe was one of the first speakers in the plenary. She said new global responsibilities for individuals and states have been defined, with women playing an increasing role in debates. She reviewed Uganda's achievements in advancing the status of women, noting her appointment to the second highest post and the appointment of six female government ministers in Uganda. Dr. Kazibwe emphasized that the Ugandan government was working towards a critical mass of women to effect change at all levels. Uganda's successful experience in applying affirmative action and quotas was of great interest to other delegates, e.g., provisions in the Constitution allow for each of the nation's 39 districts to elect one woman to Parliament to fill a seat reserved for women.

Education for girls is a major concern of the Ugandan women. They favor a comprehensive approach to the education of women, which addresses the educational needs of the girl child from infancy through adulthood. This view was reflected both at the Beijing plenary and at the prepcoms. At the plenary session, Dr. Kazibwe called for new and additional resources to improve functional literacy in the developing world, with guarantees of education for the girl child. She strongly advocated affirmative action in support of disabled women and members of religious and ethnic minorities. Also, during the final Preparatory Committee Meeting (March 1995) in New York, Uganda made several interventions on girls' education. The Ugandan delegation strongly advocated equal access to education, particularly in the areas of science and technology.

Many of the official delegation also attended the NGO Forum, and found it the more useful meeting. About 200 Ugandan women attended, including government officials, parliamentarians, constituent assembly delegates, NGO leaders, and businesswomen. The Ugandans were particularly proud that Winnie Byanyima was the keynote speaker for Africa at the NGO Forum. Engineer Winnie, as she is popularly known (she is an aeronautical engineer by training), received a standing ovation for her efforts, apparently the only keynoter so honored. Other Ugandans presented papers or were workshop panelists.

Uganda: Population and Family Planning

Uganda's population of approximately 20 million people is growing at 2.5 percent per year. Not surprisingly, the use of modern contraception is low; in 1995, only 7.8 percent of married women used modern family planning methods, with urban/rural differences ranging from 35 percent for modern methods in and around Kampala to a rural average of 5 percent. The pill and injectable are the most popular methods. Meanwhile, 68 percent of married women say they either want no more children or want to space their next birth by at least two years. About 29 percent of women can be characterized as having an immediate "unmet need" for family planning; if this need could be met, contraceptive prevalence would be 44 percent.

Recent survey data indicate that substantial infant and child mortality is associated with high-risk pregnancies (birth interval less than two years, mother too young or too old, more than three previous births). Two thirds of all births in Uganda are characterized by one or more of these factors. Infants born less than two years after the previous sibling are twice as likely to die before age five than those born at least 24 months apart. A child born to a mother under 18 is 85 percent more likely to die before five than a child of a low-risk mother; 56 percent of Ugandan women marry by age 18.

Though declining, the total number of births per woman was estimated in 1995 to be 6.9, meaning that women spend many years bearing and nursing children, taxing their health and limiting their ability to engage in income-generating activities. Women are also the caretakers of the sick and the elderly. One in seven children die before age five and over half of the population, 10 million people, are under 15 years of age. Health clinic staff are poorly paid, trained and supervised, and maintaining reliable supplies of contraceptives is a problem. Many women fear that using family planning will adversely affect their health or meet with spousal disapproval.

Government of Uganda policy fully supports family planning and there are no significant policy obstacles to making these services available. USAID'S health program seeks to increase the use and quality of an integrated package of reproductive and child health services: family planning, maternal health care, HIV testing and counseling, and the treatment and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases. Interventions include a highly successful contraceptive social marketing program, training of public and private sector service providers, and an information, education and communication campaign to dispel popular misconceptions about family planning and educate people about the benefits of spacing children.

Uganda: Health Care Issues

AIDS is a central fact of social, economic, and political life in Uganda. It is estimated that over 1.5 million Ugandans are already infected with the AIDS virus. Nearly half of the beds in medical wards are occupied by patients with HIV infection and AIDS. USAID and research projects funded by the National Institutes of Health are a major partner with the Government of Uganda in the efforts to respond to the epidemic and prevent its spread. A wide range of projects to prevent new HIV infections and to respond to the social and family-level impact of the epidemic have been implemented with USAID funding.

Since 1993, studies indicate a decline in HIV prevalence in pregnant women and evidence suggests that HIV prevalence in Uganda is declining, especially among young women. In one site in Kampala, for example, 15 to 19 year old women had an HIV prevalence rate of 26 percent in 1992. By 1996 this had declined to 9 percent.

These trends are consistent with a 50 percent reduction in incidence -- or new cases of HIV infection -- in women in this age group. At the same time, behavioral surveys strongly indicate an increase in the age of first sex, a reduction in casual sexual partners, and an increase in general condom use especially with casual sexual partners. Taking all these findings together, demographers and epidemiologists are asserting that the documented contraction in the HIV epidemic in Uganda is "most likely causally linked" to changes in high-risk behavior. Beginning in 1988, USAID-funded health projects have emphasized increased knowledge of risk factors, reduction in high risk behaviors, and condom promotion and distribution.

These encouraging early trends have occurred in a context in which the burden of disease and premature death of young adults continues to be overwhelming. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that, due to AIDS, Uganda's life expectancy at birth -- 37 years -- may be among the lowest in the world.

Uganda: Human Rights

Since gaining power in 1986, President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) have succeeded in restoring relative stability and the rule of law to most of Uganda, a country that had become emblematic of governmental brutality under the regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote. Uganda adopted a new constitution in 1995 and held a presidential election in May 1996, followed by parliamentary elections in June. While the elections were technically well conducted and signaled a return to constitutional government, provisions of the law which substantially restricted the activities of political parties and the use of government resources on behalf of NRM supporters meant that the playing field was not level. President Museveni was elected with a substantial majority, and the NRM won a majority of seats in the parliament. Uganda is scheduled to hold a referendum on multipartyism in the year 2000.

Human rights abuses are committed in Uganda by the government and by insurgent forces, particularly those operating in northern Uganda. Government forces committed or failed to prevent some extrajudicial killings of suspected rebels and civilians. Police, the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF), and poorly trained local defense units (LDUs) regularly beat and sometimes tortured suspects, often to force confessions. These problems have persisted despite measures to improve discipline, training of security forces, and the punishment of some officials guilty of abuses.

Insurgent forces commit numerous human rights abuses. The Lords Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, continues to kill, torture, maim, rape, and abduct large numbers of civilians in northern Uganda. The West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), operating in the northwest, and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), operating along the western border with Zaire, have also killed civilians.

Prison conditions in Uganda are harsh, and prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem. Poor judicial administration, lack of resources, and a large case backlog infringed on due process and the right to a fair trial. The Government at times restricted freedom of the press, although independent newspapers generally publish freely in Uganda. The Government's use of outdated sedition laws on occasion and detention of some media members may have caused journalists to practice self-censorship, and direct censorship has been exercised over reporting on the conflict in northern Uganda.

Discrimination against women remains a problem in Uganda. The authorities have failed to respond adequately to the problems of domestic violence and the rape of women and children, and FGM is practiced by one ethnic group. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, customary laws restrict women's access to land, inheritance rights, and rights in cases of adoption, marriage, and divorce. Women's rights groups operate freely in Uganda, and the Government reserves representational positions for women, insuring that gender issues can receive at least a minimal public hearing in Uganda.

Uganda: Environment

Uganda's natural resource base is among the richest and most diverse in Africa. In its unique position between the East African savanna and the tropical forests of the Congo Basin, Uganda unites 7 of the 18 biogeographic regions found in Africa. This highly diverse landscape features rift valleys, highlands, mountain ranges, papyrus swamps, acacia savannas, and an extensive network of rivers and lakes. These varied habitats are home to biological diversity of global importance.

Uganda's natural resource base also provides a foundation for economic growth. The economic vitality of each component of the country's agricultural sector -- livestock, fisheries, food and cash crops -- hinges on ecosystem health. Furthermore, natural areas -- including Uganda's network of national parks -- are once again generating resources from a rapidly recovering ecotourism industry.

Uganda is a party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Biodiversity Convention, and most endangered species in Uganda have become less threatened with the restoration of governmental authority following the violence of the 1970s and early 1980s. Today, the pressure of Uganda's large and impoverished population on ecosystems is of greatest concern. Foraging for fuel wood in many parts of the country, for example, has caused deforestation. Water-borne pollution from urban areas and agriculture is also a threat to Uganda's aquatic resources. On Lake Victoria, efforts to halt the spread of Water Hyacinth has become a top priority for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The USG has also aided these efforts.

Environmental protection suffers from a weak legal, institutional and technical base for environmental management and sustainable resource use; excessive pressure on critical ecosystems related to subsistence needs; and low public awareness of environmental problems.

USAID and the Peace Corps are partners with the Government of Uganda to address threats to the global environment stemming from loss of biological diversity and to foster economic growth by promoting environmentally sustainable practices.

Present environmental efforts endeavor to: improve planning through legislation; decentralize responsibility for natural resources management; strengthen Uganda's protected area system; capitalize on ecotourism; and build support for conservation through education

Uganda: U.S. Assistance

The U.S. assistance program in Uganda is one of the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Our \$45-50 million in annual development assistance is used to promote democracy and good governance, improve rural household incomes, protect the environment, improve basic education, and promote reproductive health (including HIV/AIDs prevention).

Through Uganda's involvement in the President's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, the U.S. is also contributing to regional efforts to achieve food security and conflict prevention, resolution and mitigation.

The United States provided significant technical support to Uganda during the formulation of its new Constitution, working with the Constituent Assembly to encourage a more democratic and constitutionally balanced system. At present, our assistance in the democracy and governance area provides financial support to governmental and non-governmental institutions with the objective of strengthening constitutional checks and balances (particularly by enhancing the Parliament's institutional capacity), regularizing the country's legal framework and protecting human rights, and strengthening local government.

In response to crisis and potential famine in northern Uganda, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has obligated an initial \$25,000 to provide bulk food supplies to the region. OFDA is currently considering proposals for additional assistance in northern Uganda.

The U.S. Peace Corps has 56 volunteers (PCVs) serving in locations throughout much of the country. PCVs are working in environmental management, education (primary teacher training), and small business promotion.

Our FY 96 Front Line States (FLS) assistance package of \$3.85 million in non-lethal defensive military equipment (radios and load-bearing equipment) will be delivered to Uganda within the next two months. The U.S. will provide modest additional assistance during FY 97.

Uganda: U.S. Embassy

Five USG Agencies, including the State Department, the U.S. Information Service, USAID, the Peace Corps, and Centers for Disease Control are represented in the U.S. Embassy in Kampala. The U.S. Mission includes 37 direct-hire employees, 41 expatriate contract staff, and approximately 200 Ugandan employees. Ambassador E. Michael Southwick and Deputy Chief of Mission Wayne Bush have both served in the country for almost three years.

The Embassy is located in the rear of the British High Commission in downtown Kampala, with offices spread in six other locations throughout the city.

The USAID program in Uganda is one of the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Peace Corps has 56 volunteers at locations throughout the country.

The USG has an active security assistance program with Uganda, encompassing International Military Education and Training (IMET), Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Foreign Military Financing.

Overall USG objectives in Uganda are to promote respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law; to encourage a responsible Ugandan role in regional conflict resolution; to promote expanded U.S. trade and investment; and to improve the standard of living through equitable sustainable development.

Uganda is also home to nearly 200,000 Sudanese refugees; the U.S. refugee coordinator for the Great Lakes region is based at the Embassy in Kampala.

Uganda: Etiquette

Ugandans are quite conservative in the way they dress. Outlandish clothing or the exposure of large areas of one's body are uncommon. Women conventionally wear dresses; men wear business suits.

When meeting a Ugandan, it is always polite to greet him/her and then ask several questions regarding his/her well-being, family, etc., before beginning substantive discussions.

"African time" is the antithesis of western clock watching. For a visit by the First Lady, western time will be followed, but it is not uncommon for Ugandans to arrive late for an event, and for meetings to run over their scheduled time.

Haggling over prices in markets is normal procedure. Bargaining is not bad manners - your starting price should be about half of what you are prepared to pay.

Do not give or receive items with your left hand. It is impolite to extend it. It is common to see Ugandans of the same sex holding hands; it means they are close friends.

While there are over 40 local languages in Uganda, English is the official language and is spoken by all educated Ugandans.

People will clap (sometimes rhythmically) upon the honored guest's entrance. Some women may kneel or curtsy if personally greeted. A normal handshake is the standard manner of greeting. The honored guest usually shakes hands with everybody attending the meeting.

Numerous, long welcoming speeches are the norm in Uganda. The honored guest will be seated in the middle of a group of chairs, and the program will proceed. Handshakes and singing will again take place during departure.

First Lady's Remarks
Nile Conference Center, Kampala, Uganda

Sources

Amb. Michael Southwick (O: 256-41-259-792, H: 256-41-233-175)
DCM Wayne Bush (O: 256-41-259-792, H: 256-41-233-982)

Context

This is the final major speech on the trip, on the second to last day. It is an opportunity to highlight major themes (health/AIDS, women's empowerment, democracy, environment, humanitarian assistance), and should include anecdotes from other stops. The audience will include officials, including women MPs, members of Uganda's delegation to Beijing, and civil society activists. It will be a proud moment for many, a vindication of their work for Uganda.

Acknowledgments

Vice President Dr. Specioza Kazibwe should be recognized first as the highest ranking Ugandan official in attendance, as should Foreign Minister Eriya Kategaya. Mrs. Museveni, wife of the President, will likely attend and should be recognized. The women's parliamentary caucus should be acknowledged.

Setting

The Nile Conference Center is a large, modern facility in the heart of Kampala. Its increasing use by business visitors and regional conferences symbolizes the country's economic renewal.

Contents

We must mention:

(1) For the American audience, this is an opportunity to underline that our assistance can have a major, positive impact in Africa. The role of USAID, USIS and the Peace Corps in supporting Uganda's remarkable transformation should be highlighted.

- Compelling images could be created by contrasting the Uganda of today with that of 10 years ago. For example, after a period of 15 years in which per capita GDP declined by 40 percent, Uganda has experienced ten years of strong economic growth. Once a country ruled by violence, Uganda is now ruled by laws, and most Ugandans live in security.
- Uganda's great progress in terms of economic growth, respect for human rights, protection of the environment, women's role in society, and opportunities for trade and investment, offers excellent material.

(2) Our discussion of assistance also plays to the African audience. Note that our substantial commitment to Uganda -- approximately \$55 million in total FY 1997 assistance -- is

indicative of our readiness to support African countries where governments and peoples are making growth and development possible.

(3) Uganda's record in dealing with HIV/AIDS is an example for all audiences. The First Lady should acknowledge the role of President Museveni and the government in "demystifying" AIDS and transforming the social stigma previously associated with it in favor of the much more progressive "Living Positively with AIDS" message. The First Lady will have heard dramatic testimony earlier in the day at the AIDS Information Center site visit which can be referred to in the speech.

(4) The Ugandan audience must hear a message on democratization. This is an overriding theme of our mission to Uganda. The First Lady can effectively reinforce the message delivered by Vice President Gore to President Museveni in early February, that democratization in Uganda, as it is in the United States, is a work in progress.

- Specifically, the First Lady should congratulate Ugandans on their progress since 1986 in implementing constitutional government. Uganda today offers considerable freedom of speech, of the press, and of religion.
- The First Lady should encourage Ugandans to continue the process of political reform and liberalization, aimed at achieving a political system in which there can be full exercise of the freedom of assembly and association. Following up on the theme of racial harmony, the First Lady can point to political competition and pluralism as a means of making a space for different ethnic groups in the system, giving them a stake in a peaceful political process.

The Embassy's recent Op-Ed piece on democratization is attached as a resource.

(5) The role of women in development and democratization should be highlighted.

- Present on the dias will be Ugandan First Lady Janet Museveni, who has played a visible, active role in a Peace Corps-supported project, "Ugandan Women's Efforts to Save Orphans." Mrs. Museveni's activism in this area, and her relationship with our Peace Corps Volunteers, should be acknowledged.
- Vice President Specioza Kazibwe will be present. Kazibwe, previously Minister of Gender Community Development, is an orthopedic surgeon, a Member of Parliament, and the highest ranking female public official in Africa. She is a role model for young Ugandan women.

- The Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Betty Okwir, should also be acknowledged.
- The First Lady should point out the constructive role that the women's caucus played in the constituent assembly which debated and ratified the constitution, and encourage members of the women's parliamentary caucus, who will be the honored guests. 50 out of 270 Members of Parliament are women; the Ugandan Constitution provides for a women's seat in Parliament from each of Uganda's 39 districts.
- To endorse the role of women in business, the First Lady may wish to refer to a visit to a women's group or cooperative earlier in the trip, or note her enthusiasm to meet women entrepreneurs later that afternoon at the FINCA event.
- This is also an opportunity to congratulate the Government for its commitment of equal access to education for girls and boys, as implemented in its late 1996 decree that up to four children per family be provided with free education - an equal number of whom must be girls in families with girls and boys.

(6) The First Lady should mention our humanitarian interests in Uganda as emblematic as our larger interests on the continent.

- She should recognize that despite its progress Uganda remains a poor country, and note the need for continued donor support.

In this context, she should refer to the President's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI), with its emphasis on food security and conflict prevention. With its excellent climate and soils, Uganda can be a breadbasket for the region. GHAI seeks to facilitate that. Just as women and children suffer first in situations of famine, empowering women economically is a key element in creating the conditions for food security in the region.

- The First Lady should praise President Museveni's commitment to wean Uganda away from aid dependency, and would draw a positive response by referring to his oft-stated desire to see Uganda eventually become a donor.
- She should recognize the suffering of those in northern Uganda -- especially the children -- who bear the brunt of the ravages of the insurgencies in that region. She should express the hope that the tens of thousands of displaced persons in northern Uganda will soon be able to return to their homes and livelihoods.

- And the First Lady should thank Uganda for the hospitality it has offered to refugees from Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda and elsewhere, and acknowledge Uganda's willingness to resettle refugees permanently and enable them to lead lives of self-respect and dignity. Note: there are currently an estimated 240,000 refugees in Uganda.

(7) Finally, Uganda should be recognized for its efforts to preserve biodiversity, paying particular attention to the establishment in 1996 of the Uganda Wildlife Authority and passage of the 1996 Wildlife Act, which aims to preserve endangered species such as the mountain gorilla, while enabling communities surrounding private areas to derive economic benefits from conservation.

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	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00
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SUBJECT: EMBASSY OPED PIECE ON UGANOAN
DEMOCRATIZATION

1. ON THE EVE PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, WE PROVIDE BELOW THE TEXT OF AN OPED PIECE PREPARED BY THE EMBASSY. IT APPEARED JAN. 27 IN A SPECIAL NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (NRM) PUBLICATION ISSUED ON THE OCCASION OF THE NRM'S 11TH ANNIVERSARY SINCE TAKING POWER.
2. THIS UNUSUAL PLACEMENT OCCURRED THROUGH PAO CONTACTS. WE INITIALLY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO TRY TO GET IT INTO ONE OF THE MAJOR DAILY NEWSPAPERS. BUT THIS PLACEMENT CERTAINLY GETS TO A GOOD TARGET AUDIENCE. WHY PREACH TO THE CONVERTED, WE ASKED OURSELVES. WE SUSPECT THAT PUBLICATIONS WITH A WIDER CIRCULATION WILL PICK IT UP.
3. THERE ARE SOME IRONIES HERE. THE NRM IN A TECHNICAL SENSE DOESN'T EXIST UNTIL A NEW BILL IS PASSED BY PARLIAMENT. THE USG IS THE STRONGEST CRITIC OF THE MOVEMENT SYSTEM. THE OPED PIECE ITSELF IS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE CELEBRATORY AND TRIUMPHALIST MOOD MANIFEST BY THE NRM FAITHFUL ON NRM DAY JAN. 26 (SEPTEL). ALL THAT SAID, WE THINK IT PRAISEWORTHY THAT THE NRM SECRETARIAT WOULD ACCPT THE OPED PIECE IN THE SPIRIT OF PROMOTING A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS.
4. THE SPEECH BREAKS NO NEW GROUND BUT BRINGS TOGETHER THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CRITICISMS OF THE NRM SYSTEM AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT WITH BASIC HUMAN

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RIGHTS. THE COMPOSER HANDEL SAID THE BEST THING TO DO WITH A GOOD TUNE IS PLAY IT AGAIN LOUDER. WE SUGGEST THE SAME GOES FOR GOOD POLICY.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

UNFINISHED BUSINESS: DEMOCRACY IN UGANDA, BY E. MICHAEL SOUTHWICK, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO UGANDA. ON JANUARY 20, EVERY YEAR, AMERICANS COMMEMORATE THE LIFE AND WORK OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE GIANT OF THE U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT DURING THE 1950'S AND 60'S. HIS ACHIEVEMENTS CONTINUE TO INSPIRE THOSE STRUGGLING FOR GREATER RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

MARTIN LUTHER KING DAY IS A TIME OF SOBER REFLECTION ON THE NATURE OF OUR SOCIETY, AND THE LEVELS OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY FOR ALL. IT IS A TIME TO REMIND OURSELVES, AS THE 18TH CENTURY POLITICAL WRITER THOMAS PAINE ASSERTED, THAT "THE PRICE OF LIBERTY IS ETERNAL VIGILANCE." NO COUNTRY, NO MATTER WHAT ITS LEVEL OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, CAN AFFORD TO REST ON ITS LAURELS. THERE IS ALWAYS WORK TO DO.

IT IS OUR CONSCIOUSNESS OF OUR OWN HISTORY, INCLUDING THE LONG DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO AFRICAN-AMERICANS, WHICH MAKES US IDENTIFY WITH THOSE WHO ARE DENIED RIGHTS ELSEWHERE. IN CONSEQUENCE, THE U.S. HAS LONG SUPPORTED THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD, INCLUDING IN UGANDA. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE ISSUES ARE MATTERS OF UNIVERSAL CONCERN, TOO IMPORTANT TO BE CONFINED TO QUIET DIPLOMACY. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE SPOKEN OUT OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS ON UGANDA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, AND THAT IS WHY WE APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK OUT NOW.

OUR SECRETARY OF STATE-DESIGNATE, MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, IS KNOWN FOR SPEAKING PLAINLY. I FOLLOW HER CUE AS I MAKE SOME COMMENTS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN UGANDA AT THE BEGINNING OF 1997, AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF RECENT AND UPCOMING ELECTIONS, AND THE ONGOING PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE 1995 CONSTITUTION.

THE 1996 ELECTIONS, IF VIEWED AS PART OF A TRANSITION TO FULL DEMOCRACY, REPRESENT AN IMPRESSIVE AND SOLID STEP FORWARD FOR UGANDA. DESPITE SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION PERFORMED WELL IN ASSURING THAT EVENTS ON VOTING DAY PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY AND FAIRLY. MOST OF ALL, THE

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SUBJECT: EMBASSY OPED PIECE ON UGANDAN DEMOCRATIZATION

PE
OPLE OF UGANDA SHOWED OVERWHELMINGLY THAT THEY TAKE DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY AND CAN BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY DESPITE A HIGHLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE.

TO THOSE WHO ARE NOW DISCONTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT THAT RESULTED FROM THE ELECTIONS, WE SAY THAT THE MEANS OF ADDRESSING THEIR CONCERNS IS THROUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. TO BUILD A

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CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE, THOSE IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

AT THE SAME TIME, UGANDA'S 1996 ELECTIONS WERE NOT UNIVERSALLY REGARDED AS FREE AND FAIR, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF FULL RESPECT FOR THE FREEDOMS OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, THE FREEDOMS WHICH UNDERPIN MULTIPARTYISM. MOREOVER, THE ELECTORAL LAWS AND GOVERNMENT MACHINERY UNDULY FAVORED SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT.

SOME HAVE RIGHTLY POINTED OUT THAT MULTIPARTYISM IS NOT A PANACEA FOR ALL THE ILLS OF SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY WHEN THOSE IN POWER MANIPULATE SHAMELESSLY THE RULES OF THE GAME AND THE MACHINERY OF THE STATE TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. ONE DOES NOT NEED TO LOOK TOO FAR TO SEE EXAMPLES OF SUCH MANIPULATION. ACCORDINGLY, I AGREE WITH THE UGANDAN MP WHO SAID RECENTLY THAT MULTIPARTYISM IS A NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.

THE CORE ISSUE IS FREEDOM. GENUINE POLITICAL COMPETITION DEPENDS ON THE ABILITY OF CANDIDATES TO ORGANIZE TO WIN SUPPORT. THIS REQUIRES FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. THE NOTION THAT AN INDIVIDUAL, WITHOUT JOINING FORCES WITH LIKE-MINDED OTHERS, CAN COMPETE AGAINST THOSE WHO CONTROL THE MACHINERY OF THE STATE, DEFIES COMMON SENSE. MOREOVER, THE ABSENCE OF A VIABLE, ORGANIZED OPPOSITION CARRIES NUMEROUS COSTS. CORRUPTION AND UNRESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT ARE BUT TWO.

POLITICAL MODELS WHICH DENY BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, AS THE MOVEMENT SYSTEM EXPLICITLY DOES, ARE NOT A LONG TERM SOLUTION FOR ANY GOVERNMENT. THEY RELY TOO MUCH ON OVERLY SIMPLISTIC NOTIONS OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM. THE ESSENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS THAT THE RIGHTS OF A MINORITY ARE PROTECTED FROM THE MAJORITY. IF THE FREEDOMS OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION CAN BE PUT TO A MAJORITY VOTE, WHY NOT FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF THE PRESS, AND OF RELIGION? TO THE AUTHORITARIAN FRAME OF MIND, THE EXERCISE OF ANY OF THESE CAN BE AS "DESTABILIZING" AS THE EXERCISE OF FREE ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. ALLOWING A VOTE TO OCCUR ON ANY OF THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS CHEAPENS AND PUTS AT RISK UGANDANS' CLAIM TO ALL SUCH RIGHTS. WORSE, SUCH A VOTE IS INEVITABLY CAST AS A REFERENDUM ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY, NOT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS INVOLVED.

CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRACY IS THE BEST WAY FOR UGANDA TO SECURE THE MAGNIFICENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GAINS IT HAS MADE SINCE 1986. KEY TESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO GREATER DEMOCRACY WILL BE THE INTERRELATED ISSUES OF LOCAL ELECTIONS, NRM LEGISLATION, AND POLITICAL PARTY LEGISLATION OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. TO SAFEGUARD AND BUILD UPON THE ACHIEVEMENTS UGANDA HAS MADE SINCE 1986, THESE ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED IN WAYS WHICH LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SUSTAINABLE AND TRULY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, ONE THAT EMBRACES THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PLURALISM.

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AS WE SAID AT THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING IN PARIS IN NOVEMBER LAST YEAR, PROPOSALS TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE INFLUENCE OF THE NRM OVER THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT REPRESENT A BACKWARD STEP IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. INSTEAD, WE

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WOULD LIKE TO SEE UGANDA'S ELECTED LEADERS PROMOTE GREATER OPENNESS TO DISSENT, PLURALISM, PUBLIC DISCUSSION, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT AND THE JUDICIARY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND POLICY MAKING. WE APPLAUD THE STEPS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THIS REGARD.

ADDITIONAL CONCRETE STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE FOR PARLIAMENT TO REPEAL UGA NDA'S ANTIQUATED AND DRACONIAN SEDITION LAW AND TO PASS LAWS WHICH WOULD HELP MAKE UGANDA'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW AND MORE DEMOCRATIC, TRANSPARENT, ACCOUNTABLE, AND NATIONAL IN CHARACTER. IF THE NRM OFFERS THE BEST HOPE FOR UGANDANS TO ACHIEVE THEIR ASPIRATIONS, IT SHOULD COMPETE FAIRLY WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT, UNDER THE SAME RULES.

WHILE RECOGNIZING THE NECESSITY OF PLURALISM, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT DISMISS OUT OF HAND THE REASONED CRITICISMS OF MULTIPARTYISM AS IT HAS BEEN PRACTICED IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. A PARTICULARLY ACUTE PROBLEM IS THE TENDENCY OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENT ITSELF TO BE SEEN AS PATRONAGE OPERATIONS BY WHICH WELL PLACED INDIVIDUALS CAN SIPHON OFF PUBLIC RESOURCES FOR PRIVATE GAIN. THIS THEME IS WELL DEVELOPED IN THE RECENT DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED BY USAID. IN FACT, I WOULD ARGUE THAT PATRONAGE IS THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM IN AFRICAN POLITICS.

UGANDA STANDS AT A CRITICAL CROSSROADS IN DEMOCRATIZATION. IT CAN CONTINUE TO LEAD THE WAY IF IT REMAINS VIGILANT AND RECOGNIZES THAT THE TASK REMAINS UNDONE. THAT TASK STILL REQUIRES OPEN DISCUSSION WITH GIVE AND TAKE, NOT JUST VOTES WHERE ONE SIDE IMPOSES ITS WILL ON ANOTHER.

SHOULD THE FOUNDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE, GENUINE DEMOCRACY BE ACHIEVED, THE VERDICT OF HISTORY ON THE PROCESS LAUNCHED IN 1986 WOULD BE UNEQUIVOCALLY POSITIVE. AND UGANDA'S LUSTRE WOULD BE GREATER, ITS FUTURE BRIGHTER, AND ITS ROLE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE REST OF AFRICA FAR MORE SECURE. KAMPALA, UGANDA
JANUARY, 1997. SOUTHWICK

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An African Success Story?

Uganda, of all places, is enjoying a period of peace, but the price of stability has been high

YOWERI Museveni is a bear of a man with an avuncular style that has disarmed many a visitor. Politician, intellectual, former guerrilla leader, and, since 1986, the President of Uganda, Museveni is widely hailed as a new kind of African leader. The darling of Western donors, he minces no words about the "backwardness" of his country.

He says things like "I have never blamed the whites for colonizing Africa; I have never blamed these whites for taking slaves. If you are stupid, you should be taken a slave." Sitting in the shade of a huge flame tree on his cattle farm in southwest Uganda, sipping from a glass of piping-hot fresh cow's milk, the President speaks ironically, Socratically, turning questions back on his questioner, chuckling at his own answers.

But his mission could not be more serious. He is trying to achieve what many

feared no one could: to bring Uganda back from the dead. Uganda occupies a singular place among the horror-plagued countries of post-independence Africa. In the 1970s and early 1980s Idi Amin, and the less notorious but no less wanton Milton Obote, plunged Uganda into a nightmare as dark

and sinister as the one that has unfolded just across its southern border in Rwanda. Perhaps a million Ugandans died in two decades of sheer terror.

The road from the capital, Kampala, to Museveni's farm cuts through lush tropical mountains straddling the Equator along the edge of Lake Victoria. Banana palms, coffee plantations, and bougainvillea in perpetual bloom—this is the hauntingly beautiful landscape that moved Winston Churchill to call Uganda the "pearl" of East Africa. When I first traveled this road, a decade ago, teenage soldiers in baggy battle fatigues and rub-

ber flip-flops, with bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, manned dozens of checkpoints, poking their AKs into taxis, shaking down travelers, often raping women and girls. My notebooks were filled with tales of torture and massacres.

Today the road is newly paved, and there are no roadblocks. The streets are safe at night, markets bustle, and nightclubs pulsate to the twangy rhythms of the latest hits from neighboring Zaire. At the time of my return, last spring, nearly all of Uganda's immediate neighbors were in turmoil. To the south Rwanda and Burundi were convulsed by ethnic slaughter in which hundreds of thousands had been killed. Zaire, on Uganda's western border, was in the throes of "ethnic cleansing" as Mobutu Sese Seko maneuvered to survive in power. To the north thousands of Sudanese were in flight from the Sudanese army's latest offensive against southern rebels, as the latest phase of Sudan's civil war entered its second decade. Even Kenyans, on Uganda's eastern border, who for years had viewed Uganda's agony with a mixture of horror and disdain, were beset by yet another round of state-inspired ethnic clashes, which have shaken Kenya's reputation for stability. Uganda, of all places, looked like a model of tranquillity. A decade earlier I had felt a rush of relief when I exited Uganda for what was then pacific Rwanda; this year I experienced precisely the opposite sensation.

"Uganda is out of the woods," Museveni told me. But the twinkle in his eye masks toughness, arrogance, even ruthlessness. He has not stayed on top of Uganda by being soft. Almost alone among African leaders, Museveni has managed to secure broad international support while defying Western pressure for multi-party democracy. He argues that multi-partyism aggravates tribal divisions. It is a familiar argument, made by many a cynical African leader as a means of rationalizing absolute power. But such is Uganda's uniquely fractious past that his argument is rarely dismissed out of hand. Uganda is a place where a top-ranking Western diplomat, lamenting the arrests of three leading "multi-partyists" on sedition charges, could nonetheless

Above, voting in Uganda last spring

"Uganda is out of the woods," Museveni told me. But the twinkle in his eye masks toughness, even ruthlessness.

suggest that "Museveni may have calculated that it is time to demonstrate power, and he may be right—safety first."

At the time of my visit Ugandans were electing members of a constituent assembly that will ratify a new constitution. It was a dress rehearsal for parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for next year. The central issue for voters was whether to elect candidates who favored "multi-partyism" or those who favored continuing for five more years with Museveni's all-inclusive—some say too inclusive—"movement" system. Alas, most of the multi-partyists looked less like Jeffersonian democrats than like partisans of the old Obote regime, bent on reclaiming power by aggravating ethnic divisions. The campaign opened a window on a stubbornly polarized country at a crossroads—battling AIDS, still very poor, and still largely dependent on the personal authority of one man, Museveni. Most Ugandans were living in peace. The question was how long it might last.

THE VIP lounge at The Nile Hotel, in Kampala, is directly below room 311. In the years of Amin and Obote room 311 was a torture chamber. Beatings, whippings, electric shocks, burns on the chest and testicles—the cries emanating from room 311 may have been audible down on the second floor, where Amin and Obote occupied rooms during some of their years in power. Nile Mansions, as it was then called, provided the only decent accommodation in town, and thus housed much of the Cabinet, army, and secret police. Today the Nile is a metaphor for Uganda, a functioning entity with a fresh coat of paint. Room 311 is a plush suite with crimson carpeting, glass tabletops, and a super-chic bathroom; a Gideon's Bible rests on the bedside table. "It's a different story altogether," the receptionist said when I was there. "It has shed a bad name."

Sitting on a sofa in the VIP lounge, sipping from a glass of passion-fruit juice, was the man who had ousted Obote in a coup in July of 1985, Major General Tito Okello Lutwa. Tito Okello commanded the force of Ugandan exiles who, along with the Tanzanian army, invaded Uganda in 1979 and drove Amin from power. Okello's forces then helped Milton Obote, whom Amin had displaced in a 1971 coup, to steal the 1980 election. From 1980 to 1985 Okello was the commander of Obote's army, the Uganda National Liberation Army. Under Okello's command UNLA soldiers slaughtered thousands of civilians in Amin's old stronghold, a region known as West Nile. They killed tens of thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands, more in the region north of Kampala known as the Luwero Triangle, where Museveni's insurgency was based. Ultimately Okello turned on Obote. The six months of Okello's tenure as head of state were the most chaotic in Uganda's history; Kampala disintegrated into Beirut-like fiefs controlled by warlords and murderous gangs. Museveni's forces seized the capital in January of 1986, and Okello fled into exile. He was invited back in November of last year with the promise of amnesty—and armed protection.

Now eighty years old, carrying a cane of gold and carved ebony, dressed in a dark-brown suit and a blue necktie with a pattern of crossed Winchester rifles, Okello seemed fit, good-natured, wily. He told me that love of his country and the lure of "fifteen to twenty grandchildren" had brought him back. He spoke in



Kampala: back to business

Acholi, his native tongue, which was translated for me by his aide-de-camp.

Okello's career tracked the history of Uganda in microcosm. Like many young Acholis before and after, Okello sought his fortune as a soldier, joining the old British colonial army, the King's African Rifles, at the start of the Second World War. He fought against the Italians in Eritrea and against the Japanese in Burma. After the war he was an instructor in the colonial force that crushed the nationalist Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. It was in the King's African Rifles that Okello met Idi Amin, who reminded him then of a hyena, he told me—"always looking to steal, wary of others, not a stable man."

At independence from Britain, in 1962, Uganda, an example of colonial map-making at its most arbitrary, was already vulnerable even by the standards of post-colonial Africa to the destructive forces of sectarianism and ethnicity. Its borders had been drawn up by the European colonial powers at the oft-lamented Berlin conference of 1884, with little regard to the interests of the indigenous peoples. Some forty distinct ethnic groups were roped together.

As elsewhere in the British Empire, from Nigeria to South Africa to India, the system of "indirect rule" accentuated ethnic differences by vesting unaccountable power in tribal chiefs and by divvying up schooling and jobs according to the time-honored method of divide and rule. The Baganda, whose kingdom was the most advanced and whose lands in the fertile mountainous region around their capital, Kampala, were the best suited to export crops, were favored for posts in the colonial service—and thus for the schooling needed to fill them. Stereotyped as warlike, the Nilotics of the north—the Acholi and Langi, and also the Kakwa, Idi Amin's tribe—filled out the ranks of the colonial army, along with Nubians from Sudan who were brought in as mercenaries.

Comparable conditions existed in nearly all the countries of postcolonial Africa, yet not all degenerated to the depths that Uganda did. It is not true that Africa's many tribes are inevitably prone to conflict and bloodshed; most, even among Uganda's forty-odd tribes, live side by side in relative harmony. In Uganda as elsewhere, though, inherent divisions were compounded by feeble institutions of law and civil society, which left the

country especially vulnerable to the idiosyncratic personalities of its leaders. "What happened here was not inevitable," Grace Ibingira told me. Ibingira, a veteran Ugandan politician, was Justice Minister in Obote's first Cabinet before he was jailed for five years, and served as ambassador to the United Nations under Amin until he went into exile. "It all had to do with the personalities of the people involved at critical periods in our history."

Milton Obote now lives in Zambia in what is by all accounts a mostly drunken exile; Ugandans say that he was often publicly drunk while in power. Obote never achieved the worldwide infamy of Idi Amin, but his impact on Uganda was

five years Obote oversaw the cumulative militarization of power, which became blatant when Amin led a successful coup in January of 1971. The militarization of politics fragmented the army and security forces, largely along ethnic lines. As first Amin's faction and later Obote's assumed power, they set about liquidating their predecessors and the predecessors' families and presumed civilian supporters—along with the supporters of new insurgencies, which inevitably arose in response.

"It was just open, straightforward, the fighting that took place in Uganda," Tito Okello told me. "It was a big war." I asked him about the Luwero Triangle. "The allegations were one-sided," Okello


"DEMBE kintu kikulu, eeh, eeh, dembe kintu kikulu, eeh"—"Peace is very important, yes, yes, peace is very important, yes." The singers were lined up twelve in a row before President Museveni, with the drummers in front, in a clearing on the edge of Wobulenzi, a rural trading center in the Luwero Triangle. In the early 1980s Luwero came to be known as the killing fields of Uganda. Luwero is where Museveni waged his five-year guerrilla struggle against Obote—and where Obote's marauding gang of an army waged its wanton, largely indiscriminate, ultimately futile counterinsurgency campaign. Perhaps 300,000 civilians were killed. A quarter of Luwero's children were orphaned.

Peace is very important, yes, and most Ugandans are living in peace. The economy is picking up. Schools and hospitals have reopened. Refugees have returned. Ugandans are living with hope. "Let's agree on the essential points," Museveni told me. "Regular elections, universal franchise, free press, separation of powers."

But peace can also be relative. If Museveni has friends in Luwero and throughout the south of Uganda, he also has enemies, mainly in the north and east. After NRA forces took power in 1986, in a continuation of the familiar cycle remnants of Obote's UNLA army went back into the bush in the north to wage yet another guerrilla campaign. The NRA has been battling a succession of insurgencies in the north ever since, by turns crushing and coopting the insurgents and their supporters. Not a few civilians have been killed.

When I met Museveni at his farm, I asked him what it would take to arrest so entrenched a cycle of ethnic violence. "What Europeans and Americans call ethnicity in this context is actually backwardness—social and economic backwardness," Museveni said. "Africa is pre-industrial. It does not have a middle class. Its dominant opinions are held by peasants. Their attitudes are often parochial. They do not have a vested interest in cosmopolitanism or in nationalism."

The President was, obliquely, making the case for his economic program as a key to stability. It is a virtual textbook adaptation of the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment program: free markets, a convertible currency, an independent central bank, selling off state-owned companies, tight budgets,



President Yoweri Museveni, at his cattle farm

just as destructive. Unlike Amin, Obote was a weak and paranoid leader who handled the army with kid gloves. He created the opening for the rule of the gun. Idi Amin was Obote's hatchet man. "Amin had two qualifications," Ibingira recalled. "The first was that he was ruthless, so Obote could unleash him. The second was that Amin was illiterate. Obote believed that Amin would not aspire to overthrow him. There he was wrong."

THE descent into chaos began in earnest with the so-called Buganda crisis, in 1966, when Obote, the country's first Prime Minister, suspended the constitution and ordered army units under Amin's command to attack the palace of the Kabaka, the popular hereditary king of the Baganda, who were Uganda's largest and most prosperous tribe. Over the next

replied. "The deaths should not be attributed to one side only."

Okello would appear to be a war criminal. That he is back in Uganda is a testament to Museveni's policy of cooptation rather than confrontation. Civilian officials from previous regimes and hundreds of members of the myriad erstwhile fighting forces, police and intelligence units, private militias, and bandit gangs have been lured out of the bush or exile and integrated into Museveni's umbrella-like National Resistance Movement and its National Resistance Army. The goal is reconciliation. Thus very few people have been held accountable for past crimes; a great many Ugandans have quite literally gotten away with murder. I asked Okello if he has any crimes to answer for. "Even up until now people still like me," he replied. "I am a man of peace."

and downsizing the civil service and the army. Museveni has invited back Uganda's Asians, whom Amin expelled in the early 1970s, and has returned their property. His aim is to attract investors and build a middle class. "If there is a middle class, it will cut across ethnic groups," Museveni said. Not surprisingly, some of Museveni's most fervent support comes from the growing number of Ugandans who have come to be known as "my cars"—members of a modernized elite who can't stop talking about their cars.

"Backwardness" is also Museveni's explanation for the dangers of multi-partyism. His argument is simple: multi-party democracy works where social divisions are horizontal, based on class. In Africa the divisions are vertical, based on tribe, and political parties inevitably reflect that vertical division. In Uganda this is not just an academic point. The existing parties are in fact closely identified with ethnic and sectarian interests—and with the regimes that represented those interests to the detriment of others. Milton Obote's old Uganda Peoples Congress remains a force in Ugandan politics, and is identified with northerners, mostly Acholis and Langis. Although the UPC and other parties were barred from publicly backing candidates during the campaign, the party allegiances of most candidates were well known, and "pro-multi-party" or "multi-partyist" was in many cases code for pro-UPC.

Three weeks before election day, in a widely criticized move, three top UPC leaders were arrested and charged with sedition. The charges stemmed from a manifesto published by the UPC which alleged that Museveni's government was dominated by "foreigners"—specifically, Banyarwandans, people of Rwandan origin. Many top officials in Museveni's NRA were, in fact, Rwandan refugees, primarily Tutsis, who had settled in



Taxis await fares in Kampala

Uganda after fleeing ethnic violence in Rwanda decades earlier; others were Ugandans of Rwandan descent. In 1982 President Obote expelled more than 80,000 Banyarwandans from southwest Uganda. Many returned to the country as NRA guerrillas, and when Museveni took power, they took power with him. Now Obote's old UPC allies, campaigning as "multi-partyists," were raising doubts about Museveni's ethnicity as a means of discrediting his government. Museveni ordered them arrested.

"They are criminals," Museveni told me with evident bitterness. "These multi-partyists are not committed to multi-party politics. It is a means of dividing the people. We look at them as traitors. They are opportunists manipulating ethnic divisions."

Clearly Museveni has an authoritarian streak, but his comments underscore the complexity of Uganda's predicament. What he says about the multi-partyists undoubtedly is true: many are, in fact, cynical partisans of a discredited regime that murdered thousands. Not a few Ugandans who are otherwise critical of the "movement" system nevertheless defended the sedition arrests as a necessary evil.

Meanwhile, at the height of the election campaign, Museveni's army was battling in the north with yet another remnant of the old insurgent forces, a ragtag collection of bandits who call themselves the Lord's Resistance Army. The sometimes heavy-handed counterinsurgency campaign was reviving old enmities. "This fear is coming up again," I was told when I visited the northern

provincial capital of Gulu, where some said Museveni was scarcely better than Idi Amin. "Museveni is more educated," I was told. "Museveni is a learned killer."


An extreme view, perhaps, but reports of army abuses, though not generally considered on a scale comparable with those from past regimes, were consistent with the record of abuses the army committed during previous NRA campaigns against northern insurgents. Amnesty International has documented beatings, torture, and massacres of unarmed civilians, including children and whole families. When I asked Museveni about these allegations, he said, "I don't dispute them. What I don't agree with is the charge that we condone abuses, that we know about but ignore abuses, that we cover up abuses. In fact we have executed soldiers who committed abuses." Indeed, Amnesty International, which opposes the death penalty, protested in 1992 that more than forty soldiers had been executed since 1987. "Amnesty says executions are too harsh," Museveni continued. "We still apply the law of Moses. We still say an eye for an eye. If you kill someone, you must die."

The constituent-assembly elections were Uganda's first legitimate balloting since independence from Britain, in 1962, and foreign election observers judged them generally free and fair. Museveni's "pro-movement" candidates won two thirds of the seats, but multi-partyists won nearly all the seats in the north, underlining the degree to which the country remains polarized along ethnic lines.

UGANDA'S continued polarization is worrisome not just because of the legacy of past ethnic conflict but because of the continued absence or weakness of the mediating institutions of civil society. Amin and Obote destroyed the rule of law in Uganda. Museveni, to his credit, has sought to re-establish it. He virtually scrapped the discredited police force he inherited in 1986 and has hired and trained a new one. With Western aid he is rebuilding a cowed and withered judiciary—he told me there were only "three or four" high-court justices left in the entire country when he came to power. He has also worked to diversify and professionalize the army. By all accounts (except in the north), the progress on these fronts has been remarkable. But there is still a long way to go, and abuses still occur.

*Ugandans need only
look next door to see
how fleeting peace
can be. Rwanda had
decades of peace.*

One of Museveni's first acts when he came to power, in 1986, was to establish a human-rights commission to document the country's history of abuses and, many Ugandans hoped, identify and prosecute the culprits. The results have been disappointing. Inevitably, past regimes were closely identified with particular regions and tribes; going after accused human-rights abusers was perceived in those regions as persecuting their tribes. In some instances communities refused to cooperate with investigators, shielding criminals in their midst on grounds of ethnic solidarity. And there was concern that because so many people had blood on their hands, settling accounts would be impossible.



Musevenian democracy? Voting procedures explained, in Kampala

The recurring insurgencies in the north also created problems. Many northern insurgents, who had fought for Obote, were motivated by fear that they would be brought to account by a government dominated by southerners. In 1987 a broad amnesty was declared, in hopes of luring northern rebels out of the bush. This was Museveni's strategy of "buying peace." He offered rebels a chance to be integrated into the national army. Many of them took it. "We thought that trying to punish everybody would be an endless process," Museveni told me.

The downside, of course, is that a great many murderers are at large. "A government has given an amnesty, but the people against whom these crimes have been committed didn't give that amnesty—the people have not forgiven them," Joan Kakwenziri, a historian who serves on the

Human Rights Commission, says. "Amnesty is really just a cover-up of the problem. It's like pushing dirt and dust under the rug. Eventually it begins to smell. It doesn't work." Of course, the NRM now has its own crimes to answer for in the north. "I think they feel quite inadequate to be the judges," Kakwenziri said.

Others, too, worry about the country's future. Ugandans need only look across their borders to know how fleeting peace can be. Rwanda had three decades of peace. Sudan has had seventeen years of war, eleven years of peace, and then, since 1983, a decade more of ruinous war, with no end in sight. Yet Su-

dan also teaches that multi-party democracy is no panacea: it had such a democracy for three years, until in 1989 it was swept away by a military coup led by Islamic fundamentalists.

Uganda and its army still revolve around the personal leadership of Museveni, who has shown, for better or worse, that he can be as authoritarian as he is visionary. Museveni has said that he will step down after five more years. "My cows are crying for me," he told me with a chuckle. "My mission is now almost accomplished, which is to orient my people toward modernization. We shall complete this process of democratization."

Not many Ugandans I spoke with were so confident. "The stability of Uganda hinges on one man," said Billy O'Kadimiri, an Acholi journalist in Gulu whose support for the movement has put him at

odds with many of his neighbors. "National sanity and international respect revolve around one man. In a situation of vacuum of leadership there will be a direct slide to anarchy. People are still not sure that if Museveni is not there, would the army behave as it is behaving now? These are their fears."

They are fears I heard over and over again. At Makerere University, in Kampala, a group of law students I met with, all born in Amin's time, some of them orphans of the Luwero war, others ex-combatants, agreed that Uganda remains a "powder keg." Their Harvard-trained lecturer, Joe Oloka-Onyango, told me, "Museveni has been a boon and a bane, larger than life. No other person could have done what he has done. My problem is sustainability. The institutional basis for stability has not been created. If Museveni were to disappear, a lot that is positive would collapse. It's too close to a one-party system. It's a slippery slope. At some point diminishing returns are going to set in. Museveni must recognize the point at which it's time to let go."

Museveni scarcely blinked when I mentioned these doubts. "When we defeated the dictatorship," he said, "our first task was to put these pillars in place: to restore the police, to restore the rule of law, to restore the civil service, to restore the army, and to restore the judiciary." One can only hope that he succeeds in this task above all others. In my conversations with Museveni he repeatedly stressed what he called the "ignorance" of Uganda's "bad elements." This was part of his rationale for a broad amnesty. Speaking of Amin, Okello, and those under them, he said, "They were doing what they were doing because of ignorance. People cannot be punished for what they don't know very well. There are two priorities: The first is to remove the criminals from power. That one we have done. The second is to educate people about a modern ethos."

But there are "bad elements" everywhere; what's to stop them from taking over again? Uganda will have real peace only when its stability depends not on the character of its leaders but on the quality of the institutions those leaders are a part of. History will judge Yoweri Museveni not according to the measure of peace he has achieved while in power but on whether it survives after he steps down—assuming he keeps his word. ☉

An independent monitor talks about the 1996 elections

Q & A Q: What is your opinion of political developments in Uganda since 1986?

A: I think it has been highly positive if you measure it against the period before. Uganda was just coming out of a period of violence then. I was in Rwanda but I know people who would go to Nairobi through Uganda with some trepidation. The security situation over the last 10 years has improved remarkably. So has the legal system.

Q: You were here during the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Do you think the elections were free and fair?

A: They were a major step forward and technically successful. It was an improvement over the Constituent Assembly elections which were also technically successful. The Interim Electoral Commission did an excellent job. The voters were able to vote largely free of intimidation, ballots were counted accurately and campaigns were run according to the law.

Q: So there were no problems?

A: The problem is that the law itself is not entirely adequate. It is not a complete law, when is Museveni a President and when is he a candidate? In most countries that is not a question to be asked because everybody is free to campaign whenever he wants campaign.

By limiting the campaign period in an election to 39 days you make that a crucial question. The opponents, Semogerere and Mayanja could probably say that when Museveni was doing something during Christmas he was more of a candidate than president and they should have been allowed to do similar activities.

Q: Was that the only problem in the whole election period?

A: I think the Internal Security agents did not act appropriately for a democracy. By contrast the police made a major step forward in conforming to democracy. It was positive and I would characterise it as a major step forward. But more steps need to be taken.

Q: Do you think these problems significantly influenced the outcome of the election, say percentage of the votes Museveni got?

A: No. I think the vast majority of people in Uganda wanted to vote for him. Semogerere and Mayanja didn't lose because of the way the ISOs behaved. But I still think Uganda needs to bring the intelligence services under control.

Q: Many NRM candidates in the parliamentary elections harped so much on being close to the President...telling the electorate to vote for them because they are close to Museveni. What do you think of this?

A: This is typical of democracies around the world. If you have a popular incumbent, people will want to be identified with that incumbent. It happens in the USA all the time.

Q: What do you see as the

future of the movement type of government in Uganda?

A: My understanding is that the movement came in as a transition type of government. I would emphasize transition. That is what they said and I would hope the people of Uganda hold them to this. But I think the time will come when Ugandans need to go to full multiparty democracy, maybe the NRM will turn itself into one or two new parties.

Q: Some of the NRM people think they have invented a new unique form of Government that is suitable to Uganda. And the argument holds at the moment.

A: That is not true. What they have done has taken a traditional form of government and transformed it to meet the needs of Uganda over the last 10 years. I do not think it will meet the needs of Uganda indefinitely. I would certainly hope that within the next 5 years there will be multinary democracy in Uganda and the NRM might be a party that will contest elections as a party.

Q: So you think the NRM should transform itself into a political party?

A: That would be a positive step. But the constitutional articles 269 should be changed to allow for anyone who wishes to form a political party to do so and to contest election.

Q: But parties in Uganda



Norman Olsen: the law was not entirely adequate. Photo by Kalungi Kabuye.

Kind words for Museveni, not the movement

have a bad track record. They were a recipe for chaos and recent developments inside the UPC can be seen as testimony to this. They are wrangling and the movement should continue for some time because it ensures stability.

A: I don't agree with that argument. Certainly there is all sorts of infighting in the NRM. I think there has been a tendency to blame the political parties for the chaos and violence but they should not take all the blame. Most of the Ugandans I have talked to seem to believe the problem has not been the political parties but the occupants of State House, be that Obote or Amin.

But the traditional parties deserve some blame also. They didn't believe in multiparty democracy either because when the UPC came in they equally tried to convert themselves into a one party state.

Q: So how can Uganda

"There were always things I wanted to do but never got the time...like climbing the Rwenzori Mountains," says Olsen of his stay in Uganda. He arrived in Uganda from Rwanda on August 29, 1990, and immediately built up a large number of friends. Together with his wife Betsy and two children, Olsen has been active in the Charismatic Church and in coaching basketball at the Rhino Club in Kampala. "I came to Uganda because my daughter wanted to go to boarding school and I was given an option to either go to Nigeria or Uganda. I chose Uganda..." he says. Before coming to Uganda, he had lived in Latin America, Vietnam, Kenya, Cameroon, Rwanda, Botswana, Nigeria and Ghana. Although his job mainly involved strategic planning and budgeting at the USAID mission, he was also involved in political developments in Uganda and monitored CA, Presidential and Parliamentary elections, and was widely quoted in press circles. As Programme Officer at the USAID Mission in Kampala for six years, Norman Olsen has closely watched political and economic developments in Uganda for six years. Olsen, who is leaving the country talked to *The New Vision's* Erich Ogoso Opolot mainly about Ugandan politics. Below are excerpts of the interview:

maintain stability?

A: In the long term and it is up to Ugandans to decide what the long term is; I think stability will only be achieved and maintained in Uganda by a political system that allows everybody to freely advance their preferences.

Q: Do you agree that the movement is the best form of government Uganda has had since independence?

A: Museveni has certainly been a remarkable head of state. He has done very good things to bring stability, to stimulate the economy, to re-

pair basic infrastructure and I think the movement does reflect his personality. When Ugandans voted for the movement, I think they voted more for Museveni and what he has accomplished.

Q: Do you think the movement type of government is good for other countries with problems like Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria?

A: Rwanda had a movement, the MRND and it worked rather well for a 20 year period. But where it faltered was when it was time for Habyarimana as head of state to be replaced. One, there was nobody suitable to take his place, two there was nobody to tell him it was time to go. The big problem with movements is that they tend to reflect the personality of the individual but one's time runs out no matter how good you are.

Q: So when should Museveni quit to avoid a Rwanda kind of situation?

A: Certainly there will come

a time when Uganda will be better served by other leaders. Where the movement here scores is that they tried to make it a national movement not just an ethnic type of movement. Burundi is more of an ethnic situation while Nigeria is a more complicated situation. Time for Museveni to quit...that is up to Ugandans to decide.

Q: You witnessed the election of the new parliament. What is your impression so far?

A: A lot of development needs to take place. One of their first acts—approving the appointments to cabinet wasn't their finest hour. It was remarkable that a slate of 60 potential ministers was given and after approval you would be told what capacity they would serve in. One could argue that that is a step forward but I think the parliamentarians were all eager to become ministers themselves and did not look at the situation as independently as they should have. Appointments should be scrutinised more closely next time.

Q: The blanket approval of presidential nominees was almost reminiscent of the way the NRC used to operate. Some people argue that the NRM has a big majority in the house. Do you see a situation where this parliament could become like the NRC; where the influence of the dominant group overshadows all other interests?

A: That is possible. I hope the situation with the ministers was a unique one time event and that parliament will act more independently although the parliament needs to work with the President.

Q: What about the ban parliament has imposed on the press covering their closed sessions. Do you think this is fair to the public?

A: Having some sessions closed is some times fair and there are some issues you may want to discuss in private. But this should be limited because if the constitution says you have freedom of the press and the parliament says you cannot publish some things that is a potentially dangerous situation. (The ban was lifted. Ed.)

Q: What do you think should happen to the IEC eventually?

A: I think they did an excellent job; not perfect though. They should be made a permanent commission and perhaps play a wider role in regulating political activities here than they have done in the past.

Q: What in your opinion is the root cause of instability in Africa?

A: The biggest problem is unemployment. There are far too many youths who do not have a job and so they are influenced by people like Joseph Kony who comes along to say hey, you don't have a job, so join me and we go around the countryside shooting people.

Africa is also relatively young. Most of the countries became independent over the last 30 to 40 years and they are only building up their legal and political institutions.

King of Buganda Takes Role Seriously, Titular Though It Is

The Ugandan Tribal Leader Sold Windows in England, Now Is Back in His Palaces

By TIM CARRINGTON

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
KAMPALA, Uganda—An aide suggests a Western visitor greet the King of Buganda with the simple salutation: "Sabasujja, Kabaka" — loosely "his majesty, the king" or, literally, "man above other men."

A venerable London barrister says he merely kneels to address the king, though others lie prostrate on the floor. In a still more dramatic gesture, some villagers earlier this year lay in the path of the kabaka's moving Mercedes.

Managing the adulation is one of many new tasks for 38-year-old Ronald Muwenda Mutebi, enthroned as king last year after leading a modest life in one-bedroom flats in England, where for a while he sold double-glazed windows and wrote articles for a Nigerian magazine. The switch to reigning monarch, a big career move, wasn't, however, a complete surprise.

"Even though I had grown up in exile, I'd been brought up with the notion that I was my father's heir and that this role was something I would eventually do," he explains.

Buganda isn't a country, but rather the most powerful of several ancient kingdoms colonial mapmakers lumped into the present state of Uganda. The kabaka, as the king is called, is a serious man, albeit one who enjoys Eddie Murphy movies. He is living one of them in rewind: "Coming to America," which is about an African prince who moves West.

Relaxing in loafers and a sport jacket at the Kololo palace here, the Cambridge-educated kabaka seems as properly English as county cricket and tea on the lawn. But he also relishes the ancient traditions of Buganda and hopes to prove that Africa can modernize without losing its identity or mimicking its European colonizers.

"My father's coronation," he says, "was supposed to have been particularly hijacked by the Anglican church, and the traditional aspects were played down." So at his own enthronement there was a distinctly African tone, as well as Anglican hymns. The kabaka was clad in leopard skin and bark shawls — which wasn't easy, he adds, since "most of the ceremonial garments were destroyed" during the tyrannical regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote. He beat ancestral drums, touched the neck of a white cow with a spear and, just before the enthronement, visited his father's umbilical cord, carefully preserved through two decades of chaos and civil war alongside those of earlier kings.

Rich Landlord

Those cramped quarters in England are just an unpleasant memory. King Ronald has two palaces, with a third to be refurbished. He owns 350 square miles of Buganda, which generates sufficient farming and rental income to finance his monarchy. But in the name of frugality, two recent ceremonial occasions were merged — the first anniversary of his coronation and his 38th birthday.

The kabaka was just nine years old and enrolled in an English boarding school



King Ronald

The King of Buganda Is Living An Eddie Murphy Movie in Rewind

Continued From First Page

went over the palace wall to escape President Obote's rampaging army. After a hard trek through the bush, and a rest stop in Burundi, the ousted king ended up in a dreary suburban London bed-sit. He died in his London exile three years later, poisoned. Bagandans believe but haven't proved, by an agent of the Obote government.

For 27 years, Bagandans waited for the return of royalty, but the heir bided his time. After President Yoweri Museveni had stopped the killing and restored stability, the kabaka, in late 1992, made his move. "I went to see the president with a delegation of Bagandans," he recalls. "I said, 'Look, a lot of people in Buganda believe it's now time to restore the monarchy, and we should now do so.'"

President Museveni agreed to call home the king of Buganda, plus the monarchs of four smaller groups, provided they



serve as titular leaders.

This limitation hasn't damped local enthusiasm. Several months ago, when the kabaka was scheduled to drive through Masaka, a down-at-the-heels town west of Kampala, people lined up along the road hours in advance, adorning it with arrangements of flowers and banana leaves. When the entourage arrived, some subjects offered to be run over; others begged the kabaka's driver to kill the motor so they could push the car along its way.

King Ronald doesn't take these blandishments personally. They come with the job. In the 19th century, amazed European explorers wrote that Mutesa I, his great-great-grandfather, never had to look for a chair when he sat down: A page was always at the ready to drop onto all fours and provide a seat.

Cleanup Squad

Recently, President Museveni ruled that a palace of the late King Edward would remain army property for another year or so, but that a nearby lake, where the late king had enjoyed swimming, would be the kabaka's. Spontaneously, hundreds of Bagandans arrived to clean up

the lake, which Idi Amin had used as a body dump in the 1970s and which was subsequently reclaimed by the bush. Today, its sloping banks are lovingly manicured and there's an island (with palms) in the center.

Nearby, the National Council of Traditional Healers and Herbalists Associations, or Nacotha, operates a great bazaar of ancient cures for everything from ulcers to premature ejaculation. The kabaka, who opened the medicinal mall, is honored in stall after stall with pictures showing him in full regalia, seated on his leopard skin. Beneath a huge guava tree, the healers erected a thatch shrine where the king can go to think things through in times of perplexity.

He hopes all this reverence for him and his position will help him deal with modern problems like deforestation. Worried about dwindling jungles, the kabaka has inspired a tree-planting boomlet. Street vendors in Kampala, which is part of Buganda, sell seedlings. "If the king says something, it will be done," says one devout Bagandan.

More broadly, the kabaka thinks traditions of Buganda can serve as a fire wall against the mayhem that has plagued the nation on and off since Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962.

Underlying Order

The king cites Buganda's traditional emphasis on order and stability dating back to the 14th century.

Much of the structure comes through a complex clan system over which the king presides. "I've got the duty of being the major arbiter of clan disputes," he explains, adding that "because they've been in disarray for 30 years," there's no shortage of quarrels. There are 52 clans in Buganda, each with its own animal totem and leadership organization.

Modern politics may yet intrude. Ugandans currently are debating a new constitution, and some want a federated structure extending a measure of self-governance to Buganda and the other ancient kingdoms. In the past, such ideas have helped split Uganda into warring factions. King Ronald avoids the debate and is concentrating instead on plans for a non-profit operation, to be called the Kabaka's Foundation, to address environmental issues and AIDS, a terrible problem for Uganda.

King Ronald's overarching goal is a synthesis that has eluded most of Africa—a melding of tradition and Western advances. "The more enlightened African governments in the 1990s," he says, "have found that rather than uproot ancient cultures, why not work hand in hand with them? A blending of ancient and modern is the only way Africa will progress."

USAID CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION FY 1997

Following is a Web version of a document from USAID's 1997 Congressional Presentation. Please note that some formatting may have been lost in the automated conversion of the original file. This document is also available for download in its original WordPerfect 5.1 format.

UGANDA

FY 1997 Development Fund for Africa: \$48,030,357
FY 1997 P.L. 480 Title II: \$4,387,000

Introduction.

Uganda is in the midst of completing a remarkable transformation from 20 years of chaos and violence to stability, recovery and growth. Signs of progress abound. The economy grew by 10% over the past year while limiting inflation to 3.4%. A new democratic constitution has been promulgated, general elections were held in May 1996, investment exceeded \$200 million in the past year, and, significantly, the human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) infection rate appears to be declining. The USAID program has had a major impact by assisting Uganda in creating an environment which has made these achievements possible, and which has set the stage for completing the transition to constitutional democracy accompanied by sustained economic growth. Located in the Greater Horn of Africa, Uganda is a concrete example to other nations in the area of the benefits of free-market economics combined with democratic government. Uganda has been highly supportive of U.S. policy initiatives in the region, including humanitarian operations, peace-keeping and the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI).

The Development Challenge.

Stability and sound economic policies have brought growth which has set the stage for completing the transition to constitutional democracy. This environment is attracting large-scale private investment. Completing the transition remains an enormous challenge that will take several years, but both the government and people of Uganda are committed to finishing the job. Their achievements over the past five years strongly suggest they will fulfill their commitments.

Although economic growth has increased real per capita income by 20% since 1986, to \$180 in 1994, this is still 23% below the level of 25 years ago, placing Uganda among the poorest countries in the world. Life expectancy, estimated at 37 years, is the lowest in the world as the alarmingly high prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) -- perhaps as high as 20% of sexually-active women and men -- affects every aspect of the society. Only 48% of adults are literate -- well below levels in neighboring Kenya and Tanzania -- an indication of an education system where lack of access and poor quality limit the supply of basic skills within the economy. Inadequate physical infrastructure for energy, transportation, and telecommunications has severely limited Uganda's ability to meet the demands of a growing private sector. Despite the strong liberalization of the past five years, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) project that Uganda will continue to depend on substantial external assistance for at least the next decade. The proliferation of water hyacinth, a plant which chokes lakes and rivers, is a new environmental threat to the livelihoods of people throughout the region.

Uganda remains severely indebted; its \$3.2 billion debt at the end of 1994 is equivalent to about 60% of gross domestic product (GDP). Debt service payments represent 23% of government-financed expenditures, reducing productive investments. Multilateral debt accounts for three-quarters of the debt and two-thirds of projected debt service, severely limiting Uganda's access to relief under existing international arrangements. Illustrating the confidence the international community has in how the government manages the economy, Uganda became the first nation under the Paris Club to receive permission to write off \$71 million in debt; even so, the next three years' debt service will be 50% higher than Uganda has paid in the past three years. This is a staggering burden.

Effective implementation of sound economic policies has permitted Uganda to manage its debt while continuing to grow economically. A major factor in these achievements has been the leadership, technical assistance and financing which USAID has provided. Uganda's economy can point to the following noteworthy achievements as illustrative of what has been achieved with USAID assistance. The growth of non-traditional exports from a low base five years ago to over \$100 million in 1995, the improved management of natural resources contributing to the four-fold increase in tourism over the past four years, and the groundbreaking reduction in the incidence of HIV transmission are among the visible fruits of this program.

Other Donors.

Uganda's remarkable record of economic growth over the past five years has enabled the country to finance a higher percentage of its development program, but Uganda will still be dependent on external assistance for a number of years. Approximately one-third of public expenditure is externally financed. The World Bank is the largest and most influential donor. USAID is the fifth largest bilateral donor behind Denmark, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Japan. Donor coordination is good and USAID provides parallel financing for major reform programs in the health and education sectors with the World Bank. Donors collectively pledged \$800 million dollars for FYs 1995/96 at the annual meeting of donors convened by the World Bank meeting in July 1995.

FY 1997 Program.

The foundation for sustainable growth now exists, and USAID will continue to build on it through investments in primary education, health, environmental management and agricultural production.

U.S. intervention has been a key factor in stimulating Uganda's remarkable transformation. However, much remains to be done, and it is in the interest of the United States to apply continued engagement in selected sectors. American investors are already benefitting from the strikingly improved investment climate. Uganda is also becoming an American customer, and imports of U.S.-manufactured goods increased sixfold between 1985 and 1996. Equally important, it is in the U.S. interest that the principles underlying Uganda's positive transition, including free-market economics, constitutional democracy and public accountability, be spread to the several troubled countries in the region. This can happen if those principles continue to be practiced, bringing benefits to Uganda and to the region. Uganda is now part of the solution, but without continued support, there is significant risk it would become part of the problem. The failure of Uganda to maintain its march toward constitutional democracy would likely add to the pool of refugees and humanitarian crisis in the area.

A reduction in resources will result in the cancellation of activities in each of USAID's four strategic areas, hurting both American and Ugandan interests. In real terms, a reduction would mean training fewer primary teachers and health workers, canceling procurement of desperately-needed equipment for schools and health centers, reducing credit for poor rural business people, and scaling back support to

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in HIV testing and counseling. Because most planned activities are underway, we are already engaged with, and committed to, numerous partner organizations and communities. Resource cuts will jeopardize contracts and grants with our U.S. partners and undermine the development efforts and aspirations of the Ugandan people.

Four strategic objectives (SOs) and one specific objective comprise USAID's program of assistance to Uganda. While activities under each SO target specific development problems, the SOs are mutually reinforcing and in some cases contribute to the achievement of more than one Agency goal.

Agency Goal: Encouraging Broad-Based Economic Growth

Underlying sustainable development in Uganda is continuing political stability and broad-based economic progress. The benefits of growth will have broader impact if shared, especially among the majority rural population. Two of USAID's four strategic objectives address this pressing need.

SO 1 aims to increase income from on-farm activities, primarily by promoting non-traditional exports, and from off-farm activities by encouraging the growth of micro and small enterprises, and by improving the business environment. Increasing non-traditional agriculture exports can benefit thousands of marginalized farmers. Title II resources are an integral part of the Mission's strategic objective in economic growth. Title II is used to improve rural infrastructure and expand opportunities to grow and market traditional export crops including coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco. The Title II resource is also used to revitalize the Cooperative Bank, the only formal financial institution active in agricultural credit. A successful example is a pyrethrum activity promoted by a U.S. investor and financed under a USAID-supported venture capital fund in the remote southern part of the country has tripled income for over 3,000 producers, mostly women. The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), a U.S. NGO, has organized over 1,000 women into savings groups that have borrowed, and repaid, over \$400,000 during the last two years. This is a significant achievement in a country where rural credit programs have a reputation for failure.

SO 3 responds to the long-term need for literacy and other basic skills in order to boost productivity and provide an informed and responsible electorate. USAID's policy dialogue has strengthened the Government of Uganda's ability to adopt policies leading to wholesale reform of the primary education system. New policies have resulted in the construction of hundreds of classrooms, the removal of thousands of redundant, untrained teachers from the payrolls and a sixfold increase in teachers' salaries, in-service training for thousands of other teachers, and the purchase of 1.5 million textbooks. During the last year the percentage of untrained teachers in the classroom fell from 50% to 40%.

- Strategic Objective 1: Increase Rural Household Incomes
- Strategic Objective 3: Improve the Quality and Efficiency of Basic Education

Agency Goal: Protecting the Environment

USAID selected Uganda as a Biodiversity Priority Country containing unique, essential ecosystems critical to the conservation of globally-important biodiversity. Uganda's unique biodiversity has been placed at risk by intense and increasing population pressures, poverty, unsustainable natural-resource management practices, and a history of conflict. Therefore, this Strategic Objective addresses the challenge of biodiversity conservation by assisting Uganda to maintain the integrity of targeted biodiverse ecosystems.

USAID emphasizes natural-resource planning, strengthening management of protected areas and support to NGOs engaged in activities which integrate conservation and development in and around protected areas.

Uganda successfully completed a National Environmental Action Plan in May 1995 with the passage of landmark implementation legislation. The new legislation defines both needs and guidelines for biodiversity conservation. Management of Uganda's protected areas, USAID's target areas for biodiversity stabilization, by the Uganda Wildlife Authority has improved markedly through strengthened management capacity, improved infrastructure, and higher revenues from ecotourism. Finally, the incentives and ability of local communities to conserve biodiversity have grown due to new revenue-sharing policies, access to resources, and ongoing conservation education.

- Strategic Objective 2: Stabilize Biodiversity in Target Areas

Agency Goal: Stabilizing World Population Growth and Protecting Human Health

Uganda was among the first countries in Africa to be hit hard by the HIV pandemic. Close to 10% of the total population may be infected, and cases are mostly among adults in the prime of their economic lives and those about to enter this age group. A large, and generally unattended, problem with sexually transmitted infections is probably a significant contributor to continuing HIV incidence.

With one of the highest fertility rates in Africa, Uganda has a serious population problem. At current rates, the population will double in 21 years. This has resulted in a disproportionately large number of children dependent upon a correspondingly small number of adults. In Uganda over 50% of the population is under 20 years old. Women have an average of 6.8 children each, so many that childbearing poses a significant health threat to both women and children. Although precise figures are not available, prevailing opinion is that maternal mortality is extremely high, and poor child-spacing contributes to poor nutrition, which in turn leads to sickness and physical and mental stunting. Infant mortality has been estimated at 81/1,000 live births, a surprising figure in that it is lower than most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Fertility has dropped since 1989, and it appears that Uganda is entering a period of significant fertility decline. While the causes for this decline are complex, USAID's support for family planning and use of modern contraceptives has played an important role. Contraceptive use has increased from 2.5% to 7.8% since 1991. USAID's social-marketing program has helped create a robust commercial market for family planning and maternal health services. It also appears that the incidence of new HIV infection has levelled off and actually started to decline. Constraints that USAID will address include poorly trained health workers, reluctance among many Ugandans to use modern health services.

- Strategic Objective 4: Improve the Reproductive Health of Ugandans

Agency Goal: Building Democracy

Uganda has made encouraging progress toward becoming a constitutional democracy. Over the past three years, the first free and fair national elections were completed, a new democratic constitution promulgated, and human rights abuses almost eliminated. USAID leadership, technical assistance and financing made a major contribution to these achievements. USAID was actively involved with the preparations for the general elections for president and parliament, held in May 1996. Although there were a few allegations of election irregularities made primarily by the opposition, the election results were validated, and the first free, peaceful and democratically-elected president has been inaugurated. Building on the foundation of the 1995 constitution, and following the 1996 elections, USAID anticipates funding activities in civic education, judicial improvement and human rights defense. These activities are aimed at assisting Uganda to spread the benefits of democracy to the grass-roots level.

- Specific Objective: Establish a Constitutional Democracy

UGANDA
FY 1997 PROGRAM SUMMARY

	Encouraging Broad-based Economic Growth	Stabilizing World Population Growth & Protecting Human Health	Protecting the Environment	Building Democracy	Providing Humanitarian Assistance	TOTALS
USAID Strategic Objectives						
1. Increase Rural Household Incomes - Dev. Fund for Africa - P.L. 480, Title II	11,847,316				4,387,000	11,847,316 4,387,000
2. Stabilize Biodiversity in Target Areas - Dev. Fund for Africa			8,306,527			8,306,527
3. Improve the Quality and Efficiency of Basic Education -Dev. Fund for Africa	11,691,760			643,597		12,335,357
4. Improve the Reproductive Health of Ugandans - Dev. Fund for Africa		15,541,157				15,541,157
Totals - Dev. Fund for Africa - P.L. 480, Title II	23,539,076	15,541,157	8,306,527	643,597	4,387,000	48,030,357 4,387,000

USAID Mission Director: Donald B. Clark

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE and NUMBER: Increase Rural Household Income, 617-S001

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997 \$11,847,316 DFA, \$4,387,000 P.L. 480, Title II

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 2001

Purpose: To increase rural household income. Increasing income will enhance food security, alleviate poverty and contribute to an improved quality of life for the majority of Ugandans.

Background: USAID's development efforts must result in a better life for the 80% of the people living in poor rural areas. This depends upon higher household income through increased on and off-farm production and better use of family resources. Four on-going activities, as well as the P.L. 480, Title II Program, work to increase household income. Two activities are aimed at expanding non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) in areas where Uganda has a natural comparative advantage. Title II resources are also integrated into the strategy by supporting rural infrastructure improvement and expanding opportunities to grow and market traditional exports crops including coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco. NTAEs can benefit thousands of small farmers. For example, an activity to cultivate pyrethrum, the foundation for natural insecticide, was promoted by a U.S. investor in the remote southern part of the country. It has tripled income for over 3,000, mostly women, producers. A third activity is expanding employment with off-farm activities with small amounts of credit to support agricultural-based businesses such as sunflower oil production. This credit is designed to respond to needs among small and micro enterprises. USAID is also working to build an appropriate business environment for small entrepreneurs in rural Uganda. The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), a U.S. non-governmental organization (NGO), has organized over 1,000 women into savings groups that have borrowed -- and repaid -- over \$400,000 during the last two years. This is a significant achievement in a country where rural credit programs have uniformly failed.

USAID Role and Achievements To Date: USAID acts as a facilitator and catalyst to create an enabling environment in which entrepreneurs can take advantage of Uganda's natural comparative advantages, and new market opportunities emerge. This entails many diverse activities, from working with farmers to improve farming, storage and handling, to helping business people put deals together, and rehabilitating long-impassable rural roads. Our program is working. NTAEs grew at an average annual rate of 35% between 1990 and 1994. Returns to rural labor associated with NTAE production increased at an average annual rate of 25% over the 1990-1993 period, well in excess of the growth of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). These achievements translate into a better quality of life for Ugandans. For example, women in one of the NTAE-producing areas confirmed increased incomes and stated that they are now better able to pay for school fees, medical care, and food.

Description: Accomplishing this effort relies on increasing rural business activity, including farm businesses. Actions funded under four principal activities lead to this result. The Cooperative Agriculture and Agribusiness Support (CAAS) activity increases agricultural productivity and rural incomes through an increased supply of inputs, liberalized marketing and assistance to agribusiness. Resources from a P.L. 480, Title II monetization program support these objectives. The Agriculture Non-Traditional Export

Promotion (ANEP) activity aims at alleviating public and private sector constraints to export of a range of NTAEs, in part by strengthening analytic and policy-making capacity. The Investment in Developing Agricultural Exports (IDEA) activity helps to diversify NTAEs by expanding food crop exports such as maize and beans to other countries of the Greater Horn, thereby enhancing regional food security, and meeting regional demands for basic food requirements. The Private Enterprise Support, Training and Organizational Development (PRESTO) activity is expanding rural credit through U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and local financial institutions and tackling policy and regulatory constraints to business development.

Host Country and Other Donors: Alleviating poverty is the Government of Uganda's (GOU) highest development priority. The GOU is committed to creating the proper enabling environment through disciplined adherence to structural reforms such as the abolition of marketing boards and liberalized trade and payments systems. Achievements realized under the SO require a primary role by the private sector. USAID's chief collaborators are the World Bank and the European Union, although most major donors address the problems under this SO with activities designed to raise income and alleviate poverty. To improve coordination, a private sector donor subgroup, chaired by USAID, meets monthly.

Beneficiaries: Fourteen million Ugandans living in rural areas are the target beneficiaries of this strategic objective.

Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: Activities contributing to the achievement of SO 1 are implemented by a number of U.S. contractors and PVOs. These include Chemonics International, Agricultural Cooperative Development International, the Foundation for International Community Assistance, Land O'Lakes, and Mississippi State University. A U.S. firm is currently being selected to implement the Private Enterprise Support, Training and Organizational Development activity.

Major Results Indicators:

Baseline Target

Average household expenditures 100 (1992) 137 (1998)^{1/}
 Increase in NTAEs \$33.7 million (1990) \$138 million (1998)
 Increase in savers and repeat rural borrowers 1,000 (1995) 6,000(1998)
 in USAID-supported programs

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE AND NUMBER: Stabilize Biodiversity in Target Areas, 617-S002

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997: \$8,306,527 DFA

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 1997

Purpose: To maintain the integrity of globally-important biodiverse ecosystems.

Background: USAID has designated Uganda as a biodiversity priority country containing ecosystems critical to the conservation of globally-important biodiversity. However, this unique biodiversity is imperiled by unsustainable natural-resource management practices. USAID is assisting Uganda to maintain the integrity of targeted biodiverse ecosystems. USAID's Action Program for the Environment (APE) activity is the principal component of this strategic objective (SO).

USAID Role and Achievements to Date: At a national level, USAID supports activities designed to establish an appropriate policy and institutional framework for environmental management; and at the local (e.g., protected area) level APE activities assist the National Parks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to better manage protected areas. USAID's efforts have led to major improvements in Uganda's environmental policy and institutional framework. A National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) was adopted with landmark legislation signed into law. Six new national parks have been created since 1991, bringing to 10 the number of parks within Uganda's protected area system. These parks are USAID's target areas for biodiversity stabilization, including basic repositories for *in situ* conservation in Uganda. Important progress has also been made outside the policy arena. Tourism has increased fivefold since 1991, with a concomitant tenfold increase in park-user fees. Privatization of state-owned tourism concessions, and numerous ecotourism ventures launched by local communities intent on capitalizing on increasing numbers of tourists, have created significant employment. The parks system has adopted a policy of sharing revenue with local communities, and sustainable multiple-use practices have allowed buffer-zone communities continued access to park resources. Finally, local communities participate in park management. USAID is also assisting the Government of Uganda (GOU) to respond to the uncontrolled spread of destructive water hyacinth plants in the countries adjacent to Lake Victoria.

Description: At the national level, assistance focuses on the development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy to address environmental issues through policy, legislation and institutional reform--the NEAP. Technical assistance and training have resulted in the adoption and implementation of the plan. At the local level, USAID-funded U.S. and local NGOs strengthen management of protected areas by creating conservation incentives for local communities; promoting conservation through revenue sharing, and by increasing public awareness. USAID also supports research aimed at improving protected-area management and increasing environmental management capacity of GOU agencies, local NGOs and community-based organizations. A U.S. firm is assisting the GOU to contain the economic and environmental damage caused by the proliferation of water hyacinths on the region's lakes and rivers.

Host Country and Other Donors: USAID works most closely with the National Environment Management Authority on broad policy and institutional issues, and with the Uganda Wildlife Authority on protected-area management issues. USAID collaborates with other donors, including the World Bank, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, German Technical Cooperation, the European Community and Danish International Development Agency to ensure overall donor coordination in natural resource management.

Beneficiaries: Activities implemented under this SO benefit the nation as a whole through improved management of the country's natural resources and increased foreign exchange and employment from an expanding ecotourism industry. Activities implemented by NGOs in the buffer zones of protected areas benefit rural communities surrounding national parks. USAID efforts to control water hyacinth benefit riparian communities around Lake Victoria.

Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: Activities contributing to the achievement of SO 2 are implemented by U.S. contractors, private non-profit companies, and U.S. and host-country private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and NGOs. These include Tropical Research and Development, Aquatics Unlimited, Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance, Agricultural Cooperative Development International, Consortium for International Development, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), World Wide Fund for Nature, and African Wildlife Foundation.

Major Results Indicators:

Baseline Target

% current surface areas maintained^{2/} 40% (1986) 100% (1997)
 Annual park user fees revenues \$74,000 (1991) \$1 million (1997)
 Increase in buffer zone employment 0 (1989) 12,000 (1997)
 Increase in % park staff trained 0% (1989) 60% (1997)

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE AND NUMBER: Improve the Quality and Efficiency of Basic Education, 617-S003

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997: \$12,335,357 DFA

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 2001

Purpose: To improve the quality and efficiency of basic education.

Background: Basic education is fundamental to sustainable development, and is one of the essential elements in USAID's strategy of encouraging broad-based economic growth. Primary education has a decisive impact on all four of USAID's Strategic Objectives in Uganda. There is a strong correlation between investments in education and increased productivity and life expectancy, reduced fertility and poverty, improved income and distribution, and democracy. A recent study in Uganda demonstrated a strong correlation between education and the adoption of behaviors to avoid human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) infection.

One critical precondition for Uganda's long-term success in social and economic reforms is the availability of people with appropriate training and skills in a broad range of technical, professional and commercial areas. The skill level of primary school graduates must increase dramatically to provide the basis for this training. Uganda's education system is constrained by limited access, poor quality and dilapidated physical infrastructure. USAID assistance supports the Government of Uganda's (GOU) priority policy goals within a cohesive education reform program.

USAID Role and Achievements to Date: USAID finances key elements of the GOU's education reform program. After three years significant results have been achieved. Some 5,000 principals, teachers, and tutors, representing 7% of the primary teaching force, are currently enrolled in USAID-sponsored inservice training programs. As a result of policy dialogue, the GOU has committed itself to increasing teachers' salaries to a minimum living wage of \$70 per month. Since 1992, the GOU has increased teachers' salaries from the equivalent of \$8 per month to \$51 per month in 1995. For the first time in two decades, primary schools have been given a budget and permitted to select and order a total of 1.5 million textbooks. During the last two years, communities have been mobilized to build an additional 1,000 classrooms.

Description: USAID's education program targets four policy objectives as precursors to establishing an environment in which education can once again flourish. The first is to help re-establish teaching as a respected profession--by bettering salaries and working conditions, upgrading skills and certification through in-service training, and improving school management. The second is to work with the GOU to increase the level of resources available for primary education by improving resource allocation and budgeting. A related objective is to increase availability of instructional materials by allocating more resources and liberalizing the procurement process. Decentralization is an important principle in this activity. Prior to USAID's involvement, a corrupt and monopolized market for school supplies was in place. Finally, USAID's program is encouraging local communities to become more involved and

responsible for meeting students' educational needs. At the same time, the school systems are encouraged to become more accountable to parents and students.

Host Country and Other Donors: USAID's resources complement those of other donors in the education sector. USAID funds educational reform alongside the World Bank's efforts by financing agreed-upon activities from the GOU's reform agenda. Other participants in the primary education sector include the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and, on a smaller scale, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as World Vision, ActionAid, InterAid and the Aga Khan Foundation.

Beneficiaries: Two and a half million primary school pupils and 75,000 primary teachers directly benefit.

Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: Activities contributing to the achievement of SO 3 are implemented by a number of U.S. institutions. These include the Academy for Educational Development (AED), the Institute for International Research (IIR), Creative Associates, the University of Massachusetts, and the Research Triangle Institute.

Major Results Indicators:

Baseline Target

Increased efficiency of basic education: 72% (1990) 85% (2002)

% of pupils passing grade 7

Number of years of school provided 32 yrs+ (1990) 12 yrs+ (2002)

per primary school graduate^{3/}

Increased number of students using 1:6 (1990) 1:3 (2002)

relevant educational materials:

Book-pupil ratio increased to a minimum of one set of four core books for every three pupils

Increased number of effective teachers:

% of qualified Grade III teachers 49% (1990) 90% (2002)

Increased girls' persistence

% of girls enrolled in grade 7 as a % 24% (1990) 40% (2002)
of girls who start school

ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: UGANDA

TITLE AND NUMBER: Improve the Reproductive Health of Ugandans, 617-S004

STATUS: Continuing

PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997: \$15,541,157 DFA

INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1996; **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:** FY 1999

Purpose: To reduce fertility and the transmission of human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV).

Background: Uganda's current fertility of 6.8 is among the highest in Africa. Although 67% of married women either want no more children or want to delay their next pregnancy by at least two years, only 7.8% are currently using modern family planning. Estimates of maternal mortality range from 600 to 1,000/100,000 live births. Uganda also has one of the highest rates of HIV prevalence in the world.

Approximately 1.9 million Ugandans have been infected, and over 400,000 have died. Estimated prevalence is as high as 20% of the adult population of some urban populations. Poorly trained and paid health staff at insufficient health facilities, popular misconceptions about family planning and HIV, high prevalence of sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs), traditional sexual norms and the status of women, and low condom utilization are major constraints.

USAID Role and Achievements to Date: Since 1989, when USAID involvement in family planning and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) began with modest support, fertility has begun to drop and the use of modern family planning has more than tripled. A 1995 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) concluded that "...Uganda is witnessing a period of rapid fertility decline." The DHS also indicates that knowledge of AIDS is nearly universal and that knowledge that AIDS can be prevented is on the order of 90%. The country is witnessing a decline in the number of new HIV infections (measured among women who attend pre-natal clinics) after years of steady increases, with clear indications of important changes in sexual behavior and steadily increasing use of condoms. Evaluation data clearly indicate that USAID projects have been effective contributors to these trends. USAID project beneficiaries report reductions in multiple and casual partners and increased condom utilization.

Description: USAID-supported activities seek to reduce fertility and HIV transmission by increasing the utilization of basic reproductive health services (family planning and maternal health, STDs/HIV), improving the quality of those services and changing behaviors in selected areas of Uganda. The SO 4 portfolio includes six sets of activities intended to: (1) increase availability of good-quality services in health facilities; (2) increase availability of good-quality services at the community level; (3) provide the public with correct information and motivation to use available services and adopt preventive behaviors; (4) increase availability of contraceptives through the private sector; (5) increase revenue generation in health facilities; and (6) strengthen private-sector provider organizations.

Host Country and Other Donors: USAID is the largest bilateral donor in reproductive health, followed by the British Overseas Development Agency. Among the multilaterals, the World Bank is the largest donor, with substantial investments in controlling sexually transmitted infections and improving district-level health services. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is also a major actor in family planning. The Government of Uganda has encouraged these donors to work in different districts to spread resources evenly around the country and avoid overlap, with the Ministry of Health assuming an overall coordination role. USAID has closely coordinated with the World Bank in reproductive health, with the Bank agreeing to finance commodities to complement USAID's provision of technical assistance. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is a major source of funds for child survival activities. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) are significant sources of AIDS funding.

Beneficiaries: USAID-funded programs are active in 13 of Uganda's 39 districts, which include about 35% of Uganda's population of around 20,000,000. Thus, about 7 million people are potential beneficiaries of activities in the SO 4 portfolio. Women from 15 to 45 years of age in these districts total about 1,500,000 and are the direct beneficiaries of family planning and maternal health services. In addition, the social-marketing program has created commercial markets for condoms and oral contraceptives throughout the country.

Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: Pathfinder International, Johns Hopkins University, University of North Carolina, E. Petrich and Assoc., Futures Group, African Medical and Research Foundation, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, AIDS Information Center, AIDS Support Organization, Association for Voluntary Safe Contraception, and John Snow International.

Major Results Indicators:**Baseline^{1/} Targets^{5/}**

Total Fertility Rate 6.8 (1995) 6.0 (1999)

Contraceptive Distribution to be set 1996

HIV prevalence, 15 - 19 year 12.5% (1995) 3% decrease (1998)
old women

Condom Distribution TBD (1996) TBD

^{1/} Represents a 3.5% annual growth rate in average rural expenditures. Therefore, the baseline is taken as 100%.

^{2/} This measure assesses the area of national park protected by national wardens.

^{3/} This measure is the average number of years of instruction provided per primary school graduate, or completion of seventh grade.

^{4/} To be determined.

^{5/}