

FOIA MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2757				
Document ID: 9907968 [5]				
Stack: V	Row: 46	Section: 5	Shelf: 4	Position: 1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. briefing paper	Meeting with French President Jaques Chirac (4 pages)	11/01/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. briefing paper	Meeting with President Stephanopoulos (3 pages)	11/01/1999	P1/b(1)
001c. briefing paper	[Duplicate of 001d] [incomplete - pages 5-8 only] (4 pages)	11/01/1999	P1/b(1)
001d. briefing paper	Meeting with French President Jaques Chirac (8 pages)	11/01/1999	P1/b(1)
001e. briefing paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	11/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2757

FOLDER TITLE:

9907968 [5]

2008-0994-F

ke5956

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9907968
RECEIVED: 27 OCT 99 18

TO: BRADTKE

FROM: KENNEY, K

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 99
SOURCE REF: 9919802

KEYWORDS: EUROPE
SUMMIT
BULGARIA

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL
OSCE
ITALY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ADDL STATE BRIEFING MATERIALS FPR POTUS TRIP TO EUROPE 12 - 23 NOV

ACTION: NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED

DUE DATE: 03 NOV 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF: 9907733 9908032

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *YDE* NARA, Date *5/10/24*
2008-0998-F-3

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

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DOC 8 OF 15

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RECORD ID: 9907968

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>ACTION OFFICER</u>	<u>CAO</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>ACTION REQUIRED</u>
001	YEE	Z	99102809	PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
001		Z	99102815	ACTION TRANSFERRED
001	GORDON	Z	99102815	PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
001		X	99111518	NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED
002	GORDON	Z	99102914	APPROPRIATE ACTION
004	GORDON	Z	99102916	APPROPRIATE ACTION
004		X	99111518	NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED
005	GORDON	Z	99103011	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
006	GORDON	Z	99103013	APPROPRIATE ACTION
007	GORDON	Z	99110114	APPROPRIATE ACTION
007		X	99111518	NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED
008	GORDON	Z	99110119	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
008		X	99111518	NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED
009	GORDON	Z	99110310	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
010	GORDON	Z	99110416	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
010		X	99111518	NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED
011	GORDON	Z	99110513	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
012	GORDON	Z	99110516	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
013	GORDON	Z	99110616	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
014	GORDON	Z	99110913	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
015	KAIDANOW	X	99111111	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION

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CODES:

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FOR ACTION
GORDON

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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By 102 NARA, Date 5/10/24
2008-0994-F.3

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DOC 8 OF 8

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
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 1, 1999

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(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. BRADTKE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILSUBJECT: Briefing Materials for the President's Trip to Europe and
the OSCE Summit, November 12-23, 1999Attached is briefing material and seven diskettes for use by
the President during his trip to Europe and the OSCE Summit.
Kristie A. Kenney
Executive SecretaryAttachments:

1. Briefing Memorandum: OSCE: Turkish-Armenian Event
2. Briefing Memorandum: OSCE: Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac
3. Briefing Memorandum: Greece: Meeting with President Stephanopoulos
4. Briefing Memorandum: Greece: Meeting with Kostas Karamanlis, New Democracy Party Leader
5. Briefing Memorandum: Bulgaria: Roundtable with Students from the American University in Bulgaria
6. Background Paper: Turkey: Turkey and MEPP
7. Background Paper: Turkey: Turkey's EU Prospects
8. Background Paper: Italy: Domestic Economic Situation
9. Background Paper: Italy: Political-Military Issues
10. Fact Sheet: Bulgaria: U.S. Assistance and Trade
11. Fact Sheet: Bulgaria: IFI Support
12. Fact Sheet: Bulgaria: U.S. Stability Pact Participation
13. Fact Sheet: Bulgaria: NATO Policy on Enlargement and the Membership Action Plan
14. Fact Sheet: Italy: U.S.-Italy Relations
15. Fact Sheet: France: U.S.-France Relations
16. Questions and Answers on OSCE

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By VDE NARA, Date 3/10/24

2008-0994-F-3

TURKISH-ARMENIAN EVENT

I. KEY OBJECTIVES

- Demonstrate the benefits of bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Armenia to promote resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- Encourage mutual confidence building steps.

II. CONTEXT OF MEETING

This event presupposes that sufficient progress has been achieved toward a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that Azerbaijan would signal ascent to Turkey initiating tangible measures to normalize relations with Armenia. A Turkish commitment to improve relations would bolster Armenia's resolve to reach a peaceful settlement and provide Armenia with tangible evidence of the benefits a settlement would bring.

We envision the event involving the President bringing the Turkish and Armenian presidents together and encouraging them to explore ways of improving bilateral relations. To ensure the meeting's success, we will need to have reached agreement separately with the Turks and Armenians on a tangible set of measures that the two sides can announce. The meeting could conclude with a press conference in which the President would stress the importance of normalized Turkish-Armenian relations to regional peace and cooperation, and invite the Turkish and Armenian presidents to make statements on what has been agreed.

III. BACKGROUND

Turkey does not have diplomatic relations with neighboring Armenia and has kept their common border closed since April 1993. Armenia professes to desire normal relations "without preconditions," but continues to make Turkish recognition of the Ottoman 1915 "genocide" against the Armenians a priority. Turkey also expresses a desire for improved relations but sees progress toward resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as a necessary first step. In December 1998, Armenia withdrew its objection to Istanbul as the OSCE 1999 summit venue. Turkey's eventual acceptance of Armenian earthquake relief on August 27, and President Demirel's gracious letter of thanks to President Kocharian, opened the door a crack for better relations. The Turks remain anxious, however, not to jeopardize Azerbaijani support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline

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by moving too far or too fast on relations with Armenia. Despite the closed land border, Turkey permits Armenian Airlines to fly between Yerevan and Istanbul.

IV. SUGGESTED REMARKS

To President Demirel:

- Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is important for regional peace and cooperation. It will reinforce progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. I hope you will take concrete steps toward normalizing relations.
- I encourage you to open Turkey's land border with Armenia for limited purposes such the transit of humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan and rail traffic to Georgia.
- Expanding direct commercial contacts and inviting Armenian experts to participate in restoring Armenian historic sites in Turkey would demonstrate good will.

To President Kocharian:

- I urge you to respond to Turkish steps to normalize relations by advancing the pace of your efforts to reach a settlement with Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh.

To President Demirel following a Turkish commitment:

- We welcome your commitment to take the first steps toward normalizing relations at this time and to play a leading role in ensuring a durable resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- Cooperative relations between Turkey and Armenia are essential for peace in the region and for the prosperity of all regional nations.

To President Kocharian following a Turkish commitment:

- I believe you now have the Turkish assurances of concrete commitment that will allow you to move ahead rapidly and boldly to conclude with Azerbaijan a mutually acceptable and durable resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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Q&A's

OSCE: DOCUMENT-CHARTER

Question:

What is the President agreeing to in signing the Document-Charter on European Security?

Answer:

-- Like previous OSCE summit documents, this Document-Charter adapts the OSCE to meet the needs of its participating States as we enter the next century.

-- It recognizes the importance of addressing conflicts within societies. It provides the OSCE with new tools to address conflicts within societies, such as the U.S.-proposed mandate for Rapid Expert Advisory and Cooperation Teams (REACT). It will allow the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations for more effective crisis prevention or management.

Question:

Why is the President signing this?

Answer:

-- The President is signing the Document-Charter because it is important for the community of OSCE states to set high standards for how governments treat their people. This is particularly important for countries which are still in transition to democracies and free market economies. Since the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, Europe has moved from Cold War confrontation to cooperation.

Question:

Why doesn't it address any serious crises, like Chechnya?

Answer:

-- Summit documents provide guiding principles for how participating States should deal with their people and with

each other and identify ways the OSCE can help meet those commitments.

ADAPTED CFE TREATY

Question:

How does the Adapted CFE Treaty serve U.S. interests?

Answer:

- It commits the 30 CFE states to limitations on their conventional arms that will increase stability and predictability of military forces in Europe.
- It enhances transparency, including of Russian stationed forces, and provides for more intrusive verification measures.
- An adapted Treaty would advance U.S. security interests by modernizing the structure of the original Treaty in a way that protects U.S. military flexibility as well as other U.S. security interests and those of other States parties.

Question:

How can you sign a Treaty in which the Russians are already out of compliance in Chechnya?

Answer:

- The Russians have told us and other Treaty partners that they intend to comply with the provisions of the CFE Treaty, but due to the security situation they face in Chechnya, they have had to deploy forces that put them over their revised flank limits for the adapted Treaty. They have also stated that they will return to Treaty compliance as soon as possible.
- Compliance with arms control agreements is very important to the U.S. We are concerned about this situation and have been discussing it intensively with the Russians and our Allies.

-- Under the CFE Treaty and its related commitments, Russia has destroyed thousands of pieces of conventional military equipment.

RAPID ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION TEAMS (REACT)

Question:

What is REACT and why does the U.S. support the concept?

Answer:

-- REACT was largely inspired by the OSCE's experience in Kosovo. The OSCE performed admirably in standing up a 1,300 strong mission in five months. However, that experience revealed that the OSCE needed to make significant changes to meet future challenges more effectively.

-- REACT is a tool designed with that end in mind. REACT will create a database of individuals placed on rosters in fields such as human rights, democratization, policing, elections, and rule of law. When problems in the region occur, the OSCE will have the ability to deploy civilian experts rapidly drawing from specific REACT rosters.

-- This capability will enable the OSCE to do a better job of anticipating crises in the OSCE region and meeting them head on when they do occur with the best experts our countries can provide.

Question:

Isn't REACT just one more example of the U.S. subsuming its own national interests to the will of an international organization?

Answer:

-- The OSCE is a consensus-based organization. It cannot undertake policy decisions without the consent of the U.S.

-- States will retain ultimate authority for forwarding candidates for REACT Office consideration as well as seconding nationals for REACT deployment.

-- REACT will bolster the ability of the U.S. to leverage the resources of the international community to promote greater security and deeper respect for democratic principles in Europe -- a strong U.S. national interest.

Question:

Where do you envision using REACT? Could a REACT Team be deployed to the U.S.?

Answer:

-- We are committed to making REACT operational promptly so that we can begin using this tool as soon as possible.

-- REACT should be utilized wherever and whenever it can have a value-added benefit.

OSCE MISSIONS

Question:

Can you name a few accomplishments of any OSCE field missions besides "dialogue" with the parties? What have they done of practical use?

Answer:

The OSCE has had a number of practical successes. A few examples:

-- It has organized all elections in Bosnia since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.

-- Throughout the Balkans, it has promoted adherence to human rights standards.

-- In Kosovo, it is training police officers and will conduct elections there by early next year.

-- The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) saved hundreds of lives and helped prevent a humanitarian catastrophe during the winter of 1998-1999. Milosevic's offensive of early 1999 should not obscure this accomplishment.

-- In Latvia, the OSCE implemented the agreement for the dismantling of a huge Russian radar station in Skrunda - a project that was completed ahead of schedule this year.

-- In Estonia and Latvia, it made specific legislative recommendations regarding the large ethnic Russian communities in those societies. These measures were adopted, and tension between ethnic communities in the Baltics has diminished significantly.

-- In Eastern Slavonia, OSCE assumed policing responsibilities after UN peacekeepers departed in 1998.

Question:

What can OSCE missions do that the UN or NATO cannot?

Answer:

-- The OSCE is based on a shared set of norms called the OSCE principles.

-- NATO is composed of 19 Western nations, whereas the OSCE has 54 member states.

-- Its decisions require the consensus of all participating States, ensuring that small nations participate fully in shaping OSCE decisions.

-- The OSCE has the mandate and the flexibility to respond quickly and flexibly to breaking crises.

-- As a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, it has proven effective in establishing missions of a type the UN has not developed. It has a proven record of conflict prevention and often works with the UN and other international agencies in carrying out its operations. The OSCE's staffing and operating costs have also proven to be less expensive than those of the UN.

-- In Istanbul, we want to make the OSCE even more operational to face its challenges in the next century. To do that, the United States has proposed REACT - a civilian rapid reaction corps of experts to help solve problems and prevent conflicts before they turn violent.

THE OSCE AND CHECHNYA

Question:

What has the OSCE done for Chechnya until now? What can it do in the future?

Answer:

-- The OSCE Chechnya Assistance Group first deployed in April 1995 with a mandate to promote peaceful resolution of the conflict that had been raging since 1994, and to assist with post-conflict rehabilitation and stabilization. The Assistance Group pursued dialogue and negotiations between Russian and Chechen leaders under OSCE auspices.

-- Its first initiative resulted in a short-lived July 1995 ceasefire agreement which broke down soon thereafter. However, the Assistance Group remained in Grozny to monitor the situation and assist the parties, arranging the May 1996 direct talks between the parties which produced a Russian/Chechen political settlement.

-- The Assistance Group followed up by organizing and monitoring the January 1997 elections which installed the current Chechen government. After the election, it shifted its focus to post-conflict rehabilitation, helping to arrange for the resumption of NGO humanitarian operations, promoting prisoner exchange, monitoring human rights performance, and assisting with reconstruction.

-- Today, the OSCE remains available to address issues such as facilitating a political dialogue; helping to alleviate the humanitarian crisis; and providing assistance after the conflict has ended in elections and establishing the institutions of civil society.

Question:

Why doesn't OSCE have people on the ground in Chechnya?

Answer:

-- The OSCE withdrew its international staff to Moscow in 1998 because the security threat to foreigners had become so grave that the risk outweighed the benefit of their presence. The mission still has local-citizen personnel on the ground in the Caucasus.

Question:

How can you sign a new security charter and adapted CFE treaty if the Russians are already violating them in the Caucasus?

Answer:

-- We have urged Russia to come into compliance with the CFE limits in the Caucasus at the earliest possible time. The Russians have told us and other Treaty partners that they intend to comply with the provisions of the CFE Treaty. They have also stated that they will return to Treaty compliance as soon as possible.

-- Failure to sign the adapted CFE treaty would be a mistake for the United States, for Russia, for all of Europe.

-- Signature of an adapted CFE Treaty by the current 30 Parties completes a two-year effort to update the Treaty to reflect the new political landscape in Europe, replacing outdated Treaty structure based on two military "blocs" - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - with limits on military equipment located in individual countries.

-- The adapted Treaty will also improve the methods - mandatory notifications and verification by inspection - by which the Treaty's parties can be assured that others are living up to their commitments. That means more security for everyone.

-- Finally, the adapted Treaty will be open to new European members once it is ratified by all current parties. Thus, CFE's contribution to European military stability and security will continue well into the 21st century.

-- But the question goes beyond the tragic events unfolding in Chechnya, or any other specific conflict in Europe.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VDE NARA, Date 5/10/24

2008-0994-F-3

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Classified by S/NIS Ambassador at Large Stephen Sestanovich
Reason: 1.5 (B and D)

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MEETING WITH KOSTAS KARAMANLIS, NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY LEADER

I. KEY OBJECTIVES

- Affirm continuity of bilateral relationship and expanded commercial ties.
- Urge support for the democratic opposition in Serbia.
- Encourage support for improved Greece-Turkey relations.
- Brief on U.S. efforts to reach a Cyprus settlement.

II. CONTEXT OF MEETING

Kostas Karamanlis has implied that New Democracy (ND), the main opposition party, will force early elections next spring rather than wait until September 2000. ND has strongly attacked PM Simitis' policy toward Turkey, arguing that the PASOK government has not received anything in return for Greek concessions. On domestic issues, ND has focused on government mismanagement and, most recently, after a raucous parliamentary debate, forced Simitis to withdraw a controversial bill allowing video-poker gambling to obtain funds for the 2004 Olympics. Although polls show ND neck-and-neck with PASOK, a booming Athens stock market and internal ND dissension continue to limit ND's ability effectively to challenge PASOK.

III. BACKGROUND

U.S.-educated Kostas Karamanlis (age 43) is the nephew of former PM Constantine Karamanlis, founder of the center-right New Democracy party. The late Karamanlis was for years Greece's elder statesman, and ended his political career as President. Kostas Karamanlis visited the U.S. this year and met Vice President Gore and Secretaries Albright and Cohen. He essentially used the visit to relay an image back home that Washington saw him as Greece's next Prime Minister, but that visit did not prevent him from adopting shortly thereafter a harsh anti-U.S. stance during the Kosovo campaign. Karamanlis hopes to revive the party which, except for a brief interval in the early 1990s, has failed to rule the government since 1981. His task is made more difficult by PASOK's success in capturing the political center and reviving the economy, driven by the EU criteria for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

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Classified by EUR DAS James I. Gadsden
Reason: Section 1.5 B and D

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- 2 -

IV. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Bilateral

- Appreciate your recent (Sept 15) letter to me in thanks for U.S. earthquake relief.
- I want to deepen and strengthen the historical ties between our countries. Our shared values are supported by all major political parties in both countries. You have a unique ability to improve bilateral ties in the months and years ahead.
- Prime Minister Simitis and I have agreed that our governments should engage in more regular consultations on major issues such as European security, regional stability and the fight against terrorism. This on-going policy dialogue will focus on promoting the unique common interests in our bilateral relationship.
- We need to be careful about our relationship, keep our disagreements private and be as supportive as possible despite electoral considerations. We have too much at stake.

Economic Issues

- We aim to improve our trade and investment ties. Greece's market rigidities, Intellectual Property Rights problems, and lack of transparency do not attract businesses. We are pleased that we are on the road to resolving many problems.
- We very much support Greece's EMU entry and the deepened economic reform it will bring.

Greece-Balkans

- As an EU and NATO member, Greece can serve as a role model for democratic development in Southeastern Europe.
- Greece's leadership position in the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Royaumont and over \$300 million for regional reconstruction will promote economic development and bolster regional political stability.
- Stability in the region cannot be achieved until the Milosevic regime is replaced by a democratic government. We need to keep the pressure on Belgrade and should not relax the economic and visa sanctions already in place.

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- We should support the democratic opposition in Serbia and encourage them to coordinate their efforts. I understand that you have worked with conservative parties in the region. We would like to see more active promotion of democracy in the region.
- The U.S. appreciates Greece's contribution of peace-keeping troops to KFOR.

Greece-Turkey

- The heartfelt reactions of the Greek and Turkish people to the recent terrible earthquakes in both countries has helped create an improved climate in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations; we know the positive trend was underway before the tragedies struck.
- The United States strongly supports the difficult political steps that Greece has taken in reaching out to Turkey. A European orientation for Turkey is in Greece's long-term interest, and will promote regional stability.
- Greece's support at December's EU Summit in Helsinki will be critical in determining whether Turkey becomes a candidate for future accession to the European Union. Your party's stand will be important. We are encouraging Turkey to respond positively to Greece's overtures.
- Our relationships with both Greece and Turkey are a vital component of our partnership with Europe. We do not seek to enhance relations with one country at the other's expense.

Cyprus

- A major U.S. policy objective during the remainder of my term as President will be to work for a Cyprus solution.
- My special envoy, Ambassador Moses, has visited the region and his consultations are beginning to show results. Our aim is an early launch of Cyprus negotiations to establish a bi-zonal bi-communal federal structure.

Terrorism

- I encourage you to work to transform Greece's poor counterterrorism record; arrests and prosecutions should be a bipartisan objective.

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2008-0994-F-3

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**ROUNDTABLE WITH STUDENTS
FROM THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN BULGARIA**

I. KEY OBJECTIVE

- To commend American University of Bulgaria staff and students on their efforts to create a strong multiethnic institution with a focus on teaching the principles of democracy and market economics.

II. CONTEXT OF MEETING

The American University in Bulgaria (AUBG) is the first and most prominent indigenous institution dedicated to providing an American-curriculum university education in the English-language in the Balkans. The current student body has members representing all Balkan nationalities and ethnic groups who study market economics, journalism, democratic governance and public administration. It is, in short, a glimpse at the potential of the Balkans. The current student body president of AUBG is a Kosovar Albanian. He and a Serbian student make up the university's prize-winning two-man debate team. The elected student representative to the Board of Governors is a Hungarian student.

III. BACKGROUND

The first students began classes at the American University of Bulgaria (AUBG) in the fall of 1991. AUBG was an initiative of Ambassador John Menzies and was launched with funding from the U.S. Government and the Soros Foundation. AUBG's administration is American, and American professors have been a feature of the University's programs since its founding. AUBG has a special partnership with the University of Maine. The average SAT score for the class of 2002 was 1329, rivaling that of Harvard. The university is accredited under the Bulgarian law for higher education and has provisional accreditation in the United States.

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During the recent Kosovo conflict, students formed the "Kosovo Forum," which, among other activities, held an auction to raise money for refugees. AUBG was the target of anti-U.S. and anti-NATO demonstrations and media commentary during the Kosovo air war, including the accusation that it is a CIA cover institution.

IV. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

- I know that the last year has been a difficult one for all of you. Many of you have had family and friends directly affected by the Kosovo crisis and I am heartened by the way the student body and the university's administrators and professors have pulled together to support each other.
- AUBG has been ahead of the curve in terms of forging a unified, cooperative South Central Europe. You, who hail from across the region and represent all of the major ethnic groups, are learning the principles of market economics and democracy. You are certainly the future of the Balkans. With your efforts to reconfigure your Center of Excellence in Southeast Studies and to create a new Policy Studies Center that will focus on Southeast Europe, you are working on issues currently at the center of U.S. foreign policy efforts and key to continued progress in the region and Europe as a whole. For their part, your leaders are working with their counterparts in the region within the framework of the Stability Pact to develop strong, integrated economies; democratic societies where human rights are respected; and militaries that, through cooperation, ensure peace throughout the region.
- The United States has made peace, stability and economic growth in South Central Europe a key foreign policy goal. In addition to the Stability Pact, the Southeast Europe Initiative (SEI) and the Partnership for Peace are vehicles we use to provide needed financial and technical assistance to the region.

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- The formation by AUBG students of the "Kosovo Forum" during the recent crisis was a constructive way to examine and debate the very complex and often personal issues thrust under the world's microscope. That was followed by the recent AUBG conference on nationalism and peace in the Balkans in which 80 students from 16 countries participated. I am sure that your dialogues would prove interesting to policymakers and students of the region. It is always better to discuss such contentious issues in constructive fora, rather than fighting about them in the streets and fields.
- Your concern for the community around you is encouraging. I have been told of the tutoring some of your students do for orphans in Blagoevgrad and about the funds you raised for Kosovo refugees.
- I share the sentiments of Secretary Albright, who said in May, 1999, "AUBG and its students are a powerful symbol for the region and a potent expression of its hopeful possibilities."
- The United States is the most multi-ethnic, multi-national, multi-cultural nation in the world. While we have our problems, we are committed to working together in harmony. AUBG is making the same effort in the context of Southern Europe and you truly prove the value of multiethnic education. The United State applauds your success and I promise our continued support.

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TURKEY AND MEPP

I. OBJECTIVE

- Brief Ecevit on status of MEPP and prospects for progress on all tracks.

II. BACKGROUND

The Turks have a small contingent in an international monitoring force in Hebron. They are active participants in the Arms Control and Regional Security working group of the multilaterals, which is now operating on a non-official "track two" basis. They have offered the PA \$50 million for infrastructure costs but are still negotiating the details. Israeli PM Barak's October 26 visit to Turkey was the first by an Israeli PM. He inaugurated an Israeli-built village of 320 prefabricated homes in the earthquake area. He also met with Ecevit and Demirel to discuss Israel's expanding security and economic ties with Turkey.

III. KEY POINTS

- Pleased with continued broad international support for all tracks of the peace process, as demonstrated in September 24 "Partners in Peace" ministerial in New York.
- Israel and Mauritania's recent decision to establish full diplomatic relations is a further positive step.
- Egypt does not support formal revival of the multilateral track until talks between Syria and Israel resume.
- We are working with Egypt to find ways to move the multilateral track forward. We think we can bridge our differences.
- At the October AHLC meeting in Tokyo, the gavelholders of the multilateral working groups and the core regional parties -- including Egypt -- agreed to reassess the situation by late November with a view to scheduling formal meetings next year.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

by KDE NARA, Date 5/11/24TURKEY'S EU PROSPECTS2008-0994-F-3I. OBJECTIVE

- Underscore U.S. support for closer ties between Turkey and the EU and promote recognition of Turkey as an EU candidate at the Helsinki summit this fall.

II. BACKGROUND

PM Ecevit's aggressive legislative reform agenda, along with improvements in Turkish-Greek relations, have allowed the EU and Turkey to resume their political dialogue, starting with a lunch meeting on September 13 between FM Cem and EU FMs. The Turks then received the EU troika in Ankara on October 4-5. EU FMs approved a new aid package that includes up to 45 million Euros in humanitarian aid, 150 million Euros in "European strategy funds," 500-600 million Euros in EIB loans for reconstruction, and a pledge of macroeconomic assistance and increased MEDA II funds.

Turkey's EU prospects were enhanced by the Commission's October 13 recommendation that it be granted candidate status, although negotiations on membership would not begin until Turkey meets the Copenhagen political criteria (democracy, human rights). It also proposed an "Accession Partnership" and "National Program" to guide Turkey's adoption of the acquis. Greece and Sweden are the most cautious on formal candidacy for the Turks. The Greeks are looking for either tangible progress on Cyprus or a Council commitment that no barriers would be placed in the way of Cyprus's membership. Swedish FM Lindh has argued that Turkey should meet certain human rights benchmarks before being offered formal candidacy.

At the October 25 U.S.-EU Task Force meeting, the Presidency reported that, while discussions with the Turks were generally good, progress on Cyprus remained a concern. She reported that EU ministers would work the issue on the margins of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul.

III. KEY POINTS

- U.S. supports Turkey's further integration into Europe.
- Know some are concerned about treatment of Turkey's Kurdish minority and PKK leader Ocalan's death sentence.
- Ecevit government has taken some important steps to improve human rights and seek reconciliation with its

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Kurdish population. Clearly, we all want to see significant and concrete improvements on the ground.

- By making Turkey a candidate for EU membership at Helsinki, the EU will provide a positive incentive for Turkey to improve its HR record.

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2008-0994-F-3

ITALY: DOMESTIC ECONOMIC SITUATION

I. Objective

- Encourage Italy to continue structural reforms.

II. Background

Italy is the world's sixth largest industrial economy. Real growth in 1998 was slow, around 1.3 percent, but inflation stayed low, around 1.9 percent. Unemployment, exacerbated by a rigid labor market and strong job protection rules, continues to be a major problem, remaining just below 12 percent.

Prime Minister D'Alema's central economic objective is to keep Italy firmly within the norms required for the European Economic and Monetary Union. This has required serious efforts to address the two most pressing and long-standing macroeconomic problems -- excessive public sector debt and the public sector deficit. Pension reform remains an issue. The Italian government is concerned that inflation, while still at historically low levels, is rising and more than one percentage point higher than in France or Germany. The government is also concerned about the prospects of a rate hike by the European Central Bank which would increase the cost of servicing government debt.

As one of the United States' most important trading partners, total trade between the United States and Italy exceeded \$30 billion in 1998. That year, the United States was the fourth largest foreign supplier of the Italian market and the largest supplier outside the EU. Generally, Italy has an open economy and the rules governing foreign companies are the same as those governing Italian firms. The Italian government used to dominate industry and finance. Since 1992, the government has pursued an active privatization strategy but retains significant influence in major utility providers, such as the telephone, electric and oil companies. The central bank has influenced the merger process to resist foreign domination of key banks.

III. Key Points

- Italy has made considerable progress on structural reforms. I urge you to continue your good efforts.

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ITALY POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES

I. OBJECTIVE

- Secure continued and generous Italian cooperation for U.S. military efforts.
- Reinforce Italian Government's desire to play a more active role in creating security within the Euro-Atlantic region.

II. BACKGROUND

We cannot bask in the afterglow of our successful cooperation with the Italians in Kosovo. We need to be proactive in defending the privileged access to bases and flexibility of operation that our military has long enjoyed in Italy. The Cavalese aircraft accident -- especially the acquittal of the pilot on all the most serious charges against him -- was grist for the mill of those who oppose the U.S. military presence.

Our opponents also have been able to seize on the U.S. Senate's rejection of the CTBT, exploiting the strong support for arms control measures across the entire Italian political spectrum. Our friends are concerned about what this means for U.S. leadership in arms control.

We need to work toward a "modernized" and more transparent structure of true defense cooperation with Italy. There are many classified basing agreements that have served us well for decades, but we need to move ahead with new base agreements to demonstrate that the United States respects the sovereignty of its Italian ally.

Italy needs to hear that its role in the defense of Europe is significant and important. In addition, disagreement over the exclusion of Italy's largest union federation CGIL (also Prime Minister D'Alema's union, and formerly communist-affiliated) from representing Italian employees of the U.S. armed forces needs to be resolved. And we need to use the fact that, despite its support for "European defense," Italy still prizes its partnership with the United States. Support for Italy's efforts to improve its defense capabilities and expand its modern, deployable forces is important. Further demonstrable openness to U.S./Italian defense-industrial cooperation will promote our overall political and security cooperation.

III. KEY POINTS

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- Italian role in Kosovo intervention was absolutely crucial; it demonstrated Italy's importance and impressive capabilities.
- An even more capable and activist Italy is in U.S. interests and we want to help you.
- Our bilateral cooperation, in the NATO framework, is more important than ever -- we are committed to preserving it.

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FACT SHEET: BULGARIA

U.S. ASSISTANCE AND TRADE

USAID Assistance: From FYs 90-98, the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) program provided \$268M in assistance to Bulgaria, and \$30M in FY1999. Projects support Bulgaria's transition to a market-based economy by helping expand the private sector, developing the financial sector, building civil society, strengthening local government, and reforming the justice and court administration systems. In 1997 and 1998, USAID also provided \$6M/year in humanitarian food assistance. To help offset effects of the Kosovo crisis, SEED is providing \$25M balance of payments support.

Treasury Technical Assistance: Two resident advisors from Treasury provide government debt and tax administration advice. U.S. resident enforcement advisors also give technical assistance which has contributed to the emergence of a national crime strategy, passage of a money laundering law, and development of a financial intelligence unit.

Trade and Bulgarian Economy: Bulgaria has a trade deficit with the U.S. In 1998, Bulgarian exports to the U.S. totaled \$111M compared to \$198M in U.S. exports to Bulgaria. The Kosovo crisis cost the Bulgarian economy an estimated \$100 million in lost trade opportunities, with GDP growth projected to drop from 3.7 to 1.5%. From 1998 to 1999, the Danube blockage and closure of the FRY overland route caused exports to drop by an estimated 22%. However, FDI and tourism were not hurt as much as expected. To address the adverse effects of the Kosovo conflict USAID provides \$5M to the Bulgaria Crisis Recovery Program (BCRP) which provides targeted assistance in local economic development and ethnic conflict resolution to affected municipalities along the Danube. AID also provides balance of payment support (\$25M ESF) to help offset the economic disruption due to the crisis.

Trade Agreements: A draft U.S. Southeast Europe Trade Act is being prepared which envisions duty-free access to the U.S. for most Southeast European goods. Bulgaria belongs to the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), expects to enter EU accession talks early in 2000, and recently negotiated a free trade agreement with Macedonia.

FACT SHEET: BULGARIA

IFI SUPPORT

IFI relations: Bulgaria's significant economic accomplishments over the last two years illustrate the benefits to countries in Southeast Europe of building strong relations with IFIs.

IMF: Bulgaria's relations with the IMF over the past 30 months have been exemplary. Fund officials recently praised GOB and Bulgarian National Bank for continuing their economic reforms and sound macroeconomic policies during the Kosovo crisis, thereby minimizing effects of the external shock. Since its economic crisis in 1996-1997, Bulgaria has maintained macroeconomic stability, including with a currency board arrangement agreed in an April 1997 IMF crisis Stand-By Agreement. In mid-September of this year, the Fund approved the second disbursement (\$72 million) of an \$850M, three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Given Bulgaria's macroeconomic progress, the EFF focuses on accelerating much-needed structural reforms to strengthen the banking sector and privatize or rationalize state-owned industries (SOEs) and banks.

World Bank: World Bank activities in Bulgaria support the privatization of SOEs and banks; liberalization of agricultural markets; and completion of energy reform, particularly privatization of the power industry. In mid-October, the Bank praised Bulgaria's excellent performance on Bank-sponsored structural reforms and is expected to release a \$100M Financial Enterprise Sector Adjustment Loan (FESAL) in December, conditional on Bulgaria's rationalization of loss-making SOEs and banks. Other recent adjustment lending includes a \$75M Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan (ASAL) and an \$80M Social Protection Adjustment Loan. The Bank's active portfolio in Bulgaria contains \$500M (\$200 dispursed), and Bank financing will total between \$300M and \$700M in 1999-2001.

EBRD: By the end of June 1999, EBRD had signed 29 investments in Bulgaria, worth EUR 327M, and mobilized total funding of EUR 1.2b. 51 percent of investments went to state sector and 49 percent to private enterprises.

FACT SHEET: BULGARIA

U.S. STABILITY PACT PARTICIPATION

U.S. Stability Pact approach: Two ideas guiding U.S. engagement in the Stability Pact are that 1) The West needs to take firmer ownership of a process that will lead to transformation and integration of Southeastern Europe (SEE) into the transatlantic community; and (2) Over the long term only private sector-led growth will generate development.

U.S. implementation: Following up on the President's announcements at the Sarajevo Summit, the U.S. moved quickly to commit resources to the Stability Pact. We obligated \$11 million for projects promoting democracy in the region. We drafted an Investment Charter (with the British and OECD), and OPIC began preparing a \$150 million regional investment fund. We proposed a special initiative of the Stability Pact Chair on anti-corruption, and prepared legislation granting unilateral trade preferences to SEE countries.

Good start: The Stability Pact got off to a good start with a successful September Regional Table meeting and economic, security, and human rights/democratization working table meetings in October. The meetings opened a wide range of discussions -- from security concerns to gender and education issues, to opportunities to improve the investment climate -- that will inspire action beyond the Istanbul OSCE Summit. Countries in the region will host the next round of working table meetings during the first months of 2000.

Istanbul Accomplishments: By the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit, each working group will have ready concrete accomplishments, including anticipated agreement on: an Investment Compact; an anticorruption initiative; a project vetting process and date for a regional donor conference; a Media Charter for protection of journalists; creation of a Regional Textbook Commission; a Declaration of Intent by regional states to destroy or secure small arms and stockpiles; and renewed effort to implement WMD commitments. Stability Pact leaders wish to use the Istanbul Summit as a venue for endorsing the Pact's early accomplishments.

Bulgaria and Stability Pact: Bulgaria plays a key role in regional cooperation to transform Southeast Europe. Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania have worked well together on specific proposals for infrastructure improvement. It participates in the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), hosts the Multinational Peacekeeping Force Southeast Europe (MPFSEE) headquarters, and will host a regional arms sale conference in December. Sofia was the

site of a conference promoting trade and investment in the region, organized and hosted by Secretary Daley, and attended by nearly 100 U.S. firms.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

FACT SHEET: BULGARIA

NATO POLICY ON ENLARGEMENT AND THE MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN

NATO Summit Decisions: At the Washington Summit NATO members reiterated support for the Open Door. Further enlargement of the alliance will continue to be subject to NATO's decision that any new members serve the political and strategic interests of the Alliance, and that they enhance European security and stability. Aspirants must demonstrate their willingness and ability to assume responsibilities and obligations of membership, including commitment to Euro-Atlantic values. At the summit NATO also adopted the Membership Action Plan (MAP), and agreed to review the enlargement process at next summit, no later than 2002.

Requirements for future members: The key message from NATO is that future members must behave like Allies over issues such as Kosovo. Performance in implementing reforms and achieving NATO military requirements also remains vital to any decision on enlargement.

Until the next summit: Working together, we want to create conditions under which aspirants (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) can walk through the Open Door. Our goal between now and the next summit is to work closely with all aspirants to help each of them become as strong a candidate as possible by using the MAP process. The intervening years are crucial to this process. Aspirants need to focus on those steps necessary to establish strong performance-based track records, including all military aspects.

Importance of MAP: Aspirants will be considered on merits, thus individual programs under MAP and MAP reviews are important. MAP is a real innovation for NATO. It will provide great help with aspirants' preparations and they should take full advantage of it. NATO has begun work with aspirants to facilitate their participation in MAP, but progress depends ultimately on their efforts.

FACT SHEET: ITALY

U.S.-ITALY RELATIONS

Political Situation: Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema has been in office since October 1998. His center-left coalition includes his own Democratic Party of the Left and others ranging from communists to former Christian Democrat centrists. Over the past five years, the political scene has generally moved away from fragmentation and toward bipolarity, with the conservative opposition coalition led by media magnate and former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. In May 1999, Treasury Minister (and former Prime Minister) Carlo Azeglio Ciampi was selected by Parliament as the new Italian President.

Buoyed by economic growth and a summer tax income upswing, D'Alema recently postponed action on a contentious internal issue -- pension reform. (Italy spends 14 percent of its GDP on pensions, twice the European average.) D'Alema presently is negotiating not only redistribution of ministerial slots, but also a common political program for the March 2000 regional and April 2001 general elections. On external issues, the Prime Minister's leadership of his country throughout the Kosovo crisis was widely admired by his Allies.

Economic Situation: Italy has the world's sixth-largest industrial economy. The United States and Italy enjoy a close, cooperative commercial relationship, bilaterally and within the G-8. Total bilateral trade exceeded \$30 billion in 1998, making the United States Italy's largest supplier outside the EU. Italy has made strong progress in addressing two long-standing problems: its public sector deficit dropped below 3 percent in 1997, the level required for European monetary union, and public sector debt has also been reduced. Real growth in 1998 was slow (1.3 percent) but inflation remains under control (1.9 percent). Addressing unemployment, which hovers around 12 percent, is a top priority. Italy continues its ambitious privatization efforts and has sold or is selling public sector monopolies in telecommunications, electricity and energy.

U.S.-Italy Relations: Italy and the United States are the closest of Allies, shouldering responsibilities in NATO, the UN, OECD, WTO and OSCE. Italy hosts 17,000 U.S. military personnel at bases throughout the country. Following the 1998 Cavalese aircraft tragedy, the United States and Italy have worked hard to decrease the risks of another such accident. Italy's Mediterranean presence makes it critical for regional security and stability in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East. Italy cooperates closely with the United States on a wide range of security and peacekeeping issues and continues to play a strong role in military and humanitarian support operations in the Balkans.

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FACT SHEET: FRANCE

U.S.-FRANCE RELATIONS

Our relationship with France is complex and comprehensive. While we generally find ourselves on the same side of most important issues, differences on a range of issues have peppered the relationship. Through intensive and frequent consultation with French officials we have enhanced bilateral cooperation in many areas and improved appreciably our ability to manage our differences. Secretary Albright and her French counterpart, Foreign Minister Vedrine enjoy a strong and cooperative working relationship and consult with each other often. In addition, the successful earlier visits to Washington of Prime Minister Jospin and President Chirac and the equally successful June 1999 visit to Paris of President Clinton, have underscored the strong friendship between the President and GOF leaders. We further enhanced our bilateral relationship with the signing of a bilateral civil aviation treaty in June 1998, and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty last December.

Consultation remains one of the most important aspects of our bilateral relationship. It is a formula that has allowed us to consult and coordinate closely on a number of fronts and in numerous international fora on a wide range of issues. For example, we have worked closely with France during Operation Allied Force and we supported strongly France's leadership of the Kosovo Extraction Force. We continue to cooperate on Kosovo related issues during the current period of restructuring, with UNMIK coordinator Bernard Kouchner. We are also consulting more closely on a number of issues including relations with Africa.

The transatlantic business environment with France is longstanding, broad-ranging and economically advantageous to us both. France is one of our largest trade partners and one of the largest foreign direct investors in the United States and employs approximately 350,000 U.S. workers. Similarly, the United States is the one of largest foreign investor in France. U.S.- owned firms in France employ 390,000 French people and value France's central location in Europe, its highly skilled workforce, and its excellent infrastructure.

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-- The new security charter will better equip the OSCE to help to protect democracy and human rights and to prevent new conflicts before they turn violent, and to help restore peace and rebuild societies that have suffered from conflict. The OSCE will not be able to prevent all conflicts from erupting, but the Charter provides the organization with a tool to respond more effectively to crises.

-- The question "Why are you signing the Charter?" really gets back to, "Why do we need the OSCE?"

-- The OSCE is an institution of enormous potential, uniquely uniting diverse nations across Europe, North America, and Central Asia on the foundation of a shared set of values called the OSCE principles.

-- OSCE was born in the Cold War, but since the fall of the Berlin Wall it has become our most effective tool for conflict prevention, democracy building and promotion of the rule of law.

-- In the Cold War, our challenge was to address conflict between societies. Today, we and the other states of the OSCE community need to meet the challenge of resolving instability within societies.

SELECTION OF OSCE CHAIRMAN IN OFFICE (CiO) FOR 2001

Question:

The job of OSCE CiO brings tall responsibilities. Are you convinced Romania is equal to the task, especially in view of its economic problems?

Answer:

-- Romania is fully aware of the challenges it will face as OSCE CiO. We have been impressed with the level of commitment demonstrated by Romania -- in terms of dedication of appropriate personnel and resources -- to prepare itself for this undertaking. We have every reason to believe that Romania will carry out its CiO responsibilities professionally and effectively.

-- We believe the coming year as a member of the OSCE Troika will further assist Romania in preparing to be CiO in 2001.

-- The U.S. is prepared to assist Romania in any way appropriate to meet its responsibilities as CiO.

Question:

How can the U.S. support Romania to be CiO when it is not meeting fundamental OSCE commitments with regard to freedom of speech and freedom of religion?

(Background: A 1996 Penal Code retains jail sentences for those convicted of libel or slander, including journalists. A 1998 attempt to amend the code and remove jail sentences failed over an unrelated matter. Many libel suits were brought against journalists in 1998 under provisions concerning "offense to authority" and "defamation of the country."

Current Romanian law recognizes 15 religions; 385 other faiths are registered as religious associations which entitles them to juridical status but not the right to build churches or perform rites of baptism, marriage or death. GOR officials have reached out to minority faiths in drafting a new religion law but concerns remain it will assign the Romanian Orthodox Church status as the State religion.)

Answer:

-- Romania is fully aware of our concerns.

-- In 1998, the Romanians attempted to amend the code that criminalizes defamation to remove the jail sentences but failed over unrelated matters. The Romanian government remains committed to addressing this issue.

-- A new law on religion is also under review. Romanian government representatives and parliamentarians have consulted extensively with many religious communities, including minority faiths. They have also met with U.S. officials and religious leaders to discuss these issues.

- We welcome continued close dialogue on both of these important issues.

SELECTION OF NEW HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES

Question:

Whom did the U.S. support?

Answer:

-- Max van der Stoel has earned high praise in the position he virtually created. When we learned of his willingness to extend for another year, we enthusiastically endorsed his decision.

Question:

Why is the HCNM's job important?

Answer:

-- Ethnic conflict is one of the main sources of large-scale violence in Europe. The HCNM can identify and resolve ethnic tensions that might endanger stability within or friendly relations between participating states.

-- The HCNM enjoys great latitude and independence. Mr. van der Stoel has worked on minority issues in many states, including Croatia, Bosnia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, FYROM, Ukraine, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Question:

Why couldn't the participating states agree on a successor to van der Stoel, whose term was to expire at the end of this year?

Answer:

-- Mr. van der Stoel decided to stay on for another year. He's done a wonderful job. We welcome his decision. We'll find a suitable successor by the end of next year.

OSCE ROLE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING

Question:

Will the OSCE get more involved in peacekeeping operations?

Answer:

-- The OSCE should focus first and foremost on its role as the crucial civilian partner in peacekeeping rather than as an institution that provides the military capability for such operations.

-- At the same time, we need to keep an open mind about the possibility of an OSCE role in peacekeeping in situations where the OSCE may be the most effective and appropriate institution and does not duplicate the efforts of the UN or regional organizations such as NATO.

Question:

What is the OSCE's role in conflict prevention?

Answer:

-- One lesson we draw from Bosnia and Kosovo is that we must strengthen the OSCE as our institution of choice for long-term conflict prevention, including promoting and defending democracy.

-- At this Summit, OSCE leaders created a new tool, Rapid Expert Advisory and Cooperation Teams (REACT), which will enable the OSCE to address issues that, if left unattended, could become a source of instability and conflict.

Question:

Why wasn't the Kosovo Verification Mission successful?

Answer:

-- The KVM was the largest, most complex and most challenging mission the OSCE ever undertook. It deployed almost 1,500 persons to verify the FRY's compliance with UNSC resolutions and maintenance of the ceasefire and perform other tasks.

-- The KVM withdrew from Kosovo after Belgrade refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords and NATO allies threatened military action.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. briefing paper	Meeting with French President Jaques Chirac (8 pages)	11/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo])
OA/Box Number: 2757

FOLDER TITLE:

9907968 [5]

2008-0994-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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MEETING WITH KOSTAS KARAMANLIS, NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY LEADER

I. KEY OBJECTIVES

- Affirm continuity of bilateral relationship and expanded commercial ties.
- Urge support for the democratic opposition in Serbia.
- Encourage support for improved Greece-Turkey relations.
- Brief on U.S. efforts to reach a Cyprus settlement.

II. CONTEXT OF MEETING

Kostas Karamanlis has implied that New Democracy (ND), the main opposition party, will force early elections next spring rather than wait until September 2000. ND has strongly attacked PM Simitis' policy toward Turkey, arguing that the PASOK government has not received anything in return for Greek concessions. On domestic issues, ND has focused on government mismanagement and, most recently, after a raucous parliamentary debate, forced Simitis to withdraw a controversial bill allowing video-poker gambling to obtain funds for the 2004 Olympics. Although polls show ND neck-and-neck with PASOK, a booming Athens stock market and internal ND dissension continue to limit ND's ability effectively to challenge PASOK.

III. BACKGROUND

U.S.-educated Kostas Karamanlis (age 43) is the nephew of former PM Constantine Karamanlis, founder of the center-right New Democracy party. The late Karamanlis was for years Greece's elder statesman, and ended his political career as President. Kostas Karamanlis visited the U.S. this year and met Vice President Gore and Secretaries Albright and Cohen. He essentially used the visit to relay an image back home that Washington saw him as Greece's next Prime Minister, but that visit did not prevent him from adopting shortly thereafter a harsh anti-U.S. stance during the Kosovo campaign. Karamanlis hopes to revive the party which, except for a brief interval in the early 1990s, has failed to rule the government since 1981. His task is made more difficult by PASOK's success in capturing the political center and reviving the economy, driven by the EU criteria for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

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IV. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Bilateral

- Appreciate your recent (Sept 15) letter to me in thanks for U.S. earthquake relief.
- I want to deepen and strengthen the historical ties between our countries. Our shared values are supported by all major political parties in both countries. You have a unique ability to improve bilateral ties in the months and years ahead.
- Prime Minister Simitis and I have agreed that our governments should engage in more regular consultations on major issues such as European security, regional stability and the fight against terrorism. This on-going policy dialogue will focus on promoting the unique common interests in our bilateral relationship.
- We need to be careful about our relationship, keep our disagreements private and be as supportive as possible despite electoral considerations. We have too much at stake.

Economic Issues

- We aim to improve our trade and investment ties. Greece's market rigidities, Intellectual Property Rights problems, and lack of transparency do not attract businesses. We are pleased that we are on the road to resolving many problems.
- We very much support Greece's EMU entry and the deepened economic reform it will bring.

Greece-Balkans

- As an EU and NATO member, Greece can serve as a role model for democratic development in Southeastern Europe.
- Greece's leadership position in the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Royaumont and over \$300 million for regional reconstruction will promote economic development and bolster regional political stability.
- Stability in the region cannot be achieved until the Milosevic regime is replaced by a democratic government. We need to keep the pressure on Belgrade and should not relax the economic and visa sanctions already in place.

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- We should support the democratic opposition in Serbia and encourage them to coordinate their efforts. I understand that you have worked with conservative parties in the region. We would like to see more active promotion of democracy in the region.
- The U.S. appreciates Greece's contribution of peace-keeping troops to KFOR.

Greece-Turkey

- The heartfelt reactions of the Greek and Turkish people to the recent terrible earthquakes in both countries has helped create an improved climate in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations; we know the positive trend was underway before the tragedies struck.
- The United States strongly supports the difficult political steps that Greece has taken in reaching out to Turkey. A European orientation for Turkey is in Greece's long-term interest, and will promote regional stability.
- Greece's support at December's EU Summit in Helsinki will be critical in determining whether Turkey becomes a candidate for future accession to the European Union. Your party's stand will be important. We are encouraging Turkey to respond positively to Greece's overtures.
- Our relationships with both Greece and Turkey are a vital component of our partnership with Europe. We do not seek to enhance relations with one country at the other's expense.

Cyprus

- A major U.S. policy objective during the remainder of my term as President will be to work for a Cyprus solution.
- My special envoy, Ambassador Moses, has visited the region and his consultations are beginning to show results. Our aim is an early launch of Cyprus negotiations to establish a bi-zonal bi-communal federal structure.

Terrorism

- I encourage you to work to transform Greece's poor counterterrorism record; arrests and prosecutions should be a bipartisan objective.

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TURKEY AND MEPP

I. OBJECTIVE

- Brief Ecevit on status of MEPP and prospects for progress on all tracks.

II. BACKGROUND

The Turks have a small contingent in an international monitoring force in Hebron. They are active participants in the Arms Control and Regional Security working group of the multilaterals, which is now operating on a non-official "track two" basis. They have offered the PA \$50 million for infrastructure costs but are still negotiating the details. Israeli PM Barak's October 26 visit to Turkey was the first by an Israeli PM. He inaugurated an Israeli-built village of 320 prefabricated homes in the earthquake area. He also met with Ecevit and Demirel to discuss Israel's expanding security and economic ties with Turkey.

III. KEY POINTS

- Pleased with continued broad international support for all tracks of the peace process, as demonstrated in September 24 "Partners in Peace" ministerial in New York.
- Israel and Mauritania's recent decision to establish full diplomatic relations is a further positive step.
- Egypt does not support formal revival of the multilateral track until talks between Syria and Israel resume.
- We are working with Egypt to find ways to move the multilateral track forward. We think we can bridge our differences.
- At the October AHLC meeting in Tokyo, the gavelholders of the multilateral working groups and the core regional parties -- including Egypt -- agreed to reassess the situation by late November with a view to scheduling formal meetings next year.

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TURKEY'S EU PROSPECTS

2008-0994-F-3

I. OBJECTIVE

- Underscore U.S. support for closer ties between Turkey and the EU and promote recognition of Turkey as an EU candidate at the Helsinki summit this fall.

II. BACKGROUND

PM Ecevit's aggressive legislative reform agenda, along with improvements in Turkish-Greek relations, have allowed the EU and Turkey to resume their political dialogue, starting with a lunch meeting on September 13 between FM Cem and EU FMs. The Turks then received the EU troika in Ankara on October 4-5. EU FMs approved a new aid package that includes up to 45 million Euros in humanitarian aid, 150 million Euros in "European strategy funds," 500-600 million Euros in EIB loans for reconstruction, and a pledge of macroeconomic assistance and increased MEDA II funds.

Turkey's EU prospects were enhanced by the Commission's October 13 recommendation that it be granted candidate status, although negotiations on membership would not begin until Turkey meets the Copenhagen political criteria (democracy, human rights). It also proposed an "Accession Partnership" and "National Program" to guide Turkey's adoption of the acquis. Greece and Sweden are the most cautious on formal candidacy for the Turks. The Greeks are looking for either tangible progress on Cyprus or a Council commitment that no barriers would be placed in the way of Cyprus's membership. Swedish FM Lindh has argued that Turkey should meet certain human rights benchmarks before being offered formal candidacy.

At the October 25 U.S.-EU Task Force meeting, the Presidency reported that, while discussions with the Turks were generally good, progress on Cyprus remained a concern. She reported that EU ministers would work the issue on the margins of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul.

III. KEY POINTS

- U.S. supports Turkey's further integration into Europe.
- Know some are concerned about treatment of Turkey's Kurdish minority and PKK leader Ocalan's death sentence.
- Ecevit government has taken some important steps to improve human rights and seek reconciliation with its

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Kurdish population. Clearly, we all want to see significant and concrete improvements on the ground.

- By making Turkey a candidate for EU membership at Helsinki, the EU will provide a positive incentive for Turkey to improve its HR record.

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ITALY: DOMESTIC ECONOMIC SITUATIONI. Objective

- Encourage Italy to continue structural reforms.

II. Background

Italy is the world's sixth largest industrial economy. Real growth in 1998 was slow, around 1.3 percent, but inflation stayed low, around 1.9 percent. Unemployment, exacerbated by a rigid labor market and strong job protection rules, continues to be a major problem, remaining just below 12 percent.

Prime Minister D'Alema's central economic objective is to keep Italy firmly within the norms required for the European Economic and Monetary Union. This has required serious efforts to address the two most pressing and long-standing macroeconomic problems -- excessive public sector debt and the public sector deficit. Pension reform remains an issue. The Italian government is concerned that inflation, while still at historically low levels, is rising and more than one percentage point higher than in France or Germany. The government is also concerned about the prospects of a rate hike by the European Central Bank which would increase the cost of servicing government debt.

As one of the United States' most important trading partners, total trade between the United States and Italy exceeded \$30 billion in 1998. That year, the United States was the fourth largest foreign supplier of the Italian market and the largest supplier outside the EU. Generally, Italy has an open economy and the rules governing foreign companies are the same as those governing Italian firms. The Italian government used to dominate industry and finance. Since 1992, the government has pursued an active privatization strategy but retains significant influence in major utility providers, such as the telephone, electric and oil companies. The central bank has influenced the merger process to resist foreign domination of key banks.

III. Key Points

- Italy has made considerable progress on structural reforms. I urge you to continue your good efforts.

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ITALY POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES

I. OBJECTIVE

- Secure continued and generous Italian cooperation for U.S. military efforts.
- Reinforce Italian Government's desire to play a more active role in creating security within the Euro-Atlantic region.

II. BACKGROUND

We cannot bask in the afterglow of our successful cooperation with the Italians in Kosovo. We need to be proactive in defending the privileged access to bases and flexibility of operation that our military has long enjoyed in Italy. The Cavalese aircraft accident -- especially the acquittal of the pilot on all the most serious charges against him -- was grist for the mill of those who oppose the U.S. military presence.

Our opponents also have been able to seize on the U.S. Senate's rejection of the CTBT, exploiting the strong support for arms control measures across the entire Italian political spectrum. Our friends are concerned about what this means for U.S. leadership in arms control.

We need to work toward a "modernized" and more transparent structure of true defense cooperation with Italy. There are many classified basing agreements that have served us well for decades, but we need to move ahead with new base agreements to demonstrate that the United States respects the sovereignty of its Italian ally.

Italy needs to hear that its role in the defense of Europe is significant and important. In addition, disagreement over the exclusion of Italy's largest union federation CGIL (also Prime Minister D'Alema's union, and formerly communist-affiliated) from representing Italian employees of the U.S. armed forces needs to be resolved. And we need to use the fact that, despite its support for "European defense," Italy still prizes its partnership with the United States. Support for Italy's efforts to improve its defense capabilities and expand its modern, deployable forces is important. Further demonstrable openness to U.S./Italian defense-industrial cooperation will promote our overall political and security cooperation.

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III. KEY POINTS

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- Italian role in Kosovo intervention was absolutely crucial; it demonstrated Italy's importance and impressive capabilities.
- An even more capable and activist Italy is in U.S. interests and we want to help you.
- Our bilateral cooperation, in the NATO framework, is more important than ever -- we are committed to preserving it.

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FACT SHEET: ITALY

U.S.-ITALY RELATIONS

Political Situation: Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema has been in office since October 1998. His center-left coalition includes his own Democratic Party of the Left and others ranging from communists to former Christian Democrat centrists. Over the past five years, the political scene has generally moved away from fragmentation and toward bipolarity, with the conservative opposition coalition led by media magnate and former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. In May 1999, Treasury Minister (and former Prime Minister) Carlo Azeglio Ciampi was selected by Parliament as the new Italian President.

Buoyed by economic growth and a summer tax income upswing, D'Alema recently postponed action on a contentious internal issue -- pension reform. (Italy spends 14 percent of its GDP on pensions, twice the European average.) D'Alema presently is negotiating not only redistribution of ministerial slots, but also a common political program for the March 2000 regional and April 2001 general elections. On external issues, the Prime Minister's leadership of his country throughout the Kosovo crisis was widely admired by his Allies.

Economic Situation: Italy has the world's sixth-largest industrial economy. The United States and Italy enjoy a close, cooperative commercial relationship, bilaterally and within the G-8. Total bilateral trade exceeded \$30 billion in 1998, making the United States Italy's largest supplier outside the EU. Italy has made strong progress in addressing two long-standing problems: its public sector deficit dropped below 3 percent in 1997, the level required for European monetary union, and public sector debt has also been reduced. Real growth in 1998 was slow (1.3 percent) but inflation remains under control (1.9 percent). Addressing unemployment, which hovers around 12 percent, is a top priority. Italy continues its ambitious privatization efforts and has sold or is selling public sector monopolies in telecommunications, electricity and energy.

U.S.-Italy Relations: Italy and the United States are the closest of Allies, shouldering responsibilities in NATO, the UN, OECD, WTO and OSCE. Italy hosts 17,000 U.S. military personnel at bases throughout the country. Following the 1998 Cavalese aircraft tragedy, the United States and Italy have worked hard to decrease the risks of another such accident. Italy's Mediterranean presence makes it critical for regional security and stability in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East. Italy cooperates closely with the United States on a wide range of security and peacekeeping issues and continues to play a strong role in military and humanitarian support operations in the Balkans.

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FACT SHEET: FRANCE

U.S.-FRANCE RELATIONS

Our relationship with France is complex and comprehensive. While we generally find ourselves on the same side of most important issues, differences on a range of issues have peppered the relationship. Through intensive and frequent consultation with French officials we have enhanced bilateral cooperation in many areas and improved appreciably our ability to manage our differences. Secretary Albright and her French counterpart, Foreign Minister Vedrine enjoy a strong and cooperative working relationship and consult with each other often. In addition, the successful earlier visits to Washington of Prime Minister Jospin and President Chirac and the equally successful June 1999 visit to Paris of President Clinton, have underscored the strong friendship between the President and GOF leaders. We further enhanced our bilateral relationship with the signing of a bilateral civil aviation treaty in June 1998, and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty last December.

Consultation remains one of the most important aspects of our bilateral relationship. It is a formula that has allowed us to consult and coordinate closely on a number of fronts and in numerous international fora on a wide range of issues. For example, we have worked closely with France during Operation Allied Force and we supported strongly France's leadership of the Kosovo Extraction Force. We continue to cooperate on Kosovo related issues during the current period of restructuring, with UNMIK coordinator Bernard Kouchner. We are also consulting more closely on a number of issues including relations with Africa.

The transatlantic business environment with France is longstanding, broad-ranging and economically advantageous to us both. France is one of our largest trade partners and one of the largest foreign direct investors in the United States and employs approximately 350,000 U.S. workers. Similarly, the United States is the one of largest foreign investor in France. U.S.- owned firms in France employ 390,000 French people and value France's central location in Europe, its highly skilled workforce, and its excellent infrastructure.

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Q&A's

OSCE: DOCUMENT-CHARTER

Question:

What is the President agreeing to in signing the Document-Charter on European Security?

Answer:

-- Like previous OSCE summit documents, this Document-Charter adapts the OSCE to meet the needs of its participating States as we enter the next century.

-- It recognizes the importance of addressing conflicts within societies. It provides the OSCE with new tools to address conflicts within societies, such as the U.S.-proposed mandate for Rapid Expert Advisory and Cooperation Teams (REACT). It will allow the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations for more effective crisis prevention or management.

Question:

Why is the President signing this?

Answer:

-- The President is signing the Document-Charter because it is important for the community of OSCE states to set high standards for how governments treat their people. This is particularly important for countries which are still in transition to democracies and free market economies. Since the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, Europe has moved from Cold War confrontation to cooperation.

Question:

Why doesn't it address any serious crises, like Chechnya?

Answer:

-- Summit documents provide guiding principles for how participating States should deal with their people and with

each other and identify ways the OSCE can help meet those commitments.

ADAPTED CFE TREATY

Question:

How does the Adapted CFE Treaty serve U.S. interests?

Answer:

- It commits the 30 CFE states to limitations on their conventional arms that will increase stability and predictability of military forces in Europe.
- It enhances transparency, including of Russian stationed forces, and provides for more intrusive verification measures.
- An adapted Treaty would advance U.S. security interests by modernizing the structure of the original Treaty in a way that protects U.S. military flexibility as well as other U.S. security interests and those of other States parties.

Question:

How can you sign a Treaty in which the Russians are already out of compliance in Chechnya?

Answer:

- The Russians have told us and other Treaty partners that they intend to comply with the provisions of the CFE Treaty, but due to the security situation they face in Chechnya, they have had to deploy forces that put them over their revised flank limits for the adapted Treaty. They have also stated that they will return to Treaty compliance as soon as possible.
- Compliance with arms control agreements is very important to the U.S. We are concerned about this situation and have been discussing it intensively with the Russians and our Allies.

-- Under the CFE Treaty and its related commitments, Russia has destroyed thousands of pieces of conventional military equipment.

RAPID ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION TEAMS (REACT)

Question:

What is REACT and why does the U.S. support the concept?

Answer:

-- REACT was largely inspired by the OSCE's experience in Kosovo. The OSCE performed admirably in standing up a 1,300 strong mission in five months. However, that experience revealed that the OSCE needed to make significant changes to meet future challenges more effectively.

-- REACT is a tool designed with that end in mind. REACT will create a database of individuals placed on rosters in fields such as human rights, democratization, policing, elections, and rule of law. When problems in the region occur, the OSCE will have the ability to deploy civilian experts rapidly drawing from specific REACT rosters.

-- This capability will enable the OSCE to do a better job of anticipating crises in the OSCE region and meeting them head on when they do occur with the best experts our countries can provide.

Question:

Isn't REACT just one more example of the U.S. subsuming its own national interests to the will of an international organization?

Answer:

-- The OSCE is a consensus-based organization. It cannot undertake policy decisions without the consent of the U.S.

-- States will retain ultimate authority for forwarding candidates for REACT Office consideration as well as seconding nationals for REACT deployment.

-- REACT will bolster the ability of the U.S. to leverage the resources of the international community to promote greater security and deeper respect for democratic principles in Europe -- a strong U.S. national interest.

Question:

Where do you envision using REACT? Could a REACT Team be deployed to the U.S.?

Answer:

-- We are committed to making REACT operational promptly so that we can begin using this tool as soon as possible.

-- REACT should be utilized wherever and whenever it can have a value-added benefit.

OSCE MISSIONS

Question:

Can you name a few accomplishments of any OSCE field missions besides "dialogue" with the parties? What have they done of practical use?

Answer:

The OSCE has had a number of practical successes. A few examples:

-- It has organized all elections in Bosnia since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.

-- Throughout the Balkans, it has promoted adherence to human rights standards.

-- In Kosovo, it is training police officers and will conduct elections there by early next year.

-- The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) saved hundreds of lives and helped prevent a humanitarian catastrophe during the winter of 1998-1999. Milosevic's offensive of early 1999 should not obscure this accomplishment.

-- In Latvia, the OSCE implemented the agreement for the dismantling of a huge Russian radar station in Skrunda - a project that was completed ahead of schedule this year.

-- In Estonia and Latvia, it made specific legislative recommendations regarding the large ethnic Russian communities in those societies. These measures were adopted, and tension between ethnic communities in the Baltics has diminished significantly.

-- In Eastern Slavonia, OSCE assumed policing responsibilities after UN peacekeepers departed in 1998.

Question:

What can OSCE missions do that the UN or NATO cannot?

Answer:

-- The OSCE is based on a shared set of norms called the OSCE principles.

-- NATO is composed of 19 Western nations, whereas the OSCE has 54 member states.

-- Its decisions require the consensus of all participating States, ensuring that small nations participate fully in shaping OSCE decisions.

-- The OSCE has the mandate and the flexibility to respond quickly and flexibly to breaking crises.

-- As a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, it has proven effective in establishing missions of a type the UN has not developed. It has a proven record of conflict prevention and often works with the UN and other international agencies in carrying out its operations. The OSCE's staffing and operating costs have also proven to be less expensive than those of the UN.

-- In Istanbul, we want to make the OSCE even more operational to face its challenges in the next century. To do that, the United States has proposed REACT - a civilian rapid reaction corps of experts to help solve problems and prevent conflicts before they turn violent.

THE OSCE AND CHECHNYA

Question:

What has the OSCE done for Chechnya until now? What can it do in the future?

Answer:

-- The OSCE Chechnya Assistance Group first deployed in April 1995 with a mandate to promote peaceful resolution of the conflict that had been raging since 1994, and to assist with post-conflict rehabilitation and stabilization. The Assistance Group pursued dialogue and negotiations between Russian and Chechen leaders under OSCE auspices.

-- Its first initiative resulted in a short-lived July 1995 ceasefire agreement which broke down soon thereafter. However, the Assistance Group remained in Grozny to monitor the situation and assist the parties, arranging the May 1996 direct talks between the parties which produced a Russian/Chechen political settlement.

-- The Assistance Group followed up by organizing and monitoring the January 1997 elections which installed the current Chechen government. After the election, it shifted its focus to post-conflict rehabilitation, helping to arrange for the resumption of NGO humanitarian operations, promoting prisoner exchange, monitoring human rights performance, and assisting with reconstruction.

-- Today, the OSCE remains available to address issues such as facilitating a political dialogue; helping to alleviate the humanitarian crisis; and providing assistance after the conflict has ended in elections and establishing the institutions of civil society.

Question:

Why doesn't OSCE have people on the ground in Chechnya?

Answer:

-- The OSCE withdrew its international staff to Moscow in 1998 because the security threat to foreigners had become so grave that the risk outweighed the benefit of their presence. The mission still has local-citizen personnel on the ground in the Caucasus.

Question:

How can you sign a new security charter and adapted CFE treaty if the Russians are already violating them in the Caucasus?

Answer:

-- We have urged Russia to come into compliance with the CFE limits in the Caucasus at the earliest possible time. The Russians have told us and other Treaty partners that they intend to comply with the provisions of the CFE Treaty. They have also stated that they will return to Treaty compliance as soon as possible.

-- Failure to sign the adapted CFE treaty would be a mistake for the United States, for Russia, for all of Europe.

-- Signature of an adapted CFE Treaty by the current 30 Parties completes a two-year effort to update the Treaty to reflect the new political landscape in Europe, replacing outdated Treaty structure based on two military "blocs" - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - with limits on military equipment located in individual countries.

-- The adapted Treaty will also improve the methods - mandatory notifications and verification by inspection - by which the Treaty's parties can be assured that others are living up to their commitments. That means more security for everyone.

-- Finally, the adapted Treaty will be open to new European members once it is ratified by all current parties. Thus, CFE's contribution to European military stability and security will continue well into the 21st century.

-- But the question goes beyond the tragic events unfolding in Chechnya, or any other specific conflict in Europe.

-- The new security charter will better equip the OSCE to help to protect democracy and human rights and to prevent new conflicts before they turn violent, and to help restore peace and rebuild societies that have suffered from conflict. The OSCE will not be able to prevent all conflicts from erupting, but the Charter provides the organization with a tool to respond more effectively to crises.

-- The question "Why are you signing the Charter?" really gets back to, "Why do we need the OSCE?"

-- The OSCE is an institution of enormous potential, uniquely uniting diverse nations across Europe, North America, and Central Asia on the foundation of a shared set of values called the OSCE principles.

-- OSCE was born in the Cold War, but since the fall of the Berlin Wall it has become our most effective tool for conflict prevention, democracy building and promotion of the rule of law.

-- In the Cold War, our challenge was to address conflict between societies. Today, we and the other states of the OSCE community need to meet the challenge of resolving instability within societies.

SELECTION OF OSCE CHAIRMAN IN OFFICE (CiO) FOR 2001

Question:

The job of OSCE CiO brings tall responsibilities. Are you convinced Romania is equal to the task, especially in view of its economic problems?

Answer:

-- Romania is fully aware of the challenges it will face as OSCE CiO. We have been impressed with the level of commitment demonstrated by Romania -- in terms of dedication of appropriate personnel and resources -- to prepare itself for this undertaking. We have every reason to believe that Romania will carry out its CiO responsibilities professionally and effectively.

-- We believe the coming year as a member of the OSCE Troika will further assist Romania in preparing to be CiO in 2001.

-- The U.S. is prepared to assist Romania in any way appropriate to meet its responsibilities as CiO.

Question:

How can the U.S. support Romania to be CiO when it is not meeting fundamental OSCE commitments with regard to freedom of speech and freedom of religion?

(Background: A 1996 Penal Code retains jail sentences for those convicted of libel or slander, including journalists. A 1998 attempt to amend the code and remove jail sentences failed over an unrelated matter. Many libel suits were brought against journalists in 1998 under provisions concerning "offense to authority" and "defamation of the country."

Current Romanian law recognizes 15 religions; 385 other faiths are registered as religious associations which entitles them to juridical status but not the right to build churches or perform rites of baptism, marriage or death. GOR officials have reached out to minority faiths in drafting a new religion law but concerns remain it will assign the Romanian Orthodox Church status as the State religion.)

Answer:

-- Romania is fully aware of our concerns.

-- In 1998, the Romanians attempted to amend the code that criminalizes defamation to remove the jail sentences but failed over unrelated matters. The Romanian government remains committed to addressing this issue.

-- A new law on religion is also under review. Romanian government representatives and parliamentarians have consulted extensively with many religious communities, including minority faiths. They have also met with U.S. officials and religious leaders to discuss these issues.

- We welcome continued close dialogue on both of these important issues.

SELECTION OF NEW HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES

Question:

Whom did the U.S. support?

Answer:

-- Max van der Stoel has earned high praise in the position he virtually created. When we learned of his willingness to extend for another year, we enthusiastically endorsed his decision.

Question:

Why is the HCNM's job important?

Answer:

-- Ethnic conflict is one of the main sources of large-scale violence in Europe. The HCNM can identify and resolve ethnic tensions that might endanger stability within or friendly relations between participating states.

-- The HCNM enjoys great latitude and independence. Mr. van der Stoel has worked on minority issues in many states, including Croatia, Bosnia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, FYROM, Ukraine, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Question:

Why couldn't the participating states agree on a successor to van der Stoel, whose term was to expire at the end of this year?

Answer:

-- Mr. van der Stoel decided to stay on for another year. He's done a wonderful job. We welcome his decision. We'll find a suitable successor by the end of next year.

OSCE ROLE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING

Question:

Will the OSCE get more involved in peacekeeping operations?

Answer:

-- The OSCE should focus first and foremost on its role as the crucial civilian partner in peacekeeping rather than as an institution that provides the military capability for such operations.

-- At the same time, we need to keep an open mind about the possibility of an OSCE role in peacekeeping in situations where the OSCE may be the most effective and appropriate institution and does not duplicate the efforts of the UN or regional organizations such as NATO.

Question:

What is the OSCE's role in conflict prevention?

Answer:

-- One lesson we draw from Bosnia and Kosovo is that we must strengthen the OSCE as our institution of choice for long-term conflict prevention, including promoting and defending democracy.

-- At this Summit, OSCE leaders created a new tool, Rapid Expert Advisory and Cooperation Teams (REACT), which will enable the OSCE to address issues that, if left unattended, could become a source of instability and conflict.

Question:

Why wasn't the Kosovo Verification Mission successful?

Answer:

-- The KVM was the largest, most complex and most challenging mission the OSCE ever undertook. It deployed almost 1,500 persons to verify the FRY's compliance with UNSC resolutions and maintenance of the ceasefire and perform other tasks.

-- The KVM withdrew from Kosovo after Belgrade refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords and NATO allies threatened military action.