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PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1993

Dear Mr. Leader:

Please accept my respect and appreciation for the manner in which we were able to work through the foreign policy issues on the defense appropriations bill.

Frankly, I was reminded fondly of how the Senate has in years past been able to achieve a level of civility and mutual respect undeterred by partisan differences. On a personal level, it means a great deal to me to be able to work well with you and your able staff. I called Sheila and Randy to thank them personally, but I thought that you too should know that I was grateful to them for their professionalism and constructive approach to difficult issues.

Many thanks and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Howard Raster
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Robert Dole
Republican Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

WITH
AND
THANKS
RESPECT
H

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I understand you intend to offer an amendment to the FY 94 Defense Appropriations bill to maintain funds for our mission in Somalia, if needed, up to the March 31, 1994 date proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As we have discussed on more than one occasion, I recognize that you believe U.S. forces should be out of Somalia sooner than March 31, and it was typically courteous of you to call me in advance of proposing a February 1, 1994 withdrawal date.

I, too, would like to end our deployment as soon as practical, consistent with completing our mission in Somalia. While we have set March 31, 1994 as the outer limit for fulfilling our mission, I certainly will order the withdrawal of U.S. forces sooner if at all feasible. It is my understanding that your amendment providing funds until March 31 is designed to provide needed flexibility, but that it remains our common goal to use no more time than absolutely necessary to complete our tasks in Somalia and bring our troops home.

Thank you for working with the Administration in a cooperative spirit to bring us to common ground on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "B" and a long, sweeping underline.

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1993

Dear Mr. Leader:

I understand you intend to join in sponsoring an amendment to the FY 94 Defense Appropriations bill to maintain funds for our mission in Somalia, if needed, up to the March 31, 1994 date proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I share your belief that we should end our deployment as soon as practical, consistent with completing our mission in Somalia. While we have set March 31, 1994 as the outer limit for fulfilling our mission, I certainly will order the withdrawal of U.S. forces sooner if at all feasible. It is my understanding that the Senate amendment providing funds until March 31 is designed to provide needed flexibility. But it remains our common goal to use no more time than absolutely necessary to complete our tasks in Somalia and bring our troops home.

Thank you for working with the Administration in a cooperative spirit to bring us to common ground on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "B" and "C".

The Honorable Robert Dole
Republican Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1993

Dear Mr. Leader:

I understand you intend to join in sponsoring an amendment to the FY 94 Defense Appropriations bill to maintain funds for our mission in Somalia, if needed, up to the March 31, 1994 date proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I share your belief that we should end our deployment as soon as practical, consistent with completing our mission in Somalia. While we have set March 31, 1994 as the outer limit for fulfilling our mission, I certainly will order the withdrawal of U.S. forces sooner if at all feasible. It is my understanding that the Senate amendment providing funds until March 31 is designed to provide needed flexibility. But it remains our common goal to use no more time than absolutely necessary to complete our tasks in Somalia and bring our troops home.

Thank you for working with the Administration in a cooperative spirit to bring us to common ground on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a stylized, cursive script.

The Honorable George J. Mitchell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

October 14, 1993
9:32 a.m.

AMENDMENT NO. _____

Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To provide restrict funding for United States Armed Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES -- 103 Cong., 1st Sess.

H.R. 3116

Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be offered by Mr. Dole, _____ to the Committee amendment

Viz:

At the end of the Committee amendment on page 157, after line 9, insert the following:

1
2 Sec. ____ (a) None of the funds appropriated under this Act may
3 be available for the purposes of deploying United
4 States Armed Forces to participate in the
5 implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia-
6 Herzegovina, unless previously authorized by the
7 Congress.

8 (b) Provided that the limitation set forth in
9 subsection (a) shall not preclude the provision of any
10 humanitarian assistance by the Department of Defense.
11

October 14, 1993
8:32 a.m.

AMENDMENT NO. _____

Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To provide prohibit funding for the deployment of
United States Armed Forces in Haiti.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES -- 103 Cong., 1st Sess.

H.R. 3116

Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be offered by Mr. Dole, Mr. _____ to
the Committee amendment

Viz:

On page 157, after the committee amendment ending on line 9,
insert the following:

1 SEC. _____. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR UNITED STATES
2 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI.

3 (a) PROHIBITION.---Funds appropriated under this Act may not
4 be obligated or expended for United State military operations in
5 or over Haiti unless--

6 (1) authorized in advance by the Congress; or

7 (2) the President transmits to the Congress a
8 certification pursuant to subsection (b), along
9 with a written justification for such
10 certification.

11 (b) CERTIFICATION.---The prohibition of subsection (a) shall
12 not apply if the President certifies to Congress that--

13 (1) the temporary deployment of United States Armed

Forces into or over Haiti is necessary in order to evacuate United States citizens from a situation of imminent danger;

(2) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into or over Haiti is vital to the national security interests of the United States and there is not sufficient time to seek and receive Congressional authorization; or

(3) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into or over Haiti--

(A) is justified by U.S. national security interests;

(B) is justified due to the presence of a real threat to international peace;

(C) will be undertaken only after ensuring all necessary steps have been taken to guarantee the security of U.S. Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces will not become targets;

(D) will be undertaken only after an assessment that the proposed mission and objectives of U.S. Armed Forces cannot be performed by civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations;

(E) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the deployment are

1 established;

2 (F) will be undertaken only after an end point
3 for the deployment has been identified; and

4 (G) will be undertaken only after the costs of
5 the deployment are calculated.

6 (c) DEFINITION.---As used in this section, the term "United
7 States military operations in or over Haiti" means the continued
8 deployment, introduction or reintroduction of United States Armed
9 Forces into the territory, airspace or waters of Haiti,
10 irrespective of whether those Armed Forces are under United
11 States or United Nations command, but does not include activities
12 for the collection of foreign intelligence, activities directly
13 related to the operations of U.S. diplomatic facilities, or
14 operations of the United States Coast Guard to counter illegal
15 immigration.

AMENDMENT NO. _____

Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To provide funding for the involvement of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia through March 31, 1994, unless the President requests and the Congress authorizes an extension of that date.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES -- 103 Cong., 1st Sess.

H.R. 3116

Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be offered by Mr. BYRD to the Committee amendment

Viz:

At the end of the Committee amendment which appears on page 8, lines 12 through 17, strike "environment" and insert the following:

"environment: Provided further, That the Senate finds that--

(1) the United States entered into Operation Restore Hope in December of 1992 for the purpose of relieving mass starvation in Somalia;

(2) the original humanitarian relief mission in Somalia had the unanimous support of the Senate, expressed in Senate Joint Resolution 45, passed on February 4, 1993;

(3) the original humanitarian mission was successfully accomplished by United States forces, and an expanded mission was assumed by the United Nations on May 4, 1993 pursuant to United Nations Resolution 814, of March 26, 1993;

(4) neither the expanded United Nations mission of national reconciliation nor any other mission not strictly humanitarian in nature has been endorsed or approved by the Senate;

(5) the expanded mission of the United Nations was, subsequent to an attack upon United Nations forces, diverted into a mission aimed primarily at capturing certain persons,

pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 837, of June 6, 1993;

(6) the actions of hostile elements in Mogadishu, and the United Nations mission to subdue those elements, have resulted in open conflict in the city of Mogadishu and the deaths of 29 Americans and the capture of American personnel; and

(7) during fiscal years 1992 and 1993, the United States incurred expenses in excess of \$1.1 billion to support operations in Somalia:

Provided further, That the Senate approves the use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia for the following purposes --

(i) The protection of United States personnel and bases; and

(ii) The provision of assistance in securing open lines of communication for the free flow of supplies and relief operations through the provision of--

(I) United States military logistical support services to United Nations forces; and

(II) United States combat forces in a security role and as an interim force protection supplement to United Nations units:

Provided further, That funds appropriated, or otherwise made available, in this or any other Act to the Department of Defense may be obligated for expenses incurred only through March 31, 1994 for the operations of United States Armed Forces in Somalia:

Provided further, That such date may be extended if so requested by the President and authorized by the Congress:

Provided further, That funds may be obligated beyond March 31, 1994 to support a limited number of U.S. military personnel sufficient only to protect American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, and noncombat personnel to advise the United Nations commander in Somalia:

Provided further, That United States combat forces in Somalia shall be under the command and control of United States commanders under the ultimate direction of the President of the United States:

Provided further, That --

(A) captured U.S. personnel in Somalia should be treated humanely and fairly; and

(B) the United States and the United Nations should make all appropriate efforts to ensure the immediate and safe return of any future captured U.S. personnel:

Provided further, That the President should ensure that, at all

times, United States military personnel in Somalia have the capacity to defend themselves, and American citizens:

Provided further, That the United States Armed Forces should remain deployed in or around Somalia until such time as all American service personnel missing in action in Somalia are accounted for, and all American service personnel held prisoner in Somalia are released"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MACK McLARTY
TONY LAKE
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS
DAVID GERGEN

FROM: Howard Paster
SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Somalia

The President is committed to providing to Senator Byrd by Monday a statement of policy on Somalia (I think the text of yesterday's speech should suffice) and an outline of the report being submitted Wednesday under the terms of the Byrd Amendment to the Defense Authorization bill.

I need to receive the material for Senator Byrd by noon on Monday for transmittal to his staff.

It is my assumption the NSC will provide the materials (and Wednesday's report) and State and Defense will provide whatever support the NSC needs.

Enclosed are two items I received late yesterday that should be considered in the preparation of the report:

- A list of 11 questions from four generally supportive Senators. I recommend strongly the report to be submitted Wednesday address each of these questions if we are to be in the best position of winning a floor vote.
- A letter to me from Newt Gingrich which also provides suggestions on how to address the issue in a way that may help us prevail on the Hill. Preparation of the report should also take into account Newt's suggestions.

Also, you should know that at the end of the day yesterday I suggested to the President he call Senators Mitchell, Dole, Nunn and Warner and ask them to jointly sponsor an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill incorporating Administration policy. The President asked me for a note, a copy of which is enclosed.

cc: Wendy Sherman
Sandi Stuart

Questions suggested by Senator Dole in consultation with
Senators Cohen, Warner, and Lugar

- 1) What U.S. national interests are at stake in Somalia? What national interests would be jeopardized by an expeditious withdrawal?
- 2) Given that the original humanitarian purpose of Operation Restore Hope -- feeding hungry Somalis -- has been fulfilled and that the last feeding station closed in August, what is the precise purpose in continuing the U.S. presence in Somalia?
- 3) Is the deployment of additional troops to Somalia necessary for the safety of the troops currently stationed in the country? Is the deployment you propose adequate to ensure the security of American forces for the duration of their mission? Wouldn't expeditious withdrawal be the best manner to ensure the safety of American troops in Somalia?
- 4) How does the mission of ensuring that Somalia does not revert to famine and chaos differ from "nation-building" as a mission for U.S. armed forces? Can preventing a repeat of recent Somali history be assured without the establishment of a legitimate government with police and judicial powers - the exact tasks undertaken in nation building?
- 5) If a date certain for American withdrawal is established, will it be unconditional? Will American forces leave no matter what the situation on the ground -- even if famine, anarchy or civil war are ongoing or imminent?
- 6) If a conditional date certain for American withdrawal is established, upon what conditions will American withdrawal be contingent?
- 7) What specific benchmarks can Congress and the American people use to measure progress toward achieving the objectives for which American armed forces are deployed in Somalia?
- 8) What specific steps have been or will be taken to share the burden of the Somali mission with African states more directly affected?
- 9) How will the manner and timing of the U.S. withdrawal affect future peacekeeping operations, especially the ability to encourage greater participation by other nations? How will it affect the security of Americans serving abroad?

- 10) Do we continue intend to continue the hunt for General Aideed as part of the mission for U.S. forces? Are we willing to inflict civilian casualties as a part of any effort to capture Aideed? Are we willing to negotiate with General Aideed? if so, under what circumstances? Can a political resolution be achieved without Aideed's participation?
- 11) What will the command structure be for the additional troops deployed to Somalia? Why should we not bring all U.S. forces in Somalia under U.S. command?

NEWT GINGRICH
SIXTH DISTRICT, GEORGIA

THE REPUBLICAN WHIP

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1006
(202) 225-4501



3823 ROSWELL ROAD
SUITE 200
MARIETTA, GA 30062
(404) 565-8398

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

October 7, 1993

Mr. Howard Paster
Director of Legislative Affairs
The White House
West Wing
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Howard:

The President's report to the country should put everything in context:

1. Bush was right: 350,000 died, maybe 2,000,000 saved.
2. At our request with our leadership 27 countries have come (list names).
3. At our request and with our leadership other countries have helped maintain security; Pakistani losses, other losses; they have suffered, more are suffering; they are still holding firm.
4. The loss of a retreat would be large and worldwide.
 - a. killing Americans gets Americans out
Every terrorist, every faction will learn that, and every American everywhere will be in greater danger;
 - b. every nation which came in at our request will feel betrayed;
 - c. the Somali people will be in danger of starvation and death again;
 - d. the future challenges to freedom and human rights will face huge costs of distrust and disbelief in American staying power;
 - e. the losses are tragic, our heart goes out to their families; we will do everything to protect our young men and women and we will do everything we can to avenge our dead, but the cost of retreat would devalue their lives and deprive their deaths of meaning. Precisely because they died for a noble cause, we must honor their sacrifices by sustaining that cause for freedom.

Mr. Howard Paster
October 7, 1993
Page 2

5. Therefore, here is our mission, here is our commitment, here is our plan, and here is what you can hold me accountable for. (This can be expanded and I am glad to help, but I do not understand it at the present time, so I cannot explain it)

I would like to help support you in Somalia, but our House Republican leadership letter indicates how troubled we are by the confusion, incompetence, and ineptness in the current policy.

We have to be convinced you know what you want to do, that it is worth doing, and that you know how to do it. After Aspin's disastrous briefing on Tuesday and today's discussion, I cannot at this time express confidence or offer support.

Your ability to answer number 5 above "what is the mission, commitment, plan, and accountable command structure?" is the key to our changing our current opposition. So far I have seen nothing to convince me you have solved the problem.

Please let me know if I can be of help.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Newt", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Newt Gingrich

NG:jkh

NEWT GINGRICH
SIXTH DISTRICT, GEORGIA

THE REPUBLICAN WHIP

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
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3823 ROSWELL ROAD
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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

October 7, 1993

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

After listening carefully to an extraordinary dialogue on Somalia between your administration and the legislative leadership, there seem to be four major lessons to be learned out of the mess we are in.

First, prior consultation for major foreign policy decisions is an absolute requirement under our political system. The Legislative branch will not sustain the Executive branch if it is not systematically and routinely consulted. "Don't ask me to be in on the landing if I am not in on the takeoff" was Lyndon Johnson's advice to Dwight Eisenhower (which Johnson himself tragically and disastrously forgot when he left the Legislative branch for the White House). On Somalia, your administration failed to follow this principle prior to Tuesday.

Second, any commitment of the American military must meet a national security requirement, have a clear definition of victory, and have a clearly defined mission. If lives are involved there should also be a moral purpose. Since your administration accepted the United Nations expansion of the goals for Somalia, there has been a failure to redefine our national security interests, our clear definition of victory, our clear statement of mission, and our moral purpose.

Third, the use of the military must be competent. Everything about last Sunday reeks of incompetence. The fact that your administration rejected requests from Mogadishu for heavy equipment smacks of Washington micromanagement of military affairs by civilian political appointees (the McNamara disease). On the grounds of current evidence, it is hard to believe your appointees could implement a military policy even if we agree with its goals.

Finally, the effort to blame the United Nations for its obsession with getting Aidid misses the entire point of most Americans' objections to your administration's policy of subordinating American interests and American men and women to

President Bill Clinton
October 7, 1993
Page 2

the United Nations. According to your administration's hindsight comments, over a dozen young Americans were killed last weekend in pursuit of a United Nations' obsession.

It is precisely the administration's unwillingness to recognize the current ineffectiveness and incompetence of the United Nations and to change Presidential directives that makes us very hesitant to support a policy of engagement.

Your administration must reshape its strategies, its structures, and its habits to implement these four principles on a regular, routine basis.

Without these changes to sustain an active foreign policy it will be extraordinarily difficult for us to work with you to help enlarge freedom and to work to build a freer, safer, more prosperous world.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Newt", written over the word "Sincerely,".

Newt Gingrich

NG:jkh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Memorandum for The President

From: Howard Paster *HP*

Subject: Somalia

Date: October 7, 1993

The parliamentary situation is that the Senate will proceed Wednesday or Thursday to the Defense Appropriations bill and we will need 51 votes to prevail on an amendment that incorporates Administration policy. There will be a separate effort to dissuade Senator Byrd from sponsoring a December 31 fund cut-off. But even if he changes his position, we need anticipate an amendment from another source.

The key to securing the necessary votes is to put a bi-partisan leadership cover on an important foreign policy issue. This means the best amendment is cosponsored by Mitchell-Dole-Nunn-Warner. (Thurmond is actually the ranking member of Armed Services but Warner commands more respect and has been generally supportive.)

Prior to your speech this afternoon I provided advanced texts to all of the above. In addition, we have received 11 questions from the Republican Senators; questions I will forward to the NSC so they are answered in the report being done to comply with the Byrd amendment.

What is needed now are personal requests from you to the four Senators - Mitchell, Dole, Nunn and Warner - asking them to sponsor an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill to affirm Administration policy. Brief comments on each:

Mitchell - He is ready to help, and anxious to beat Byrd.

Dole - He thought you should reserve the right to stay beyond March 31 "if authorized by Congress." Your staff felt that would weaken your position in garnering the votes.

Nunn - He had wanted a sit down discussion prior to the speech and I apologized to him for the lack of time when I spoke with him at about 4 p.m. today.

Warner - He is the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee and participated in a classified briefing today so you should assume he has maximum knowledge of the situation.

FAX

DATE: 10/6


TIME: _____

TO:RECIPIENT: Howard PorterORGANIZATION: White House Leg Off.FAX NUMBER: 456 - 6220**FROM:**PERSON SENDING: John HilleyORGANIZATION: Maj Ldr.NUMBER OF PAGES: 8
(including this one)

COMMENTS:

John really needs to
talk to Howard
about his tonight.
Thanks

FLOOR STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN ON SOMALIA
Wednesday, October 6, 1993



MR. PRESIDENT, I rise today to address our challenge in Somalia. Like all Americans, I am deeply saddened by the recent loss of American lives in that country -- and angered and repulsed by television footage of dead Americans being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Most Americans are outraged that our soldiers, who went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission, have now become targets of attacks and even desecrations.

We must not, however, permit our anger and disgust to dictate rash or unsound policy. A crescendo of voices is now demanding an immediate withdrawal of our forces from Somalia. Others say we should stay the course in that country, even if it means deploying much larger U.S. forces there. In my view, MR. PRESIDENT, the first thing we must do is keep our wits about us. We expect our troops in Somalia to remain calm and collected under fire, and we owe them nothing less than equal composure back here in Washington as we decide what to do next in Somalia. We need a careful and reasoned consideration of the situation, including an immediate but thoughtful reassessment from the administration; and, as Senator Byrd has said, we need a full debate within the Congress.

MR. PRESIDENT, CNN, which is headquartered in my home state, is rightfully regarded by many as the greatest electronic

broadcast organization in the world. I am very proud of CNN under the leadership of Ted Turner and Tom Johnson. I believe, however, they would agree that we should not permit CNN or any other news organization inadvertently to dictate, simply by virtue of the television images its provides of events overseas, when and where we are going to deploy forces overseas -- or when we should withdraw them. In my view, daily graphic and heart-rending television footage of starving Somalis contributed significantly to the Bush administration's decision to intervene in Somalia last December. Today, footage of dead and captured Americans is fueling calls for an abrupt and immediate pull-out.

We must do all that is necessary to protect our troops in Somalia and to ensure the safe return of those that have been captured. We also have broader concerns. We have troops who are in harm's way in many places other than Somalia. We must not send a signal that encourages adversaries to attack our troops elsewhere and invite in television cameras in the hopes of forcing us to leave. In the name of protecting our military forces in Somalia, we must not jeopardize our other military forces elsewhere -- in Europe, in Macedonia, in the Persian Gulf, in Korea, in Central America, and many other places around the world.

MR. PRESIDENT, there are essentially three options now being discussed. The first is what I would call the status quo plus.

3

This option would involve continuing our present operations with a modest increase in our forces in Somalia. The second option would ~~be to~~ immediately withdraw our forces without conditions. The third option would be to heavily reinforce our deployments in Somalia with the aim of militarily crushing Aideed and providing the foundation for disarmament and nation-building in Somalia.

MR. PRESIDENT, the first option would simply extend a status quo that is now unacceptable. We have been drawn into playing Aideed's game of urban guerrilla warfare with insufficient force to prevail. Adding modest reinforcements will help protect our troops already there, but is not likely to deprive Aideed's forces of the tactical initiative they have enjoyed in southern Mogadishu. The second option -- an immediate departure -- I have already spoken of; how we leave Somalia can affect the security of our other forces deployed overseas, and the willingness of other nations to participate with us in other U.N. operations. The third option of heavy reinforcement promises a wider war in a country where we have no economic or security interests -- and at a time in which our shrinking military power may again be called upon protect our primary security interests in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The ultimate mistake in U.S. foreign policy would be to become so entangled in a nation where we have no strategic interests that we lose sight of events in Russia, which have potentially profound consequences for our future national security.

4

MR. PRESIDENT, the fundamental flaw of the U.N. position in Somalia is the large disparity between political ends and military means. The recently expanded U.N. objective in Somalia is disarmament and nation-building in a country where in the short term political stability is probably inherently unachievable, given the clan-based organization of Somali society. The irony, of course, is that we entered Somalia last December with much larger military forces than we have there today in pursuit of a simple and very narrow political objective -- ending starvation. Today, the U.N. is pursuing a vastly expanded political agenda in the wake of the withdrawal of most U.S. military forces initially deployed to Somalia. I believe that the U.N. made a major mistake in expanding the its mission in Somalia at a time when the means to fulfill that mission were being withdrawn.

MR. PRESIDENT, I believe there is a fourth option that should be considered: an immediate change in tactics, a narrowing of the military mission, and a carefully-constituted exit strategy. Specifically, I would propose consideration of four measures:

First, the U.N. needs to alter its approach to the tactical situation on the ground. Whatever the U.N. may decide on this matter, U.S. forces should cease urban police operations aimed at capturing Aideed and his henchmen. There is not enough of the

5

right kind of force on the ground for such missions, and the urban guerrilla warfare environment plays to Aideed's strengths - as we saw over the weekend. The U.N. should instead concentrate on the security of its forces and protecting key facilities essential to the humanitarian mission. This means, as the administration ~~is now doing~~ ^{has announced}, reinforcing our forces with appropriate amounts of heavy armor. ~~I do not believe the President regards these reinforcements as a down payment toward later escalation, but rather views them as designed to protect U.S. forces already in Somalia. I support this defense of our troops.~~ ~~I do not believe the President regards these reinforcements as a down payment toward later escalation, but rather views them as designed to protect U.S. forces already in Somalia. I support this defense of our troops.~~ A support measure ~~that~~ ^{that} is required?

~~To protect our existing troops. I do not support escalation.~~
Second, we need to redefine the essential U.N. military

mission in Somalia -- or at a minimum the role of U.S. forces there. The U.N. must determine the minimal level of security throughout Somalia, most of which is peaceful, to complete the original humanitarian mission. We should also consider ignoring Aideed -- yes, ignoring him -- by-passing southern Mogadishu and isolating the bulk of Aideed's forces in that area. We should deprive Aideed of the targets whose destruction make him a hero to his own people -- and let him bear the responsibility for interrupting relief supplies to his own people. The U.N. should defend only those essential areas of Mogadishu that are defensible from secure positions and required ^{for} humanitarian purposes, such as Mogadishu's airport and port facilities. The U.S. Quick Reaction Force, which is now in effect serving as the

6

U.N.'s cutting edge of attempts to capture Aideed and his henchmen, should return to its original mission of serving as a contingency back-up for other U.N. forces.

Third, we need to define an exit strategy for our forces. MR. PRESIDENT, I believe that whether or not the U.N. changes its present declared mission in Somalia, the United States should put the U.N. on notice ^{immediately} that it must commence plans to deploy forces from other nations to replace the U.S. forces. We have already done much more than our fair share of the military work in Somalia, and the time has now come for other nations to take our place. All of this should be carried out over a reasonable period of time. Our goal as I view it is to exit in a way that gives the U.N. and our allies an opportunity to preserve the integrity of the original, narrow humanitarian mission in Somalia.

Finally, MR. PRESIDENT, I believe that U.N. must consider the redefinition of its overall mission in ~~Somalia~~ ^{Somalia}. Feeding the hungry is one thing, disarming the clans and building a nation-state from scratch is quite another -- and in the case of Somalia, probably a mission impossible. If the U.N. insists on sticking to this broadened mission, the United States should lend a hand economically and politically, but not militarily. Our role is too important in areas of the world significant to U.S. interests to allow our military effectiveness to be dissipated in

7

places where we have no economic or security interests. Violence and political instability have been endemic to the Horn of Africa for centuries, and the U.N. has recently bitten off far more than it can chew.

To sum up, MR. PRESIDENT, at this juncture of our predicament in Somalia, we must change our military tactics. We must redefine the essential military mission to complete the original humanitarian mission. We must craft a sound exit strategy for U.S. forces. And the U.N. must reassess its present overall mission in Somalia.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 12, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HOWARD PASTER *HP*

SUBJECT: THE CONGRESS AND SOMALIA

Tony Lake told me you wanted a report tonight on why you were not asked to call Senator Nunn today on the language in the draft resolution dealing with Somalia. To clarify, we were working earlier today with a staff draft that while unacceptable was not cleared by Senators.

I did not ask you to make that call for these reasons:

- 1) The situation was very fluid and it did not seem necessary;
- 2) It is in our interest for Senator Mitchell to control the process, and I did not want to further elevate Senator Nunn's role in forging a compromise;
- 3) I did not know if you had called Senator Warner, whether you had made the promised second call to Senator Mitchell, or what was the outcome of your call to Senator Dole -- all of which were more important than a subsequent call to Senator Nunn; and
- 4) Your calls are a precious commodity that should not be used unnecessarily.

The status as I write this at about 8 p.m. is as follows:

- Senator Mitchell is planning to convene a meeting tomorrow morning with Senators Dole, Thurmond, Warner and Nunn to which he will invite the Administration (Tony, me and someone from the Joint Chiefs) to work out a position we all can support.
- Senator Dole is being extremely helpful and constructive, and fully supports a resolution with which we can live.
- There is continued speculation Senator Byrd might be willing to compromise, and Senator Dole has offered to serve as an emissary to him.

page 2

- Senators Stevens, Warner, Domenici, D'Amato and Lautenberg had General Hoar up for a briefing this afternoon.

- Subsequent to the Hoar briefing, Senator Nunn said he wanted a closed meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee to hear General Hoar tomorrow. This is because Hoar reported that he could have all the troops safely out of Somalia by sometime in January, making no allowance for the transfer of the humanitarian functions.

- The Senate will proceed to the Defense Appropriations bill in the morning but all amendments are blocked until 2 p.m. after which Senator Mitchell may try to put Somalia off until Thursday in order to put together a Mitchell-Dole-Nunn-Thurmond-Warner deal. While there are many friends who do not like our Somalia policy, it is still reasonable to expect a win if we have that coalition in place.

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Draft Joint Resolution Regarding United States Policy Towards Somalia

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short Title

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Statement of Congressional Authorization Regarding the Presence of United States Armed Forces in Somalia".

SECTION 2. Statement of Congressional Policy.

(a) United States Armed Forces should remain deployed in and around Somalia until such time as all American service personnel missing in action have been accounted for; and all American service personnel held prisoner have been released.

(b) The Congress endorses a planned, orderly withdrawal of all American troops from Somalia no later than March 31, 1994 unless authorized by Congress; except subject to subsection (f), for certain specified non-combat personnel to advise the United Nations commander, whose number shall not exceed 500.

(c) The President should intensify efforts to have United Nations member countries immediately deploy additional troops to Somalia to assume the security missions of United States Armed Forces.

(d) The President should vigorously urge the United Nations to accelerate its diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement among all internal parties and factions to the crisis in Somalia.

(e) The President should strongly encourage and assist, the leaders of the neighboring African countries most directly affected by the crisis in Somalia, to intensify their efforts to build a political settlement among the Somali people.

(f) The President should ensure that, at all times, United States military personnel in Somalia have the capacity to defend themselves.

SECTION 3. Command and Control Arrangements.

United States Forces, including the support personnel assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), should at all times remain under the command operational control and tactical control of United States commanders.

2

SECTION 4. Mission of United States Forces in Somalia.

(a) The President is authorized to conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia to:

- (1) protect United States troops in Somalia;
- (2) assist in securing and maintaining security of airports, seaports, and lines of communication whose use is essential to the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies throughout Somalia;
- (3) provide an emergency backup force for United Nations forces and respond, as deemed appropriate by the on-scene United States commander, to requests for assistance when such forces are under actual or threatened attack;
- (4) to assist within the performance of assigned mission of providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief; and
- (5) assist in the protection of troops of countries participating in United Nations operations, consistent with paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).

(b) In performing this mission, it is the sense of Congress that United States Armed Forces should not:

- (1) conduct search and seize operations in an attempt to arrest and detain personnel pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 837 of June 6, 1993;
- (2) regularly conduct urban police functions, except as essential pursuant to paragraphs (a), (1), (2) and (3).
- (3) conduct disarmament of various Somali clans, except as incident to the conduct of operations carried out pursuant to paragraphs (a) (1), (2) and (3) above; nor
- (4) conduct nation-building or conduct other activities that are the responsibility of the United Nations.

**SECTION 5. Reports Regarding The Presence of United States Forces
In Somalia.**

(a) **Periodic Reports.**-- The President shall submit periodic reports to the Congress with respect to United States Armed Forces participation in and support for the United Nations force in Somalia.

(1) not later than January 15, 1994, and March 1, 1994, the President shall submit a report to the Congress specifying the following regarding United States Armed Forces participating in, or operating in support of the United Nations force in Somalia:

- (A) the number and location of such forces;
- (B) the missions and functions of all such forces operating in and around Somalia;
- (C) the command and control arrangements;
- (D) the anticipated duration of the deployment of such forces in and around Somalia;
- (E) the amount of the incremental costs incurred by the United States as a result of the participation of such forces;
- (F) the efforts made to seek reimbursement from the United Nations and other countries for the incremental costs incurred by the participation of such forces.

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

October 6, 1993

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are gravely concerned by the worsening crisis in Somalia that ever more deeply involves the United States. Although Administration consultation with us has been minimal, we must provide you with our views. The escalating loss of American lives in an ill-defined cause must end. Americans deserve an explanation for what is becoming a national tragedy.

In response to a truly horrendous human rights tragedy, President Bush sent U.S. armed forces to Somalia to allow food to reach the starving. In so doing, he made a commitment to withdraw our forces when that mission was completed and return the operation to the United Nations. As has been acknowledged by your Administration, the Bush mission was accomplished, but our servicemen and women have not come home. Instead, large numbers of U.S. armed forces have been turned over to the U.N. and the mission has been changed to include the substantial task of nation-building in a hostile environment. Despite transformation of the mission, the overall size of the U.N. force was never adequate to accomplish it and does not even operate in much of the country.

We have been troubled by this changing mission for some time. On April 1, 1993, House Republicans adopted the enclosed Statement of Republican Policy calling on you "to bring our troops home." As you know, the resolution authorizing U.S. participation in the new U.N. mission that passed the House on May 25 was opposed nearly unanimously by Republicans and it stalled in the Senate shortly thereafter. As recently as September 15, House Republicans went on record in another Policy Statement expressing deep concern that at a time when our Pentagon budget was being cut by the Administration and Democrats in Congress by \$127 billion over five years, scarce military manpower and financial resources are being diverted to pursue illusory goals in Somalia.

The situation on the ground and in the air over Somalia has worsened considerably. In addition to the eleven servicemen previously killed in combat, in the last several days at least twelve American servicemen have lost their lives, and over seventy additional American casualties have been sustained. Reportedly eight U.S. servicemen are missing in action or have been captured by Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed. But, in a Congressional briefing yesterday, your Administration proved convincingly that it had neither a defined goal nor a plan in Somalia.

Mr. President, this situation is in urgent need of resolution. You must state clearly that our nation holds Aideed's faction responsible for any American soldiers held prisoner and you must take whatever diplomatic or military steps are necessary to gain their release. Furthermore, we must urgently shift responsibility for this mission back to the U.N. In addition, African countries should take a more prominent role in resolving Somalia's conflict. Other countries in the general region should also play a significant role.

In our view, the Somalia policy your Administration has pursued is a failure. Therefore, we believe it imperative that you communicate to Congress and the American people your Administration's plan to secure the freedom of any American prisoners held in Somalia and your intention to expeditiously withdraw our forces in a safe and orderly manner. America's international standing must not be jeopardized by an indecisive and naive approach to foreign policy.

Sincerely,

Newt Gingrich

Bob Michel

Hay Hyde

Dick Cheney

Carl Albert

Bill McClellan

Ben Gilman

Lincoln Hunter

Dan Dineen

Dan Rostenkowski

Bob Livingston

Jim Tuck

W. J. Craig

DeWane

Al Calvert

L. Roy Shaffer

Bob Hollatz
Ray Hogue

Michael Huffington

Cost Dellenge

Tom Lewis

Don Long

Al Mbandeni

Jim Berger

Chas Brown

Tom Howard

Mike Cottle

Paul Nienow

Tom Ridge

Jack Quinn

Dave Rupp

Jim Swenson

Angus Tule

Tom Totten

Paul Valley

Art Woodard

Paul

Est Walker

John Kamil

Dan Burton

Jack King

Paul Sieb

Jim Felt

Marion Ayer

Debi Cunningham

Carl Keller

Klara Ros. Sedlitz

Olympic Army

James H. Rindt

Jonny Leub

Craig Thomas

Steve Key

John G. Fortulden

Lucy S. Lunt

Tillie K. Fowler

Pete Blute

Tom Bliley

Jim Cooper

John T. Dabbs

Wesley Carroll

Pat Summitt

Zachary Parker

Lamar Smith

Ernst Pataki

Sam T. Walsh

Bob Frank

Sheldon

John J. Myers

Phil Engler

Barbara Vucanovich

Chris T. Coons

Bob Dole

Bill Darrach

Mike Enzi

Joe Kennedy

St. John

Wendell

Glenn Spencer

Jennifer Dunn
Chuck Smith

Jan Meyers

Ron Sackel

J. Esten
Ed Brill

Wally Herger

Marge Roukema

Robert H. Dalmor

Ann H. Zipp

Colleen Gr-3

Robert Lott

Donald Manzullo

Jerry Conant

Ernie L

Horace Cole

Howard Buck

Jim Ramstad

Norma Frip

Tom Lagan

Don Kullback

Bob Ross

CC Sakuma

→

LOA by
Gardner

~~H. J. Sakuma~~ AK

~~Hill Grand~~

~~Smith~~

J. R. Ruck

Spokane

Rene Sakuma

John W. Long

Robt. Pantano



Bill Emerson

Robert L. Dornak

John Linder

Robert H. Baker

Jay Kim

Long funeral

Susan Mainardi

Pete Hebert

Bert Shurtz

Allen Powell

Alex Cox

Jeff Smith

Bill Baker

James Adams

James Adams

Christopher Trays

Lee Beaton

John Boehm

Don Miller

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James Talbot

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Mike ...

De ...

Al ...

... ..

Bob Goodlett
Ray Hays

Michael Huffington

Casey Bollenage

Tom Lewis

Don Ingram

Al McHardless

Jim Beyer

Cliff Stacey

Tom Howard

Miss Cottle

Paul Trimmer

Tom Ridge

Jack Zucchin

Dave Camp

Jim Swenbaker

Angela Linder

Tom Vothman

Paul Kelley

Alfred Starnick

Rae

Est Walker

John Kamil

Van Burton

Jack King

Jack Field

John Elder

Marion Rye

Walter Cunningham

Carl Keller

Wanda Ross-Redman

Olympic Army

James H. Rindt

Jerry Leach

Craig Thomas

Steve Kelly

John G. Fortin

George S. Clark

William K. Fowler

John Blute

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Jim Conroy

John T. Dabbs

Wesley Dabbs

Don Dabbs

Richard Dabbs

Lamar Smith

Ed St. Patrick

Sam T. Walsh

Bob Frank

Shallan

John J. Myers

John Egan

Barbara Vaccaro

Chas. T. Conroy

W. H. Dabbs

Bill Dabbs

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Tom Lagan

Don Kullback

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Ed St

LOA by
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Happy ^{AK}

Hil Crane

~~Sam H~~

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Patricia C. Long

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Allen Parnell Jr

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Lee Boston

John Boehm

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Bill Thomas

James Talbot

Robt Jones

Dave Hobbs

James V. Hansen

Fred Hardy

Etton Gallegley

Rick Lazo

Billy Cooper

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8262

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
HOWARD PASTER 
SUBJECT: Congressional Consultation Strategy

Purpose

To describe new efforts to improve congressional consultation on national security issues, particularly on those related to peacekeeping.

Background

Part of the recent congressional and press criticism over Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia has centered on our process of consultation with Congress.

The problem is not simply too few discussions with Congress: as recently noted regarding Sen. Lugar's CNN criticisms, there were extensive consultations, spanning more than six months, on Haiti. Moreover, our consultations have at times aggravated tensions with Congress, as with the October 13 congressional briefing on Somalia by Secretaries Aspin and Christopher.

Rather, the core of the problem is this: we have not done enough to develop a common set of understandings with Congress regarding the use of American force in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, especially in multilateral settings.

During last week's Senate debate, Sen. Mitchell and several key Democrats considered offering an amendment calling on the Administration to work with Congress to develop better understandings, and perhaps new legislation, regarding our policy toward peacekeeping and the use of US force. This idea was in part a response to your October 18 letters to Sens. Mitchell and Dole in which you welcomed a new "dialogue" about executive-legislative relations on these issues. Although such an amendment ultimately was not offered, Sen. Mitchell held a press conference Friday with Sens. Biden, Nunn, DeConcini, Levin and Boren proposing that this group take the lead in examining such issues.

We believe this call for a cooperative process, coupled with the clear signals Congress has recently sent, provides an opening to take several steps to improve our relations with Congress:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

1. Work with the Mitchell-Biden group on war powers. The Mitchell-Biden group is driven significantly by Sen. Biden's desire to revise the War Powers Resolution. Although his proposal differs from the revisions we prefer, we will begin holding regular meetings with this group to work toward legislative changes. We will also engage Sen. Dole, as well as the bipartisan House leadership, in pursuing this effort. This process likely will extend into next Spring.
2. Continue the "Hamilton" process of periodic consultations. Reps. Hamilton and Dellums recently suggested that the Administration begin meeting periodically with top House and Senate leaders to discuss conflicts in which American force potentially or already is involved. On September 23, we held the first such meetings -- one for the House and one of the Senate. Secretary Christopher, Secretary Aspin, General Powell, Ambassador Albright and Lake met with about a dozen leaders from each chamber. The primary topics were Russia and Bosnia. The meetings were useful and we have told Rep. Hamilton and others that we plan to continue the process, with the next meetings to occur soon.
3. Seek a convergence of views on internal conflicts and peacekeeping. As noted above, the heart of the problem here is US policy toward peacekeeping, especially where American force is involved. We need to work to help Congress understand and embrace our policy. PRD 13 provides a starting point for this effort. Additional steps include:
 - Work with the congressional leadership and key committees to encourage briefings and later hearings on these topics. Some committees, such as Senate Armed Services, already have held hearings; others, such as Foreign Relations, would like to do so soon. We plan to take the initiative to consult widely on the Hill and to work with staff and members to focus their inquiries, provide Administration witnesses and suggest outside experts.
 - Lake, Christopher, Aspin and other key officials also will hold private one-on-one and group meetings with key members to develop better understandings on these issues.
 - Continue pursuing reforms in the UN and improving our own arrangements for managing and financing peacekeeping, as outlined in PRD 13.
4. Give Congress more information about our work plans. In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Ambassador Albright said that on a monthly basis she would begin providing Congress with an outline of upcoming UN votes and her office's general work plan. We plan to explore similar ideas for State and DoD.

5. Better coordination for congressional notification. We have begun taking steps to ensure that we achieve timely and comprehensive notification of key members of Congress in cases of foreign crises and presidential announcements. For example, we have clarified rules among NSC, State, DoD and CIA regarding clearance of talking points, coordination of call lists and 24-hour availability of key legislative affairs staff.
6. Expanded White House involvement in congressional consultations on foreign policy. Lake and Berger will begin expanding their meetings with members to demonstrate White House concern over these issues and to ensure a direct line of congressional feedback. For example, Lake and Berger have decided to begin informal breakfasts with small groups of members every week or two. We also plan to have NSC Senior Directors increase their contacts with Congress.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve this strategy.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____