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THE MUSLIM MAJORITY:

*Views from Beyond the
Middle East*

R-1-00

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Office of Research
Department of State
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Middle East*

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with
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Executive Summary

Public opinion polls conducted in mid-to-late 1999 in five non-Middle Eastern countries with large Muslim populations* -- Pakistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Nigeria and Indonesia -- show the following patterns of opinion on issues related to Islam and its role in society:

In Society:

- Large majorities in each Muslim society covered except Pakistan view the impact of Islam on public life as already very high and growing. In Pakistan, where the threshold of public expectations regarding Islamic influence on social mores may be somewhat higher than is the case in the more secularized of the countries surveyed, solid pluralities hold see Islam as having a large and increasing impact on society. But significant minorities of Pakistanis failed to answer the relevant questions.
- Moreover, majorities in all five publics say they want Islam to play a larger role in their society. Except in Uzbekistan, they all want more religious education. And there is remarkably little variation in these views across all demographic groups.
- On a personal level, reported observance of certain rituals (e.g., Ramadan) has also risen to high levels, even in relatively secular Uzbekistan and Turkey.
- Attitudes on other social issues are more mixed. For example, majorities in three publics reject gender restrictions in the workplace, though prevailing opinion in the other two supports such restrictions. And majorities in four publics reject religious-based censorship, while a plurality in the fifth support such censorship.
- The rough spectrum of views is: Uzbekistan is most secular; with Turks close behind; Pakistanis are most "Islamic;" Nigerian and Indonesian Muslims are in the middle. But there are also surprising deviations from this pattern (see below).

In Politics:

- Contrary to caricatures of Islamic culture, these publics *do* distinguish between the personal or social roles and the political role of religion. Across the board, there is considerably less popular support for the latter than for the former.
- Within that framework, the spectrum of views is roughly as above: Public opinion in Uzbekistan is the most decidedly secular, with the polling evidence suggesting that support

*In addition to the five non-Middle Eastern countries highlighted in this report, a sixth survey was completed in one Middle Eastern Arab entity -- the Palestinian Authority. For comparative purposes, findings from this poll are included in the Tables in Appendix II. See Appendix I for a discussion of those results.

for mixing Islam and politics has actually declined in recent years. Turks have broadly similar views, though a hard core of around 20 percent consistently take an Islamist political position.

- Pakistanis are at the opposite, Islamist pole. But only around half the public voices Islamist *political* views – although the other half refused to respond to such questions even before the recent military coup, possibly because of their perceived political sensitivity.
- Indonesian and Nigerian Muslims are again in the middle. They have especially mixed, uncertain or reticent views about such issues as whether *shari'ah* [Islamic law] is too harsh to be the sole basis for national law and whether non-Muslims should hold key government positions in Islamic countries, with the Nigerians tilting slightly more toward Islamist positions.

In Foreign Policy:

- Muslim solidarity is very thin. Saudi Arabia is popular everywhere besides Turkey; but otherwise (except in Pakistan) fellow Muslim countries enjoy no special favor. A specific question about Iraq elicits sympathy for its people -- but even so there is *no majority anywhere* for ending sanctions altogether.
- Even more surprising, all five publics -- even Pakistanis --are overwhelmingly uninterested in the Arab-Israeli issue, or in U.S. efforts in that arena.
- More broadly, the U.S. fares fairly well among these major Muslim publics outside the Middle East. The balance of opinion is positive except in Pakistan. Significantly, only a minority in *any* of these five countries subscribes to the canard that the U.S. is "anti-Muslim."*
- U.S. treatment of its own Muslim population gets uniformly good reviews, with half or more in each survey country offering an opinion on this offbeat subject.

Individual Surprises:

- **Turkey:** Beyond the one-fifth with consistently Islamist views, a significantly larger minority of the Turkish public tags along on certain specific issues. Around a third, for example, say that co-ed workplaces are un-Islamic and should be restricted, or that religious leaders should be more involved in politics. Closer to half say there is only one true interpretation of Islam. And a narrow majority (57%) say Turkey's leaders must be Muslims.

*Surveys in Arab Middle Eastern countries, on the other hand, generally have found the U.S. image in those Muslim publics tainted by the perception that America tilts toward Israel in its Middle East policies.

- **Nigeria:** This is the only Muslim public where a majority (72%) want religious leaders *more* involved in politics -- perhaps because that was an idiosyncrasy of Islamic history in that country. At the same time, ironically, this Muslim public is among the most internally divided, and with unusual intensity, over key Islamic political issues such as imposition of *Shari'ah* and non-Muslim rights.
- **Indonesia:** Despite their tolerant traditions and moderate reputation, Indonesia's Muslims expressed the *highest* support for an important militant position: use of violence even against civilians, at least "sometimes," to defend Islam (40%). However, this was probably a temporary effect of the political violence and the controversy over Western intervention in East Timor that engulfed Indonesia during this survey.
- **Pakistan:** The extent to which the Pakistani public surpasses all others in this group in expressed Islamic fervor, as noted above, is notable if not truly surprising. What is perhaps more surprising is that the best-educated Pakistanis are generally no less Islamic in their orientation, whether in the personal, social, or political spheres. Also, Pakistanis are alone in having a predominantly (47% vs. 6%) favorable image of Iran. Their view of Iran's Taliban antagonists in Afghanistan is, however, nearly as favorable (41% vs. 9%).

On both these questions, as on many others, around half of Pakistanis offer no response. This large non-response rate suggests that, whether they are politically ignorant, indifferent, or afraid to speak their minds, a large number of Pakistanis may have unformed political views that could fairly easily be swayed in different directions.


- **Uzbekistan:** Similar surprises may be in store for public opinion in this country, at the opposite pole from Pakistan in both Islamic and survey research terms. The problem in Uzbekistan is not that respondents are too reticent, but that they appear all too eager to please. (An incredible nine-in-ten, for instance, said that things in general and the local economy in particular were just fine).

That is why the qualitative research discussed in this report is at least as good as the numbers. It suggests that, under a secular surface, there is a groundswell of Islamic social activism that could someday confront (or perhaps become) a repressive regime.

Introduction

General Background.

For much of the past millennium, the majority of Muslims have lived far beyond the boundaries of the Middle East. Today, more than three out of every four of the world's billion-plus Muslims live not in the region of their religion's birth but (in roughly descending order of population size) in South Asia, East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, or Central Asia. Moreover, Islamic social and political activism is currently on the rise around those far-flung margins of the Muslim world, just as it may be receding in the original Arab core of Islam. These facts form the point of departure for this study, which looks at how Islamic issues are actually understood by the publics in those areas, using public opinion polls conducted in mid-to-late 1999.



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This report discusses findings from public opinion surveys in five non-Middle Eastern countries, each one of which contains the largest Muslim community in its region: Pakistan in South Asia, Indonesia in East Asia, Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey in Europe, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia.* In many ways, of course, these are quite different places. But in all of them, Islam has been playing an increasingly significant social and even political role in recent years.

Current Context

The context for this phenomenon of resurgent Islam is as varied as the countries themselves. In the two most dramatic cases, Nigeria and Indonesia, it is mainly a matter of earlier regime restraints on Islamic activism relaxing over the past year or so as part of a hectic and bumpy transition from entrenched authoritarianism to fledgling democracy. (The two countries differ greatly, to be sure, in the pervasiveness of Islamic influences among their populations as a whole: non-Muslims are a significant minority in Indonesia, but still constitute no more than about ten percent of the total; while fully half the people of Nigeria are estimated to belong to other religions, primarily Christianity.) In both of these cases, the surveys were conducted shortly after the first free national elections in many years.

Turkey, by contrast, has long been an established democracy, one of the few in the Muslim world, though one with interludes of military intervention in politics as well. The Turkish poll was taken just before a new national election capped several years of fractious, highly controversial coalition governments, all subject to frequent military meddling aimed at cutting back growing Islamic influences. In the meantime, Turkish society seems to have drifted away, albeit more gradually and gently than in other countries, from the rigid secularism of the past generation or two.

Something similar seems to have started in Pakistan. The survey there was completed about three months before the military took over power. Their target was a leader who had been democratically elected, but then appeared to govern in a manner at once arbitrary and ineffective, occasionally invoking Islam to rationalize his rule. During this period, parts of Pakistani society experienced a further rise in an already substantial level of Islamic political and social activism. This process was often referred to in the region, perhaps with exaggerated alarm, as the "Talibanization" of Pakistan -- after the fiercely fundamentalist regime in neighboring Afghanistan, with its many connections back across the border.

Only in Uzbekistan, of the five societies covered here, does the political situation still seem stagnant, and the level of Islamic activism very low. Even there, however, there may be changes afoot. True, power remains the monopoly of a leader firmly opposed to Islamic politics of any kind (though he is ironically named after that religion himself). But this configuration now coincides more uneasily with what may be a growing, sometimes violent Islamic political underground -- and with what appears even more clearly to be a growing, albeit basically apolitical, Islamic presence in Uzbekistan's popular culture. Whenever the transition from this one man's rule takes place, these underlying Islamic influences will make their mark on this country's society, if not its politics.

*As previously indicated, a sixth survey was completed in one Middle Eastern Arab entity -- the Palestinian Authority. See the Appendix for a discussion of those results.

How the Polls Were Taken.

All five polls were conducted by professional, independent local survey research organizations, supervised by this Office and using questionnaires containing similar core questions administered in private face-to-face interviews. To ensure that results accurately represent each public as a whole, respondents were selected strictly in accordance with standard scientific (probability) sampling procedures. For practical reasons, the Indonesian sample was confined to urban areas; the other four are all national samples representing both urban and rural sectors.

In reporting the data here, the following conventions are used: For Turkey, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, where the populations are currently approximately 95 to 99 percent Muslim (or of Muslim family background), results are reported for the sample as a whole. For Indonesia, which is approximately 90 percent Muslim, selected results are reported separately for the Muslim and non-Muslim minority subsamples as appropriate; where not indicated, Indonesian data are for Muslims only. For Nigeria, where the population is estimated to be around 50 percent Muslim, most of the relevant questions were asked only of the Muslim subsample in this national survey, and the results reflect only that group unless otherwise noted.

Some of these findings have been previously reported, but most (including all comparisons from one country to another) are presented here for the first time. More detailed descriptions of survey methodologies, including theoretical margins of error and other limitations, may be found in the reports on individual countries covered.

It must be acknowledged at the outset that there is a potential "credibility" problem with some of these findings. Only in Turkey is polling on such sensitive subjects a truly well-accepted practice. In each of the other survey countries, various social, cultural, or political inhibitions almost certainly affect (and may sometimes actually distort) certain kinds of responses. While there is no foolproof way to eliminate or correct for this problem, it has been taken into account in interpreting the numbers. In some cases, for example, "don't know" responses may be just as important as responses expressing opinion. In other cases, where the problem may be especially severe (or especially subtle), this will be made explicit.

In addition, in two of the more untested and potentially problematic places for polling on Islamic issues – Indonesia and Pakistan – focus groups were first conducted for help in designing effective survey questions, and later used to help make sense of their results. Detailed methodological descriptions of this qualitative research are available in the respective individual country focus-group reports. In both of those places, and also in Uzbekistan, native experts steeped in the local culture as well as in Western social science provided their own narrative assessments of the findings, which served as a useful complement to an outsider's view. Reference will be made to all of these additional research tools as relevant.

Individual topics are organized under the following major headings, moving from the personal to the political: first *social issues*, then *domestic politics*, and finally *foreign policy*. The report concludes with a look back at long-term trends in this field for Uzbekistan and Turkey, the two societies where the essential data are available – and a look ahead at what past trends may portend for the future of these Muslim countries.

Muslim Society: Signs of a Religious Revival?

Perceptions and Realities


The first simple but striking finding is how different the impact of Islam appears from the inside. Of the five survey countries, Pakistan is often viewed by outsiders as a hotbed of fundamentalism, while all the others are seen as more-or-less secular to varying degrees. Not so in their own eyes. In fact, not even half (45%) of Pakistanis say Islam is playing even a "fairly" large role in their society today. By contrast, at least three-quarters of Turks, Uzbekistanis, Nigerian Muslims, and Indonesians (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) assert that Islam is playing a substantial role in their own societies. In Nigeria and Indonesia, at least half credit Islam with playing a *very* large role at the present time. (Table 1 and Figure 1)

A logical explanation for the huge discrepancy between inside and outside views is that publics are reacting to perceived *changes* in the place of religion in their own milieu, not making judgments based on some "objective" standard of comparison across the Muslim world. This interpretation gains some credence from a separate question about impressions of Islam's *relative* importance *over time* in each location. In Pakistan, just half (49%) think Islam is playing a *larger* role lately. In the other four countries, large majorities sense a recent shift toward greater religious influence: roughly six-in-ten in Turkey; seven-in-ten in Uzbekistan; eight-in-ten in Nigeria; and nearly nine-in-ten in Indonesia (Table 2). Generally speaking, the more widespread this perception of a shift, the more people seem intuitively inclined to feel that Islam currently occupies a large place in their country.

Regardless of how prevalent (or how accurate) their perception of increased Islamic activity may be, these publics seem well aware that such activism does not necessarily mean real influence. In all five cases, large majorities, ranging from 59 percent in Pakistan to a remarkable 82 percent in Nigeria, agree with this skeptical statement: "There may be a lot of Islamic activity in our country, but many people are not very devout" (Table 3). Such assessments tend to belie the presumably inflated self-reporting of personal piety in some cases – such as the claim by so many

Fig. 1. "INSIDE" VIEWS ON ROLE OF ISLAM IN SURVEY COUNTRY

Mid-to-Late 1999



"What role do you think Islam plays in our society – a very large role, a fairly large role, a fairly small role, or a very small role?" (IN PAKISTAN) "what role do you think Islam plays in the political life of our country ...?"

Muslim respondents (76% in Indonesia, 84% in Nigeria) that they really do pray the required five times every day (Table 4).

These findings are a far cry from the much smaller proportions who more credibly claim to pray five times daily in Pakistan (40%), Turkey (33%), or Uzbekistan (11%). In the latter two countries, a majority admit to shirking this daily obligation. Fewer than half (44%) in Turkey report praying more than just once per week. In Uzbekistan, that figure drops to a mere one-in-five (Table 4).

A less frequent ritual that has risen to a much higher level of reported observance is Ramadan, the annual lunar month of dawn-to-dusk fasting. In Turkey, an astonishing 81 percent claim to observe the fast regularly, that is, during all of Ramadan and during other religious holidays. In Pakistan, the percentage who say they fast that often is similarly high (83%). Even in Uzbekistan, half (50%) say they fast all through Ramadan and during other religious holidays, while barely a third (31%) concede that they do not observe the fast at all (Table 5).


Another, arguably less mechanical, measure of Islamic impact is how much importance people say they attach to religion in their own lives. This measure produces a parallel spectrum from the relatively secular to the relatively religious, with Turks again seeming surprisingly non-secular, at least in their own estimation. At the relatively secular pole, in Uzbekistan, only one-quarter (24%) say religion is *very* important in their lives. Even there, however, an additional half (47%) of the total population allow that religion is "somewhat" important to them.

In Turkey, nearly all (93%), consider religion important in their lives, including fully 70 percent who say it is *very* important to them; another 23 percent give it some importance. (One area where this intensity of feeling manifests itself is Turkish family life. Nearly two-thirds of Turks say they would *strongly* object if their daughter married a non-Muslim.) Moving further up the religious scale, among Pakistanis, and also among Nigerian and Indonesian Muslims, the proportion who ascribe great importance to religion in their own lives, across virtually all demographic categories, is well into the 80 percent range, or even higher. (Figure 2 and Table 6)

A closer look at the demographics in the most "secular" and the most "religious" of these societies –

Uzbekistan and Pakistan – suggests that stereotypes about the effects of youth and of education on Islamic practice badly need revision. Contrary to the notion that more education tends to temper

Fig. 2. IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN PERSONAL LIFE



religious devotion, the reality is that professed Islamic observance generally rises with the level of education even among Pakistanis, where the baseline for such observance is already relatively high. For example, reported observance both of daily Ramadan fasting and of more than weekly prayer is about 20 points higher among those with completed secondary or higher education than among illiterate Pakistanis. In Uzbekistan, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the better-educated are no more secular when it comes to personal practice than their less-educated counterparts.

Similarly misleading is the image of fanatical mobs of fundamentalist youth. In fact, whether in relatively secular Uzbekistan or relatively religious Pakistan, it is the younger cohorts who actually tend to be less devout, on the whole, than their elders. In Uzbekistan, for example, those under 30 are far more likely to report *never* praying (69%), visiting a mosque (60%), or fasting during Ramadan (35%) than those over 60 (28%, 40%, and 12%, respectively). Based on these figures, it would be hard to argue that the younger generation in that country is returning to its Islamic roots – and only a little less hard to explain why so many Uzbekistanis of all ages see the influence of Islam increasing around them.



Unfortunately, only limited long-term trend data on actual religious knowledge, attitudes, and practices -- information of the kind that could provide a more objective “reality check” on this subjective sense of Islamic revival -- are available, and then only for Turkey and Uzbekistan. These will be discussed separately below, after a comparative analysis of the current state of public opinion on social, political, and foreign policy issues related to Islam. Here we move from descriptive to prescriptive attitudes, in other words, from how people think things *are*, to how they think things *ought to be*.

Islamic Values Yes, Laws Maybe Not

The discussion begins with an appropriately sweeping generalization: three-quarters or more of the public in all five countries surveyed, from “secular” Uzbekistan to “religious” Pakistan, say Islam should play at least a “fairly” large role their country. This is an important finding, but a closer look reveals some finer distinctions. The public in Uzbekistan has by far the smallest proportion (29%) who desire a *very* large role for Islam. Elsewhere the figures in that column rise to a remarkably robust 55 percent in Turkey, to two-thirds among Nigerian Muslims, to three-fourths among Pakistanis and Indonesian Muslims (Table 7).

Comparison with results from a related question permits a further important inference regarding these publics: With one exception, they generally appear to differentiate between a role for Islam in society, on the one hand, and in politics, on the other. A higher proportion generally endorses the former than the latter. Furthermore, the degree to which publics make this distinction, preferring Islamic influence in the social over the political sphere, is a good indicator of relatively secular orientation. That rank order matches many others on more specific topics (e.g., official enforcement as opposed to voluntary observance of *shari’ah*, or Islamic law). And on many such

topics, the distinction some publics see between (widely popular) Islamic social values and (much more controversial) Islamic politics is very sharp indeed. (See Tables 7 and 8 and Figures 3 and 4 below.)



In Uzbekistan and Turkey, this distinction is especially clear. While large majorities in both countries want a role for Islam in their society, only minorities (37% and 46%, respectively) agree even “somewhat” with the statement that “Islamic values should play a larger role in *government policy*.” Indonesian Muslims, in contrast, are much more likely to agree at least mildly with the latter statement (81%) than are their distant Turkic cousins (46%) – but even so, that figure for Indonesians is measurably below their near-unanimous endorsement (93%) of a *social* role for Islam. Similarly, in Pakistan, a considerably slimmer majority (63%) want a bigger role for Islamic values in “government policy” than want a large role for Islam in the country’s more vaguely worded “political life” (86%). The finding that these four publics generally make a distinction between Islamic social values and Islamic political influence casts some doubt on the conventional wisdom that religion and politics must *always* be thoroughly mixed from a Muslim perspective.

Nigerian Muslims, however, seem to make little distinction between Islamic social values and Islamic influence in politics. They generally seem indiscriminately agreeable to both the social *and* the political aspects of Islamic influence, giving each a resounding endorsement.

A final comment. In Indonesia, Muslims and non-Muslims are surprisingly inclined to agree about many things – but not about this big thing. While three-quarters of the Muslims want Islam to play a very large role in society, and also a larger role in government policy, barely a fifth of the non-Muslims agree at all with either position. Nevertheless, the reassuringly higher amount of agreement between the two groups on a number of more specific issues, also discussed immediately below, gives some grounds for believing that differences on abstract ideals are not necessarily unbridgeable in everyday practice.

Religious Education

One major area of society in which most of these Muslim publics want more religious influence is education. Two overlapping but distinct questions were used to test popular attitudes on this subject, and – with the notable exception of Uzbekistan – both the “harder” and the “softer” versions showed a widespread desire for a greater infusion of religion into each country’s schools. In four out of the five survey countries, not only do decisive majorities want more religious education, but at least half also say they feel *strongly* about it. In Indonesia, interestingly enough, there is practically no difference on this question between Muslims and non-Muslims. Even in relatively secular Turkey, and even when the question poses an explicit tradeoff between “religious” and “practical” schooling, a clear majority (59%) favors more of the former.

Only in Uzbekistan does the public lean toward less religious education for their children. The tendency is especially marked when the question offers a choice between religious and practical training, in which case a solid majority (62% vs. 18%) opt for more of the latter. These findings represent a complete reversal from polls taken earlier in this decade, when Uzbekistanis predominantly preferred more rather than less religious education. An explanation might be that, in the interim, additional religious classes have in fact become available. That innovation, coupled with a question worded in relative (more vs. less) terms, may account for this seemingly abrupt swing in the pendulum of public opinion. (Tables 9 and 10)

Also of some interest, from a methodological standpoint, is a comparison of results from this pair of closely related questions within each survey country. In most cases around ten percent or so seem to agree with two contradictory statements. This suggests an acquiescence bias – i.e., a tendency to agree with all statements, regardless of content – on that order of magnitude. Nigerian Muslims, however, seem to be a special case in this sense, with an even more widespread tendency toward such “agreeable” responses. This potential distortion, almost always merely on the margins, will be borne in mind in interpreting some of the findings that follow. Only in the very rare cases, however, do such disingenuous responses loom large enough to cast doubt on the overall argument, and any such cases will also be flagged below.

Islam and Gender (in the Workplace)

The issue of sexual segregation in employment provides another example of how popular interpretations of Islam fall into some intriguing patterns across the five major Muslim-world societies analyzed here. Such segregation is enforced in a few other parts of that world (including Saudi Arabia), and practiced to some extent in various traditionalist societies. It is, however, roundly rejected in the more liberal or “Westernized” Muslim lands.

The five non-Middle Eastern publics examined here exhibit a wider range of views on this issue than might be expected, certainly by comparison with their generally convergent views on other social issues considered above. Here again attitudes were probed with two different formulations, beginning with the abstract question of whether co-ed employment is or is not “in line with Islamic teaching.” Most adamantly liberal on this question, characteristically, is the public in Uzbekistan, which overwhelmingly (71% vs. 13%) says “yes.” But very close behind (73% vs. 24%) in this “Western” outlook, for a change, are Indonesia’s Muslims. In Turkey, two-thirds agree; a surprisingly large minority of three-in-ten, however, call mixed-gender workplaces un-Islamic. Nigerian Muslims are even more divided (53% vs. 42%) on this issue. By the time we get to Pakistan, the balance has tipped, again more characteristically, in the “conservative” direction: a narrow plurality (46% vs. 38%) label a co-ed work environment as not in line with Islam. (Table 11)

This picture fragments further, with the sequence altered, when the question is posed in more practical terms: should there be restrictions on men and women working together? Uzbekistanis are still the most liberal, with the unusually large fraction of three-fifths (58%) responding “strongly” in the negative and another fifth feeling “somewhat” that way. But now Indonesians emerge as more conservative than Turks, and Nigerian Muslims as even more conservative than their Pakistani counterparts. In ascending order, the figures for those saying men and women should be separated are: in Turkey, 30 percent; in Indonesia, 40 percent; in Pakistan, 48 percent; and in Nigeria, 60 percent. (Table 12)

A quick glance back reveals that in both Indonesia and Nigeria, nearly twice as many want such restrictions as feel that Islam requires them – suggesting that local customs as well as purely religious factors are involved. (That hypothesis obtains additional support from the startling finding that in Indonesia almost as many non-Muslims (32%) as Muslims are in favor of limiting co-ed

employment.) This, then, constitutes a kind of “upside-down” situation, in which the publics’ practical desires are *more* conservative than their interpretations of Islam – not, as is often assumed, the other way around.

Equally interesting are the gender differences (or, in many cases, the absence of such differences) on these coupled questions. On most other issues covered in the survey, women seldom express sharply divergent attitudes from men in each society, though they are frequently more prone to voice no opinion. When it comes to sexual segregation, by contrast, the gender differences can be quite significant – but only in the more conservative countries. In Uzbekistan, at the liberal pole, men are just as liberal as women on this issue. In Indonesia, at an intermediate position on this spectrum, women are only very slightly more liberal than men.

But in Pakistan, on the conservative end of the continuum, men are about twice as likely as women to oppose gender mixing in the workplace. Sixty-one percent of men, as against just 31 percent of women, say Islam prohibits such mixing. And almost exactly the same ratio holds for saying restrictions should actually be applied against this practice: among men, 60 percent take that position; among women, only 34 percent. The other side of this coin, of course, is that a third even of Pakistani women seem to share the heavily conservative views of their male compatriots on this quintessentially personal question of interpreting and implementing Islam.

Freedom of Expression and Observance

On many of the social issues discussed here, the five societies surveyed seem to follow a rough order, from most liberal or “secular” to most conservative or “religious”: Uzbekistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan. Occasionally, to be sure, a couple of these countries switch places in this order, but an overall pattern remains. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in the next section, a broadly parallel pattern emerges on political issues as well.

Concerning the media, only in Pakistan is the public even moderately inclined to confine its coverage to material that is Islamic, or at least “consistent with Islamic values.” Half (51%) of Pakistanis take that view, while a third voice no opinion. Among the other four Muslim publics, this notion of some kind of “Islamic” censorship, even a mild one, is distinctly a minority position. The range in this case is from a low of 14 percent in Turkey, to similar highs of just 36 and 38 percent, respectively, in Nigeria and Indonesia, with Uzbekistan (25%) falling in between (Table 13). Generally, then, these publics display an unusually large measure of tolerance for diversity of expression. Possibly a popular thirst for entertainment and variety tends to counteract puritanical impulses even in the more conservative cultures.


The picture is not so clear-cut, to put it mildly, on the question (not asked in Nigeria) of diversity inside Islam. Turks divide right down the middle about whether “Islam should tolerate diverse interpretations of its teachings” (44%) or whether “there is only one true interpretation of Islam” (43%). Perhaps this is because even some relatively “secular” Turks are reluctant to accept the prospect of fissures in their religion. Indonesian Muslims are split in almost exactly the same atypical way, with 44 percent accepting diversity of interpretation, and 47 percent rejecting it (Table 14).

Even more extraordinary is that, on this one issue, the publics in “secular” Uzbekistan and “Islamic” Pakistan seem to stand on common ground: only about a fifth in each society say Islam can be variously interpreted, while around twice as many take the contrary view. Notably high proportions, approximately 40 percent in both places, plead ignorance or refuse to respond at all. One can speculate that these two generally very different publics might not mean the same thing by their answers (or non-answers) to this question. Possibly, in Pakistan the tendency to reject religious pluralism reflects traditionalism or support for orthodoxy (whether Sunni or Shi’i); while in Uzbekistan that tendency stems more from opposition to Islamic extremism.

Muslim Politics: Separation of Mosque and State?

Personal Faith vs. Islamic Government.

A fascinating set of patterns emerges from a comparison among the five survey countries, and also within each one, of the publics’ responses to a pair of broad “mirror-image” questions about the proper relationship between government and religion. Respondents were asked sequentially to what extent they agree or disagree with the following two statements: First, “an Islamic state based on shari’ah is the best form of government for Muslim countries today.” Second, “religion is a matter of personal faith, and should be kept separate from government policy.” Responses to these two questions fall into a range that could be called secular-to-split-to-silent, with Turks at one end, Pakistanis at the other, and Uzbekistanis and especially Indonesians and Nigerian Muslims making up a kind of muddled middle ground. (See Figure 5 below and Tables 15 and 16.)



Turks alone among these five nations solidly reject (by a majority of 63% vs. 28%) the very notion of an Islamic state based on *Shari'ah* law. Fully half *strongly* disagree with the idea of such an Islamic state. But even in Turkey, around a fifth (18%) of the public *strongly* supports *shari'ah*-based Islamic government, at least as the ideal to which contemporary Muslims should aspire (Table 15). Roughly consistent with this division of opinion, an even larger majority (81% vs. 15%) agree that religion should be kept separate from politics, including an impressive 72 percent who strongly endorse this view.

Turning to Uzbekistan, the public is nearly as convinced there about the separation of mosque and state, when measured by the assertion that religion should be kept apart from government policy. Three-quarters of the public agree with that formulation, including around half (53%) who say so *strongly*. A mere 9 percent -- even fewer than in Turkey -- dispute that assertion (Table 16).

Yet when asked whether a "*shari'ah*-based Islamic state" is the ideal political system for "Muslim countries today," the overwhelmingly Muslim Uzbekistani public appears much more divided and uncertain. Approximately equal segments voice agreement (29%) and disagreement (32%), with only about half in each group conveying a strong view, while the plurality (39%) offers no opinion either way (Table 15). The most plausible explanation may be that the concept of an Islamic state is simply too hypothetical or abstract to elicit firm reactions from most people in Uzbekistan, even as most are clearly in favor of the purely personal definition of religion with which they are familiar at first hand.

Muslims in Indonesia and Nigeria are in a category of their own in this context, conceivably because these are the two survey countries with the largest and most prominent non-Muslim populations. Perhaps as a result, some who say religion should be kept out of politics nevertheless recommend an Islamic state for "Muslim countries" -- possibly excepting their own country from this category because of its mixed religious makeup. Whatever the reason, the survey shows large majorities of both Indonesian and Nigerian Muslims agreeing with two assertions that are very hard to reconcile.

In Indonesia, 79 percent of the Muslim public (as against just 36% among the non-Muslim minority) endorse Islamic government as the ideal for Muslim countries. At the same time, 63 percent of the Muslims agree that religion should be kept out of politics. The same proportion, two-fifths, feels "strongly" about both of these patently contradictory assertions.

A clear qualitative indication that Indonesia's oft-proclaimed multi-religious character helps account for this odd coupling of opinions comes from a series of 18 focus groups among middle-income Muslims there conducted in November-December 1998. Analysis of those discussions indicates that "for many ... an overtly Islamic political system would not be consistent with Indonesia's religious diversity." That attitude was emphatically shared by the more devout Muslim participants, as illustrated in the following typical comments from that segment:

... we cannot repress -- not like in Arab countries where the women must wear head scarves. In our country there are five religions -- Hinduism, Christianity, and others -- and they have their own rules.

According to Islamic fanatics, we should rule our country and life merely based on Islam. However, Indonesia is not that kind of country. We are diverse in religion and we need each other to build our society.

A roughly comparable mood prevails in Nigeria. The Muslim public there seems to subscribe even more firmly to the two apparently incompatible propositions about mosque and state posed in the questionnaire. Eighty-three percent call Islamic government “best” for Muslim countries; but in the next breath 70 percent say religion and politics should not be mixed. What is more, absolute majorities (58% and 55%, respectively) say they *strongly* agree with both statements.

How can Nigerians so widely subscribe to two such diametrically opposed concepts? Again, a partial answer is that some Nigerians may feel their own country’s major sectarian cleavage exempts it from the ideal they approve for preponderantly Muslim countries. In addition, to some indeterminate extent, this may also be an extreme case of respondents finding it difficult to disagree with abstract assertions that sound plausible or “politically correct” – even when those assertions disagree with each other!

Finally there is Pakistan, whose public also seems uncertain or ambivalent about Islamic government, albeit in a different way. Unlike the other four survey countries, there is no Muslim majority here offering even lukewarm support for relegating religion to private life. Asked about this alternative, fewer than half (41%) agreed that religion and government should be kept separate, with “don’t know/no answer/no clear view” responses running a close second (34%). A similarly high proportion of non-responses is elicited by the other question in this pair, about a *shari’ah*-based state as the ideal system. But in replying to this second formulation, a majority (60%) of Muslims in Pakistan, as in Nigeria and Indonesia, endorsed at least the principle of Islamic guidance for public as well as private life. On both questions in the Pakistani poll, the high non-response rate probably reflects concern about treading too deeply into dangerously politicized territory – bearing in mind that the Pakistani regime in power during the survey was unique among these five countries in moving to establish *shari’ah* as the supreme law of the land. (See Figure 5 above and Tables 15 and 16).



Demographic Diversity?

Here a brief digression into demographics is useful. In seeking to explain the cross-country spectrum of opinion sketched above, it is tempting to look for some underlying social variable. Certain features of the overall makeup of these five mostly Muslim societies are loosely similar: they are all relatively young, for example, and still around a third-to-half rural. Educational differences, though, are more pronounced. The average level is somewhat higher in Turkey and Uzbekistan. Those two also show the most “secular” public opinion patterns; and the better-educated in both tend to be somewhat more “secular” than the others. Cross-national variations in religiosity are also reflected in major demographic categories *within* the countries. For example, even less-educated Turks tend to be more “secular,” say, than less-educated Indonesians. But there is no consistent correlation across the countries of level of religiosity and level of education.

In fact, in the framework of the current focus on ‘personal faith vs. Islamic government,’ the educational divide in the two polar opposites – Uzbekistan and Pakistan -- offers an excellent

illustration of such inconsistent and unexpected demographic variation, or lack thereof. One might suppose, based on some intuition born of Western historical experience, that the better-educated would tend to take a more explicitly secular perspective. In Uzbekistan this is indeed the case by many of the measurements at hand. For example, strong agreement that religion should be relegated to personal rather than public life rises with level of schooling in that country: elementary, 42%; secondary, 54%; university, 69%. So does *disagreement* with the desirability of Islamic government: elementary, 23% (and 50% "don't know"); secondary, 31% (and 38% "don't know"); university, 48% (and just 22% "don't know").

But in Pakistan, the better-educated are considerably more likely than their illiterate compatriots to agree with *both* notions at once, as can be seen from a glance at Figures 6 and 7 below:



To sum up, a sweeping generalization, and a surprising one, emerges from a comparison of the findings: in all five of these major Muslim societies, there are generally only modest variations on many Islamic issues by any of the standard demographic categories. To be sure, women and rural respondents are somewhat less likely than others to venture any view on these issues across the board; and both those groups are considerably less likely than urban men to observe the formal ritual of mosque attendance. But the direction of their opinion is only very rarely at odds with any other group.

Nor does age matter as much as might have been expected. In the five countries covered, young adults are not dramatically more “radical” regarding Islamic politics than their elders – nor is the oldest cohort decidedly more “conservative” on the relevant social issues. And in some instances, where clear-cut differences by demographic segments are highlighted in this report, those differences are often not consistent across the five countries. Moreover, as in the previous discussion about the effects of age and education on personal piety, such variations may not lend themselves to easy causal explanations.

Religious Leaders in Politics

A very broad spectrum of opinion among the five survey countries is once again evident on the more concrete question of political involvement by "religious leaders." At the secular end is Uzbekistan, where barely a quarter (23%) want them more involved in politics. This fraction edges up to a third (34%) in Turkey. Next in this ascending order are the Muslims of Indonesia, half (54%) of whom would like religious leaders to be more active politically. (The non-Muslim minority in Indonesia, not surprisingly, rejects this proposition by more than a two-to-one margin.) Pakistan follows, with a solid majority (60%) in favor of this step – although in reality such leaders have never attracted more than a small minority of votes on those occasions when Pakistanis have been offered that option. (Table 17)

Unexpectedly, the most favorably disposed of all five publics to greater political activity by religious leaders are Nigeria's Muslims. Three-fourths (72%) – triple the proportion in Uzbekistan – endorse an increase in such Islamic activism. What is more, nearly half (47%) of Nigerian Muslims feel that way strongly. The notably high Nigerian figure probably reflects a historical idiosyncrasy of Islam in Nigeria. It is one the rare cases in which religious leaders have in fact traditionally also exercised meaningful temporal power through much of modern times, though this has lessened, at least on the national level, in the last several decades.

At the same time, in both countries where the majority want religious leaders more engaged in politics, there is also fairly widespread recognition that this could take its toll on them. A clear plurality in Pakistan (48%), and a majority (61%) in Nigeria, agree with the judgment that "if religious leaders get involved in politics, it corrupts their own faith" (Table 18). This cautionary note, quite logically, rings true at least as often in the other three survey countries, whose publics are less desirous of mixing religion and politics that way in the first place.

Non-Muslim Rights

A separate issue of political leadership and legal status concerns the position of those outside the faith but living among the believers. In each of the four Muslim countries where a question on legal rights of non-Muslims was asked, a majority accepted the principle of equal rights under the law for all religions, although the range from top to bottom is still tellingly wide: in Indonesia, 82 percent; in Nigeria, 75 percent; in Uzbekistan, 67 percent; and in Pakistan, 58 percent. (The question was not asked in Turkey.) (Table 19)

At the same time, paradoxical as it may appear, significant segments in all of these publics are predisposed to favor a "Muslims only" rule when it comes to high political office. Others, of course, take issue with that restrictive qualification. Indeed, this is one of the few issues touched upon in the entire survey on which Nigeria's Muslim community is clearly deeply divided: 48 percent say only their own coreligionists should lead the country, while just about as many (46%) disagree, with three-in-ten feeling strongly about it on each side. In Pakistan, a plurality (40% vs. 18%) endorse the belief

that only Muslims should lead the country, though just as many (40%) offer no answer to this question. (Table 20)


In Indonesia, there is a subtle split between the Muslim majority and the roughly 10 percent non-Muslim minority regarding the latter's political participation. By overwhelming margins, as noted, Muslims (82%) and non-Muslims (93%) agree that both groups should enjoy equal rights in Indonesia. Yet half (51%) of the Muslims say only fellow Muslims should be allowed to hold high office. Somewhat fewer (42%) reject that infringement on the principle of equal rights. Among non-Muslims, by comparison, most (73%) feel they should not be barred from national leadership, including a substantial proportion (43%) who say they feel strongly about it.

Significantly, even in relatively secular Turkey, a narrow majority (57%) think only Muslims should be eligible to serve in senior political positions, with two-in-five (42%) voicing that view in strong terms. Contrast this with Uzbekistan, for once the only survey country on the secular side of a specific subject. Just one-fifth (21%) of the public feel even "somewhat" inclined to favor Muslims for high office. Half (50%) of Uzbekistanis disagree with that position, while the remainder (30%) express no opinion. This is a rare instance where even the symbolism of Muslim leadership in the political domain is predominantly rejected by the public – even as Islam continues to make inroads into the personal and social spheres of life in that country. (Table 20)

The Question of Shari'ah

Maybe the most explicit of all the questions in this inquiry is a deceptively simple one about *shari'ah*, the Islamic legal code: is it "too harsh" to serve as "the sole source of law" in each country? In Turkey, where a vocal minority of Islamists has stopped short of this demand while still challenging the state's studiously secular orientation, the public has no trouble responding. Two-thirds say Islamic law would indeed be too harsh, including half who feel that way strongly. Just one-fourth take the contrary view. (Figure 8 and Table 21).

Indonesian and Nigerian Muslims, by contrast, are all over the map



on this one, possibly because it has been less of a live political issue in their countries until very recently. The Indonesians split (45% vs. 44%), though just 12 percent feel strongly either way. Nigerian Muslims are similarly split, but with greater intensity, probably because this issue is now beginning to emerge as a political cause celebre in their country: a total of 54 percent voice strong views, evenly divided on opposite sides of this question.

Still a third distribution of responses is evident in Uzbekistan and Pakistan, where nearly half of each public offers no answer at all – but one suspects that is for very different reasons in each case. In Uzbekistan, it may reflect a fair amount of real ignorance, given that country's official atheism under Communist rule until a decade ago, and the enforced apolitical nature of Islam there even today. Moreover, even among those who comprehend the question, some may consider it simply too hypothetical to warrant a response. In Pakistan, quite the opposite has been true: various recent governments, including that of ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, have made a show of proclaiming the legal supremacy of *shari'ah*, in the face of considerable reluctance on the part of the more secular segments of society. As a result, the high degree of popular diffidence on this question more likely stems not from lack of knowledge, but from willful wariness about responding to it, precisely because it has been so politically inflammatory.

The idea that, behind their common reticence, there really are deep differences within and between these two publics is supported by a look at the half or so who do respond in each case. Pakistanis are inclined (37% vs. 17%) to reject the notion that *shari'ah* is too harsh. Uzbekistanis, by contrast, are just about evenly divided (29% vs. 27%) on this question.

Can Shari'ah and Democracy Coexist?

A related question, and one that likewise evokes revealingly different response patterns across these five Muslim societies, is whether or not *shari'ah* and democracy are compatible. Even more revealing, perhaps, are the different ways in which this question may be understood – or misunderstood – around the Muslim world.

Only in Turkey, of the countries covered here, does a majority (59%) say that *shari'ah* and democracy are *not* compatible. As usual in Turkey, a substantial minority (30%) takes the opposite position (Table 22). This 2:1 majority may be less conclusive than it seems, however. It is possible, as one Muslim scholar pointed out, that some respondents on either side of this question understood it in a very different sense than the one intended: not whether imposing *shari'ah* would infringe upon democracy, but whether Turkey's stridently secular version of democracy infringes upon the right to observe *shari'ah* in one's own way – for instance, by wearing a head scarf on campus, or in parliament! This ambiguity makes it doubly difficult to determine what the link might be between responses to this question, on the one hand, and attitudes toward observance of *shari'ah*, on the other.

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At the other end of this continuum is Indonesia, quite unlike the place it holds on most other questions in this survey. Despite the fact that attitudes on other Islamic issues tend to be relatively relaxed and tolerant there – or perhaps because of that very fact – Indonesia is the only survey country where a clear majority of Muslims (65% vs. 22%) take the view that *shari'ah* and democracy *can* coexist. Compounding the mystery is the astonishing finding that *non-Muslims* in Indonesia give that view a resounding endorsement as well, by an almost identical margin (67% vs. 22%). Perhaps the solution to this apparent paradox lies in an assumption, which may be shared by most Indonesian Muslims and non-Muslims alike, that – as in many other Muslim countries -- *shari'ah* would be applied only to Muslims and would cover only family law, rather than encompassing many other aspects of civic life as Islamic law was initially conceived.

A related point may help explain another mystery: the huge discrepancy between Turkish and Indonesian responses to this question, even though both countries have long had self-consciously secular governing ideologies. The difference is that Turkey, unlike Indonesia, has actually experienced democracy, and with it the potential for tension in practice between that system and *shari'ah*. For Indonesians, this is still a largely theoretical prospect, so they may feel freer to take the more optimistic view about the compatibility of those two institutions.

Somewhere in between these two diametrically opposed perspectives are the Uzbekistani and Nigerian Muslim publics. In Uzbekistan, a slim plurality (39%) say democracy and *shari'ah* are compatible; in Nigeria, that figure climbs to half (52%). In each case, a quarter take the “incompatible” position. Notable in both countries is the relatively high proportion voicing no view at all: 24 percent in Nigeria, 35 percent in Uzbekistan.

The real standout in that column, though, is Pakistan, where fully half (49%) say they either can't or won't answer this question. (Among the other half, the "compatibles" prevail by a 3:1 margin, 39% vs. 13%.) A probable partial explanation is that many Pakistanis were simply reluctant to express any opinion in response to a query that combined two such highly charged terms as *shari'ah* and democracy, especially during a period of maximum political tension in mid-summer 1999. Some mystery remains, however, because the non-response rate to this particular item was even higher than that recorded for other, presumably equally controversial ones.

Qualitative Insights from Pakistan

Some additional light on this question is shed by a Pakistani report on a series of focus groups about Islamic issues that were conducted to help develop survey questions. The results suggest a different reason why so many Pakistanis (and possibly others) did not respond when asked about *shari'ah* and democracy: not because they were afraid to answer, but because they really did not understand the question.

The focus group study in Pakistan consisted of nine professionally moderated sessions, conducted in Urdu or Pashto among middle-class individuals under age 36 with at least a high school education in Pakistan's four major metropolitan areas during July 1999. According to the local research professional, "participants do not actually understand what *shari'ah* or the Islamic Law actually is. It is used as a cliché term, which is the solution to all evils." This vagueness probably helps account for the strikingly high percentage of survey respondents voicing no view about the compatibility or incompatibility of *shari'ah* and democracy.

At the same time, the focus groups offer a window into the larger cultural context within which such questions are considered in a place like Pakistan. Among female participants, there was remarkably little controversy in this area. Islam was apparently assumed to be simply superior to any other system, and therefore to encompass whatever virtues, and restrain whatever vices, might be included in the notion of democracy.

The male participants, on the other hand, had sharply divided views about whether or not Islam and democracy were compatible. But that debate was not cast in Western terms of separation of church and state; instead, a close interaction between politics and religion was generally taken for granted. Those who saw Islam and democracy as compatible cited such things as the former's avowal of the "independence to speak your mind," or else some general sense (as one participant put it) that "the real meaning of Islam is democracy; we just misunderstand it." Those who felt otherwise cited other aspects of their religion, often implying its superiority to the unduly individualistic ethos of democracy. For example:

Democracy means individual independence, and our religion has put the individual under several restrictions.

Democracy is merely a vote count; they do not give weight to the opinion. In *shura* [Islamic consultation], on the other hand, it is taken into consideration whether this person's opinion is worth having or not.

Is Violence Ever Justified?

This is the one question on which the Indonesian public, seemingly quite out of character, "jumps the queue" and overtakes Pakistanis en route to the militant end of Muslim opinion. Asked if "violence against civilians to defend Islam" is justified "usually, sometimes, rarely, or never," Indonesian Muslims split almost evenly between usually/sometimes (14% and 26%) and rarely/never (8% and 41%). Most likely this anomaly reflects the general climate of political violence engulfing Indonesia at poll time last June, most of which had little to do with Islam per se. Still, this unexpected response is a useful warning that even these relative moderates within the Muslim fold could shed their traditional tolerance in the face of provocation, or in other unaccustomed circumstances. It is also a useful reminder of just how crucial timing can sometimes be in surveys.

As of May 1999, Nigeria's Muslims resembled Indonesia's on this point, perhaps responding to sectarian strife and political violence in their country as well. This public split three ways: usually/sometimes justified, 31 percent; rarely/never, 34 percent; and don't know/no answer, 35 percent. Pakistanis, by contrast, sounded unusually pacific this past summer, possibly because their longer experience with just this kind of violence in recent years has made them more weary of it. A majority say it is never (48%) or only rarely (11%) justified; among high school graduates, that total atypically climbs to around 70 percent. Just one-quarter fail to respond, a much lower figure than on most other tough questions in Pakistan.

Uzbekistan was the only place of four polled (this question was omitted in Turkey) where a majority (69%) said such violence is never justified. Twelve percent opted for "rarely"; and only a handful said it could usually or sometimes be justified. Nevertheless, before jumping to any conclusions from this, it would be well to remember that the two most peaceful response patterns on this question came from countries at opposite poles of the secular-to-religious range. It may well be that attitudes toward violence in the name of Islam derive more from situational factors than from some underlying Islamic mind-set.

Islam and Foreign Policy

Is Islam Under Threat?

The sense of siege sometimes attributed to Muslims is not shared by the majority in any of the five Muslim societies included in this study. Asked whether "there is any serious threat to Islam today," only a minority in each place answers in the affirmative: Nigeria, 20 percent; Uzbekistan, 23 percent; Indonesia, 26 percent; Pakistan, 30 percent; and Turkey, 33 percent. This unusual sequence is intriguing. It shows that the threat perception is least prevalent in the most religiously mixed country, Nigeria and most prevalent in the two most homogeneously Muslim of the five survey countries: Turkey and Pakistan. That, in turn, suggests that the most salient threats to Islam are seen to come from within Muslim society itself, rather than from rival religions at home or enemies abroad. (Table 24)

A follow-up question probed this possibility, and discovered some confirmation. Respondents were asked to pick the *most* serious threat to Islam (or, in Turkey, to Turkish society) from a short list of options. In all five countries, the "winner" – with at least three times the vote of any other choice in Turkey, Nigeria, and Indonesia -- was "drugs and alcohol," not TV programs, Islamic extremists, other religions or even Western culture. Only in Pakistan did Western culture come close, with nearly as many picking that threat (34%) as chose drugs and alcohol (37%). The next highest perception of Western culture as the top threat is among Nigerian Muslims (20%); elsewhere, that score barely breaks into double digits. (Table 25)

Second place honors for most serious perceived threat to Islam goes to its *own* "extremists," or "militants," or "fundamentalists": 38 percent in Uzbekistan, and 18 percent in Turkey. Interestingly, in the other three countries, this amorphous grouping is chosen as the most serious threat by fewer than 10 percent – even though sectarian and other religious strife has been a fairly common occurrence in all three places in recent memory. But this does not mean, of course, that such incidents are viewed as no threat at all. In Pakistan, for example, a plurality (40% vs. 32%) say, in response to a parallel question, that "militant Islamic groups" do indeed pose a threat.

External Enemies.


A couple of companion questions, asking whether any *foreign countries* pose a threat to Islam, and if so, which ones, reveal correspondingly clear regional divergences. Only in Pakistan does a majority (58%) say yes to the first query. Elsewhere, that figure drops precipitously to a quarter or less: in Indonesia, 27 percent; in Nigeria, 20 percent; in Uzbekistan, 17 percent (Table 26). (The question was not asked in Turkey, although 6 percent in that survey volunteered "foreign countries" or "western countries" when asked to name the most serious threats to Islam generally.) Among those who do sense a foreign threat to Islam, the perceived sources also vary widely. Pakistanis predictably most often (45%) identify India. But in Uzbekistan, ironically, it is the nearby sites seen as hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism that are most often named as threats to Islam: Afghanistan

rates 9 percent; Tajikistan, 4 percent, and Pakistan itself comes in third, with 3 percent (Table 27).

In three of the survey countries, the U.S. also receives fairly frequent mention for this dubious distinction, scoring 30 percent among the general population in Pakistan and in the teens among the Indonesian (17%) and Nigerian (15%) Muslim populations. In those same three locations, Israel places a distant second or third as a perceived outside threat to Islam: in Pakistan, 21 percent; in Indonesia, 9 percent; in Nigeria, 6 percent. In Uzbekistan, by contrast, only two percent cite the U.S., and one percent Israel, in this pejorative context.

Views of the U.S.: Overall Opinion

A more encouraging picture emerges, however, when the focus is on the predominant tendency in overall opinion of other countries. Popular attitudes toward the U.S. represent another area of both surprising diversity and intriguing general patterns. Overall opinion of the U.S. in the five societies studied here, belying any stereotype of mutual animosity, can fairly be described as mostly mixed-to-positive. (See Table 28 and Figure 9 below.)



On balance, the most positive is the public in Uzbekistan, where a majority (56%) has a good opinion and only 8 percent a bad opinion of the U.S., with around a third voicing no view. About as many are favorable in Turkey (52%) and Indonesia (57%) as well, although in both cases the minority with unfavorable views climbs to a quarter of the total. And, in Nigeria, though good

opinion prevails over bad opinion (46% vs. 11%), two-fifths (42%) did not respond. Pakistan stands out in this group as the one in which the balance swings narrowly negative, with just 23% favorable and 27% unfavorable toward the U.S. (and half not responding at all). One of the more significant findings from this measure, however, is that so many in the five countries are unable or unwilling to express views of the U.S.

While these five countries are by no means a representative sample of the Muslim world, findings on the range of views cited above suggests that there may be some connection between relatively secularist political views and positive attitudes toward the United States. Similarly, relatively Islamist political views may be linked with negative opinions of the United States, as in Pakistan.

A closer cross-country comparison of the minorities with a negative opinion supports this hypothesis. The proportion who cite specifically Islamic rationales for that negative view is much lower where the public as a whole tends to be relatively secular. Specifically, only about one-in-ten of the Turks or Indonesians unfavorably disposed toward the U.S. attributes that attitude to religious factors – such as the non-Muslim, or allegedly anti-Islamic, or just morally dissolute nature of American society. Instead, much larger percentages cite purely political factors, such as a perceived American tendency to interfere in others' affairs. Contrast this with Pakistan, where Islamic factors are cited by nearly half of those with a negative overall view of the United States.

Overall Opinion of Other Countries

In this connection, a useful comparison can be made with the range of views expressed toward other countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The standing of the U.S. among all five of the non-Middle Eastern Muslim publics surveyed is roughly comparable to that of France – and clearly ahead of Russia, which gets a net positive rating only in Uzbekistan (57% vs. 24%). Among other Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia emerges as a clear favorite, with three-quarters or more favorable everywhere except in Turkey, where the balance tilts sharply in the opposite direction. Only a third of Turks voice a positive, and half voice a negative, opinion of that highly Islamic Arab kingdom, which differs in so many ways from the Turkish model of modern Muslim development. (Table 29).

In general, Turks seems to have a rather jaundiced view of other countries, offering a mixed-to-highly-negative assessment of all others listed besides the U.S. or their own immediate kinfolk in northern Cyprus. Indonesians, by way of contrast, come off as generally more agreeable about foreign lands, though they divide on Iraq (43% vs 42%) and more often dislike (56%) than like (19%) Russia. They too, however, reserve special favor not for Muslim over non-Muslim ones indiscriminately, but only for some of their own immediate neighbors.

Here Pakistan is once more the exception that proves the rule. This is the only public among


the five polled that spontaneously gives pride of place to any other Muslim country – in this case Saudi Arabia -- as either a political model (11% of all responses to this unprompted and open-ended question) or an economic model (15%) for themselves: Pakistanis also stand out in appearing to give the benefit of doubt to every other Muslim country that they are asked about (although around half offer no opinion about any of them). Among the five publics polled, they give the only positive assessment of Iraq (40% good vs. 10% bad), and the most positive one of Iran (47% good vs. 6% bad). Among those with a favorable view of the latter country, fully half explain it simply by saying that Iran is also a Muslim land.

Opinion of Iran varies to a highly unusual extent, however, by region inside Pakistan. Respondents in Baluchistan, next door to Iran, are nearly twice as likely to have a positive view (60%) of that country than are those in the Northwest Frontier Province, where anti-Iranian Afghan influences are strongly felt. Afghanistan (about which only Pakistanis were asked) itself is viewed favorably by four-in-ten Pakistanis over all, with just one-in-ten expressing a negative opinion – but here again half voice no view either way. Interestingly, Pakistanis with high school or higher education are more likely than others to express favorable rather than negative or no views of Muslim countries across the board – whether of secular Turkey (63%), Sunni-led Afghanistan (62%), or Shi'i-led Iran (70%).

It would be interesting to know how these views divide as between the Sunni and the Shi'i "man in the street" in Pakistan; the latter represent an estimated 20 percent of the population. To protect their privacy, however, Pakistani respondents were not questioned about their own sectarian affiliation, so it is impossible to distinguish attitudes between the minority Shi'i side and the majority Sunni side of the street.

Is the U.S. Anti-Muslim?

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the reality is that only a minority of each major public surveyed believes that the U.S. is even "somewhat" hostile to Muslim countries. Within those parameters, the range is quite wide: from a tiny fraction (5%) in Uzbekistan, to a fifth (19%) in Nigeria, to around a quarter in Turkey (26%), Pakistan (27%), and Indonesia (26%). (See Figure 10 below and Table 30).



A useful point of comparison is provided by a Palestinian poll taken in April 1999, near the very end of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's tenure -- just when the Arab-Israeli peace process was at a low ebb, and Arab frustrations accordingly high. Three-fourths in the Palestine Authority labeled the U.S. "hostile to Muslim countries" at that point, triple the percentage who felt that way in Turkey, or even in Pakistan, a few months later. The implication is twofold: time and space can both make a big difference. In other words: timing, while not quite everything in survey research, can matter a fair amount or even a great deal; and Muslim publics, like most others, tend to care most about their own backyard.

Returning to the five non-Middle Eastern countries covered in this report, still another unexpected finding is that, at least in some cases, the perception of American hostility to Muslim nations appears to *rise* with education. Possibly this tends to be a learned prejudice (or maybe greater awareness of the outside world fosters a more acute threat perception). In Pakistan, for example, the prevalence of the view that the U.S. is hostile to Muslim countries is substantially higher among those with high school or higher education (38%) than among the less-educated (18%). Similarly, in response to a related open-ended question in Pakistan, 46 percent of the better-educated compared with only 18 percent among the less-educated named the U.S. as a country that threatens Islam.

American Muslims: An Ace in the Hole?

There is only one, often overlooked area where the U.S. gets a uniformly positive reading from all five Muslim publics covered: treatment of its own Muslim population. Asked whether Muslims in the U.S. are treated "fairly or unfairly," significantly more in every case felt the treatment was fair. In Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Indonesia, four-in-ten said Muslims received fair treatment in the U.S., outnumbering those with the contrary view by two-to-one or more. In Nigeria, half (51%) had no view on this question; but those who did, tilted narrowly toward the positive side (28% vs. 21%). (Table 31).

Even in Pakistan, where anti-American sentiment overall was highest at poll time because of the Kargil crisis and other factors, the balance on this particular point was moderately favorable (27% vs. 18%). Also noteworthy was that those with at least a high school diploma were far more favorable (46%) than those with less education (12%) – in welcome contrast to some other findings from Pakistan, which show criticism of the U.S. actually tending to rise with level of education. Altogether, these findings suggest that greater efforts to publicize the positive American Muslim experience would find a receptive audience among an unusually wide range of Muslim publics abroad.

Kosovo: How Much Do Other Muslims Care?

At the time these surveys were taken, the U.S.-led military campaign to save the overwhelmingly Muslim ethnic Albanians of Kosovo had just been completed. Official statements, media commentary, and other anecdotal evidence from various Muslim countries suggests that local elites were often quite interested in that situation, and generally pleased that (in the words of one observer), the U.S. was "finally using force for the right reasons, namely to help instead of harm fellow Muslims." Turkey was a very special case in this context, as the sole Muslim member of NATO, one with its own Balkan history and geography, and unlike any other Muslim country, a key participant in both the Bosnian and Kosovo operations.

Yet in some other Muslim countries, to judge from the sparse data available in these surveys, the general public either did not pay much attention or quickly forgot the Kosovo episode. Among Indonesian Muslims, for example, a solid majority (61%) reported having heard "not that much" or "nothing at all" about it. Similarly, in Pakistan, a similar majority (63%) voiced no opinion in response to a question about Kosovo, and about the same percentage did not reply when asked if American actions there had affected their view of the United States. Both countries, of course, were fully occupied with their own problems during this entire period; it may also be relevant that the U.S. studiously avoided calling attention to the Muslim identity of the Kosovars.

Nevertheless, among the minority (33%) in Pakistan who responded substantively when asked how, if at all, their views of the U.S. were influenced by Kosovo, more reported a positive (38%) than a negative (27%) effect, with one-third (36%) saying those views were unchanged. And perhaps most surprisingly of all, Pakistanis were more likely to voice reactions of some kind to U.S. policy in Kosovo (33%) than to U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli arena (25%) – supposedly the litmus test of American intentions in the Muslim world.

The U.S. and Israel: Not Such A Big Deal Outside the Arab World

A very striking finding is how little the issue of American support for Israel seems salient to all these non-Arab Muslims, even the ones who are unfavorably disposed toward the U.S. for other reasons. Among the minority of Indonesian Muslims disposed that way, not a single one attributed that sentiment to the Israeli issue in response to an open-ended question on the subject. Even in Pakistan -- politically the closest of these countries to its Arab fellow-Muslims, and with the most negative popular attitudes toward the U.S. -- a mere one percent of those with such attitudes attribute those attitudes specifically to American support for Israel. Apparently Arab (and especially Palestinian Arab) resentment of perceived U.S. favoritism toward Israel is not generalizable to the Muslim world as a whole, even if it undoubtedly has some spillover effect beyond the narrow confines of the Middle East. Non-Middle Eastern Moslems have their own issues with the U.S.

A corollary is that the enormous American role in shepherding the Arab-Israeli peace process attracts amazingly little attention, for better or worse, outside that region. These surveys were taken, it should be recalled, around the time of a fateful Israeli national election, and then a totally new governing coalition, followed by high-profile U.S. activity and an intense air of excitement and expectation among all Mideast aficionados. Yet by huge margins, to pick two examples from opposite sides of the secular-to-religious spectrum, the publics in Uzbekistan (57%) and even more so in Pakistan (75%) offered no opinion at all when queried about the American role in the Arab-Israeli arena. The few with views divided much more favorably in Uzbekistan (28% at least "somewhat positive" vs. 9% "not very" or "not at all" positive) than in Pakistan (8% positive vs. 17% not positive). (Table 32)

Even in Turkey, by far the closest of these five countries geographically to the Arab-Israeli issue, and the closest politically to both the U.S. and Israel, an absolute majority (57%) had nothing to say when asked about the American role in that nearby dispute. The minority who did express any opinion tilted toward the positive side (28% vs. 15%). At least one could conclude that, on balance, the U.S. tends to get more credit than blame for its role in the Mideast peace process, even if it is not a major issue for many publics in the wider Muslim world.

Iraq: More Nuances Than Meet the Eye.

Attitudes toward Iraq are another important indication that the majority of Muslims, outside the Middle East, are *not* reflexively opposed to U.S. policies in that part of the world. Overall views of Iraq, for example, are at best mixed or even sharply negative in several major societies: Indonesia (43% good vs. 42% bad); Turkey (13% good vs. 69% bad); and Uzbekistan (20% good vs. 30% bad). In Pakistan, Iraq comes out ahead (40% good vs. 10% bad), though half express no view about that country -- but those numbers pale by comparison with Iraq's arch rival Saudi Arabia, which overwhelmingly gets good reviews from Pakistanis (87% good vs. 1% bad). (Table 29).

More to the point, only about a third in either Pakistan (39%) or Uzbekistan (34%) say UN sanctions against Iraq should be lifted entirely, rather than kept in force or just eased to spare suffering civilians. Around half in both countries offer no opinion on this question (Table 33). In Indonesia and Turkey, a somewhat larger proportion, but half (49% in each case), want sanctions stopped. In Indonesia, responding to an open-ended question asked only there, the vast bulk (84%) of Muslims *who want sanctions ended* attribute that sentiment to humanitarian concern for Iraq's people, not to political factors. Only very small percentages justify opposition to these sanctions by citing either their support for Saddam's regime (10%), or their objections to U.N. or U.S. policy toward Iraq (17%).

Responding to a separate question, the Turks, who border Iraq, and whose economy has been badly hurt by the sanctions during this entire decade, significantly are much more likely to label the sanctions regime "mostly Saddam's own fault" (50%) than to blame it mainly on the West (22%). The more distant Uzbeks, on the other hand, as often blamed the West (27%) as Saddam (24%), though four-in-ten failed to answer the question. (This question was not asked in the other three countries.)

Islam and Foreign Policy: A Recap

To summarize, Islam in the five countries surveyed seems less linked in the public eye with foreign policy than with internal social or political issues. The U.S. enjoys a reasonably good reputation among key non-Middle Eastern Muslim publics, except in Pakistan. Mideast issues that may be inflammatory elsewhere assume a low profile, on the whole, outside that immediate region. Washington does get modest mileage from its efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace, and also to defend Muslims in Kosovo. Surprisingly, however, these publics seem more aware of and more favorably disposed to the U.S. track record with respect to treatment of its own Muslim population.

The most important determinants of the U.S. image in any Muslim society, however, may be particular local issues rather than any of these broader ones. The next, concluding section, which looks at longer-term opinion trends in two of these societies, will follow up that point by analyzing the swings (or the stability) in popular attitudes toward the U.S. over the past decade.

Long-Term Trends: Uzbekistan and Turkey

The Evidence

Until this study was undertaken in mid-1999, systematic surveys on such sensitive Islamic subjects had never before been completed in three of these five major non-Middle Eastern Muslim societies: Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan. The newly democratic political climate in the former two countries was what made the surveys there possible for the first time; in Pakistan, success was more a matter of gradually overcoming cultural rather than political inhibitions (and fortuitously timing the poll three months before Gen. Pervez Musharraf's coup created new cause for concern). In any case, since the surveys were unprecedented in these three places, hard data about long-term attitudinal trends there are simply not available. This is especially unfortunate since all three have been undergoing interesting and important transformations over the past few years, almost certainly with some significant linkages to public opinion.

Fortunately, however, there is a longer record of credible survey research on these issues, dating back at least a decade, in the two other countries: Uzbekistan and Turkey. Despite their common Turkic ethnolinguistic roots, these two countries have very different modern histories: Turkey has been an independent, largely democratic and Western-oriented republic for most of this century; Uzbekistan gained independence from the former Soviet Union only at the start of this decade, and remains a relatively isolated and underdeveloped autocracy. Nevertheless, the last several years have witnessed the reemergence of an element with certain common characteristics in both countries: an increasing, and increasingly controversial, social and even political role for Islamic tendencies and movements.

Uzbekistan: An Outsider's Quantitative Assessment

The prevalence of personal religiosity, in the sense of self-identification as a believer, has climbed measurably in the decade since Uzbekistan's independence from Soviet rule: from the mid-50 percent range to the mid-70 percent range today.

Certain selected indicators of personal Islamic commitment have risen as well, to judge from the relatively fragmentary polling data on specific practices. Attendance at public prayer has stayed roughly stable, at relatively low levels. But self-reported fasting during Ramadan and donations to mosques have each jumped dramatically since the early 1990's, from nearly negligible rates to around the halfway mark in the current survey. (How much of this is an actual increase, and how much is due instead to an erosion of inhibitions against acknowledging such behavior, or perhaps even positive social pressure to report it, is impossible to glean from the available evidence.) The ability to identify and recite the *shahada*, the one-sentence Muslim profession of faith, has gone up from a mere 3 percent to about 30 percent during this decade -- leading one local survey research expert to claim, with some justice, that "it is possible to draw the conclusion that there was a tenfold rise in religious knowledge."

Putting it that way may give an exaggerated impression of what is still a minority of Muslims with more knowledge about their faith. Yet it is abundantly clear that the public in Uzbekistan has moved toward greater support for an injection of Islamic values in their society -- to the point where this represents the majority position today. In early 1993, in one of the first such polls ever conducted there, only around one-third agreed that "the teachings of Islam should play a larger role in our country." By late 1994, the percentage who wanted a larger role for religion had edged up to half. And as of mid-1999, three-quarters say that Islam should play at least a "fairly large" role in their society. Trends among the better-educated follow the same pattern, climbing from 53 percent in the 1994 survey to 66 percent five years later.

Behind this significant shift in overall public opinion is a little-known story of changing attitudes among Uzbekistan's younger generation. Even though those under 30 remain considerably less personally pious than senior citizens of that country, it is among the under-30 crowd that the most noticeable shift toward a desire for more Islamic values in society has occurred. A comparison of statistics from this year's survey with those from 1994 tells the story.

Five years ago, three-fourths of those 60 and older wanted a larger role for religion in Uzbekistan -- but only half the general public agreed. Today, young adults have caught up with their elders in this respect. Around 70 percent in both age groups now say that Islam should play a fairly or even a very large role in their society. Even more striking is that the youngest cohort is now actually significantly more likely than the oldest one -- 44 percent vs. 27 percent -- to say that Islamic values should have a larger role in *government policy*. With other age groups mainly sticking with their old attitudes, it is this growing Islamic tendency among young adults in Uzbekistan that largely accounts for the overall trend that way in public opinion.

At the same time, these figures point to a crucial distinction between personal piety, social values, and a third dimension of Islamic life: political activism. Personal piety has increased in Uzbekistan, albeit moderately and unevenly; popular support for Islamic social values has risen all the way to the majority mark. But during the past five-year period, overall backing for Islamic intervention in politics (or for government promotion of Islam) has moved in exactly the opposite direction: down.

The evidence for this assertion is complex but compelling. For starters, consider the question of religious education mentioned in an earlier section. In September 1994, a majority (63%) wanted more of it; five years later, that figure had fallen to just 35 percent. Among the educational elite (those with at least some post-secondary schooling), this downward trend was even more pronounced: from 62 percent five years ago, all the way down to 26 percent today.

Another example is the question of religious figures in politics, also previously mentioned in a different context. Here the "elite" again seems "ahead" of the "street" in moving further and further away from Islamic politics. From 1994 to 1999, overall popular rejection of religious personalities participating in Uzbekistan's political life increased only marginally, if at all (from 46% to 49%). Among those with some higher education, however, the rate of rejection rose from an already high

57 percent to a crushing 73 percent. Finally there is the question of whether "religious extremists" are a threat. "Yes" answers overall climbed appreciably (from 39% to 51%) over the past five years. And the educational elite, true to form, are in the lead on this one as well, with those calling religious extremists a threat edging up from an already high 61 percent in 1994 to 67 percent today.

Looking outward toward other countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, not that much has changed in Uzbekistani public opinion over the past five years or more -- especially considering the important shifts on some internal Islamic issues. Iran, a fellow Muslim land not so far away, but politically and culturally quite alien, continues to get essentially the same very mixed reviews as in 1994: a third are positive, but nearly a fourth are negative; and the rest voice no opinion either way. The U.S. continues to attract a majority of favorable views in the not-quite-60-percent range, with just a handful (around 10%) of negative notices. The only significant change registered in this domain is in attitudes toward Russia, which, while still favorable, have slid smartly downhill since a March 1993 poll: from overwhelmingly good (83% vs. 6%) to just mostly good (59% vs. 24%) today.

In any event, this changing picture, like the unchanged images of Iran and the U.S., appears unrelated to any trends in Uzbekistani attitudes on Islamic issues. The discussion of long-term Turkish trends below suggests a similar dynamic. There, too, the public's ups and downs on external actors have a rhythm all their own, apparently timed to events in the region rather than to those inside that country.

Equally important, in Uzbekistan, Turkey, and almost certainly other Muslim societies is this key finding: Even within the framework of purely internal Islamic issues, opinion trends may differ greatly depending upon which dimension of Islamic life is in question: personal, social, or political. Before moving on to the next country, however, it is worth looking at some qualitative shifts that may lurk behind the numbers from Uzbekistan itself.

Uzbekistan: An Insider's Qualitative Assessment

There is a qualitative dimension to the evolution of Islamic life in Uzbekistan that, in the local pollster's own estimation is potentially of considerable social and even political import. What follows is a necessarily somewhat subjective attempt to explore that reality, and to extrapolate its broad qualitative trends over time, drawn largely from the insights of this knowledgeable native.

The community of observant Muslims has become not just larger, but also more diverse, and to some extent more organized along these diverse lines. In the first place, there is, in the pollster's words,

... traditional Islam, that is, a "cocktail" made of the mix of traditional or customary law (*adat*), two or three Muslim laws (*shariat*), several pages of Sufi teachings, and "barbarous" or "shaman" Islam. That is, various prejudices and superstitions, sorcery invocations and motions, visits to the graves of some miracle men, visits to holy water springs or holy trees with various requests: to deliver from childlessness,

help to build the house, help to get married, conduct profitable deal, pass University entrance tests, etc.

Alongside this diffuse and informal cultural construct there is a growing network of what this observer terms "theological" Islam. This relatively formal version of the faith places greater emphasis on learning, doctrine, and approved ritual, and has a much clearer leadership cadre, whether clerics or laymen.

Nevertheless, "theological" Islam is itself subdivided into two variants: the various Sufi (quasi-mystical) brotherhoods, each with its own local leaders, and the more straitlaced, mosque-based variety of Islam presided over by "orthodox" prayer leaders (*imams*). Overlapping this distinction is the increasingly important one between officially recognized and unofficial, community-based mosques. In the official mosques, this expert's local informants report, "we are taught how many times it is necessary to bow during prayer." Not so in "our" mosques, where, according to a typical devotee,

We may discuss various questions. For instance, what for a person lives, what justice means, where are the roots of injustice, why some people are poor and others are rich, what should be done to prevent people from suffering.

If this sounds potentially politically inflammatory, that corresponds precisely to the judgment of at least this one local observer. He argues that grass-roots Islam could someday challenge Uzbekistan's existing elite. Without implying any endorsement of this view, it appears both provocative and perceptive enough to be worth excerpting one last segment at some length:

...the split between the rich and the poor, and, therefore, between the authorities and the common people, becomes bigger. On one side there is a non-official, persecuted mosque that is attractive for poor and "inquiring" people. On the opposite side, there is the state, [through] official, magnificent, and replete mosques, that cannot and does not want to help people with explanation or with solution of their problems.... This means that the state is opposed not by a non-numerous Islam as it was ten years ago. Nowadays, the state is opposed by a substantial part of the society that is gradually increasing each year.

Looking ahead, it would be well worth watching for warning signs that this contrarian appraisal might materialize. A long-term Islamic social and ultimately political groundswell in Uzbekistan could conceivably have the far-reaching implications hinted at by this native scholar.

Turkey: Political Turmoil, Social Stability

In some respects, the situation in Turkey seems almost a mirror image of Uzbekistan's story of political stagnation alongside incipient social mobilization on Islamic lines. The past ten years have witnessed some major ups and downs in Islamic influence in Turkey at the political level. The earlier part of the decade saw the slow but steady rise in electoral strength and political power of the Islamist *Refah Partisi* [Welfare Party], first at the municipal and then at the national level. This trend, flying in the face of furious but fragmented secularist opposition, peaked in 1995/96, when Refah emerged with a bare plurality of the vote (under a quarter of the total) in a badly fractured constellation of political parties. After months of political wrangling, when the relatively secular but rival parties could not stay united against Refah, its veteran leader, Necmettin Erbakan, ascended to the prime ministry.

This watershed event marked the first time an Islamist ever led modern Turkey. It was also one of the very few occasions in the history of the Muslim world – this year's electoral outcome in Indonesia was another – that such a leader was installed in a truly free election. Within a year, however, pressure from Turkey's staunchly secular military establishment helped topple Erbakan's government in a peaceful, slow-motion variant of the classic Turkish "coup by memorandum." In a new election in mid-1999, the Islamist share of the vote – garnered by the newly outlawed Refah's successor, *Fazilet Partisi* [Virtue Party] – actually fell slightly, for the first time in recent memory. Instead, the voters returned the veteran secular politician Bulent Ecevit to power, at the head of perhaps the strongest coalition in Ankara in at least a decade of dramatic political vicissitudes.

Turkey: Predictions Predicated on the Past

The richness of the relevant data over time makes Turkey a uniquely fruitful field for analyzing the interaction among different dimensions of Islamic attitudes. Is there, for instance, a close correlation between personal piety and political views? That analysis, in turn, makes possible an attempt to project these patterns into the future.

On domestic Islamic issues, in particular, some vital trends were identified in a major 1995 report by this Office [*In the Eye of the Beholder: Muslim and non-Muslim Views of Islam, Islamic Politics, and Each Other*, pp. 17-23]. The study showed that personal piety is indeed tied to Turkish views on some political and social issues – but not always to the same extent, and sometimes mainly at the extremes. For example, four-fifths of the Turks who are themselves very religious said Islamic values should play a larger role in their society – as against just one-fifth who felt that way among the least religious in their own personal lives. But it is the large middle ground of Turks of intermediate Islamic observance who swing the balance. They tend to agree more often with their most pious brethren on the social values question, and so a majority of the public as a whole consistently comes down in favor of a greater dose of Islam in that arena.

Somewhat more surprising (and quite at variance with the pattern in Uzbekistan) is the strong *inverse* correlation between personal religiosity and perception of an Islamic extremist threat. Four-fifths of those regularly attending a mosque said such extremism was *not* a threat, while about two-thirds of the general public said it was. Similarly, support for imposition of *shari'ah* on the entire

country is also linked to individual observance. The significant surprise here, however, is that an absolute majority even of the most religious Turks reject the assertion that *shari'ah* should become the law of the land.

In the realm of foreign policy, one key question with a documented link to Islamic issues is Turkish opinion of the U.S. This was examined in another previous study by this Office, using data from a mid-1996 survey¹. This research demonstrated that the strongest advocates of a larger Islamic role in society have also been more skeptical about American foreign policy in general, and about the American commitment to Turkey in particular.

Yet the impact of this factor on the overall Turkish image of the U.S. over the years appears to be very limited. Certainly there is no simple inverse relationship dictating that positive views of the U.S. will rise whenever Islamist sentiments are on the decline, or vice versa. In fact, annual surveys over the past decade tracking the American image in Turkey reveal a low point (63% unfavorable vs. 31% favorable) in late 1994. And yet this was also precisely the point when popular support for an infusion of Islamic values in Turkish society also reached its nadir for the 1990's. Moreover, a detailed analysis of these data demonstrated that there was no correlation between personal Islamic piety and unfavorable views of the United States.

Instead, circumstantial evidence suggests that changing Turkish Muslim attitudes toward the U.S. are related to the perceived consequences of recent American policies in Turkey's vicinity. In this respect, the trough of 1992-94 probably reflects growing popular dismay with Desert Storm's inconclusive aftermath. That episode had drastic and abrupt adverse consequences both for Turkey's economy and for its security posture vis-a-vis the Kurds.

It seems that such factors, rather than "Islamic" ones, contributed most to the precipitous downturn in the U.S. image in Turkish eyes. Within a few years, as the shock of those events wore off, views of the U.S. staged a recovery, eventually reaching the roughly 2:1 favorable ratio recorded in the first flush of victory over Iraq in early 1991. Just two years after the low point of late 1994, favorable views of the U.S. had gone up nearly twenty points, and they have continued to climb. During that same two-year period -- but, it seems, purely by coincidence -- popular support for more Islamic values in Turkish society also rose on a sustained basis, and by almost exactly the same amount.

These linkages -- or lack of linkages -- among selected variables allow one to hazard some guesses about how the past decade's trends in Turkish views of Islam will play out into the future. It seems likely that popular support for imposition of *shari'ah* will remain low, unless the level of personal religiosity suddenly starts to rise at an unprecedented rate. Similar stability can be anticipated in the already prevalent perception of Islamic extremism as a threat to the Turkish "way of life." That, too, is unlikely to change much anytime soon, again barring the remote possibility of a sudden, massive revival of strict Islamic observance.

¹ "Turks Lack Confidence in U.S. as a Security Partner -- Yet General View of America Is Improving."

Furthermore, if that remote possibility somehow does begin to materialize, we may well witness a secularist "backlash," one in which the intensity of opposition rises among those who do not share the experience of religious revival. At the same time, one can speculate that since a wholesale abandonment of all Islamic practice is likewise most unlikely, the generalized popular yearning for some social role for Islamic values will probably continue to be a constant (give or take ten or twenty percentage points!) in Turkish public opinion. Finally, in the foreign policy sphere, it is plausible to predict that external events, not internal Islamic issues, will keep having the greatest effects on Turkish views of the U.S. for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion: Whither U.S.-Muslim Ties?

Much the same basically "secular" trajectory can be predicted, with nearly the same (modest) level of confidence, for American interaction with the four other major Muslim countries covered in this report. There, too, Islam enjoys increased visibility in personal, social, and in most cases even political life. Yet its influence on attitudes (and on actual policies) toward the outside world appears severely constrained by other factors -- except in the unlikely case of an Iranian-style revolution that installs not just a nominally but a radically Islamic regime.

Thus, if the past is in any sense a prologue, issues only indirectly linked with Islam -- regional conflict resolution, economic expansion, global security and other challenges -- will continue to be at the core of American influence and American interests among the vast Muslim majority beyond the Middle East. For the minority of Muslims inside that region, Islamic issues (including those linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict) will continue to have greater resonance in foreign relations, though even there a more pragmatic approach appears to be gaining ground.

At the same time, there are surely opportunities for the U.S. to improve the tone of its ties with each of these societies, and with the wider Muslim world, through deeper dialogue on some of the specifically Islamic issues treated here. Prime examples might be more determined efforts to explain U.S. policy in Bosnia and Kosovo to other Muslim audiences, and to underline the vibrancy of Muslim life in the U.S. itself. Such efforts might make a difference only on the margins, in the atmospherics of American relations with Muslim societies around the world. But those atmospherics are important. Anything which could tip that balance in a better direction would have appreciable benefits in all the far-flung places, mostly beyond the Middle East, where Islam now plays an increasingly influential social role, and a potentially important political one as well.

APPENDIX I

THE PALESTINE AUTHORITY:

A SUMMARY OF VIEWS ON ISLAM IN SOCIETY AND PUBLIC LIFE

Findings from an Office of Research survey taken in April 1999 in the Palestine Authority show that Palestinians share a preference for Islamic governance and law with their coreligionists outside the Middle East. On some issues related to a role for religion in politics, however, they seem closer to the more religiously conservative Muslim publics in Nigeria and Indonesia, and to some extent, in Pakistan, than to the more secular Islamic populations in Turkey and Uzbekistan. But the most striking differences between the views of Palestinians and those of non-Middle Eastern Muslims are to be found in their views of the U.S. and its role in the Middle East peace process.

Islam in Society

- A majority (60%) of Palestinians view Islam as playing a large role in their society, as do somewhat larger majorities in each of the other countries polled except Pakistan. Moreover, three-fourths (77%) feel that Islamic influence in their country is growing. And like most in the non-Middle Eastern countries, the large majority (93%) wants an even larger role for Islam in their society. (Table 7)
- But at the same time, most (83%) suspect that not all persons engaged in "Islamic activity" in their entity are actually very devout, a note of skepticism echoed by majorities in the other countries. (Tables 1, 2, and 3)
- On a more personal level, nearly all (95%) say religion is important in their lives, including 75 percent judging it to be *very* important (Table 6). Most (69%) say they pray five times a day – significantly more than say this in Turkey, Uzbekistan, or even Pakistan. (Table 4)

In Politics

- In their views on religion and politics, Palestinians more closely resemble the publics in Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia than their more secular coreligionists in Uzbekistan and Turkey. They predominantly (84%) want a larger role for Islamic values in government policy (Table 8). Most also see a role for religious leaders in politics (72%) (Table 17), and disagree that "if religious leaders get involved in politics, it corrupts their faith" (67%). (Tables 17 and 18). They also disagree that Shari'ah is too harsh to be used as the sole basis for law in their entity (60%) (Table 21), and want more religious instruction in the schools (92%) (Table 9).

The study is based on face-to-face interviews conducted in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, April 15-16, 1999, among 1,200 adult Palestinians. For a more detailed report of this study, see M-165-99, "Palestinian Views on Islam, Politics, and Public Life." August 20, 1999.

Democracy Issues

- The majority (60%) feel that Islamic law is compatible with democracy (Table 22), as do pluralities to majorities in each of the non-Middle Eastern countries covered. Seemingly consistent with this view, three-fourths (76%) hold that “non-Muslims should have the same legal rights as Muslims in our country.” (Table 20)
- The plurality (51% vs. 36%) would support at least some rights for women in the workplace, holding that “it is compatible with Islam for men and women to be employed in the same workplace. (Table 11)
- But on another democracy issue, views divide on whether non-Muslims should (50%) or should not (46%) be allowed to hold key government posts in Muslim countries.

U.S. Image

- In their views of the U.S., Palestinians are far more likely to be negative than Muslims in the other countries surveyed. Three-fourths (76%) say they have a poor or very poor opinion of America. (Table 28) The U.S. image for this public is closely linked to the perception of the U.S. role in the peace process. Those with poor opinions most often cite American support for Israel (36%), followed by references to the U.S. as “anti-Arab” or “anti-Palestinian” (14%), as an enemy of Islam (11%) or as “hegemonic” and “imperialist” (11%).
- Moreover, in sharp contrast to the non-Middle Eastern publics, the solid majority (66%) say they have a somewhat to very negative view of the role America has played in the Arab-Israeli peace process. (Table 32)
- Three-fourths (75%) see the U.S. as hostile in its dealings with Muslim countries, a view expressed by only minorities in the other countries. (Table 30)

APPENDIX II: TABLES

Table 1. PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE ISLAM PLAYS IN SURVEY COUNTRY

“What role do you think Islam plays in our society -- a very large role, a fairly large role, a fairly small role, or a very small role?” (IN PAKISTAN: “What role do you think Islam plays in the political life of our country - a very large role, a fairly large role, a fairly small role, or a very small role?”)

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Very large role	27%	55%	32%	50%	60%	26%
Fairly large role	18	32	46	22	29	34
Fairly small role	16	6	12	9	6	27
Very small role	22	2	4	9	1	11
Don't know/No response/Other	18	6	7	10	4	2
	101%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%

Table 2. IS ISLAM'S ROLE IN SURVEY COUNTRY GROWING?

“Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *“Islam is playing a growing role in our society today.”*”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Agree strongly	22%	41%	38%	54%	46%	33%
Agree somewhat	27	24	34	28	40	44
Disagree somewhat	11	16	6	7	8	14
Disagree strongly	8	14	4	7	2	3
Other/unrelated response	1	-	-	-	4	-
Don't know/No response	32	6	17	4	-	6
	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%	100%

Table 3. DOES ISLAMIC ACTIVITY EQUATE TO DEVOTION?

"Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *"There may be a lot of Islamic activity in our country, but many people are not very devout."*

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Agree strongly	36%	50%	35%	54%	23%	44%
Agree somewhat	23	26	33	28	41	39
Disagree somewhat	6	8	7	10	23	12
Disagree strongly	3	7	5	4	8	3
Other/unrelated response	1	-	-	-	5	-
Don't know/No response	30	9	21	3	-	2
	99%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%

Table 4. FREQUENCY OF PRAYING

"How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, everyday at least once, or everyday five times."

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Never	NA*	18%	59%	NA*	NA*	9%
Hardly ever	17%	NA*	10	2%	1%	7
Only during religious holidays	2	16	8	1	2	NA
Only on Fridays, religious holidays	8	21	2	2	2	6
More than once a week	6	4	1	3	5	8
Everyday at least once	22	7	6	9	14	NA
Everyday five times at least	40	33	13	84	76	69
Don't know/No response	5	1	1	*	*	1
	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%

*NA = Response category not offered in that survey country.

Table 5. FREQUENCY OF FASTING

“How often, if at all, do you fast: hardly ever, some days during Ramadan, most days during Ramadan, during all of Ramadan, during all of Ramadan and other religious holidays.”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)**
Never	NA*	7%	31%	NA*	NA*	
Hardly ever	2%	NA*	6	3%	*%	
Some days during Ramadan	5	6	8	4	12	
Most days during Ramadan	8	5	5	14	22	
During all of Ramadan	72	55	49	73	32	
During all of Ramadan and other religious holidays	11	26	1	4	34	
Don't know/No response	2	*	*	2	*	
	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	

*NA = Response category not offered in that survey country.

** Question not asked in the PA

Table 6. IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN PERSONAL LIFE

“How important is religion in your life – very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Very important	86%	70%	24%	96%	98%	75%
Fairly important	8	23	47	3	2	20
Not very important	1	5	19	*	*	4
Not at all important	*	1	7	*	-	1
Don't know/No response	4	1	2	*	*	1
	99%	100%	99%	99%	100%	101%

Table 7. VIEWS ON THE ROLE ISLAM SHOULD PLAY IN SURVEY COUNTRY

“What role do you think Islam should play in our society -- a very large role, a fairly large role, a fairly small role, or a very small role?” (IN PAKISTAN AND TURKEY: “What role do you think Islam should play in the political life of our country - a very large role, a fairly large role, a fairly small role, or a very small role?”)

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Very large role	77%	55%	29%	66%	74%	75%
Fairly large role	9	32	46	18	19	18
Fairly small role	2	6	13	5	3	4
Very small role	1	2	4	4	*	2
Don't know/No response/other	11	6	9	7	4	1
	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%

Table 8. ISLAMIC VALUES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

“Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *“Islamic values should play a larger role in government policy.”*”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Agree strongly	44%	32%	14%	52%	41%	51%
Agree somewhat	19	14	23	28	40	33
Disagree somewhat	3	18	14	9	12	8
Disagree strongly	1	29	19	8	2	4
Other/unrelated response	1	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	31	8	30	4	5	3
	99%	101%	100%	101%	100%	99%

Table 9. MORE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE SCHOOLS?

"Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *"Our schools should provide more religious instruction for our children."*

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Agree strongly	59%	49%	11%	69%	72%	66%
Agree somewhat	19	23	24	20	23	26
Disagree somewhat	2	13	22	6	3	4
Disagree strongly	2	11	29	3	1	2
Other/unrelated response	*	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	17	4	15	2	1	2
	99%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%

Table 10. SHOULD SCHOOLS FOCUS MORE ON "PRACTICAL" EDUCATION?

"Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *"Our schools should focus more on practical subjects and less on religious education."*

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)**
Agree strongly	6%	17%	38%	28%	10%	
Agree somewhat	9	18	24	15	11	
Disagree somewhat	19	20	11	17	34	
Disagree strongly	45	39	7	36	43	
Other/unrelated response	1	-	-	-	-	
Don't know/No response	21	6	20	4	2	
	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

** Not asked in the PA.

Table 11. ISLAM AND GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE

"Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *"It is compatible with Islam for men and women to be employed in the same workplace."*

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Agree strongly	20%	50%	50%	32%	31%	29%
Agree somewhat	18	16	21	21	42	32
Disagree somewhat	18	8	5	16	17	21
Disagree strongly	28	21	8	26	7	15
Other/unrelated response	*	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	16	6	15	5	2	4
	100%	101%	99%	100%	99%	101%

Table 12. SHOULD THERE BE GENDER RESTRICTIONS IN THE WORKPLACE?

"Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *"There should be restrictions on men and women being employed in the same workplace."*

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)**
Agree strongly	29%	19%	6%	37%	13%	
Agree somewhat	19	11	6	23	27	
Disagree somewhat	17	16	18	16	38	
Disagree strongly	16	50	58	18	19	
Other/unrelated response	1	-	-	-	-	
Don't know/No response	18	4	11	5	3	
	100%	100%	99%	99%	100%	

** Not asked in the PA.

Table 13. SHOULD THE MEDIA BE FREE TO PRESENT DIVERSE VIEWPOINTS?

“Thinking about the media in our country (that is, television, radio and the press), which of the following statements on this card comes closest to your own views?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200**)
The media do not need to carry Islamic religious material (Turkey only)	NA*	17%	NA*	NA*	NA*	
The media should carry material that represents a variety of viewpoints, including non-Islamic values	15%	57	58%	63%	55%	
The media should carry only material consistent with Islamic values	34	9	22	30	29	
The Media should carry only Islamic religious material	17	5	3	6	9	
None of these	1	-	-	-	-	
Don't know/No response	32	12	16	2	7	
	99%	100%	99%	101%	100%	

*NA = Response category not offered in that survey country.

** Not asked in the PA.

Table 14. ARE DIVERSE INTERPRETATIONS OF ISLAM ACCEPTABLE?

“Some people believe Islam should tolerate diverse interpretations of its teachings. Others believe that there is only one true interpretation of the teachings of Islam. Which of these two points of view is closer to your own?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)**	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)**
Diverse interpretations acceptable	18%	44%	23%		44%	
There is only one true interpretation	43	43	42		47	
Don't know/No response	39	13	36		9	
	100%	100%	100%		100%	

** Not asked in Nigeria or the PA.

Table 15. IS SHARI'AH BEST BASIS FOR GOVERNMENTS OF ISLAMIC STATES?

"Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *"An Islamic state based on the Shari'ah is the best form of government for Islamic countries today."*

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Agree strongly	43%	18%	12%	58%	39%	55%
Agree somewhat	17	10	17	25	40	27
Disagree somewhat	2	13	16	5	12	11
Disagree strongly	2	50	16	5	2	5
Other/unrelated response	1	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	34	10	39	6	7	3
	99%	101%	100%	99%	100%	101%

Table 16. SHOULD RELIGION BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM GOVERNMENT POLICY?

"Now I'm going to read you several statements about the role of religion here and elsewhere. For each statement, please use this card to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly: *"Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy."*

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Agree strongly	25%	72%	53%	55%	38%	23%
Agree somewhat	16	9	22	15	25	20
Disagree somewhat	12	5	5	10	21	25
Disagree strongly	11	10	4	19	11	30
Other/unrelated response	2	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	34	5	16	2	5	2
	100%	101%	100%	101%	100%	100%

Table 17. VIEWS ON RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN POLITICS

“Religious leaders should play a larger role in politics.” (In Pakistan: “Religious leaders should play a larger role Pakistan.”)

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Strongly agree	37%	22%	10%	47%	22%	36%
Somewhat agree	23	12	13	25	32	36
Somewhat disagree	6	16	20	11	32	17
Strongly disagree	7	42	29	13	7	7
Irrelevant, other	1	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	25	8	27	4	7	4
	99%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%

Table 18. ARE RELIGIOUS LEADERS CORRUPTED BY POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?

“If religious leaders get involved in politics, it corrupts their faith.”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Strongly agree	26%	40%	22%	44%	17%	11%
Somewhat agree	22	14	21	17	24	17
Somewhat disagree	11	12	13	18	34	37
Strongly disagree	11	22	12	17	18	30
Irrelevant, other	1	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	29	13	33	3	7	4
	100%	101%	101%	99%	100%	99%

Table 19. SHOULD MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS HAVE SAME LEGAL RIGHTS?

“Non-Muslims should have the same legal rights as Muslims in our country.”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey* (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Strongly agree	37%		46%	52%	50%	40%
Somewhat agree	21		21	23	32	36
Somewhat disagree	9		4	10	11	15
Strongly disagree	7		5	11	3	6
Irrelevant, other	1		-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	26		25	4	3	3
	101%		100%	100%	99%	100%

* Question not asked in Turkey

Table 20. SHOULD NON-MUSLIMS HOLD KEY GOVERNMENT POSTS IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

“Non-Muslims should not hold key government positions in Muslim countries.”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Strongly agree	23%	42%	9%	30%	19%	23%
Somewhat agree	17	15	12	18	32	23
Somewhat disagree	10	12	16	18	28	32
Strongly disagree	8	20	34	28	14	18
Irrelevant, other	2	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	40	12	30	6	7	4
	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%

Table 21. IS SHARI'AH TOO HARSH TO BE SOLE BASIS FOR NATIONAL LAW?

"*Shari'ah* is too harsh to be used as the sole source of law in our country."

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Strongly agree	7%	51%	15%	27%	12%	16%
Somewhat agree	10	14	12	18	33	19
Somewhat disagree	13	9	12	21	32	26
Strongly disagree	24	15	17	27	12	34
Irrelevant, other	2	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know/No response	45	10	45	7	12	5
	101%	99%	101%	100%	101%	100%

Table 22. VIEWS ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF SHARI'AH AND DEMOCRACY

"Some people say that democracy cannot exist in a country where the laws are based on the *Shari'ah*. Others disagree and say that democracy and a system of laws based on the *Shari'ah* can exist together. Which of these views is closest to your own?"

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Democracy can <i>not</i> exist under <i>Shari'ah</i> law	13%	59%	26%	24%	22%	24%
Democracy can exist under <i>Shari'ah</i> law	39	30	39	52	67	60
Don't know/No response	49	11	34	24	12	16%
	101%	100%	99%	99%	101%	100%

Table 23. IS VIOLENCE IN DEFENSE OF ISLAM JUSTIFIED?

“Some people think that the bombing of civilian targets and similar forms of violence is justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is usually justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?”

	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey* (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority* (1200)
Unweighted base:						
Usually justified	7%		1%	13%	14%	
Sometimes justified	8		4	18	26	
Rarely justified	11		12	9	8	
Never justified	48		69	25	41	
Don't know/No response	27		15	35	11	
	101%		101%	100%	100%	

* This question was not asked in Turkey or the PA.

Table 24. ARE THERE ANY SERIOUS THREATS TO ISLAM TODAY?

“In your opinion, are there any serious threats to Islam today?”

	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Unweighted base:						
Yes	30%	33%	23%	20%	26%	67%
No	43	56	57	80	62	26
Don't know/No response	27	11	20	-	12	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%

Table 25. VIEWS ON WHAT THREATENS ISLAM THE MOST

“Using this card, please tell me which one, if any, poses the greatest threat to Islam.”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey* (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)****
Drugs & alcohol	37%	54%	49%	58%	77%	
Western culture	34	10	8	20	16	
(Survey country's) TV programs	1	6	1	4	1	
Other religions	6	2	1	7	2	
Islamic extremists/militants	2	12	38	9	3	
Fundamentalists**	NA**	6	NA**	NA**	NA**	
Extreme nationalism**	NA**	7	NA**	NA**	NA**	
None pose a threat	6	1	NA***	NA***	NA***	
Don't know/No response	14	3	4	2	2	
	100%	101%	101%	100%	101%	

* In Turkey, respondents were asked about the “greatest threat” to *Turkish society*.

** Response options offered only in Turkey.

*** “None of these pose a threat” was not offered as a response category in Uzbekistan, Nigeria, or Indonesia.

**** In the PA, no card was used. Responses as follows: Western countries and their culture, 37%; Israel/Zionism, 11%; lack of religious belief, 8%; corruption, 5%; terrorism and violence, 1%; Arab rulers and political institutions, 1%; decline or morals/decline of Arab customs, 2%; other 18%; no answer 17%.

Table 26. COUNTRIES THOUGHT TO POSE A THREAT TO ISLAM

“In your opinion, are there any countries which pose a serious threat to Islam?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey* (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)*
Yes	58%		17%	20%	27%	
No	19		50	80	55	
Don't know/No response	24		33	-	18	
	101%		100%	100%	100%	

* Question not asked in Turkey or the PA.

Table 27. COUNTRIES THOUGHT TO POSE A THREAT TO ISLAM

“Which country or countries pose a threat to Islam?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey* (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)*
United States	30%		2%	15%	17%	
India	45		-	*	*	
Afghanistan	-		9	-	-	
Tajikistan	-		4	-	-	
Pakistan	-		3	*	-	
Russia	9		1	2	7	
Iran	-		1	*	*	
Israel	21		1	6	9	
Chechnya	-		1	-	-	
France	-		-	2	*	
Great Britain	2		-	6	1	
Italy	-		-	1	*	
Germany	-		-	1	1	
Yugoslavia	-		-	*	1	
Serbia	-		-	-	1	
European Union	-		-	-	1	
Netherlands	-		-	-	1	
Other European countries	-		2	*	*	
Japan				*	1	
China	-		-	-	3	
Other Asian countries	-		1	*	-	
Iraq	-		1	1	1	
Saudi Arabia	-		-	1	-	
Other Middle Eastern Islamic countries	-		1	-	-	
Other	3		1	*	1	
Don't know/No response	1		3	*		
Not asked	42		83	80	73	
	153%		114%	115%	118%	

* Question not asked in Turkey or the PA.

Table 28. OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

“Now I’d like to ask you about your opinion of several countries. For each one I mention to you, please tell me if you have a very favorable, a somewhat favorable, a somewhat unfavorable, or a very unfavorable opinion. First take (READ FIRST COUNTRY)....”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Very good	5%	20%	26%	34%	17%	2%
Fairly good	18	32	30	12	40	12
Fairly poor	9	8	5	6	17	25
Very poor	18	18	3	5	9	51
Don’t know/No response	49	22	36	42	17	9
	99%	100%	100%	99%	100%	99%

Table 29. OPINIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

"For each country mention to you, please tell me if you have a very favorable, a somewhat favorable, a somewhat unfavorable, or a very unfavorable opinion. First take (COUNTRY)..."

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Saudi Arabia						
Very good	78%	12%	32%	67%	47%	18%
Fairly good	9	20	41	10	40	50
Fairly poor	*	16	4	1	6	20
Very poor	1	32	2	1	1	6
Don't know/No response	12	19	22	21	6	6
	100%	99%	101%	100%	100%	100%
Turkey						
Very good	11%		17%	12%	10%	1%
Fairly good	30		43	18	34	21
Fairly poor	4		7	7	27	45
Very poor	4		4	6	4	22
Don't know/No response	50		29	58	26	11
	99%		100%	101%	101%	100%
Iraq						
Very good	10%	3%	4%	23%	12%	
Fairly good	30	10	16	18	31	
Fairly poor	6	18	19	6	32	
Very poor	4	51	11	6	10	
Don't know/No response	49	18	51	47	15	
	99%	100%	101%	100%	100%	
France						
Very good	6%	8%	22%	26%	14%	9%
Fairly good	19	27	26	12	35	41
Fairly poor	7	10	2	3	14	30
Very poor	6	25	2	3	5	9
Don't know/No response	62	29	48	56	33	11
	100%	99%	100%	100%	101%	100%

Table 29 Cont. OPINIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

“For each country mention to you, please tell me if you have a very favorable, a somewhat favorable, a somewhat unfavorable, or a very unfavorable opinion. First take (COUNTRY)...”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Russia						
Very good	3%	2%	17%	17%	2%	4%
Fairly good	11	10	40	20	17	28
Fairly poor	10	19	18	4	36	42
Very poor	17	44	6	6	20	14
Don't know/No response	59	25	20	52	25	12
	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%
Iran						
Very good	18%	3%	5%	20%	8%	8%
Fairly good	29	11	26	22	42	46
Fairly poor	2	15	15	5	23	26
Very poor	4	50	7	7	7	10
Don't know/No response	47	21	47	47	20	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 30. VIEWS ON HOW U.S. DEALS WITH MUSLIM COUNTRIES

“For each of the countries I am about to name, please tell me how you think it deals with Muslim countries -- would you say that it is very friendly to Muslim countries, somewhat friendly to Muslim countries, neutral to Muslim countries, somewhat hostile toward Muslim countries, or very hostile to Muslim countries?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Very friendly	9%	5%	11%	16%	6%	2%
Somewhat friendly	18	24	31	15	29	10
Neutral	9	18	24	9	24	8
Somewhat hostile	13	20	4	10	19	30
Very hostile	14	10	1	9	7	45
Don't know/No response	44	22	29	41	15	5
	101%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 31. VIEWS ON HOW U.S. TREATS MUSLIMS WITHIN ITS BORDERS

“Again I would like to read you the names of some countries. Using the following card, please tell me for each one whether you think that Muslims are treated fairly or unfairly in that country, or haven't you heard or read enough to say?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)*
Treated fairly	27%	42%	41%	28%	43%	
Treated unfairly	18	24	5	21	22	
Haven't heard enough to say	8	20	33	10	19	
Don't know/No response	48	14	21	41	15	
	101%	100%	100%	100%	99%	

* Not asked in the PA.

Table 32. VIEWS ON U.S. ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

"Now I would like to read you the names of some countries and ask you about their role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Using this card, please tell me whether you think each has played a very positive, fairly positive, somewhat negative, or very negative role in the Arab-Israeli peace process."

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia* (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)
Very positive	2%	10%	10%	24%		6%
Fairly positive	6	18	18	12		22
Somewhat negative	6	5	6	3		27
Very negative	11	10	3	4		39
No role	-	-	7	-		-
Don't know/No response	75	57	57	57		6
	100%	100%	101%	100%		100%

*Question not asked in Indonesia.

Table 33. VIEWS ON UN SANCTIONS ON IRAQ

“As you may know, there are currently United Sanctions on Iraq for failing to comply with UN resolutions. Which, of any, of the following statements best describes our view of the UN sanctions?”

Unweighted base:	Pakistan (1900)	Turkey (1128)	Uzbekistan (2000)	Nigeria (1844)	Indonesia (1650)	Palestine Authority (1200)**
The UN sanctions should continued because Iraq is a threat to its neighbors.	3%	18%	12%	10%	10%	
The UN sanctions should be stopped (Option used in Indonesia only)	NA*	NA*	NA*	NA*	49	
The UN sanctions should be eased but not stopped entirely because Iraq is a threat to its neighbors.	5	NA*	NA*	NA*	NA*	
Although the Iraqi government is a threat to its neighbors, the UN sanctions should be stopped, since they are causing the Iraqi people to suffer.	13	31	18	43	NA*	
The UN sanctions should be stopped because Iraq is not a threat to its neighbors AND the sanctions are causing the Iraqi people to suffer.	26	18	16	19	NA*	
None (volunteered)	1	3	2	-	-	
Don't know/No answer	52	31	52	28	40	
	100%	101%	100%	100%	99%	

*Response option not offered in that survey country.

**Question not asked in the PA.