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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9905803
RECEIVED: 30 JUL 99 15

TO: PACHIOS, HAROLD

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 07 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CORRESPONDENCE ON KOSOVO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

ACTION: BERGER SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 11 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 3 OF 3

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UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9905803

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HURLEY
002 BERGER
003

Z 99073015 APPROPRIATE ACTION
Z 99080317 FOR SIGNATURE
X 99080909 BERGER SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 990807 PACHIOS, HAROLD

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>8/3</u>	<u>See ed. 15</u>
SARGEANT	<u>2/2a</u>	<u>8/4</u>	<u>See ed. 15</u>
BRADTKE	<u>3</u>	<u>8/8</u>	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

199 AUG 3 PM 5:26

CC:

COMMENTS:

*Kosovo Public Diplomacy
 Pachio Letter*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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GIRE

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>8/3</u>	<u>See edit</u>
SARGEANT	<u>2/2a</u>	<u>8/4</u>	<u>See edit</u>
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KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
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BERGER	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
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WEST WING DESK	<u>5</u>	<u>8/7</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>D</u>

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CC:

COMMENTS:

*Kosovo Public Diplomacy
 Pachio Letter*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE up

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1999


Dear Mr. Pachios:

Thank you for your letter and the report by the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. I share your view on the importance of public diplomacy during the Kosovo crisis.

Your past recommendations contributed to our efforts to maintain public confidence during the conflict. Therefore, I have shared your new report with the National Security Council staff and asked them to consider your new suggestions carefully.

Again, thank you for your letter and for your contributions on issues related to foreign policy.

Sincerely,



Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Harold Pachios
Chairman
United States Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy
Washington, D.C. 20547

KOSOVO

Shaping the World's View of America's Foreign Policy

A Special Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

July 1999

WAR ON THE NET

"Welcome/Dobro Dosli," the website beckons, exhibiting a Wanted poster with "War Criminal" under the alternately flashing faces of Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Tony Blair, Javier Solana, Robin Cook and a pig. The side caption invites you to "help L. Arbour sort out the innocent." A quick click of the mouse to the other side's website and you can watch the U.N. Criminal Court's chief prosecutor Louise Arbour announcing the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes. Now, hit the mouse again to view a picture of a distraught young Kosovar girl next to an "e-mail from Kosovo" that reads "I can see people running with suitcases and I can hear some gunshots.... Only the past few days there have been so many new forces, tanks and soldiers coming inside Kosovo. Yesterday, a part of my town was surrounded and there were shootings happening...." Click to a site in Russian with an English banner "National American Terrorist Organization," featuring the NATO emblem easily changing to and from a swastika.

While the Vietnam War was the first major conflict to nightly reach America's dinner tables through the evening news, and the Gulf War the first conflict to be broadcast globally in "real time," the Kosovo crisis marks the emergence of the Internet as a medium for the transmission of information and propaganda from, and to, both sides and indeed the world at large.

The conflict in Kosovo offered American policy makers yet another dramatic demonstration that in the Information Age, wars have to be fought on two fronts — through the use of arms and the use of information.

It showed that military strength and traditional diplomacy are most effective when matched by strong public diplomacy that understands, informs and influences foreign publics in both the short term (i.e., broadcasting and the Internet) and the long-term (i.e., exchanges and other programs).

During May and June 1999, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy examined the use of public diplomacy in the Kosovo conflict. The Commission found that several of its previous recommendations on enhancing public diplomacy in times of crises have been implemented in the course of this crisis. These include the issuance of a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) formalizing the role of public diplomacy in American foreign policy, the establishment of an interagency coordinating body for international public information, and some supplemental funding for public diplomacy during this crisis.

The Commission also found that there are additional public diplomacy lessons to be learned from this conflict, and makes the following recommendations:

- **The new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should be actively engaged in the formulation of policy in addition to the explanation and marketing of policy.**
- **The new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should organize a joint private-sector/public-sector conference to review virtual public diplomacy lessons learned from the Kosovo conflict and examine ways to use technology interactively to understand and persuade foreign publics during crises.**
- **America's overseas presence should reflect the growing importance of foreign publics by having sufficient numbers of diplomats who are skilled in dealing directly with non-governmental, private and nonprofit sector opinion leaders of today and tomorrow, and skilled in developing public opinion strategies and managing public opinion programs.**

As the repeated incidents with Iraq have shown, information plays a critical role in any major international crisis. Yet, the world followed, watched, discussed and reacted to the Kosovo crisis as never before, and in ways that continue to have an impact on our relationships around the globe long after the conflict has ended.

Two-thirds of Britons supported NATO air strikes and an equal number of French say their country was “right” to participate. However, “Yankee out of the Balkans” graffiti appeared on the streets of Buenos Aires. India’s leaders denounced the NATO military action in parliament as public outcry mounted. Officially-sanctioned violent street protests in China kept the American Ambassador hostage in the embassy for days. Africans have compared the size of American responses to refugee crises on that continent. Disturbing parallels were drawn in the Arab world between the Kosovo action and the U.S.-led air campaign against Iraq.

America’s focus on the Kosovo crisis should not distort our bilateral and multilateral relationships around the world. The United States must address the African questions, Arab suspicions and other global doubts and misperceptions of American policy in Kosovo. It will be increasingly difficult to pursue trade interests with Argentina, nuclear policy with India, global stability issues with Russia and other key issues worldwide if the publics of those countries distrust or do not understand U.S. motives and/or actions.

In this age of democratization, of Internet and globalized markets, people have more power to influence and change their governments than ever before. Therefore, the United States needs to take into account the opinions of the peoples of other nations and integrate appropriate information and communications tools into U.S. foreign policy formulation in a flexible, proactive way. Traditional government-to-government diplomacy, military strength and adequate intelligence help to halt ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and create a framework for NATO engagement. But only public support will sustain our policies.

Public diplomacy builds the necessary public support. To be most effective, American public diplomacy programs must be well coordinated and be a high priority in our foreign policy process.

Public Diplomacy as a Central Element of American Foreign Policy

An important step was taken with the signing by President Clinton on April 30, 1999, of Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68 entitled *International Public Information* (PDD-68). It is the objective of PDD-68 to enhance the use of international public information (IPI) as a key instrument for preventing and mitigating foreign crises and advancing U.S. interests around the globe. It forms and instructs an implementing interagency IPI Core Group (ICG) to pay particular attention to foreign public opinion polling and to using America’s information edge in an innovative and proactive manner to affect issues of U.S. national interest abroad.

Despite its recent appearance, the ICG played a significant role in coordinating the public diplomacy response of the United States to the crisis in Kosovo. It took the lead in combating Serb propaganda to its own people by helping to position radio transmitters around Serbia to beam the truth to Serbs. The ICG also worked with the U.S. military to refine international military information efforts and make them more effective.

Although its initial efforts bode well for the future of public diplomacy in a world growing increasingly opposed to perceived U.S. unilateralism, the Commission encourages policy makers to broaden from the tactical view of public diplomacy to the strategic. Public diplomacy’s strategic component includes using public diplomacy to help recognize and understand the implications of policy options before a course of action is set and using public diplomacy to build long-term bridges of understanding between the United States and citizens of other countries that can help weather crises and differences of opinion on specific actions or policies.

In order to move from the tactical to the strategic view, the Department of State needs to make better use of the tools that help us understand and influence foreign public opinion. The consolidation of the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency later this year will greatly facilitate this. The Commission is encouraged that the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs will be positioned to make this happen.

The reorganized Department of State also needs to take a more inclusive view of the various actors on the world stage. For example, during this conflict there has been very little polling about Kosovo done outside of Europe. Policy makers should have the polling information in front of them on whether “Yankee out of the Balkans” graffiti in Buenos Aires is a reflection of the opinion of the majority of the Argentinean public. Although Argentina may be a continent away from central Europe, it is currently a member of the U.N. Security Council, and the voices and opinions of non-NATO, non-European countries on the U.N. Security Council are critical to the success of U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans.

The Commission recommends that the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs be actively engaged in the formulation of policy, in addition to the explanation and marketing of policy.

Building Public Support Around the World

The United States is currently engaged in using the Internet as a faster, cheaper means to refute misinformation and propaganda and contribute timely, accurate information about NATO actions, America’s policies and their true intentions. State Department and USIA websites on Kosovo provide information to anyone who seeks it. It’s easy to sign on to their listservs to have the latest policy update e-mailed to your address. USIA’s Refugee Assistance Internet Initiative goes further by targeting a specific computer-literate population important in this conflict. The joint public/private initiative provides hardware, software and related technology equipment and services to Kosovo refugee communities in the Balkans, Europe and the United States in order to meet their information needs. However, the next step should be to go further still and use the technology to proactively engage foreign publics and help U.S. policy makers understand foreign attitudes.

The Commission recommends that the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs organize a joint private-sector/public-sector conference to review virtual public diplomacy lessons learned from the Kosovo conflict and examine potential ways to use technology interactively to understand and persuade foreign publics during crises.

This use of Internet websites, chat rooms and e-mail listservs on Kosovo made the information campaign highly visible to a certain, elite sector of the world’s population. Although the trend is toward greater international use of the Internet, recent USIA surveys in France and Britain indicate that the information highway still passes by even most Europeans at the moment. Seventy-one percent of Britons and 88 percent of French have no access to the Internet. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have noted in *Foreign Affairs* that three-fourths of the world’s population does not own a telephone, much less a computer with a modem.

This means that in the Kosovo conflict, as with numerous foreign policy crises before it, the men and women at U.S. embassies and United States Information Service (USIS) posts abroad are the ones who make the difference. The illustrious broadcaster and former USIA Director Edward R. Murrow put it succinctly many years ago:

It has always seemed to me the real art in this business is not so much moving information or guidance or policy five or ten thousand miles. That is an electronic problem. The real art is to move it the last three feet in face-to-face conversation.

It is the public diplomatists who carefully lay the foundation of public diplomacy — their knowledge of a nation’s culture and society — to help ensure the U.S. message is heard long before a crisis erupts. And when a crisis occurs, the professional and even personal bonds that have been formed through hard work will help ensure a receptive foreign listener to the message of the United States.

Around the world American Ambassadors, Public Affairs and Information Officers continue to give media interviews, submit opinion pieces to local newspapers, answer questions posed by business groups, and generally engage the people of other countries in discussions on Kosovo. Senior American officials are appearing on nightly news shows in the Balkans and across Europe. USIS Information Resource Centers and American Cultural Centers are providing foreign government officials, academics and other opinion leaders with fact sheets and information to explain the many dimensions of the crisis. Foreign Service Officers on the ground are engaged in creatively addressing local audiences.

This requires Foreign Service Officers who are well-trained in foreign languages and who are in almost daily contact with leaders in government, academia and the media. And they need the tools of modern public diplomacy: Internet access, Information Resource Centers, international exchanges, speaker programs, direct video conferencing, international broadcasting and, of course, sufficient budget resources. We must be willing to pay the price to make sure our message is heard and understood.

We recommend that America's overseas presence reflect the growing importance of foreign publics by having sufficient numbers of diplomats who are skilled in dealing directly with non-governmental, private and non-profit sector opinion leaders of today and tomorrow, and skilled in developing public diplomacy strategies and managing public diplomacy programs.

A Presidential

Commission created

by Congress to

provide bipartisan

oversight of U. S.

Government

activities intended

to understand,

inform and influence

foreign publics.

**United States
Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy**

**301 4th Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20547**

**Harold C. Pachios
Chairman**

**Charles H. Dolan, Jr.
Vice Chairman**

Lewis Manilow

Maria Elena Torano

Paula Dobriansky

Penne Percy Korth

**Dr. Walter Roberts
Senior Advisor**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5803

August 2, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

MIRIAM SAPIRO *ms*

FROM:

SAMUEL MOYN *Sam*

SUBJECT:

Correspondence on Kosovo Public Diplomacy

Harold Pachios, chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, wrote to you about the importance of the role public diplomacy played in the Kosovo conflict, and enclosed a report from the Commission. In your reply, you thank him for his work and the report.

Concurrence by:

Mike Hurley; Steven Naplan *SN*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Pachios.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Response

Tab II Incoming Materials

United States Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy

Washington, D.C. 20547

5803

PLEASE STAFF

7/29/99

July 28, 1999

The Honorable Samuel R. Berger
Assistant To The President
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Berger:

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy submits herewith a special report entitled *Kosovo: Shaping the World's View of America's Foreign Policy*, in accordance with Public Law 101-246.

The Commission firmly believes that the conflict in Kosovo demonstrated vividly the importance of public diplomacy -- the ability to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics. It was not only a military confrontation, but also a clash of information. The Commission is pleased to note that some of its previous recommendations were enacted during the crisis: issuance of a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) formalizing the role of public diplomacy in American foreign policy; the establishing of an interagency coordinating body for international public information; and the providing of some supplemental funding for public diplomacy during the crisis.

The Commission in its special report on Kosovo makes three public diplomacy recommendations; the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy in the Department of State should be actively engaged in the formulation of foreign policy; a joint private-public sector conference on virtual public diplomacy should be organized to review lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis and determine how best to use information technology to serve public diplomacy goals; and it is essential that American's overseas presence be staffed by skilled public diplomatists.

We hope that the Commission's latest report will stimulate discussion among those concerned with American foreign policy about the role of public diplomacy in the Information Age.

Respectfully submitted,

Harold Pachios
by [signature]
200

Harold Pachios
Chairman

JUL 30 15:23

PRESIDENTIAL/NSA CORRESPONDENCE

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

ACTION OFFICER:

Hurley

LOG NUMBER:

5803

DUE DATE:

8.11.99

DATE STAFFED:

7.30.99

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:

☐

PRESIDENT

☒

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM:

Harold Pachios

PREPARE A RESPONSE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S SIGNATURE WITHIN 10 DAYS. IF A LETTER DOES NOT REQUIRE A RESPONSE, PLEASE RETURN IT TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT (RM 379) WITH THIS FORM, ANNOTATED ACCORDINGLY.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9905803
RECEIVED: 30 JUL 99 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: PACHIOS, HAROLD

DOC DATE: 28 JUL 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

NSA CORRESPONDENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: US ADVISORY COM ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FWDS RPT RE KOSOVO & AMER FORN
POLICY

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 11 AUG 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HURLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HURLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
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SCHULTE

FOR INFO
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COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

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DOC 1 OF 1

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5803

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Again, thank you for your letter and for your contributions ~~on issues related to~~

foreign policy.
Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Harold Pachios
Chairman
United States Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy
Washington, D.C. 20547

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

15803

Dear Mr. Pachios:

spell out
Thank you for your letter and the report
by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy, which I have shared with ^{I appreciated}
~~members of the National Security Council~~
~~staff.~~
^{hearing}

TP
The recs. of the
USAC on PD
I share your view on the importance of
public diplomacy during the Kosovo crisis.
~~Your recommendations~~ contributed to our
efforts to maintain public confidence
during the conflict. I have ^{shared your new} ~~therefore~~ report with
asked my staff to consider your new ^{the N.S.C.}
suggestions carefully. ^{staff & asked}
^{them}

^{Again,}
Thank you again for your letter and your
contributions. ~~on issues related to~~
^{foreign policy.}

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President ^{for}
~~for~~ National Security Affairs

Mr. Harold Pachios
Chairman
United States Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy
Washington, D.C. 20547

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KOSOVO

Shaping the World's View of America's Foreign Policy

A Special Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

July 1999

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"We have had birth on the net and sex on the net; now we have war on the net." —The Economist, 5/15/99