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Original OA/ID Number: 2746				
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9906260
RECEIVED: 19 AUG 99 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: KAIDANOW
HILL, C

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: KOSOVO TWO MONTH ASSESSMENT

ACTION: NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED

DUE DATE: 25 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAPIRO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KAIDANOW
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *DL* NARA, Date *5/7/24*
2608-0994-F-3

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9906260

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001 SAPIRO
002 BERGER
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99081920 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99090708 FOR REDO
Z 99090918 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
X 99101307 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

8/19

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<u>558</u> GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>8/19</u>	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
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99 AUG 19 PM 6:15

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: KOSOVO - Assessment

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

9/10

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SEP 9 9am 6:17

COMMENTS:

Kosovo - Assessment

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

8/19

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SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

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BRADTKE

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RECORDS MGMT.

Sapiro

5 to be updated

99 AUG 19 AM 6:15

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CC:

COMMENTS:

Kosovo - Assessment

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

9/10

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SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL/DATE

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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

SEP 9 6:17

COMMENTS:

Kosovo - Assessment

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6260 REDO

September 9, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CHRISTOPHER HILL *CH*

FROM: TINA KAIDANOW *TK*

SUBJECT: Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment

Attached at Tab I is the 3-4 page assessment you requested for the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo for the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *NARA*, Date *5/7/24*
2008-09944-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 08/19/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo: Progress Report

The air campaign ended nearly three months ago, and the foundations for a peaceful, self-governing Kosovo are being laid. As we approach the critical milestone of KLA demilitarization on September 19, however, key challenges remain: (1) improving the security environment; (2) establishing UNMIK's authority and diminishing KLA control; and (3) providing emergency shelter for all Kosovars before winter. The media has been slow to recognize how much the situation has improved for most of Kosovo's inhabitants since June 10. The longer term challenge remains resolving Kosovo's future status in a manner that does not further destabilize the region **or plunge us into problems with the Allies or Russia.**

Improving Security. KFOR deployment is essentially complete, with over 48,000 in theater and 41,300 personnel on the ground in Kosovo. While the vast majority of Kosovars feel more secure today because of KFOR and the number of violent incidents is gradually declining, Serbs and other minority groups continue to feel threatened. KFOR has taken steps to address the rash of violence experienced last month, which include intensive patrolling, local curfews, and measures to protect vulnerable groups. These actions by KFOR, as well as the deployment of Russian troops who are generally mistrusted by ethnic Albanians, has increased the number of attacks against KFOR itself.

Improving security requires an integrated response. The effective establishment and administration of UNMIK's civilian authority, particularly the continued deployment of the International Police Force (IPF) remain key areas of ongoing concern. UNMIK Head Bernard Kouchner has performed well: although slow to deploy civilian administrators, he has established a Kosovo Transitional Council to provide Kosovar input into decisions. UNMIK is also establishing commissions at the local level to deal with education, communications, governance, health, pensions, transportation, and public utilities. We need to continue to provide support and, where appropriate, apply pressure to

accelerate UNMIK's effort to establish its presence on the ground. Funding shortages remain a critical issue for the deployment of UN personnel.

Deployment of international police has increased over the past few weeks. Initially, it proved difficult to find qualified personnel and absorb them quickly, and we pressed the UN to accelerate the pace while maintaining appropriate standards. At present, over 1000 officers are on the ground, including 320 from the United States. The UN plans to have 1,800 regular police and 205 border police deployed by late September or early October. With Don Grady (U.S.) now installed as Deputy Police Commissioner, we hope that the rate of deployment can be increased further. We are counting on a more robust international police presence to stem violence, particularly against minorities, and encourage Serbs and others who have fled to return. Kosovo's own multi-ethnic police force is also beginning to take shape; an initial class of police officers begins training this week and another 100 students will enter the police academy every week thereafter.

Transforming the KLA. The biggest challenge we face is transforming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from a military organization into alternative civilian roles. We are under no illusion that the KLA will cease to exist on the September 19 deadline. However, we are working closely with UNMIK and KFOR on transformation and employment plans that hope to co-opt as many KLA members as possible. The existence of such by 19 September will help significantly undercut those elements who will try to form an underground army. A Kosovo Corps that would employ up to 5,000 former KLA members to perform essential public and emergency services is being negotiated by UNMIK and KFOR with the KLA leadership at this time. Other opportunities include the new Kosovar police force and counseling, training and placement opportunities offered by the International Organization for Migration. Preliminary estimates suggest that all of these initiatives could accommodate over 10,000 people, theoretically absorbing most KLA members.

On the ground, SRSG Kouchner and General Jackson are in the process of negotiating a tough sell with the KLA, who envision the transformation process as a "bridge to a Kosovar Army." In order to keep the KLA leadership on board, they have had to show some flexibility with our initial "red lines" -- no weapons, no guards, no army. The latest proposal, which Kouchner will brief to the UNSC on September 9, presents a civilian corps that includes a small rapid reaction force and authorizes approximately 200 personnel to carry weapons for the protection of a few senior

Kosovo Corps officials and ten to fifteen Corps facilities. While we work to improve both the terms and the palatability of the UNMIK-KFOR plan, we are focusing on two essential points: The KLA must demilitarize on September 19; and we must find a way to coopt the bulk of KLA membership.

Addressing Humanitarian Needs. The biggest immediate humanitarian challenge is ensuring that everyone has shelter before winter. As anticipated, some Kosovar families are beginning to rebuild their homes themselves, using remittances from abroad. Beyond these individual efforts, however, donors are trying to assist those who have returned to damaged homes to construct one to two weatherproof rooms before winter, and to supply these homes with stoves and fuel for heat.

The emergency shelter program was hampered in early August by humanitarian supplies being trapped at the Macedonian border due to tariffs imposed by the **cash-strapped Macedonian government**. This issue has been resolved, but given the disruption of regional supply lines, congestion remains an issue. KFOR is building a bypass road at the Kosovo-Macedonia border and working to expand rail capacity for humanitarian cargo. However, we anticipate that some Kosovars will need to spend the winter with host families or in collective centers, rather than in their own homes. Broader reconstruction efforts are slated for spring, and the EU has agreed to take the lead on them.

Conclusion. About 90% of refugees and displaced persons have returned to Kosovo, but we must work harder to improve security for everyone by using all KFOR and UNMIK resources available. We will continue to urge the UN to interpret and apply broadly its authority, while seeking to strengthen its financial situation by breaking the deadlock on U.S. funds. We will also enhance our efforts to co-opt, rather than confront, the KLA, but maintain our agreed deadlines and consider carefully how to deal with the weapons issue. Finally, we will fulfill our promise to meet basic humanitarian needs in Kosovo this winter, but at the same time strive to lower unrealistic expectations.

We will also maintain the strong cohesiveness that is largely responsible for the degree of success so far. An unprecedented degree of cooperation has emerged among the leading international organizations -- UN, KFOR, OSCE and EU -- and the key Allies comprising the Quint (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and the U.S.). **We also are remaining in close touch with the Russians.** If we can maintain this strong sense of teamwork, I believe we will be well prepared to meet the challenges described above.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6260

August 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

MIRIAM SAPIRO *ms*

SUBJECT:

Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment

Update

Attached at Tab I is the 3-4 page assessment you requested for the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo for the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *WOC* NARA, Date *5/17/24*
2008-0994-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 08/19/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By K22 NARA, Date 5/17/24
2008-0994-1-3

The air campaign ended two months ago, and we are at roughly the point we anticipated: the foundations for a peaceful, self-governing Kosovo are being laid, but each day we face significant challenges. As we approach a critical 30-day period that should end with KLA demilitarization, key challenges include: (1) creating a secure environment for all the people of Kosovo, including Serbs; (2) establishing UNMIK's authority and diminishing KLA control; and (3) providing emergency shelter for all Kosovars before winter. The media and others are quick to judge our performance, often without recognition of how much the situation has improved for most of Kosovo's inhabitants since June 10. The longer term challenge remains resolving Kosovo's future status in a manner that does not further destabilize the region. That solution will depend in part on whether Serb opposition efforts to unseat Milosevic succeed (the subject of a separate memorandum).

Improving Security. As I mentioned in the memorandum I sent you on KFOR's effectiveness, the force is nearly up to full strength, with approximately 40,500 troops deployed. Nonetheless, while the vast majority of Kosovars feel more secure today because of KFOR, Serbs and other minority groups are now threatened. Although the number of incidents of inter-ethnic violence has remained relatively steady for the past month, there is little sign that the violence is dissipating. KFOR continues to take steps to address the heightened tensions, which include more intensive patrolling, applying local curfews, deploying its Quick Reaction Forces, increasing aerial surveillance and taking other measures to protect vulnerable groups. These increased actions by KFOR, as well as deployment of Russian troops mistrusted by Kosovar Albanians, has increased the number of attacks against KFOR itself.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 08/19/09cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Although KFOR has deployed more quickly than expected, its overall strength will be less than initially projected and some key countries are already considering ways to draw down. Possible steps to improve security include seeking an accelerated and possibly larger deployment of multinational specialized units (MSUs) (e.g., carabinieri) and reviewing other aspects of the force structure to ensure sufficient mobility and capabilities.

Improving security, of course, requires an integrated response, including the effective establishment and administration of UNMIK's civilian authority, particularly the deployment of the International Police Force (IPF) and the creation of an indigenous Kosovar police force. UNMIK Head Bernard Kouchner has performed better than expected: although slow to deploy civilian administrators, he has established a Kosovo Transitional Council to provide Kosovar input into decisions. UNMIK has also established commissions at the local level to deal with education, communications, governance, health, pensions, transportation, and public utilities.

Unfortunately, the deployment of international police is not proceeding as quickly as we would like. It has proven difficult to find qualified personnel and absorb them quickly, and we continue to press the UN to accelerate the pace while maintaining appropriate standards. At present, over 700 officers are on the ground, including 135 from the United States. The UN plans to have 1,800 regular police and 205 border police deployed by September 20. With Don Grady (U.S.) now installed as Deputy Police Commissioner, we hope that the rate of deployment can be increased slightly and that the force will have adequate surge capacity to respond to crises. We are counting on a more robust international police presence to stem the flow of Serbs leaving and encourage those who have fled to return.

Transforming the KLA. One of the biggest challenges we face is transforming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from a military organization into alternative civilian roles. We are under no illusion that the KLA will fully demilitarize before September 19. In fact, we suspect elements will try to form an underground army (at roughly the same time we may get pressure from the FRY to allow Serb security forces back into Kosovo to protect historic sites). Although the KLA is turning over weapons to KFOR, we do not have an accurate count of overall KLA holdings and arms smuggling continues. To encourage demobilization, we are working with KFOR and UNMIK to establish

several alternative employment opportunities and incentives, including a Kosovo Emergency Service Corps (KESC) that would employ 1,500 to 3,000 former KLA members to perform essential public services. Other opportunities include staffing the new Kosovar police force and taking advantage of counseling, training and placement opportunities offered by the International Organization for Migration. Preliminary estimates suggest that these opportunities could accommodate about 9,000 people, thereby theoretically absorbing most KLA members.

We have run into two problems, however: the KLA's desire to control the selection process for jobs and -- more serious -- the KLA's continuing focus on forming a civilian defense organization. The KLA Demilitarization Accord allows for the "formation of an army in Kosovo on the lines of the U.S. National Guard in due course," as part of a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future. Viewing this provision as authorization to form a civilian defense organization, the KLA has already asked us for 6,000 uniforms. We have so far maintained our "red lines" -- no weapons, no guards, no army -- and deferred the creation of such a group at least until we are satisfied with demilitarization.

Addressing Humanitarian Needs. The biggest immediate humanitarian challenge is ensuring that everyone has shelter before winter. As anticipated, some Kosovar families are beginning to rebuild their homes themselves, using remittances from abroad. Beyond these individual efforts, however, little reconstruction will be completed until spring, given limited time and supply, and logistical constraints. Instead, donors are trying to assist those who have returned to damaged homes to construct one to two weatherproof rooms before winter, and to supply these homes with stoves and fuel for heat. To facilitate this, relief agencies are distributing winterization shelter kits to rural villages. Donors are now beginning to focus on urban areas, where there could be up to 40,000 families requiring shelter.

The emergency shelter program has been hampered by a few problems. Until last week, many supplies were trapped at the Macedonian border because Skopje was seeking to impose taxes on humanitarian items that normally receive free passage. This issue has been resolved, but given the disruption of supply lines through Belgrade and competition among military, commercial and private traffic, there remains a backlog at the Macedonian border. KFOR is building a bypass road that will help relieve congestion by the end of September. Meanwhile,

humanitarian agencies are working with KFOR to expand rail capacity for humanitarian cargo and prioritize the movement of humanitarian convoys on congested roads, as well as utilize the Pristina airport. Relief agencies have also had to look outside the region for supplies, which has caused further delays. DOD is examining ways that it can help resolve some of these problems, but we anticipate that some Kosovars will need to spend the winter with host families or in collective centers, rather than in their own homes.

Some Kosovars are disgruntled that donors are focusing on emergency shelter instead of helping them to rebuild their homes, but donors and relief agencies believe this is the best way to ensure that shelter can be provided before winter. Broader reconstruction efforts are slated for spring, and the EU has agreed to take the lead on them. We clearly need to do a better job of explaining to Kosovars, the press and the public our role and objectives, so that expectations become more realistic.

Conclusion. While implementation has proceeded faster than first appeared possible, it also is clearly not fast enough. About 90% of refugees and displaced persons have returned to Kosovo, but we must work harder to improve security for everyone by using all available resources of KFOR and UNMIK. We will continue to urge the UN to interpret and apply broadly its authority. We will also enhance our efforts to co-opt, rather than confront, the KLA, but within our "redlines" and agreed deadlines. Finally, we will fulfill our promise to meet basic humanitarian needs in Kosovo this winter, but at the same time strive to lower unrealistic expectations.

We will also maintain the strong cohesiveness that is largely responsible for the degree of success so far. An unprecedented degree of cooperation has emerged among the leading international organizations -- UN, KFOR, OSCE and EU -- and the key Allies comprising the Quint (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and the U.S.). Unlike the initial stages of Dayton implementation, we have been able to avoid, for the most part, an unhelpful split between the military and civilian components of implementation. If we can maintain this strong sense of teamwork, I believe we will be well prepared to meet the challenges described above.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By ~~208~~ NARA, Date 5/7/24
2008-0994-F3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 08/19/09cc: Vice President
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6364

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Tony:

Thank you for your letter suggesting that ^{the city of} Dayton host a meeting of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe later this year.

I am pleased to hear the ^{of community} people of Dayton remain actively engaged in promoting peace in the Balkans. The efforts of the University, ~~the city, the chamber and others~~ can make a real contribution to seeing that the promise of the Dayton Peace Agreement is realized.

We are now hard at work ^{storing} ~~to~~ maintain the momentum of the Sarajevo Summit and launch of the Stability Pact. However, I believe it is important that Stability Pact meetings be held in the region or nearby in Europe, to highlight the importance the region's integration into the rest of Europe plays in achieving the Pact's objectives.

^{Again,} Thank you for your interest in the Stability Pact. I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress to sustain support for this important initiative.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Tony P. Hall
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515