

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.**

Collection/Record Group: Clinton Presidential Records

Subgroup/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff

Series/Staff Member: Jodi Greenstone

Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 4353

FolderID:

Folder Title:

Somalia

Stack:

S

Row:

22

Section:

6

Shelf:

2

Position:

2

Source: The Associated Press

A Smiling Aidid Greets the Foreign Press

By PAUL WATSON

The Toronto Star

✓ MOGADISHU, Oct. 14 — Smiling and laughing as he described his time in hiding, Somalia's most wanted man didn't look like a harried fugitive today when he met with reporters for the first time in four months.

As United Nations helicopters hummed past, Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid relaxed in an armchair in a white-painted villa, toying with the blue vinyl case for his Italian gold-rimmed glasses.

Aides to the general have loosely agreed to interviews on several occasions over the last two months, but the promises always ended in excuses.

Today six foreign reporters were invited to visit the fugitive factional leader after he decided to free a Nigerian soldier and an American helicopter pilot. General Aidid seems to have been waiting until he had good news to deliver.

"When you fight for justice and you win, you always become happy," the militia leader said of his challenge to United Nations forces here. "I believe I acted, together with my supporters, fairly to defend ourselves."

An aide to General Aidid drove the six journalists from their hotel to a house in Mogadishu's Bakhara market district, where dead American soldiers were dragged through the streets last week. The reporters were frisked by a security aide, then hustled into another car that delivered them to a villa a few minutes away.

General Aidid arrived soon afterward and met with the journalists in a living room in which a color television set was tuned to fuzzy reception of Cable News Network. He was dressed in a crisp, blue and white pinstripe shirt, a red tie and black trousers.

The factional leader said that he had been under bombardment

once and that United Nations troops only got close to him once. The search for General Aidid began in June after an ambush by Somalis in which 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed.

"I have been bombarded while I was in my house, but after that I was always in Mogadishu and they never came close to me," he said.

For now, General Aidid says he plans to remain in hiding because the United States and the United Nations are making contradictory statements about whether it is safe for him to reappear in public.

Although he spoke in fiery terms of "sinister plots" by the United States and the United Nations, he laughed several times, especially when a reporter asked if wanted to be President.

"That's up to the Somali people," he replied.

With his gold-tipped walking stick under his arm, General Aidid shook hands, walked out to a white sedan and drove off.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1993



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1993

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: David Gergen

SUBJECT: General Aideed

As the United Nations and the African leaders consider how best to establish a body to investigate the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, I wanted to emphasize the importance of this process.

It is essential that a serious and independent tribunal be convened to determine responsibility for the attacks on the Pakistani peacekeepers. I understand that the charter of this tribunal will be limited to the investigation of the events of June 5 and will not extend to later attacks on American and other UN troops which are deemed to have occurred after a "war " started. Given this limitation, if General Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack - the crime that started the hostilities and ultimately resulted in American casualties - it is critical that he be held personally accountable.

I believe we will be exposed to serious critique as well as public outcry if General Aideed is not subjected to a rigorous and credible investigation and, if found guilty, is allowed to run Somalia. There are several reasons for this.

- 1) There is a general perception that there was a deal to let Aideed off in return for releasing Chief Warrant Officer Durant. Only a serious process with teeth will counter this.
- 2) If the perception of a deal remains, U.S. resolve and leadership will be tarnished - defeated by the events of October 3.
- 3) Anything less than a serious effort will reinforce earlier criticisms that U.S. policy towards Aideed is confused.
- 4) Given his track record, letting Aideed run Somalia has the obvious downside that Somalia could end up back where it started a year ago when the humanitarian mission was launched - mass starvation brought on by anarchy. In this event, particularly if Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack, our Somalia policy, efforts and sacrifices will be viewed as failures.

DJ

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1993

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: David Gergen

SUBJECT: General Aideed

As the United Nations and the African leaders consider how best to establish a body to investigate the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, I wanted to emphasize the importance of this process.

It is essential that a serious and independent tribunal be convened to determine responsibility for the attacks on the Pakistani peacekeepers. I understand that the charter of this tribunal will be limited to the investigation of the events of June 5 and will not extend to later attacks on American and other UN troops which are deemed to have occurred after a "war" started. Given this limitation, if General Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack - the crime that started the hostilities and ultimately resulted in American casualties - it is essential that he be held personally accountable.

I believe we will be exposed to serious critique as well as public outcry if General Aideed is not subjected to a rigorous and credible investigation and, if found guilty, is allowed to run Somalia. There are several reasons for this.

- 1) There is a general perception that there was a deal to let Aideed off in return for releasing Chief Warrant Officer Durant. Only a serious process with teeth will counter this.
- 2) If the perception of a deal remains, U.S. resolve and leadership will be tarnished - defeated by the events of October 3.
- 3) Anything less than a serious effort will reinforce earlier criticisms that U.S. policy towards Aideed is confused.
- 4) Given his track record, letting Aideed run Somalia has the obvious downside that Somalia could end up back where it started a year ago when the humanitarian mission was launched - mass starvation brought on by anarchy. In this event, particularly if Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack, our Somalia policy, efforts and sacrifices will be viewed as failures.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CU

October 19, 1993

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: David Gergen

SUBJECT: General Aideed

As the United Nations and the African leaders consider how best to establish a body to investigate the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, I wanted to emphasize the importance of this process.

It is essential that a serious and independent tribunal be convened to determine responsibility for the attacks on the Pakistani peacekeepers. I understand that the charter of this tribunal will be limited to the investigation of the events of June 5 and will not extend to later attacks on American and other UN troops which are deemed to have occurred after a "war " started. Given this limitation, if General Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack - the crime that started the hostilities and ultimately resulted in American casualties - it is essential that he be held personally accountable.

I believe we will be exposed to serious critique as well as public outcry if General Aideed is not subjected to a rigorous and credible investigation and, if found guilty, is allowed to run Somalia. There are several reasons for this.

- 1) There is a general perception that there was a deal to let Aideed off in return for releasing Chief Warrant Officer Durant. Only a serious process with teeth will counter this.
- 2) If the perception of a deal remains, U.S. resolve and leadership will be tarnished - defeated by the events of October 3.
- 3) Anything less than a serious effort will reinforce earlier criticisms that U.S. policy towards Aideed is confused.
- 4) Given his track record, letting Aideed run Somalia has the obvious downside that Somalia could end up back where it started a year ago when the humanitarian mission was launched - mass starvation brought on by anarchy. In this event, particularly if Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack, our Somalia policy, efforts and sacrifices will be viewed as failures.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1993

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: David Gergen

SUBJECT: General Aideed

As the United Nations and the African leaders consider how best to establish a body to investigate the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, I wanted to emphasize the importance of this process.

It is essential that a serious and independent tribunal be convened to determine responsibility for the attacks on the Pakistani peacekeepers. I understand that the charter of this tribunal will be limited to the investigation of the events of June 5 and will not extend to later attacks on American and other UN troops which are deemed to have occurred after a "war " started. Given this limitation, if General Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack - the crime that started the hostilities - he should also be held implicitly responsible for the American casualties. Moreover, if General Aideed is found to be responsible, he must be held personally accountable.

I believe we will be exposed to serious critique as well as public outcry if General Aideed is not subjected to a rigorous and credible investigation and, if found guilty, is allowed to run Somalia. There are several reasons for this.

- 1) There is a general perception that there was a deal to let Aideed off in return for releasing Chief Warrant Officer Durant. Only a serious process with teeth will counter this.
- 2) If the perception of a deal remains, U.S. resolve and leadership will be tarnished - defeated by the events of October 3.
- 3) Anything less than a serious effort will reinforce earlier criticisms that U.S. policy towards Aideed is confused.
- 4) Given his track record, letting Aideed run Somalia has the obvious downside that Somalia could end up back where it started a year ago when the humanitarian mission was launched - mass starvation brought on by anarchy. In this event, particularly if Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack, our Somalia policy, efforts and sacrifices will be viewed as a failure.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1993

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: David Gergen

SUBJECT: General Aideed

As the United Nations and the African leaders consider how best to establish a body to investigate the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, I wanted to emphasize the importance of this process.

It is essential that a serious and independent tribunal be convened to determine responsibility for the attacks on the Pakistani peacekeepers. I understand that the charter of this tribunal will be limited to the investigation of the events of June 5 and will not extend to later attacks on American and other UN troops which are deemed to have occurred after a "war" started. Given this limitation, if General Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack - the crime that started the hostilities - he should also be held implicitly responsible for the resulting American casualties. Moreover, if General Aideed is found to be responsible, he must be held personally accountable.

I believe we will be exposed to serious critique as well as public outcry if General Aideed is not subjected to a rigorous and credible investigation and, if found guilty, is allowed to run Somalia. There are several reasons for this.

- 1) There is a general perception that there was a deal to let Aideed off in return for releasing Chief Warrant Officer Durant. Only a serious process with teeth will counter this.
- 2) If the perception of a deal remains, U.S. resolve and leadership will be tarnished - defeated by the events of October 3.
- 3) Anything less than a serious effort will reinforce earlier criticisms that U.S. policy towards Aideed is confused.
- 4) Given his track record, letting Aideed run Somalia has the obvious downside that Somalia could end up back where it started a year ago when the humanitarian mission was launched - mass starvation brought on by anarchy. In this event, particularly if Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack, our Somalia policy, efforts and sacrifices will be viewed as a failure.

oh

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1993

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: David Gergen

SUBJECT: General Aideed

As the United Nations and the African leaders consider how best to establish a body to investigate the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, I wanted to emphasize the importance of this process.

It is essential that a serious and independent tribunal be convened to determine responsibility for the attacks on the Pakistani peacekeepers. I understand that the charter of this tribunal will be limited to the investigation of the events of June 5 and will not extend to later attacks on American and other UN troops which are deemed to have occurred after a "war" started. Given this limitation, if General Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack - the crime that started the hostilities and ultimately resulted in American casualties, it is essential that he be held personally accountable.

I believe we will be exposed to serious critique as well as public outcry if General Aideed is not subjected to a rigorous and credible investigation and, if found guilty, is allowed to run Somalia. There are several reasons for this.

- 1) There is a general perception that there was a deal to let Aideed off in return for releasing Chief Warrant Officer Durant. Only a serious process with teeth will counter this.
- 2) If the perception of a deal remains, U.S. resolve and leadership will be tarnished - defeated by the events of October 3.
- 3) Anything less than a serious effort will reinforce earlier criticisms that U.S. policy towards Aideed is confused.
- 4) Given his track record, letting Aideed run Somalia has the obvious downside that Somalia could end up back where it started a year ago when the humanitarian mission was launched - mass starvation brought on by anarchy. In this event, particularly if Aideed is found to be responsible for the Pakistani attack, our Somalia policy, efforts and sacrifices will be viewed as failures.

Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Date: 10/18

To: Joely Greenstone

Fax No. 456 - 2215

From: Peter Bass

Confirmation Tel. No. 647-5548

Number of pages (including cover sheet) 2

Message: As discussed.

SOMALIA POINTS -- IMPLICATIONS OF AIDEED REMAINING

- A U.S. withdrawal strategy that does not include the objective of securing Aideed's departure from Somalia is ill-advised.
- If Aideed was to remain after a U.S. departure, it is likely that he would reassert his dominant political position in both Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia -- perhaps even becoming the head of whatever political structure that is in place at the time of our departure. From a political perspective, such a result would underscore the impression that the U.S. effort in Somalia was a failure.
- In particular, an Aideed-dominated Somalia would send a message that U.S. resolve and leadership was indeed defeated by the tragic events of October 3 -- and that we waited six months only in order to save face, thus putting our people in jeopardy for no clear reason. Though some negative impact from the U.S. withdrawal is inevitable, if Aideed were to remain -- and in a dominant position, to boot -- it would exacerbate the loss of American prestige and heighten the domestic sense that U.S. policy in Somalia was fatally flawed.
- This assessment should be treated separate and apart from the question of whether we should highlight Aideed's departure as a stated, public objective of U.S. diplomatic efforts. Such a high profile might make the objective harder to achieve, as it would encourage a test of wills between us and Aideed.

defend themselves. He knows not to quarter one fourth of his men in one building, the way the battalion commander did in Beirut. But he can only hope that his commander in chief in Washington has learned the lessons of Beirut, too.

President Clinton may be learning, but experience is not cheap. The peacekeeping mission in Somalia began with the same kind of humanitarian concerns that sent the Marines to Beirut, but it has been plagued by some of the same mistakes that were made a decade ago.

■ **What is the mission?** The Marines were sent to Beirut to provide an American "presence." The marines off the Somali coast are "peacekeepers," and Colonel Huly says that this time his orders are clear. "They are spelled out in writing, they are listed out clearly and logically, and they are understood by me," he says.

Peacekeeping, however, can be an ambiguous assignment. In Somalia, as in Beirut, American troops arrived intent on remaining neutral amid vicious factional strife. "On my first tour [in Lebanon]," says Sergeant Russell, "a lot of civilians would talk to the marines. We would say: 'We're a peacekeeping force,



we don't take sides.' They felt that we were not there to protect them but to help the Israelis." But in part because the "presence" mission was unclear, the marines in Beirut got dragged into a civil war and lost their claim to neutrality.

In Somalia, Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid was the first to welcome U.S. marines when they came ashore last December. But the American and other troops in Somalia soon found that like the ma-

lines in Beirut, they were expected to be both peacekeepers and combatants. The most vulnerable terrain, the area between the mountains and the sea, was the only force without an American presence.

■ **Rules of engagement.** Ambiguous missions lead to unclear rules of engagement (ROE) — guidelines that tell soldiers when to shoot and when to withdraw.

SOMALIA'S 'CIRCLING DOGS'

America versus Aidid

Last week, retired American Adm. Jonathan Howe, the head of the United Nations operation in Somalia, described the U.N.'s current relationship with Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid not as a cease-fire but more like "circling dogs — meeting, sniffing around." Coming as it did shortly after General Aidid had released captured U.S. Army helicopter pilot Michael Durant and a Nigerian peace-

keeper, Howe's remark seemed unfortunate. In reality, the United States, a more powerful animal, has retrieved its prisoner and is walking away.

President Clinton has set March 31 for an American pullout from Somalia, and many soldiers already have begun to speculate about being home for Christmas. But the U.S. withdrawal will pull the teeth out of the U.N. peace-making operation, which relies

on the Americans for air power, intelligence and logistical support. "If the U.S. pulls out in March, then other armies in the U.N. here will follow," says Ahmed Aden, a pharmacist employed by one of the U.N.'s humanitarian agencies. "There will immediately be civil war, chaos and famine."

Quiet nights. Already there is confusion about how to deal with General Aidid, who last week declared a cease-fire. Last week, the warm night skies, which nightly exploded to the sound of gunfire and the clatter of helicopter blades, were mostly quiet. While U.S. envoy Rob-



Free at last. Dur-



...ant arrives at an air base in Germany.

ert Oakley put the U.N. manhunt for Aidid on hold and revived negotiations for a political settlement, both the United States and the U.N. insist that Aidid is still a wanted man. But everyone also realizes that trying to catch him would shatter the shaky truce — and perhaps hasten an uneasy America's exit from Mogadishu.

Aidid has proved to be an elusive and resourceful adversary: Last week, the wanted man summoned foreign reporters to a press conference in his lair in the medieval district of Bokara, the market center of Mogadishu. The guerrilla tac-

tics of his men have impressed military commanders, and the U.N. has found it hard to fight a war and occupy the moral high ground at the same time. Aidid has exploited this by using women and children as human shields for his gunmen and by firing mortars from the grounds of hospitals.

Securing the streets. But the 14,000 U.N. troops and the steadily rising number of American soldiers cannot continue to hide behind sandbags. "They will have to retake the streets in order to restore order and provide a secure environment for dialogue among

all Somalis," says a British aid worker with the Save the Children Fund. "But I shudder to think what will happen when they roll the tanks out."

For the time being, the American combination of tanks and talks appears to have worked. Aidid was partly frightened and partly lured into giving up his hostages and telling his men to stop killing peacekeepers. But if it is clear that the U.N. and the warlord will continue to circle one another warily, it is not at all clear how the sniffing will end.

BY SAM KILEY IN MOGADISHU

Alan L. Keyes is
dedicated columnist.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 7, 1993

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

5:02 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Today I want to talk with you about our nation's military involvement in Somalia. A year ago, we all watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands -- dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation. Of starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country.

This past weekend we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot -- all of them soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people themselves. These tragic events raise hard questions about our effort in Somalia. Why are we still there? What are we trying to accomplish? How did a humanitarian mission turn violent? And when will our people come home?

These questions deserve straight answers. Let's start by remembering why our troops went into Somalia in the first place. We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time. A third of a million people had died of starvation and disease. Twice that many more were at risk of dying. Meanwhile, tons of relief supplies piled up in the capital of Mogadishu because a small number of Somalis stopped food from reaching their own countrymen.

Our consciences said, enough. In our nation's best tradition, we took action with bipartisan support. President Bush sent in 28,000 American troops as part of a United Nations humanitarian mission. Our troops created a secure environment so that food and medicine could get through. We saved close to one million lives. And throughout most of Somalia -- everywhere but in Mogadishu -- life began returning to normal. Crops are growing. Markets are reopening. So are schools and hospitals.

Nearly a million Somalis still depend completely on relief supplies, but at least the starvation is gone. And none of this would have happened without American leadership and America's troops.

Until June, things went well, with little violence. The United States reduced our troop presence from 28,000 down to less than 5,000, with other nations picking up where we left off. But then in June, the people who caused much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani and other troops who were there just to keep the peace.

Rather than participate in building the peace with others, these people sought to fight and to disrupt, even if it means returning Somalia to anarchy and mass famine. And make no mistake about it: If we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The relief effort would stop, and starvation soon would return.

MORE

That knowledge has led us to continue our mission. It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society, or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help. But we -- we in the United States -- must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance to succeed.

enough time to succeed

We started this mission for the right reasons, and we're going to finish it in the right way. In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We've nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave them now, those embers will reignite into flames and people will die again. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place.

We also have to recognize that we cannot leave now and still have all our troops present and accounted for. And I want you to know that I am determined to work for the security of those Americans missing or held captive. Anyone holding an American right now should understand, above all else, that we will hold them strictly responsible for our soldiers' well-being. We expect them to be well-treated, and we expect them to be released.

So now we face a choice. Do we leave when the job gets tough, or when the job is well done? Do we invite a return of mass suffering, or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a decent chance to survive?

Recently, General Colin Powell said this about our choices in Somalia. "Because things get difficult, you don't cut and run, you work the problem and try to find a correct solution." I want to bring our troops home from Somalia. Before the events of this week, as I said, we had already reduced the number of our troops there from 28,000 to less than 5,000. We must complete that withdrawal soon, and I will. But we must also leave on our terms. We must do it right. And here is what I intend to do.

This past week's events make it clear that even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there. We need more armor, more air power, to ensure that our people are safe and that we can do our job. Today, I have ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and to complete our mission. I've also ordered an aircraft carrier and two amphibious groups with 3,600 combat Marines to be stationed offshore. These forces will be under American command.

Their mission, what I am asking these young Americans to do, is the following: First, they are there to protect our troops and our bases. We did not go to Somalia with a military purpose. We never wanted to kill anyone. But those who attack our soldiers must know they will pay a very heavy price.

Second, they are there to keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communication that are essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies and people moving freely throughout the country so that starvation and anarchy do not return.

Third, they are there to keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people. Not to personalize the conflict, but to prevent a return to anarchy.

Fourth, through their pressure and their presence, our troops will help to make it possible for the Somali people, working

with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve their problems and survive when we leave. That is our mission.

I am proposing this plan because it will let us finish leaving Somalia on our own terms and without destroying all that two administrations have accomplished there. For, if we were to leave today, we know what would happen. Within months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets. Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.

That is why I am committed to getting this job done in Somalia, not only quickly, but also effectively. To do that, I am taking steps to ensure troops from other nations are ready to take the place of our own soldiers. We've already withdrawn some 20,000 troops, and more than that number have replaced them from over two dozen other nations. Now we will intensify efforts to have other countries deploy more troops to Somalia to assure that security will remain when we're gone.

And we'll complete the replacement of U.S. military logistics personnel with civilian contractors who can provide the same support to the United Nations. While we're taking military steps to protect our own people and to help the U.N. maintain a secure environment, we must pursue new diplomatic efforts to help the Somalis find a political solution to their problems. That is the only kind of outcome that can endure.

For fundamentally, the solution to Somalia's problems is not a military one, it is political. Leaders of the neighboring African states, such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, have offered to take the lead in efforts to build a settlement among the Somali people that can preserve order and security. I have directed my representatives to pursue such efforts vigorously. And I've asked Ambassador Bob Oakley, who served effectively in two administrations as our representative in Somalia, to travel again to the region immediately to advance this process.

Obviously, even then there is no guarantee that Somalia will rid itself of violence and suffering. But at least we will have given Somalia a reasonable chance. This week some 15,000 Somalis took to the streets to express sympathy for our losses, to thank us for our effort. Most Somalis are not hostile to us, but grateful. And they want to use this opportunity to rebuild their country.

It is my judgment and that of my military advisors that we may need up to six months to complete these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal. We'll do what we can to complete the mission before then. All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred support personnel in noncombat roles.

If we take these steps, if we take the time to do the job right, I am convinced we will have lived up to the responsibilities of American leadership in the world. And we will have proved that we are committed to addressing the new problems of a new era.

When our troops in Somalia came under fire this last weekend, we witnessed a dramatic example of the heroic ethic of our American military. When the first Black Hawk helicopter was downed this weekend, the other American troops didn't retreat,

although they could have. Some 90 of them formed a perimeter around the helicopter and they held that ground under intensely heavy fire. They stayed with their comrades. That's the kind of soldiers they are. That's the kind of people we are.

So let us finish the work we set out to do. Let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right.

Let me express my thanks and my gratitude and my profound sympathy to the families of the young Americans who were killed in Somalia. My message to you is, your country is grateful, and so is the rest of the world, and so are the vast majority of the Somali people. Our mission from this day forward is to increase our strength, do our job, bring our soldiers out, and bring them home. Thank you, and God bless America.

END

5:11 P.M. EDT

Out of Somalia

RELLEASE OF a captured helicopter pilot in Mogadishu leaves no Americans known to be in Somali hands. The pilot had been "well taken care of," said an American doctor. This welcome development satisfies what had become an American priority—retrieval of prisoner hostages—in the light of casualties that had prompted insistent popular and congressional demands to get out of Somalia fast.

The remaining American forces have adopted defensive tactics intended to prevent the death or capture of any more Americans before March 31, the pullout deadline. By its determination to liquidate its Somali investment, the Clinton administration hopes to persuade Congress to preserve a little space for maneuver until then.

Officials were at pains to say that release of the pilot, and of a Nigerian peace-keeper who had also been taken by Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed, involved "no deals." But some Somalis captured by forces in the U.N. detachment are also to be returned. An exchange of prisoners is the traditional sign that a conflict is winding down. Americans are working their way toward direct political talks bringing in Gen. Aideed, who until now was considered a renegade deserving of arrest and trial as a war criminal. This veteran of Somalia's military and

political wars came out of hiding yesterday, resuming a public role.

The crumbling of home support for any American mission at all in Somalia forced what is turning out to be a unilateral pullout conducted entirely on Washington's terms. Regrettably, it is proceeding largely without regard either to commitments undertaken in earlier U.N. resolutions or to the evolution of events on the ground. Mr. Clinton said yesterday that the prisoner release "demonstrates that we are moving in the right direction." The "right direction" presumably means out. Whether it also means a foreign policy outcome that leaves Somalia pointed toward survival rather than chaos hinges on decisions by others. Washington can expect to exercise less and less influence over these decisions as the months go by.

Already once in the past few years, the United States saved masses of Somalis from starvation—from a condition of terror to which Gen. Aideed made an immense contribution. That American role remains a proud accomplishment no matter what comes now. At the least it provides a foundation on which others—principally the African governments trying now to bring a measure of order to Somalia—can try to build a more lasting result.

A New Federal Housing Role?

THE CLINTON administration is proposing a major new effort "to reduce the spatial separation by race and income that characterizes American urban areas." The federal role in such matters has traditionally been limited and indirect. This would greatly expand it. A "program and management plan" issued earlier this week by Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros says that within the next year the department will:

- Submit to Congress legislation requiring that every jurisdiction in the country receiving federal community development funds and certain federal housing funds have an acceptable fair housing plan. No plan, no funds. Such plans are merely optional now. The

The secretary would commit the department as well to reducing the concentrations of public and other subsidized housing in the central cities. The management plan says one possible step toward such dispersal might be to settle litigation over so-called "residency preferences" whose effect is to keep central city applicants out of federally assisted housing in the suburbs. HUD in the past has acquiesced in such preferences and the geographical barriers they strengthen. By regulation the department also proposes to make clear that a policy or practice whose effect is to increase residential segregation may be as much a violation of the 1968 statute as an act with segregative intent.

This is a huge undertaking—much more ex-

Somali Faction Frees U.S. Pilot

Clinton Says No Deal Made; Aideed Surfaces, Seeks Return Gesture

THE WASHINGTON POST

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1993

By Keith B. Richburg
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOGADISHU, Oct. 14—Somali militia leader Mohamed Farah Aideed announced the release of a captured U.S. pilot and a Nigerian peace keeper today but made clear he hoped for a reciprocal gesture from the United Nations, which holds more than a dozen Aideed supporters.

In his first public appearance in four months, during which he eluded a massive U.S. manhunt, Aideed said his Somali National Alliance faction, in releasing the two prisoners unconditionally, was responding to President Clinton's policy shift and bowing to international opinion.

in the right direction and that are making progress."

Hours after the Aideed press conference, at a villa in the southern Mogadishu neighborhood he controls, Durant and Nigerian Umar Shantali were released to the custody of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Durant, whose videotaped interrogation by Somali militiamen shocked the American public, today looked tired. He grimaced in pain as he lay, covered with a pink-flowered sheet, on a stretcher and was carried into the back of a Red Cross vehicle. He declined to speak to reporters, but an American military doctor said later that the pilot was "fine, basically," although suffering

See SOMALIA, A29, Col. 1

SOMALIA, From A1

from a broken bone in his face, a compressed fracture of his second vertebra, a fracture in his right leg and superficial bullet wounds on the left arm and shoulder. Doctors in Mogadishu expressed confidence that Durant could return to flying duty.

"I think that he was taken well care of," said the doctor, Maj. John Holcomb, who added that Durant had been tended to by a physician who put the pilot's right leg in a splint and gave him antibiotics to ward off infection from his open wounds. Holcomb said the pilot was overcome with emotion after his release, crying on occasion, and that he spent 10 minutes talking to his wife by satellite telephone.

[A White House official said that Clinton, in a seven-minute telephone call to the freed pilot, thanked him for "his contribution to the country, his service, his patriotism and his bravery."]

Durant, 32, who was captured after his helicopter was shot down by Aideed's forces Oct. 3, is scheduled to be flown Friday to a U.S. military hospital in Germany.

The freed Nigerian, Umar Shantali, 22, walked into a Red Cross vehicle limping and using a cane for support. Shantali was seized on Sept. 5, after Aideed's militia force ambushed his unit, killing seven Nigerian U.N. peace keepers and wounding seven others.

Nothing was heard of Shantali for the past six weeks, and U.N. intelligence sources said they believed he had been captured by one Somali faction and then transferred several times until he ended up a captive of Aideed's militia.

This morning, Shantali's captors told him "you're going to be a free man," and allowed him to bathe for the first time in six weeks, according to U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Dawn Kirkpatrick, a U.N. military spokeswoman who talked to Shantali after he was freed.

The release of the two soldiers also marked a personal victory for the Clinton administration's diplomatic trouble-shooter, former ambassador Robert Oakley, who walked into the Somalia imbroglio armed only with his high standing among Somalis and the promise that the United States was sincere about wanting to end four months of bloodshed in the capital.

U.S. and U.N. troops have searched for the 57-year-old militia leader since June 5, when 24 Pakistani soldiers died in an ambush for which the United Nations blamed Aideed. Armed clashes between peace keepers and Somali fighters came to a head Oct. 3, in a battle that left at least 17 Americans dead, scores wounded and Durant a prisoner. Hundreds of Somalis also died.

Today's diplomatic breakthrough was a setback for the United Nations and its special envoy here, retired U.S. Navy admiral Jonathan T. Howe, who has been slow to acknowledge the dramatic shift in U.S. policy. Even today, Howe did not concede what American officials have announced—that U.S. and U.N. forces here have been ordered to halt offensive operations against Aideed as part of a de facto ceasefire.

"All options are open," Howe said, when asked if a truce did exist, adding, "We are still in a very tenuous period."

One U.N. official, an American, said today's release and Aideed's press conference, "make Oakley

look good and Howe look like the loser.... I don't see how Howe can stay here after this."

One of the African mediators involved in the arduous discussions that led to today's release said today that an even tougher job would begin now: convincing the United Nations to respond to Aideed's move by releasing the Somalis in detention, including Aideed's chief financier, Osman Ato, who was arrested by U.S. Army Rangers.

The mediator said the release of the American pilot and the Nigerian "is a gesture to show good faith. We expect the other side to make a similar gesture. There's a lot of need for confidence-building on both sides."

But Howe today refused to discuss the possibility that Somali prisoners in U.N. custody might soon be released and said that the United Nations' arrest order for Aideed still stands.

The United States and the United Nations remain deeply divided over whether Aideed remains the object of a military manhunt. With American forces now standing down from offensive operations and Oakley telling reporters that diplomacy has now replaced confrontation, it would appear that the U.N. arrest order has been sidetracked as became evident by Aideed's surprise appearance before the international media.

Aideed, in his press conference, referred to the conflicting American and U.N. positions and said that for the moment he would remain in hiding until those divergent positions are clarified.

Over the past four months of their unsuccessful hunt for Aideed, Howe, American Embassy officials and U.S. intelligence officers have depicted the militia leader as a fugitive on the run, constantly changing his location and using disguises. Today, Aideed looked more like a statesman, smiling and jovially shaking hands.

Reporters were taken to a house to see Aideed after a cross-city car chase and a morning of wild rumors

about whether and when Aideed would appear. Officials of his militia first came to a hotel, where journalists are staying, in the early morning to take reporters to an unspecified militia "event." But that first trek was abandoned in an alleyway when the trailing caravan grew too large. Aideed spoke at another location shortly before noon.

His rambling statement, read in halting English, praised Clinton for shifting policy on Somalia. He said that "the previous mistakes and the resulting crisis were caused by the deliberate foreign military and political intervention in the affairs of Somalia, disrespect of the culture, tradition, history and indigenous social and political structure of the country."

"The solution of the Somali problem lies with the Somali people, as President Clinton stated, and the Somalis should be left alone to find peaceful and lasting solutions for their problems," Aideed said. "The international community should play the role of catalyst and provide the necessary assistance to Somalis to end their fight."

Aideed also said the new U.S. troop buildup in Somalia of an additional 3,000 infantry soldiers, was unnecessary and provocative. He added that the reason for the infusion of new American troops "is no longer valid" now that the American captive had been released.

He also said the current U.N. force of 29,000 soldiers from 30 countries "should be reduced," and the money spent on "humanitarian relief operations."

Speaking of his months in hiding, Aideed said he never left Mogadishu and that U.S. Rangers "never came close" to catching him. He also denied any responsibility for the warfare and violence that has gripped this capital since June, saying he and his militia fighters were merely acting in self-defense against the U.S.-led U.N. troops. "I believe I acted fairly with the forces, to defend ourselves," Aideed said.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS GUIDANCE -- 10:00 AM
Monday, October 18, 1993

Somalia

Background

The situation on the ground in Somalia has remained calm since the announcement of our new policy last Thursday. Durant returned to the United States on Saturday evening. Ambassador Oakley returned to the U.S. over the weekend, and provided a debrief for senior officials on Saturday. He is tentatively scheduled to return to the region in early November.

Last Thursday, the Senate essentially endorsed the President's approach to Somalia in an amendment passed with the support of the leadership and Senator Byrd. The amendment accepts a March 31, 1994 deadline for the withdrawal and defines what Senators call "narrow parameters" for the mission associated with the protection of American troops and securing roads and lines of communication needed for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The World Bank is sponsoring a donors conference for Somalia in Paris on October 22, and the U.N. will hold a humanitarian assistance conference November 2-4 in Addis Ababa.

Points

- We welcome the release of Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant last week and his return to his friends and family on Saturday. Over the past two weeks, since the United States announced its intention to strengthen our forces in Somalia and to revitalize diplomatic initiatives to seek a political reconciliation, we have seen some hopeful actions on the ground in Somalia, especially the release of Michael Durant and the Nigerian peacekeeper, and the cessation of attacks on the U.S. and U.N. peacekeepers.
- As Ambassador Albright noted over the weekend, we are no longer actively searching for Aideed. At the same time, it is important that we fully investigate the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers in early June. The African leaders and the United Nations are now considering how best to establish an investigatory body.

(if asked whether we are discouraging UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali from travelling to Somalia)

- Our U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright had a frank discussion with Boutros Ghali about the pros and cons of his travelling to Somalia at this time, but it is up to the Secretary General to determine his own travel plans.
- We welcome the Senate action last week that essentially ratified the approach to Somalia that the President announced last Thursday. The Senate recognizes that while it is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society or its political structure -- the Somalis have to do that for themselves -- we have to give them enough time to have a

chance of succeeding and to prevent a return to the chaos and anarchy that existed before the U.S. and U.N. intervened.

- We must complete our withdrawal soon, but we must leave on our terms. That is why we will withdraw virtually all our troops by March 31, 1994. In the interim, we will enhance our military force by about 3000 troops, supported by armored vehicles and 3600 combat Marines stationed offshore, under American command. Their mission is:
 - to protect our troops and our bases;
 - to keep open and secure the roads, ports, and lines of communications essential to keep the flow of food, supplies and people moving;
 - to keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people;
 - to enable the Somali people to reach agreements among themselves, supported by the U.N. and African nations.
- We've also been pleased with reports on the meetings of Bob Oakley with African leaders, especially President Meles of Ethiopia and leaders of the OAU, to get the political reconciliation process in Somalia going again. It would be up to the African leaders to determine who could participate in this process.

Lead story

White House Unveils Pilot Cabinet Net

By BRAD BASS

The White House computer support staff last week briefed agency information resources management executives about a planned system built around Apple Computer Inc.'s PowerBook that is designed to link the president and his Cabinet secretaries electronically.

White House officials said no firm decision had been made about the system's deployment, but IRM directors at five agencies confirmed that it would include Macintosh PowerBook 180 computers and Microsoft Corp.'s Microsoft Office suite, including Microsoft Word and Microsoft Mail.

An IRM official, who requested anonymity, said the idea for the system sprang from President Clinton's inability to get quick information on the activities and whereabouts of his Cabinet secretaries while traveling. Chiefs of staff in each agency must fax the secretary's calendar of meetings to the White House each week, he said. The White House staff

SEE LINK, PAGE 37

LINK,
FROM PAGE 1

then compiles the information for the president. Often the information gets to the president late, he said. By automating the process, the president will get quicker and easier access to the data he needs, he said.

A White House spokeswoman last week said the Cabinet affairs branch might not proceed with the pilot. She said officials are looking into other ways to interconnect the president and the agency chiefs of staff. "There hasn't been a decision made that we are going to go through with this pilot," she said. Any further comment on the system would be speculative, she added.

But sources who attended the meeting said they were told the project would move forward. "The tone was very definitely, 'We are going to do this and be up and running by the end of November,'" one attendee said. "In fact, we are ordering the equipment now." The pilot is expected to run six to nine months.

Although most IRM executives support the goals of the project, they expressed dismay that the platform mandated by the White House was based on non-standard equipment and protocols. They said the White

Federal Computer Week, 10/18/93

House staff should have consulted agency IRMs before specifying the components.

"Every piece of equipment they have selected is something we have no support for in our department," said one IRM officer who asked not to be named. "We are faced with standards and shrinking support budgets. A lot of us had been making progress in these areas, and in one fell swoop, the White House has set us back about one year."

Critics of the system said the specifications fly in the face of their attempts to standardize on DOS, WordPerfect and X.400 messaging. "I don't understand why we're not using X.400, which is consistent with the National Performance Review recommendations," said Cynthia Rand, IRM director at the Transportation Department. "We are already working with the Office of Management and Budget to implement it. This puts us in a bit of a conflict. There must be compelling reasons I'm not aware of."

IRM officials said White House personnel told them it was too late to change the specifications. Most said they were unaware of plans to field the system until shortly before last week's briefing. Sources said White House staff told IRM officials they were not required to participate in the

tests. But several agency officials said their chiefs of staff are likely to want to participate regardless of technical issues.

Some IRM officials said they could overlook their reservations about the deployment strategy because they thought the system was urgently needed. "I think it is positive that the White House is looking at expanding communications through technology," said Roger Cooper, deputy assistant attorney general for information resources management at the Justice Department. "We should try to get them excited about this thing. It's too easy to throw rocks around here."

Ron Hack, director of the Commerce Department's Office of Systems and Telecommunications, said he will work with the White House staff to come up with ways to use existing Commerce software packages and technology as part of the system. Unlike other IRM officials interviewed, Hack said he did not get the impression that the White House was forcing agencies to use specific products.

"Nobody has given us an order to buy an Apple or anything else," he added. "Depending on what the White House wants to do with this system, the compatibility issue could be resolved. I haven't quite yet gotten to the bottom of that." ◀

10:40Z-335-7245
UPPER MERIDIAN 07-301
FAX TRANSMITTAL
To: JOHN RODESTA
Dept./Agency
From: BRUCE MCCONNELL
Phone # CMR
Fax #
NBN 7540-01-317-7386 5095-101
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
of pages 1
UL 18 93 12:13 NO.002 F.01

SOMALIA POINTS -- IMPLICATIONS OF AIDEED REMAINING

- A U.S. withdrawal strategy that does not include the objective of securing Aideed's departure from Somalia is ill-advised.
- If Aideed was to remain after a U.S. departure, it is likely that he would reassert his dominant political position in both Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia -- perhaps even becoming the head of whatever political structure that is in place at the time of our departure. From a political perspective, such a result would underscore the impression that the U.S. effort in Somalia was a failure.
- In particular, an Aideed-dominated Somalia would send a message that U.S. resolve and leadership was indeed defeated by the tragic events of October 3 -- and that we waited six months only in order to save face, thus putting our people in jeopardy for no clear reason. Though some negative impact from the U.S. withdrawal is inevitable, if Aideed were to remain -- and in a dominant position, to boot -- it would exacerbate the loss of American prestige and heighten the domestic sense that U.S. policy in Somalia was fatally flawed.
- This assessment should be treated separate and apart from the question of whether we should highlight Aideed's departure as a stated, public objective of U.S. diplomatic efforts. Such a high profile might make the objective harder to achieve, as it would encourage a test of wills between us and Aideed.



FOCUS - 26 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 7, 1993, Thursday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A37

LENGTH: 1161 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Rhetoric Changed, but Hunt Persisted;
Clinton Had Power to Stop Operation Against Aideed

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

Nine days ago, an eternity in U.S. policy toward Somalia, the Clinton administration unveiled what it called a new approach to establishing security in that war-shattered state: Rather than hunt a defiant warlord, it would emphasize ways to isolate him politically.

* Asked if he had given up on capturing Mohamed Farah Aideed, President Clinton skirted the question and instead said the new focus would be on a political strategy designed to let Somalia "be given back to the people who live there."

"If Aideed gives himself up, we're not going to turn him away," a top adviser said at the time, speaking on condition of anonymity. "Absent that, our goal is to marginalize him."

It is now clear that those assertions of policy, repeated by Cabinet-rank officials in a coordinated public relations attempt to suggest a shift in U.S. policy, bore nearly no relationship to events on the ground in Mogadishu. The hunt for Aideed -- conducted almost exclusively with American forces -- continued aggressively.

And with grim results. Sunday's carnage when hunters met hunted -- 12 Americans dead, 78 wounded and six missing, most of them from one company of 100 men -- has now brought its own logic of escalation. Unable to withdraw after that kind of fight but also unable to win with forces on hand, Clinton decided yesterday to send a new force of roughly 1,500 troops with a mission to pacify a far-from-pacific town.

The disconnect between last week's words and this week's deeds owed something to a confusion of authority in the 28-nation intervention force. Power and accountability were scattered across a hydra-headed United Nations command structure. Two key players -- U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his special representative in Mogadishu, retired Adm. Jonathan Howe -- remained deeply committed to pursuing and punishing Aideed, now blamed for the deaths of scores of U.N. peace keepers since June.

But another part of the explanation was uncertainty and hesitation within the Clinton administration itself, which sometimes used the United Nations as cover for its own indecision.



The Washington Post, October 7, 1993

FOCUS

The administration ensured, when it committed U.S. combat forces to the U.N. operation, that an American major general would always have final say over their use. With or without U.N. consent, Clinton had sole power to stop the track-and-snatch operation against Aideed. He did not.

"We never had a change of mission. As far as we're concerned the mission to detain Aideed is still valid," Army Maj. David Stockwell, the United Nations spokesman in Mogadishu, said in a telephone interview late Tuesday.

Aideed, who leads the Habr Gedir subclan and a political grouping called the Somali National Alliance, had once been treated as a legitimate authority by the multinational intervention force. When the American-led mission began last December, U.S. diplomats and senior officers banned their troops from calling him "warlord." They honored him instead as a "faction leader" and escorted him in ceremonial motorcades around the Somali capital.

Cooperation soured in ensuing months, and forces loyal to Aideed attacked Pakistani U.N. troops in a well-orchestrated series of ambushes on June 5. Twenty-four Pakistanis died. A U.N. investigation by consultant Tom Farer, an American University professor of law and international relations, later concluded that there was "clear and convincing evidence" that Aideed alone could have directed the attacks.

Within a day of the Pakistani deaths, the die was cast for outright war with Aideed. The U.N. Security Council passed a hastily drafted Resolution 837, which directed U.N. forces to use their warring powers to secure the "arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment" of "those responsible" for the previous day's attacks.

Farer, despite blaming Aideed for the June 5 attack, said yesterday that the June 6 U.N. resolution was hurried and ill-advised. "Anything which could get through all of the relevant bureaucracies in 24 hours is extraordinarily extemporized," he said. "Not much thought could have gone into it."

But Howe and Boutros-Ghali, who has known and disliked Aideed since long before taking his U.N. post, were by then committed. On June 17 Howe branded the Somali a criminal and shocked the U.N. military commanders in Mogadishu -- Turkish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir and American Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery -- by placing a public price on his head.

The Clinton administration had mixed reactions to the transformation of its humanitarian mission into an open war against one Somali faction. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright backed Howe enthusiastically, branding Aideed a "thug," and David Shinn, the State Department coordinator on Somalia, said that "it's very important he be removed from the equation."

But U.S. military leaders, backed by Defense Secretary Les Aspin, were alarmed at the change. With burning memories of Panama in 1989, where they felt humiliated by a lengthy search for strongman Manuel Antonio Noriega, the armed services opposed any mission to capture an individual.

More broadly, they were convinced there could be no military solution to Somalia's anarchy. They wanted no part of a mission that would force them to

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®



The Washington Post, October 7, 1993

FOCUS

take sides in a civil war or hold them accountable for creating a stable government.

"Personally I think you're asking the forces on the ground to put Somalia in a position that would be better than it has ever been in its existence," said one American general who spent time there. "I think the administration aimed too high."

But the price on Aideed's head had its own logic. The Somali general now launched a guerrilla war against U.N. forces, and an American "quick reaction force" -- once envisioned as a last-resort reserve for U.N. commanders -- fought daily skirmishes, many deadly, with attackers who laid ambushes and then melted away.

Force begat more force, and in August the administration dispatched a reinforced company team of 400 Rangers, an elite group of special operations infantry, with the explicit -- though not acknowledged -- mission of neutralizing Aideed. In six weeks of search-and-seizure raids, they snared some of Aideed's aides but also embarrassed themselves by seizing an Aideed lookalike who headed the U.N.-backed Somali police force.

The standing orders for that Ranger force were to launch a raid against Aideed or his top aides whenever they got a strong tip on whereabouts. Last Sunday at about 2:30 p.m., an informer told them -- accurately -- of a major gathering at Mogadishu's Olympic Hotel.

"The tempo of operations was, if you got information on Aideed or his supporters you had to act on it very quickly," said one senior Army officer.

No one had told the Rangers their mission had changed. Montgomery and Bir approved a rapidly drawn raiding plan. Within 90 minutes they launched 12 helicopters into Mogadishu's gathering dusk.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, MOHAMED FARAH AIDEED, SHOWN IN JUNE, BECAME WANTED AFTER ATTACK ON PAKISTANI PEACE KEEPERS. AP

October 7, 1993



FOCUS - 31 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 4, 1993, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 827 words

HEADLINE: At Least 5 Americans Killed in Somali Attack;
Two Army Helicopters Shot Down During U.N. Operation Against Warlord Aideed

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Tom Kenworthy, John Lancaster, Washington Post Staff Writers

BODY:

At least five American soldiers were killed in Somalia yesterday and two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down during an operation by U.N. peace-keeping forces that Pentagon officials said resulted in the capture of a top lieutenant of warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed.

Pentagon spokesmen said they had only sketchy details of the circumstances of the downing of the two helicopters carrying elite U.S. Army Ranger units, but said "a number of U.S. troops" were wounded. Officials portrayed an extensive firefight that was still underway at 10 p.m. EDT yesterday, 13 hours after the helicopters were downed.

This morning Reuter reported that at least one U.S. soldier appeared to have been taken hostage by Somali gunmen.

In a separate incident that precipitated the attack in which the helicopters were downed, three Marines were wounded, one seriously, when a remote-controlled mine exploded under their vehicle in Mogadishu, killing a Somali.

Yesterday's deaths brought to 16 the number of Americans killed in combat in Somalia since the United States intervened there in December to halt famine and anarchy. There have been four noncombat U.S. deaths. The United Nations took command of the operation in May.

U.S. Army Rangers, acting on new intelligence, attacked a heavily defended compound in downtown Mogadishu believed to be a stronghold of Aideed, Pentagon sources said. The Rangers apparently summoned reinforcements from among the 1,200-member U.S. quick reaction force. In addition to the associate of Aideed -- blamed by the United Nations for the deaths of peace keepers and ordered arrested -- as many as 20 other people were detained.

Military sources said they expected the count of Americans killed and injured to grow when full details were known. One said the list would grow "a lot longer."

The five known dead were all on board the first helicopter downed, and a senior Pentagon official said it was not clear if there were any survivors. The fate of the crew of the second helicopter was unknown last night. A third helicopter also was hit by ground fire but "managed to land in friendly



The Washington Post, October 4, 1993

FOCUS

territory."

In a statement released in Sacramento, Calif., where he is on a three-day trip, President Clinton expressed his "deepest sympathies" over the deaths of "brave Americans . . . engaged in a vital humanitarian mission."

Clinton said the international effort in Somalia "has succeeded in bringing order to most of the country. . . . These positive developments must not be lost because of the unwillingness of a few who reject the peaceful political process and seek to achieve power by force."

Yesterday's incidents came amid growing debate on Capitol Hill and elsewhere about how long U.S. troops will remain in Somalia and what their mission should be, and efforts by the administration to reassure Congress that the United States will be more selective in the future about committing forces to U.N. peace-keeping operations.

Defense Secretary Les Aspin said yesterday that the administration is anxious to withdraw from Somalia, but not before there is sufficient security to prevent a return of the anarchy and famine that prompted the U.S. mission in the first place.

"We would like not to stay in Somalia, and we certainly are not going to stay more than we're needed," Aspin said on CBS's "Face the Nation." But he cautioned that "it's important not to withdraw in a way that, 18 months later, people will say, 'Well, it never made any difference. You guys came and fed people for a little while, but when you left, the warlords took over again and we're back where we started.' "

But Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) said flatly, "We ought to leave now."

Both the House and Senate have adopted nonbinding resolutions calling on Clinton to seek congressional endorsement by Nov. 15 of any plan to keep U.S. forces in Somalia.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Congress should have a full debate on Somalia and endorse a narrow, purely humanitarian objective for U.S. troops there.

"I don't believe in setting a date and saying we're going to get out by December the 1st," Nunn said on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley." But he said, "We ought to be in a position of trying, in the Congress, of trying to say to the administration, 'We want a definable, narrow mission -- not a date, but a narrow mission.' "

Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) said on CNN's "Late Edition" that yesterday's events "will clearly increase the voices demanding an American withdrawal."

The casualties were the highest single-day losses since the operation began last December. On Aug. 9, four U.S. troops were killed when their vehicle hit a command-detonated mine. Three others died Sept. 25 in a helicopter downing.



The Washington Post, October 4, 1993

FOCUS

Staff writers Barton Gellman in Washington and Ruth Marcus in Sacramento and correspondent Keith B. Richburg in Nairobi contributed to this report.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, A MAN RUNS PAST BURNING WRECKAGE OF U.S. HUMVEE DESTROYED BY A MINE IN MOGADISHU. THREE MARINES WERE WOUNDED AND A SOMALI WAS KILLED IN BLAST. AP

October 14, 1993

LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®] LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®]



FOCUS - 35 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

September 28, 1993, Tuesday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 1379 words

HEADLINE: Clinton Seeks Limits On Peace Keeping;
U.N. 'Must Know When to Say No'

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Ruth Marcus, Washington Post Staff Writer

DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 27, 1993

BODY:

President Clinton said today that the United Nations needs to ask "hard questions" before sending peace-keeping forces to more world trouble spots and must recognize that it "cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts."

In his first address to the U.N. General Assembly, Clinton also announced a new effort to win an international ban on production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium used in nuclear weapons and called on more countries to commit to stop the spread of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles.

Describing himself as "the first U.S. president born after the founding of the United Nations," Clinton affirmed his administration's commitment to stay active in world affairs and "expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies." But mindful of congressional concerns about the costs and risks of the growing number of U.N. peace-keeping operations, he insisted that the world body put more thought and attention into such involvements and be more discriminating.

"If the American people are to say yes to U.N. peace keeping, the United Nations must know when to say no," Clinton declared.

His speech appeared intended both to reassure international audiences that the United States would remain engaged abroad and to promise domestic U.S. audiences that there would be limits and conditions on America's involvement in future U.N. military operations.

Clinton promised to pay the \$ 400 million the United States owes for its share of the U.N. peace-keeping bill. But he also said it was time to reduce the U.S. share for such efforts and increase contributions by countries -- such as Germany and Japan -- whose economies have grown since the system was adopted in 1973. The United States currently pays just over 30 percent of the peace-keeping bill, and administration officials have said they want that cut to 25 percent.

Clinton said that in U.N. Security Council deliberations lately, the United States had begun asking tougher questions about new peace-keeping missions, such as: "Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®



The Washington Post, September 28, 1993

FOCUS

have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified . . .? How much will the mission cost?

"From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission begins," Clinton said. "The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts."

Additionally, he said member nations must make certain the United Nations has the logistical capabilities to function effectively, including creating a "genuine U.N. peace-keeping headquarters" with planning and communications capabilities and access to intelligence.

"When lives are on the line, you cannot let the reach of the U.N. exceed its grasp," he said. The scope of U.N. peace-keeping activities has expanded dramatically in recent years, growing from 9,800 peace keepers in 1987 to more than 80,000 today.

While focusing on the realistic limits of U.N. peace-keeping missions, Clinton also emphasized the usefulness of many such operations. He praised U.N. forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina for having "maintained a valiant humanitarian effort"; he said U.N. troops in Somalia had saved "literally hundreds of thousands of lives" by restoring food supplies and security to much of the country; he credited U.N. operations in Cambodia with helping "turn the killing fields into fertile soil for reconciliation."

But Clinton's tone after eight months in office differed markedly from his call during last year's presidential campaign for an expanded U.N. peace-keeping role, including the idea of creating a standing rapid-deployment force. It follows marked criticism in Congress and elsewhere of the difficulties that the Somalia peace-keeping mission has encountered and resistance among some in Congress to Clinton's commitment to contribute U.S. forces to help enforce a potential peace agreement among Bosnia's warring Serbs, Muslims and Croats.

Asked about Clinton's shift from his campaign stance, a senior administration official said, "I'd call it growth." The official said the administration had learned that "before you can even consider [a U.N. rapid-deployment force], you've got to get the basic foundation stones in place. The U.N. now does not have a headquarters operations, any kind of logistical operation."

Speaking later at a news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, Clinton said former president George Bush "made the right decision" to send U.S. forces to Somalia and the mission "has largely succeeded in its humanitarian efforts."

But, he said, "I think perhaps too little thought was given to the long-term need to develop some political alternative" to rival warlords Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, adding, "We may have underestimated the difficulty of setting in motion a political transition."

On Bosnia, Clinton expanded a bit on the criteria he and his aides have continued to refine for committing U.S. forces to a U.N. peace enforcement operation there: a "clear understanding" of the chain of command; a NATO



The Washington Post, September 28, 1993

FOCUS

commander in charge; a "clear timetable" for reviewing U.S. participation; "a clear political strategy along with a military strategy," and "a clear expression of support from the United States Congress." Clinton said the United States would also have to know the cost of the mission, "how we're going to fund it" and what other countries would contribute.

Asked what potential peace-keeping initiatives he believed would not be justified, Clinton simply spoke of "limits to how many things we can do" given "a lot of chaotic situations" and noted developments in the Republic of Georgia, where separatist Abkhazian rebels today seized the Black Sea port of Sukhumi.

"We may or may not be able to see the U.N. go into every one of these circumstances," he said.

In addition to proposing changes in U.N. peace-keeping operations, Clinton during his speech urged the world body to undertake a broader program of reform, along the lines of his administration's own "reinventing government" initiative. "Now the time has come to reinvent the way the United Nations operates as well," the president said.

He appealed specifically for establishment of an inspector general to address reports of corruption and other abuses in U.N. operations, and for the creation of a high commissioner of human rights.

On nuclear proliferation, an administration official said the United States, which last year pledged not to produce new weapons-grade material, would not only press for a global convention to halt such production but would open part of its own stockpile to international weapons inspectors.

Clinton also renewed his call for all countries to abide by a global moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. That statement was aimed particularly at China, which, according to U.S. intelligence reports, is on the verge of resuming testing.

To counter the spread of chemical weapons, Clinton urged "all nations, including my own," to ratify the chemical weapons convention so that it could take effect by January 1995 as planned. On the subject of biological weapons, Clinton said he would seek to make every nation's biological programs and facilities "open to more international scrutiny." He also proposed strengthening the principles of the Missile Technology Control Regime "by transforming it from an agreement on technology transfer among just 23 nations to a set of rules that can command universal adherence."

With an Oct. 1 deadline looming for the Libyan government to turn over two suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, Clinton said, "My government is determined to see that such terrorists are brought to justice." An administration official said the United States would support expanding international sanctions against Libya if it fails to comply.

After his address, Clinton met individually with the leaders of the Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, President Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri of Lebanon and President Joaquim Alberto Chissano of Mozambique, as well as Japan's Hosokawa.

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®



The Washington Post, September 28, 1993

FOCUS

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, IN HIS REMARKS TO THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PRESIDENT CLINTON AFFIRMED HIS ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO STAY ACTIVE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND TO "EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN THE WORLD'S COMMUNITY OF MARKET-BASED DEMOCRACIES.", AP

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

October 14, 1993

LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®] LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®]



FOCUS - 39 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

September 18, 1993, Saturday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A18

LENGTH: 653 words

HEADLINE: Clinton Vows to Find Political Solution for Somalia

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Ann Devroy, Daniel Williams, Washington Post Staff Writers

BODY:

President Clinton yesterday pledged to step up U.S. efforts to develop a "political initiative" to restore government in Somalia and establish conditions for the withdrawal of United States peace-keeping troops. But until civil authority is restored, he added, the troops must remain.

Clinton, in a joint news conference with visiting Italian Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi, accused supporters of Somali militia leader Mohamed Farah Aideed of provoking U.N. forces to violence as a means of making the forces unpopular. U.N. troops, including American soldiers, have fired into crowds and killed civilians.

Italy has contributed 2,000 peace keepers to Somalia, and Ciampi warned before he left Rome that the U.N. initiative in Somalia had turned into a police effort with no end in sight. Members of Congress have also begun to express similar worries.

Ciampi and Clinton discussed the Somalia situation at length, officials said, and Clinton endorsed the need for a broader diplomatic effort through the U.N. that would put Somalis in charge of the devastated country.

"What the prime minister and I recognized is that we have to do more to develop a political initiative that will enable the United States to withdraw but the United Nations to remain as long as is necessary, in a more peaceful and constructive role," he said.

Asked if he was not outlining a U.S. effort to establish a new government in Somalia, Clinton said, "Our position is not well enough formed yet to be characterized fairly."

A senior official said that Clinton and Ciampi discussed U.N. sponsorship of talks among Somali factions, excluding Aideed's, with a goal of establishing a government. Aideed has asked the U.N. for an independent commission to evaluate criminal charges against him.

State Department officials said that an ongoing reconciliation project will continue: the rebuilding of civil rule from the ground up. The project was conceived at U.S.-brokered talks among 15 clan and political factions in Addis Ababa in the spring.



The Washington Post, September 18, 1993

FOCUS

The plan envisions creation of district councils that would in turn designate representatives for regional assemblies. The regional councils would elect representatives to a national council, forming the basis of a new central government.

So far, 30 of a proposed 92 district councils have been formed. There is no timetable for putting the rest in place nor for elections to the regional and national councils, although U.S. State Department officials hope that the councils will all be in place by the end of next year.

Under the plan, the national council would contain 54 representatives from the regional groups, as well as 15 from organizations represented by signers of the Addis Ababa accord, including Aideed. Mogadishu, Aideed's stronghold, also chooses five representatives.

Aideed is banned from participation, U.S. officials said, although members of his clan militia may take part. Aideed is wanted for arrest by the U.N. for allegedly masterminding attacks on peace-keeping forces.

Clinton expressed concern about the involvement of U.S. troops in conflicts. "But I am also disturbed that this is plainly part of the strategy by supporters of General Aideed to make the presence of the U.N. troops there more unpopular," he said.

The United States "cannot continue to pursue a military solution or be obsessed with Aideed," Clinton said. To pull the forces out would reward violence and anarchy, he said.

Ciampi skirted the issue of Italy's reported sympathy for Aideed. U.S. and U.N. officials have criticized commanders of Italian peace-keeping troops for running their own diplomacy with the fugitive warlord.

"Italy does not support Aideed. We must be very clear," Ciampi said in an interview.

Rather, Aideed's following must be recognized and he must be dealt with in a way so the "aftereffects" may not prove "more difficult to resolve politically."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER CARLO CIAMPI VISITS PRESIDENT CLINTON IN THE OVAL OFFICE. OFFICIALS SAID THE LEADERS DISCUSSED THE SOMALIA SITUATION AT LENGTH. REUTER

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

October 14, 1993



FOCUS - 47 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

August 9, 1993, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A13

LENGTH: 574 words

HEADLINE: President Promises 'Appropriate' Response;
Clinton Rebuts Criticism of Somalia Mission

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Lynne Duke, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

President Clinton said yesterday that the United States will take "appropriate action" against those responsible for the deaths of four U.S. soldiers in Somalia, but defended U.S. participation in the United Nations peacekeeping effort there.

But only hours after the soldiers were killed by a land mine, Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) said the United States should rethink its role in the strife-torn African nation and House Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.) said the United States should take strong steps against Mohamed Farah Aideed, the Somali warlord suspected of masterminding the attack.

Dole predicted that congressional pressure for a U.S. withdrawal will build in the coming days, even though Congress is in summer recess.

"We are in active consultation with our U.N. allies about" the situation in Somalia, Clinton told reporters yesterday as he left church. "We'll proceed through the U.N., as our troops there are part of the U.N." He did not specify what an "appropriate" reaction would be.

Both Clinton and Vice President Gore, in separate public statements yesterday, defended the U.S. mission in Somalia, which began last December as a unilateral humanitarian venture, and in May became part of a broader United Nations operation to ensure that food and medicine reach starving residents of the East African country, which has suffered both drought and civil war.

"I still believe the United Nations mission is well-conceived and properly undertaken," Clinton said. Gore, on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley," said: "We have a mission there. We are going to continue."

Foley, interviewed on CNN's "Newsmaker Sunday," urged stronger action against Aideed, although neither U.S. nor U.N. officials said for certain that he and his militia forces were responsible for the attack.

"We shouldn't allow this cat-and-mouse game to go on in which Americans take casualties and Aideed escapes capture," said Foley. "If we don't suppress this last pocket of active attack on our forces, I think we are going to see other casualties."



The Washington Post, August 9, 1993

FOCUS

Foley said it would be "tragic" if the peacekeeping forces were forced out of Somalia by Aideed. "It would be a sad commentary on the effectiveness of both the U.N. mission and our participation in it."

But Dole, appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," said that the time "may be close" for a U.S. withdrawal. He said he would support such a move, although "I would hate to give up on this mission. . . . I think it's time to reassess it."

He noted that other senators, such as Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), question whether the United States has gotten away from "our original mission, which was humanitarian."

Congress is "not going to be in session for 30 days," Dole said, "but I'll bet there'll be some pressure on the president" to get the remaining U.S. troops out of Somalia.

Of the 22,251 U.N. troops in Somalia, 4,028 are American. An additional 1,269 American troops remain under U.S. command. The deaths yesterday bring to eight the total of Americans killed in combat in Somalia since U.S. troops were sent there in December by President George Bush.

Thirty-nine U.N. peacekeeping troops have been killed in Somalia since June 5, when gunmen ambushed and killed 24 U.N. troops from Pakistan. The gunmen were loyalists of Aideed, who has eluded U.N. capture and continues fighting U.N. forces in southern Mogadishu.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

October 14, 1993



LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 1 DOCUMENT

Public Papers of the Presidents

Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Following Discussions
With Caribbean Leaders

29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1661

August 30, 1993

LENGTH: 2027 words

President Clinton. Good afternoon. Today I had the great honor of welcoming five outstanding leaders from the English-speaking Caribbean to the White House: President Cheddi Jagan of Guyana, Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford of Barbados, Prime Minister Patrick Manning of Trinidad and Tobago -- Tobago, excuse me; I'm still hoarse from our luncheon -- Prime Minister P. J. Patterson of Jamaica, and Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham of the Bahamas. I'm impressed by the intelligence, the dynamism, and the dedication of the Caribbean leadership.

The end of the cold war has altered the nature but not the depth of our interest in the Caribbean. Our concern for the region is firmly rooted in geographic proximity, the resultant flows of people, of commodities and culture, and in our shared interest in fighting drug trafficking and projecting our economic interests and in protecting fragile ecosystems.

As with U.S.-Mexican relations, U.S.-Caribbean relations dramatically demonstrate the absolute inseparability of foreign and domestic issues. More than ever before, our Nation is a Caribbean nation. In our discussions, we recognize the concerns that NAFTA may adversely affect the Caribbean and Central American nations by diverting trade and investment flows to Mexico. Therefore, I want to announce today that I have asked Ambassador Mickey Kantor to study the impact of NAFTA on these small economies and to consult with them on new measures to increase regional trade.

American workers have a direct interest in the prosperity of the English-speaking Caribbean. The \$ 2 billion in United States exports to those countries creates at least 40,000 American jobs. Our warm and productive luncheon meeting covered many other areas as well. These nations are all vibrant democracies striving to adapt their economies to new global realities while maintaining a full respect for individual freedoms and human rights.

In the Organization of American States and in the United Nations, they consistently take strong stands in favor of the collective defense of democracy. They have all been firm supporters of multilateral efforts to restore President Aristide in Haiti. And we discussed cooperative security and economic measures to assist Haitian democracies. I thank them for their support of the restoration of President Aristide and, of course, we all enjoyed a recounting of President Aristide's swearing-in of his new Prime Minister today.

The Caribbean community will be an important building block of a hemispheric community of democracies linked by growing economic ties and common political beliefs. That will happen, I believe, in no small measure because of the leadership of the five people who are here with us today. And I'd like now to ask them each in turn to come to the microphone and say a few remarks. And I think President Jagan is going first. He was here first in 1961. Is that



29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1661

right?

The microphone is yours, sir.

[At this point, President Jagan, Prime Minister Sandiford, Prime Minister Patterson, and Prime Minister Ingraham made brief remarks.]

The President. Thank you. Let me also say, before you ask the question, if there are people here representing your nations, I want to make sure that I give them a chance to ask their questions also, but we'll start with Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

NAFTA

Q. Mr. President, since you have a better chance of passing NAFTA in the Senate, will you push for the Senate consideration first? And did it come as a surprise to you that the Caribbean would feel adversely affected by NAFTA? I mean, was it news?

President Clinton. No. Well, let me answer the first question first. I haven't made a decision on that yet, and I don't think I should until I consult with the supporters of the agreement. It can't pass in either House until the legislation is developed, which is now going on to embody the agreement. But I'm certainly open to that. I just simply haven't had the opportunity to sit down and visit with the supporters and see what they want to do. I have no objection to going that way.

With regard to the Caribbean, it didn't come as a surprise to me. I think in general what these leaders said was that they thought it was a good idea but that it shouldn't adversely affect existing relationships. Our administration has worked hard to have a positive mutually beneficial relationship with the CARICOM nations to faithfully carry out the laws of Congress, including one that was passed late last year designed to stop a previous problem with our efforts there. And I said, as I said today, I asked the Ambassador for Trade, Mickey Kantor, to look into this and see whether we can provide some assurances that there will not be a disadvantage to the Caribbean nations.

Cuba

Q. Mr. President, can you be more specific about what the dialog was on Cuba and bringing it into a more democratic society?

President Clinton. Actually, we had a general conversation about it. As you know, the position of CARICOM and the position of the United States with regard to trade with Cuba is different. I just simply reiterated that the Cuban democracy act does not sanction any trade with Cuba unless it is somehow subsidized by governments. That is not contemplated, so the difficulty issue we just got off the table, and then we talked a little bit about what the prospects were for economic and political reform in Cuba, something that is devoutly to be hoped for by the peoples of all the nations here represented. But there was nothing more specific than that.

Bosnia



29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1661

Q. Mr. President, if the Bosnian peace agreement is reached in Geneva, how many American forces would you be willing to offer to help enforce that agreement? How long would they be required to serve? And what would be the risk to those forces?

President Clinton. Well, first of all, whether I would be prepared to do that or not depends on whether I'm convinced that the agreement is both -- is fair, fully embraced by the Bosnian government, and is enforceable. That has been a source of concern for our military planners all along -- about, you know, whether we could have something that would be enforceable.

But I made clear last February, and I will reiterate again, the United States is prepared to participate in a multinational effort to keep the peace in Bosnia. But I want to see what the details are. I want to get the briefing on it. I want to know that it will be enforceable. But I'm certainly open to that, but I also want to know whose responsibility it is to stay, for how long.

It's a little bit different than the situation in Somalia, for example, where you really have two problems that relate to one another. There needs to be a lot of nation-building in Somalia from the ground up, a lot of institution-building. We did go there to stop the starvation and the violation and the bloodshed. But it's also true that the absence of order gave rise to all those problems.

And so we're still trying to fulfill our original mission in Somalia. This is a very different sort of thing, but I certainly think it can work. A multinational effort to keep the peace, if it is enforceable and the understandings are there, can clearly work. You can see that in the longstanding success we've had in our participation in the aftermath of the Camp David agreement.

Cuba

Q. Mr. President, my question is for Prime Minister Patterson, if you could step to the microphone. Going back to Cuba, what is the position of CARICOM in regards to Cuba? And do you think you can do anything to bring Cuba back into the democratic fold?

Prime Minister Patterson. First of all, what we are seeking to establish with Cuba is a joint commission that discusses the range of matters no different from those presently covered by a joint commission with Mexico, with Venezuela, with Colombia. It is not an agreement that provides for subsidized trade with Cuba and therefore does not offend any existing legislation in the United States or elsewhere.

We feel that the time has come for all countries in the hemisphere to work towards a normalization of relationships among them. There are differences between the political systems in Cuba and those in the CARICOM countries. We remain firmly committed to the democratic tradition. But Cuba unquestionably is a Caribbean country. That is a reality which we must face, and we believe that the joint commission should assist in the process of inducing Cuba towards the sorts of policies and programs that are compatible with those of other independent nations in the hemisphere.



29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1661

Q. Would you like to see the U.S. do the same thing?

Prime Minister Patterson. What the U.S. does is a matter for the U.S. to determine. If we can assist anywhere in the process of contact or mediation, we are always prepared to do so.

Somalia

Q. Mr. President, in Mogadishu some of the humanitarian relief workers say that the U.S. raid early this morning was a blunder, and in fact, the U.S. military is making their job more difficult. What do you say to those who are there to help? And will the U.S. forces remain there long enough to capture Aideed? Is that a target for you?

President Clinton. Well, the United Nations operation set that as their objective, and they asked us for our help in that regard.

I would remind you that I understand the problems with this, but the United Nations believes, and has ample evidence to support the fact, that the supporters of Aideed murdered a substantial number of Pakistani peacekeepers and are behind the deaths of four Americans. So we have to deal with that. And I am open to other suggestions. I think the United Nations should be open to other suggestions.

To date, we have tried to be cooperative with the policies that have been jointly developed. We have not been just simply driving this. We have really tried to work within the framework of the U.N. to prove that this thing could work over the long run. We've also tried to make sure that everyone understood that this is not all of Somalia we're talking about. We're talking about one part of Mogadishu. In much of the rest of the country, the U.N. mission has continued unimpeded and successfully. I don't think anyone wants to change the fundamental character of it.

And so, would I be willing to discuss that with our people and with anyone else? Of course, I would. But I think it is very important to point out that what provoked this was people involved with Aideed killing the Pakistanis first and then the four Americans.

Q. Mr. President -- [inaudible] -- talked about the need for -- [inaudible]. Is there a need to ensure the dialog continues through the establishment perhaps of U.S.-CARICOM policy machinery? What are you prepared to do?

President Clinton. Well, I think there is a need for a continuing dialog. One of the things that I pledged today to these leaders is that next year when the conference on the sustainable development in smaller nations is held in the Caribbean, that the United States would send a high level delegation there. And we didn't discuss any specific mechanism. But I think it is very important. You know, all these nations, and others not here present, in the Caribbean, are at different points in their history with different challenges. And I think that what we need to do is to make it clear that the United States is committed to democracy, to market economics, and to economic growth of this region over the long run. Here even at home we find great difficulty in predicting with precision what's going to happen economically, because we're in a period of real profound economic change. And I think it's important that we make these commitments over the long run and that we keep the doors of communication

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®



29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1661

open, and that's exactly what we intend to do.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 2:09 p.m. in the East Room at the White House.

FOCUS - 4 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 15, 1993, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 1005 words

HEADLINE: A 'Pretty Good Beginning';
That's How Clinton Rates Foreign Policy Record

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Ruth Marcus, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

President Clinton yesterday responded to critics of his foreign policy, declaring at a news conference that his administration was off to a "pretty good beginning" in world affairs.

Clinton told reporters that on "the biggest issues affecting the future and the security of the United States we have a good record." Clinton pointed to his administration's efforts to maintain stability in Russia ("the most important issue"), support the Middle East peace process, promote nuclear nonproliferation, forge a new relationship with Japan and hold "the most successful meeting of the G-7 [international economic summit] in over a decade." He said the United States is finally "moving in the right direction" in Somalia.

The deaths of U.S. soldiers in Somalia, and the collapse of a United Nations-mediated agreement in Haiti, have revived and intensified doubts, reflected in public opinion polls, about Clinton's leadership abilities in foreign affairs, an area in which the former Arkansas governor had little experience before becoming president.

Clinton seized the opportunity of the release of American helicopter pilot Michael J. Durant in Mogadishu to call a news conference designed to display his understanding of foreign policy and to dispel mounting public dissatisfaction.

Clinton said "it's easy to second-guess" and "easy for people who don't have these responsibilities to use words like 'naive' or this, that, or the other thing."

But he said those who criticize the administration's conduct of foreign policy because of the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Somalia "have a pretty weak reed to stand on," and said Durant's release demonstrated that his administration's policy in the last week "was plainly right."

Saying he had assumed the presidency at a time when the United States is facing a "new and different world," Clinton said he thought he was doing a good job of leading the United States in an uncharted international environment. "I think that in this new world we made a pretty good beginning, and clearly on the things that affect us most," he said.

The Washington Post, October 15, 1993

FOCUS

Clinton also cited as evidence on his side the administration's policy in Haiti. He said that "when I took office, what we had was everybody in Haiti thinking about whether they could leave and come to the United States because they thought there was no way that anybody would ever stick up for the democratic process in Haiti."

But after the election, Clinton's incoming administration was facing a potential flood of refugees from Haiti precisely because of Clinton's promise during the campaign -- later described as "unsound" by Secretary of State Warren Christopher -- to reverse Bush administration policy and grant Haitian boat people a hearing about whether they qualified as refugees.

Clinton acknowledged problems with a mission in Somalia that he said was mistakenly "transformed into a military endeavor" after the deaths of 24 Pakistani peace keepers and a U.N. resolution, supported by the United States, to go after the man deemed responsible, Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed.

On Somalia, Clinton said his experiences there "would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peace-keeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command with direct accountability to the United States here."

During the presidential campaign, Clinton proposed creation of a U.N. rapid deployment peace-keeping force. But, echoing earlier comments, Clinton said yesterday he had learned that the United States needs to retain operational control over any forces it contributes to peace-keeping missions, the same policy followed by the Bush administration.

Despite such criticism, the biggest problem the United States has encountered in Somalia was a mission under U.S. control: the ill-fated Oct. 3 attack in which at least 17 Americans were killed and Durant was taken hostage.

Asked about whether the Somalia experience would make him wary of sending peace-keeping troops to Bosnia, as the administration has said it is willing to do if the parties there reach a peace accord, Clinton repeated his insistence that any forces there be under NATO command -- meaning "an American general that talks every day to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

With that setup, he said, "I would have a far higher level of confidence about not only the safety of our troops but our ability to deal with that as a NATO operation. It's a whole different issue, Bosnia, but I would have a much higher level of confidence there."

Clinton adopted a conciliatory tone toward Aideed that contrasted with the conclusion of the administration's report to Congress yesterday pinning him with the responsibility for the murder of the Pakistani peace keepers. In the report, the administration said flatly that "forces loyal to" Aideed carried out the ambush and tied Aideed personally to the violence, describing it as "Aideed's attack" and discussing his motivations. The United Nations had earlier concluded that Aideed was culpable.

But Clinton, asked whether he believed there was a possibility that Aideed was not directly responsible, said, "I can't answer that." He said he believed

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®

The Washington Post, October 15, 1993

FOCUS

it was important to have an "honest, unencumbered effort to investigate what happened to those Pakistanis and to have some resolution of that."

Clinton indicated his openness to Aideed's suggestion of "a genuinely unbiased commission" to investigate the incident -- an offer originally spurned by the administration -- rather than having the United Nations pursue the matter.

And Clinton also said Aideed could play a role in the political process in Somalia. "We have no interest in keeping any clan or subclan or group of Somalis out of the political process affecting the future of their people," Clinton said. "It is not for the United States or the United Nations to eliminate whole groups of people from having a role in Somalia's future."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, PRESIDENT CLINTON. AFP

October 15, 1993

LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®] LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®]

FOCUS - 2 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 17, 1993, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A29

LENGTH: 692 words

HEADLINE: SOMALIA;
Inattention Led To U.S. Deaths

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: R. Jeffrey Smith, Ann Devroy

BODY:

The debacle in Somalia that led to the deaths of 18 U.S. servicemen two weeks ago stemmed principally from inattention at the highest levels of the Clinton administration, according to Secretary of State Warren Christopher and senior policymakers.

In an administration that focuses its foreign policy gaze on what Christopher called the "big issues," the potential for serious harm to U.S. servicemen deployed in the strife-torn African nation never attracted the scrutiny of top decision makers, he and others said.

Instead, key issues of U.S. policy toward Somalia -- including the ill-fated attempt to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed that U.S. officials now blame for the servicemen's deaths -- were considered and decided by an interagency committee composed of lower-ranking officials known as the "deputies committee."

The committee, customarily chaired by deputy White House national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, is now blamed by top policymakers for not warning more senior officials of the potential for trouble.

"We were not sufficiently attentive," Christopher said. "This is my fault and the fault of the rest of us, but the fact is that the policy was being managed by the deputies committee, and as I say I have to take responsibility as I'm sure the others will for that."

What happened in Somalia, he and others said, is that key officials in Washington failed to realize the U.N.-backed effort to capture Aideed and bring him to trial for the deaths of 24 Pakistani troops was interfering with U.S. efforts to improve the nation's political stability and pave the way for a U.S. withdrawal.

Aideed's forces -- provoked by U.S. commandos dispatched to hunt him down -- confronted U.S. forces in southern Mogadishu on Oct. 3-4 and inflicted startling casualties. Had they not been so provoked, the officials now say, the incident would never have happened.

Senior U.S. officials now blame themselves for not keeping a closer eye on the U.N. operation, which was -- in Christopher's words -- "out of focus . . .

The Washington Post, October 17, 1993

FOCUS

[and] out of balance" because it devoted too much effort during the summer and early autumn to getting Aideed and not enough to creating a viable political system in Somalia.

"I don't think we fully appreciated until several weeks ago just how much [the political process] . . . had been abandoned when we turned it over to the U.N. mission," President Clinton said in an interview with The Washington Post on Friday.

One reason that senior officials never took a fundamental look at the policy, Christopher said, was that they were focused during this period on the "big issues" of U.S. foreign policy, a category that includes matters that directly affect U.S. security or economic interests, such as Russia, Japan, China, Asia and the world economy.

But the U.S. deployment in Somalia, which was conceived and initially carried out as a strictly humanitarian U.S. mission to save hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis, never made the "cut" that separated the big issues from ones considered less deserving of high-level attention in the administration.

"In the last month or so, we've been very busy dealing with Russia and the Middle East . . . and our attempts to . . . keep that on track and go forward. Both of which, in terms of our immediate national interest, are far more significant than our operations in Somalia," Clinton said.

Officials said that one result of the inattention was that no ranking U.S. official pressured U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali to back away from the anti-Aideed campaign before late September, when Christopher finally met with him.

Christopher said Boutros-Ghali told him that "we've just got it under control and you know I was dissatisfied with that response, and so we followed up and we followed up again. In fact, finally, I thought that he had had the message, frankly."

A senior official at another agency said that top policymakers had not yet devised an effective method of tracking potential problems when U.S. forces are "deployed in harm's way," but added that he would urge creation of such a mechanism.

GRAPHIC: MAP

October 15, 1993

FOCUS - 5 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 15, 1993, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 1470 words

HEADLINE: Somali Faction Frees U.S. Pilot;
Clinton Says No Deal Made;
Aideed Surfaces, Seeks Return Gesture

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Keith B. Richburg, Washington Post Foreign Service

DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia, Oct. 14, 1993

BODY:

Militia leader Mohamed Farah Aideed announced the release of a captured U.S. pilot and a Nigerian peace keeper today but made clear that he hoped for a reciprocal gesture from the United Nations, which holds more than two dozen of his supporters.

In his first public appearance in four months -- during which he eluded a massive U.S. manhunt -- Aideed said his Somali National Alliance faction, in releasing the two prisoners unconditionally, was responding to President Clinton's policy shift and bowing to international opinion.

Aideed, dressed in a pin-striped shirt and red tie and looking fit and relaxed, said at his news conference here, "The U.S. has now decided to adopt a new policy to correct the past mistakes."

The release marked the first major success for the Clinton administration's new policy of negotiation and dialogue with Aideed.

[In Washington, Clinton told a news conference: "I want to . . . emphasize that we made no deals to secure the release of Chief Warrant Officer [Michael] Durant." He added that the latest development "demonstrates that we are moving in the right direction and that we are making progress."]

Hours after the Aideed press conference, at a villa in the south Mogadishu neighborhood he controls, Durant and Nigerian Pvt. Umar Shantali were released to the custody of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Durant, whose videotaped interrogation by Somali militiamen shocked the American public, today looked tired. He grimaced in pain as he lay, covered with a pink-flowered sheet, on a stretcher and was carried into the back of a Red Cross vehicle. He declined to speak to reporters, but an American military doctor said later that the pilot was "fine, basically," although suffering from a broken bone in his face, a compressed fracture of his second vertebra, a fracture in his right leg and superficial bullet wounds on the left arm and shoulder. Doctors in Mogadishu expressed confidence that Durant could return to flying duty.

The Washington Post, October 15, 1993

FOCUS

"I think that he was well taken care of," said the doctor, Maj. John Holcomb, who added that Durant had been tended to by a physician who put the pilot's right leg in a splint and gave him antibiotics to ward off infection from his open wounds.

Holcomb said the pilot was overcome with emotion after his release, crying on occasion, and that he spent 10 minutes talking to his wife by satellite telephone.

[A White House official said that Clinton, in a seven-minute telephone conversation with the freed pilot, thanked him for "his contribution to the country, his service, his patriotism and his bravery."]

Durant, 32, who was captured after his helicopter was shot down by Aideed's forces Oct. 3, is scheduled to be flown Friday to a U.S. military hospital in Germany.

Shantali, 22, the freed Nigerian, walked into a Red Cross vehicle limping and using a cane for support. Shantali was seized on Sept. 5, after Aideed's militia force ambushed his unit, killing seven Nigerian U.N. peace keepers and wounding seven others.

Nothing was heard concerning Shantali for the last six weeks, and U.N. intelligence sources said they believed he had been captured by one Somali faction and then transferred several times until he ended up in the hands of Aideed's militia.

This morning, Shantali's captors told him "you're going to be a free man" and allowed him to bathe for the first time in six weeks, according to U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Dawn Kirkpatrick, a U.N. military spokeswoman who talked to Shantali after he was freed.

The release of the two soldiers marked a personal victory for the Clinton administration's diplomatic trouble-shooter, former ambassador Robert B. Oakley, who walked into the Somalia imbroglio armed only with his high standing among Somalis and the promise that the United States was sincere about wanting to end four months of bloodshed in Mogadishu.

Today's diplomatic breakthrough was described as a setback, however, for the United Nations and its special envoy here, retired U.S. Navy Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, who has been slow to acknowledge the dramatic shift in U.S. policy. Even today, Howe did not concede what American officials have announced -- that U.S. and U.N. forces here have been ordered to halt offensive operations against Aideed as part of a de facto cease-fire.

"All options are open," Howe said, when asked if a truce did exist, adding, "We are still in a very tenuous period."

One U.N. official, an American, said today's release and Aideed's press conference, "make Oakley look good and Howe look like the loser. . . . I don't see how Howe can stay here after this."

U.S. and U.N. troops have searched for Aideed since June 5, when 24 Pakistani soldiers died in an ambush for which the United Nations blamed the 57-year-old

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®



The Washington Post, October 15, 1993

FOCUS

militia leader. Armed clashes between peace keepers and Somali gunmen came to a head Oct. 3, in a battle that left at least 17 Americans dead, scores wounded and Durant a prisoner. Hundreds of Somalis also died.

At his news conference today, Aideed called for the unconditional release of 32 Somalis detained by the United Nations, including his chief financier, Osman Ato, and three other top aides. Aideed earlier made their release a condition for releasing Durant.

One of the African mediators involved in the arduous discussions that led to today's release said that persuading the United Nations to respond to Aideed's move by releasing the Somalis in detention might prove more difficult than securing Durant's and Shantali's freedom.

The mediator said the release of the American and the Nigerian "is a gesture to show good faith. We expect the other side to make a similar gesture. There's a lot of need for confidence-building on both sides."

But Howe today refused to discuss the possibility that Somali prisoners in U.N. custody might soon be released and said that the United Nations' arrest order for Aideed still stands.

The United States and the United Nations remain deeply divided over whether Aideed remains the object of a military manhunt. With American forces now standing down from offensive operations and Oakley telling reporters that diplomacy has now replaced confrontation, it would appear that the U.N. arrest order has been sidetracked -- as indicated by Aideed's surprise appearance before the international media.

Aideed, in his press conference, referred to the conflicting American and U.N. positions and said that for the moment he would remain in hiding until those divergent positions are clarified.

During the four-month hunt for Aideed, Howe, American Embassy officials and U.S. intelligence officers have depicted the militia leader as a fugitive on the run, constantly changing his location and using disguises. Today, Aideed looked more like a statesman, smiling and jovially shaking hands.

Reporters were taken to a house to see Aideed after a cross-city car chase and a morning of wild rumors about whether and when he would appear. Officials of his militia first came to a hotel, where journalists are staying, in the early morning to take reporters to an unspecified militia "event." But that first trek was abandoned in an alleyway when the trailing caravan grew too large. Aideed spoke at another location shortly before noon.

His rambling statement, read in halting English, praised Clinton for shifting policy on Somalia. He said that "the previous mistakes and the resulting crisis were caused by the deliberate foreign military and political intervention in the affairs of Somalia, disrespect of the culture, tradition, history and indigenous social and political structure of the country."

"The solution of the Somali problem lies with the Somali people, as President Clinton stated, and the Somalis should be left alone to find peaceful and lasting solutions for their problems," Aideed said. "The international

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®

The Washington Post, October 15, 1993

FOCUS

community should play the role of catalyst and provide the necessary assistance to Somalis to end their fight."

Aideed also said the new U.S. troop buildup in Somalia of an additional 3,000 infantry soldiers was unnecessary and provocative. He added that the reason for the infusion of new American troops "is no longer valid" now that the American captive had been released.

He also said the current U.N. force of 29,000 soldiers from 30 countries "should be reduced" and the money spent on "humanitarian relief operations."

Speaking of his months in hiding, Aideed said he never left Mogadishu and that U.S. Rangers "never came close" to catching him. He also denied any responsibility for the warfare and violence that has gripped this capital since June, saying he and his militia fighters were merely acting in self-defense against the U.S.-led U.N. troops. "I believe I acted fairly with my forces, to defend ourselves," Aideed said.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, U.S. ARMY PILOT MICHAEL DURANT IS CARRIED TO A RED CROSS VEHICLE AFTER BEING FREED BY THE SOMALI MILITIA THAT HAD HELD HIM FOR 11 DAYS. DURANT, SHOWN IN A TV IMAGE, HAS MULTIPLE FRACTURES SUFFERED WHEN HIS HELICOPTER CRASHED. WORLDWIDE TELEVISION NEWS VIA AP

October 15, 1993

LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®] LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®]

FOCUS - 13 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 11, 1993, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 1135 words

HEADLINE: Administration Aides Defensive On Foreign Policy Strategies

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

Administration officials defended their strategy in Somalia yesterday against criticism that it is ill-conceived and ill-defined, while lawmakers took President Clinton to task for his overall foreign policy and argued against a scheduled deployment of U.S. soldiers to Haiti today.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher acknowledged that the administration, which once believed it possible to help Somalia build a stable government, "is no longer signed on to that goal."

Instead, he said on NBC's "Meet the Press," President Clinton has decided to limit the U.S. goal to helping the United Nations restore order and is trying, through U.S. special envoy Robert B. Oakley, to turn over any political nation-building to nearby African nations.

"Our main mission now is to try to help the Somalis and help the adjacent country leaders to find a sound, political solution," he said.

On Thursday, Clinton announced he would send 1,700 more combat troops to Somalia and station an additional 3,600 Marines offshore but pledged to pull all but a few hundred support personnel out by March 31. The decision followed a fierce battle four days earlier in which at least 15 Americans died and 75 were injured.

Since then, congressional criticism has mounted over Clinton's handling of Somalia and over the extent to which U.S. foreign policy -- and U.S. troop deployment -- in Somalia and elsewhere should be guided by decisions made at the United Nations.

Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) yesterday said he believed a proposal by Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) to cut off money for the Somalia operation later this year "stands a reasonable chance of passing."

"This is not a problem of execution of policy. This is a problem of formulation of policy. And the policy formulation was ill-conceived and it was open-ended and it was poorly planned," Bradley said. "And that is why we are in this fix now . . . in this case, through a series of ad hoc decisions, we find ourself in this predicament."

LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®] LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®]

The Washington Post, October 11, 1993

FOCUS

Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), who has been more supportive of Clinton's Somalia policy than many Democrats, predicted the vote would make "it clear how Congress feels about having our troops under another command. And the answer is, if we're going to have the casualties and we're going to do all the hard work, then they ought to be commanded by Americans," he said.

The ongoing concern over the changing U.S. role in the world was made more immediate by today's scheduled arrival of several hundred lightly armed U.S. soldiers in Haiti.

"This is another area where we need to send up a little alarm and say it's time for us to be fully briefed, Congress needs to be brought in on the action here," said Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). "It could be a very dangerous situation for our military."

Asked to comment on continued U.S. participation in U.N. peace-keeping missions, given the problems in Somalia, Dole replied: "I wouldn't be sending anybody to Haiti. My view is that this probably precludes any participation in Bosnia . . . and we ought to bring what few people we have in Haiti back home and not send any more."

Responding to concerns about troop vulnerability in Haiti, Defense Secretary Les Aspin, on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley," said: "They will be armed to protect their own lives and their own safety. They are not armed sufficiently in order to do a peace-keeping job."

About half the 600 U.S. soldiers being sent to Haiti should arrive today and Tuesday. Most are military engineers and trainers who will help implement a U.N.-brokered agreement that calls for Haiti's military rulers to resign by Oct. 15 and to restore the elected president the military deposed two years ago, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Recent violence and threats of noncooperation by the military there have caused concern in the Pentagon and elsewhere.

On Somalia, Christopher acknowledged that the United States might have underestimated the consequences of supporting the U.N. decision in June to try to capture factional leader Mohamed Farah Aideed, whom officials blamed for an ambush that killed 24 Pakistani U.N. peace keepers.

"There's no doubt that the mission changed in June . . . perhaps without a full understanding of the consequences of that," Christopher said.

At the same time, he said, after the attack on U.N. forces, the U.S. government "got undue focus on the military side of this and not adequate focus on the political side." As for the decision to send U.S. soldiers into a dangerous situation, "I think we're all responsible for that, right up to and including the president . . . but, as I've said, I think it did get out of balance."

Within 24 hours of the June 5 attack on the Pakistani peace keepers, the U.N. Security Council approved a resolution demanding the arrest of those responsible. By mid-June the U.N. special envoy to Somalia, retired U.S. Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, was offering a reward for Aideed's capture, and U.S. troops, with the president's approval, began a series of raids against Aideed forces.

The Washington Post, October 11, 1993

FOCUS

Aspin and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright yesterday defended the new mission, as well as what now appears to be a third and simultaneous one -- negotiating a cease-fire with Aideed's clan and helping Ethiopia, Eritrea and other African nations take hold of the political process needed to establish a lasting government in Somalia.

"We need to have both parts of this policy, we need to have pressure on Aideed and on the people who disrupt the process," said Aspin, "at the same time beginning the process of negotiating and talking and the political process."

Howe, speaking to ABC by telephone from Somalia yesterday, said, "It would be a disaster if the United States pulled out now," and reiterated his support for the idea of capturing Aideed.

"We still feel that's a worthwhile goal," he said. Howe said Oakley's talks with African leaders are "very complementary" to the U.N. mandate.

Howe also confirmed reports that U.S. soldiers have been in a position to kill Aideed. "Yes, we've had many opportunities to eliminate him," Howe said. "That's not our job. We're trying to arrest him or bring him one way or the other into a legal process."

Asked about charges that U.N. troops were too slow to come to the aid of U.S. Rangers during last Sunday's deadly battle, Howe said it was "not really fair to be outraged at the United Nations in this circumstance."

The battle "was a wonderful example of what the United Nations can do in an emergency situation. There were some contingency plans, but there was intense fire and blocking as people moved out, so they had to reorganize something a lot stronger, and they did so, and they did it well, and lives were saved."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, WARREN CHRISTOPHER.

October 9, 1993

FOCUS - 17 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 9, 1993, Saturday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 1225 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Prepares Peace Offer;
White House Considers Cease-Fire With Somali Warlord

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: John Lancaster, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

Clinton administration officials yesterday sought to lower the temperature of their military confrontation with Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed, saying they were preparing a peace overture that could include a cease-fire and possible exchange of prisoners.

U.S. Special Envoy Robert B. Oakley, dispatched to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa Thursday night, yesterday conferred by phone with top administration officials who told him to begin negotiations through intermediaries with Aideed, sources said.

"He has been given a broad mandate," said a senior administration official. The official said Oakley had been given permission from President Clinton to "engage Aideed in an effort to make peace" in Somalia.

The new diplomatic push for a peaceful political settlement represents a decision by Clinton to pursue a strategy largely independent of the United Nations, which has pressed for Aideed's arrest, and reflects Clinton's growing dissatisfaction with the U.N. approach.

At the same time, administration officials said that U.S. military forces in Mogadishu are prepared to respond aggressively to new clashes with Aideed and his Habr Gedir sub-clan, possibly with airstrikes on Aideed's arms depots in the interior of the country.

A senior Pentagon official disclosed at a background briefing yesterday that Army Rangers, sent to Somalia in late August to capture Aideed, would now turn to a new task: rescuing Chief Warrant Officer Michael J. Durant, a helicopter pilot captured in a bloody clash with Aideed's forces on Sunday and early Monday.

The death toll from that episode rose to 15 U.S. soldiers yesterday with the recovery of two more bodies. Several more are still missing in action, though the Pentagon is not disclosing an exact number in hopes they may still be alive.

"We're not going to tolerate people messing with us," Clinton said at a White House photo session yesterday. "But we need to state unambiguously that our job is not to decide who gets to play a role in post-war Somalia, that we want the political process to work."



The Washington Post, October 9, 1993

FOCUS

Clinton's comments followed his decision Thursday to send 1,700 additional Army soldiers and 3,600 Marines to Somalia, effectively doubling the U.S. military presence in the country.

Clinton yesterday defended his defense secretary, Les Aspin, against charges by Republican lawmakers that Aspin acted irresponsibly by turning down a request from the U.S. commander in Somalia for more tanks and other armored vehicles weeks before Sunday's battle.

Clinton said he accepted Aspin's explanation that there had been no consensus among military advisers on the need for the equipment and that the advisers had indicated the tanks were needed for offensive purposes -- conflicting with the administration's desire at the time to reduce military operations in the Somali capital.

Clinton said, moreover, that he was talking "on a very regular basis" during that period to then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin L. Powell, and Powell never brought the request for armored vehicles to his attention.

Responding to criticism that Clinton had not fully explained his decision to send in more troops, administration officials yesterday sought to clarify the U.S. mission, which is scheduled to end on March 31.

The officials said, in effect, that the new forces are not looking for a fight and will play a largely defensive role. Among other things, the officials said, the U.S. forces would establish "buffer zones" around U.S. and U.N. compounds and along Mogadishu's three or four main roads and help escort humanitarian relief convoys, 10 of which roll out of the city every day.

Along the same lines, the existing U.S. "quick reaction force" of 1,700 soldiers in Mogadishu will cease daily patrols, which had risen to about 50 a day, and revert to its original mission of responding to emergencies, officials said.

The Rangers, meanwhile, in addition to trying to rescue Durant -- an effort that the senior Pentagon official told reporters would be aided by four slow-flying AC-130 gunships -- also plan to focus on training multinational forces, encouraging them to shoulder more of the security burden in Mogadishu.

But the most striking aspect of yesterday's developments was the administration's clear retreat from confrontation with Aideed, who has a \$ 25,000 price on his head from the United Nations and has been blamed for scores of deaths among U.S. and multinational peace keepers.

"Clearly we want people to understand that we have the capability to go after people who pursue these kinds of activities," the senior Pentagon official said. "[But our] intent clearly is not to go into the middle of the compound [of Aideed loyalists] and start a firefight just for the sake of starting a firefight."

The official cautioned, however, that if satellite photographs show that Aideed has started to rearm his "technical" vehicles and move them out of depots in the country's interior, the United States would respond with airstrikes

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®

The Washington Post, October 9, 1993

FOCUS

from the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. The official noted pointedly that the carrier has 250 precision-guided bombs, information that is normally classified.

Oakley's new mission grew out of a three-week reassessment of Somalia policy, triggered in part by a letter from Aideed delivered by former president Jimmy Carter, a senior State Department official said yesterday. The letter requested a new investigation of the U.N. allegations against Aideed, who hopes to clear himself.

At the United Nations yesterday, U.S. Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright announced in the Security Council that the United States had asked Ethiopian President Zenawi Meles to appoint an independent commission of African jurists to investigate the attacks on the peace keepers.

Oakley's primary assignment is to try to enlist the help of African leaders in organizing Somali clans into "some type of transition council" that could serve as the seed of a new government, State Department spokesman Michael McCurry said. Reflecting administration ambivalence over the need to deal with Aideed, McCurry said "it's nearly impossible to imagine him as a participant in those talks."

But McCurry also acknowledged what many senior U.S. military officers have been saying for months -- namely, that the administration cannot afford to ignore Aideed or his clan and needs to find a way to bring the Habr Gedir subclan into peace negotiations.

"I don't rule out the possibility that elements of his clan might in fact, want to participate in those discussions," McCurry said. "That doesn't necessarily mean that General Aideed is the type of person who has to participate, but you're correct in suggesting that his clan . . . is large enough and influential enough in south Mogadishu that it has to be part of the solution."

Elsewhere in Washington yesterday, a spokeswoman for the Walter Reed Army Medical Center said that five U.S. servicemen wounded during Sunday's battle had been flown to the facility for treatment. Four of the servicemen arrived at the hospital Thursday night, and another one was brought in yesterday. The spokeswoman said that several more soldiers were scheduled to arrive at the hospital late yesterday.

Staff writers Ann Devroy, Barton Gellman and Thomas W. Lippman contributed to this report.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, MOHAMED FARAH AIDEED.; PHOTO, PAUL WATSON; PHOTO, AFP

October 9, 1993

FOCUS - 15 OF 54 STORIES

Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

October 10, 1993, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 3123 words

HEADLINE: A Humanitarian Gesture Turns Deadly;
Distracted Clinton Administration Missed Signs of 'Peacemaking' Gone Sour

SERIES: Occasional

BYLINE: Thomas W. Lippman, Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writers

BODY:

When U.S. Marines first landed in Mogadishu last December, Americans applauded the effort to save the starving Somalis whose televised agony had so moved them. Last week, Americans were moved by different media images -- of a dead U.S. soldier being dragged through Mogadishu by apparently jubilant Somalis, and a wounded and clearly terrified U.S. helicopter pilot in captivity.

How an internationally acclaimed humanitarian mission became a war against Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed is a story of an administration whose still-vague vision of the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world suddenly confronted a complicated international reality.

That vision, spelled out by President Clinton and his aides on numerous occasions, was of a world in which the United States would participate, along with other nations, in promoting democracy and salvaging what some U.S. officials called "failed societies" around the world. Administration officials viewed Somalia as a laboratory where their theories of a new kind of "peacemaking" mission would be proved.

But the Somalia crisis refused to behave as the theory said it should. Instead, it became mired in Somalia's own decades-long internal battles and in the egos and personalities of its protagonists in Mogadishu, the United Nations and Washington. It has been a killing ground for 26 Americans, so far. And it has dealt a significant blow to Clinton's standing at home just as his presidency appeared to be making a fresh start after the difficulties of its first six months.

On a day-to-day basis, what has happened in Somalia is a story of inattention in Washington and missed connections between Washington and United Nations and American officials on the ground in Mogadishu.

Although Americans heading the political and military efforts in Somalia made clear that their goal -- in conjunction with their U.N. colleagues -- was to diminish Aideed's strength and exclude him from power, officials in Washington were largely tuned out. "There were so many [other] pots on boil here, and that one wasn't boiling, that people didn't pay attention," a senior official said last week.

The Washington Post, October 10, 1993

FOCUS

Only after Clinton returned from a political trip in California on Tuesday, two days after at least 15 soldiers were killed in a battle with Aideed forces, did he begin asking about decision-making among U.S. and U.N. forces in Mogadishu. "He asked the classic question," one aide said. " 'Why didn't I know this was happening?' "

In hindsight, at least, the Somalia crisis is the story of a bloody conflict that nobody planned and nobody wanted.

The initial American intervention force in Somalia had few illusions about Aideed, the strongest of militia leaders in a civil war that rewarded only ruthless men. Once a prisoner and later Army chief of staff under longtime Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre, Aideed had military training from both Italy and the Soviet Union. It had been his forces that drove Siad Barre out of Somalia in 1991 and then began fighting against remaining competitors for power.

All sides in Somalia's internal conflict had used starvation as a weapon and, by the time the U.S. Marines arrived nearly two years after Siad Barre's ouster, some 300,000 Somalis had died.

But Robert B. Oakley, whom President George Bush had appointed special emissary to Somalia, and Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, who led the U.S. intervention force, believed they had no choice but to establish relations with Aideed. Not only was he the most powerful warlord, but his home base was in Mogadishu -- the Somali capital and the center of U.S. operations.

Aideed complained bitterly that the U.S. presence in Mogadishu, and the American ban on heavy weapons there, made it difficult for him to continue to confront his clan enemies to the north and south. When the Americans started a propaganda radio station and a newspaper in Mogadishu, Aideed voiced suspicions that they might be used to undercut his support.

To all these objections, the U.S. intervention force was sympathetic but firm. Oakley, Johnston and Marine Maj. Gen. Tony Zinni, director of operations for the intervention in its first five months, emphasized their evenhandedness in daily contacts with Aideed and rival warlords. The three men told Aideed and his competitors that they would not try to decide Somalia's form of government, or who the players would be.

"We went through great pains to make sure no faction became ostracized and we didn't create an enemy," Zinni said.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the new Clinton team came into office with Somalia already on its plate, and a number of ideas about what it wanted to do with it. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's first trip out of town after Inauguration Day was to New York, to talk to U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali about reducing the 28,000-strong U.S. troop presence in Somalia and transferring responsibility for the operation to the United Nations. "It was important to get it right in Somalia, because of the impact it could have on international activism," a senior State Department official said.

On March 26, the U.N. Security Council voted to go beyond feeding Somalia's hungry to "political reconciliation" and helping Somalia rebuild its "national and regional institutions and civil administration." Oakley left Mogadishu and

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®

The Washington Post, October 10, 1993

FOCUS

came home, along with about 24,000 of the U.S. troops, who were replaced by a multinational U.N. force.

Washington was well-satisfied. "The first [humanitarian] phase had gone so well -- people were fed, inoculations were given -- we had a false sense of optimism about Phase 2," a senior State Department official said.

Asked if there were any Cabinet or deputy-level meetings devoted to discussing the March "nation-building" U.N. resolution, or the implications it would have on the ground in Somalia, three senior administration officials could recall none. "Our campaign statements and our policy was that we would support, encourage, using the United Nations to go to trouble spots like this and help . . . this was not a problem, this was a solution," said one official about the resolution.

By numerous accounts of U.S. and U.N. officials, Washington paid little attention to the Somali operation once it had handed over control to the United Nations in March. Busy with constitutional crises in Russia, civil war in Bosnia and the retaliation against Iraq for an alleged attempt to kill former president Bush, the administration essentially put Somalia in the out basket.

Boutros-Ghali sent retired U.S. Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, a former deputy national security adviser under Bush, to Mogadishu as his special representative. The American team Howe was relieving held many hours of transition meetings with him. Johnston, the Marine general, sat down one final time with Howe before flying back home in May.

"The last thing Johnston told Howe was, 'Look, do not take on Aideed. You have to understand who the guy is in this country. You do not need to make him the enemy,' " recalled one official with knowledge of the exchange. "And I'll be a sonofabitch if the first thing they didn't do was start a war with the guy."

Relations with Aideed quickly started to sour. Howe, unlike Oakley, refused to visit Aideed in his compound, and his hostility was shared by other members of his team on the ground -- most of whom were Americans. One of Howe's principal aides -- seconded to the U.N. by State after Howe requested political assistance -- was April C. Glaspie, the former U.S. ambassador to Iraq who had been strongly criticized for her perceived failure to take a sufficiently hard line with Saddam Hussein. Robert Gosende, another State Department official who had replaced Oakley as U.S. special envoy, was known by a number of Somali specialists as a "hard-liner" on Aideed.

Within weeks of his arrival in Mogadishu, informed sources said, Gosende was telling Washington that Aideed had to be removed from the scene in order for the political process to go forward. Donald Teitelbaum, a young Foreign Service officer based in Nairobi, Kenya, had already had run-ins with Aideed.

The Americans on the team felt particularly hamstrung by agreements that had been reached in political meetings among the warlords earlier in Addis Ababa under American auspices. "When people understood what had happened, that the warlords had been able to capture the constitutional drafting committee, what happened is that the [Americans on the ground in Mogadishu] started saying this is unacceptable," said a mid-level Defense official who has been following events in Somalia from the beginning. The agreements also put the warlords in

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®

The Washington Post, October 10, 1993

FOCUS

charge of disarming their own forces -- a task on which Americans believed Aideed was falling short.

Another U.S. diplomat, Ann Wright, was leading the group assigned to reconstruct Somalia's courts and legal system. With the support of many Somali lawyers and former judges, her team rejected Aideed's proposals for accomplishing that task, strengthening Aideed's conviction that the U.N. operation, and the United States, had taken sides against him.

"It did look as if the United States and the United Nations were the same people," one American participant said. "We were trying as best we could and not receiving instructions direct from Washington, but there were so many of us of one nationality."

"Once you adopted the more intrusive strategy [shifting from a humanitarian to a political mission], that made it much more likely that this [conflict] would happen," said Tom Farer, an American University law professor with extensive experience in Somalia. Aideed "was saying, 'I'm a player, you can't rule me out.'"

Howe, according to many who know him, brought no animus with him against Aideed. But he was acutely aware that he was arriving just as the U.S. military was pulling out, and he strongly expected the warlords -- Aideed above all -- to test his strength.

Within weeks of his arrival, Howe had begun working on ambitious plans to disarm the Somali warlords and build grass-roots regional councils to govern the country. Even with the U.S. troop strength cut to about 4,000, Americans remained a highly visible and -- to Aideed -- threatening component of the U.N. military force because they had the gunships, helicopters and communications equipment that were essential to the mission, according to Howe.

To the extent officials here focused on Somalia, Washington saw no reason to object to the U.N. team's anti-Aideed activism. Aideed "was trying to consolidate and strengthen his own position as U.S. troop strength went down," a senior State Department official said. He "is in fact a guy who will stop at nothing to assert power, even to the mass slaughter of human beings."

The clash finally came on June 5, when Aideed forces attacked Pakistani peace-keeping troops, leaving 24 of them dead. There is little doubt that Aideed was at fault.

"There is a very strong case that Aideed provoked the confrontation" with the Pakistanis, said Farer, who investigated the attack on the Pakistanis for the United Nations. The evidence is "clear and convincing," Farer's report to Boutros-Ghali said.

Several White House officials said that June was the point where Aideed perceived he was losing ground to his warlord rivals, and "changed his tactics." "He ordered the murders" of the Pakistanis, one official said.

The response from the United Nations, and the United States, was sharp and immediate. Within 24 hours, the Security Council -- with an emotional appeal from Pakistan for justice -- had drafted and approved Resolution 837,

LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®] LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®]

The Washington Post, October 10, 1993

FOCUS

demanding the arrest and trial of "those responsible" for the Pakistani deaths. Although the resolution specifically mentioned Aideed's Somali National Alliance, at U.S. insistence, it did not name Aideed.

The motivation behind Aideed's attack on the Pakistanis, Farer said in an interview, was his fear that U.N. forces were going to attack the radio station from which he was broadcasting attacks on the peace-keeping mission. One week after the ambush -- with the U.N. resolution as justification -- U.S.-led troops raided Aideed's headquarters compound and silenced the radio.

The headquarters raid ensured that a cycle of violence would ensue, said an Italian official, whose government had open disagreements with the U.S. team over tactics in Mogadishu. "We had a strong feeling that bombing the radio station was a mistake. Now you can see why," the Italian said.

By mid-June, Howe had stunned the U.N. military commanders in Somalia, Turkish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir and American Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery, by issuing a public arrest warrant for Aideed and offering a \$ 25,000 bounty for his capture. It followed, he believed, from Boutros-Ghali's declaration that Aideed was responsible for killing the Pakistanis.

But Bir and Montgomery were furious, as were others in the U.N. military command structure. "We've never been comfortable with this mission because we see where it's getting us," said one U.N. military officer in Somalia. "No one elected Boutros-Ghali. No one elected Jonathan Howe. But they're making the decisions."

In Washington, arguments arose between officials who felt it was necessary and others, including national security adviser Anthony Lake, who felt it was dangerous to "personalize" the conflict and tried to keep Clinton and other officials from directing remarks against the Somali warlord. But those arguing that Aideed was the problem prevailed. "We lost the battle," said a senior official.

It was at this point, the official said, that the Pentagon argued "if it is us against Aideed, we might as well try to actually get Aideed." It was Howe, some officials said, who "wanted more force, and said 'you have approved the U.N. resolution to go after [Aideed] and you have to provide the forces to do it.' " Clinton approved the Pentagon's proposal to send powerful AC-130 gunships, and later, 400 Army Rangers -- elite special operations infantry -- to try to capture Aideed. On arrival, these forces began a series of raids against Aideed forces.

On July 12, for the first and only time, U.S. forces in Mogadishu tried to kill Aideed and his high command. Described at the time as just another assault on "command and control facilities" associated with Aideed, it was in fact explicitly a "decapitation mission," according to an authoritative U.S. source. Aideed, chief financier Osman Ato and an ally, Col. Omar Jess, were all believed to be in the target area. They all survived. A defense official with access to Somali intelligence said Aideed "had a very close call" in the attack.

Subsequent orders were to capture Aideed and his lieutenants, not kill them. The American forces mounted a series of "fast-rope" missions, dropping Rangers out of helicopters. Although some Aideed aides were captured, including Ato,

LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®] LEXIS[®] NEXIS[®]

The Washington Post, October 10, 1993

FOCUS

there was a series of embarrassing mistakes, including raids on various U.N. and independent aid missions, and on the U.N.-backed Somali chief of police.

In congressional testimony, Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff hailed the Somalia operation as a "model worth promoting" for future operations to rebuild devastated, anarchic countries.

During much of the summer, the national security staff "was the locus of where information [about Somalia] was going in and out on what was happening," said a White House official. "I am not at all sure they felt fully apprised. . . . They did not know how bad things were going."

On its summer recess, Congress had heard much about problems in Somalia. When the House and Senate returned to Washington on Sept. 6, pressure began building on the White House to start pulling out. But it was not until Sept. 13, according to officials, that Clinton first showed significant interest in the subject.

That evening, Clinton discussed the issue with former president Jimmy Carter. Carter told Clinton about the letter he had gotten from Aideed asking for a neutral investigation of his culpability in the deaths of the Pakistanis. The former president told Clinton he was opposed to the drive against Aideed in Mogadishu, and urged him to gear up diplomatic efforts there toward making peace.

Clinton received a similar message several days later from visiting Italian Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi. In a public statement later that day, Clinton said, "What the prime minister and I realized is that we have to do more to develop a political initiative that will enable the United States to withdraw but the United Nations to remain as long as is necessary."

But when asked what the process would be, Clinton said, "Our position is not well enough formed yet to be characterized fairly."

On Sept. 20, Christopher told the U.N. secretary general that the United States would try to break the Somali stalemate through a new political initiative, which Oakley had been summoned to head. Christopher asked for a rotation schedule that would replace U.S. troops with those of another nation.

Although Boutros-Ghali resisted and referred in a response to Christopher to his personal animosity toward Aideed, Clinton reinforced the message in his Sept. 27 speech to the General Assembly. He called for stricter conditions on U.N. and U.S. involvement in international peace keeping.

"He was paying attention to Somalia" during this period, one senior official said of Clinton, "but what he was paying attention to was the diplomatic effort to get a real peace process going. I think he thought, or we thought, that if the president says we are concentrating on the diplomatic effort, the military part, which was tactical, would follow."

But as events last Sunday in Somalia demonstrated, that was not what happened. As the bad news continued to pour in, "Clinton put a basic question out," a White House official said.

LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®

The Washington Post, October 10, 1993

FOCUS

"How did it happen when we were trying to put the emphasis on the diplomatic effort, and a new diplomatic effort was underway, that these offensive raids were going on on the ground?" the official said Clinton asked.

By Thursday, Clinton seemed to have forgotten the two U.N. Security Council resolutions that the United States had pledged to support -- the March promise to work toward "political reconciliation" and help Somalia rebuild its "national and regional institutions and civil administration," and in June to bring those responsible for the Pakistani deaths to justice.

"It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society," Clinton told the nation, "or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace."

Staff writer Ann Devroy contributed to this report.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR SOMALIA OPERATION (GRAPHIC WAS NOT AVAILABLE). REUTER/BETTMANN; PHOTO, AP; PHOTO, REUTER; ILLUSTRATION, COMPILED BY BARTON GELLMAN; PHOTO, PAUL WATSON/TORONTO STAR VIA AP

October 14, 1993

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1993

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the United Nations and the United States, approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

o We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.

o What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."

o We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would

more

(OVER)

send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 13, 1993.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1993

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the United Nations and the United States, approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

o We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.

o What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."

o We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would

more

(OVER)

send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 13, 1993.

#

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a publication.

Publications have not been scanned in their entirety for the purpose of digitization. To see the full publication please search online or visit the Clinton Presidential Library's Research Room.

**Report to the Congress
on US Policy in Somalia**

October 13, 1993

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1993

To: Mr. McLarty

From: Rod von Lipsey *Rv*

Re: NY TIMES ARTICLE ON GI'S IN SOMALIA

1. Sir, tough issue and disturbing article. My first impression was disappointment with the immediate leadership of these young soldiers. I think that there are two points:

(a) That the reporter interviewed 2 "bitter and grouching G.I.'s." Although more probably exist, these are young men, maybe 24 years old, 20,000 miles away from home, who have had a terrifying (and probably first) experience with combat. They have lost buddies in an environment for which they have had little training. The "enemy" doesn't wear uniforms, is hard to predict, and has the advantage of fighting by their own rules. Their "grouching" reflects a lack of understanding of what they are there to do; that's a leadership problem. These are good kids, and they'll do whatever we ask, as long as they understand the mission. That's why military leaders press so strongly for a clearly-defined mission.

(b) That it would be interesting to see what the battalion commander said that didn't make it into the article. I hope that he mentioned that the mission in which his units took casualties was one to rescue fallen American soldiers; that's an important point and one which is key to his unit's future morale and discipline. If not, it is a leadership problem.

Very respectfully.

Somalia G.I.'s: They're Bitter And Grousing

By DOUGLAS JEHL ✓

Special to The New York Times

MOGADISHU, Somalia, Oct. 14 — Lieut. Col. Bill David could only grimace when asked the other day if he believed that military force could put a stop to the anarchy that has made south Mogadishu a hell for his infantry troops. The battalion commander finally replied that such questions were best left to politicians.

But in Company C, the most battle-tested unit in Colonel David's quick-reaction force, there was no disguising the frustration and confusion felt by some American combat soldiers.

In two months in Somalia, the troops of Company C, Second Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, have spent 30 hours in combat against the forces of Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid. And if battle has taught them respect for their foe, it has also persuaded at least some of them that the United States military does not belong in the role of trying to stabilize a city already riven by warring factions.

'This Is an African Problem'

"I don't see anything in this country worth our people dying for," said Sgt. Kevin Cook, a squad leader in the company's third platoon. "This is an African problem. Let Africans fix it. These people are killing each other just because they can."

Of the 10 soldiers who set out with Sergeant Cook in the back of a five-ton truck 11 days ago as Company C attempted a rescue of two downed American Black Hawk helicopters and dozens of stranded Army Rangers, two were wounded almost immediately as forces loyal to General Aidid ambushed them in a hail of fire less than a mile from their starting point at the international airport. By the time the day was done, the battle had lasted more than 11 hours, and Colonel David's battalion had suffered 24 casualties, including 2 dead.

Those losses were not nearly as severe as those of the rangers, who suffered the most casualties in the battle that lasted through Sunday afternoon and evening and into Monday morning, claimed the lives of 18 American soldiers and left 77 wounded.

Mission 'We Couldn't Finish'

With the United States reaching out to General Aidid, and all offensive missions against him now halted, many of those who less than two weeks ago were pitched in firefights against General Aidid's forces now look back at those battles with a sense of some futility.

"We started a mission here that we couldn't finish," Staff Sgt. Ventura Burjon of Oxnard, Calif., and Company C's first platoon said. "We came here for humanitarian aid, and then suddenly we were trying to build a peaceful country, and that just costs too much money and too many lives lost."

Read - File:
Somalia

P.L. Give
me your views
on this.

Rest
well

Desl

10/15/92

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

File: *Somalia*

DATE: 10/13/93 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ASAP!!

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOMALIA

SUBJECT: _____

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	PASTER	☒	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
NEEL	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BAGGETT	☐	☐	SEIDMAN	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☒	☐
GEARAN	☒	☐	TYSON	☐	☐
GERGEN	☒	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	WATKINS	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
McGINTY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
NUSSBAUM	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS: Please review ASAP re attached message to Congress which will cover a Report on Somalia & provide any comments or edits. The reports will be ready for transmittal around

RESPONSE:

11:00

JOHN D. PODESTA
 Assistant to the President
 and Staff Secretary
 Ext. 2702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 12, 1993 9:52

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Somalia

Purpose

To respond to the request of the Congress that you provide a report on Somalia policy by October 15, 1993.

Background

Congress requested that you provide a report outlining U.S. policy in Somalia by October 15, 1993. The cover letter attached at Tab A will be attached to each report to Congress. The report will be sent to each member of Congress.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached cover letter at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Cover Letter to the Report to Congress on Somalia

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the United Nations and the United States, approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

o We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.

o What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."

h

o We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the United Nations and the United States, approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

o We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.

o What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."

o We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.

o We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

THE WHITE HOUSE,